G.R. No.

138084            April 10, 2002

MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NAILS AND WIRES CORPORATION, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision dated September 30, 1998, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45547, affirming the decision dated December 10, 1993, of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 163, and the resolution dated March 25, 1999, of the
Court of Appeals denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 1

Respondent Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation insured against all risks its shipment of
10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at P67,156,300 with petitioner Malayan Insurance
Company Inc. The shipment delivered was short by 377.168 metric tons. For this shortage,
respondent claimed insurance for P2,698,637.04, representing the value of undelivered steel billets,
plus customs duties, taxes and other charges paid by respondent. Petitioner refused to pay.

On July 28, 1993, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for sum of money with the RTC of
Pasig representing said lost and/or undelivered cargo. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds that it failed to state a cause of action, and that it was filed in the wrong venue. The
motion was denied. It thus filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals. This was also
denied. Upon motion for reconsideration, the petition was reinstated. However, it was eventually
dismissed by the Court of Appeals, and its dismissal became final and executory.

On September 8, 1993, respondent filed a motion to admit an amended complaint which the trial
court granted. It sent petitioner summons and a copy of the complaint on October 13, 1993 and also
gave petitioner until October 31, 1993 to file its answer.

On November 4, 1993, respondent moved to declare petitioner in default. The trial court granted and
allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte before the branch clerk of court. Respondent
presented its lone witness, Jeanne King.

On November 11, 1993, petitioner filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim. Upon motion by
the respondent, the trial court expunged from the records the answer for late filing.

On December 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a judgment by default which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and

against defendant, ordering the latter to pay the following:

1. P2,532,926.53 representing the insured value of the lost and/or not delivered 377.168
metric tons of steel billets plus legal rate of interest from date of filing of this complaint until
fully paid;

2. Fifteen (15) percent of the amount awarded to plaintiff as attorney's fees; and

3. Cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. 2
Respondent moved to execute judgment pending appeal. The trial court granted the motion.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed its notice of appeal which was given due course.

Pursuant to the grant of the motion for execution, the trial court issued the corresponding writ.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
implementation of the writ. The Court of Appeals granted the prayer for the temporary restraining
order. The writ of execution was likewise stayed by the trial court which favorably considered
petitioner's urgent motion to stay execution pending appeal and to approve the supersedeas bond.

Pursuant to the notice of appeal, the entire records of the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals, where petitioner argued that the trial court erred in rendering judgment by default
notwithstanding that issues were joined by petitioner's filing of an answer; in awarding
damages to respondent based on unauthenticated documentary evidence and hearsay; and
in admitting documentary evidence which is irregular in nature and not in accordance with
the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court and disposed the case thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error committed by the lower
court, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. 3

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion nor err when it expunged
the answer from the records because petitioner answered way beyond the prescribed period. It
further held that respondent's witness, Jeanne King, was a competent witness because she
personally prepared the documentary evidence and had personal knowledge of the allegations in the
complaint. In addition, the appellate court said that conclusions and findings of fact of the trial courts
were entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent
reasons, which were not present in this case. Lastly, the absence of a written report by the branch
clerk of court on the ex parte proceedings did not necessarily deny petitioner due process. Nothing
in the Rules of Court stated that the absence of the commissioner's written report nullified a
judgment by default. The appellate court observed that if there was a defect, such was only
procedural that can be waived. Besides, petitioner was declared in default because of its own failure
to answer within the prescribed period. It cannot claim denial of due process because it was given
the opportunity to be heard.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition alleging that the Court of
Appeals erred and acted contrary to existing law and jurisprudence in:

I. …GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE PURELY HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF

RESPONDENT'S SOLE WITNESS.

II. …AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH WAS BASED ON
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ADMITTED WITHOUT BEING PROPERLY
AUTHENTICATED. 4

For resolution now are the following issues: Was Jeanne King's testimony hearsay, thus without any
probative value? Should respondent authenticate the documentary evidence it submitted at the trial?

On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that Jeanne King's testimony
was hearsay because she had no personal knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting
respondent's cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list, bill of lading, SGS
Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that even though King was personally
assigned to handle and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, herein
respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the facts which gave rise to
respondent's cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even though she personally prepared the
summary of weight of steel billets received by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of
the weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.

At the outset, we must stress that respondent's cause of action is founded on breach of insurance
contract covering cargo consisting of imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has
to prove, first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at P67,156,300.00, and
second, the actual steel billets delivered to and received by the importer, namely the respondent.
Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle respondent's importations, including their
insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel billets being imported,
and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay, as this doctrine is
defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 5

However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of the imported steel billets.
She did not have personal knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared
the summary of the received steel billets, she based the summary only on the receipts prepared by
other persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It has no probative value even if
not objected to at the trial.
6

On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly authenticate respondent's
documentary evidence. Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is
7 

admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person
before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or
who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to
the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. In this case, respondent admits that
King was none of the aforementioned persons. She merely made the summary of the weight of steel
billets based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of steel
billets actually received had no proven real basis, and King's testimony on this point could not be
taken at face value.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in giving imprimatur to the trial court's ruling with
regard to the admission of documentary evidence submitted by respondent. On this score, we find
petitioner's contention meritorious. Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or
private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Section 20 of the same law, in turn, provides that before any private
8  9 

document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by
anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker. Here, respondent's documentary exhibits are private
documents. They are not among those enumerated in Section 19, thus, their due execution and
authenticity need to be proved before they can be admitted in evidence. With the exception
concerning the summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent presented no
supporting evidence concerning their authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove
10 

less of the insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum, we find no
sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioner's liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 30,
1998 and its resolution on March 25, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45547 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, Civil Case No. 63445 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 79597-98             May 20, 1991

HEIRS OF DEMETRIA LACSA, represented by: BIENVENIDO CABAIS, VIRGINIA CABAIS,

LEONOR CABAIS-PENA and DOLORES CABAIS-MAGPAYO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AURELIO D. SONGCO, ANGEL D. SONGCO ENCARNACION D.
SONGCO, LOURDES D. SONGCO, ANGELA S. SONGCO, LUDIVINA S. SONGCO, JOSEPHINE
S. SONGCO, ALBERT S. SONGCO, INOSENCIO S. SONGCO, JAIME S. SONGCO, MARTIN S.
SONGCO, and BERNARD S. SONGCO, Being Heirs of Inocencio Songco, respondents.

Norbin P. Dimalanta for petitioners.

Dante S. David for private respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV Nos. 08397-08398 dated 16 July 1987 affirming with modification the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, in favor of private respondents, and its resolution dated 14
August 1987 denying the motion for reconsideration.

This petition which originated with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga involves two (2)
cases, namely: Civil Case No. G-1190 and Civil Case No. G-1332. 1

Civil Case No. G-1190 is an action for recovery of possession with damages and preliminary
injunction filed by herein petitioners, the heirs of Demetria Lacsa, against Aurelio Songco and John
Doe based on the principal allegations that petitioners are heirs of deceased Demetria Lacsa who,
during her lifetime, was the owner of a certain parcel of land consisting partly of a fishpond and
partly of uncultivated open space, located in Bancal, Guagua, Pampanga, evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-1038 (11725); that the principal respondent and his predecessor-in-
interest who are neither co-owners of the land nor tenants thereof, thru stealth, fraud and other
forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or possessing the fishpond of said parcel of land and
caused the open space therein to be cleared for expanded occupancy thereof, and refused to vacate
the same despite petitioner's demands on them to vacate. 2

Civil Case No. G-1332 is an action also by herein petitioners against private respondents before the
same lower court for cancellation of title, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction, based
on the allegations that they are the heirs of Demetria Lacsa who was the owner of the land also
involved in Civil Case No. G-1190; that the herein private respondents and their predecessors-in-
interest, thru stealth, fraud and other forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or possessing
the fishpond of the said parcel of land, and later abandoned the same but only after the case was
filed and after all the fish were transferred to the adjoining fishpond owned by the private
respondents; that on 31 October 1923 and 15 March 1924, by presenting to the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga certain forged and absolutely simulated documents, namely: "TRADUCCION AL
CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" and "ESCRITURA DE
VENTA ABSOLUTA", respectively, and by means of false pretenses and misrepresentation,
Inocencio Songco, the private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, succeeded in transferring the
title to said property in his name, to the damage and prejudice of the petitioners; and that a
preliminary injunction was necessary to prevent the private respondents from disposing of said
property.3

Private respondents denied the material allegations of both complaints and alleged as special and
affirmative defenses, petitioners' lack of cause of action, for the reason that Original Certificate of
Title No. RO-1038 (11725) was merely a reconstituted copy issued in April 1983 upon petitioners'
expedient claim that the owner's duplicate copy thereof had been missing when the truth of the
matter was that OCT No. RO-1038 (11725) in the name of Demetria Lacsa, had long been cancelled
and superseded by TCT No. 794 in the name of Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin by virtue of the
document entitled "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRA-
JUDICIAL" entered into by the heirs of Demetria Lacsa; that the latter TCT was in turn superseded
by TCT No. 929 issued in the name of Inocencio Songco (father of private respondents) by virtue of
a document entitled "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA" executed by spouses Juan Limpin and
Alberta Guevarra in favor of said Inocencio Songo. 4

Private respondents, in their answer, pleaded a counterclaim against petitioners based on

allegations that the latter headed by Carlito Magpayo, by force and intimidation, took possession of a
portion of the fishpond in the land and occupied a hut therein, that at that time, private respondents
had 3,000 bangus fingerlings left in the fishpond which upon petitioners' harvest thereof left private
respondents deprived and damaged in the amount of P50,000.00 more or less; that such illegal
occupancy caused private respondents to suffer unrealized income and profits, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and serious anxiety which entitled them to actual, moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney's fees and P500.00 appearance fee for every hearing. 5

On 20 January 1985, the parties assisted by their respective counsel filed in Civil Case No. G-1332
a joint stipulation of facts, alleging:

1. That on June 9, 1982, the plaintiffs, being heirs of Demetria Lacsa, filed Civil Case No.
1190;

2. That after the defendants filed their Answer in the said Civil Case No. G-1190, and
learning the land subject of the two (2) abovementioned cases (sic), said plaintiffs filed a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended and/or Supplemental Complaint.

3. That the said motion was denied by the Honorable Court, hence, said plaintiffs filed Civil
Case No. G-1332, the above-entitled case, with the same cause of action as that of the
proposed Amended and/or Supplemental Complaint;

4. That the evidences of both parties in Civil Case No. G-1190 and in the above-entitled case
are practically and literally the same;

5. That in view of the foregoing, and in order to avoid duplicity of action by repeatedly
presenting the same act of evidences and same set of witnesses, the parties mutually
agreed as they hereby agree and stipulate that any and all evidences presented under Civil
Case No. 1190 shall be adopted as evidences for both parties in the above-entitled case,
and upon submission for resolution of Civil Case No. G-1190, the above-entitled case shall
likewise be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence presented in the
same Civil Case No. G-1190. 6
On the basis of this joint stipulation of facts, the lower court held that:

. . . the fishpond in question was originally owned by Demetria Lacsa under Original
Certificate of Title No. 11725. After Demetria Lacsa died her two daughters Alberta Guevarra
and Ambrocia Guevarra with their respective husbands Juan Limpin and Damaso Cabais
entered into an extrajudicial partition of the properties left by Demetria Lacsa under the
document "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Partition Extra-judicial" dated April 7,
1923 (Exhibits "3","3-A" and "3-B") wherein the fishpond in question was adjudicated to
Alberta Guevarra and which deed was duly registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds
of Pampanga as evidenced by the certification of the Deputy Register of Deeds marked as
Exhibit "3-C". Aside from the "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial" written in the Spanish language, the spouses Alberta Guevarra and Juan
Limpin and the spouses Ambrosia Guevarra and Damaso Cabais executed on April 7, 1923,
another deed of partition in the Pampango dialect marked as Exhibit "3-D" "wherein the
fishpond in question was adjudicated to Alberta Guevarra. As a consequence, Original
Certificate of Title No. 794 (Exhibit "4") was issued to spouses Alberta Guevarra and Juan
Limpin. On January 20, 1924, the spouses Juan Limpin and Alberta Guevarra sold the
fishpond in question to Inocencio Songco under the deed entitled "Escritura de Venta
Absoluta" (Exhibits "7" and "7-A") which was duly registered in the Office of the Registry of
Deeds of Pampanga as evidenced by the certification of the Deputy Register of Deeds
marked Exhibit "7-B". As a result of the sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 794 (Exhibit "4")
in the name of the spouses Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin was cancelled by the Office of
the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 929 was issued to
Inocencio
Songco." 7

The lower court thus held that the fishpond in question belongs to the private respondents, having
been inherited by them from their deceased father Inocencio Songco. 8

The dispositive portion of the judgment in favor of private respondents reads:

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered

In Civil Case No. G - 1190

(A) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. G-1190;

In Civil Case No. G-1332

(B) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. G-1332;

In Both Civil Case No. G-1190 and Civil Case No. G-1332

(C) Ordering the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. RO-1038 (11725) in the name
of Demetria Lacsa;

(D) Ordering the plaintiffs to restore possession of the fishpond in question located in Bancal,
Guagua, Pampanga, to the defendants (sic);

(E) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the defendants the sum of Twenty Five
Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as and for moral damages;
 (F) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the defendants the sum of Twenty Five
Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as and for exemplary damages;

(G) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the defendants the sum of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as attorney's fees;

(H) Costs against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED. 9

Petitioners appealed the above-mentioned decision to the respondent Court of Appeals assigning
the following errors allegedly committed by the lower court:

I. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF

THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS THAT THE TWO DOCUMENTS (EXHS. 3 & 7 AND THEIR
SUB-MARKINGS) WERE FORGED AND ABSOLUTELY SIMULATED DOCUMENTS.
HENCE, NULL AND VOID;

II. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SIGNATURE OF JUAN
LIMPIN AND THUMBMARK OF ALBERTA GUEVARRA APPEARING ON THE EXCRITUA
DE VENTA ABSOLUTA (EXHS. 7 & 7-A) WERE FORGED;

III. IN APPRECIATING IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED

BY WITNESS JESUS CRUZ WHEN THEIR SOURCES COULD NOT BE ACCOUNTED
FOR AND THEIR AUTHENTICITY IS IN QUESTION;

IV. IN HOLDING THAT INOCENCIO SONGCO, THE PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF

THE APPELLEES WAS AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE;

V. IN HOLDING THAT TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 929 WAS ISSUED TO

INOCENCIO SONGCO BY THE REGISTERED TRY OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA;

VI. IN HOLDING THAT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. RO-1038 (11725) WAS
ISSUED BY THE COURT (CFI-III PAMPANGA) IN EXCESS OF OR WITHOUT
JURISDICTION AND THEREFORE NULL AND VOID;

VII. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT THE VOLUNTARY ABANDONMENT OF THE

FISHPOND IN QUESTION BY THE APPELLEES WAS A RECOGNITION OF
APPELLANTS' TITLE TO IT;

VIII. IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE APPELLEES. 10

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in the appealed case, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
appellants are not liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED. 11
Petitioners flied a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in
its resolution dated 14 August 1987.  Hence, this petition.
12

Petitioners assign the following alleged errors to the Court of Appeals:

I. IN APPLYING THE "ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE" ON THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENT

ENTITLED "ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" AND "ESCRITURA DE VENTA
ABSOLUTA; AND MARKED DURING THE TRIAL AS EXHIBITS "3" AND "7",
RESPECTIVELY, FOR THE RESPONDENT HEREIN;

II. IN DISREGARDING THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF THE NOTARIAL LAW

WHICH TOOK EFFECT AS EARLY AS FEBRUARY 1, 1903;

III. IN DISREGARDING THE RULE ON PROOF OF PUBLIC OR OFFICIAL RECORD,

(SEC. 25, RULE 132, RULES OF COURT) 13

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals wrongfully applied the "ancient document rule"
provided in Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.  The rule states that:
14

Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary.— Were a private writing is more than thirty
years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is
unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its
execution and authenticity need be given.

