GR No. L-30642, Apr 30, 1985 ] FLORESCA v. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION +

Facts:

Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred
to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June
28,1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the runnels... of the mine. Specifically, the
complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and
deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working
underground.

the defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take
the required precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time,
and in utter... violation of the laws and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Government
pursuant thereto, allowed great amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the
mine above Block 43-S-l which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and...
rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level, with the
result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, with the collapse of all underground
supports due to such enormous pressure, approximately 500,000 cubic feet... of broken ores, rocks,
mud and water, accompanied by surface boulders, blasted through the runnels and flowed out and filled
in, in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber supports and
carried off materials; machines and equipment... which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping
within its tunnels all of its men above referred to, including those named in the next preceding
paragraph represented by the plaintiffs herein;

That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said date,
five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7 days; and
the rest, 21 in number, including those referred to in paragraph 7... hereinabove, were left mercilessly to
their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still alive, entombed in
the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant PHELEX's decision to abandon rescue
operations, in utter disregard of its... bounden legal and moral duties in the premises;

That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above referred to, in their Report of
Investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B'hereof, but also failed... completely to provide its men working
underground the necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it had
vast financial resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total operating income of
P38,220,254.00, or net earnings,... after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its 11th Annual Report for the
year ended December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P45,794,103.00 as of December 31,
1966... e Workmen's Compensation has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation
claims for work-connected deaths or... injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not
the employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's negligence result in work-connected deaths or
injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay
additional... compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.
Issues:

"Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the
Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say, whether his or his
heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the... limited compensation provided under the
Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action between
availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages

(actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or
of his other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition... for damages in the regular
courts."

Ruling:

workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or
death of the working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the fault or
negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages under the

Civil Code which petitioner pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless
and wanton negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.

On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the resolution of
September 7,1978, WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid... petitioners are concerned,
it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.

It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of
eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825.000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not... invoke the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation
appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of
their employments. The complaint instead alleges gross... and reckless negligence and deliberate failure
on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred
resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining
whether or not the cause of... action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for
damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the
complaint... recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is not barred by
Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not
administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code,... which defines the "System" as
referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d],
and [e] of the New Labor Code).

Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law
of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:

"Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines."

The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera, ruled:

"Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws... mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since
the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the construed law purports to... carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270,  272-273, [1975]).

WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself

In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provisions:

"A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making
body must be sought, first of all, in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural,
ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious... significations, according to good and approved usage
and without resorting to forced or subtle construction. Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that
the law-making body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar. Consequently, the
grammatical... reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense."
68 SCRA 62 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. CATOLICO
FACTS:

Two administrative complaints and four charges of “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law”
were formulated against Judge Alfredo Catolico.

The first complaint concerned that of the naturalization of 50 naturalized citizens which the the
respondent declared the oath taking of the petitioners null and void. The second and third complaints
which relate to respondent’s dismissal of the cases which have not been tried for more than thirty days
and refusal to recognize not only the authority of the Court to authorize the continuation of the
corresponding proceedings but also the personality of the Clerk of this Court to transmit to him the
pertinent resolutions of the Court. The fourth complaint regarding the respondents alleged bias and
prejudice either in his questioning of the witnesses or in acquitting the accused.

Respondent claims that all his impugned actuations were motivated by his desire to comply with the
rules and the law and, most of all, the best interests of justice which require the speedy and expeditious
disposition of cases. Respondents plead that “if at all there was any error committed it is of the mind
rather than the heart”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent acted with “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law” in the four
complaints charged against him.

