What Is A Human Person?

Many approaches to philosophical study of the human person, there are two general kinds
how it could be distinguished:

A. The Metaphysical approach

- which focuses on the kinds of substances or materials and capacities that uniquely make
up a human person
-examines the essential components of a human person.
- Matrin Heidegger (1962, 149-153) describes the metaphysical approach as dealing with
the what of the human person.

B. The Existential approach

- which focuses on the kind of life, or mode of existence, that is unique to a human person.
- examines the essential features of the human way of life.
-as dealing with the who of the human person.

Philosophy defines the Human Person

• Philosophers also think about upon the concept of the Human Person and what makes
him or her a different in nature and entity.
•“Human Person” refers to the individual, and all the attributes and characteristics that set
him or her apart from other human beings.
•Like all other animals, human beings posses SENTIENCE –The ability to feel and experience
and perceive things

The Body As Intermediary

• Intermediary connotes two meanings: as bridge and as wall

• Because of my body, and encounter and agreement occur between myself and the world.
Though my body, my subjectivity is opened to the world and the world is opened to me.
• On the other hand, because also of my body, I experience the world as separate from me. I
am hidden from the world, and the world is hidden from me.

The Body As Intersubjectivity

• My body is not only an intermediary between me and the world but also between me and
others. I show myself to the other and the other also shows himself to me through my body.
• Yet it’s also my body that I hide myself from them , and they hide their selves to me.

The Value of The Body

• As the appearance and subjectivity , my body has a unique value and dignity. It directs me
not only to the world and others but also to God.

An initial encounter with the title of this course begs the question as to what it primarily
seeks to understand, “what is the human person?” And indeed since 400 B.C. answers have
been proffered as to what is it that essentially makes us human. It is the body; the soul;
man’s rational nature; the mind; free will; or all or any combination thereof as mentioned in
the previous modules. But detailed as the discussions of Aristotle may be, or vivid as in the
case of Descartes or St. Thomas Aquinas, somehow, they still fall short in capturing the
totality of our experience of being human. Maybe because deep down we know that what
makes us, is not enough to tell us about who we are.(1) And herein lies the importance of
Martin Heidegger’s discussion. In his radical reformulation of the question about man’s
being (as radical as consciously refraining from using the word “man” changing it
to DASEIN instead) he is able to bring to the fore the subjective aspect of our experience,
gaining insights about who we are, who are we with, and where we will be going.

At the end of this learning activity at least 90% of the students are expected to:

a. Be able to define what “being-in-the world”, “being-with-others” “being-towards- death”,

“facticity” and “existentiality” mean;

b. Be able to explain the difference between the kind of existence that objects have from the
kind of existence that human beings have in the world;

c. Be able to explain the relation between facticity and existentiality;

d. Be able to relate the discussions in this learning module with the previous ones in order
understand the supposed flaw in focusing merely on the “ontological aspect” of our
existence;
e. Be able to compare and contrast the Ancient, Medieval and Modern conceptions of man
with those of Martin Heidegger’s in order to illustrate its effect on the Existentialist and
Phenomenological traditions later on;

f. Be able to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Heideggerian conception of Dasein

and determine whether that in itself is enough to provide an account of all there is in being
human;

g. Be able to use the insights gained in this module in writing their reflection paper on the
Youtube video: “Greatest Success Story ft. Jack Ma”

In order to achieve these objectives, this module will be divided into two topics, with the
first one dealing with the Heideggerian concepts of “being-in-the-world” “being--
with others”, “being-towards-death”, while the other one being about Facticity and
Existentiality.