It is submitted by petitioners that under this rule, for a document to be classified as an "ancient
document", it must not only be at least thirty (30) years old but it must also be found in the proper
custody and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from suspicion.  Thus, according to
15

petitioners, exhibits "3" and "7", entitled "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial" and "Escritura de Venta Absoluta", respectively, can not qualify under the foregoing
rule, for the reason that since the "first pages" of said documents do not bear the signatures of the
alleged parties thereto, this constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget unlimited alterations. 16

We are not persuaded by the contention. Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient
document to be exempt from proof of due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more
than thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled; (1) that it is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is
unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. 17

The first document, Exhibit "3", entitled 'Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial" was executed on 7 April 1923 whereas the second document, exhibit "7", entitled
"Escritura de Venta Absoluta" was executed on 20 January 1924. These documents are, therefore,
more than thirty (30) years old. Both copies of the aforementioned documents were certified as exact
copies of the original on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by the Deputy
Register of Deeds. There is a further certification with regard to the Pampango translation of the
document of extrajudicial partition which was issued by the Archives division, Bureau of Records
Management of the Department of General Services. 18

Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind third parties, must be recorded
with the appropriate Register of Deeds. The documents in question, being certified as copies
of originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to be found in the
proper custody. Clearly, therefore, the first two (2) requirements of the "ancient document
rule" were met.

As to the last requirement that the document must on its face appear to be genuine, petitioners did
not present any conclusive evidence to support their allegation of falsification of the said documents.
They merely alluded to the fact that the lack of signatures on the first two (2) pages could have
easily led to their substitution. We cannot uphold this surmise absent any proof whatsoever. As held
in one case, a contract apparently honest and lawful on its face must be treated as such and one
who assails the genuineness of such contract must present conclusive evidence of falsification. 19

Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that a document must be unblemished
by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality of the document itself.
The lack of signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that the documents in question, which were certified
as copied of the originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and free from
any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.

The documents in question are "ancient documents" as envisioned in Sec. 22 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.  Further proof of their due execution and authenticity is no longer required. Having
1âwphi1

held that the documents in question are private writings which are more than thirty (30) years old,
come from the proper repository thereof, and are unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of
suspicion, there is no further need for these documents to fulfill the requirements of the 1903
Notarial Law. Hence, the other contentions of the petitioners that the documents do not fulfill the
mandatory requirements of the Notarial Law  and that the proper person or public official was not
20

presented to testify on his certification of the documents in question,  need not be resolved as they
21

would no longer serve any purpose.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127745            April 22, 2003

FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A. MONTINOLA, EDUARDO

A. MONTINOLA, JR., petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, as
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the Late Juan Bon Fing Sy, respondents-appellees.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Court of Appeals Decision of May 31, 1996 and Resolution of December 9, 1996.

On February 7, 1990, herein petitioner-appellant Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as

creditor, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a petition, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 4497, for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy (the deceased) who died
on January 10, 1990. Sanson claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount
of P603,000.00 and to his sister Celedonia Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount
of P360,000.00.1
Petitioners-appellants Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Angeles) later filed
separate claims against the estate, alleging that the deceased owed them P50,000.00
and P150,000.00, respectively.2

By Order of February 12, 1991, Branch 28 of the Iloilo RTC to which the petition was raffled,
appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the deceased, as administratrix of his estate, following
which she was issued letters of administration.3

During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade Montinola, wife of
claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified on the transactions that gave rise thereto, over the
objection of the administratrix who invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
otherwise known as the Dead Man’s Statute which reads:

SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.—Parties or

assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person
of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
(Emphasis supplied)

Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she had a transaction with the
deceased which is evidenced by six checks4 issued by him before his death; before the deceased
died, Celedonia tried to enforce settlement of the checks from his (the deceased’s) son Jerry who
told her that his father would settle them once he got well but he never did; and after the death of the
deceased, Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for payment but were dishonored5 due to the
closure of his account.6

Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she knew that the deceased
issued five checks7 to Sanson in settlement of a debt; and after the death of the deceased, Sanson
presented the checks to the bank for payment but were returned due to the closure of his account.8

Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo Montinola, Jr. and mother-in-law Angeles,
testified that on separate occasions, the deceased borrowed P50,000 and P150,000 from her
husband and mother-in-law, respectively, as shown by three checks issued by the deceased,9 two to
Angeles and the other10 to Eduardo Montinola, Jr.; before the deceased died or sometime in August
1989, they advised him that they would be depositing the checks, but he told them not to as he
would pay them cash, but he never did; and after the deceased died on January 10, 1990, they
deposited the checks but were dishonored as the account against which they were drawn was
closed,11 hence, their legal counsel sent a demand letter12 dated February 6, 1990 addressed to the
deceased’s heirs Melicia, James, Mini and Jerry Sy, and Symmels I & II but the checks have
remained unsettled.13

The administratrix, denying having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the claims, nevertheless alleged that if they ever existed, they had been paid and
extinguished, are usurious and illegal and are, in any event, barred by prescription.14 And she
objected to the admission of the checks and check return slips-exhibits offered in evidence by the
claimants upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are disqualified under the Dead
Man’s Statute.
Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade, the administratrix asserted that
they are inadmissible because Jade is the daughter-in-law of claimant Angeles and wife of claimant
Eduardo Montinola, Jr., hence, she is covered by the above-said rule on disqualification.

At all events, the administratrix denied that the checks-exhibits were issued by the deceased and
that the return slips were issued by the depository/clearing bank.15

After the claimants rested their case, the administratrix filed four separate manifestations informing
the trial court that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their claims.16

Finding that the Dead Man’s Statute does not apply to the witnesses who testified in support of the
subject claims against the estate, the trial court issued an Order of December 8, 1993,17 the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, Judicial Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, is hereby ordered, to pay, in due

course of administration, creditors-claimants Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of
P603,500.00; Celedonia S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00;18 Angeles A. Montinola, in
the amount of P150,000.00 and Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00, from
the assets and/or properties of the above-entitled intestate estate.

On appeal by the administratrix upon the following assignment of errors:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CLAIM[S] FOR FAILURE TO PAY
THE FILING FEES THEREON

II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE CLAIM[S] BECAUSE [THEY ARE]
ALREADY BARRED BY THE LAW OF LIMITATIONS OR STATUTE OF NON-CLAIMS

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT CLAIMANT[S’] EVIDENCE OF THE
CLAIM IS INCOMPETENT UNDER THE DEAD MAN’S STATUTE, AND INADMISSIBLE

IV.

THE ALLEGED CHECKS ARE INADMISSIBLE AS PRIVATE DOCUMENTS,19

the Court of Appeals set aside the December 8, 1993 Order of the trial court, by Decision of May 31,
1996, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and another order is
entered dismissing the claims of:

1. Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00;

2. Celdonia S. Saquin, in the amount of P315,000.00;20

 3. Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00; and

4. Eduardo Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00 against the estate of the deceased
JUAN BON FING SY.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. (Italics supplied)

The claimants’ Motion for Reconsideration21 of the Court of Appeals decision having been denied by
Resolution of December 9, 1996,22 they filed the present petition anchored on the following assigned
errors:

FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

TESTIMONY OF JADE MONTINOLA IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE CLAIMS OF
CLAIMANTS ANGELES A. MONTINOLA AND EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR..

SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, 4TH DIVISION, ERRED IN FINDING THAT

CLAIMANT FELICITO G. SANSON IS DISQUALIFIED TO TESTIFY [ON] THE CLAIM OF
CELEDONIA SANSON-SA[Q]UIN AND VI[C]E VERSA. (Underscoring in the original)23

With respect to the first assigned error, petitioners argue that since the administratrix did not deny
the testimony of Jade nor present any evidence to controvert it, and neither did she deny the
execution and genuineness of the checks issued by the deceased (as well as the check return slips
issued by the clearing bank), it was error for the Court of Appeals to find the evidence of the
Montinolas insufficient to prove their claims.

The administratrix counters that the due execution and authenticity of the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas were not duly proven since Jade did not categorically state that she saw the filling up and
signing of the checks by the deceased, hence, her testimony is self-serving; besides, as Jade had
identical and unitary interest with her husband and mother-in-law, her testimony was a circumvention
of the Dead Man’s Statute.24

The administratrix’s counter-argument does not lie. Relationship to a party has never been
recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the credibility of the witness or—
subject only to well recognized exceptions none of which is here present—the admissibility
of the testimony. At most, closeness of relationship to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a
little more caution in the assessment of a witness’ testimony but is not necessarily a negative
element which should be taken as diminishing the credit otherwise accorded to it.25

Jade’s testimony on the genuineness of the deceased’s signature on the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas is clear:

xxx

Q:         Showing to you this check dated July 16, 1989, Far East Bank and Trust Company
Check No. 84262, in the amount of P100,000.00, is this the check you are referring to?
 A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         There appears a signature in the face of the check. Whose signature is this?

A:         That is the signature of Mr. Sy.

Q:         Why do you know that this is the signature of Mr. Sy?

A:         Because he signed this check I was . . . I was present when he signed this check.

xxx

Q:         Showing to you this check dated September 8, 1989, is this the check you are
referring to?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         Why do you know that this is his signature?

A:         I was there when he signed the same.

xxx

Q:         Showing to you this Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No. 84262 dated July
6, 1989, in the amount of P50,000.00, in the name of Eduardo Montinola, are you referring to
this check?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         Whose signature is this appearing on the face of this check?

A:         Mr. Sy’s signature.

Q:         Why do you know that it is his signature?

A:         I was there when he signed the same.

x x x26 (Emphasis supplied)

The genuineness of the deceased’s signature having been shown, he is prima facie presumed to
have become a party to the check for value, following Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
which reads:

Section 24. Presumption of Consideration. – Every negotiable instrument is

deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every
person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.
(Underscoring and italics in the original; emphasis supplied),
Since, with respect to the checks issued to the Montinolas, the prima facie presumption was not
rebutted or contradicted by the administratrix who expressly manifested that she was dispensing
with the presentation of evidence against their claims, it has become conclusive.

As for the administratrix’s invocation of the Dead Man’s Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The
rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted.

xxx

The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to
disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above
enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction between
the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein.

x x x27 (Italics supplied)

Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is
being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those
involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties.
Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to
the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be
discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still
prosper on the basis of their documentary evidence—the checks.

As to the second assigned error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as
witnesses to each other’s claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Man’s
Statute;28 besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined
them.

The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on
review, the pertinent portion of which reads:

The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from
testifying in each other’s favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.

Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing
between testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified
from testifying for his co-parties. The law speaks of "parties or assignors of parties to a
case." Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each other’s behalf, as co-
parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in the
original and emphasis supplied)

But Sanson’s and Celedonia’s claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions.
Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonia’s claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect
to Sanson’s claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the other’s transaction.

In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon
a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of
testimony.29 Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-
documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
This brings this Court to the matter of the authenticity of the signature of the deceased appearing on
the checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia. By Celedonia’s account, she "knows" the signature of
the deceased.

xxx

Q:         Showing to you these checks already marked as Exhibit "A" to "E", please go over
these checks if you know the signatures of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy? on these checks?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         Insofar as the amount that he borrowed from you, he also issued checks?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         And therefore, you know his signature?

A:         Yes, sir.

x x x30

Sanson testified too that he "knows" the signature of the deceased:

xxx

Q:         I show you now checks which were already marked as Exhibit "A" to "G-1" – Saquin,
please go over this if these are the checks that you said was issued by the late Juan Bon
Fing Sy in favor of your sister?

A:         Yes, these are the same che[c]ks.

Q:         Do you know the signature of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy?

A:         Yes, sir.

Q:         And these signatures are the same signatures that you know?

A:         Yes, sir.

x x x31

While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged the quantum of
proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may be

proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
x x x,
not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a comparison32 with the naked eye of
the deceased’s signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas with that of the
checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all of which checks were drawn from the same account, they
appear to have been affixed by one and the same hand.

In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence, substantiated their claims against
the estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix who, however,
expressly opted not to discharge the same when she manifested that she was dispensing with the
presentation of evidence against the claims.

WHEREFORE, the impugned May 31, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE
and another rendered ordering the intestate estate of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy, through
Administratrix Melecia T. Sy, to pay:

1) Felicito G. Sanson, the amount of P603,500.00;

2) Celedonia S. Saquin, the amount of P315.000.00;33

3) Angeles Montinola, the amount of P150,000.00; and

4) Eduardo Montinola, Jr., the amount of P50,000.00.

representing unsettled checks issued by the deceased.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. CA-02-14-P            July 31, 2002

LEONOR MARIANO, complainant,
vs.
SUSAN ROXAS, CLERK III, COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The present administrative case arose from the complaint-affidavit of Leonora Mariano filed with the
Court of Appeals (CA) on May 8, 2001, docketed therein as Administrative Case No. 01-01-G,
charging Susan Roxas, Clerk III, assigned at the Third Division of the said court, with forgery and
dishonesty.

In her complaint-affidavit,1 complainant alleged that respondent refused to pay P12,110.00. This is

the balance of the price of jewelry items complainant sold to respondent. The latter insists she made
an overpayment as shown by 4 receipts dated (1) January 25, 2001 for P5,525.00; (2) February 15,
2001 for P6,500.00; (3) April 14, 2000 for P400.00; and (4) April 16, 2000 for P400.00. These
receipts were forged.

Complainant further alleged that in a letter dated February 5, 2001 addressed to the Cashier of the
CA, respondent authorized complainant to collect her (respondent’s) benefits "on March 2001 and so
on up to the total amount of P30,000.00 more or less" as payment for her outstanding obligation.
However, on April 18, 2001, respondent revoked the said authorization without informing the
complainant, thus committing dishonesty.

In a Memorandum dated June 5, 2001,2 Justice Cancio C. Garcia, then Acting Presiding Justice of
the CA, directed respondent to file her answer and manifest if she opts for a hearing.

On June 14, 2001, respondent submitted her counter-affidavit3 and manifested her desire for a full-
blown hearing of the charges against her. She claimed that she had overpaid complainant in the
amount of P6,425.00; that she could present witnesses to prove that she made several payments on
various occasions; and that complainant issued to her the corresponding receipts.

