International Journal of Project Management 39 (2021) 339–350

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International Journal of Project Management

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman

The organisational architecture of megaprojects

Juliano Denicol a,∗, Andrew Davies b, Stephen Pryke a
a
School of Construction and Project Management, The Bartlett Faculty of the Built Environment, University College London, United Kingdom
b
Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business School, University of Sussex, United Kingdom

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Keywords: This research explores the formation and evolution of the organisational architecture in megaprojects. We intro-
Megaproject management duce the Project System Organisation (PSO) conceptual framework, which charts the architecture of megaproject
Organisation design organising, from intra- to inter-organisational design, and ultimately to system-level design. The PSO identifies
Organisational architecture
the multiple and evolving actors across the multi-level and multi-layer megaproject system and defines four roles
Inter-organisational relationships
often used to label the client in megaprojects: owner, sponsor, client, and partner. Six megaprojects that cur-
Client organisations
Governance rently represent a combined investment of more than £100 Bn have been analysed through 171 interviews in
the United Kingdom: High Speed One, Heathrow Airport Terminal 5, London 2012 Olympics, Crossrail, Thames
Tideway Tunnel, and High Speed Two. The PSO provides a structure to design megaproject delivery models and
prototype the configuration of inter-organisational relationships. We suggest designing megaprojects as dynamic
production systems, decomposing and integrating the organisational boundaries of the system in the evolving
architecture.

1. Introduction where the intra-organisational structure is developed influencing the

emergence of inter-organisational strategies.
A megaproject is defined as a transformational project of over US$ 1 This study explores the organisational architecture of megaprojects
billion cost proposed by public or private sectors, providing assets that and started with one of the most frequent questions from the commu-
will last for decades and have large impact on societies (Flyvbjerg et al., nity involved in megaproject delivery: Who is the client in megapro-
2003; Priemus and Van Wee, 2013; Flyvbjerg, 2014; 2017). Megapro- jects? In recent years clients have been moving away from the traditional
jects are commonly associated with the delivery of major infrastructure approach of distant investors towards new frameworks of engagement
projects in several industrial sectors, which often face significant cost with stakeholders to foster integration, coordination, and innovation,
overruns and delays due to multiple factors (Morris and Hough, 1987; therefore it is important to understand in detail the terminology, vari-
Priemus et al., 2008; Merrow, 2011). The megaproject management lit- ous organisational configurations and behaviour of each actor over the
erature has been consolidated in one of the largest systematic reviews life-cycle.
to date, revealing 18 causes and 54 solutions to improve megaproject This research introduces the Project System Organisation (PSO) con-
performance (Denicol et al., 2020). The solutions emphasise the impor- ceptual framework to identify the multiple actors in the megaproject
tance of exploring the organisational elements of megaprojects through structure, provide clear terminology, and unpack the roles and respon-
a systems lens. sibilities of those entities in the megaproject delivery model. The frame-
Megaprojects are delivered through a combination of relationships work was developed based on 171 interviews with the senior leader-
between multiple organisations, creating a complex organisational chal- ship of London’s megaprojects. Six megaprojects have been analysed:
lenge that is often underexplored in light of the technical specifications. High Speed One, Heathrow Airport Terminal 5, London 2012 Olympics,
Prior research has focused on individual actors in megaprojects, using a Crossrail, Thames Tideway Tunnel, and High Speed Two.
variety of interchangeable and often confusing terms to describe the We conceptualise megaprojects as a system of organisations that
focal organisation responsible for leading a megaproject such as the need to be designed, coordinated, and collectively organised at intra-,
owner (Morris and Hough, 1987; Merrow, 2011), owner and opera- inter- and system-level to deliver the asset and unlock value. This re-
tor (Winch, 2014), sponsor (Miller and Lessard, 2000; Morris, 2013) search argues that the client is the key organisation in megaproject de-
and client (Airtua et al., 2009). However, little is known about how livery and is responsible for configuring how the system is organised,
the organisational architecture is formed and evolves in megaprojects, coordinating the multiple parties involved during different phases of
project.

∗
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: juliano.denicol@ucl.ac.uk (J. Denicol).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2021.02.002
Received 30 December 2019; Received in revised form 1 February 2021; Accepted 10 February 2021
Available online 27 February 2021
0263-7863/© 2021 Elsevier Ltd, APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
J. Denicol, A. Davies and S. Pryke International Journal of Project Management 39 (2021) 339–350