RULING:

For the obvious reason that all the facts involved in the first three complaints relate to matters of record
in the proceedings in this Court in which respondent had been duly heard, no further administrative
proceedings were held after respondent filed his answer.
In the first charge, the Court has, in a way, admonished the respondent, adding that they “should not
lose the proper judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they
do not overstep the limitations of their power as laid down by statute and by the rules of procedure”
With reference to the second and third charges of the Secretary, the Court had already reprimanded
respondent for his offense for his refusal to “apply the law” as interpreted by the tribunal.
Anent the fourth charge, the report of the investigator is to the effect that the actuations of respondent
complained of by Mrs. Olaes were not due to any improper or personal motive and were just the result
of the innocuous eccentricities and odd ways and ideas of respondent which could not be categorized as
serious misconduct nor deserving of any heavier sanction than admonition.
While the Court was awaiting said report, however, in a letter dated April 17, 1975, respondent
informed the Court that His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos had accepted his resignation
effective January 11, 1974, “without prejudice to his receiving whatever rights he may be entitled to
under the retirement and other existing laws.” Premises considered, and in line with the established
policy regarding similar situations wherein the President has accepted resignations without prejudice to
the grant of legally possible retirement benefits thus rendering administrative cases pending against the
official concerned, moot and academic, the Court resolved to DISMISS the cases against respondent.
People vs. Jabinal 55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974
Antonio J.

Facts:
The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding
the accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.  The validity of
the conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People
vs. Mapa.
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5,
1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was
without the requisite license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT
appointed by the governor, and was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent,
which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the performance of his official duties as
peace officer.  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang and People
vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his acquittal.
Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless
decided otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed
and subsequently abandoned in people vs. mapa.
Issue:
Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and
Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and
Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
Ruling:
The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.
Reason:
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the
law, at the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned
by the trial court.  It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should
be applied prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine
and acted on the faith thereof.
PEOPLE v. RAFAEL LICERA, GR No. L-39990, 1975-07-22

Facts:

Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint... with the municipal court of the
said municipality, charging Rafael Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle... the municipal
court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from five years and one day to six years and eight months of
imprisonment.

Licera appealed to the Court of First

Instance of Occidental Mindoro.

On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of assault upon
an agent of a person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of firearm, sentencing him to
suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of... the Winchester rifle in favor of the
Government.

Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winchester rifle his appointment as
secret agent

He claims that as secret agent,... pursuant to People... vs. Macarandang,[1] was exempt from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms.

He alleges that the court a quo erred in relying on the later case of People vs. Mapa[2] which held... that
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret
agents by provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.

Under the rule then prevailing, enunciated in Macarandang,[3] the appointment of a civilian as a "secret
agent... exempts from the requirements relating to... firearm licenses.

Issues:

The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be applied to the case
at bar that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.

Ruling:

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted.  Costs de oficio.

Principles:

At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for
possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the
Macarandang rule the Court's interpretation of section 879 of the Revised

Administrative Code formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. 
Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967.  Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an
old rule, the new doctrine should operate... prospectively only and should not adversely affect those
favored by the old rule,
[G.R. No. L-39990. July 22, 1975.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAFAEL LICERA, Defendant-Appellant.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor
Pedro A. Ramirez for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Romeo Mercado (Counsel de Oficio), for Defendant-Appellant.

SYNOPSIS

In the municipal court, defendant was charged with the offenses of illegal possession of firearm and
assault upon an agent of a person in authority. Found guilty of the first charge, he appealed to the Court
of First Instance of the province. The second case against him was forwarded to the same court where
the parties agreed to a joint trial of the two cases but was only convicted of illegal possession of firearm.
Plaintiff brought the case to the Court of Appeals invoking as his legal jurisdiction for his possession of
firearm his appointment as a secret agent by the Governor of Batangas. He claimed that as secret agent
he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People v. Macarandang (L-12081, Dec. 23, 1959), he was
exempt from the requirements relating to issuance of license to possess. He alleged that the lower court
erred in relying on the later case of People v. Mapa (L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967), which held that Section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents
by provincial governors for the requirements relating to firearms licenses. The case was certified to this
Court on the ground that a question of law was involved.

The Supreme Court held that pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of
defendant’s appointment as secret agent, which appointment included a grant of authority to possess
the firearm, but as well as at the time of his apprehension, defendants incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non-compliance with the legal requirements relating to
firearm licenses.

SYLLABUS

1. COURT DECISIONS; PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS. — Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution form part of this
jurisdiction’s legal system. These decisions, although in themselves are not laws, constitute evidence of
what the laws mean. The application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.

2. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; DOCTRINE EXEMPTING SECRET AGENTS FROM THE FIREARM
LICENSE REQUIREMENT, ABANDONED. — The rule enunciated in Macarandang (106 Phil. 713) to the
effect that the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a ‘peace officer’
equivalent to a member of the municipal police" whom Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
exempts from the requirements relating to firearms licenses, had been revoked by the rule in Mapa (L-
22301, August 30, 1967) which held that said section provides no exemption for persons appointed as
secret agents by provincial governors from the firearm license requirement.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EX POST FACTO LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST

FACTO LAW APPLIED TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINES. — Where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new
doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old
rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more especially true
in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any
other it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

4. ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; DOCTRINE OBTAINING AT THE TIME OF POSSESSION OF
FIREARM BY SECRET AGENT APPLIES. — Where the rule obtaining not only at the time of his
appointment as secret agent, but as well as at the time of his apprehension, Accused as such secret
agent was exempt from the firearm license requirements under Section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code and therefore incurred no criminal liability for possession of the firearm, a
subsequent rule holding that said law does not exempt a secret agent from the firearm license
requirement shall not adversely affect said accused who was favored by the abandoned doctrine.

DECISION

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment dated August 14, 1968 of the
Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearm
and sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. We reverse the judgment of conviction, for the
reasons hereunder stated.

On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint,
subscribed and sworn to by him, with the municipal court of the said municipality, charging Rafael Licera
with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August 13, 1966 the municipal
court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging five years and one day to six years and eight months of imprisonment.
Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro.
In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal possession of
firearm and another case, likewise filed against Licera with the municipal court but already forwarded to
the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person in authority, the two offenses
having arisen from the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by the Chief of Police and a patrolman of
Abra de Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or
permit therefor.

On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of assault upon
an agent of a person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of firearm, sentencing him to
suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of the Winchester rifle in favor of the
Government.

Licera’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as involving only
one question of law.

Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his appointment as
secret agent on December 11, 1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that as secret
agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People v. Macarandang, 1 was exempt from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. He alleges that the court a quo
erred in relying on the later case of People v. Mapa 2 which held that section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial
governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.

The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be applied to the case
at bar — that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.

The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears the date "December 11, 1961"
includes a grant of authority to Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In accordance
with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the
right to bear a firearm . . . for use in connection with the performance of your duties." Under the rule
then prevailing enunciated in Macarandang, 3 the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in
the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within
the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police" whom section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirement relating to firearm licenses.

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since
the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the construed law purports to carry into effect. 4

At the time of Licera’s designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for
possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the
Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code —
formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction’s legal system. Mapa revoked the
Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new
doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old
rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more especially true
in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any
other, it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
5

Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera’s appointment as secret
agent, which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as well at
the time as of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession of the said rifle,
notwithstanding his non-compliance with the legal requirements relating to firearm licenses.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. Costs de oficio.
Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Manila
Electric Company, 77 SCRA 469
Posted by ROSSVEEVIOLANTA on OCTOBER 15, 2016

ARTICLE 10. IN CASE OF DOUBT IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF LAWS, IT IS PRESUMED
THAT THE LAWMAKING BODY INTENDED RIGHT AND JUSTICE TO PREVAIL.

FACTS:

The Acting Commissioner of Customs, the late Norberto Romualdez, Jr., said that the private respondent
Manila Electric Company was not exempt for shipment of insulating oil from the payment of special
import tax under Republic Act No. 1394.

The Meralco claimed that they were exempted from paying tax shipment of insulating oil because
under  the R.A 1364 of Sec. 6 implied that the exemption from said tax  equipment and spare parts for
use in industries and also exempts insulators from all taxes of whatever kind and nature. The grantee
shall be liable to pay the same taxes upon its real estate, buildings, plant (not including poles, wires,
transformers, and insulators), machinery and personal property as other persons are required by law to
pay but in consideration of the franchise that the above “exempts it from all taxes of whatever nature,
and by whatever authority, with respect to its insulators in consideration for the payment of the
percentage tax on its gross earnings.”