On June 19, 2001, Acting Presiding Justice Garcia designated Atty. Elisa Pilar-Longalong, Assistant
Clerk of Court, to conduct an investigation and to submit a report and recommendation.

On July 23, 2001, respondent submitted her supplementary affidavit,4 explaining that she revoked
complainant’s authority to receive from the CA whatever benefit was due her (respondent) because
she had made an overpayment. Respondent also explained that the receipts mentioned in the
complaint are authentic as they were personally handed to her by complainant on two separate
occasions within the CA premises.

On October 30, 2001, complainant filed with the CA a supplemental affidavit-complaint5 showing

respondent’s balance in the amount of P12,110.00, and denying that respondent paid her debt.

After conducting an investigation, Atty. Pilar-Longalong submitted to the CA her Report and
Recommendation dated January 28, 2002,6 quoted in part, thus:

"On February 22, 2000, Mrs. Mariano sold to Mrs. Roxas a total of P55,700.00 worth of
assorted pieces of jewelry (Exh. F), payable on installment. Mrs. Roxas paid Mrs.
Mariano P2,000.00 on March 3, 2000 (Exhs. C and F) and P800.00 on March 15, 2000 (Exh.
F). On an unspecified later date, Mrs. Mariano sold one 18K gold chain necklace
worth P2,500.00 (Exh. F). On April 16, 2000, Mrs. Roxas paid P400.00 to Mrs. Mariano
(Exhs. F and C). On an unspecified later date, Mrs. Roxas returned to Mrs.
Mariano P30,900.00 worth of pieces of jewelry which were later sold to Armin Arzaga,
another Court employee, also on installment basis and which has been settled (Exh. F). This
left an unpaid balance of P24,100.00 of Mrs. Roxas as of March 12, 2001 (Exh. F-1).

"On February 5, 2001, Mrs. Roxas executed a written authority to the Court Cashier for Mrs.
Mariano to get her benefits in March, 2001 and thereafter up to payment of the total amount
of P30,000.00 more or less (Exh. D). Pursuant thereto, on March 9, 2001, Mrs. Mariano
received P5,000.00 from the Court Cashier Leo Ulanday (Exhs. F, C-2, and 3-b) as partial
payment of Mrs. Roxas. On March 12, 2001, Mrs. Mariano again received from the Court
Cashier P6,990.00 as partial payment of Mrs. Roxas (Exhs. F, C-1 and 3-a), thus leaving an
unpaid balance of P12,110.00 (Exh. F-1). On April 18, 2001, Mrs. Roxas revoked the
authority in favor of Mrs. Mariano by a letter to the Court Cashier on the ground that she
overpaid Mrs. Mariano (Exhs. 1 and 2) by P6,425.00 (Exh. C).

"The amounts Mrs. Roxas claimed as overpayments referred to alleged payments made by
her on January 25, 2001 in the amount of P5,525.00, on February 15, 2001 in the amount
of P6,500.00, and on an unspecified date in the amount of P400.00 (Exh. C), evidenced by
receipts purportedly signed by Mrs. Mariano. The latter denied she received said amounts on
said dates and that she signed and issued those receipts since those signatures are
forgeries. She also claimed that she never issues typewritten receipts as the one Mrs. Roxas
presented evidencing her alleged payment on January 25, 2001 and on February 15, 2001.
This fact was corroborated by her witness, Lorna Caraga, a friend and former officemate who
affirmed that the signature on the aforementioned receipts are not Mrs. Mariano’s whose
signature she is familiar with and whom she knows as one who does not issue typewritten
receipts. Moreover, Mrs. Mariano presented a medical certificate (Exh. G) that on January
25, 2001 when she was supposed to have been paid the amount of P5,525.00 for which she
purportedly issued a typewritten receipt, she was in fact sick in Bulacan and went to her
doctor’s clinic (Exhs. E, G, and G-1). The foregoing belies Mrs. Roxas’ uncorroborated claim
that she paid Mrs. Mariano on January 25, 2001 at the Court Canteen for which the latter
issued the typewritten receipt (Exhs. C-4 and 3-d).

"With respect to the alleged payment on February 15, 2001 in front of the Court Auditorium
for which another signed typewritten receipt was issued (Exhs. C-3 and 3-c), the same is not
credible as said date is only a few days after Mrs. Roxas issued on February 5, 2001 and
authority to Mrs, Mariano to get her benefits from the Court Cashier (Exhs. D and E). The
testimony of Mrs. Roxas’ friend Mercy Valencia on the payment and issuance of the
typewritten receipt on said date is not credible since despite claiming being present, she did
not know the alleged amount paid by Mrs. Roxas, did not read the alleged receipt issued, did
not know the alleged contents thereof and did not see Mrs. Mariano signed the alleged
receipt. Besides, she erroneously claimed that she saw the prints and signature written in
blue ballpen when in fact the alleged receipt was typewritten with only the alleged signature
in blue ink (Exhs. C-3 and 3-c). With respect to the alleged receipt for the payment of
P400.00, the same, although handwritten, did not bear any signature of Mrs. Mariano (Exhs.
C-6 and 3-f), hence, can not be considered as proof of her receipt of payment.

"Moreover, an examination of the receipts which Mrs. Mariano claims to be forged (Exhs. C-
3 and 3-C, C-4 and 3-d) show to the naked eye that there are differences from her genuine
signatures, thus supporting Mrs. Mariano’s and Mrs. Caraga‘s statements that those
signatures are forged and not those of Mrs. Mariano.

"Hence, Mrs. Mariano has established by sufficient evidence that Mrs. Roxas still has an
unpaid balance of P12,110.00 (Exh. F-1) and that the two receipts she presented whose
signatures Mrs. Mariano disowns and the other unsigned receipt are not accurate records of
the transactions between them and do not prove that Mrs. Roxas had overpaid complainant.
Mrs. Mariano would not have wasted her time, effort and money hiring a lawyer and
commuting from Bulacan several times if she been fully paid the amount due her.

x x x           x x x           x x x

"However, the charge of forgery is a criminal offense which should have been filed in the
proper forum, not in an administrative proceeding. The proper administrative offense for the
act complained of is misconduct, for which Mrs. Roxas maybe found liable.

"Mrs. Roxas action in unilaterally revoking the authority of Mrs. Mariano to collect her
benefits does not constitute dishonesty. Her act more properly constitutes the administrative
offense of refusal to pay her debts. Her cancellation of the authority to collect her benefits
was deliberately done in bad faith for the purpose of avoiding payment, which is tantamount
to willful failure to pay just debts. x x x.

"In view of all the foregoing, it is recommended that:

 "1. The complaint for forgery be dismissed. Instead, Mrs. Roxas be found guilty of
misconduct, and since this is her first offense, the penalty of suspension for one month and
one day be imposed on her; and

"2. Mrs. Roxas be reprimanded for her willful failure to pay her debts and that she be ordered
to pay Mrs. Mariano the balance of her debt in the amount of P12,110.00 thru payroll
deduction by the Court Cashier by equal weekly deductions from the salaries and benefits
due her until the total amount of P12,110.00 is fully paid. In this connection, the Court
Cashier may be ordered to deduct and deliver the said weekly payments direct to Mrs.
Mariano."

Finding the Report and Recommendation of Atty. Pilar-Longalong in order, then CA Presiding
Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez7 issued an Order dated February 6, 2002,8 quoted as follows:

"WHEREFORE, Susan Roxas is hereby found guilty of misconduct and since this is her first
offense, the penalty of suspension for one month and one day is hereby imposed on her.
She is also hereby reprimanded for her willful failure to pay just debts to Mrs. Mariano. Mrs.
Roxas is hereby ordered to pay Mrs. Mariano the balance of her debt in the amount of P12,
110.00."

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated March 26, 2002.9

In a letter dated April 1, 2002, the CA transmitted to this Court the records of this case.

In administrative proceedings, such as the one at bar, the quantum of proof required to establish the
administrative liability of respondent is substantial evidence, not proof beyond reasonable
doubt.10 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.11

Based on the evidence on record, we hold that respondent is administratively liable.

As correctly found by the CA, respondent has still an unpaid balance of P12,110.00. The receipts
she presented to prove that she overpaid complainant P6,425.00 were forged. As found by the CA,
there are marked differences between the signatures in the receipts and complainant’s specimen
signature which are easily discernible by the naked eye. That the receipts are not genuine was
confirmed by Lorna Caraga.12 She testified that she is familiar with the signature of complainant who
was her officemate for a period of 5 years in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 130, Caloocan
City. In many occasions, complainant signed documents in her presence. Her opinion as to
complainant’s genuine signature is admissible in evidence pursuant to Section 50, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence which provides:

"Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. – The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is
given, may be received in evidence regarding –

xxx

(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

x x x" (Emphasis ours)

Corollarily, Section 22, Rule 132 of the same Rules provides that:
 "Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may
be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because
he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting
of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge." (Emphasis ours)

Respondent’s act of forging those receipts to avoid her contractual obligation affects not only her
integrity as a public servant but more importantly, the integrity of the Judiciary where she is
connected. As a court employee, respondent should bear in mind that the court is regarded by the
public with respect. For this reason, the conduct of every court personnel should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility and must at all times be characterized by, among other
things, uprightness, propriety and decorum. Respondent failed to meet this exacting standard. Her
actuation, although arising from a private transaction, has tarnished the image of her public office.

Respondent’s offense constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, not
misconduct as held by the CA. As an administrative offense, misconduct must have direct relation to
and be connected with the performance of official duty,13 which circumstance is absent in this case.

Pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19,
series of 1999, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is classified as a grave
administrative offense punishable by suspension of six (6) months and 1 day to one (1) year if
committed for the first time, as in this case. Considering that the value involved in the forged receipts
is minimal, this Court deems that the penalty of six (6) months suspension is in order.

With respect to respondent’s act of revoking the authority of complainant to collect her
(respondent’s) benefits in payment of her debt, we agree with the CA that the same is tantamount to
a willful failure to pay just debt. Such offense, under the same CSC Circular, is classified as a light
administrative offense which carries a penalty of reprimand if committed for the first time, as in this
case. In addition, respondent should pay complainant her indebtedness.14

It may not be amiss to state that respondent, like any other member of the Judiciary, is expected to
be a model of fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in her personal
actuations, including business and commercial transactions. Any conduct that would be a bane to
the public trust and confidence reposed on the Judiciary shall not be countenanced.15

WHEREFORE, respondent Susan Roxas is adjudged GUILTY of CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO

THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE and WILLFUL FAILURE TO PAY HER JUST DEBT.
She is SUSPENDED for SIX (6) MONTHS and is REPRIMANDED.

Respondent is further ordered to PAY complainant the sum of P12,110.00, representing her unpaid
debt, through payroll deductions.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 170071 : July 16, 2012]

HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA NAMELY: RUBY B. OCHOA MICAELA B.

OCHOA AND JOMAR B. OCHOA, PETITIONER, VS. G & S TRANSPORT
 CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

[G.R. NO. 170125]

G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL

K. OCHOA NAMELY: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B. OCHOA AND JOMAR B.
OCHOA, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration [1] of our March 9, 2011 Decision filed by G &
S Transport Corporation (G & S). cralaw

Brief Background

On March 9, 2011, we rendered a Decision[2] in the consolidated petitions of G &

S[3] and of the heirs.[4] These petitions stemmed from a Complaint [5] for Damages filed
by the heirs against G & S with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 164
on account of Jose Marcial’s death while onboard a taxicab owned and operated by G &
S.cralaw

The RTC adjudged G & S guilty of breach of contract of carriage and ordered it to pay
the heirs the following amounts:

1. P50,000 as civil indemnity;

2. P6,537,244.96 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased;
3. P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees; and,
4. costs of litigation.[6]

Acting upon the heirs’ Partial Motion for Reconsideration, [7] the RTC also ordered G & S
to pay the heirs the following:

1. P300,000.00 as moral damages;

2. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.[8]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Decision but with the
modifications that the awards for loss of income in the amount of P6,537,244.96 be
deleted and that moral damages be reduced to P200,000.00. [9] The deletion was
ordered on the ground that the income certificate issued by Jose Marcial’s employer,
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), is self-serving,
unreliable and biased, and that the same was not supported by competent evidence
such as income tax returns or receipts. With respect to moral damages, the CA found
the same excessive and disproportionate to the award of P50,000.00 exemplary
damages. Thus, the same was reduced to P200,000.00.[10] chanrobles virtual law library

The parties’ respective appeals[11] from the CA Decision became the subject of this
Court’s March 9, 2011 Decision which denied G & S’s petition and partly granted that of
the heirs. The Court affirmed the assailed CA Decision with the modifications that G & S
is ordered to pay the heirs P6,611,634.59 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased,
as well as moral damages in the reduced amount of P100,000.00. The dispositive
portion of our March 9, 2011 Decision, reads: chanrobles virtualaw library

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 170071 is PARTLY
GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 170125 is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution dated June 29, 2005 and October 12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 75602 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that G & S is ordered
to pay the heirs of Jose Marcial K. Ochoa the sum of P6,611,634.59 for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased and P100,000.00 as moral damages. cralaw

SO ORDERED.[12]

G & S’s Motion for Reconsideration 

G & S filed a Motion for Reconsideration[13] arguing that the USAID Certification used as
basis in computing the award for loss of income is inadmissible in evidence because it
was not properly authenticated and identified in court by the signatory thereof; that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
its employees and, hence, was able to overcome the presumption of fault imputed to it;
and, that while settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts, G & S can seek a
review of facts even if it did not particularly state under which exception to such rule its
case falls. cralaw

The heirs’ Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration

In their Comment,[14] the heirs point out that G & S’s arguments have already been
squarely passed upon by this Court and by the lower courts. Moreover, these
arguments involve questions of fact which cannot be reviewed in a petition for review
on certiorari. As to the USAID Certification, the heirs aver that the same was properly
admitted in evidence. This is because Jose Marcial’s widow, witness Ruby Bueno Ochoa,
was able to competently testify as to the authenticity and due execution of the said
Certification since the signatory thereof, Jonas Cruz (Cruz), personally issued and
handed the same to her. In addition, the accuracy of the contents of the Certification
was never questioned by G & S as, in fact, it did not present evidence to dispute its
contents.cralaw

The Court’s Ruling

The Motion for Reconsideration is denied. cralaw

The requirement of authentication of

documentary evidence applies only to a
private document.

It is true that before a private document offered as authentic be received in evidence,

its due execution and authenticity must first be proved. [15] However, it must be
remembered that this requirement of authentication only pertains to private documents
and “does not apply to public documents, these being admissible without further proof
of their due execution or genuineness. Two reasons may be advanced in support of this
rule, namely: said documents have been executed in the proper registry and are
presumed to be valid and genuine until the contrary is shown by clear and convincing
proof; and, second, because public documents are authenticated by the official
signature and seals which they bear and of which seals, courts may take judicial
notice.”[16] Hence, in a case, the Court held that in the presentation of public documents
as evidence, due execution and authenticity thereof are already presumed. [17] chanrobles virtual law library

The subject USAID Certification is a

public document, hence, does not require
authentication.

