Parental Authority

G.R. No. 193652               August 5, 2014

Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM vs.
Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C. YANGCO

Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano Constantino
III and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting
pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she
proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have the child
adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children in to avoid placing her family in a potentially
embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.

On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center.
Thereafter, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to
the DSWD.

On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died without knowing about the birth of
his son. Thereafter, during the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she and the
deceased had a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial embarrassment.
Marcelino’s family was taken aback by the revelation and sympathized with Christina. After the
emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby.

Consequently, the DSWD issued a certificate declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available for Adoption."
A local matching conference was held and Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel and
Filomina Medina of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation.

Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking for the
suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together.

The DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD informing that
the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had attained finality three months
after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and
effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.

Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelino’s brother, sent a letter to Atty. Escutin informing her that a DNA
testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the University of the
Philippines.

On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter to Noel Constantino stating that it would not
allow Baby Julian to undergo DNA testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed Noel Constantino that
the procedures followed relative to the certification on the availability of the child for adoption and the
child’s subsequent placement to prospective adoptive parents were proper, and that the DSWD was no
longer in the position to stop the adoption process. Assistant Secretary Cabrera further stated that
should Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption process,
she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period for her to regain her parental
rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523.

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of
Quezon City seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant
Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the DSWD.

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In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into surrendering custody of her
child to the DSWD utilizing what she claims to be an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which
respondents allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor
child had been complied with.

The RTC issued the Writ of Amparo, commanding the four respondents to produce the body of Baby
Julian at a hearing scheduled on August 4, 2010.

ISSUE:

WON a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child.

HELD: NO.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful actor omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., this Court held:

[T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by
the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.

As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.

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In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced separation"
from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context of
the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed
Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010
Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she
filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that
the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the
afternoon of August 5, 2010. There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of
the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the
latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the
child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental
authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that
what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all
intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be
properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the
unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically
to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that
vitiate the quality of life.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

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David vs. CA
GR No. 111180 250 SCRA 82

Facts:

Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a married man
and the father of four children. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born. Christopher J. was
followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine and Cathy Mae.

The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's
house and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by
Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.

In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., to go with his family to Boracay.
Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Hence, on July 30, 1991, Daisie
filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

RTC:, issued an Order declaring that ―the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David is
hereby given to the natural mother, the herein petitioner Daisie T. David.

Court of Appeals : reversed, holding that question of custody over an illegitimate child cannot be
decided in habeas corpus. The CA further ruled that until the issue on custody and support shall have
been determined in a proper case, it is for the best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily
remain under the custody of respondent.

Issue : WON petitioner is entitled to the custody of Christopher.

Held:

Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It makes no distinction between the
case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that
of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of
her rightful custody of her child.

In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father,
private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As
such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of
his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her
child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to
give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family
Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."

Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her
children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they

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were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the
RTC decision was rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer
System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her
employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening
to make up for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the
support of the three children is not a point against her

Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the
child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to
support her children according to her means.

Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this
case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor
child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the
child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either
by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the
person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age
at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even
now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld
because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the
Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of
her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for
him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).

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CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI v. IAC, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG
G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992

The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative
qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor
offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code.

FACTS:

Julie Ann Gotiong, an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu
City, and Wendell Libi, a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, who
both died in the same event and date. The two were a sweetheart for more than 2 years until the former
broke up with the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted
reconciliation but was not granted by Julie, so it prompted him to resort to threats.

One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun, a
Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered
from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General
Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city. The parents of Julie herein private respondents
filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Due to the absence of an
eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are
the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation of
circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.

The Libis rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have
displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-
Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any
witness and thereby avoid identification

Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence by reason of the absence of
gunpowder or tattooing around the wound of Wendell at the point of entry of the bullet. Private
respondents pointed out that the body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral
parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after 8 hours and Dr. Cerna himself could not
categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral parlor before he was
able to conduct his autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a
paraffin test on Wendell Libi.

CA however set aside the same. Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, CA agree with respondent court
that testimonies do not inspire credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses’
observations, since the visual perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in their respective
houses. On the other hand, witness Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without
contradiction that he and his sister, Malou, were waiting for Julie Ann when they heard her scream; that
when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was going on inside, he heard the first shot; and, not more
than 5 seconds later, he heard another shot. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or
present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe."

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Petitioner’s contention: They had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family, hence they
should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence
on record either. Petitioner Amelita, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband owns a gun which he
kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom where each holds a key and Amelita’s key
is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son taking
or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety
deposit box.