Lesson 1: BEING-IN-THE-WORLD, BEING- WITH-OTHERS, BEING-TOWARDS DEATH

The aforementioned terms were discussed at length by the German Philosopher Martin
Heidegger in his seminal book published in 1927 entitled Being and Time. It should be
noted however that primarily this book is an attempt to understand “being” or “existence” in
general (which as stated in the previous modules is tackled in the branch of Philosophy
called “ontology” or “metaphysics”), however as Heidegger argued, this study has been
problematic since Philosophers have misunderstood what they are studying in the first
place. They are supposed to give us an account of “being” (in general) and yet what they
have done so far is to give us accounts of “particular beings” instead. Thus in order to rectify
this, Heidegger suggested that the topic be studied under the light of the being to whom
such question is important in the first place, i.e. human beings. For it is only human beings
who concern themselves over questions about their existence, and it is only human beings
who know the value of such questions. Succinctly put, a tree doesn’t concern itself over
being a tree and neither does the cat concern itself over being a cat, it is only us, human
beings, who ask such questions. However as Martin Heidegger recognized that there were
flaws even on how the term “man” is understood, an attempt was made to replace it with
the term “Dasein”.

In order to be persuaded of such move on Heidegger’s part it is worth mentioning that, in

Philosophy, there are two approaches in studying the nature of the human person. One is,
to focus on the kinds of substances or materials and capacities that uniquely make up a
human person, or what is called as the “metaphysical approach” whereas the “existential
approach” focuses on the kind of life or mode of existence that is unique to the human
person. (Mabaquiao, 2017, p.88.). It can be said that the first one deals on the what of the
human person, whereas the latter on the who of the human person. It should be noted that
for Heidegger, all that has been done so far is the metaphysical approach— much to
our detriment—hence the use of the word DASEIN, to signify his break from such an
approach.

DASEIN AS A BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

According to Heidegger, the human person, in terms of his/her mode or kind of existence,
has two fundamental features. First is that the human person exists in a world, i.e. the
person does not exist in vacuum. There is always a context, or a situation in which he exists.
Heidegger expressed this fact about man’s existence through the phrase “being-in-the-
world.” But it should be noted that our existence in the world also denotes activity. Thus the
second feature. We try to define ourselves as we exist in this world. This feature is crucial.
For indeed this is what makes our existence different from the kind of existence that objects
have. The existence of objects can simply be defined in relation to some place, like, my
guitar which is in my room right now. Aside from describing its qualities, nothing can be
said about it or accounted for.

This is different however when it comes to the human person. I, as an example, may be in
the same room as my guitar, but I am reading a book, I am writing this module, and may
think of countless other things, and as such, these activities can be used to describe me.
Mere mention of the space where I am currently at cannot capture all there is that can be
said about me, for I relate to the world, the entities in it and not simply be in the world as
the objects are.

DASEIN AS A BEING-WITH-OTHERS

Heidegger identifies two ways by which a person gets involved with things in the world.
Either being alongside-with or being-with.

In being-alongside with entities or things in this world, one’s involvement or engagement

with things has the character of utility. This means that such entities appear only to the
person as an instrument or equipment that the human person can use either for practical
purposes (e.g. to satisfy one’s practical needs or desires) or theoretical contemplation (e.g.
as an object to be studied). (Ibid. p. 102.)

Such should be contrasted from what Heidegger calls as being-with other entities, since
such an involvement is marked not by utility or practicality but of forbearance or
considerateness. This is seen when a person recognizes, through empathy, that he is dealing
with another human being that should be treated as one wishes to be treated. From here it
can be gleaned that the totality of entities that a human person is alongside with constitutes
his equipmental world, whereas the totality of entities a human person is with, constitutes
his public or social world. (Ibid.) Thus it can be inferred that ideally, a human person is
alongside mere objects or non-humans and with his fellow human persons. Hence objects
should be treated as equipment or for practical purposes and human beings , as human
beings, i.e. to be dealt with considerateness and forbearance and not merely as objects to
be used. This is the basis for the difference between authentic and inauthentic encounter
between human beings as discussed in the succeeding modules. (Ibid.)

DASEIN AS A BEING TOWARDS DEATH

Heidegger’s analysis of death is not concerned with dying is it is commonly understood, but
more of in the context of it being a “possibility which is one’s ownmost, non-relational and
not to be outstripped.” (Being and Time) Here what he is emphasizing is that, first, one’s
death is one’s own. Nobody can die for another person’s death. Moreover it cannot be
shared, thus it is non-relational. Lastly, it cannot be outstripped since it is inevitable.