It therefore becomes necessary to first ascertain whether the subject USAID

Certification is a private or public document before this Court can rule upon the
correctness of its admission and consequent use as basis for the award of loss of
income in these cases. cralaw

Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court classifies documents as either public or
private, viz:
chanrobles virtualaw library

Sec. 19. Classes of Documents – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private. cralaw

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;
and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein. All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)

Paragraph (a) of the above-quoted provision classifies the written official acts, or
records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country, as public documents.
As mentioned in our March 9, 2011 Decision, USAID is the principal United States
agency that extends assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape
poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms and that it is an independent federal
government agency that receives over-all foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of
State of the United States.[18] A further research on said agency shows that it was
created through Executive Order 10973[19] by President John F. Kennedy on November
3, 1961 pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. [20] It is headed by an
Administrator and Deputy Administrator, both appointed by the President of the Unites
States and confirmed by its Senate.[21] From these, there can be no doubt that the
USAID is an official government agency of a foreign country, the United States. Hence,
Cruz, as USAID’s Chief of the Human Resources Division in the Philippines, is actually a
public officer. Apparently, Cruz’s issuance of the subject USAID Certification was made
in the performance of his official functions, he having charge of all employee files and
information as such officer. In view of these, it is clear that the USAID
Certification is a public document pursuant to paragraph (a), Sec. 19, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court. Hence, and consistent with our above discussion, the
authenticity and due execution of said Certification are already presumed. Moreover, as
a public document issued in the performance of a duty by a public officer, the subject
USAID Certification is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.[22] And, there
being no clear and sufficient evidence presented by G & S to overcome these
presumptions, the RTC is correct when it admitted in evidence the said document. The
USAID Certification could very well be used as basis for the award for loss of income to
the heirs.
cralaw

G & S failed to overcome the presumption

that “the common carrier is at fault or is negligent
when a passenger dies or is injured.”[23]chanrobles virtual law library

G & S insists that it exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family when it
hired and continued to employ Bibiano Padilla, Jr. (the driver of the ill-fated Avis
taxicab). It claims that it was able to prove this through the documentary exhibits it
submitted before the trial court and that the same are sufficient to relieve it from
liability to the heirs.
cralaw

The reasons advanced by G & S in support of this argument are mere rehash if not a
repetition of those raised in its petition which have already been considered and passed
upon in our March 9, 2011 Decision and, hence, do not require reconsideration. The
conclusion therefore that G & S failed to overcome the presumption that the common
carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured stands. cralaw

There is no compelling reason to reexamine

the factual findings of the lower courts.

G & S questions the portion of our March 9, 2011 Decision which reads: chanrobles virtualaw library

In this case, the said three issues boil down to the determination of the following
questions: What is the proximate cause of the death of Jose Marcial? Is the testimony
of prosecution witness Clave credible? Did G & S exercise the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees? Suffice it to say that these
are all questions of fact which require this Court to inquire into the probative value of
the evidence presented before the trial court. As we have consistently held, “[t]his
Court is not a trier of facts. It is not a function of this court to analyze or weigh
evidence. When we give due course to such situations, it is solely by way of exception.
Such exceptions apply only in the presence of extremely meritorious cases.” Here, we
note that although G & S enumerated in its Consolidated Memorandum the
exceptions to the rule that a petition for review on certiorari should only raise
questions of law, it nevertheless did not point out under what exception its
case falls. And, upon review of the records of the case, we are convinced that
it does not fall under any. Hence, we cannot proceed to resolve said issues and
disturb the findings and conclusions of the CA with respect thereto. x x x [24] (Emphasis
supplied.)

G & S avers that its failure to indicate the specific ground/exception for this Court to
review the facts of the case should not be taken against it. It contends that even if it
failed to specify which of the exceptions is applicable here, the Court should have
nonetheless determined the existence of any of the said exceptions on its own. cralaw

This matter has been properly addressed in our March 9, 2011 Decision. While we
indeed mentioned that G & S failed to indicate under which of the exceptions its case
falls, the line following that portion states that “And, upon review of the records of the
case, we are convinced that it does not fall under any.” It is plain from this statement
that although G & S failed to specify the reason why we should resolve factual
questions in these cases, we nevertheless have carefully studied the records to
ascertain whether there exists sufficient justification for us to re-examine the factual
findings of the lower courts. And convinced that there is none, we adhered to the
settled principle that a review of the factual findings of the lower courts is outside the
province of a Petition for Review on  Certiorari.

The award of attorney’s fees and cost

of litigation should be deleted. 

While we are constrained to deny the present Motion Reconsideration for the reasons
above-stated, we cannot, however, end without discussing the awards of attorney's
fees and costs of litigation.
cralaw

In Mercury Drug Corporation v. Baking.[25] the Court held viz: chanrobles virtualaw library

On the matter of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, it is settled that the reasons
or grounds for the award thereof must be set forth in the decision of the court.  Since
the trial court's decision did not give the basis of the award, the same must be deleted. 
In Vibram Manufacturing Corporation v. Manila Electric Company, we held: chanrobles virtualaw library

Likewise, the award for attorney's fees and litigation expenses should be deleted.  Well-
enshrined is that 'an award for attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the court's
decision and not in the dispositive portion only' (Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation (Solidbank) v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 193 [1995]) and Keng Hua
Paper Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 257 [1998]). This is also true with
the litigation expenses where the body of the decision discusses nothing for its basis.

The Text of the court  a quo's Decision is bereft of any factual or legal justification for
the awards of attorney's fees and costs of litigation.  It merely declared the grant of
said awards to the heirs in the dispositive portion of its decision.  Hence, the same
should be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the awards of attorney's fees and costs of litigation are DELETED.  G &
S's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 206284

REDANTE SARTO Y MISALUCHA, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 31 July 2012
Decision  and the 6 March 2013 Resolution  of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 32635,
1 2

which affirmed the 18 May 2009 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga
3

City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400 finding petitioner Redante Sarto y

Misalucha (Redante) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy

THE FACTS

On 3 October 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly contracting two (2)
marriages: the first, with Maria Socorro G. Negrete (Maria Socorro), and the second, without having
the first one legally terminated, with private complainant Fe R. Aguila (Fe). The charge stemmed
from a criminal complaint filed by Fe against Redante on 4 June 2007. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

That on or about December 29, 1998, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage
with one Ma. Socorro G. Negrete, as evidenced by hereto attached Certificate of Marriage mark as
Annex "A," and without said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there, willfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with FE R. AGUILA-SARTO, herein complaining witness, to
her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

During his arraignment on 3 December 2007, Redante entered a plea of "not guilty." Pre-trial ensued
wherein Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages but interposed the defense that his
first marriage had been legally dissolved by divorce obtained in a foreign country.

On 22 May 2008, the defense filed a motion to allow the taking of Maria Socorro's deposition
considering that she was set to leave the country on the first week of June 2008.  This was granted
5

by the RTC in its Order,  dated 26 May 2008. Maria Socorro's deposition was taken on 28 May 2008.
6

On 22 August 2008, the prosecution moved for a modified or reverse trial on the basis of Redante's
admissions.  The RTC granted the motion in its Order,  dated 27 August 2008, wherein the defense
7 8

was directed to present its case ahead of the prosecution.

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented Redante and Maria Socorro as witnesses. Their testimonies, taken together,
tended to establish the following:

Redante and Maria Socorro, both natives of Buhi, Camarines Sur, were married on 31 August 1984
in a ceremony held in Angono, Rizal.  Sometime thereafter, Maria Socorro left for Canada to work as
9

a nurse. While in Canada, she applied for Canadian citizenship. The application was eventually
granted and Ma. Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship on 1 April 1988.  Maria Socorro then filed
10

for divorce in British Columbia, Canada, to sever her marital ties with Redante. The divorce was
eventually granted by the Supreme Court of British Columbia on 1st of November1988. 11

Maria Socorro came back to Buhi, Camarines Sur, sometime in 1992 for a vacation. While there
Redante' s mother and grandparents, who were against the divorce, convinced her and Redante to
give their marriage a second chance to which they acceded. Their attempts to rekindle their romance
resulted in the birth of their daughter on 8 March 1993 in Mandaluyong City. In spite of this, Redante
and Maria Socorro's efforts to save their marriage were futile.
12

Sometime in February 1998, Redante met Fe to whom he admitted that he was previously married
to Maria Socorro who, however, divorced him.  Despite this admission, their romance blossomed
13

and culminated in their marriage on 29 December 1998 at the Pefiafrancia Basilica Minore in Naga
City.  They established a conjugal home in Pasay City and had two children. Their relationship,
14

however, turned sour when Ma. Socorro returned to the Philippines and met with Redante to
persuade him to allow their daughter to apply for Canadian citizenship. After learning of Redante and
Maria Socorro's meeting and believing that they had reconciled, Fe decided to leave their conjugal
home on 31 May 2007.  On 4 June 2007, Fe filed a complaint for bigamy against Redante.
15 16

Meanwhile, Maria Socorro married a certain Douglas Alexander Campbell, on 5 August 2000, in
Chilliwack, British Columbia, Canada. 17

The defense presented a Certificate of Divorce  issued on 14 January 2008, to prove the fact of
18

divorce.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution waived the presentation of testimonial evidence and presented instead, the
Marriage Contract  between Redante and Maria Socorro, to prove the solemnization of their
19

marriage on 31 August 1984, in Angono, Rizal; and the Marriage Contract  of Redante and Fe to
20

prove the solemnization of Redante's second marriage on 29 December 1998, in Naga City. The
prosecution also adopted the Certificate of Divorce  as its own exhibit for the purpose of proving that
21

the same was secured only on 14 January 2008.

The RTC Ruling

In its judgment, the RTC found Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. The
trial court ratiocinated that Redante's conviction is the only reasonable conclusion for the case
because of his failure to present competent evidence proving the alleged divorce decree; his failure
to establish the naturalization of Maria Socorro; and his admission that he did not seek judicial
recognition of the alleged divorce decree. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Redante Sarto y Misalucha guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court hereby sentenced him an imprisonment of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum. 22

Aggrieved, Redante appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling
In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's Judgment. The appellate court ratiocinated that
assuming the authenticity and due execution of the Certificate of Divorce, since the order of divorce
or the divorce decree was not presented, it could not ascertain whether said divorce capacitated
Maria Socorro, and consequently Redante, to remarry. It continued that Redante failed to present
evidence that he had filed and had secured a judicial declaration that his first marriage had been
dissolved in accordance with Philippine laws prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to
Fe. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellant Redante Sarto y
Misalucha of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400, is AFFIRMED. 23

Redante moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its 6 March 2013
resolution.

Hence, the present petition.

On 26 June 2013, the Court issued a Resolution  requiring the respondent Republic of the
24

Philippines to file its comment.

The OSG's Manifestation

In compliance with this Court's resolution, the respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed its Manifestation (in lieu of Comment)  advocating Redante's acquittal. The OSG argued
25

that the RTC had convicted Redante solely because of his failure to provide evidence concerning the
date when Maria Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship. It observed that Maria Socorro failed to
provide the exact date when she acquired Canadian citizenship because of the loss of her
citizenship certificate at the time she took the witness stand. The OSG claimed, however, that
Redante was able to submit, although belatedly, a photocopy of Maria Socorro's Canadian
citizenship certificate as an attachment to his appellant's brief. The said certificate stated that Maria
Socorro was already a Canadian citizen as early as 1 April 1988; hence, the divorce decree which
took effect on 1 November 1988 is valid. The OSG further averred that substantial rights must
prevail over the application of procedural rules.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY FOUND PETITIONER
REDANTE SARTO y MISALUCHA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF BIGAMY.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is bereft of merit.

Elements of bigamy; burden of

proving the termination of the
first marriage.

For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the following elements must concur: (1) that the offender
has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case of an
absentee spouse, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the provisions of
the Civil Code; (3) that the offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 26
Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages. He, however, put forth the defense of the
termination of his first marriage as a result of the divorce obtained abroad by his alien spouse.

It is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction that the burden of proof lies with the party who alleges
the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.  Since the
27

divorce was a defense raised by Redante, it is incumbent upon him to show that it was validly
obtained in accordance with Maria Socorro's country's national law.  Stated differently, Redante has
28

the burden of proving the termination of the first marriage prior to the celebration of the second. 29

Redante failed to prove his capacity

to contract a subsequent marriage.

A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage. As in any other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in
the Philippines. Consequently, recognition by Philippine courts may be required before the effects of
a divorce decree could be extended in this jurisdiction.  Recognition of the divorce decree, however,
30

need not be obtained in a separate petition filed solely for that purpose. Philippine courts may
recognize the foreign divorce decree when such was invoked by a party as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense. 31

Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.  Proving the foreign law under
1âшphi1

which the divorce was secured is mandatory considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not
be expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws.  For the purpose of establishing divorce as a fact,
32

a copy of the divorce decree itself must be presented and admitted in evidence. This is in
consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive evidentiary value only
after it is presented and admitted in evidence. 33

In particular, to prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking them must
present copies thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court.  Pursuant to these rules, the divorce decree and foreign law may be proven through (1) an
34

official publication or (2) or copies thereof attested to by the officer having legal custody of said
documents. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country, the copies of said documents must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.35

Applying the foregoing, the Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the existence of the
divorce as a fact or that it was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to
Fe.

Aside from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only piece of evidence presented by
the defense to prove the divorce, is the certificate of divorce allegedly issued by the registrar of the
Supreme Court of British Columbia on 14 January 2008. Said certificate provides:

In the Supreme Court of British Columbia

Certificate of Divorce
This is to certify that Ma. Socorro Negrete SARTO and Redante M SARTO who were married at
ANGONO, RIZAL, PHILIPPINES on August 31, 1984 were divorced under the Divorce Act (Canada)
by an order of this Court which took effect and dissolved the marriage on November 1, 1988.

Given under my hand and the Seal of this Court

January 14, 2008

(SGD.)
REGISTRAR

This certificate of divorce, however, is utterly insufficient to rebut the charge against
Redante. First, the certificate of divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules and
jurisprudence. As discussed previously, the divorce decree required to prove the fact of divorce is
the judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere certification. Second, assuming
the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce decree, it was not accompanied by a
certification issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular officer stationed in
Canada, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law
was presented by the defense. Thus, it could not be reasonably determined whether the subject
divorce decree was in accord with Maria Socorro's national law.

Further, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was satisfactorily
demonstrated, the type of divorce supposedly secured by Maria Socorro - whether an absolute
divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited divorce which merely suspends it  - and whether
36

such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also be ascertained. As such, Redante failed to
prove his defense that he had the capacity to remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to
Fe. His liability for bigamy is, therefore, now beyond question.

This Court is not unmindful of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Indeed,
in Republic v. Orbecido,  a case invoked by Redante to support his cause, the Court recognized that
37

the legislative intent behind the said provision is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse under the laws of his or her country. The Court is also not oblivious of the fact
that Maria Socorro had already remarried in Canada on 5 August 2000. These circumstances,
however, can never justify the reversal of Redante's conviction.