The PSO charts the architecture of megaproject organising, from supply chain. An owner-driven delivery model is a more recent and
intra- to inter-organisational design, and ultimately to system-level de- innovative way of organising the megaproject structure (Gil, 2009;
sign. The PSO provides a structure to design, decompose and integrate Gil and Beckman, 2009), where the owner can either vertically inte-
the relationships between the main actors of the megaproject organisa- grate the project management skills, trusting entirely in his own project
tional system. The PSO offers an inter-organisational canvas for organi- management team (Davies et al., 2009; Gil, Miozzo, and Massini,
sation designers, system of systems architects, meta-system integrators, 2012), or establish a temporary client organisation which will be
meta-organisation architects, network orchestrators, enterprise and sup- augmented in capacity and capability by delivery partners, developing
ply chain architects, and delivery model designers. a governance structure to proactively contribute in strategic, tactical
and operational decisions (Davies and Mackenzie, 2014; Davies et al.,
2. Theoretical framework 2014). Previous megaprojects suggest that the building blocks that
enabled their successful performance (Denicol et al., 2020) was the
This section provides a review of the literature, problematising and appropriate management of the front-end, where the owner had a deep
identifying unresolved questions neglected in prior research, in order to involvement proactively defining strategies of governance, programme
develop a theoretical framework to understand the organisational archi- procurement and supply chain management, either through the in-
tecture of megaprojects, different roles and configurations. house project team (Heathrow Terminal 5 – British Airports Authority,
BAA) or temporary client organisation (London 2012 Olympics –
2.1. Megaproject delivery models Olympic Delivery Authority, ODA and Crossrail – Crossrail Limited,
CRL Ltd) (Davies, Dodgson, and Gann, 2017).
Megaprojects are complex system of systems projects used as the
delivery model to build large sport events such as the Olympic Games 2.2. Clients, Owners, or Sponsors?
(Flyvbjerg and Stewart, 2012; Davies and Mackenzie, 2014) and the
Football World Cup or major defence programmes (National Audit Of- Morris and Hough (1987) conceptualised the role of the owner, ex-
fice [NAO], 2004) including weapons systems, submarines and air- ploring cases across several industrial sectors (e.g. civil construction,
craft programmes like the Joint Strike Fighter. Megaprojects are of- aerospace, energy, oil and gas, ICT), arguing that some of the character-
ten used to deliver major infrastructure assets, including nuclear power istics of the owner are associated with the practices of each industrial
plants (Morris and Hough, 1987), oil and gas factories and plat- sector, such as the in-house development, outsourcing and contracting
forms (Merrow, 2011), mining, telecom facilities (National Audit Of- policies. The level of engagement of the owner with the supply chain
fice [NAO], 2004a), hydroelectric plants (Ansar, Flyvbjerg, Budzier, throughout the project life-cycle (design, construction, operations) was
and Lunn, 2014), seaports, airports (Davies, Gann, and Douglas, classified across the cases in the following categories: no owner (Channel
2009), railways (Davies, MacAulay, DeBarro, and Thurston, 2014), Tunnel – Civil/Mechanical), weak to almost non-existent owner (Con-
bridges (Van Marrewijk, 2015), tunnels (Greiman, 2013) and highways cord – Aerospace), muddled owner (APT – In-company product devel-
(Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003). opment), weak owner (The Thames Barrier – Civil construction), learn-
‘Project Delivery Model’ is a concept that was recently explored in ing owner (Heysham 2 – Power station), strong but still learning owner
light of the business model literature (Davies et al., 2019). However, (Fulmar – North Sea oil and gas), strong owner (COP – Computerisa-
the word delivery can be associated with the construction phase of tion), and strong participatory owner (Giotto – Aerospace). The classifi-
the project and sometimes ‘delivery model’ can be mistakenly under- cation ranging from weak to strong owners is associated with whether
stood as just the execution strategy, which is only a part of the deliv- they are experienced or not, which is partially a reflection of the indus-
ery model and reflects partially the strategy to engage with the supply trial dynamics that occur in each sector, which in turn might be anal-
chain (Davies et al., 2019). Therefore, it is relevant to emphasise that ysed both structurally and in terms of the product and its complexities.
the ‘project delivery model’ represents not only the construction phase Winch (2014) explores this domain by the lens of the owner operators, as
but the whole life-cycle, where several organisations act and add value. an alternative to clients, and Winch and Leiringer (2016) do so through
A megaproject delivery model is defined here as the overall strategy that the strong owner concept, building upon Morris and Hough’s (1987) re-
a public or private entity (often the owner or sponsor) adopts to engage search. Winch and Leiringer (2016) argue that an emphasis on the
with organisations from the public or private sector that will ‘deliver’ ‘owner’ would move the focus towards long-term decisions associated
(design/deliver/operate) the physical asset throughout different phases with the operations and provision of services, rather than short-term
of the project, from development, through delivery, to operations. transactional ones driven by a ‘client’.
Megaprojects are characterized as extremely complex endeavours, Morris (2013) emphasised the role of the sponsor rather than the
comprising a range of different platforms of systems to be integrated, the owner, as previously identified in Morris and Hough’s (1987) work.
so-called systems of systems or array project (Shenhar and Dvir, 2007). However, the differentiation and connections between both terms could
In terms of organisational structure, a megaproject comprises a large have been explored in more depth, as exemplified by instances where
network of enterprises distributed in several supply chain tiers, which the terms owner and sponsor are used as synonyms at the organisational
are requested to contribute according to their expertise in specific as- level. Miller and Lessard’s (2000) research provides a comprehensive re-
pects of the project (Denicol, 2020). This temporary multi-organisation flection of large engineering projects, drawing upon 60 projects. The au-
coalition is frequently composed of an owner who usually is the spon- thors emphasise the concept of ‘project shaping’ in the front-end, where
sor and operator, a delivery partner who performs the role of pro- ‘persistent sponsors’ would shape and reshape projects in the front-end.
gramme manager, Tier 1 prime contractors that act as systems in- The authors highlight that one of the key competencies of sponsors is
tegrators, Tier 2 subcontractors that supply sub-systems, Tier 3 sup- ‘ownership’, where the sponsor would take into consideration its future
pliers that provide components, and subsequent tiers that contribute operator role, informing its decisions as ‘a responsible owner’ through-
with sub-components until raw materials (Pryke, 2009; Mead and out the project life-cycle. Previously, Genus (1997) highlighted a similar
Gruneberg, 2013; Pryke 2017). challenge (i.e. ‘missing operator’) in the Channel Tunnel project.
The traditional way of delivering megaprojects is the Similar to Morris and Hough’s (1987) exploration of the owner,
owner/operator acting as the sponsor and empowering other sup- Miller and Lessard (2000) labelled sponsors as ‘strong’ and ‘compe-
ply chain actors to act on their behalf to deliver the physical asset. tent’ to identify those organisations with previous involvement and
Therefore, the owner might appoint a prime contractor (single organi- experience, whereas ‘inexperienced ones were given the label ‘weak’.
sation) or delivery partner (single entity or consortium of enterprises) The authors distinguish between public and private sponsors, the
to manage the project and establish relationships with the rest of the latter represented by a firm or consortium appointed when gov-