One very important aspect of death is that it makes one focus on the moment, and embrace
its inevitability, which is the hallmark of an authentic existence for Heidegger.

However, as he notes, there are those who try to avoid reflecting on its meaning, acting as if
one can avoid such an inevitable confrontation. And this is what Heidegger calls as the state
of fallenness or inauthentic existence. It is inauthentic because Dasein does not reflect on its
own possibility. It listens to the interpretations of others –or what Heidegger calls as the
they self—tempting one to think that one’s death will not be one’s own, tranquilizing,
alienating one from his authentic self by concealing death. This constant evasion of the
topic of dying, as if we can do something about it by not reflecting on it, is a mark of
fallenness; preventing one from making the present meaningful; preventing one from
authentically living each moment as one’s own and based on how others would live it, or
the they-self.

Lesson 2: FACTICITY AND EXISTENTIALITY

Heidegger’s concept of temporality must be mentioned in order to understand the

abovementioned concepts. But a distinction must be in such a way that temporality refers
not to an ordinary clock time, but more of a unity connecting the past, present and the
future within the individual. Thus, it is the summation not just of the things that have
happened to the person in the past, as well as the events happening in his present, but it
also contemplates possibilities entertained by the individual in his future.

Facticity, for Heidegger, basically refers to the person’s past, and to everything about the
existence of the person which cannot be changed. (Mabacquiao, Ibid) The term includes all
that has been given to the person (without his consultation) and has been there the
moment the person becomes conscious of his existence. Examples of which can be one’s
physical features, parents, age, nationality and even the period in history where one is born
into. By being given without first being consulted, Heidegger equates this to the
phenomenon of being “thrown into the world”. The term also encompasses those
experiences and decisions which we can no longer change as well. (Ibid. p. 104)

The term existentiality on the other hand was used by Heidegger to refer to all the
possibilities that a human person has and can choose to have. (Mabacquiao, Ibid). By such it
includes all that a human person has and can choose to have. It even attaches to those
projects that a human person can set for himself to accomplish in the future. With this it can
be inferred that though there are things that may be said of us that are not of our own
choosing, as human beings, we have the capacity to transcend them. Our existence is one
that is different from objects in such a way that our possibilities, what we can do, and what
we may become is not determined by those that are outside of our will. We can choose to
go beyond them.

Lesson 1: The notion of Intersubjectivity

In Philosophy, the term “intersubjectivity” is generally attributed to Edmund Husserl(1859-
1938) who in his seminal book entitled Ideas: General Introduction to Pure
Phenomenology (1931) equated it to mutual understanding or one wherein there is:

"a connection of consciousness and body into a natural unity that can be empirically
intuited that such a mutual understanding between the animal natures that belong to one
world is possible, and that thereby every subject that knows find before it a full world
containing itself and other subjects, and at the same time know it for one and the same
world about us belonging in common to itself and all other subjects." (Husserl, 1931: 149-
50, Par. 53)

What can be gleaned from this definition is that intersubjectivity is a common or mutual
understanding wherein individuals realize that a.) they are occupying the same world, b.)
there are other subjects (or individuals) occupying the same world, c.) they and the other
subjects share a common nature, making a meaningful interrelation between them possible.
A parallel can be drawn between (a) and Heidegger’s notion of empathy and
considerateness (see Mabaquiao, 2017, p. 103) and this understanding is crucial for an
individual to recognize that he is living in a public or social world—in turn this basic
realization is the groundwork for all ethical decisions.

In simpler terms the term intersubjectivity encompasses how individuals relate to each other
bearing in mind that the other share the same nature as him. Sadly however, not all
relations can be considered as being intersubjective in the strict sense of the word; for it is
possible that one views the other as an object, a mere tool that exists for one’s utility, or it
may also be the case that both of them are objectifying one another, making a genuine
relation between them impossible.

