Dominos Report
Dominos Report
Dominos Report
Domino’s Pizza
Team B6
December 14, 2010
“On my honor, I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid in completing this academic
work.”
Tai Adkins
Vanessa Bailey
Ben Schmidt
Joe Ypma
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. 3
BUSINESS SEGMENTS ................................................................................................................ 3
ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 4
Revenue....................................................................................................................................... 4
Cost of Goods Sold ..................................................................................................................... 5
Financial Ratios........................................................................................................................... 5
Inventory Accounting ................................................................................................................. 6
Allowance for Uncollectible Receivables ................................................................................... 6
Long-lived and Intangible Assets................................................................................................ 6
Capital Structure ......................................................................................................................... 7
DCF Valuation ............................................................................................................................ 8
MARKETING ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................ 9
Competitive Analysis ................................................................................................................ 10
Customer Analysis & Market Segmentation............................................................................. 10
Positioning & Marketing Mix ................................................................................................... 10
OPPORTUNITIES FOR GROWTH ............................................................................................. 11
Developing a Loyalty Program ................................................................................................. 11
Increased Expansion in China ................................................................................................... 12
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 12
Page 2 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Domestically, Domino’s faces highly competitive markets and challenges from Pizza
Hut, Papa John’s and various local/regional competitors. Internationally, opportunities abound
but Domino’s faces the challenge of converting customers to its quick-service model. Even with
these challenges, Domino’s has generated fairly consistent Net Operating Income (NOI) over the
past decade. This steady NOI has been necessary to service the high level of debt with which
Domino’s is financed. Domino’s has nearly $1.5 billion in debt on approximately $450 million
of assets. As such, Domino’s carries a negative balance in Retained Earnings and a Stockholders’
Deficit. Servicing and paying down its debt will be central to Domino’s again achieving positive
shareholder equity. In the face of its debt, Domino’s has undertaken several initiatives to grow
NOI, including successfully launching a revamped pizza product and increasing its international
program for its domestic customers and as well as broader expansion into China.
BUSINESS SEGMENTS
chain and international. See Appendix A for a breakdown of revenues by business segment.
Domestic Stores – Domino’s franchises 4,461 stores and owns an additional 466 stores.
approximately 35% of total revenues. While domestic franchise fees have been a
consistent 11% of total revenues for the past decade, revenues from domestic company-
owned stores have been decreasing as a percentage of total revenue, from nearly 30% of
Domestic Supply Chain – Domino’s supply chain generated revenues of $763.7 million in
FY 2009, which were approximately 54% of total revenues. Domestic supply chain
Page 3 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
contains 16 dough manufacturing and food centers, one thin crust manufacturing center
and one vegetable-processing center. These facilities manufacture dough and distribute
food supplies to all company stores and to 99% of domestic franchised stores.
markets. Domino’s international supply chain also contains six dough manufacturing and
supply centers. Together, the international business for Domino’s generated revenues of
percentage of total revenue, international revenues have been steadily increasing, from
an operating margin of 45%-55% versus only 20% for domestic company-owned stores.
As of 3Q FY 2010, Domino’s international store count was 46% of its total store count,
most of which are operated under master franchise agreements with large companies that
own many stores. For example, Higa Industries Co., Ltd., the Japanese master
franchisee, operates 179 stores in Japan. See Appendix B for a list of the largest
Revenue
For the first time since FY 2006, both domestic and international revenues are growing
effect generated by increased marketing and its revamped pizza product, but management also
Revenues fluctuate from time to time as a result of store count changes. Retail sales from
company-owned stores are recognized when items are delivered to or carried out by customers,
while revenue from franchisees are determined and paid to Domino’s weekly based on a
Page 4 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
percentage of retail sales (generally 5.5%). Domino’s will record royalty revenues based on an
estimate of the franchisee’s sales when figures are not timely reported by franchisees, and these
Domino’s business remains subject to price fluctuations for its commodity ingredients,
especially cheese and red hard wheat. While these prices increase the cost of goods sold for
Domino’s company-owned stores, Domino’s receives some benefit of higher ingredient prices in
the form of higher revenues for its supply chain operation. Domino’s has a five-year contract
with its largest cheese supplier and does not use derivative instruments to hedge its costs for
commodity ingredients. While prices are not hedged, operating margins have remained
Financial Ratios
$1.242 billion. This capital structure is quite atypical, not only for its industry but also generally.
