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Steven Lukes On The Concept of Power: Peter Morriss

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Steven Lukes On The Concept of Power: Peter Morriss

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© © All Rights Reserved
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POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW: 2006 VOL 4, 124–135

Steven Lukes on the Concept of Power


Peter Morriss
National University of Ireland, Galway

Steven Lukes has recently reissued his famous book on power, Power: A Radical View. He now admits
that the concept of power that he used in his original (1974) book is flawed, but he still wants to
defend the position that he advanced there. I argue that he is right to regard his concept of power as
flawed, but that admitting this undermines his argument. I conclude that he can rescue his argument
by realising that he is not, in fact, using a concept of power at all.

In 1974, Steven Lukes wrote a very short book called Power: A Radical View,
setting out and advocating what he called a ‘three-dimensional’ approach to
power. Lukes’ book rapidly became the most widely read analysis of the concept
of power, and has remained in print ever since – which nowadays is startling
longevity for a social science book. Needless to say, it also attracted a great deal
of academic commentary. It is therefore very welcome that Lukes has chosen
to return to this territory 30 years later, and provide us with his thoughts on
the subsequent literature.
One of the reasons for the success of Lukes’ book was doubtless that it was
indeed very short, and therefore ideal to recommend to students. Another
reason was that it was commendably clearly written. A third may be the cute
marketing ploy of calling his preferred analysis ‘three-dimensional’, implying
that it necessarily completed the task begun by his predecessors, all of whom
employed fewer dimensions. If there is anything in this suggestion, then Lukes’
marketing ability (or that of his publishers) has now deserted him. For it is seri-
ously underselling this book to describe it as (merely) a second edition of Power.
It is true that it reprints the original virtually unaltered, but it does a great deal
more than that. This book is more than three times the length of the first
edition, and contains a corresponding amount of new material and new ideas.
So do not think that because you have the first edition you need not bother
to buy the second. This is in reality a new book.
The book opens with a brief introduction, situating the original book in the
literature and concerns of the time; this will be very useful in explaining to
students – to almost all of whom 1974 is now a foreign country – what moti-
vated Lukes to deal with the issues that he did.There is then the original book,
which forms Chapter 1 of the new book.1 There are then two additional chap-
ters, each of which by itself is the length of the original book, and which read
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LUKES ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER 125

as if they were separately composed essays; there is a good deal of thematic


overlap, and it is not too clear what principle is being used to allocate mater-
ial between these chapters. Here Lukes amplifies and defends the position
advanced in PRV – and also criticises it.
This unusual structure will surely create difficulties for anybody approaching
Lukes’ book for the first time: we do not normally expect Chapter 2 of a book
to tell us that much of chapter 1 was just wrong.Yet that is what occurs here.
Lukes reprints PRV, and then, with remarkable honesty, admits that the work
contained major mistakes: no less than five are itemised on page 109. (Indeed,
the introduction warns that much of what we are about to read in Chapter 1
contains ‘mistakes and inaccuracies’ [p. 11, repeated on p. 12].) Lukes is now
quite scathing about his own earlier work: ‘the definition of the “underlying
concept of power” offered in Section 5 of PRV [reprinted on pp. 29–37 (orig-
inally pp. 26–33)] is, plainly, entirely unsatisfactory in several respects’ (p. 109).
But, if it really is that bad, then why reprint it? Why not rework it to remove
the mistakes, if that is possible?
I want to suggest that Lukes’ failure to rewrite the original book is not just
due to laziness. A more plausible explanation is that the mistakes that Lukes
now sees in PRV are so fundamental to the argument of PRV that the book
cannot be satisfactorily rewritten. That would not be surprising: the argument
in PRV – like all good arguments – was a coherent structure, and one cannot
usually throw out central parts of an argument and expect the rest still to stand.
It is my view that Lukes fails to grasp the significance of the mistakes to which
he is now admitting; and that if he did grasp their significance, he would have
to admit that much of the main argument of PRV must be abandoned.