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ernments opt for a concession (e.g. Build Operate Transfer (BOT)). delivering systems of systems projects (Gil et al., 2012; Davies et al.,
Brealey et al. (2000) recognise that one of the first choices of the sponsor 2016). BAA took advantage of its in-house capabilities, supply chain
is associated with the organisation responsible for delivering the project, knowledge and buyer power, and acted as a strong and intelligent client,
such as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), or through a company owned in a rare case where the owner internalised the project management
by the sponsor and functioning as its extension. function and performed the roles of owner, sponsor, client, and opera-
Miller and Lessard (2000) represent the term ‘sponsors’ recognising tor (Davies et al., 2009). In this context, BAA created a delivery model
both the organisational (e.g. sponsoring organisations) and individual innovation internalizing the risk and not dumping it on the contrac-
levels (e.g. project sponsor executives within the sponsoring organisa- tors, creating an environment where the supply chain would have their
tion); however, sometimes sponsors and owners are used interchange- profit margin guaranteed and would be free to focus their attention to
ably. As it is argued in this research, they might be the same organ- innovations, to impact the project and reduce its costs (Michaud and
isation, but not necessarily. In other instances, the relationship men- Lessard, 2000; National Audit Office [NAO], 2005). In this agreement,
tioned is owner-contractor, which is covered in the literature through every supply chain member was able to propose innovations having
different streams, mainly at the individual level (e.g. project owners the possibility to increase their profit, since this saved margin would
and project sponsors as representatives interfacing with the project be shared by a contract between BAA and the supply chain partners
manager), with the governance and procurement streams (e.g. project (Brady and Davies, 2011).
delivery methods and systems) emphasising more the organisational Davies et al. (2017) present further examples from several industry
level. Illustrative literature streams include: project delivery methods sectors of enduring owners, organisations that act in a similar fashion to
(Gordon, 1991; Miller, 1997; Miller and Evje, 1999; Pietroforte and BAA for operations and capital projects: British Petroleum (BP), Shell,
Miller, 2002), project delivery systems (Miller et al., 2000; Garvin, 2003; Network Rail, Highways England and London Underground. This con-
Ibbs et al., 2003; El Asmar et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2014, 2015, 2016), cept can be expanded to some major public owners, like the National
project champion (Bryde, 2008), agency (Andersen, 2008; Turner and Health Service (NHS) and even the government for strategic projects,
Müller, 2004; Müller and Turner 2005; Szentes and Eriksson, 2016), be- which should become strong owners and participate actively throughout
haviours (Helm and Remington, 2005; Kloppenborg et al., 2006), trust the delivery process to guarantee its own interest and decrease the num-
(Zwikael and Smyrk, 2011), relationship (Larson, 1995; Andersen, 2012; ber of unsuccessful projects. The literature presents several names to
Drexler and Larson, 2000; Harmon, 2003; Suprapto et al., 2015), gov- classify this type of owner, which is often still called by the term ‘client’:
ernance (Crawford et al., 2008; Zwikael and Smyrk, 2015). strong owner (Morris and Hough, 1987; Porter, 1998; Swarup et al.,
2012; Winch and Leiringer, 2016), sophisticated owner (Lovejoy and
2.3. Capable owner model Mortensen, 1989), influential owner (Cox and Ireland, 2006), capable
owner (Long, Ogunlana, Quang, and Lam, 2004; Merrow, 2011), intel-
The owner can drive the multi-organisation supply chain perform- ligent client (Airtua, Male, and Bower, 2009; Airtua, Male, Bower, and
ing the role of supply chain manager or systems integrator, establish- Madter, 2011; Emuze and Smallwood, 2011; Madter and Bower, 2015;
ing relationships with construction companies at several tiers to inte- Laryea and Watermeyer, 2016), sophisticated client (Higgin and Jes-
grate the procured work-packages (Prencipe, Davies, and Hobday, 2003; sop, 1965; Loosemore and Richard, 2015), pluralistic client (Cherns and
Pryke, 2009). In this organisational structure, the supply chain actors are Bryant, 1984; Green, 1996; Thompson, 2011), continuing client
independent entities operating under separate contractual agreements (Hillebarndt, 1984; Wu, Kumaraswamy, and Soo, 2011), informed client
with the owner (e.g. architects, tier 1 main contractors, cost consultants) (Elston, 1992; Smith, 1994), experienced client (Masterman and Game-
(Rolstadås et al., 2011; Hart, 2015). The owner aiming to influence the son, 1994), large ongoing portfolio client (Blismas, Sher, Thorpe, and
governance of the supply chain and act as a systems integrator should Baldwin, 2004), progressive client (Tah, 2005), active client (Sturdy and
look into its organisation and analyse if there is enough in-house project Wright, 2011), and capable client (Denicol, 2020a).
management capabilities to fit together all the systems and sub-systems
and complete the mission (Hobday, Davies, and Prencipe, 2005). The 2.4. Temporary client organisation model
owner that assumes the risk and trusts its own project management
team, or develops it through an insource process of this knowledge, In one-off projects, if the project is not related to the core business
is rare, mostly because of the temporal characteristic of the construc- of the owner, there is a high probability of hiring a delivery partner
tion industry and the lack of guarantee of future projects. This type of that has the knowledge and expertise to manage complex projects and
owner therefore is no longer a mere sponsor just providing the capital programmes (Grabher and Thiel, 2015). The argument is that the de-
at the beginning with no control, or interest, in strategic decisions at the livery partner will do it better and more competitively than the owner,
front-end of the project or in the dynamics of the construction phase at since they are working on their core business (Davies and Brady, 2000).
enterprise and project level (Winch, 2014). It expands the usual charac- However, it is critical for the owner to have its own project team, which
teristics of owners as sponsor and operator, by exerting the ownership will be part of a temporary client organisation that will be established
of the project through involvement in strategic and tactical decisions in to manage the interface with the delivery partner (one company or joint
order to guarantee a successful delivery (Winch and Leiringer, 2016). venture) (Davies and Mackenzie, 2014). The temporary client organisa-
In general, these owners are permanent organisations that have opera- tion should report to the owner and act as the supply chain architect
tional capabilities to run their business, an extensive knowledge of the (Denicol, 2020a), coordinating together with the contracted delivery
supply chain as well as buyer power, which allow economies of scale and partner and leading the integration of the supply chain (Denicol, 2020).
supplier interest to access the given market (Davies and Brady, 2016). In the management of megaprojects, the front-end should be empha-
Thus, these organisations are well positioned to conduct sporadic cap- sized, in order to create the governance structure that will enable a suc-
ital projects, either to expand their business or to improve the current cessful achievement of the goals (Artto, Ahola, and Vartiainen, 2016).
portfolio of assets in order to provide better service for their customers The Temporary client organisation model is suitable for owners that
(Merrow, 2011). do not have in-house project management capability or are not strate-
A well-known case of owner enterprise with these characteristics was gically interested in conducting capital projects in parallel to their busi-
the British Airports Authority (BAA), which was a case of best practices ness operation (Söderlund and Tell, 2009). After Heathrow Airport Ter-
in supply chain management by the time of Heathrow T5 construction minal 5, a legacy of lessons was available and the following UK megapro-
(Potts, 2009; Denicol, 2020). In the case of Heathrow T5, the owner jects adopted a different strategy, London 2012 Olympics (Brady and
(BAA) developed a strategic programme to deliver megaprojects that is Davies, 2014), Crossrail, Thames Tideway Tunnel and High Speed Two.
considered an innovation in project management, redefining the way of Crossrail is a 118-km, west-east, interurban railway that provides 10%

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extra capacity to London’s rail network. Thames Tideway Tunnel is a