In Orbecido, as in Redante's case, the alien spouse divorced her Filipino spouse and remarried
another. The Filipino spouse then filed a petition for authority to remarry under paragraph 2 of Article
26. His petition was granted by the RTC. However, this Court set aside said decision by the trial
court after finding that the records were bereft of competent evidence concerning the divorce decree
and the naturalization of the alien spouse. The Court reiterated therein the rules regarding the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it, as well as the necessity to
show that the divorce decree capacitated his former spouse to remarry. 38

Finally, the Court notes that the OSG was miserably misguided when it claimed that the sole reason
for the RTC's judgment of conviction was Redante's failure to provide evidence, during trial, of the
date Maria Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship.

An examination of the 18 May 2009 judgment would reveal that the trial court rendered the said
decision after finding that there was lack of any competent evidence with regard to the divorce
decree  and the national law governing his first wife,  not merely because of the lack of evidence
39 40

concerning the effectivity date of Maria Socorro's naturalization. Thus, even if the Court were to
indulge the OSG and consider Maria Socorro's citizenship certificate, which was a mere photocopy
and filed belatedly, it would not have any effect significant enough to produce a judgment of
acquittal. The fact that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce and that it was validly
acquired prior to the celebration of the second marriage still subsists.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision, dated 31
July 2012, of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CR No. 32635 which affirmed the 18 May 2009
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga City, in Criminal Case No. 2007- 0400 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner Redante Sarto y Misalucha is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 209518

MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE, Petitioner

vs.
ANA KARI CARMENCITA NUSTAD, as represented by ATTY. MARGUERITE THERESE L.
LUCILA, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Petitioner Ma. Hazelina A. Tujan-Militante seeks to set aside and reverse the: (1) Decision' dated
February 27, 2013, which dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65; and (2)
Resolution  dated October 2, 2013, which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court
2

of Ap'peals  (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 124811.

3

The Facts

On June 2, 2011, Respondent Ana Kari Carmencita Nustad (Nustad), as represented by Atty.
Marguerite Therese Lucila (Atty. Lucila), filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55,
Lucena City (RTC) and prayed that Ma. Hazdina A. Tujan-Militante (Tujan-'Militante) be orqered to
surrender to the Register of Deeds of Lucena City the owner's duplicate copy of the Transfer
Certifi.cate of Title Nos. T-435798, T-436799, T- 387158 and T-387159, which 'were all issued in
Nustad's name. She averred that Tujan-Militante has been withholding the said titles.

In its Order dated July 26, 2011, the RTC set the petition for a hearing 4

Instead of filing an Answer, Tujan-Militante filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Annul
Proceedings  dated September 2, 2011. She averred that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
5

her person as she was not able to receive summons. Moreover, she argued that the Order appeared
to be a decision on the merits, as it already ruled with certainty that she is in possession of the
subject titles.

The Ruling of the RTC

In an Order dated November 23, 2011, the RTC  denied TujanMilitante' s Motion and ruled that it has
6

jurisdiction over the case. Further the RTC stated.that it has not yet decided on the merits of the
case when it ordered Tujan-Militante to surrender TCT Nos. T-435798, T-436799, T- 387.158 and T-
387159 because it merely set the petition for a hearing.

Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration  and alleged that the Power of Attorney executed
7

by Nustad in favor of Atty. Lucila is void and non-existent. Tujan-Militante likewise averred that Atty.
Lucila is representing a Norwegian, who is not allowed to own lands in the Philippines. Aside from
the dismissal of the case, petitioner prayed that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Land
Registration Authority be impleaded. Moreover, Tujan-Militante prayed for moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

In an Order  dated February 27, 2012, the court a quo denied Tujan- Militante's Motion for
8

Reconsideration.

Aggrieved, Tujan-Militante filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In a Decision  dated February 27, 2013, the CA recognized the jurisdictional defect over the person
9

of Tujan-Militante, but nevertheless ruled that the flaw was cured by Tujan-Militante's filing of her
Motion

Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a

Resolution  dated October 2, 2013.
10

Hence, this appeal.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons. However,
it is equally significant that even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it.   Section 20,
11

Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 20. Voluntary Appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds of relief
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.

By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual [petitioner is] deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court
to secure the affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. 12

In this case, while Tujan-Militante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the court a
quo on the ground of improper service of summons, the ·subsequent filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration which sought for affirmative reliefs is tantamount to voluntary appearance and
submission to · the authority of such court. Such affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position
that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief, without the proper
objection, necessitates submission to the [court]'s jurisdiction.  13

As to the claim of Tujan-Militante that the requirements laid down in Sec. 24, Rule 132  of the Rules
14

of Court apply with respect to the power of attorney notarized abroad, he cited the ruling
in Lopez v. Court of Appeals.   In said case, this Court held that the power of attorney must comply
15

with the requirements set forth under Sec. 25 (now Sec. 24), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court in order
to be considered as valid.

Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that:

Section 24. Proof of official record.- The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, andauthenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)

Section 19 of Rule 132 states that:

Section 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents
are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official· acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.

All other writings are private. (emphasis supplied)

In the Heirs of Spouses Arcilla v. Teodoro   , this Court clarified that the ruling in the Lopez case is
16

inapplicable because the Rules of Evidence which were then effective we.re the old Rules, prior to
their amendment in 1989. When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989, the introductory
phrase "An official record or an entry therein " was substituted by the phrase "The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section . 19 ,;  , as found in the present Rules. Also,
17

Section 25 of the former Rules became Section 24 of the present Rules.

On this note, the case of Heirs of Spouses Arcilla explained further:

It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service under
Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in Section 19 (a), to wit: written official acts or
records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers
of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. The Court agrees with the CA that had the Court intended
to include notarial documents as one of the public documents contemplated by ·the provisions of
Section 24, it should not have specified only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of
Section 19.  (emphasis supplied)
18

As the Rules explicitly provide that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service refers
only to written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines, or of a. foreign country, as found in Section 19(a),
Rule 132, such enumeration does not include documents acknowledged before a notary public
abroad.

With all these, We rule on the validity of the subject notarial document. What is important is that
[Nustad] certified before a commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer an oath that she
is authorizing Atty. Lucila to institute the petition before the court a quo on her behalf.  19

A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same,
there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the
document should be upheld. 20

Lastly, Tujan-Militante's contention that the TCTs under the name of N ustad are invalid because of
her citizenship constitutes a collateral attack on the titles. The CA correctly ruled that the issue as to
whether an alien is or is not qualified to acquire the lands covered by the subject titles can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. 21

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the. Decision dated February 27, 2013
and Resolution dated October 2, 2013, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124811 are
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150206               March 13, 2009

Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN, PEREGRINO

GABATAN, REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA
GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA GABATAN, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the
Decision1 dated April 28, 2000, and Resolution2 dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated October 20, 1995 in Civil Case No. 89-092,
an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and Possession, thereat commenced by
respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and
Catalino Acantilado.

Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5 and
situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in the name
of Juan Gabatan. In the complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of
Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero
(Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Juan
Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan,
Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the
return of the land but to no avail. After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same but
petitioners refused to heed the numerous demands to surrender the subject property. According to
respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took
possession of the disputed land despite respondent’s demands for them to vacate the same.

In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan
Gabatan with Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan
Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and
that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in-
interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan
Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted
possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of
the improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent. Petitioners
clarified that Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject land; the former is
merely the husband of Teofilo’s daughter while the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added that a
similar case was previously filed by respondent against Teofilo’s wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on
February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for
lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states no cause of action
or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.

On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually named,
to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and
Jesus Jabinis, Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.

On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the disputed land
was already covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan represented by
petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilo’s daughter).

On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
declaring the plaintiff the owner of Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de
Oro City; and ordering the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan Tumala to RECONVEY
Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff Lourdes Evero Pacana, free of any
encumbrance; ordering the defendants to pay ₱10,000.00 by way of moral damages; ₱10,000.00 as
Attorney’s fees; and ₱2,000.00 for litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.4

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
52273.

On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC.
Dispositively, the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court dated October 20,
1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Discounting petitioners’ argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA declared
that respondent’s claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established during trial. Thus,
the CA echoed a long line of jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
weight and are not disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not
supported by evidence.

The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale5 executed by Macaria Gabatan de
Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as an
heir of Juan Gabatan:

x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently residing at
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.

To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was
signed by Teofilo and the latter’s nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they
acknowledged Hermogena’s status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule
1306 of the Rules of Court on the declaration against interest, the CA ruled that petitioners could not
deny that even their very own father, Teofilo formally recognized Hermogena’s right to heirship from
Juan Gabatan which ultimately passed on to respondent.

As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners’ possession of the disputed property
could not ripen into acquisitive prescription because their predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never held
the property in the concept of an owner. lawphil.net

Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally contending that
the CA committed the following reversible errors:

FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single and
without issue;

SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent) as
the sole and surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a certain Hermogena Clareto
"GABATAN";

THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto
"GABATAN" is the child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;

FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of

evidence in favor of the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that they and the heirs of
Justa and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan Gabatan
and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject matter hereof;

FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of plaintiff-
appellee (respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription.7

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary matters.
In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this particular mode of appeal, for this
Court is not a trier of facts.8 It is not our function to examine and evaluate the probative value of the
evidence presented before the concerned tribunal upon which its impugned decision or resolution is
based.91avvphi1

However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of fact by
the lower courts, such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.10

Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack
of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. Thus, the Court is clothed with
ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these
instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is
necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests
of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on
appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue
submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned
as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors
on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. 11

In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the case.

The respondent’s main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and
possession of property. It is undisputed that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned by the
deceased Juan Gabatan, during his lifetime.12 Before us are two contending parties, both insisting to
be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.13
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,14 this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be
made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated
in Solivio v. Court of Appeals15 where the Court held:

xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate
of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that
they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled
to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa
Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the
deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera,
and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that ‘such declarations (that
Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being
within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as
yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,16 the Court reiterated its ruling that
matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in
a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case
of Agapay v. Palang,17 this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an
heir to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case,
was for the recovery of property.

However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,18 where the Court
relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the
status of the party therein as heirs, to wit:

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is
the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case –
subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as
heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners (Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174
SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court
should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a
decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)

Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense
with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir
of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue
of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently
rendered judgment thereon.

We GRANT the petition.

After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and questionable the basis
of the RTC in conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.

Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned her
claim entirely on her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to
present preponderant evidence in support of her complaint.

Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved
by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of
status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.

Here, two conflicting birth certificates19 of respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent,
during her direct testimony, presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her typewritten
birth certificate which indicated that her mother’s maiden name was "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan."
Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a certified true copy of respondent’s handwritten birth
certificate which differed from the copy presented by respondent. Among the differences was
respondent’s mother’s full maiden name which was indicated as "Hermogena Calarito" in the
handwritten birth certificate.

In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:

The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting Certificate (sic) of
Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff and Exhibit
"1" for the defendants. Which of this (sic) is genuine, and which is falsified. These (sic) issue is
crucial and requires serious scrutiny. The Court is of the observation that Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff
which is a certified true copy is in due form and bears the "as is and where is" rule. It has the
impression of the original certificate. The forms (sic) is an old one used in the 1950’s. Her mother’s
maiden name appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic) Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit "1", the entries
found thereof (sic) is handwritten which is very unusual and of dubious source. The form used is of
latest vintage. The entry on the space for mother’s maiden name is Hermogena Calarito. There
seems to be an apparent attempt to thwart plaintiff’s mother filiation with the omission of the
surname Gabatan. Considering these circumstances alone the Court is inclined to believe that
Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic certificate of live birth.20

Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with the above-
quoted findings of the trial court. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an original
typewritten document, not a mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of 1950’s vintage21 but this
Court is unable to concur in the trial court’s finding that Exhibit 122 was of a later vintage than Exhibit
A which was one of the trial court’s bases for doubting the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary,
the printed notation on the upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states "Municipal Form No. 102 –
(Revised, January 1945)" which makes it an older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial court’s finding
regarding which form was of more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by the evidence on
record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy
Local Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly
certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A was a true copy of respondent’s birth certificate. The names
of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were
typewritten with the notation "(Sgd.)" also merely typewritten beside their names. The words "A
certified true copy: July 6, 1977" above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be
inscribed by the same typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A and
the information stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo P.
Noriga was never presented as a witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of
Maximo P. Noriga therein were identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot
be deemed sufficient authentication of her birth certificate.

We cannot subscribe to the trial court’s view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten,
Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten birth
certificate of respondent (petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly authenticated by two competent
witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of the City
Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the National
Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part of their official
duties they have custody of birth records in their respective offices,23 and (b) the certified true copy of
respondent’s handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original birth certificate
registered in their respective offices.24 Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even brought the original of
the handwritten birth certificate before the trial court and respondent’s counsel confirmed that the
certified true copy (which was eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful reproduction of the
original.25 Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified that no other copy of respondent’s birth certificate
exists in their records except the handwritten birth certificate.26 Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the
original of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate found in the records of the NSO Manila (from
which Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to their office by the Local Civil
Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro.27 Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho testified and brought their
respective offices’ copies of respondent’s birth certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by
the trial court and there is no showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their
testimonies. Thus, between respondent’s Exhibit A and petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter
documents deserve to be given greater probative weight.

Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by respondent
(Exhibit A) is a reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove respondent’s filiation to
her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and authentic, would
have proven was that respondent’s mother was a certain "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." It does not
prove that same "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan" is the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held
that the conflicting certificates of live birth of respondent submitted by the parties only proved the
filiation of respondent to Hermogena.28

It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation of
her mother to Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan
Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing
in the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment. In the absence of these,
respondent should have presented proof that her mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the respondent
allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship to
Juan Gabatan.

However, respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the best
evidence of Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC.
Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing
Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana and
Cecilia Nagac Villareal who testified that they personally knew Hermogena (respondent’s mother)
and/or Juan Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito and that
Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana. However, none of these witnesses had personal
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and
Laureana. They were not yet born or were very young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or
when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and
Laureana’s wedding or Hermogena’s birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had
been told by, or heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.

Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondent’s witnesses’ testimonies. The
records would show that they cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco Lawan
testified that he was the son of Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not
at all related to Juan Gabatan.29 His testimony regarding the relationships within the Gabatan family
is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are children of
Justa Gabatan Nagac,30 this Court is wary of according probative weight to their testimonies since
respondent admitted during her cross-examination that her (respondent’s) husband is the son of
Felicisima Nagac Pacana.31 In other words, although these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of
petitioners, they are also the mother and the aunt of respondent’s husband. They cannot be said to
be entirely disinterested in the outcome of the case.

Aside from the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on a
photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale32 (Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which appeared to
be signed by the siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document involving
the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5, "Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan
Gabatan" was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the statement therein as an
affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners’ predecessor in interest, that Hermogena
Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan.33 The CA considered the same statement as a declaration
against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.34

However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures
therein, as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners’ counsel for
being a mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated.35 After a close scrutiny of the said
photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself.36 Although the best evidence rule admits
of exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary evidence would be
allowed, such as when the original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for the
presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in Department of Education
Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,37 we held that a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of
the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present
to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original
instrument.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who
identified the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no testimony
regarding the whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any
public office.