The core argument in PRV was about how we should think about the concept
of power. Lukes’ starting point in 1974 was that ‘The absolutely basic common
core to, or primitive notion lying behind, all talk of power is the notion that
A in some way affects B’ (p. 30 [p. 26]). More specifically, he ‘defined the
concept of power by saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B
in a manner contrary to B’s interests’ (p. 37 [p. 34]). Lukes now thinks that this
is quite wrong.
PRV offers a very partial and one-sided account of the topic. For one
thing, it focuses entirely on the exercise of power and, for another, it
deals only with asymmetric power – the power of some over others
– and, moreover, with only a sub-type of this, namely, the securing
of compliance to domination (p. 64, original emphases; these criti-
cisms are repeated on p. 12 and p. 109, and amplified on pp. 69–74).
I will explore the implications of these two self-admitted mistakes in turn, in
the opposite order.
© 2006 The Author. Journal compilation © 2006 Political Studies Association
Political Studies Review: 2006, 4(2)
126 PETER MORRISS

‘Power-to’ and ‘Power-over’


As Lukes’ definitions show, the three-dimensional view of power focuses explic-
itly on someone’s power over another person. In PRV, Lukes was scathing about
those who instead wanted to consider someone’s power to do something or to
achieve some end:
In the first place, the[se] are revisionary persuasive redefinitions of
power which are out of line with the central meanings of ‘power’ as
traditionally understood and with the concerns that have always cen-
trally preoccupied students of power. They focus on the locution
‘power to’, ignoring ‘power over’. Thus [for these wrong-headed
people] power indicates a ‘capacity’, a ‘facility’, an ‘ability’, not a rela-
tionship. Accordingly, the conflictual aspect of power – the fact [sic]
that it is exercised over people – disappears from view. And along with
it there disappears the central interest of studying power relations in
the first place – an interest in the (attempted or successful) securing
of people’s compliance by overcoming or averting their opposition.
In the second place, the point of these definitions is ... to reinforce
certain theoretical positions; but everything that can be said by their
means can be said with greater clarity by means of the conceptual
scheme here proposed, without thereby concealing from view the
(central) aspects of power which they define out of existence (p. 34
[pp. 30–1]).
In my Power: A Philosophical Analysis, I argued against that view, and claimed
that our primary understanding of power is as ‘power-to’ (Morriss, 2002, pp.
32–5; see also ch. 2). It follows from this that ‘power’ is best thought of as the
ability to effect outcomes, not the ability to affect others (Morriss, 2002, ch.
5). Lukes clearly thinks that there is something in my argument, for he now
says that ‘power-to’ and ‘power-over’ are ‘two distinct variants ... where the latter
is a sub-species of the former’ (p. 69; see also p. 74, p. 83 and p. 109), and ‘a
better definition of power in social life than that offered in PRV is in terms
of agents’ abilities to bring about significant effects’ (p. 65). In accordance with
this new belief of the importance of ‘power-to’, he has a brief analysis of the
concept. There is nothing in that discussion with which I would disagree.
(Interested readers might like to compare pp. 69–83 with Morriss, 2002, Parts
I and II, particularly chs. 4, 5, 11–3).
But, although Lukes says that ‘power-to’ is the more central concept, and ‘the
ability to produce effects’ is the better definition of power, when he develops
and defends his account he follows the old three-dimensional approach, which
denied both claims. So while the ‘official’ position is the modest one that
‘power-over’ is indeed just one sort of power, albeit the sort that he happens
to be interested in (see pp. 109–10, quoted below), there are also signs that, at
© 2006 The Author. Journal compilation © 2006 Political Studies Association
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LUKES ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER 127

