LAW ON PROPERTY

CASE DIGESTS

HON. JUDGE MAMILO ROYULADA

Law Professor

KEVIN G BANAWAG
Juris Doctor
 GR No. 183543
NHA v. Manila Seedling Foundation
FACTS:

Petitioner NHA is the owner of a 120-hectare government property in Diliman, QC which is

reserved for the establishment of the National Government Center. President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1670 on September 19, 1977, where he reserved seven hectares of such land
and granted usufructuary rights over it to Manila Seedling. Manila Seedling Foundation (MSF)
occupied a total of 16 hectares, thereby exceeding the seven-hectare area it was allowed to
occupy. It leased the excess to private tenants. On November 11, 1987, President Corazon
Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 127 which revoked the reserved status of the remaining
50 hectares of the 120-hectare property. NHA was expressly authorized to commercialize the
area and sell it to the public through bidding. President Fidel Ramos subsequently issued
Executive Order No. 58 on February 15, 1993, creating an inter-agency executive committee
(Executive Committee) composed of NHA and other government agencies to oversee the
comprehensive development of the remaining 50 hectares, therein referred to as the North
Triangle Property. As Manila Seedling occupied a prime portion of the North Triangle Property,
the Executive Committee proposed its transfer to areas more suitable for its operations. On
August 12, 1994, MSF filed before the RTC a Complaint for injunction with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner. Respondent sought the protection of
its occupancy and possession of the property reserved for it under Proclamation No. 1670. In its
answer, NHA prayed that MSF be ordered to vacate the seven-hectare area and the excess, and
to pay rent therefor on top of exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses. On
November 11, 1994, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining NHA from causing
the relocation of respondent. The trial court eventually issued a summary judgment on granting a
final injunction over the seven-hectare area in MSF’s favor. The court, however, reserved the
determination of the counterclaim of NHA as to the excess. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
and respondent's motion for partial reconsideration were both denied by the RTC. NHA’s
petition for certiorari was denied by the CA, which remanded the case to the RTC for further
proceedings on the matter of petitioner's counterclaim. Petitioner no longer questioned the CA
ruling. In the meantime, it recovered possession of the excess on March 1, 1999.

RTC: validated the turnover of the excess to NHA, but disallowed the recovery of rent,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

The trial court found that MSF had leased the excess to various establishments upon
authority given by Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto Maceda. As he had administrative
control over respondent at the time, he gave it that authority to enable it to earn income to finance
its operations, considering that it no longer received any donation from the national government
since 1986. Respondent had protected the excess by developing it and keeping squatter
syndicates from taking possession. For that reason, the expenses it incurred for the development
of the excess were more than sufficient to compensate NHA in terms of rent. Petitioner filed an
appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that MSF cannot be
considered an officious manager under the principle of negotiorum gestio, as the latter had not
established that the excess was either abandoned or neglected by petitioner. As respondent
possessed the excess by tolerance of NHA, a demand to vacate was necessary to establish the
reckoning point for the filing of an unlawful detainer action, as well as for the recovery of rent and
damages. In that case, the CA found that the Executive Committee's proposal for the transfer of
respondent was not a demand in contemplation of the law. Considering that the excess was
eventually surrendered by MSF to NHA without any demand, there was no basis for the award of
rent and damages in the absence of bad faith.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE: Whether MSF is possessor in good faith (NO).

HELD:

In National Housing Authority v. CA, this Court upheld the usufructuary right of respondent over
the seven-hectare area granted under Proclamation No. 1670.

However, the Court also emphasized that the rights of respondent were circumscribed within the
limits of the seven-hectare area allotted to it.

The important doctrines in such case are as follows:

● A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. Respondent, for
its part, must vacate the area that is not part of its usufruct. Respondent's rights begin and end
within the seven-hectare portion of its usufruct. This Court agrees with the trial court that
respondent has abused the privilege given it under Proclamation No. 1670.