There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document. For this,
respondent relied on the stamped notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is a certified true
xerox copy and said notation was signed by a certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr., Assessment Officer,
who seems to be an officer in the local assessor’s office. Regarding the authentication of public
documents, the Rules of Court38 provide that the record of public documents, when admissible for
any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.39 The attestation of the certifying officer must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be.40

To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of Exhibit H was
registered or exists in the records of the local assessor’s office. Furthermore, the stamped
certification of Honesto P. Velez is insufficient authentication of Exhibit H since Velez’s certification
did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Even worse, Velez was not presented
as a witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original. Indeed, it is highly doubtful
that Velez could have made such an attestation since the assessor’s office is not the official
repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the legal custodian
contemplated in the rules.

It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his
notarial register and to forward the same to the proper court. It is the notary public or the proper
court that has custody of his notarial register that could have produced the original or a certified true
copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale was identified by Felicisima Nagac Pacana who,
despite appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested witness and as can be gleaned
from her testimony, she had no personal knowledge of the preparation of the alleged certified true
copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even know who secured a copy of Exhibit H from the
assessor’s office.41 To be sure, the roundabout and defective manner of authentication of Exhibit H
renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan
acknowledged or admitted the status of Hermogena Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.

Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same
admissible, it still nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan
was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation of respondent to either
Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the only document that respondent
produced to demonstrate her filiation to "Hermogena Gabatan" (respondent’s Exhibit A) was
successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence presented by petitioners.

As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According to
respondent’s own testimony,42 Juan Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action of
the heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover the decedent’s property from third parties or to quiet title to
their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena, if they were truly
the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their rights as such. It is only in 1978 that respondent
filed her first complaint to recover the subject property, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840, against
Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan.43 However, that case was dismissed without prejudice
for failure to prosecute.44 Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile her cause of action, i.e. the
present case.45 She claimed that she waited until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of
respect because Rita was then already old.46

We cannot accept respondent’s flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and her
contemporaries (who might have personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) were
advancing in age and might soon expire that respondent should have exerted every effort to
preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her claim. As we held in Republic of the Philippines
v. Agunoy: "Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those
who sleep on their rights…[O]ne may not sleep on a right while expecting to preserve it in its pristine
purity."47

All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible
and independently verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus,
entitled to the property under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the
circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with clean hands for she presented a
tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b) she
unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the Court cannot now affirm her
claim, respondent has her own self to blame.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 52273,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The complaint and amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-092 are DISMISSED
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 207406

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are
guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari  assailing the Court of Appeals Decision  dated July
1 2

18, 2012 and Resolution  dated June 3, 2013. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
3

Decision  of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella
4

Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.  Norberto
5

was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. 6

In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged Norberto
with bigamy.  The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
7

That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with
ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has all the legal requisites for its validity
with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing fully well prior to and at the time
of the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.

Contrary to law. 8
Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. 9

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at
the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children. 10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another
woman[.]"  She eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M.
11

Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National
Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto. 12

On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in
1987.  "After much prodding by their friends and relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in
13

1994." 14

Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake
marriage"  with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina Gaerlan.  Nevertheless, despite Norberto’s
15 16

revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were
married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children. 17

Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an
affair with a married man. He was able to confirm the affair after hearing Alice in a phone
conversation with her paramour. 18

Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the affair.
The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing
her paramour. 19

Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal Complaint
for bigamy against Norberto. 20

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid marriage
with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. The
dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
maximum imprisonment.

SO ORDERED. 21

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the
penalty imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the
penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced. Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED. 22

Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution
23

dated June 3, 2013. 24

Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment  to which Norberto filed a Reply.
25 26

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case.  He presents as evidence a
27

Certification  from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has
28

no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that
with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the
prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. 29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the
crime of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that
punishes bigamy mentions that requirement.  Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be resolved
30

in favor of the accused[,]"  Norberto prays for his acquittal.

31 32

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid marriage with
Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they had executed. The prosecution likewise proved
that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage
was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that the second marriage
would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. Norberto, therefore, should be
convicted of bigamy. 33

The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it
has no record of the marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife
Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is
suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license.
Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more
than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious
first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any decision
from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.

For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following
elements:

[first,] that the offender has been legally married;

[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 34

The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the civil
registrar of the municipality where they were married had no record of the marriage license allegedly
issued in their favor.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still
legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the
crime charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized on
July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the Philippines became effective on August
3,1988.  Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines  govern the validity of his first
35 36

marriage.

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which
renders the marriage void from the beginning: 37

Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides.  The marriage license represents the state’s
38

"involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested."39

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
the parties."40

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:

[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and
License Issuance available in this office, no record could be found on the alleged issuance of this
office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA
M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987. 41
This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license. It does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist. 42

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract
between him and his first wife, Gina.  The marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a
43

positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first marriage. This "should be given
44

greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of the
marriage[.]" 45

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro  was originally an action for the declaration of nullity of a
46

marriage.  As part of its evidence, the plaintiff presented a certification that states that the marriage
47

license "cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear from [the local civil registrar’s]
records." 48

This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license."49

This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’
sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license . . . to the
contracting parties." 50

The circumstances in Castro and in this case are different. Castro involved a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the possible loss of liberty. The certification
in Castro was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for
bigamy involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To
our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the Certification having been issued to Norberto for
him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its
presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification
in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine
that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement
that no such license existed or was issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite
should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now cannot be found is
not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned.
Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do
this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.

This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.  In Cariño, the marriage contract
51

between Santiago Cariño and his first wife, Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license number.  In 52

addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage license issued to
Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.  This court declared Santiago Cariño’s first marriage void for
53

having been solemnized without a marriage license. 54

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely
and voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing
officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into
on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days,
petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration of the nullity of his first marriage. Even while the
bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was presented. In
other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own
actuations.

This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first marriage,
petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage
contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage exists. The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to
the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license
cannot be found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license was
issued.

The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract.  There is no
55

evidence to show that the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have been
issued from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after the
document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There is no evidence that relates
to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This would have shown whether there
was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the
proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.

This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official
functions to the civil registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion that
there is no marriage license.

At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without the
context just discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the marriage
license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor
does it mean that the marriage license was issued.

However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly
executed by petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage
contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer a conclusion that the
marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.

Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a

deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched conclusion—although this is not always the case—that a
well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many criminal cases
can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the discretion of a government
employee. The temptations for the employee to issue a document, which may be accurate but which
he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be created by an
accused. Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the
demeanor of the witnesses. We can defer to that discretion as much as to make our own judgment
based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by the trial court. Using both, we have no
reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court.

II
Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially
declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code.  The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.
56

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.  that

57

parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy. 58

The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article 40 of
the Family Code: 59

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. 1avvphi1

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of
bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist
has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming
that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first."  Further, "[a] party may even enter into a marriage aware of
60

the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract a subsequent

marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
marriage is void." 61

For these reasons, the Landicho ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court En
Banc as petitioner insists. 62

The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he subsequently
married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994.  As for the last element of bigamy, that the
63

subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime of bigamy
was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice without his first marriage to Gina
having been judicially declared void. 64

With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime
charged. 1âwphi1

III

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on
petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court
then has the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower to
the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are considered. 65

The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.  The penalty next lower to that is prision
66

correccional. Prision correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years;  hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this range.
67
As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period,
there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period ranges
from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months
of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
The ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges as previously computed.
The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.

Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law ‘to uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness[,]’"  we lower the minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six (6)
68

months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision

dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated June 3, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184843               July 30, 2010

VIRGILIO DYCOCO, herein represented by his Attorneys-in-fact CRISTINO C. GRAFILO, JOSE

C. GRAFILO and ADOLFO C. GRAFILO, and CRISTINO C. GRAFILO, JOSE C. GRAFILO and
ADOLFO C. GRAFILO for and in their own behalf, Petitioners,
vs.
ADELAIDA ORINA joined by her husband GERMAN R. ORINA as represented by her Attorney-
in-fact EVELYN M. SAGALONGOS and for in the latter's own behalf, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On petition for review on certiorari is the November 29, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals1 affirming the dismissal of the action for annulment of real estate mortgage and transfer
certificate of title with damages.

Virgilio Dycoco (Dycoco) is alleged to have executed on October 9, 1995 a "Real Estate Mortgage
with Special Power to Sell Mortgaged Property without Judicial Proceedings" (REM) in favor of
respondent Adelaida Orina (Adelaida), covering a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila and
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 105730 in Dycoco’s name. The REM was
notarized on even date by Notary Public Arwin Juco Sinaguinan.
By Adelaida’s claim, Dycoco was indebted to her in the amount of ₱250,000.00, payable in six
months, to bear monthly interest rate of five percent (5%), to secure which Dycoco executed the
REM.

For Dycoco’s alleged failure to pay his obligation, Adelaida extrajudicially foreclosed the REM and as
no redemption was made within the reglementary period, Dycoco’s TCT was cancelled and, in its
stead, TCT No. 243525 was issued in her name.

Dycoco’s attorneys-in-fact-brothers-in-law Cristino, Jose and Adolfo, all surnamed Grafilo, who
occupy the property covered by the REM as caretakers/tenants, did not turn-over its possession to
Adelaida, hence, she, joined by her husband represented by her attorney-in-fact Evelyn Sagalongos
(Evelyn), filed a complaint for ejectment against them before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila.

Upon receiving notice of the complaint, Dycoco, represented by his attorneys-in-fact, filed a
complaint for annulment of the REM and transfer certificate of title with damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 01100522, against Adelaida and her husband German Orina represented by Evelyn
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

Dycoco’s attorneys-in-fact claimed that Dycoco’s signature on the REM was forged, to prove which
they presented various documents that Dycoco was working in the United States of America as a
licensed physician on the alleged date of execution of the REM. They also presented Dycoco’s U.S.
Passport, personal checks, Special Power of Attorney and Affidavit; and a Certification from the
Clerk of Court of RTC Manila that the office does not possess a copy of the REM, Notary Public
Sinaguinan having not submitted her notarial report for October 1995.

Herein respondents Adelaida et al., maintaining the due execution of the REM, presented Evelyn
who testified on a photocopy of the REM.

By Decision of May 23, 2005, Branch 15 of the Manila RTC dismissed Dycoco’s complaint, holding
that:

Plaintiff, [Dycoco], through the testimony of their (sic) lone witness as well as their (sic) documentary
exhibits tried to show that it was not . . . Dycoco who mortgaged the said property. Cristino Grafilo
even testified that their brother Miguel, admitted to having stole (sic) the title and have (sic) it
mortgaged. Plaintiffs (sic), however, failed to establish that the mortgagor, (sic) defendant Adelaida
Orina, knew it was not Virgilio Dycoco who mortgaged the same.2 (underscoring supplied)

By the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Dycoco’s
complaint, it holding that albeit Dycoco’s questioned signature appearing on the REM and the
documentary evidence presented by his attorneys-in-fact bear "striking differences," since Dycoco
was not presented on the witness stand to establish the genuineness, due execution and contents of
the documentary evidence, no probative value can be ascribed thereto.

In not crediting evidentiary weight on Dycoco’s U.S. passport showing that he was not in the
Philippines when the REM was executed, the appellate court held:

. . . [T]he existence, genuineness, due execution and contents of Exhibit "I" have not been properly
established. Again, the identification made by plaintiff-appellant Cristino Grafilo (sic) will not suffice
since he is not privy to its issuance and execution. The plaintiff-appellants (sic) should have
presented a person competent to testify to establish the genuineness and contents of Exhibit "I" like
an officer from the Bureau of Immigration. But the plaintiff-appellants (sic) failed to do so. Thus, this
court finds the stance of plaintiff-appellants (sic) that Virgilio Dycoco was out of the country at the
time of the execution of the questioned deed unsupported.3

The motion for reconsideration of Dycoco’s attorneys-in-fact having been denied by Resolution of
October 3, 2008, the present petition for review was filed.

A perusal of the REM which is, as stated earlier, a merely photocopy, shows the incompleteness of
the acknowledgment portion. It reads:

Republic of the Philippines )

City of Manila ) S.S.

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila, this 9th day of October 1995, personally
came and appeared ____________________ (sic) with Res. Cert. No. : 12262297 C issued on 27
July 95 at Manila and Tax Account No.: 110-783-724 known to me and to me known to be the same
person who executed the foregoing instrument which he acknowledged before me as his free and
voluntary act and deed.4

As the above-quoted acknowledgment shows, the name of the person who personally appeared
before the notary public is not stated.

Documents acknowledged before a notary public, except last wills and testaments, are public
documents.5 Since the subject REM was not properly notarized, its public character does not hold.

Since the REM is not a public document, it is subject to the requirement of proof for private
documents under Section 20, Rule 132, which provides:

Section 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. (underscoring
supplied)

It was thus incumbent upon Adelaida to prove that Dycoco’s signature is genuine. As stated earlier,
a mere photocopy of the REM was presented. It is axiomatic that when the genuineness of
signatures on a document is sought to be proved or disproved through comparison of standard
signatures with the questioned signature, the original thereof must be presented.6 Why respondents
did not present the original, they did not explain. Why they did not present Adelaida, who must have
been present at the execution of the REM as her purported signature appears thereon, or the notary
public, or any of the witnesses, neither did they explain. Sec. 5 of Rule 130 which reads:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of the unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.

Upon the other hand, Dycoco’s attorneys-in-fact presented his U.S. passport documenting when he
entered and exited from the Philippines, as well as various documents showing his genuine
signature. The appellate court, although upholding the admissibility of Dycoco’s documentary
evidence, did not ascribe weight to it, however, upon the justification that "[e]ven if . . . Cristino
Grafilo was empowered to appear for and on behalf of plaintiff-appellant Virgilio Dycoco in this case
by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney, the powers couched in said document do not vest upon the
former the power to testify on matters [of] which he has no personal knowledge."7

Contrary to the appellate court’s stance, there was no necessity to present Dycoco on the witness
stand or to present the one who made the entries on his U.S. passport. In respondents’
Comment/Opposition to Dycoco’s formal offer of evidence, the passport was objected to as being
"immaterial, irrelevant and impertinent."8 Such comment is a virtual admission of the authenticity of
the entries in the passport.

But more important, one of the documents offered by Dycoco is a Special Power of Attorney
executed on June 2, 2000 in Illinois, U.S.A. showing his signature, notarized and certified in
accordance with Public Act No. 2103,9 which effectively dispenses with the requirement of
presenting him on the witness stand.

Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be
considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the
following requirements:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of
legation, chargé d’affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the United States,
acting within the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer
duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents
in the place where the act is done.

(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed it,
and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his
official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In
case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in
subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the
officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister,
secretary of legation, chargé d’affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
United States, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited. The officer
making the authentication shall certify under his official seal that the person who took the
acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly
exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as such
he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the
place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are
genuine. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Evelyn insisted that Dycoco was present during the signing of the REM on October 9, 1995:

ATTY. MERCADO:
Q: Madam Witness, when this document was prepared, were you present?

WITNESS:

A: Yes sir.

Q: Are you a witness in the execution of this document?

A: Yes sir.