some level, Lukes is still convinced that ‘power-over’ is the more important
concept. Thus there is the occasional defiant reprise of the position present in
PRV, that ‘power-to’:
does not yet correspond to what, in common parlance and in the
writings of philosophers, historians and social scientists, ‘power’ is
commonly taken to identify. In this more restrictive but widespread
understanding, ‘power’ is explicitly relational and asymmetrical: to
have power is to have power over another or others (p. 73, original
emphasis).
More worryingly, there are signs that Lukes has not fully grasped the distinc-
tion between the two. For an instance of this, here is his discussion of how we
can compare the powers of two actors.
I will have more (overall) power than you if I can bring about out-
comes that are more ‘significant’ than those you can bring about. But
how do we judge the significance of outcomes? The most natural
answer is: we look at their effects upon the interests of the agents
involved ... Normally, we assume that the power of the powerful fur-
thers their interests ... Aside from that assumption, it is the impact of
power on others’ interests that provides the basis for judgment con-
cerning its extent.
Thus ... the Mafia, where it holds sway, has greater power than other
influential groups, organizations and governmental agencies, in part by
virtue of the greater harms it can inflict and the greater benefits it
can bestow ... If I can affect your central or basic interests, my power
(in relation to you) is greater than someone who affects you only
superficially (pp. 80–1, original emphasis).
This passage flips from discussing a comparison of our power to do things (to
effect outcomes) at the beginning, to comparing our power over each other (our
power to affect others) by the end. (A similar slide into considering power as
affecting occurs on page 68, discussed below.) Note, further, that when looking
at power-to, it is not an assumption that ‘the power of the powerful furthers
their interests’: it is definitional (see Morriss, 2002, ch. 12). If instead we switch
to looking at our impact on the interests of others, we are simply switching
from a notion of power to (do things) to power over (others). These are two
very different concepts, and one has to decide in advance which one he/she
is using.
There is a further unclearness here, brought out in the brief allusion to com-
paring the power of the Mafia and governmental agencies, and that is a con-
fusion between means and ends. It may well be true that the Mafia do indeed
wield power ‘by virtue of ’ its ability to inflict harms and bestow benefits, but
that does not indicate that it is sensible to use this power-over to measure their
© 2006 The Author. Journal compilation © 2006 Political Studies Association
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128 PETER MORRISS

power.The Mafia, presumably, like governmental agencies, use these means (their
‘power-over’ others) to obtain various desired ends; their power can then be
measured (and compared with that of other groups) by measuring (and com-
paring) the desired outcomes that can be obtained (their ‘power-to’). It just
might be the case, I suppose, that the point of having power for the Mafia (or
for some particular Mafioso) was solely to be able to inflict harm and bestow
benefits, but it is surely more likely that these are valued mainly as means to
other ends. We can certainly compare the power of the Mafia and a govern-
mental agency to bestow benefits, and in some places the Mafia might score
higher; but we need to keep clear in our minds whether we are looking at the
ends that can be achieved or the means by which they can be achieved.
Lukes says – rightly – that he focused on power-over in part because those he
discussed and criticised did so:
Because PRV was a response and contribution to an ongoing debate
within American political science, it was also caught up in the pre-
suppositions of that debate whose shared concept of power [was]
based on Dahl’s ‘intuitive idea’ that ‘A has power over B to the extent
that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’
(p. 60).
But, PRV was also a self-declared radical view, and therefore should have been
able to free itself from the presuppositions of that debate, if those presupposi-
tions were wrong or limiting. It was, I think, unfortunate that Lukes discussed
‘power-to’ by looking at the two major theorists who used the idea: Talcott
Parsons and Hannah Arendt. Neither theorist’s work was conducive to the sort
of radicalism that Lukes espoused, and he had good reasons for rejecting their
approaches; but, unfortunately, he appeared to think that a root-and-branch
rejection would also involve rejecting a reliance on ‘power-to’. I will suggest
that such a rejection is not helpful for constructing a radical account of power.

Power and Responsibility


Lukes considers that it is important to ask why we need concepts of power at
all, and generously refers to my own attempt to ask and answer this question
(in Morriss, 2002, ch. 6) as about the only one that there is in the literature.
He then summarises my own position, and suggests a few divergences
(pp. 65–9).
I claimed that there are three different ‘contexts’ within which we want to talk
of power, which I called the practical, moral and evaluative contexts. Lukes
reports the first context, and appears to agree that he is not much interested
in it. His concerns are with the last two contexts. However, he seems to run
these two contexts together, while I want to keep them apart. My ‘moral’
context concerned that of blaming individuals, and I located here the connec-
© 2006 The Author. Journal compilation © 2006 Political Studies Association
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LUKES ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER 129