7.2-meter-wide sewer tunnel with 25 kilometres of extension under-
neath the River Thames, running west-east from Acton to Abbey Mills.
Tideway is the largest water and sewerage project since the sector priva-
tization in 1989, and also known as London’s super sewer. High Speed
2 (HS2) is a railway that will connect London with the north of Eng-
land and is divided into three phases: (i) Phase 1 (London to Birming-
ham), (ii) Phase 2a (Birmingham to Crewe), and (iii) Phase 2b (Crewe
to Manchester, and Birmingham to Leeds). HS2 is currently the largest
infrastructure project in Europe.
The next generation of megaprojects opted to buy the necessary
knowledge from the market because they were not experienced own-
ers like BAA and most did not have the time to develop the capabilities
to run the project (Davies and Brady, 2016). In this model, the tempo-
rary client organisation might act as the integrator of external stake-
holders, creating a shield from the external environment for the deliv-
ery partner, which is responsible for the systems integration of all Tier
1 contractors, managing the interfaces between each Tier 1 contractor.
On the London 2012 Olympics programme, a temporary client organisa-
tion was created, (Olympic Delivery Authority – ODA) and three compa-
nies with recognised experience in megaproject deliveries (CH2M Hill,
Laing O’Rourke and Mace) were hired to act as Delivery-Partner (CLM),
performing the role of programme and project manager (Davies and
Mackenzie, 2014). In Crossrail, the strategy was to divide into two part-
ners the programme and project manager functions, both with inter-
faces with the temporary client organisation (Crossrail Limited – CRL)
(Dodgson et al., 2015). This model allows visibility and assurance to the
temporary client organisation and the delivery partners, which are the
only ones that have the visibility of the whole supply chain to manage it
systemically (Denicol, 2020a). Tier 1 contractors often can only manage
their own supply chain, their own independent island, not having the
scope and time to understand what is happening in other Tier 1 islands,
and therefore there is no visibility to manage the interfaces, where the
risks and problems are often hidden. Figure 1. The inclusion of the temporary client organisation in the temporary-
permanent interface.
2.5. Summary

Owners with ongoing operations and previous organisational expe- will primarily be responsible for managing the external stakeholders,
rience in major capital projects might select to internalise the coordi- creating a safe environment and shielding the production from turbu-
nation and act as the system of systems integrator, while if the project lences, where delivery partners and contractors can focus on their areas
is not strategic they can still appoint an external agent as a partner to of expertise.
deliver on their behalf. However, owners without the prior knowledge
of and exposure to major projects would not be able to consider inter- 3. Research methodology
nalising the systems integration role, finding it necessary to appoint a
delivery agent. Strategically, even when owners have in-house project This research is inspired by Langley’s (1999) call for qualitative
capabilities to deliver projects, often megaprojects are risky endeavours research following a combination of theory and data-driven research
that do not fit the corporate profile and appetite of shareholders. How- methods (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley, 1999; Van de Ven, 2007), rec-
ever, what is distinctive is that owners are creating their own standalone onciling the deductive (theory-driven) and inductive (data-driven) ap-
entities to be solely responsible for that project, a temporary organisa- proaches in iterative loops to generate and advance theory and practical
tion that often closes at the end of the project, aiming to have a closer recommendations. The abductive study conducted multiple case-studies
interface with the delivery partner, enhancing integration, coordination to develop theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). A megaproject is composed of sev-
and control through several forms, as illustrated by Figure 1. eral firms organised in a temporary coalition to deliver the project across
The owner terminology is helpful when dealing with permanent its life-cycle. Therefore, megaprojects were selected as the setting for
organisations with a clear intention of integrating that asset in their this research due to their intrinsic complex multi-layer and multi-level
structure. However, the boundaries of ownership become blurred as organisational structures, which provide the opportunity to shed light
megaprojects are funded by a variety of sources, particularly in light in the research problem regarding organisational roles and their inter-
of the large sums involved and their longevity. In addition, the long organisational dynamic in the system (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011).
timeframe of megaprojects offers the space for changes in the owner- The process of selecting empirical settings to use as a case in a re-
ship over time, influenced by a variety of factors. The client terminology search project is part of the process called “casing”, which also ad-
is ideally suited for the management of projects, as opposed to owners dresses the limitations and boundaries of the single case (Ragin, 1992).
associated with operations, categorising them into public/private and This process needs to be thoroughly conducted by justifying the sam-
permanent/temporary, as well as highlighting their potential relation- ple with rigour and clear logic. The theoretical sampling is aligned with
ship with the supply chain. When public or private clients are establish- Pettigrew’s (1990) four rules to orient the selection of cases:
ing a dedicated organisation to deliver (through several forms) a single
“(a) Go for extreme situations, critical incidents and social dramas;
project, one of the most strategic interfaces is between the temporary
client organisation and its delivery partners. As a principle, the client (b) Go for polar types;