ISSUE :

Does the insulating oils can be contrued as insulator?

RULING:

Yes, because the insulating oils imported by petitioner are ‘used for cooling as well as for insulating and
when used in oil circuit breakers, they are ‘required to maintain insulation.

The decision appealed from not being in accordance with law, the same is hereby reversed. Respondent
is ordered to refund to petitioner the sum of P995.00 within thirty days from the date this decision
becomes final, without pronouncement as to costs.” It was therein made clear that private respondent
was not liable for the payment of the special import tax under Republic Act No. 1394.

Such a ruling was reaffirmed in subsequent decisions. It does not mean, however, that petitioner should
prevail, for as was unequivocally set forth in the leading ease of Republic Flour Mills v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes. “It is true that in the construction of
tax statutes tax exemptions (and deductions are of this nature) are not favored in the law, and are
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. However, it is equally a recognized principle that where
the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court’s seeking
the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.

The petition for review is dismissed and no costs.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V.
PARCERO, petitioners,vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP
INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 162155.          August 28,2007.
Facts:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, the Vice President of Primetown (respondent), applied for
refund of the income tax which they have paid on 1997. According to Yap, the company
accrued losses amounting to P/ 71,879,228. These losses enabled them to be exempt from
paying income tax, which respondent paid diligently. Respondent was therefore claiming a
refund. Respondents submitted requirements but the petitioners ignored their claim. On April
14, 2000, respondents filed a review in the Court of Tax Appeals. The said Court, however,
denied the petition stating that the petition was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for
filing judicial claim for tax refund.
According to Sec 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code, “no suit or proceedings shall be
filed after the expiration of 2-yearsfrom the date of the payment of the tax regardless of any
supervening cause that may arise after payment. Respondents paid the last income tax return
on April 14, 1998. Article 13 of the New Civil Code states that a year is considered 365 days;
months 30 days; days 24-hours; and night from sunset to sunrise. Therefore, according to CTA,
the date of filing a petition fell on the 731st day, which is beyond the prescriptive period.
Issues:
Whether the two-year/730-day prescriptive period ends on April 13, 2000 or April 14, 2000
considering that the last payment of tax was on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap
year.
Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 Chap 8 Book 1 of
the Administrative Code of 1987.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that when a subsequent law impliedly repeals a prior law, the new law shall
apply. In the case at bar, Art 13 of the New Civil Code, which states that a year shall compose
365 days, shall be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, which states
that a year shall be composed of 12 months regardless of the number of days in a month.
Therefore, the two-year prescriptive period ends on April 14, 2000. Respondents filed petition
on April 14, 2000 (which is the last day prescribed to file a petition.
Garvida v Sales
September 14, 2016
Article 13
Lynetter Garvida Petitioner
Vs.
Floencio Sales Jr., COMELEC, Election Officer Dionisio Rios & Provincial Supervisor Noli
Pipo Respondents

Facts:                   
Lynette Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte on March 16, 1996.
However, her application was denied by the Board of Election Tellers since she
exceeded the age limit. She then filed a “Petition for Inclusion as Registered
Kabataan Member and Voter” with the Municipal Trial Court which was granted
by the said court. Then, on April 23, 1996, Garvida filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San
Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. On the same date,
Election Officer Dionisio Rios, per advise of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli
Pipo, disapproved petitioner’s certificate of candidacy again due to her age.
Petitioner then appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon Asperin who set
aside the order of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. Earlier and without
knowledge of COMELEC officials, private respondent and petitioner’s rival
Florencio Sales Jr. filed with the COMELEC en banc a “Petition of Denial and/or
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” via facsimile and registered mail on April
29, 1996. And, on May 2, 1996 respondent Riso issued a memorandum to
petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving hr 24 hours why her
certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. Also on the same date, the
COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board Election Tellers and Board
of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in
the election. This is why on May 6, 1996, Election Day, Garvida was not
proclaimed the winner. She was only proclaimed on June 2, 1996. Said
proclamation was “without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on
Elections or any other interested parties.
Issues:              
  Whether or not COMELEC erred in the cancellation of her candidacy on the
ground that she has exceeded the age limit.
  Whether or not COMELEC en banc acted within its jurisdiction in cancelling her
certificate of candidacy.