Domino’s competitor Papa John’s, for example, at the end of its FY 2009 held assets of
approximately $359 million against liabilities of approximately $212 million for total
compared to Papa John’s 0.25, and Domino’s debt-to-equity ratio is (1.19) as compared to Papa
John’s 0.53. The difference in these numbers is primarily due to Domino’s debt.
Due to its large stockholders’ deficit and highly leveraged capital structure, Domino’s
measures of profitability can be hard to interpret. On one hand, over the past year Domino’s
return on equity was (6.6)% as compared to 27.8% for Papa John’s. On the other hand, over the
past year Domino’s had a gross margin of 27.8% versus 27.4% for Papa John’s, and Domino’s
had a return on assets of 20.1% as compared to 13.6% for Papa John’s. Further, Domino’s asset
Page 5 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
turnover ratio of 3.57 compares favorably to 2.76 for Papa John’s. Each of these measures
reflects Domino’s ability to generate high levels of sales from minimal assets. As well, Domino’s
has a relatively low level of short-term debt. Domino’s current ratio is 1.65 and it has a working
capital surplus of $104.1 million. Domino’s is positioned well to cover its short-term obligations.
Inventory Accounting
inventories, which is common among QSRs. As previously mentioned, Domino’s does not
currently use derivative instruments to hedge against changes in prices for ingredients.
experience and a review by aging categories. At the end of its FY 2009, Domino’s allowance for
Domino’s records at cost its long-lived assets, including PP&E and capitalized software.
Domino’s depreciates and amortizes these costs using a straight-line method. For acquisitions of
franchisee operations, Domino’s estimates the fair values of the assets and liabilities acquired
based on a physical inspection of assets, historical experience and other information available.
Domino’s goodwill amounts are primarily related to franchise store acquisitions and are not
amortized. Domino’s performs impairment tests in Q4 of each fiscal year and did not recognize
any impairment charges for long-lived or intangible assets in FYs 2007, 2008 or 2009. Domino’s
reduced its goodwill by approximately $3.1 million in FY 2008 and by $300,000 in FY 2009 due
Page 6 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
Capital Structure
Domino’s completed an initial public offering of its stock on July 16, 2004, though it sold
only a portion of its company. As of FY 2009, Bain Capital (which purchased 93% of the
company from founder Tom Monaghan in 1998) remains the largest shareholder of Domino’s.
approximately $1.7 billion in long-term debt and repaid all of its then-existing long-term debt.
Domino’s used part of the recapitalization proceeds to pay common shareholders a special
dividend of $13.50 per share. First priority of cash collected is given to repayment of interest on
the long-term debt. Cash is segregated weekly and accounted for as restricted cash.
The recapitalization debt was securitized and syndicated after issuance. As well,
Domino’s insures all principal and interest obligations under the Class A-2 Notes and Variable
Funding Notes. Premium payments on these insurance policies are accounted for as additional
interest expense. Financing costs associated with the recapitalization have been capitalized and
Since the recapitalization, Domino’s has retired approximately $290 million of long-term
debt while drawing $60 million of its previously untapped Variable Funding Notes. Thus,
As indicated above, Domino’s can extend the maturity of its Fixed Rate Notes to April
2014 if the Company maintains a certain debt service coverage ratio (DSCR). As of 3Q 2010,
management indicates that the Company continues to exceed the required DSCR. Management
Page 7 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
has also indicated that it intends to take advantage of the full extension period, though it will
A typical DSCR measures the ability of a company’s cash flow to cover all debt
payments. A proxy for the exact ratio can be determined by comparing NOI to debt service. The
relatively steady NOI that Domino’s generates year-over-year makes it possible to take on a high
level of debt while remaining in compliance with its DSCR. Since the 2007 recapitalization,
Domino’s has been making a concerted effort to reduce the principal amount of its debt, which in
turn reduces interest expense. By reducing interest expense, Domino’s is able to increase its
DSCR for the same level of operating performance and reduce the possibility of triggering a
The Company’s steady performance justifies further refinancing of the debt. We feel
Domino’s will likely be able to negotiate some extension of its current loan terms, although
perhaps at a slightly higher effective interest rate that the Company is currently paying. If not,
Domino’s could be forced to file for bankruptcy. We consider bankruptcy unlikely, as it benefits
neither the bondholders nor equity holders so long as operating performance remains steady.