There are two levels by which we can assess whether relations between individuals are
being intersubjective or merely objective, i.e. practical and theoretical. (See Mabaquiao’s
discussion on pages 149-153 of the book). But in reading the said pages, the students are
advised to keep in mind that examining from a “theoretical level” is nothing but considering
the perspective that one has for the other, whereas examining from a “practical level” is
more of analyzing the corresponding actions instead. It may be argued of course that
outside the confines of this discussion it is difficult to separate views from practice, or
perspectives from actions, nevertheless such distinctions are necessary to appreciate the
ideas of various philosophers concerning intersubjectivity.

Theoretical Level

"You cannot negotiate with people who say what's mine is mine, and what's yours is
negotiable." John F. Kennedy

A good point of reflection in determining whether we can rightfully empathize with others is
our moral standards. Are they all self-serving that we can conveniently justify actions if
performed by us but, when committed by others, automatically it calls for righteous
indignation? Do we find ourselves self-entitled to something, that we can demand it on a
whim, whereas others have to fight tooth and nail for it? Have we become too self-absorbed
that we think where others have to follow rules, we are exempted from its purview?

Such is the point of analyzing intersubjectivity from a theoretical level. It brings to the fore
our views of the individuals surrounding us. Are they merely objects that exist for our own
utility? Are they merely expandable? Are they mere figures in statistical reports on poverty,
on war, on the ills brought about by the pandemic? Do we view them essentially lacking in
what we have that we can turn a blind eye on their suffering? Genuine intersubjectivity
presupposes a view of the others as persons—as subjects to empathize with and not as
objects that we cannot humanely relate with.

Practical Level

Actions toward the other (and not necessarily how they are viewed) are the crux of this level
of analysis.
Below are some views of different philosophers on how an intersubjective encounter differ
from an objective experience.

A. I-It and I-Thou Relation

As the philosopher Martin Buber (1878-1965) famously pointed out, an authentic relation
between individuals is marked by having them recognize the humanity of the other in their
dealings (I-Thou). It is one wherein the self (I) realizes that though an individual may be
apart from him, yet both of them share the same nature. Thus the other (Thou) is afforded
the same level of respect, and consideration as that of one's self. The THOU is not merely
confined to one's preconceived notions (or concepts or some categories on the mind as
Mabaquiao (Ibid, 2015, p.151) would like to say) and thus is allowed to genuinely disclose
himself. It is for this reason that Martin Buber argues that an interrelation with a "THOU" is
an encounter.

This is in contrast to a relation wherein the other apart from one's self is merely treated as
an "It" or a mere object. The It is not given the opportunity to reveal himself/herself for what
he/she truly is apart from what the self ascribes him/her to be. To the self, the other is
merely an object to be experienced—incapable of forming a genuine relation with.

2. Being for itself and Being-in-itself

Here what is considered is our treatment of the others along the lines drawn by Jean Paul
Sartre (1905-1980) in his existential analysis of beings. This view, as well as that of
Emmanuel Levinas (1905-1195), share similarities with the one brought forth by Buber
(mentioned above) in such a way that all of them would grant that where individuals are
seen as someone with a fixed essence, or one which needs no personal encounter with—
since nothing has to be gained from trying to understand them anyway—they are treated as
mere objects. In Sartrean terms, they are called en-soi or being-in-itself.

Emmanuel Levinas considers this view of the person as someone whose entire identity is
merely fixed by the view of others, as an act of violence. Such is a great disservice to the
person (tantamount to robbery) whose essence cannot be entrapped by preconceived
notions and made up categories. Human beings are essentially free. A person always has the
capacity to go beyond what we thought of him to be. Hence the need to allow him to
disclose himself to us. To rob him of this opportunity is what Levinas calls as Totalization,
or an act of violence where the others are viewed solely on our own terms, thereby making
him viewed as if he is an object. (Ibid.)
A being-for-itself or pour-soi on the otherhand is one where the self, consciously
acknowledges the purposive nature of the others apart from him. Just like him, the others
are rational and free—capable of determining his own essence. The person (or the self)
understands that human beings are categorically different from objects whose essences are
fixed. In order to understand what the term “fixed essence” means, let us use chair as an
example. A chair has a fixed essence since by being non-rational it cannot will itself to
become something different. It will always be what its essence dictates (that it is a piece of
furniture for people to sit on). Such is not applicable to human beings however, since on the
account of his rationality, he can always transcend such limitations. In fact he is free to
determine who he wants to be. (*A similar discussion is found on the previous module, see
discussion on facticity and existentiality*)