Private respondents’ contention: Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid
firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide.

ISSUE: Whether the parents should be held liable for vicarious liability. (YES)

RULING:

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to
a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their
duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and
immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered
that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both
parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of
their children who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers,
or even drug users. Neither was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a
handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back thereof, holding upright what clearly appears as a
revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm.

It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this dangerous
activity involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the
activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have prevented
Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code which provides: ‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their company.’ The subsidiary liability of
parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code, which
covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses and Art. 101 of Revised Penal
Code covered obligations both arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The parents'
liability as being primary and not subsidiary, and liability shall cease if the parents can prove that they
observe all the diligence of a good father to prevent damage.

The court held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and
not subsidiary, and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In this case, the parents had not exercised
due diligence in supervising the activities of their son. Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns
a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had
their own key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety
deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying
around and that he has free access of the mother’s bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed to
observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

It was only at the time of Wendell's death that they allegedly discovered that he was drug informant of
CANU and that the gun used in the shooting incident was missing from the safety deposit box. Having

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been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell from having access to said gun, the Libis are subsidiary
liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor who was living in their company.

In the case at bar, whether the death of Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict
committed by Wendell Libi. Respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages
arising therefrom. The Court stated that the petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi
patris familias to prevent such damages. Article 221 of the Family Code states that “Parents and
other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and
under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.” In this case,
Wendell was under the parental authority of his natural parents and was living and staying with them.
Hence, Wendell’s parents are liable for the damages caused by his quasi-delict act.

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Espiritu vs CA
G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
Facts:

Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and the private respondent Teresita Masauding met each other in 1976 at
Iligan City.  Teresita went abroad while Reynaldo followed, the two cohabited with each other and in
1986 they had their first child Rosalind Therese. 

In 1987, they got married in the Philippines and after going back to the US they had their second child,
Reginald Vince in 1988. The marriage became sour and they separated Teresita left her family and
went to California in 1990.  Reynaldo went back to the Philippines with the children, however, due to his
job he had to leave the children with her sister the co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and went back to the
US.

Teresita went back to the Philippines on 1992 and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 1993 but
the trial court dismissed the petition, awarding the custody of the children to Reynaldo.

In 1994 the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices de Pano and Ibay-Somera concurring,
reversed the trial court’s decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to
Reynaldo.

Reynaldo questioned the decision by filing a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the custody of the two children should be awarded to the mother

RULING:

No. In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the child’s welfare shall be the
paramount concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from
the mother for compelling reasons.

The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but
not conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were both over 7 years of age.
The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be considered.

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It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was found of
suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity. Furthermore, there was nothing in the
records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the
kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other hand, the
mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused emotional
disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter.

Wherefore, the custody of the minors shall be given to their father Reynaldo

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LEOUEL SANTOS, SR. v. CA and SPS. LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA

FACTS:

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia, a nurse by profession, were married
in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union begot only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. Julia Bedia-Santos left for the
United States but could not anymore be located.

From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the
care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel, Jr., in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the
respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the
subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so.

Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy
when petitioner and his brother visited the Bedia household and clandestinely spirited him away to his
hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos,
Jr.," before the RTC, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. The trial court issued an order on the same day
awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order.

Petitioner’s contention: Since private respondents have failed to show that petitioner is an unfit and
unsuitable father, substitute parental authority granted to the boy's grandparents under Art. 214 of the
Family Code is inappropriate. Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by the private respondents in
having custody over the boy, are flimsy and insufficient to deprive him of his natural and legal right to
have custody.

Private respondents’ contention: They can provide an air-conditioned room for the boy and that
petitioner would not be in a position to take care of his son since he has to be assigned to different
places. They also allege that the petitioner did not give a single centavo for the boy's support and
maintenance. When the boy was about to be released from the hospital, they were the ones who paid
the fees because their daughter and petitioner had no money.

The Bedias argue that although the law recognizes the right of a parent to his child's custody, ultimately
the primary consideration is what is best for the happiness and welfare of the latter. As maternal
grandparents who have amply demonstrated their love and affection for the boy since his infancy, they
claim to be in the best position to promote the child's welfare.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC’s order awarding custody of the child Leouel
Santos, Jr. to his grandparents (YES)

RULING:

The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental
authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one

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where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States while the father, petitioner
Santos, Sr., is present.