● Since respondent had no right to act beyond the confines of the seven-hectare area granted to
it, and since it was fully aware of this fact, its encroachment of nine additional hectares of
petitioner's property rendered it a possessor in bad faith as to the excess. While respondent may
have been allowed by Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto Maceda to lease the excess, such
authority did not come from NHA, who is the owner. Even if petitioner tolerated the encroachment
by respondent, that fact does not change the latter's status as a possessor in bad faith. Under
Article 549 in relation to Articles 546 and 443 of the Civil Code, a possessor in bad faith has a
specific obligation to reimburse the legitimate possessor for everything that the former received,
and that the latter could have received had its possession not been interrupted. Respondent,
however, shall be entitled to a refund of the necessary expenses it incurred. Necessary expenses
are those made for the preservation of the land occupied, or those without which the land would
deteriorate or be lost. These may also include expenditures that augment the income of the land
or those that are incurred for its cultivation, production, and upkeep. The courts found that
respondent had exerted efforts and expended money to develop the excess and protect it from
squatter syndicates. These expenses would naturally fall under those defined as necessary
expenses for which respondent, even as a possessor in bad faith, is entitled to be reimbursed.
There is a need to remand the case to the RTC for the conduct of trial for the purpose of
determining the amounts the parties are entitled to as laid out in this Decision. The SC denied
NHA’s prayer for the award of exemplary damages. While respondent was a possessor in bad
faith, there is no evidence that it acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner. The award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses to petitioner is also
improper.
 G.R. No. 149117. December 16, 2004
Heirs of Gamos
vs
Heirs of Frando

Facts:
The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of agricultural land located in Sta.
Magdalena, Sorsogon Juliana Frando, respondents predecessor-in-interest, was in possession of
the abovedescribed property. Since 1925, she had planted several trees and other plants
thereon, including coconuts, pili, bananas and cacao. Sometime in 1946, the property was
traversed by a national road that effectively divided it into two portions, denominated as Lot Nos.
7 and 1855, respectively. The latter, Lot No. 1855, is the subject of the present controversy.

Evident from certified copies of existing records of the Bureau of Lands introduced in
evidence is the fact that on February 14, 1952, Frando filed Insular Government Property Sales
(IGPS) Application No. 162 for the parcel in question. Pursuant thereto, a representative of the
Bureau of Lands inspected the area and found it to be inside an agricultural zone, free from
private claims and conflicts. Full payment of the purchase price was effected approximately a
year later, on April 6, 1956,when Frando paid the balance of P216 as evidenced by OR No. A-
2675530. On the same day, an Order/Award was made in her favor by Director of Lands Zoilo
Castrillo.

Apparent from a survey plan executed pursuant to an Order of the Bureau was the fact that
the property awarded to her covered both Lots 7 and 1855 with an aggregate area of 4.000
hectares. One of her two children, Salvacion Gallanosa who was married to Abdon Gimpes,
continued possession of the property. Sometime in 1940, the couple constructed their house on
the southwestern portion thereof.
Private respondents claimed to be unaware of these developments, as neither she nor her
heirs had taken possession of the disputed portion until 1981. In that year, Ambrocio Guatno and
the other petitioners, who had joined him later, entered the property, gathered its produce and
built their houses thereon.
In its Answer, the Bureau of Lands, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG),admitted that Juliana Frando had filed an IGPS application for a parcel of land with an
area of 2.4969 hectares located at Poblacion, Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Admittedly,
she won the public bidding and deposited the amount of P24 under OR No. 9654851 dated April
22, 1955, but allegedly failed to pay the balance price of P216.
Thus, concluded the Bureau, while the land had previously been awarded to her, the
Complaint was rendered dismissible for lack of merit, as a consequence of her failure to pay the
balance price to assert her right to perfect her title thereto, and to controvert the subsequent
cadastral survey covering a portion thereof. In its Answer,however, the Bureau made no mention
of OCT No. P-10548.
On July 7, 1998, the Sorsogon RTC rendered the following judgment in favor of
respondents. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Affirming the RTC, the appellate court noted that the trial courts
Decision was fully supported by the evidence on record.

Issue: Whether or not Cerila Gamos free patent was secured through fraud.