Hence an intersubjective relation is one where persons are mindful that they are dealing
with beings pour-soi. They are respectful and considerate of each other's situation.
Emmanuel Levinas acknowledges that this is our responsibility to others. We have to always
show that we are willing to help the person by allowing him to disclose himself to us
without forcing our impressions or made up categories on him (as mentioned by
Mabaquiao in Ibid., p.151).

3. Being-alongside and being-with

Going to back to the previous module, we have learned that Martin Heidegger distinguishes
two ways by which Dasein, upon recognizing that there are others apart from him, relates to
his environment. One is to treat others as tools, or whose existence is merely for his utility
(being-alongside with); while the other is to treat them as if the others are just like him, as
Dasein being-with other Daseins. This sort of treatment is characterized by forbearance or
considerateness. A good way to illustrate what Heidegger means by forbearance is to
juxtapose it with Confucius' notion of Zhong, or the Golden Rule (as it is more commonly
known.). In 5:12 of the Analects of Confucius we can find its famous expression "What I do
not wish others to do to me, I do not wish to do to others." Since naturally Dasein wishes to be
treated with compassion, respect and sincerity then as a corollary, Dasein would treat the
other Dasein with compassion, respect and sincerity too. Such is the yardstick for an
intersubjective relation between persons. Am I treating other persons as mere tools for my
own happiness? Or am I treating them in a manner that I also want to be treated?

4. Treating persons not just as a means but as ends in themselves.

We have learned in the first module that Ethics, being a branch of Philosophy deals with the
study of the different justifications for the rightful and wrongfulness of human conduct.
Now, Immanuel Kant in his seminal book The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of
Morals (1785), laid down the foundations of one of the most deeply revered schools of
thought in ethics, i.e. deontological system. Roughly put, this ethical position (in contrast
with consequentialism) grants that the rightfulness of an action is not to be based on its
consequences but rather on whether or not the will abides with a clear set of norms (or
mandates of reason). Thus as moral beings, we are obliged to follow these moral duties (or
categorical imperatives in Kantian terminology), regardless of the outcome. Actions are
judged therefore on the account of whether or not a person is able to do their duty as
dictated by reason.

There are three formulations of the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant, however in
order not to painstakingly delve on a matter beyond the scope of this course, we will only
focus on one of its formulations.

The second formulation of the categorical imperative can be read as "act in such a way that
you treat humanity, whether in your own person, or in the person of any other, never merely
as a means to an end, but always at the same time an end." (Groundwork for the Metaphysic
of Morals, 4:429)

Means are ways by which something is attained. Thus if something is considered as a

means, it is always in relation to a goal; an end; a purpose so to speak. Means are pursued
not for its own sake, but rather for its apparent usefulness in achieving a certain purpose.
Like in local politics for example. Come election time, some politicians may tend to show
acts of kindness and generosity to the electorate, but these actions are not without ulterior
motives. They are just performed in furtherance of their goal, i.e., to be elected.

What can be gleaned however from the second formulation of the categorical imperative is
that since people are inherently endowed with dignity, they are not to be treated as mere
instruments for one's goal. Such is akin to a debasement of their worth, as if they are just
objects, resources to feed off one's needs. We should not desire to seek happiness at the
expense of the others. Instead what we should be aspiring for is a pursuit of happiness
where others take part in it, or better yet, we pursue the happiness of others, for therein lies
our own happiness.