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(c) Go for high experience levels of the phenomena under study; and was a focus on considering empirically-informed research to guide and
build a research mutually interested in both domains, theory and prac-
(d) Go for more informed choice of sites and increase the probabili- tice (Van de Ven, 2007). In a second stage, when the interviews were
ties of renegotiating access.” (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 275) gradually collected, the conceptual framework was refined and kept
evolving with inductive insights (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Given the rich megaproject environment in London, a strategy was
The deductive categories consisted of: (i) Permanent owner/sponsor;
conceived to build, develop and nurture relationships with practition-
(ii) Temporary client organisation; and (iii) Tier one suppliers, as il-
ers (Van de Ven, 2007) over two years to enable access to three ongoing
lustrated by Figure 1. During the iterative process of data collection
megaprojects: Crossrail, Thames Tideway Tunnel and High Speed 2. In
and analysis, inductive categories emerged to refine the ones deducted
total, six megaprojects that currently represent a combined investment
from the theoretical framework (Eisenhardt, 1989). The empirical in-
of more than £100 Bn have been analysed in the United Kingdom: High
sights that shaped and improved the understanding of the setting and
Speed One (HS1), T5, London Olympics, Crossrail (CRL), Thames Tide-
its configurations are twofold: (i) the division of the category ‘Perma-
way Tunnel (TTT), and High Speed Two (HS2). Three projects were anal-
nent owner/sponsor’ into two separate categories, ‘Owner’ and ‘Spon-
ysed retrospectively (HS1, T5 and London Olympics) and three projects
sor’, reflecting that they are different entities within the fluid nature
in real time (CRL, TTT and HS2).
of megaproject inter-organisational relationships, where they might
In terms of configurational aspects (Yin, 2003), this research is a
change roles throughout the project; and (ii) the division of the category
multi-case (six megaprojects), single type of evidence (qualitative), us-
‘Temporary client organisation’ into two separate categories, ‘Client’ and
ing multiple data collection methods (predominantly interviews as pri-
‘Partners’, reflecting the evolutionary nature of the project where one
mary data, and publicly available documents and reports about the
group, the evolving client, needs to make decisions about engaging with
projects as secondary). The empirical data was collected through 171
partners, in an effort to build complementary capability in the client or-
semi-structured interviews with the senior leadership from CRL, TTT
ganisation. The balance and combination of deductive and inductive in-
and HS2, who in several cases had worked in leading positions in
sights through several iterations avoids the criticism that the researcher
the three projects analysed retrospectively. The majority of interviews
is trying to ‘fit the data’ to a particular theoretical angle (Miles et al.,
lasted one hour (as scheduled), with eventual variations to 45 and
2014). Ultimately, the concern with the inductive consideration (the
120 minutes. The megaproject ecology in London (Davies, 2017) the-
voice of the data) adds another layer of insights from practice and re-
oretically informs the sampling of cases, as managers moved from
flects the authors’ intention to produce content that is relevant to society
one megaproject to another over the last decades and anchored their
(practical, impactful, applied, useful), (Van de Ven, 2007).
responses comparing and contrasting insights from the retrospective
megaprojects. The interviews explored the question of who is the client
4. Findings
in megaprojects by presenting to practitioners the two categories de-
ductively derived from the literature: ‘Permanent owner/sponsor’ and
Our findings differentiate four terms that are commonly used as syn-
‘Temporary client organisation’. The categories and terminologies were
onyms in the literature to represent the client function or a client or-
discussed in light of the evolution of the entities throughout the phases
ganisation: owner, sponsor, client, and partner. Each one of these terms
of the megaproject life-cycle. The informants’ roles are not disclosed for
represent a different entity which has a different role and responsibil-
confidentiality purposes, given their easy identification in light of the
ity, impacting on the managerial function that they need to perform.
high-profile of the projects in question and their leadership position.
Megaprojects are interesting settings to observe/study/research the dif-
Therefore, the interviews shown in Table 1 are classified into three cat-
ferences about the role of the client considering the temporary and per-
egories, namely: (i) Senior Manager (e.g. Senior Project Manager, Se-
manent dilemma, usually appointed as one the inhibitors of productiv-
nior Delivery Manager; Senior Commercial Manager); (ii) Director (e.g.
ity in the construction industry. The temporary dimension is coupled
Head of Department, Director of Function); (iii) Senior Leader (e.g. Se-
with the fragmentation of the construction industry. The nature of a
nior Strategy/Policy Advisor, Development Director, Programme Direc-
megaproject implies the necessity to engage with an extensive number
tor, Managing Director, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operating Officer,
of suppliers to have capacity and capability to deliver a large and com-
Chief Executive Officer).
plex project. Given the scale of the project, it is unlikely that a client
The research utilises data triangulation to complement, confirm and
organisation will design a strategy to hire one or a reduced number of
validate the primary data. Illustrative examples include dedicated learn-
companies to complete the work, it would be a risky decision which is
ing legacy websites (e.g. London 2012 Olympics, Crossrail), publicly
most likely to be repelled by the regulators, sponsors directly or via their
available presentations from firms (e.g. Crossrail, Tideway), reports
organisational extension which is embedded in the project, often called
from government institutions (e.g. DfT, IPA), regulators, audit organisa-
project representative. Considering the scale dimension of megaprojects,
tions (e.g. NAO), strategic management consultancies (e.g. McKinsey),
if there is capacity in the market through several organisations, the client
executive interviews, and articles published in the press. The informa-
will develop a strategy to spread the risk and divide the work in an opti-
tion gathered form the interviews is the primary source, and where rel-
mal configuration of work packages, therefore the number of suppliers
evant confirmed either with the practitioners or with secondary infor-
tend to increase when looking through the capacity lens.
mation publicly available online.
The answer to the research question of who is the client in megapro-
This research follows Van de Ven’s (2007) Engaged Scholarship ap-
jects is connected to a structural problem of the construction industry
proach, where the conceptual framework is influenced by practice and
given its fragmented nature. Such characteristic maximises the interme-
of mutual interest for both domains. Even when the literature was anal-
diary clients throughout the supply chain tiers and creates a plurality
ysed to narrow the research focus through a deductive manner, there
of actors in the promoter-side. The empirical insights provided some
guidance to clarify the terminology found in the literature, expanding
Table 1 it to four categories (owner, sponsor, client, partner), as illustrated by
Distribution of interviews per megaproject. Table 2.
Beyond the terminological problem as they are different organisa-
Project Number of interviews Senior Manager Director Senior Leader
tions, the structural understanding of the system is important given that
Crossrail 57 06 24 27 those entities might accumulate each other’s functions at different stages
Tideway 43 11 15 17 of the megaproject. Informed by Table 1, the following organisational
HS2 71 09 38 24
Total 171 26 77 68
structure is proposed, where each entity represent one of the six levels
of the system and counts with a sphere of influence around itself:

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Table 2
Empirical evidence of multiple organisational actors.