Held:
Fraud
Petitioners argue that the trial court erred in holding that the free patent issued to Cerila Gamos
had fraudulently been secured. Both parties failed, though, to present a copy of Free Patent No.
459501. This lapse resulted in the trial courts failure to examine the document and to appreciate
the circumstances under which it had allegedly been issued. Thus, any determination of whether
fraud indeed attended its issuance is not possible now.
 GR No. 190106, 2014-01-15
Villasi
vs
Garcia
Facts:
Sometime in 1990, petitioner Magdalena T. Villasi (Villasi) engaged the services of
respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium
building located at Aurora Boulevard corner N. Domingo Street, Cubao, Quezon City.  For failure
of
Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite several demands, FGCI initiated a suit for
collection of sum of money before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77.  In its action docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-91-8187, FGCI prayed, among others, for the payment of the amount of
P2,865,000.00, representing the unpaid accomplishment billings.  Served with summons, Villasi
filed an answer specifically denying the material allegations of the complaint.  Contending that
FGCI has no cause of action against her, Villasi averred that she delivered the total amount of
P7,490,325.10 to FGCI but the latter accomplished only 28% of the project.  After the pre-trial
conference was terminated without the parties having reached an amicable settlement, trial on
the merits ensued.
RTC rendered a Decision[4] dated 26 June 1996 in FGCI's favor.  While the trial court
brushed aside the allegation of Villasi that an excess payment was made, it upheld the claim of
FGCI to the unpaid amount of the contract price the Court of Appeals reversed the disquisition of
the RTC in its Decision dated 20 November 2000.  The appellate court ruled that an
overpayment was made by Villasi and thereby directed FGCI to return the amount that was paid
in excess. FGCI filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
147960, asseverating that the appellate court erred in rendering the 20 November 2000
Decision.  This Court, however, in a Resolution dated 1 October 2001, denied the... appeal for
being filed out of time.  The said resolution became final and executory on 27 November 2001, as
evidenced by the Entry of Judgment made herein.
A Writ of Execution was issued on 28 April 2004, commanding the Sheriff to execute and make
effective the 20 November 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building located at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue,
Quezon City, covered by Tax Declaration No. D-021-01458, and built in the lots registered under
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 379193 and 379194.  While the building was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was erected were registered in the
names of the Spouses Filomeno Garcia and Ermelinda Halili-Garcia (Spouses Garcia).  After the
mandatory posting and publication of notice of sale on execution of real property were complied
with, a public auction was scheduled on 25 January 2006.
To forestall the sale on execution, the Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim[10]
and a Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on Execution, claiming that they are the lawful owners
of the property which was erroneously levied upon by the sheriff.  To persuade the court a quo to
grant their motion, the Spouses Garcia argued that the building covered by the levy was
mistakenly assessed by the City Assessor in the name of FGCI.  The motion was opposed by
Villasi who insisted that its ownership belongs to FGCI and not to the Spouses Garcia as shown
by the tax declaration.
the RTC issued on 24 February 2005 an Order[12] directing the Sheriff to hold in abeyance the
conduct of the sale on execution
Arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in ordering the suspension of the sale on
execution, Villasi timely filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.  In a
Decisiondated 19 May 2009, the appellate court... dismissed the petition.  In a Resolution dated
28 October 2009, the Court of Appeals refused to reconsider its decision.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO SUSPEND AND HOLD IN
ABEYANCE THE SALE ON EXECUTION OF THE BUILDINGS LEVIED UPON ON THE BASIS
OF RESPONDENTS' AFFIDAVIT OF THIRD-PARTY CLAIM.
Ruling:
It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against the property
incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if the property belonging to any third
person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man's indebtedness, such person has...
all the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of
Court.  Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the
remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of
the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent "separate action"
to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property.  However, the
person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied properties is not
precluded from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim.
The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. 
Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the
property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its... rightful owner, the claimant must
first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon.
In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya, we declared that for a third-party claim or a terceria to prosper,
the claimant must first sufficiently establish his right on the property.
A third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the
judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of the court which authorized such execution.
Upon due application by the third person and after summary hearing, the court... may command
that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or
possessor. What said court can do in these instances, however, is limited to a determination of
whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his... duties in the execution
of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property not belonging to the
judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of title to the property,
with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter only... insofar as may be necessary to
decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to restore the property to
the claimant's possession if warranted by the evidence. However, if the claimant's proofs do not
persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of possession thereto, the claim will be
denied.
Our perusal of the record shows that, as the party asserting their title, the Spouses Garcia failed
to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building in question.  Aside from their postulation
that as title holders of the land, the law presumes them to be owners of the improvements built
thereon, the Spouses Garcia were unable to adduce credible evidence to prove their ownership
of the property.  In contrast, Villasi was able to satisfactorily establish the ownership of FGCI thru
the pieces of evidence she appended to her opposition.  Worthy to note is the fact that the
building in litigation was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI and not in the
Spouses Garcias'.  While it is true that tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they constitute credible proof of claim of title over the property.
 G.R. No. 185020 10-6-2010