tion between power and responsibility (Morriss, 2002, pp. 38–40); my ‘evalua-
tive’ context was that of judging social systems, and I argued that here the
concept of responsibility was not appropriate (Morriss, 2002, pp. 40–2). I
thought that Lukes’ work was best placed within the evaluative context; I there-
fore claimed that his wish to link power and individual responsibility was mis-
taken. I also thought that it would follow from my position that it would be
better to use a concept of power-to rather than power-over in evaluative con-
texts. The key passage went as follows:
Lukes and Connolly, as radicals, want to emphasize the plight of the
powerless and thus to persuade people of the evils of contemporary
capitalism. But they fail to achieve their aim, because they mistake
their target.They think that what is wrong if you are powerless is that
you are thereby in someone else’s power, and that that someone else
must be responsible for your powerlessness if you are to have a valid
complaint. Both of these assumptions are wrong ... What is wrong
with being powerless is that you are powerless – that is, lacking in
power. And if people are powerless because they live in a certain sort
of society – that is, they would have more power if the social arrange-
ments were changed – then that, itself, is a condemnation of that
society. A radical critique of society requires us to evaluate that society,
not distribute praise or blame to people. The two are very different
procedures, and must be sharply distinguished (Morriss, 2002,
pp. 41–2).
Lukes responds to this as follows.
Morriss is right to warn against what we might call ‘the paranoid
fallacy’ of assuming that powerlessness results from domination – that
when people lack power, it can only be because of the machinations
of the powerful. But his suggestion that, in our actual world, these are
sharply separate questions ... does not withstand scrutiny. For one
thing, people are often rendered and kept powerless by the deliber-
ate activities of others ... But, in any case, ... power should not be
conceived narrowly as requiring intention, actual foresight and posi-
tive actions (as opposed to failing to act): the power of the powerful
consists in their being capable of and responsible for affecting (nega-
tively or positively) the ... interests of others. On this broader view
of power, the issues of powerlessness and of domination will no longer
seem so obviously separate and locked into distinct perspectives.
(Indeed, if we think of powerlessness as an injustice, rather than as bad
luck or misfortune, is that not because we believe that there are those
in a position to reduce or remedy it?) As suggested in the discussion
above of responsibility, the powerful will include those who both con-
tribute to and are in a position to reduce or remedy others’ power-
lessness (p. 68, original emphasis).
© 2006 The Author. Journal compilation © 2006 Political Studies Association
Political Studies Review: 2006, 4(2)
130 PETER MORRISS

I do not think that Lukes’ response meets the points I made. Firstly, I am not,
of course, denying that often (very often) people are powerless because others
seek to keep them so. What I was trying to suggest is that there is a conceptual
difference between being powerless and being dominated, and we have to make
up our mind which we are studying. If we are evaluating a society, we will be
doing so by reference to some criteria or other; I was making a plea that we
should not ignore those who are powerless but nevertheless not dominated. It
is of course true that if this powerlessness is to be thought an injustice, then
there must be some alternative social set-up that is better. But it is not neces-
sary to have to find some particular individuals on to whom we can pin respon-
sibility. Many Marxists used to argue that capitalism is unjust even though (or,
perhaps, particularly because) no blame could attach to any individuals; that was
thought to be precisely why the whole system had to be swept away.That posi-
tion may (or may not) have been factually inaccurate, but it was certainly not
logically incoherent. Hence, we do need to keep social evaluation separate from
individual responsibility; it is a fault of Lukes’ analysis that such a gap seems
impossible within it.
Secondly, in the middle of the passage I have quoted, Lukes slips back into the
PRV analysis of power as ‘responsible for affecting’ others, instead of the lan-
guage of which (he now claims that) he approves, which is in terms of ability
to bring about outcomes. It is worth noting here that the difficulties Lukes has
with the interrelationship between power (as agency) and structure only arise
because he continues to work with a concept of ‘power-over’. The problem is
that talk of ‘structural power’ would seem to be either oxymoronic, or require
structures to be held responsible for exercising or having power over people.
But the problem simply disappears when we focus on ‘power-to’, and have a
context of social evaluation that does not involve responsibility; for there is no
difficulty in saying that structures limit the ends that people can obtain (and
should, for that reason, be altered).
A hint at the difference between us can be seen in the use we both make of
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s ‘capability’ approach (compare pp. 117–8
and Morriss, 2002, pp. xxii–xxv). The capabilities approach involves assessing
which important human capabilities are left unrealised, and then striving to
develop as many of these capabilities as possible. Yet, Lukes draws the lesson
from Sen and Nussbaum that ‘Domination occurs where the power of some
affects the interests of others by restricting their capabilities for truly human
functioning’ (p. 118). But Sen and Nussbaum take a much wider focus: they
are interested in all unnecessary restrictions on important capabilities. They are
surely right to do so.