The grandparents’ wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide
financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-
laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's
custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it
cannot be construed as abandonment. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between
parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to
experience the warmth and support which a father can give. llcd

His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform
who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural
guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their
children merely because of the normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such as
temporary separation from their families.

Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is
likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him. Private respondents' attachment to the young boy
whom they have reared for the past three years is understandable. Still and all, the law considers the
natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when the parent present is
shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute parental authority, a fact
which has not been proven here.

The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by private respondents as grandparents should not
be seen as incompatible with petitioner's right to custody over the child as a father.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April
30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel
Santos, Sr.

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Perez vs. CA
G.R. No. 118870. March 29, 1996
Facts:

Private respondent Ray Perez, a medical doctor, married petitioner Nerissa, a registered nurse working
in New York. Nerissa suffered several miscarriages. On July 20, 1992, Nerissa gave birth to Ray Perez
II in New York.

A year after they went back to Cebu. Thereafter, Nerissa went back to the U.S., but Ray stayed behind.
Their stories then diverged from this point onwards. Nerissa claims that her husband stayed behind
because he said that he is going to take care of his sick mother and promised Nerissa that he will go
back to the US with their child. Ray, on the other hand, claims that they agreed that they will settle
permanently in the Philippines, but Nerissa changed her mind.

Nerissa went back to the Philippines days before their child’s birthday. During this time, they were no
longer in good terms. The petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her
husband’s income. She only wants to be with her child, but the child was being kept away from her by
her husband.
Ray, on the other hand, wanted to stay in the Philippines with his child. He asserted that he has the
means to support the child. He claimed that he has a home and a car, and that he has sufficient income
for their child to live comfortably.

Because of the foregoing, the petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus to gain the rightful custody
over their child. She cited Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The trial court gave ruled in favor of the petitioner, but the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
the respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled in awarding the custody of the child to the
respondent.

Held: NO. The second paragraph of Article 213 provides that “No child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” This was
likewise reiterated in Section 6 of Rule 99(Adoption and Custody of Minor) of the Revised Rules of
Court. The use of shall in the foregoing provisions connotes a mandatory character.

A child of such age may only be separated from the mother only for the most compelling reasons. In the
past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease.

In this case, the Court did not find any compelling reason to deprive the mother of the custody over her
child. She can provide for the child; this is supported by the fact that she works as a nurse in the United
States. Also, it was not shown that she is incapable of caring for her child. It was not shown that her
schedule is so hectic that she is incapable of attending her child’s needs. Moreover, even if such is the
case, it is accepted in our culture to employ a “yaya” who is under the supervision of the parents to take
care of the child. Therefore, based from the foregoing, the petitioner should have custody over Ray
Perez II.

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186. BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner, vs. HELEN G. BELMES, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder Vancil, a US Navy serviceman, who died in the
said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie
and Vincent by his common-law wife, respondent Helen Belmes.

Subsequently, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the RTC of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings
over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed as Special Proceedings No.
1618-CEB. At that time, Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed
in the petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of
proceeds from their father’s death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00. Thereafter,
petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of
Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.

However, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject
guardianship proceedings, asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship
under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the RTC of Pagadian City. Thereafter, Helen Belmes
followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New One,
asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the
subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing; that
the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the time the petition was filed, Bonifacia
Vancil was a US resident citizen.

After due proceedings, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes’ motion. Instead, it ordered petitioner
Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond
of P50,000.00.

On appeal, the CA reversed the order of the trial court, and dismissed Special Proceedings No. 1618-
CEB. It held that Article 225 of the Family Code considers parents, the father, or in the absence, the
mother, as natural guardian of her minor children. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court
confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor children without need of a
court appointment and only for good reason may another person be named.

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PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS:
1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the preferential right of a parent to be
appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the minors is absolute, contrary to existing
jurisprudence.
2. The respondent (sic) Court of Appeals gravely erred when it disqualified petitioner Bonifacia P.
Vancil to be appointed as judicial guardian over the persons and estate of subject minors
despite the fact that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications as judicial
guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S. citizenship which is clearly not a statutory requirement
to become guardian.

During the pendency of the case, Valerie turned eighteen. Thus, the case was dismissed with respect
to Valerie, she being no longer a proper subject of guardianship proceedings.

ISSUE: Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian. (mother)

RULING:
Respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to
be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides: "Art. 211.
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to
the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the
corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.