Actors Representative quotes

Owner Regardless of whatever the ownership structure is for a programme or a project, or even a portfolio to be successful, there needs to be absolute clarity
between the role of the sponsor, the role of the deliverer, and the role of the owner or the operator.
I think the owner, and it will depend on the particular thing that is being done and it’s not temporary obviously. Actually your sponsor is setting the
requirements, providing the funding, making the business case, all that good stuff. It will either be saying to a temporary or permanent client organisation,
"Right, you go and deliver that for me," and they could actually be the same organisation. There will be an instance where the delivery organisation, the
client organisation is handing over to itself. There’s something like Crossrail where it’s Crossrail limited delivering the stuff and then handing over to TfL
[Transport for London] for the most part, some bits handing over to Network Rail so it’s not always the same person.
HS2 is fundamentally different because they are going to be the owner of the High-Speed network. They’re going to have maintenance, responsibility. Train
services will be franchised out, you know, the operation of the railway services but the management of the assets, the operation of the asset… well the
decision to be taken out will remain with HS2, they are the custodians of the asset home. Therefore, they’re in a position to look at whole life costs.
So, then we’re left with this model where we have Thames [Water], who ultimately become the operator, and Tideway are the asset owner and maintainer.
So, Thames [Water] will pay Tideway for use of their tunnel and Tideway passes that on to its investors. Then, you have the main works contractors and
then in between all of that, you have [the partner].
Sponsor Sponsors, traditionally, it’s about setting the requirements about managing the scope, reporting on the budget. Ultimately moving through the benefits,
benefits realisation. So, I think it’s clear what they do. There’s a danger that that gets muddled with a sort client role. There becomes a sort of degree of
confusion between the two. Because having a budget responsibility almost drives you into the client area.
I think even Crossrail, which is a different vehicle delivery mechanic again. Where it was a new delivery organisation, in terms of Crossrail Limited, that
was set up to deliver that on behalf of its joint sponsors, TfL and Government, or DfT [Department for Transport].
So then within that construction of the delivery model, so you have the regulator, which is Ofwat, you have DEFRA which is effectively the government
sponsor because of the support package, obviously Thames Water because they originally developed it and then you move into a more, as we create a
client, a more traditional delivery model, i.e. we’re the client, we have a programme manager who manages the work and then we have a series of main
works contractors and a system integrator.
Client So if you take Heathrow Airport Terminal 5 (T5), T5 was super controlling. They controlled everything. The client was all over everything. They bought,
within to their client organisation, all the skills they needed and they managed everything to death.
We had changed the industry by delivering Terminal 5. We did it by actually having parts of our consulting team, parts of our supply chain all forming
the client role. T5 was completely collaborative and had it in-house. There’s no differentiation between those people who work for a supplier and those
people who work Terminal 5. Terminal 5 decided to take the risk themselves, exposed themselves to the risk but to get the best people around to actually
manage that risk.
Crossrail is different because it’s set up just to deliver the construction project and is being handed over to TfL to operate so the organisation and the
individuals will be gone by the time we get down to the maintenance and operation.
We’re the client [Crossrail Limited]. We are a pop-up client. Transport for London are going to be the owners. The mayor and the DfT are the sponsors, so
you have sponsors, you have owners and operators who use it and will gain revenue from it and will be accountable for the reputation of how that thing
operates.
The decision was made in 2014 that HS2 Ltd would be the deliverer. The decision was also made that we would be the future infrastructure manager, and
that we would be the initial shadow operator. This has now extended the life of HS2 from 2017 because that’s when we get an Act for the 2017, or as a
developer, we’re now saying, “You will deliver it through to 2033, and you will, out of you will grow the infrastructure manager and operator for post…”
Because we’ve got two stages, “From 2026 onwards, you will be the infrastructure manager of Phase 1, and the operator of Phase 1, and then you’ll be the
infrastructure manager of Phase 2. We’re not just a developer. We’ve got to deliver this thing. This means we’re not a company, a project company for, not
a development company, we’re not at that stage of Channel Tunnel Rail Link, HS1, or anything else, the builder, so we’re not just a project to build it. We
are basically now turning into a company forever. Whether that company is sold off, split up, it doesn’t matter.
Partner It’s how you then, as a client, contract with the [Partner]. So the delivery partner, if you create this correctly, these guys have skin in the game. So this
organisation isn’t just here’s some bodies and just pay me some money. It’s here’s some expertise. So it therefore comes down to whether this becomes a
body shop or a service provider.
Using our example from High Speed One [HS1] because we were a thin client and as you say that was part of the model for the ODA (Olympics). And this
gave rise to the delivery partner concept. The delivery partner concept recognised [the need] on the complex long-term projects, where you’ve got new
skill requirements, to build those up from scratch for one-off projects.
So, [on Crossrail] you have the client’s organisation on the top, the PDP [Project Delivery Partner] would be managing the central section, Network Rail
would be managing their own network works and then to complement that, they identified a Programme Partner [PP].

• The owner, and often the ultimate sponsor (e.g. treasury, central project (all integrated at T5; CLM independent of ODA at Lon-
banks, investors) who might be the operator; don 2012; Programme Partner and Programme Delivery Partner
• The sponsor, for example public departments that receive the fund- at Crossrail – independent and later integrated with Crossrail
ing and are empowered by the owner to act as the sponsor (e.g. Limited);
Department for Transport – DfT); • The tier one suppliers, which are responsible to deliver a substan-
• The client (i.e. delivery authority/vehicle/body), a single-purpose tial work package acting as systems integrators of their own supply
organisation (temporary or permanent) created by the sponsor to chains (they can be organised as single entities or joint-ventures);
oversee the project (e.g. ODA, Crossrail Limited, Bazalgette Tunnel and
Limited, HS2 Limited). This entity is empowered by the sponsor to • The wider supply chain (tier 2s, 3s, 4s, and so on).
establish contracts with the development partner, delivery partner,
tier one suppliers, and the wider supply chain; 4.1. Project System Organisation (PSO)
• The partner, which is composed of one or more organisations
who are responsible to augment the capacity and capability of A Project System Organisation (PSO) is defined here as the combi-
the client organisation, usually mistakenly understood as “the nation of permanent and temporary organisational layers, which form
client” by the supply chain. It might be independent or in- the megaproject organisational architecture during the entire life-cycle
tegrated to the client organisation at different stages of the towards a variety of temporary-permanent configurations. All projects

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Figure 2. The Project System Organisation (PSO) conceptual framework.

exhibit a PSO, but it is particularly pronounced in megaprojects where nature. Between the delivery and operations phases there is a transition
the structures are more complex and easily observed. The megaproject called operational readiness, where the client will coordinate and close
PSO is constituted by organisational components acting across layers, all tier one contracts and hand the physical asset over to one or more
levels and phases, and each entity is embedded in a permanent or tem- organisations, often the sponsor, who might be the owner and operator,
porary layer, has to deal with different levels of authority across the or not.
supply chain tiers and phases of activities from begging to end. The PSO The permanent layer is composed of the institutional environment,
has two layers, usually six levels and three phases (Development, Deliv- which is mainly represented by the owner (usually the ultimate sponsor
ery, and Operations), as illustrated by Figure 2. and might be the operator) and the sponsor (might be the operator or
Given the ambiguity in nomenclatures regarding megaproject phases not). This layer relies upon established cultures from long-term state-
observed in the literature, this paper proposes terminologies that can be owned structures and organisations, however it is not static and needs
used in the same phase, aiming to simplify the language and unify the to reconfigure itself to play different roles at the several phases of the
discussions. project. For instance, the permanent layer will function as the body re-
•
sponsible for the establishment of the client organisation (temporary or
Inception, gestation: For the stage where the project is under con-
not) in the development phase, for the assurance processes in the de-
sideration but not confirmed by policy makers;
•
livery stage and for the operation (or interface with the operator) after
Development, planning, initiation, front-end: For the stage where
the conclusion of the asset. The temporary layer is represented by the
the project is confirmed and conducting studies to get permissions;
•
client organisation, which is set up with the single purpose of coordi-
Delivery, execution, construction: For the construction phase;
•
nating the activities of the project and by the pool of organisations that
Operations: For the stage after construction when the asset is com-
are assembled through several supply chain tiers to conduct the work
pleted.
(e.g. development and delivery partners, designers, consultants, tier one
Between the development and delivery stages there is a transition contractors, wider supply chain with suppliers distributed from tier two
called delivery readiness, where the organisation will go through a sig- onwards).
nificant expansion challenge reorganising itself for a task of different