Benedicto
vs.
Villaflores
 
FACTS: 

 Maria Villaflores (Maria) was the owner of Lot 2-A, with an area of 277 square meters, in
Bulacan.  In 1980, Maria sold a portion of Lot 2-A to her nephew, Antonio Villaflores.  

 Antonio then took possession of the portion sold to him and constructed a house
thereon.  

 Twelve (12) years later, Maria executed in favor of Antonio a Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan covering the entire Lot 2-A.  However, Antonio did not register the sale or pay the
real property taxes for the subject land.

 In 1994, Maria sold the same Lot 2-A to Filomena.  Filomena registered the sale with the
Registry of Deeds.  Consequently, Transfer of Certificate of Title was issued in the name
of Filomena.  Since then Filomena paid the real property taxes for the subject parcel of
land.

 In September 2000, Filomena filed a case for Accion Publiciana with Cancellation of

Notice of Adverse Claim against Antonio.

 She alleged at the time of the sale, she was not aware that Antonio had any claim or
interest over the subject property.

 Antonio assured her that there was no impediment to her acquisition of the land, and
promised to vacate the property five (5) years after the sale.  In August 1999, Antonio
requested an extension of one (1) year, and offered to pay a monthly rental which she
granted.  However, in 2000, Antonio refused to vacate the property and, instead, claimed
absolute ownership of Lot 2-A.

 Antonio asserted absolute ownership over Lot 2-A.  He alleged that he purchased the

subject property. He averred that Filomena was aware of the sale; hence, the subsequent
sale in favor of  Filomena was rescissible, fraudulent, fictitious, or simulated.

 RTC rendered a decision  sustaining Filomena’s ownership.  According to the RTC,

Filomena was the one who registered the sale in good faith; as such, she has better right
than Antonio. It rejected Antonio’s allegation of bad faith on the part of Filomena because
no sufficient evidence was adduced to prove it. It declared Antonio a builder in good faith. 

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and remanded the case to the RTC for further
proceedings to determine the respective rights of the parties under Articles 448 and 546 of
the Civil Code. 

ISSUE: WON Antonio is a builder in good faith

HELD: YES.

It is not disputed that the construction of Antonio’s house was undertaken long before the
sale in favor of Filomena; that when Filomena bought the property from Maria, Antonio’s house
which he used as residence had already been erected on the property.  
 
Thus, we sustain the finding that Antonio is a builder in good faith.  
 
Under Article 448, a landowner is given the option to either appropriate the improvement as his
own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity, or sell the land to the possessor in good
faith.  Relatedly, Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full
reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives him right
of retention until full reimbursement is made.   
 
The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between appropriating the
building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to pay the price of the land.  The
choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession, i.e.,
that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.   
 G.R. No. 194538

Mirallosa
v.
Carmel Development Inc.
FACTS:

Carmel Development, Inc. (respondent) was the registered owner of the TCTs for
Pangarap Village at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City (156 hectares, 3 parcels of land).
September 14, 1973: President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 293, which
invalidated the titles and declared them open for disposition to members of
Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI).
o Fun Fact: Marcos cited Proclamation 1081 and General Order No. 1 (issued
Sept. 21 and 22, 1971 respectively) as his authority to do so.
By virtue of PD 293, a Memorandum was inscribed on the last page of thetitles,
certifying that they are “declared invalid and null and void ab initio and
considered cancelled xxx.”
On the basis of PD 923, Pelagio Juan, a member of MHAI, occupied Lot 32 and
built houses there.
Respondent made several oral demands to asking them to vacate, to no
avail.
April 2002: they sent a written demand to vacate the premises, but they
were unheeded.
September 24, 2008: CA reversed, reinstating the MTC decision.
Since the Complaint specifically alleged that the possession of respondent
was by petitioner's tolerance, and that respondent's dispossession had not
lasted for more than one year, MeTC rightly acquired jurisdiction over the
Complaint.
CDI had a better right to the property’s possession and enjoyment, so
petitioner had no right to the continued possession of the property.
Petitioner is also not a builder in good faith who can claim benefits under
Art. 448, CC because when PD 923 was declared unconstitutional and the
property restored to respondent, no good faith can be claimed.
 Art. 449, CC applies, petitioner losing what he would be building,
planting, or sowing without right of indemnity from that time.
ISSUE:

1. W/N petitioner is a builder in good faith. NO.

HELD:

The appeal is dismissed. CA decision is affirmed.

NO, petitioner may not be deemed to be a builder in good faith.

 Petitioner’s Argument: he is a builder in good faith for want of knowledge of any
infirmity in the promulgation of P.D. 293, so he is entitled to the reimbursement of
his useful expenses and has a right to retain possession of the premises (Art. 545,
CC).
 However, a builder in good faith is "one who builds with the belief that the
land he is building on is his, or that by some title one has the right to build
thereon, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title."
 Since petitioner only started occupying the property sometime in 1995 (when his
predecessor-in-interest executed an Affidavit in his favor), or about seven years
after Tuason was promulgated, he should have been aware of the binding effect
of that ruling.
 All judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, and ignorantia legis non
excusat. He thus loses whatever he has built on the property, without right to
indemnity, in accordance with Article 449 of the Civil Code.
 171 SCRA 213

Nuguid

vs.

Court of Appeals, and Guevarra

FACTS: 

The deceased spouses Victorino and Crisanta dela Rosa (spouses dela Rosa) were registered
owners of a parcel of land in Orani, Bataan, and covered by OCT No. 3778. On or about May 4,
1931, Victorino dela Rosa (widowed by then) sold one-half of the said property to Juliana Salazar
for P95.00. This sale between him and Salazar, though evidenced by a document, was not
registered. Nevertheless, Juliana Salazar constructed a house on the lot she purchased
immediately after the sale. On March 10, 1964, petitioner spouses Diosdado Nuguid and
Marqiueta Venegas (spouses Nuguid) caused the registration of a document entitled "Kasulatan
ng Partihan at Bilihan" (Kasulatan) dated June 6, 1961. In this document, Marciana dela Rosa,
together with the heirs of Victorino and Crisanta dela Rosa, sold to spouses Nuguid the entire
area of the property for the sum of P300.00. Subsequently, OCT No. 3778 was cancelled by the
Register of Deeds of Bataan, and TCT No. T-12782 was issued in the spouses Nuguid’s names. 

Private respondents claimed that the presented by spouses Nuguid was forged. They also
allegedly discovered the forged deed as well as the certificate of title in the name of the
petitioners much later, that is, on February 28, 1978, when respondents Amorita Guevarra and
Teresita Guevarra thought of having the title of their grandmother Juliana Salazar, registered. On
the other hand, spouse Nuguid assert that in the latter part of 1960, Nicolas dela Rosa, uncle of
respondent Marciana dela Rosa and grandfather of the other heirs-signatories, offered to sell the
subject land to them. Apparently, Nicolas dela Rosa claimed that he had already purchased the
shares of the heirs over the subject property as evidenced by a private document entitled
"Kasunduan" (Kasunduan) dated August 31, 1955, and as a matter of fact, he had in his
possession the original certificate of title covering the property in the name of the deceased
Victorino and Crisanta dela Rosa. 

The CFI of Bataan dismissed the complaint filed by private respondents, but the Court of Appeals
reversed said decision and ordered the spouses Nuguid to execute a deed of reconveyance in
favor of herein respondents. 

ISSUE: 

Who is the rightful owner of the subject property? 