The Exercise Fallacy


Lukes now thinks that his earlier focus on the exercise of power was wrong,
in that it committed the exercise fallacy. This refers to an idea of Anthony
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LUKES ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER 131

Kenny’s; as far as I am aware, I am responsible for introducing it into the social


science literature on power (Morriss, 2002, pp. 14–7; see also pp. 20–2). Kenny
asked us to:
Consider the capacity of whisky to intoxicate. The possession of this
capacity is clearly distinct from its exercise: the whisky possesses the
capacity while it is standing harmlessly in the bottle, but it only begins
to exercise it after being imbibed (Kenny, 1975, p. 10).
Indeed, the whisky now in the bottle has the capacity (power) to intoxicate,
even if that capacity is never exercised at all, perhaps because the whisky is
thrown away. Similarly, the American Congress has the power to override a
presidential veto (by a two-thirds majority), even when there is no veto to
override. It would be quite wrong to think that the 107th Congress lacked this
power, just because – since George W. Bush vetoed no legislation – it never
had an opportunity to exercise it.2
Lukes agrees that the exercise fallacy is indeed a fallacy (pp. 69–70). So, Lukes
now agrees that ‘power is a dispositional concept, identifying an ability or a
capacity, which may or may not be exercised’ (p. 109), rather than being an
exercise, or action; and he admits that he thought the opposite when writing
PRV (p. 12, p. 63, p. 64, p. 109). But this change is a very fundamental one.
For it is central to the ‘three-dimensional’ view that precisely what we should
be concerned with investigating are exercises of power. This is clear from the
definitions given above (quoted from p. 30 [p. 26] and p. 37 [p. 34]), which
accurately represent Lukes’ approach. Further, when Lukes came to elaborate
and defend his position in PRV, he looked exclusively at the exercise of power.
This discussion has three parts: the first considered the question (or pair of
questions) ‘What is an exercise of power? What is it to exercise power?’; the next
defended the claim that ‘evidence can be adduced ... which ... identif[ies] exer-
cises of power of the three-dimensional type’; and the last asked ‘How ... is one
to identify the process or mechanism of an alleged exercise of power, on the
three-dimensional view?’.3 If Lukes now thinks that such a focus on the exer-
cise of power is a mistake, then the three-dimensional view of power must be
judged to be mistaken.

Domination
What I have called Lukes’ ‘official’ position is that he is interested in one sub-
set of the power field, that of power-over – or, indeed, a sub-set of that: the
sub-set involving domination.Thus Lukes says that the concept of power defined
in PRV:
is not ‘power’ but rather the securing of compliance to domination.
The text addresses the question: ‘how do the powerful secure the
compliance of those they dominate?’ – a narrower question than that
© 2006 The Author. Journal compilation © 2006 Political Studies Association
Political Studies Review: 2006, 4(2)
132 PETER MORRISS

suggested by its snappy title [which has, of course, been retained–PM].


On the other hand, it can be argued that the question addressed is
not without interest, even if it is an exaggeration to claim that this is
the central meaning of power as traditionally understood, and that the
concerns it expresses are those that have always centrally preoccupied
students of power.Yet, it has, after all, preoccupied many of them (pp.
109–10, original emphasis).
In short, the central issue addressed by PRV was ‘how is willing compliance to
domination secured?’ (p. 10), and this is also the central concern of the new
book (see particularly pp. 85–7).
Lukes admits that there is power-over that does not involve domination: power
that is ‘productive, transformative, authoritative and compatible with dignity’ (p.
109). Instances of such power offered by Lukes include the power of a mother,
teacher or therapist, and ‘command–obedience relationships that are indispens-
able to valued co-operative activities, as in armies, orchestra conducting and
sports coaching’ (p. 84). Lukes, then, notices that we can often benefit from the
power of others – but puts all that to one side, as not what he wants to discuss.
He is only interested in looking at power that demeans someone. In PRV he
thought that all power was of that demeaning kind; now he recognises that
there are other sorts of power, but he chooses not to discuss them.
Lukes introduces his analysis of this by following a distinction drawn (in Latin)
by Spinoza, between potentia (meaning here, roughly, the power to do things)
and potestas (being in the power of another) (pp. 73–4, pp. 86–7, pp. 114–5).
He quotes passages in which Spinoza worried that those who are subject to
domination are unlikely to live autonomous and authentic lives, which is doubt-
less a reason for considering domination to be a bad thing. However, Lukes
gives only the scantiest attention to when dependency (being in the power of
another) is indeed threatening to autonomy. He mentions, in passing, that
Richard Sennett has suggested that maybe we are too obsessed with autonomy;
that the opposition to ‘power which demands servility’ is a consequence of a
‘liberal horror of adult dependency’ based on ‘poor psycholog[y]’ (Sennett,
2003, p. 113). And, for what it is worth, even Spinoza did not seem to have
the opposition to domination that Lukes reports; elsewhere, Spinoza thought
that in a good state there was:
a great difference between a slave, a son, and a subject [subditum] ...
A slave is one who is bound to obey the commands of a master
given solely in the master’s interest [utilitatem]; a son is one who
does what is in his own interest by the command of a parent; and,
finally, a subject is one who does what is in the common interest
[utile], and consequently in his own interest also, by the command of
a sovereign [ex mandato summae potestatis agit] (Spinoza, 1958 [1670],
p. 137).
© 2006 The Author. Journal compilation © 2006 Political Studies Association
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LUKES ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER 133