Q: On page 2 of this document, the (sic) appears a signature above the type-written name Adelaida
Orina, will you please inform the Honorable Court whose signature is this?

Q: Why do you know that it is the signature of Adelaida Orina?

A: Because she is included there.

Q: What do you mean by "kasama po siya"?

A: There were four of us at the office of the Notary Public.

Q: When you said four of you, whao (sic) are they?

A: Adelaida, Virgilio, two other witness (sic) and me.

Q: You are not four, you are five?

A: Yes sir.10 (underscoring supplied)

Evelyn’s testimony not only contradicts the entries in Dycoco’s U.S. Passport, however, it appearing
therein that Dycoco visited the Philippines on April 2, 1990 and arrived in the United States on April
9 of the same year. Contrary to her claim, the REM does not reflect here as one of the witnesses to
its execution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29,
2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 1avvphi1

Let a NEW judgment be entered declaring null and void the document entitled "Real Estate
Mortgage with Special Power to Sell Mortgaged Property without Judicial Proceedings" purportedly
signed by Virgilio Dycoco in favor of Adelaida Orina.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Register of Deeds of Manila for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133188             July 23, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, appellee,

vs.
ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, appellant.
 DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Once again, the Court is confronted with the issue of the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession.
This appeal particularly involves the question of whether a barangay captain who is a lawyer can be
considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

On December 17, 1996, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed an Information charging appellant with
Murder, committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996, about 2:30 a.m., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with
a bladed instrument (tres cantos), with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy, by stabbing her with said bladed
instrument, hitting her on the vital parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her physical
injuries causing:

"CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO SHOCK & HEMORRHAGE SEC. TO

STAB WOUNDS TO THE TRUNK (POSTERIOR ASPECT)"

as a consequence of which, Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy died almost instantaneously.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge, and trial thereafter ensued.
2 

There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecution’s evidence, aside from appellant’s
extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial.

As presented by the prosecution, the facts are as follows:

At around 11:00 in the evening of December 14, 1996, appellant Elizar Tomaquin @ Hapon,
together with Rico and Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a certain Cardo, were drinking "Red
Horse" beer in Itom Yuta, Lorega, Cebu City. Appellant left the group at around 1:00 in the morning,

saying he has a headache. At the behest of Rico Magdasal, the group transferred to Lorega proper.
A few minutes later, they heard Rustica Isogan shouting for help as the latter heard Jaquelyn Tatoy,
3 

her goddaughter, asking for help. Isogan got two flashlights and they proceeded upstairs to
Jaquelyn’s house. The first to go up was a certain Moises, followed by the brothers Rico and Romy
Magdasal, while Noel and Cardo remained downstairs. Rico noticed that the hinge and the "walling"
of the main door were damaged, as if it were kicked open, and only the light in the kitchen was
turned on. Rico also saw a black shoe on the stairs and another in the sala, which he claims belong
to appellant. When they went into the kitchen, they saw Jaquelyn bloodied and sprawled face-up on
the floor, with her head inside a plastic container. Jaquelyn was brought to the hospital, where she
expired. A neighbor later found a tres cantos with blood on it by the stairs, which Rico also identified
to be appellant’s. A certain Rey got the black pair of shoes and tres cantos for safekeeping which
4 

were later turned over to Policeman Tariao of the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station. The
person who turned over the objects to Policeman Tariao was not identified. 5

At around 12:00 in the afternoon of December 15, 1996, barangay tanods Julius Yosores and
Armando Zabate of Lorega, Cebu City, searched for appellant because of the information given by
Rico Magdasal that the shoes and tres cantos found in the scene of the crime belonged to appellant.
Together with Rico, they went to the house of Wilson Magdasal where appellant was temporarily
staying, and found him sleeping. Appellant was wearing a bloodstained maong shorts.
The tanods told appellant that he is a suspect in the killing of Jaquelyn, and brought him to the
house of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan. There, appellant was asked about the shirt he
was wearing and he told them that it was in Wilson Magdasal’s house. It was Edgar Magdasal who
found his shirt, wet and bloodstained, among the soiled clothes. Atty. Parawan then told his tanods
to take appellant to the police station.
6

In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1996, appellant was investigated by SPO2 Mario
Monilar of the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station in Cebu City. After being apprised of his
constitutional rights, appellant told SPO2 Monilar that he was willing to confess and asked for Atty.
Parawan, the barangay captain, to assist him. SPO2 Monilar called Atty. Parawan but the latter told
him that he will be available in the afternoon. When Atty. Parawan arrived at 2:00 in the afternoon,
he conferred with appellant for around fifteen minutes. Atty. Parawan then called SPO2 Monilar and
told him that appellant was ready to give his statement. Appellant’s extrajudicial confession, which
7 

was taken down completely in the Cebuano dialect, reads:

8 

Pasiuna: Mr. ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, pahibaloon ko ikaw nga ubos sa atong batakang balaod
(Constitution) aduna kay katungod nga pahibaloon sa imong mga katungod, sama sa imong
katungod sa pagpakahilum, ingon man duna kay katungod sa pagdamgop/pagpilig sa
abogado o manlalaban aron motabang kanimo niining maong imbestighasyon nga may
kalabutan sa kamatayon ni Jaqueline Tatoy niadtong mga alas 2:30 sa kaadlawon kapin
kongkulang niadtong petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembra 1996, didto sa Brgy Lorega proper,
Siyudad sa Sugbo. Kong ugaling dili ka maka-abot pagbayad o pagpangitago abogado aron
motabang kanimo karon, ako isip negrepresenttar sa Estado mohatag akong abogado
kanimo. Nasabtan ba kini nimo?

Tubag: OO, nasabtan ka ang akong katungod?

Pangutana: Pahabloon ko usab ikaw nga sumala usab sa atong Batakang Balaod, anfg
tanan nga imong isulti karon dinhi, mahimong magamit ebedensya pabor o batok kanimo sa
bisan asaing husgado sa atong nasud. Nasabtan be usab kini nimo?

Tubag: OO, nasabtan ko usab kanang taan.

Pangutana: Tinuod ba gayod nga nasabtan pag-ayo nimo anf mao nimong mga katungod ug
anadam ka ba nga moperma karon dinhi timailhan sa imong tina-aw nga nga pagsabut?
ingon man andam ka ba sa pagsulti sa matuod walay lain kon kili ang matuod lamang
gayud?

Tubag: O
Tubag: Oo, andam ako nga mpemar Sir ug ania karon dinhi ai Atty Parawan ang among
Brgy Captain nga maoy akong giisip nga abogado nga akong pinili nga maoy motabang
kanako karon. Aron sa pagmatuod, ako kining pirmahan ning ika petsa 16 sa bulan sa
Disyembre 1996.

...

Pangutana: Sunlion ko, andama bas a pagsulti sa matuod Elizar Tomaquin kon dili ang
matuod lamang gayud? Ingon man andam ka ba nga modawat sa resulta o linugdangan
niini?

Tubag: Oo, andam gyud ako.

Pangutana: Palihog isulti ang imong ngalan inong man ang tanan nga circumstacia o rmay
kalambigitan sa imong pagkatawo, sa imong grado, imong trabaho, imong pinuy-anan ug
uban pa?

Tubag: Ako si Elizar Tomaquin kinsa nagdala sa bansagon o apelyedo sa akong mama
sanglit dili man kasado and akong mama ug papa. Ang apelyedo sa akong papa, Cabagui
ug and akon angga Hapon. Ako 19 anyos ang panuigon, ulitawo ug kasamtangan nga
nagpuyo sa Brgy Lorega proper duol sa kapilaya San Roque apan ako lumad nga taga Bo.
Tunga, Moalboal, Cebu diin didto ano nakatungha sa grade six.

Pangutana: Niadtong kaadlawon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, diin ka man?

Tubag: Sa sinugdanan nianang mga ala una kapin kon kulang kauba ko sa pag-inom si Rico
Magdasal didito sa Brgy Lorega Proper ug taodtaod niadto nilakaw ako libot sa sitio Itom
Tuta ug dayon nakong saka sa balay nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy sa Brgy Lorega nianang pagka
mga alas 2:20 sa maong petsa/kadlawon agii sa aberto nga bentana sa akong tuyo sa
pagkawat sa ilang colored nga TV.

Pangutana: Nganong nakahiabwo ka man na duna silay TV nga colored?

Tubag: Suweto man ko kay permi ko magtan-awan sa ilang colored TV.

Pangutana: Niadtong niagi ka sa ilang bentana aron pagkawat sa ilang TV, diin ka man
punta deretso.

Tubag: Deretso ako sa may lamesa sa ilang sala diin didto gibutang ilang TV.

Pangutana: Nakuha ba gayod nimo anf maong TV?

Tubag: Wala, kay sa akong pag-alsa sa among TV nisyagit man si Jaqueline Tatoy nga
naghidga sa ilang may terrace ug nidagan siya padulong sa kusina nila ug diha-diha akong
siyang ginsunod, gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan pinaagi sa akong tres kantps nga
hinagiban (Gidtudo ni Eliza rang Tres Kantos nga nakit-an didto sa patyang lawas nga
Jaqueline Tatoy).

Pangutana: Kapila nimo dunggaba ug diin maigo si Jaqueline Totay?

Tubag: Dili na ko nakahinumdom, ingon man dili sba ko makahinumdom kon diin to siya
maigo. Basta manadaghan to nako siya dunggaba ginamit ko ang akong Tres kantos.

Pangutana: Gawas nga imo to siyang gidunggab, wala ba nimo pahimudsi and iyang
pagkapbabye o wala ka bay plano sa pag rape kaniya niadtong higayona?

Tubag: Wala gyud to nako siya pahimudsi og wala gyud koy tuyo sa pag rape niya. Ang ako
ra gyud nga tuyo mao ra gyud and pagkawat sa ilang TV apan kay nisiyagit man siyang
nakaila man kayo siya nako, nahadlok kong mahibaw-an sa ako untang pagkawat sa ilang
TV, hinungdan nga ako siyang gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan.

Pangutana: Nganog nakahibawo or nakaila ka man nga si Jaqueline Tatoy tong naisiyagit ug
imong gidunggab?

Tubag: Duna ma hayag nga suga sa elektresidad sa ilang may kusina.

Pangutana: Kaila ba nimong daan si Jaqueline Tatoy?

Tubag: Oo, Sir ka saw ala pa ang among hitabo permi man kong nagtan-awan sa ilang TV.

Pangutana: Human nim dunggaba si Jaqueline Tatoy unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat?

Tubag: Dihang sa akong pagtoo nga patay na siya, ako naidagan agi sa pultahan nga akong
gisikaran dayon kanaog subay sa hagdan didto nabiyaan nako ang akong sapatos.

Pangutana: Diin ka man paduiong dagan?

Tubag: Didto ako padulong sa akong gipuya-an sa ilang Wilson Magdasal sa maong Brgy.

Pangutana: Unya unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat og nahibaw-an?

Tubag: Niadtong hapon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, didtoy mga Brgy Tanods
sa balay ni Wilson Magdasal diin ila akong gipangutaan tali sa maong hitabo og igo lan ako
nitudlo sa akong white Slave shirt nga akong gihumulan ug tubig sa planggana sa tumong
nga makuha ang mansa sa dugo nga pinisik sa akong paggdunggab patay ni Jaqueline
Tatoy.

Pangutana: Ngano ug unsa may diay kalabutan niadtong maong slaveless white shirt nimo?

Tubag: Mao na ang akong gisul-ob dihang akog kawaton unta ang TV nila ni Jaqueline ug sa
iyang pagsiyagit ako siyang gidunggab-dunggab patay. (Elizar Yomaquin postivo nga nitudlo
ug niangkon sa maong whitel sleve less shirt)

Pangutana: Kinign nia karon dinhi nga sapatos itom nga nakuha didto so hagdan sa balay
nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy human siya nakit-i nga patay, unsa may imong ikasulti niini?

Tubag: Mao kana ang akong sapatos nga nabiyaan didto sa ilang hagdan human sa hitabo
ug gain sa akong pagdagan akong napatiran kadtong ilang container.
 Pangutana: Sa pagkakaron, wala na akoy ipangutana kanimo. Ikay aduna ka pa bay ikasul ti
o bakwion ba hinoon sa mao nimong gipamahayag nga naglangkob sa duha ka pahina lakip
niining maong pahina?

Tubag: Wala na akoy ikadugang pagsulti ni bakwion ba hinnon. Nao kana ang tanan.

Pangutana: Andam ka ba pagperme niini sa pagmatuod nga wlay tawo nga nagpugos,
naghulga, nagsaad ug gnate o nag hadlok ba hinoon kon dili sa imong kaugalingon nga
kabubut-on lamang.

Tubag: Oo, andam ako pageram. Aron matuoron kining tanan kini akong permaahn ning
petsa 16 sa Diusyembre 1996, Siyudad Sugbo, Pilipinas. 9

On the witness stand, appellant did not deny that he had a drinking spree with Rico Magdasal and
three other persons. His version of the incident is that it was Rico who committed the crime and not
him. Appellant testified that Rico asked his help in stealing the television set from the Tatoy’s
residence. When Jacquelyn saw them, she ran towards the kitchen but she did not reach it as Rico
had stabbed her on the back with the tres cantos. Appellant claims that it was Rico who owns
the tres cantos, as well as the pair of shoes, left inside Tatoy’s house. Afraid of what happened,
appellant went home to Wilson Magdasal’s house and slept there. He was awakened the next
morning by barangay tanod Julius Yosores who kicked him. Yosores also boxed and poked a gun at
him. Appellant claims that Rico and Edgar Magdasal maltreated him in the presence
of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan when he was brought to the latter’s house. He was
made to admit committing the crime because Rico has a family while he is single. 10

Appellant also repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty. Parawan merely asked him
to sign a blank sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to assist and help him with
his expenses. 11

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 18) (RTC for brevity) rendered its decision
on October 24, 1997, convicting appellant of the crime of Murder, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, accused Elizar Tomaquin is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPERTUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of
Jaquelyn Tatoy in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The accused is, however,
credited in full during the whole period of his detention provided he will signify in writing that
he will abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.

SO ORDERED. 12

Hence, this appeal.

In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) CONVICTED ACCUSED-APPELLANT

BASED ON HIS UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION;

2. THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) GAVE FULL CREDENCE
AND FULL FAITH ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES; 13
Appellant’s extrajudicial confession was taken and transcribed entirely in the Cebuano dialect. Rule
132, Section 33 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language.-- Documents written in an

unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation
into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are
directed to have such translation prepared before trial.

The rule is that when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any language other than the
official language (Filipino or English), if there is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated by the
official interpreter of the court, or a translation should be agreed upon by the parties, and both
original and translation sent to this court. In this case, there is no official translation of appellant’s
14 

extrajudicial confession in the Filipino or English language. If the Court were to strictly follow the rule,
then appellant’s extrajudicial confession should not have been admitted by the trial court as
evidence for the prosecution.

Nevertheless, considering that appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, and the parties and
the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of
Cebuano in which the document was written, such extrajudicial confession was appropriately
15 

considered by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution.

As stated at the outset, the crucial issue in this case is whether or not the extrajudicial confession
executed by appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Fortunato Parawan, is admissible in evidence
against him. There is no need at this point to secure an official translation of the confession to
English.

Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

The words "competent and independent counsel" in the constitutional provision is not an empty
rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a
custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and
capable lawyer. 16

As heretofore stated, Atty. Fortunato Parawan, at that time, was the barangay captain of Barangay
Lorega, Cebu City. Under the 1991 Local Government Code, a barangay captain performs the
following duties and functions:

(a) The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay government, shall exercise
such powers and perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and other
laws.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the punong
barangay shall:
 (1) Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay;

...

(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or
municipal mayor and the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and
functions; . . . 17

Simply put, Atty. Parawan, as barangay captain, is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in
his barangay and ensure peace and order at all times.

In fact, as barangay captain, Atty. Parawan is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:

ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. – Who shall be deemed
as such. – In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any
person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some
court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority.

On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider Atty. Parawan as an independent counsel of
appellant.

In People vs. Culala, the Court reiterated the rule that a municipal attorney cannot be an
18 

independent counsel because as a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and
support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the
people, including the maintenance of peace and order, and it was seriously doubted whether he can
effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. Thus, the
Court held that he is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during
custodial investigations. 19

This is reiterated in People vs. Taliman, and People vs. Velarde, where we further ruled that a
20  21 

municipal mayor cannot likewise be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution.

Similarly in this case, considering that Atty. Parawan’s role as a barangay captain, was a
peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing
competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction,
Atty. Parawan could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter
executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of an
independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense without
any intervening conflict of interest.22

Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel.
An "effective and vigilant counsel" necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and
able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by
the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. As held in People vs.
Velarde:23

. . . The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of
the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation,
 and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he
may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview. 24

Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person
under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession
in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.
25

The assistance rendered by Atty. Parawan to appellant cannot be fittingly described as effective and
vigilant. As testified by Atty. Parawan, hereinbelow quoted verbatim, this was what transpired when
he went to the Ramos police station to assist appellant during the investigation:

Q What happened when you arrived at the Ramos Police Station at around 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon of December 16, 1996?

A I go (sic) to the room where Policeman Monilar and the accused and had a conversation
with the accused.

Q What transpired during that conversation with the accused.

A I asked him. Are you going to get me as your lawyer?

Q And may we know what did he answer?

A Yes, Cap. Okay Cap.

Q When you said "Cap" what did he mean by that word "Cap."

A Being a Barangay Captain.

Q After the accused told you that you were his counsel of choice. What did you do next if
any?

A I informed Elizar Tomaquin that do you know what will be the implication of your
admission, you will be imprisoned.

Q After you asked him whether he knew of the implication of his confession that could be …
because of that confession. What was his reaction?

A Yes Cap. I know. And then I told him as follows: "Because of this confession you will be
imprisoned."

Q And what did he say after you told him again that if he would execute that affidavit of
confession he would surely be imprisoned?

A No I even continue that "why did he do that?"

Q And what did he answer?

A He answered to me that he was drunk at that time.

 Q And so what transpired next?

A So I told him are you willing now to give your confession, then policeman Monilar went
inside the room and we had that investigation.

Q Now how was the investigation of the accused done?

A It was made in a question and answer form.

Q And in what language were the questions framed?

A In the vernacular, vesaya.

Q What did you do during the question and answer form of investigation?

A I just observed them.

Q But did you stay there until the whole taking of the confession was over?

A Yes I was there in the presence of two persons coming from my Barangay.

...

Q When you arrived and saw Mr. Monilar with the accused as an Attorney did you
immediately inquire what had happened before you arrived like; Did you start the
investigation? did you inquire from that from Mr. Monilar?

A He was already preparing this top portion here.

INTERPRETER:

Q Witness pointing to the upper portion of the certification up to the signature to that portion
above the names typewritten thereon.

...

Q And that means to say that when he prepared this from the top most portion to that portion
immediately right before the typewritten name Elizar Tomaquin and Atty. Fortunato Parawan
you were not around. Correct?

A I was not around but we have already a conversation earlier with Monilar. 26

Records also show that appellant was presented to SPO2 Monilar in the morning of December 16,
1996. When appellant intimated that he was willing to confess and requested the presence of Atty.
Parawan, SPO2 Monilar called up Atty. Parawan and informed him of appellant’s decision. Atty.
Parawan arrived at the Ramos Police Station only at 2:00 in the afternoon. By the time Atty.
27 

Parawan arrived, the investigation had already started and SPO2 Monilar had already asked and
elicited information from appellant. Worse, Atty. Parawan merely "observed" during the entire
investigation and failed to advise or explain to appellant the questions being propounded by SPO2
Monilar. He did not even bother to ask appellant if the extrajudicial confession he was about to
execute was being voluntarily given.

Moreover, that Atty. Parawan is not an effective and vigilant counsel is bolstered by his own
testimony that he already suspected appellant as having committed the crime when the latter was
brought to his house by the barangay tanods, viz.:

Q Being an attorney naturally your first question to your arresting tanods was where was he
arrested and how was he arrested and what is the reason why he was arrested. Correct?

A Yes.

...

Q You are telling this Court now Atty. Parawan that before the Barangay Tanods could
explain to you the circumstances of his arrest you already started to ask questions like; Why
did you have blood in your pants. Where is your t-shirt you wore. Where did you get that
information since you were not in the house of Jaqueline Tatoy when she was killed?

A It was like this. I heard that the victim suffered multiple stab wounds. So when I saw blood
stains with all probability it might come from the victim. It was conclusion something like
when I saw that t-shirt stained with blood.

Q So you mean to this Court that you already reached the conclusion of mine (sic) that Elizar
Tomaquin one of your constituents in the Barangay was already on your conclusion in mine
(sic) the killer of Jacquilyn Tatoy before your tanods turned it over to the police for
investigation. Is that what you are telling Atty. Parawan?

A It is somewhat like that. That is why I ordered my tanod to bring him to the Homicide. 28

The Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively safeguarded appellant’s rights
as an accused during the investigation when he himself entertained the suspicion that appellant is
guilty of the crime charged, and naturally, he would want appellant to admit having committed it.

It was posited that appellant cannot challenge Atty. Parawan’s qualification as a competent and
independent counsel because he was his choice.

As provided in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, "(A)ny person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right … to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. Ideally, the lawyer called to be present during such
investigations should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing
questioning, but the word "preferably" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a
person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling his defense. What is imperative is that the counsel should be competent
29 

and independent. That appellant chose Atty. Parawan does not estop appellant from complaining
about the latter’s failure to safeguard his rights.

It appears that appellant chose Atty. Parawan because he was the barangay captain of Brgy. Lorega
where appellant resides, and apparently, appellant trusts Atty. Parawan to protect his rights. The
latter, however, fell short in tending to the trust reposed on him. Appellant did not finish Grade 1 and
does not know how to read and write. As between him and Atty.
30 
Parawan who presumably knows the intricacies of the law and appellant’s predicament, Atty.
Parawan should have known better and exercised his sound judgment before conceding to
appellant’s choice. But it did not occur to him to inhibit himself from acting as appellant’s counsel and
instead, he even let appellant go through the investigation and execute the extrajudicial confession
knowing fully well that he was biased as regards appellant’s innocence. Quoted verbatim, Atty.
Parawan testified thus:

Q Atty. Parawan comparing yourself to the accused who is a graduate of Batchelor (sic) of
Law compared to your constituent who is jobless, illiterate [and] of low intelligence. The
question is this: It did not occur to your mine (sic) to inhibit yourself despite the request by
telling the accused as barangay Captain there could be a conflict of interest and bias that I
would not be in (sic) effective counsel or assistance to you. Did it not occur toy our mine (sic)
or not?

A It did not occur to my nime (sic).

...

Q But as experienced attorney you know very well that when you assist a suspect in the
police station and the circumstances he was arrested the best assistance a lawyer could give
is would be to tell the accused to remain silent. Would you agree?

...

A It did not occur to my mine (sic) that time. 31

Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of

an independent and competent counsel as required by the Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial
confession executed by appellant, even if gospel truth, is deemed an uncounselled confession and
therefore, inadmissible in evidence.

In this regard, it may not be amiss to repeat the declaration of the Court in People vs.
Deniega, stressing the role of the courts in ascertaining that extrajudicial confessions meet the
32 

exacting standards of the Constitution:

Every so often, courts are confronted with the difficult task of taking a hard look into the
sufficiency of extra-judicial confessions extracted by law enforcement authorities as the sole
basis for convicting accused individuals. In cases of crimes notable for their brutality and
ruthlessness, the impulse to find the culprits at any cost occasionally tempts these agencies
to take shortcuts and disregard constitutional and legal safeguards intended to bring about a
reasonable assurance that only the guilty are punished. Our courts, in the process of
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, play a central role in bringing about this
assurance by determining whether or not the evidence gathered by law enforcement
agencies scrupulously meets exacting standards fixed by the Constitution. If the
standards are not met, the Constitution provides the corresponding remedy by
providing a strict exclusionary rule, i.e., that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained
in violation of (Article III, Section 12(1) . . . hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence."

Without appellant’s extrajudicial confession, the prosecution’s case now teeters precariously on
circumstantial evidence, namely:
 (1) Rico Magdasal’s testimony that:

(a) appellant left their drinking session at 1:00 in the morning of December 16, 1996;

(b) the tres cantos and pair of shoes found inside Jaquelyn’s residence belongs to
appellant; and

(c) appellant was wearing a pair of maong shorts and white sando shirt on the night
of the crime, which blood-stained shirt was found among the soiled clothes in Wilson
Magdasal’s house;

(2) Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza’s testimony that the blood stains on
appellant’s sando shirt and the tres cantos was of human origin. 33

These circumstances, however, are not sufficient to demonstrate positively and convincingly that it
was appellant who killed Jaquelyn.

Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to
convict if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction
34 

based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 35

The circumstantial evidence in this case does not constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that appellant is the guilty person.

For one, appellant’s act of leaving the drinking session at 1:00 in the morning does not establish
appellant’s whereabouts at the time the crime was committed. There is nothing in the testimony of
Rico Magdasal and the other prosecution witnesses that will show if appellant indeed went to
Jaquelyn’s house after he left the group. No one saw him enter or leave her residence. If at all, what
was proved is that appellant was found by the barangay tanods sleeping at home in the afternoon of
the same day.

Added to that is the prosecution’s failure to establish the chain of custody of these valuable pieces of
evidence.

Prosecution witness Armando Zabate testified that the pair of black shoes and tres cantos were
given to a certain Rey for safekeeping. These were later turned over to a Policeman Tariao of the
Ramos Police Station. Zabate, however, did not identify the person who turned over the objects to
the police. There was no showing who turned over those articles to the police and Rey was not
36 

presented to identify if these were the same pair of shoes and tres cantos found in Jaquelyn’s house
and turned over to the police. Policeman Tariao was not called to the witness stand so as to confirm
if those articles were the same evidence turned over to him and later presented in court. Ordinarily, it
would not be indispensable for the prosecution to allege and prove every single fact of the case. But
in this case, the pieces of evidence are crucial to the prosecution’s case. Also, the fact that a civilian
obtained and received the evidence, the possibility that the integrity of these articles could have
been compromised cannot be ignored. The Court even noted that during his direct examination,
SPO2 Monilar was confused as to whether the pair of shoes presented in court was the same ones
that were turned over to the police. It turned out that the marking he made on the shoes were
washed off because at one time, the shoes fell in the canal located in front of the police station and
they had to clean and wash the shoes! Such sloppy handling renders the chain of custody of those
37 

pieces of evidence dubious, and damaging to the prosecution’s case.

And even if appellant did own the pair of shoes and tres cantos, the fact that it was found in the
scene of the crime merely proved that he was in the residence of Jaquelyn at some point in time. But
it does not prove when particularly he was there, his authorship of the crime or his motive for being

there. While the motive of an accused in a criminal case is generally held to be immaterial, not being
an element of the crime, motive becomes important when, as in this case, the evidence of the
commission of the crime is purely circumstantial. 38

The prosecution’s evidence that is perceived to be conclusive of appellant’s guilt is mainly the
testimony of Rico Magdasal. Such testimony, however, is uncorroborated. The rule is that the
testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, if such testimony positively
establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the doctrine of long
39 

standing that the testimony of a lone witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an
accused applies only to eyewitnesses. Thus, an uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is
certainly not sufficient for conviction when the evidence itself is in serious doubt. Rico’s lone
40 

testimony is not sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In addition, appellant vehemently denied Rico’s allegations. According to appellant, it was Rico who
actually owns the pair of shoes and tres cantos; that it was he who bid appellant to go to the Tatoys’
residence and lift their TV set; and that it was Rico who stabbed Jaquelyn. Considering appellant’s
denial and his different version of the incident, it became incumbent upon the prosecution to rebut
appellant's allegations with further evidence to corroborate the statement of Rico. It must be noted
that there were other persons present during their drinking spree, namely, Romy Magdasal, Noel
Labay, and a certain Cardo. These persons could have been presented as witnesses to back up
Rico’s claim but the prosecution did not do so. Rico testified that appellant owned the tres
cantos found by the stairs; but Rico also stated he only "heard" that the tres cantos was found by the
stairs. Who found the tres cantos that was supposed to have been used to stab Jaquelyn? The
41 

neighbor who allegedly found it by the stairs was not presented in court to identify if the tres
cantos presented by the prosecution was the alleged weapon in the stabbing of Jaquelyn. Such
failure of the prosecution to corroborate the material points of Rico’s testimony weakened their case.

The Court also has serious misgivings on the probative value of the white sando shirt that appellant
was allegedly wearing at the time of stabbing Jaquelyn, which Edgar Magdasal later found
bloodstained among the soiled clothes.

First, when appellant was asked by the barangay tanods about the shirt he was wearing, he told
them that it was in Wilson Magdasal’s house. According to barangay tanod Armando Zabate, it was
Edgar Magdasal who found the shirt, "somewhat wet and bloody," among the soiled clothes. Edgar 42 

Magdasal, however, was not presented to testify as to where he found the shirt, the state the shirt
was in when he found it, and how he knew that it was the shirt worn by appellant.

Second, Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza testified that the bloodstains on
appellant’s sando shirt, as well as the tres cantos, were human blood. Mendoza, however, did not
43 

conduct further tests to ascertain the type of blood found on these pieces of evidence nor did he
match it with the victim’s blood type, hence, it does not connect the bloodstains to the herein victim.
44 

In People vs. Rodriguez, the Court ruled that the maong pants allegedly belonging to appellant and
found positive of type O blood has no probative value since the blood type of appellant and the
victim were not taken for purposes of comparison. 45

The same ruling applies with regard to the bloodstains found on the tres cantos.

Appellant enjoys in his favor the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven. Proof of the
guilt of the accused should not be tainted with ambiguity. Although appellant’s defense is weak,
conviction must come from the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not from the weakness of
the defense. In this case, the prosecution’s evidence is not strong enough to justify a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Acquittal, therefore, is inevitable.
46 

WHEREFORE, appellant Elizar Tomaquin is hereby ACQUITTED and

ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant
unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of the date of his release,
or the ground for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice of herein decision.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.