HELD: 

The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the CFI of Bataan. The basis for the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that petitioners were buyers in bad faith is ambiguous because said court
relied on the singular circumstance that the petitioners are from Orani, Bataan, and should have
personally known that the private respondents were the persons in actual possession. However,
at the time of the purchase, the spouses Nuguid dealt with Pedro Guevarra and Pascuala
Tolentino, the latter being the actual occupants. The respondents Guevarras, children of the said
Pedro and Pascuala Guevarra, came into the picture only after their parents died. As for the
respondent heirs of Victorino dela Rosa, their being in actual possession of any portion of the
property was, likewise, simply presumed or taken for granted by the Court of Appeals. 

The private respondents cannot also honestly claim that they became aware of the spouses
Nuguid’s title only in 1978, because ever since the latter bought the property in 1961, the spouse
Nuguid have occupied the same openly, publicly, and continuously in the concept of owners,
even building their house thereon. For seventeen years they were in peaceful possession, with
the respondents Guevarras occupying less than one-half of the same property. 
 G.R. No. 199353 April 4, 2018
LEVISTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
v.
LEGASPI TOWERS 200 INC., et. al.
FACTS:

Legaspi Towers is a 7-floor condominium building with a deck roof and 2 levels
above the deck roof, as stated in the Master Deed, at Paseo De Roxas, Makati City with a
unit on the roof deck and 2 levels above said unit called Concession 2 and Concession 3.
Concession 3 was bought by Leviste Management System (Petitioner).

Petitioner sought to build another unit called Concession 4 on top of Concession 3

and was able to secure a buiding permit for its construction. However, Legaspi Towers
200 Inc. (Respondent) sent a notice to Petitioner that its construction was illegal but the
latter did not heed such. Petitioner filed a writ of mandatory injunction against
Respondent.
.
The RTC affirmed Respondent wherein it found application of Art. 448 of the Civil
Code and Depra v. Dumlao1. The “air space” above the unit actually belongs to
Respondent.
Respondent sought to demolish Concession 4 at the expense of Petitioner. Respondent
argued that Petitioner should first get the consent of the registered owners of the
condominium project before amendment of the Master Deed under Sec. 4 of the
Condominium Act. Petitioner argued that there must be a determination of the required values
under Depra before Respondent can take action.
RTC: Affirmed respondent while CA: Affirmed RTC Decision.

ISSUE: Whether Respondent can build Concession 4 on top of Petitioner’s condominium

building.

HELD:

No. Petitioner contravened the Master Deed by adding a 3 rd level above the roof deck
and by violating the Condominium Act and Respondent’s by-laws.

Instead of procuring the required consent of the registered owners under Sec. 4 of
the Condominium Act or having Concession 4 approved by the members in a regular or
special meeting called for the purpose under Respondent’s by-laws, Petitioner merely had
an internal agreement with the former president of Respondent. This cannot bind
corporations since they can act only through their Board of Directors.

Art. 448 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith does not apply where there is
contractual relation between the parties. The RTC erred in considering Art. 448 and Art.
546 of the Civil Code in this case. Art. 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good
faith are inapplicable in cases covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the
land and the builder are already bound by specific legislation on the subject property and
by contract (the Master Deed and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation).

1
 G.R. NO. 187698
6-15-2016
CABLING BS. DANCALAN
Facts:
Petitioner was the highest bidder in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale over a 216-
sqm. property in Olongapo City. The Final Deed of Sale was issued by the Sheriff and the
title to the property was duly transferred.Petitioner filed an Application for the Issuance of
a Writ of Possession with the RTC. RTC granted the petitioner’s application, and
subsequently issued a Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate.
CA dismissed the petition and affirmed in toto the RTC’s assailed orders. It ruled
that, while the issuance of a writ of possession is generally a ministerial act, the RTC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in recalling the petitioner’s writ of possession
because “the obligation of the trial court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be
ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property claiming
a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor; and where such third party exists, the trial
court should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of his adverse possession.
Issue:
WON the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner should be ministerial in
this case. (YES)
Held:
Yes – The issuance writ of possession in favor of petitioner should be ministerial.
Petitioner argues that the present case is not an exception to the ministerial issuance of a writ of
possession because respondent’s actual possession of the subject property is not adverse to that
of the judgment debtor/mortgagor. Neither is possession in the concept of an owner because in a
conditional sale, ownership is retained by the seller until the fulfillment of a positive suspensive
condition, that is, the full payment of the purchase price.
In this case, the general rule, and not the exception, applies. The respondent does not possess
the subject property by adverse title or right as her possession is merely premised on the alleged
conditional sale of the property to her by the judgment debtor/mortgagor. In a contract of
conditional sale, ownership or title to the property is retained by the seller until the fulfillment of a
positive suspensive condition which is normally the payment of the purchase price in the manner
agreed upon. Deed of Conditional Sale between the respondent (buyer) and the subject
property’s registered owner (seller) expressly reserved to the latter ownership over the property
until full payment of the purchase price, despite the delivery of the subject property to the
respondent. No deed of absolute sale over the subject property has been executed in the
respondent’s favor. In order for the respondent not to be ousted by the ex parte issuance of a writ
of possession, her possession of the property must be adverse in that she must prove a right
independent of and even superior to that of the judgment debtor/mortgagor.
Wherefore, premises considered, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari and REVERSE
and and SET ASIDE the May 12, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
110865.
 G.R. No. 201354, September 21, 2016