So, Spinoza recognized that potestas can sometimes be a good thing. This was,
as it happens, also the view of early Christians: they thought that we are all
entirely within the power (potestas) of God, but since God acts benevolently,
that is no bad thing. The distinction between domination (as bad) and potestas
therefore remains unresolved.
Rather clearer is the connection with the exercise fallacy. The distinction
between potentia and potestas is indeed a lot older than Spinoza; it was
a commonplace of Roman jurisprudence, and there was considerable use
of it in Justinian’s Digest. Here there is a discussion of whether a slave could
be said to be free if his master is benevolent (or, indeed, absent). The answer
is, no.
While such slaves may as a matter of fact be able to act at will, they
remain at all times in potestate domini, within the power of their
masters. They accordingly remain subject or liable to death or vio-
lence at any time ... The essence of what it means to be a slave, and
hence to lack personal liberty, is thus to be in potestate, within the
power of someone else.
The Roman moralists and historians draw extensively on this account,
while adding to it by speaking of slavery as that condition in which
someone is obnoxius, perpetually subject or liable to harm or punish-
ment (Skinner, 1998, pp. 41–2, footnotes omitted).
The Roman interest in potestas would thus seem to be an interest in domina-
tion as a capacity: they were concerned about being in someone else’s power,
whether or not that power is exercised. This idea has recently been resurrected
by Quentin Skinner and, particularly, Philip Pettit.4 Pettit succeeds, I think, in
articulating a sort of grievance; one which he thinks recent political theory has
tended to overlook.
The grievance I have in mind is that of having to live at the mercy
of another, having to live in a manner that leaves you vulnerable to
some ill that the other is in a position arbitrarily to impose; and this,
in particular, when each of you is in a position to see that you are
dominated by the other ... It is the grievance expressed by the wife
who finds herself in a position where her husband can beat her at
will, and without any possibility of redress; by the employee who dare
not raise a complaint against an employer, and who is vulnerable to
any of a range of abuses, some petty, some serious, that the employer
may choose to perpetrate (Pettit, 1997, pp. 4–5).
Pettit contrasts this emphasis with mainstream liberalism, which has not been
particularly concerned (he thinks) with non-domination as such: for these
liberals ‘there is nothing inherently oppressive about some people having
dominating power over others, provided that they do not exercise that power
© 2006 The Author. Journal compilation © 2006 Political Studies Association
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134 PETER MORRISS