Petitioner’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental
authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. xxx." Considering that respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously
parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian,
respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that
respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is
morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But
Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.

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Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualify as a
substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado.
Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a guardian.
Moreover, petitioner has not set foot in the Philippines since 1987 has not been controverted by her.
Besides, petitioner’s old age and her conviction of libel by the RTC will give her a second thought of
staying here. Indeed, her coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to Vincent for
only two years is not certain.

Notwithstanding that there is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians
who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.

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Spouses Masbate v. Relucio

DOCTRINE: Indeed, it may be argued that Article 176 of the Family Code has effectively disqualified
the father of an illegitimate child from exercising substitute parental authority under Article 216 even if
he were the actual custodian of the child under the premise that no one is allowed to do indirectly what
he is prohibited to do directly. However, the Court cannot adopt a rigid view, without running afoul to
the overarching consideration in custody cases, which is the best interest of the minor.

FACTS:

Queenie was born to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been living together with Renalyn's parents
without the benefit of marriage. Three years later, the relationship ended. Renalyn went to Manila,
supposedly leaving Queenie behind in the care and custody of her father, Ricky James

Ricky James alleged that Renalyn's parents took Queenie and when asked to give Queenie back,
Renalyn's parents refused and instead showed a copy of a Special Power of Attorney executed by
Renalyn granting full parental rights, authority, and custody over Queenie to them. Consequently, Ricky
James filed a petition for habeas corpus and child custody. He alleged, among others, that
Renalyn has abandoned Queenie.

RTC ruled that the custody of three (3)-year-old Queenie rightfully belongs to Renalyn, citing the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, which states that "no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother.” On appeal, the CA granted visitation rights to Ricky James.

Renalyn’s parents argued that even if there are compelling reasons to separate Queenie from her
mother, Renalyn, Ricky James would still not acquire custody over their daughter because there is no
provision of law granting custody rights to an illegitimate father.

ISSUE: W/N Ricky James has parental authority over Queenie? (NO)

RULING:
In the event that  Renalyn is found unfit or unsuitable to care for her daughter, Article 214 of the Family
Code mandates that substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
However, Article 216 states that in default of parents or judicially appointed guardian, the following
persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:

Article 216. x x x
(1) The surviving grandparent as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.

Ricky James was in actual physical custody of Queenie when Renalyn left for Manila to pursue her
studies until the instant controversy took place. As such, Ricky James had already assumed obligations
and enjoyed privileges of a custodial character, giving him a cause of action to file a case of habeas
corpus to regain custody of Queenie as her actual custodian.

Indeed, it may be argued that Article 176 of the Family Code has effectively disqualified the father of an
illegitimate child from exercising substitute parental authority under Article 216 even if he were the
actual custodian of the child under the premise that no one is allowed to do indirectly what he is
prohibited to do directly. However, the Court cannot adopt a rigid view, without running afoul to the
overarching consideration in custody cases, which is the best interest of the minor.

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ST. MARY'S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS

Facts:

St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996.
There was a visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St.
Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful
day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City.
The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school.
Allegedly, James Daniel II drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned
turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.

Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and
Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel
Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.

RTC of Dipolog City ordered (1) defendant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City to pay plaintiffs William
Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos sums of money. (2) Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants
James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount of damages in the
event of insolvency of principal obligor St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City; (3) Defendant James
Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and who was under special parental
authority of defendant St. Mary’s Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the damages, same being
adjudged against defendants St. Mary’s Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents; (4) Defendant
Vivencio Villanueva is ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not being in order as earlier
discussed in this decision, is DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages but otherwise affirming the
decision a quo, in toto.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos (YES)
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the
petitioner. (YES)

RULING:

The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary’s Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos
under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a
minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. (UNFOUNDED)

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority
and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and
other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school
or its teachers.

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Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident." In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of
petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. "The proximate cause of an injury is
that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.” The cause of the accident
was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
Villanueva. (THIS IS BASED ON the report and testimony of the traffic investigator)

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence,
the respondents’ reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code was unfounded.

Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive
the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent
Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he
allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily.
The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s
parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Mary’s
Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not
be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.

Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of
P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant’s wrongful act or omission. In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not
attributable to the petitioner.

For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of the Court of
Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted.
Moreover, the grant of attorney’s fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule. The
power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal
and equitable justification. Thus, the grant of attorney’s fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.

Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva.
He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle,
even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.” Hence, with
the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the
accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the

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school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

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