Ruling:
                 
Lynette Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for
candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan.   The
Supreme Court discussed the one year cycle of successive years in construing 
Section 428 of the Local Government Code providing that certain elective officials
should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of their election..  Only
exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency.
Petition Dismissed.
Apiag vs. Cantero, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070 – Case Digest
FACTS
Maria Apiag, a public school teacher at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, is legally
married to Judge Esmeraldo Cantero on August 11, 1947. They have two
daughters namely Teresita A. Cantero and Glicerio Cantero. 
On September 21, 1993, complainants, through Atty. Redentor G. Guyala, wrote a
letter to Judge Cantero however there is no action or response from the
respondent. Subsequently, complainants learned that respondent Judge had
another family: the wife’s name is Nieves C. Ygay, a Public School teacher from
Tagao, Pinamungajan, Cebu with five (5) children namely: Noralyn Y. Cantero;
Ellen Y. Cantero; Erwin Y. Cantero; Onofre Y. Cantero; and Desirie Vic Y. Cantero
wherein in all of the public documents, Judge Cantero misrepresented himself as
being married to Nieves C. Ygay, with whom he contracted a second marriage.
Judge Cantero denied the validity of his marriage to Maria Apiag because it was
only dramatized just to shot the wishes and purpose of their parents without his
free will. He added “As a matter of fact, I was only called by my parents to go
home to our town at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to attend party celebration of
my sister’s birthday from Iligan City, without patently knowing I was made to
appear (in) a certain drama marriage and we were forced to acknowledge our
signatures appearing in the duly prepared marriage contract(.) That was 46 years
ago when I was yet 20 years of age, and at my second-year high school days.” 
However, before the marriage, they were engaged in a lovely affair which
resulted in Maria Apiag’s pregnancy in the name of Teresita Apiag now Mrs.
Teresita Sacurom, one of the complainants. In order to save the name and shame,
the parents of both the respondent and the complainant came to an agreement
to allow them to get married in the name, but not to live together as husband and
wife. In addition, after the said affair, both will be immediately separated from
each other without living together as husband and wife even for a day, nor having
established a conjugal home. Afterwhich, they have never met each other nor
having communication for the last forty years (40) years.
ISSUE
Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary to declare
the prior marriage void.

RULING
Yes, as per current jurisprudence, “a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact” before any party thereto “can marry again; otherwise,
the second marriage will also be void.” This was expressly provided under Article
40 of the Family Code. 
However, the marriage of Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their
children were born before the promulgation of Wiegel vs. SempioDiy and before
the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante
applies in favor of the respondent. 
On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not prosper either because it is
based on a finding of guilt in the bigamy charge. Since, as shown in the preceding
discussion, the bigamy charge cannot stand, so too must the accusation of
falsification fail. Furthermore, the respondent judge’s belief in good faith that his
first marriage was void shows his lack of malice in filling up these public
documents, a valid defense in a charge of falsification of public documents, which
must be appreciated in his favor.
Miciano vs Brimo
TITLE: Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo
CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867

FACTS:

Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of

partition.  Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo)
opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance.  Joseph Brimo is a Turkish
citizen.

ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution
of Joseph Brimo’s estates.

HELD:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be
made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine
Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as
not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.  Impossible conditions
are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals.  Thus, national law of
the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
Persons Case Digest: Bellis Vs Bellis

Bellis vs Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678            June 6, 1967

Lessons Applicable: Divorce, Doctrine of Processual Presumption

Laws Applicable: Art. 16, 17 1039 NCC

Violet Kennedy (2nd wife) ß Amos G. Bellis --- Mary E. Mallen (1st wife)

Legitimate Children:                                      Legitimate Children:
Edward A. Bellis                                            Amos Bellis, Jr.                              
George Bellis (pre-deceased)                         Maria Cristina Bellis       
Henry A. Bellis                                              Miriam Palma Bellis
Alexander Bellis
Anna Bellis Allsman

FACTS:
 Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
 By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy),
Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman
 By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis
 August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines dividing his
estate as follows:
1.    $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen
2.    P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis
3.    remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second
wives
 July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A
 September 15, 1958: his will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila
on
 People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the will did as the will
directed
 Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children
 Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national
law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide
for legitimes.

ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity
of the will
HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed
 Doctrine of Processual Presumption:
 The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the
proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be
exactly the same as the law of the forum.
 In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from ours.  Apply Philippine laws.
 Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
(d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
 ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
 ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
 The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy
of Amos G. Bellis.
CASE DIGEST: BELLIS VS. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)
Testate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis, et al
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had
five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate
children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate
children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the
remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children.  The
appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they
have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to
the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine
estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate
wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of
the illegitimate children’s successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national
law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those
matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national
law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic
validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does
not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the
legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the
legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.
. DIGEST: TENCHAVEZ V.  ESCAÑO
Civil Law | Divorce | Legal Separation
Plaintiff-Appellant:  Pastor B. Tenchavez
Defendants-Appellees: Vicenta F. Escaño, et al.
15 SCRA 355
G.R. No. L-19671
November 29, 1965
Ponente: J. J.B.L. Reyes

FACTS:
Pastor and Vicenta entered into a secret marriage before a Catholic chaplain.
Upon discovery of their daughter’s marriage, spouses Mamerto and Mena sought
priestly advice where it was suggested that the marriage be recelebrated.
However, the recelebration did not take place and the newlyweds eventually
became estranged. Later, unknown to Pastor, Vicenta left for the United States.
There, she filed a complaint for divorce on the ground of extreme mental cruelty,
and an absolute divorce was granted by the Court of Nevada. She later sought for
the annulment of her marriage from the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta eventually
married an American in Nevada and acquired American citizenship.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Vicenta
and her parents whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged their
daughter from joining him and alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church for having decreed the annulment of the marriage. He asked for
legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
Vicenta claims a valid divorce from Tenchavez and an equally valid marriage to
her American husband; while her parents filed a counterclaim for moral damages,
denying that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts.
The trial court did not decree a legal separation but freed Tenchavez from
supporting his wife and to acquire property to her exclusion. It granted the
counterclaim of the Españo spouses for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees against Tenchavez, to the extent of P45,000.00. Thus, he filed a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the divorce obtained by Vicenta abroad was valid and binding
in the Philippines;
2.) Whether or not Tenchavez is entitled to legal separation and to moral
damages.
RULING:
1.) No.  The Court held that under Philippine law, the valid marriage between
Tenchavez and Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved notwithstanding the
decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained in Nevada. Article 15
of the Civil Code of the Philippines which was already in force at the time expressly
provided that “Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.” Here, at the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta,
like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then still subject to Philippine
law, which does not admit absolute divorce. Thus, under Philippine law, the
divorce was invalid.
2.) Yes.  The Court ruled that it can be gleaned from the facts and considerations
that Tenchavez is entitled to a decree of legal separation on the basis of adultery
as provided under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code. Since our jurisdiction does
not recognize Vicenta’s divorce and second marriage as valid, her marriage and
cohabitation with the American is technically “intercourse with a person not her
husband” from the standpoint of Philippine Law. Her refusal to perform her wifely
duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband also
constitute in law a wrong for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity. Thus, the latter is entitled to a decree of legal separation conformably
to Philippine law.
As to moral damages the Court assessed Tenchavez’s claim for a million pesos as
unreasonable, taking into account some considerations. First, the marriage was
celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue
humiliation on his part. Second, the parties never lived together. Third, there is
evidence that Tenchavez had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage,
although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy. Fourth,
the fact that Tenchavez is unable to remarry under our law is a consequence of
the indissoluble character of the union that he entered into voluntarily and with
open eyes. Therefore, he should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages
and attorney’s fees.