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Therefore, the PSO is organised across six vertical levels consisting There are several layers of inter-organisational coordination in the
of the owner, the sponsor, the client organisation, partners (e.g. devel- PSO, each node of the system can be perceived as a client by its subor-
opment, delivery partners), tier one contractors (e.g. joint ventures, sys- dinate supply chain tier, therefore there is a need to unpack the spheres
tems integrators) and the wider supply chain. The first two levels act of influence of each node of the system in a megaproject. This influ-
collectively as the megaproject sponsor. The often temporary client or- ence will vary according to the phase of the project and the function
ganisation and the partners act collectively as the client, however the necessary to be performed by each entity. The PSO is the conceptuali-
sponsor and client can choose to form an integrated client organisation sation of the ingredients of that particular megaproject system, which
(e.g. client + partners) or an independent one outsourcing some func- aims to provide a platform for identification of the several supply chain
tions and creating a clear line between the client organisation and the actors, clarify the terminologies, roles and responsibilities of those enti-
partners. In general, the perception of the tier one contractors and wider ties. It offers a unifying visual system to discuss and design the overall
supply chain is that there is only one client, regardless of how they are strategy to deliver the asset, the megaproject delivery model. This multi-
organised, independently or integrated. However, it is critical for the level understanding evolves previous project management literature on
client organisation to develop a governance structure to clarify the spe- megaprojects focused primarily on only one supply chain actor, such
cific authorities across organisational boundaries, which enables a more as the owner (Merrow, 2011), strong owner (Morris and Hough, 1987;
efficient reporting system. Winch and Leiringer, 2016), owner and operator (Winch, 2014), client
The client organisation is responsible to develop a governance struc- (Aritua et al., 2009; Aritua et al., 2011), and sponsor (Miller and
ture that will determine the rules of the game and clarify the roles, re- Lessard, 2000). In addition, it contributes to the discussion about the
sponsibilities and authorities internally (intra-organisational) and exter- domains of project organising proposed by Winch (2014) through the
nally (inter-organisational). The creation of this governance structure is owner and operator lens, unpacking the dynamics in the context of
usually a joint effort between the sponsor and the client organisation. megaprojects by offering a more elaborated inter-organisational struc-
The governance structure will naturally evolve during the project life- ture with an expanded set of supply chain actors and terminologies.
cycle, therefore it is necessary a degree of self-awareness in the client The PSO differs from project-based firms (PBFs) (Gann and
organisation in order to re-design/shape the governance according to Salter, 2000) and project network organisations (PNOs) (Lundin, Arvids-
the requirements of the project. The refreshed structures will continu- son, Brady, Ekstedt, Midler, and Sydow, 2015; Manning, 2017;
ously illuminate the way the client works internally, as an entity with Pryke, 2017). The PSO is not conceptualising the project organisation
several departments/functions/directorates. It also provides assistance through a focal (coordinating) firm perspective. The PSO differs from
to clients in their external engagement with the supply chain and in- project ecology (Grabher and Ibert, 2011) in the sense that it is not
stitutional environment, enabling a clear message regarding the intra- concerned with the interplay of all levels (macro, meso and micro) at
organisational structures and strategies for inter-organisational relation- the same time, from institutional organisations to the individual level.
ships. Also, the PSO does not attempt to draw comparisons and influences from
The governance structure is important to allocate the right author- past performances into the current organisational structure as project or
ity to the right level, it is a high-level conceptualisation of roles and project-based learning. Therefore, the PSO is a vehicle for discussion of
responsibilities that provides clarity to internal and external stakehold- the macro and meso-level of relationships only, aiming to shed light on
ers. The contract also plays an important coordination role, where clear strategies dealing with problems such as coordination, interdependen-
and non-ambiguous language might help to create the alignment with cies, integration (vertical vs outsourcing), governance, organisational
the supply chain, supported by performance metrics. Otherwise, there structures, procurement and management of supply chains.
is a shift in power after contracts are awarded, which makes it very dif- The PSO narrows the concept of project ecology and expands the
ficult to reengineer the principles and influence the supply chain. As PNO conceptualisation by recognising that considering the complexity
informed commercial organisations, contractors will charge an addition and longevity of a megaproject, there are several embedded PNOs act-
to the original contract to deliver the work, which is the traditional busi- ing as clients and playing roles at a multi-layer, multi-level and multi-
ness model in the construction industry, bid low to win the contract and phase perspectives. The multi-layer perspective reflects the dynamics of
escalate the costs later by additions to the contract (which might be re- permanent layer, consisting of institutions and where owners and spon-
lated to missing information or poor specification). They might also bid sors are located, and the temporary layer, where the temporary supply
low on the expectation of selling extra services later at a much higher chain composed of multi-coalitions is formed to attend the requirements
price than found in the market place, making use of a powerful position of the project (with new organisations – temporary client organisation;
as part of the project (which might be a single-source scenario). and existing ones – PBFs). The multi-level perspective presents the com-
plexity of a megaproject which tends to generate more sophisticated
5. Discussion inter-organisational structures distributed across multiple supply chain
tiers. The multi-phase perspective illustrates the long life-cycle of those
The PSO explores the dynamics of how permanent and temporary endeavours, where there are sequential phases of production (develop-
organisations configure and reconfigure themselves to support differ- ment, delivery, operations) and the myriad of supply chain organisations
ent megaproject phases, understanding the permanent as the institu- are likely to play a different role for each phase, interacting with the or-
tional players (promoters that shape the strategic context throughout ganisational dynamics during that phase. Exemplifying this argument,
the project) and the temporary as standalone (pop-up) organisations an organisation that is developing a technical design during the devel-
created only for the project’s purpose and those assembled to provide opment phase will have their natural and inherent production process
capacity and capability acting as reservoirs of knowledge in a flex- to deliver the design, which is influenced by the stage of the megapro-
ible but formal arrangement. This perspective builds upon literature ject they are embedded, and by the intra-organisational dynamics of the
of the temporary-permanent dilemma (Sahlin-Andersson and Söder- client entity during the period of engagement.
holm, 2002), and on the multiple temporalities across the megapro- Davies et al. (2019) explored ‘project delivery models’ in light of
ject life-cycle (Brookes et al., 2017). The PSO explores the rationale the business model literature and called for further analyses of the con-
behind the strategic decisions that contribute to form the supply chain cept. Building upon their work, the PSO defines the concept in conjunc-
architecture (Denicol, 2020; Denicol, 2020a) that configures an inter- tion with the life-cycle of projects, where the ‘project delivery model’
organisational project. It draws upon previous research on temporary in question encompasses development, delivery and operations. Deliv-
inter-organisational projects (Jones and Lichtenstein, 2008), and high- ery models are associated with the route in which sponsors (public and
lights the perspective of supply chain design and consideration of its private) procure the project they need, in other words the model in
elements as a system throughout several phases of the project life-cycle. which the project will be delivered to address the project’s business case