DCF Valuation
of-capital (WACC). Using weekly returns for DPZ shares from Domino’s IPO in July 2004
through present, and using the S&P 500 as a proxy for market returns, we determined Domino’s
beta (β) to be approximately 1.17. We used a risk-free rate of 3.3%, based on the 10-year
Treasury bond yield. We assumed an equity risk premium of 9.2% based on historical averages.
Page 8 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
Using Domino’s market debt-to-equity ratio of 162% (i.e., debt of approximately $1.5 billion and
WACC of 7.2%. Using WACC, we built a discounted cash flow model of Domino’s projected
free cash flow to the firm through 2015 and determined a value for Domino’s of $1.732 billion.
Given Domino’s long-term debt of $1.47 billion, equity holders have claim to
approximately $1.732 less 1.47 billion = $262 million of the firm’s value. With a weighted
average of 60.5 million shares outstanding through 3Q FY 2010, the share price of Domino’s
should be about $4.32 per share. While this is far lower than the $15.40 per share price at which
Domino’s most recently closed, the difference is likely to due to two factors. First, investors may
be expecting another special dividend when Domino’s again restructures its long-term debt in
2012 or 2014. Secondly, Domino’s investors are likely expecting growth. If one assumes that
Domino’s free cash flow will grow in the long term rather than remain constant, the terminal
value component of Domino’s share price increases. A long-term growth rate of 2.5%, for
example, will generate a share price of $15.23 per share, which is about the same price at which
DPZ most recently closed. Achieving 2.5% long-term growth for a company with the maturity of
Domino’s is realistic, so we feel the market is pricing DPZ stock relatively fairly. At the same
time, future long-term growth is vital to justifying the share price at which DPZ is currently
trading, so Domino’s must continue to seek new ways to achieve this expected growth.
MARKETING ANALYSIS
Future growth for Domino’s can be optimized with smart marketing decisions. To assess
Domino’s marketing efforts, we analyzed Domino’s segmentation and positioning strategies. See
Appendix E for our SWOT analysis of Domino’s. We also surveyed 221 U.S. adults regarding
their impression of Domino’s pizza product as well as their views on hypothetical loyalty
Page 9 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
programs intended to increase trial and repeat purchases. See Appendix F for a summary of our
survey results.
Competitive Analysis
Domino’s is the 14th-largest QSR by U.S. revenue, and within the pizza category Pizza
Hut is #1, Domino’s is #2 and Papa John’s is #3. Beyond that, Domino’s faces competition from
Domino’s target market segmentation is the consumer who is looking for inexpensive
pizza quickly. Customers are very price sensitive; higher prices have historically led to decreased
sales. Domino’s does not offer dine-in areas at it stores, instead focusing on delivery and
carryout customers. Demographically, Domino’s appears not to have a specific target. Instead, it
seems that Domino’s targets markets with the greatest number of people. It follows that
Domino’s has sought to become a leader in online pizza orders, so it can reach the greatest
number of consumers possible while also improving its ability to meet customer demand.
Domino’s has positioned itself well to reach the customer who values quick-service
pizza. Domino’s uses geographic information software to locate its stores in optimal locations.
The majority of domestic stores are located in and around highly populated large or mid-sized
cities or near college campuses. In FY 2009, Domino’s posted a 92% on-time delivery rate and
had an average time of 12-15 minutes for pizza order-taking and production. In the past,
Domino’s created the 30-minute delivery guarantee and also marketed its use of the HeatWave
insulated delivery bag to keep delivered pizzas hot. Today, Domino’s has achieved significant
online orders through its website, successfully reaching that growing segment of the market.
Domino’s revamped pizza has been very successful and has generated significant sales
growth since being introduced. Additionally, our survey data showed that poor taste was the
Page 10 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
leading reason why customers avoid Domino’s. Domino’s has used the new product to address
this major weakness. Given the positive results, it appears Domino’s has been able to generate
trial purchases from customers who previously had excluded Domino’s from their dining options.
Future growth opportunities exist for Domino’s both domestically and internationally.