and are not likely to exercise it’ (Pettit, 1997, p. 9). Those whom Pettit calls
republicans, by contrast, are very worried about such domination. For, even
when the power is not exercised, ‘the power-victim acts in the relevant area by
the leave, explicit or implicit, of the power-bearer; it means that they live at
the mercy of that person, that they are in a position of a dependent or debtor
or something of the kind’ (Pettit, 1997, p. 63; see also pp. 123–4).
But this is not Lukes’ concern with domination. Lukes is not concerned at all
with domination as merely a capacity. As he says many times, the central
concern of his book is ‘How do the powerful secure the compliance ... of those
they dominate?’.5 The whole force of the third dimension of power is not that
some people could secure compliance (if they wanted); it is that they do secure
compliance – and Lukes has new extended discussions of how they secure it
(e.g. pp. 124–44). So, Lukes is not discussing the classical sense of power as potes-
tas (which is a capacity); he is interested in domination that works out in
actuality in the subordinate party being harmed.
Given this, we can see that Lukes’ admission that he has committed the exer-
cise fallacy is itself mistaken. Or, put differently, Lukes can avoid the exercise
fallacy by admitting that he is not, in fact, discussing power at all. For power
is (as Lukes now agrees) a capacity; the concept of domination that Lukes uses
is not a capacity; these two are in conflict only if we think that the concept
of domination is a concept of power. Lukes does say that he is discussing ‘power
as domination’ (see p. 113, for just one of the frequent mentions of this linkage).
But he need not. He can separate his concept of domination altogether from
that of power, and retain intact the three-dimensional view – although it will
not, of course, now be a three-dimensional view of power.
Indeed, it seems to me that – paradoxically, perhaps – it is one of the strengths
of Lukes’ book that he ‘commits’ the exercise fallacy. For when he discusses
empirical research (both in PRV and in the new material) he does so in a fas-
cinating way, and makes a number of important and memorable points about
how domination occurs. Many people (probably most people) are more inter-
ested in what does happen in societies than in what might happen. There is, of
course, nothing whatsoever wrong with writing about what does happen in
societies, and very much that is right about doing so. Lukes’ discussion of what
does happen is insightful and helpful. His only mistake is thinking that he is
thereby writing about power.
(Accepted: 30 August 2005)

About the Author


Peter Morriss, Department of Political Science and Sociology, National University of Ireland, Galway,
Ireland; email: pete.morriss@nuigalway.ie

© 2006 The Author. Journal compilation © 2006 Political Studies Association


Political Studies Review: 2006, 4(2)
LUKES ON THE CONCEPT OF POWER 135

Notes
1 Lukes (2005). All unattributed page references in this article are to this new book. Following Lukes, I will refer
to Chapter 1 – i.e. the 1974 book – as PRV. As the pagination in the new edition is different from before, I
will give page references for the original printing in brackets after those for the new edition; citations not in
this double form are to the new material present only in the second edition.
2 See Sollenberger (2004) and Galemore (1997). George W. Bush was the first president for 150 years to veto no
legislation throughout the duration of a Congress, but that has had no impact on the power of Congress. I am
grateful to Donal Igoe for information on such vetoes.
3 The three parts occupy, respectively, pp. 41–8 (pp. 39–45), quotation from the first page; pp. 48–52 (pp. 46–50),
quotation from the last page; pp. 52–8 (pp. 50–6), quotation from the first page; my emphases throughout.
4 For a brief discussion of Pettit’s use of the idea, see Morriss (2002, pp. xiii–xiv), which I here paraphrase.
5 Lukes, p. 86; see also p. 106 and p. 118 (‘Domination occurs where the power of some affects the interests of
others’); a capacity is referred to on p. 11, but I take it that that is a mistake.

References
Connolly, W. E. (1983) The Terms of Political Discourse. Oxford: Martin Robertson (first edition 1974).
Galemore, G. L. (1997) ‘Presidential Vetoes, 1789–1996: A Summary Overview’, Library of Congress,
Congressional Research Service, 1997. Available from: http://www.house.gov/rules/97-163.htm (accessed
28 June 2005).
Kenny, A. (1975) Will, Freedom and Power. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lukes, S. (2005) Power: A Radical View, second edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Morriss, P. (2002) Power: A Philosophical Analysis. Manchester: Manchester University Press (first edition 1987).
Pettit, P. (1997) Republicanism: A Theory of Government and Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sennett, R. (2003) Respect: The Formation of Character in a World of Inequality. London: Allen Lane.
Skinner, Q. (1998) Liberty before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sollenberger, M. A. (2004) ‘Congressional Overrides of Presidential Vetoes’, Library of Congress,
Congressional Research Service, 2004. Available from: http://www.house.gov/rules/98-157.pdf (accessed
28 June 2005)
Spinoza, B. de (1958 [1670]) Tractatus Theologico-Politicus in The Political Works, ed. and trans. A.G. Wernham.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.

© 2006 The Author. Journal compilation © 2006 Political Studies Association


Political Studies Review: 2006, 4(2)

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