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based upon the sponsor’s current and future needs (HM Treasury, 2008, megaprojects is a reflection of the sophistication and capability of the
2013). The sponsor has a business model as a permanent organisation client organisation. It is a function of the structures that clients build
that might influence their appetite for particular ‘project delivery mod- to engage and integrate with its development and delivery partners, in-
els’, where this decision-making process will happen during the project tending to perform collectively the role of the client. The client needs to
inception, before the development phase. However, considering the per- act as the supply chain architect (Denicol, 2020a), establishing a core
spective of an asset owner that would later integrate the project into its team who will have the technical authority to deal with a pool of com-
network, ‘project delivery model’ could comprise only development and mercial organisations that will try to influence the project towards a
delivery, whereas operations would be conducted at the parent organi- range of commercial and technical mechanisms to best fit their organi-
sation’s level (e.g. TfL, Highways England, Network Rail). sational strategy. Therefore, a knowledgeable and capable client organ-
The sponsor of the project holds the business case, meaning that they isation assumes the responsibility as the technical authority, holistically
need (or should) know what they want. In the UK context, the HM Trea- understanding the interfaces between the components of the system and
sury and the government’s specific departments are often collectively dealing with the commercial dynamics of the marketplace.
the owner/sponsor representation. The Treasury provides the funding The systems integrator is usually represented by large tier one organ-
and allocates the project in their portfolio, influenced by the identifi- isations that manage and integrate hundreds of suppliers in their own
cation of a necessity by the National Infrastructure Commission. The supply chain to deliver their work package to a client. The client may
specific government department (e.g. Department for Transport) is re- also be an integrator and can be perceived as another layer of systems
sponsible to set up and empower the client organisation, liaising and integration (system of systems), with a different remit and visibility. In
managing the interface with them throughout the project phases, re- the particular case of London 2012 Olympics, the client established a de-
configuring itself to play different roles accordingly. livery partner consortium (CLM) who was an independent organisation
The understanding of the PSO is fundamental to design megaproject working as an extension of the client and responsible to coordinate the
delivery models, as the drivers for innovation regarding organisational integration of several tier one organisations (acting as the programme
strategy initially come from the sponsor. The sponsor is one of the most manager), also called the meta-systems integrator (Davies and Macken-
important entities regarding the project initiation and design of the PSO, zie, 2014). The PSO provides assistance in the identification of organi-
which is their first role as the sponsor, where they have choices about the sations acting as systems integrators that are distributed across several
configuration of the client organisation (Denicol and Davies, 2020), the tiers of the megaproject supply chain architecture, emphasising the im-
types of decisions that they are cascading down to the client vehicle. The plications for supply chain visibility, integration and control.
owner and the sponsor should act collectively as informed and knowl- There is an interplay of the governance structures created by each of
edgeable entities at the permanent layer, thinking systemically about those organisations, considering their company as the focal firm. For an
the final infrastructure asset that will be handed over, in order to play effective deployment of the systems integration function across different
the role of the intelligent and strong owner in the front-end (Morris and levels, it is essential to establish early in the front-end the overall gov-
Hough, 1987; Merrow, 2011; Winch, 2014). ernance structure, where the PSO might provide some clarity and assis-
After the project creation by the sponsor and allocation of money to tance by unpacking the dynamics of the supply chain organisations. The
achieve its strategic and operational objectives (outcomes and outputs), knowledge of how those actors work overtime in megaprojects might
a client organisation is set up, which is the entity created by the spon- help sponsors and clients in their reflection and consideration of the best
sor and progressively empowered to deliver its business case. The client model to engage with the supply chain, identifying integration mecha-
vehicle is often responsible for handing over the infrastructure asset to nisms and the entities best positioned to manage risks. The wider supply
the sponsor after construction is finished, therefore it is necessary an chain is composed by thousands of organisations that form a pool of re-
effort to build capabilities in the new entity drawing upon the expertise sources that can potentially be a part of the project, either working only
of other organisations (Denicol and Davies, 2020). The primary point of to one contractor with single or multiple contracts, or to a number of
contact of the client organisation is the development and delivery part- contractors through single independent contracts. Each one of these en-
ners, which would assist in coordinating the supply chain in their re- tities has a degree of influence on the project at different stages, and
spective project phases. Both development and delivery partners would by mapping them, their roles and responsibilities, the PSO contributes
be working client-side, where the question posed is about integration, to create a unified terminology to identify correctly the entities of the
whether the client organisation would like to work as a completely in- system.
tegrated team or be a client with more defined boundaries, transferring
most of the functions to the partner during delivery.
There is the intra-organisational structure of the client organisation, 6. Conclusion
which is the first layer of engagement with the private sector, when
the initially small client team needs to augment its capability and ca- This research presents the PSO framework, which provides a unified
pacity to develop the project in the early stages; the second layer of conceptualisation and definition of four roles often used to label the
engagement with the private sector is to plan the engagement with the client in megaprojects: owner, sponsor, client, and partner (Figure 2). It
contractors and the wider supply chain, where client and partner organ- recognises that megaprojects offer more elaborate structures and clar-
isation(s) propose a procurement strategy to engage with the part of the ity is required to understand the different inter-organisational dynam-
supply chain that will in fact deliver a physical product, based on the ics during their long life-cycle. The PSO highlights the complexities of
transformation of raw material into a finished product. megaproject inter-organisational architectures and chart the multiple
During the development phase, there is primarily a transformation and evolving actors across the multi-level and multi-layer megapro-
of intellectual capital (or knowledge) into documents and guidelines to ject system. It provides the building blocks for organisation designers
build the asset, which is based on the expertise of professional service to structure the configuration of megaproject delivery models, as well
suppliers, usually consultants and designers represented conceptually as particular phases and specific interactions between entities embed-
by project-based firms (Gann and Salter, 2000). The literature has fo- ded in the system. The PSO works as a canvas to design and prototype
cused more on the procurement strategy to engage with tier one con- megaproject inter-organisational relationships. It can be used to design
tractors, as well as the dynamics between tier ones and their supply megaprojects as dynamic inter-organisational systems, decompose and
chains (Vrijhoef and Koskela, 2000; Dainty et al., 2001; London, 2007; integrate boundaries in the organisational architecture. Organisational
O’Brien et al., 2008; Pryke, 2009, 2020; Segerstedt and Olofsson, 2010; architects and strategists might use the PSO to structure and prototype
Aloini et al., 2012; Denicol et al., 2020a). This research extends the con- a variety of configurations between the institutional and supply chain
versation by arguing that the efficiency of the procurement strategy in partners to deliver the megaproject.

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