We recommend that Domino’s focus on both of these fronts to grow its business, pay down its
long-term debt and increase value for shareholders. We have two primary recommendations:
According to Barclay’s, the average Domino’s customer orders five times per year while
the average quick-service pizza customer orders an average of 17-18 times per year. This data
In our survey of 221 U.S. adults, we proposed three different hypothetical loyalty
programs. Each of the three subgroups we analyzed favored a “status program” that would give
different benefits that would increase with repeat purchase frequency. Our survey data indicates
that a status program would increase average order frequency by more than two orders per
customer per year. The infrequent Domino’s consumer subgroup had the strongest response to
the status program, with data indicating that average order frequency would increase by more
than three orders per customer per year. These data suggest that a status loyalty program would
be effective in converting casual Domino’s consumers to more loyal Domino’s consumers. The
loyalty program could be coordinated with Domino’s current marketing efforts to promote its
Page 11 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
revamped pizza. The new, inspired pizza has been effective at getting customers in the door, and
our data indicates that a loyalty program could help ensure they keep coming back.
Domino’s has added 32% of its 4,027 international franchises within the past five years.
three largest master franchisees are in Mexico, United Kingdom and Australia. India is home to
the fourth-largest master franchisee with nearly 300 stores. Noticeably absent on the list of
largest master franchisees is China, where Domino’s currently has only 15 stores. By
comparison, Pizza Hut has more than 400 stores with intentions for more.
On its face, the discrepancy between Pizza Hut’s store count and Domino’s store count
seems unjustified. Domino’s should seek a master franchisee that will enable expansion to match
Pizza Hut’s presence in China. By again expanding through a master franchisee, Domino’s can
rely on the franchisee for market knowledge and for the investment of capital. As such,
Domino’s can expand without exhausting its own capital resources, which are needed elsewhere.
Domino’s faces potential challenges inherent in the China market. For example, we
understand that Chinese consumers prefer dine-in restaurant options to delivery-based options.
However, Domino’s has evolved in other markets to meet unique consumer preferences, and we
CONCLUSION
1.) Domino’s has a steady business, but its debt level makes it riskier than its competitors.
2.) Priced into DPZ stock is a future expectation of sustained long-term growth.
Page 12 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
APPENDICES
1,800
1,556.9 1,628.0 1,569.1
1,542.6 1,524.7 1,492.4
1,600 1,438.0
1,363.2 1,378.6
1,400 34.6%
1,166.1 34.5% 35.7% 35.2%
33.6% 33.1%
1,200 36.4% 37.5% 36.2%
1,000 42.8%
From OneSource
MRQ = Most Recent Quarter (i.e., 3Q 2010)
TTM = Trailing Twelve Months (as of December 3, 2010)
* = calculated using respective 10-Q data
** = Domino’s return on assets includes off-balance sheet assets of $139.7 in operating lease
obligations through 2019
Page 13 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
LIQUIDITY METRICS
Yum! Papa Dominos Industry Sector S&P
Johns 500
Current Ratio (TTM) 0.95 1.04 1.65 1.30 1.07 1.81
Working Capital (MRQ) - $3.0M $104.1M
$126M* * *
PROFITABILITY METRICS
Yum! Papa Dominos Industry Sector S&P
Johns 500
Gross Profit Margin 47.36% 27.40% 27.77% 38.43% 37.28% 44.70%
(TTM)
Gross Profit Margin - 5 47.18% 26.58% 26.22% 36.22% 44.15% 44.68%
Yr Avg
Return on Equity (TTM) 89.50% 27.82% -6.57%* 39.40% -2.22% 19.43%
Return on Equity – 5 Yr 86.42% 32.43% -6.91%* 27.48% 14.52% 20.02%
Avg
Return on Assets 14.71% 13.61% 20.10% 14.18% 0.40% 8.49%
(TTM)**
Return on Assets - 5 Yr 14.09% 12.66% 17.32% 10.79% 2.94% 8.46%
Avg**
Net Profit Margin (TTM) 10.04% 4.92% 5.62% 13.93% 4.85% 13.50%
Net Profit Margin - 5 Yr 8.84% 4.57% 5.33% 10.45% 8.61% 12.08%
Avg
EPS (MRQ) $2.58* $1.82* $1.41*
EPS 5 Yr Growth 12.82% 29.03% 11.23% 17.07% 8.69% 10.75%
Page 14 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
APPENDIX D. WACC.
Strengths: Product:
Newly revamped pizza recipe brought in high growth levels for
the first three quarters of 2010.
Strong brand name, #1 pizza delivery company in the U.S. with
market share of 18.4%.
Focused menu enables quality consistency and operational
efficiency. Total operational process is completed within 12-15
minutes.
Price:
Competitively priced product.
Place:
With almost 5000 franchises in the U.S., domestic store
delivery covers the majority of households.
Promotion:
Continuous price promotion such as two 2-topping pizzas for
$5.99 each.
Market-leading online ordering and website features.
Weaknesses: Product:
Despite aggressive marketing efforts to rebrand Domino’s as a
quality, great tasting pizza, survey respondents still said that
“does not taste good” and “low quality” were the primary
reasons they did not order Domino’s.
Proposition for investors is limited. Can’t promise shareholders
that they can guarantee strong returns.
Price:
The low price may actually be working against Domino’s
efforts to rebrand as a high quality, great tasting pizza
company.
Place:
Less-than-optimal international presence.
Promotion:
Minimal incentive for customer loyalty.
Opportunities: Product:
According to survey results, frequent Domino’s pizza
Page 15 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
There are certain limitations of our survey data that derive from our market research capabilities.
Our sample is neither as large nor as random as we would have liked. We solicited survey
responses by emailing friends and family, posting the survey on Facebook, and encouraging
others to propagate this distribution. This population is not representative of the typical
Domino’s market, which is much more diverse. More thorough market research should be
conducted if Domino’s would like to gain more confidence in these results.
How often do people order pizza and how often do they choose Domino’s?
Page 16 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
Purchase Frequency
140
120
100
80
60 All Pizza
40 Domino's
20
0
Less than 1-3 Times 4-6 Times 7-11 Once a 2-3 Times Once a
Once a a Year a Year Times a Month a Month Week or
Year Year more
When comparing the purchase frequency rates of Domino’s compared to the frequency rates of
all pizza brands there was a notable contrast between the two groups. While the largest group of
respondents indicated that they ordered pizza once a month, the vast majority of those orders
were not going to Domino’s, which had a “less than once a year” purchase frequency rate for
most respondents.
Not Loyal
22%
Other Local
42%
Other Chain
11%
Despite it’s ranking as #1 in pizza delivery in the U.S. and #2 in overall sales in the QSR pizza
category, only 6% of survey respondents said they were most loyal to Domino’s pizza, placing it
behind top competitors Pizza Hut and Papa John’s. The largest group of respondents, 42%,
seemed to feel most loyalty towards local brands.
Page 17 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
Despite it’s aggressive, “Oh Yes We Did” marketing campaign aimed toward rebranding
Domino’s as a tasty, high quality pizza, survey respondents still rank “does not taste good” and
“low quality” as the primary reasons they do not order Domino’s pizza. This suggests that even
though Domino’s had positive results from their widely promoted recipe change, there is still a
long way to go in convincing consumers that they are in fact making better pizza.
Earn 1 point for every $5 you spend at Domino's. Collect 25 points and receive a Large 3-
topping pizza for free!
Earn 1 punch for every Large Pizza you purchase at Domino's. Collect 15 punches and receive a
Large 3-topping pizza for free!
Page 18 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
Points Program Punch Program Status Program
When asked how many more times per year they would order Domino’s pizza given several
different loyalty program methods, the “status program” had the strongest increase overall. The
average increase in order frequency per year was 2.07 per person.
Interestingly, when we only looked at how the infrequent Domino’s consumers would respond to
the loyalty programs, their average order frequency increase per year was 3.13, much higher than
the overall average.
Page 19 of 20
Domino’s Pizza – Integrated Company Analysis
Team B6
December 14, 2010
Walk-in Order
11%
Order
Online
26% Order by
Phone
63%
The majority of total respondents still order pizza the old fashioned way: over the phone.
Walk-in Order
9%
Order by
Phone
Order Online 43%
48%
Frequent Domino’s consumers prefer to order online. Domino’s current online ordering system is
fun and easy to use making the ordering process painless. This is a possible opportunity of
Domino’s to maintain its status as an industry leader in the future as more and more pizza orders
begin to be placed online.
Page 20 of 20