PABLO M. PADILLA, JR. AND MARIA LUISA P. PADILLA

v.
LEOPOLDO MALICSI, LITO CASINO, AND AGRIFINO GUANES

FACTS:
Spouses Padilla bought a parcel of land in Magsaysay Norte, Cabanatuan City in 1984.
Sometime in 1998, Spouses Padilla discovered that Leopoldo Malicsi, Lito Casino, and
Agrifino Guanes (Malicsi, et al.) constructed houses on their lot.
Spouses Padilla made repeated verbal and written demands for Malicsi, et al. to vacate the
premises and pay monthly rentals, but Malicsi, et al. refused to heed Spouses Padilla's demands.
On August 6, 2007, Spouses Padilla filed a complaint for recovery of possession against
Malicsi, et al., along with three (3) others: Larry Marcelo, Diosdado dela Cruz, and Rolando Pascua.
Malicsi, et al. alleged that they believed in all honesty and good faith that the lot belonged to Toribia
Vda. De Mossessgeld (De Mossessgeld). They claimed that they possessed the land and built their
houses on the lot only after receiving De Mossessgeld's permission.

ISSUE:
WON respondents are builders in good faith.

RULING:
Undoubtedly, [Malicsi, et al.] cannot claim that they were builders in good faith because they
relied on the promise of De Mossessgeld who will sell the same to them but such allegations are
contrary to the actual circumstances obtaining in this case.
As builders in bad faith, respondents have no right to recover their expenses over the
improvements they have introduced to petitioners' lot under Article 449 of the Civil Code, which
provides: Article 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to indemnity. Under Article 452 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad
faith is entitled to recoup the necessary expenses incurred for the preservation of the land. However,
respondents neither alleged nor presented evidence to show that they introduced improvements for
the preservation of the land. Therefore, petitioners as landowners became the owners of the
improvements on the lot, including the residential buildings constructed by respondents, if they chose
to appropriate the accessions. However, they could instead choose the demolition of the
improvements at respondents' expense or compel respondents to pay the price of the land under
Article 450 of the Civil Code. Considering that petitioners pray for the reinstatement of the Regional
Trial Court Decision ordering respondents to vacate the lot and surrender its possession to them,
petitioners are deemed to have chosen to appropriate the improvements built on their lot without any
obligation to pay indemnity to respondents.
 G.R. NO. L-35648 FEBRUARY 27, 1987

TAN QUETO
VS.
CA

Facts: 
Restituta Tagalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot (Lot 304-B of the
Cadastre Survey of the Municipality of Centro, Misamis Occidental) either as a purported
donation or by way of purchase on 11 February 1927 for P50.00 as the alleged consideration
thereof. The transaction took place during her mother’s lifetime (her father having predeceased
the mother) and consummated while Restituta was already married to her husband Juan
Pombuena. On 22 January 1935, Juan filed an application of Torrens title over the land for
himself and his supposed co-owner Restituta. On 22 November 1938, a decision was
promulgated (GLRC 1638, Cadastral Case 12) pronouncing Juan (married to Restituto) as the
owner of the land. On 22 September 1949 a contract of lease over the lot was entered into
between Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta (with the consent of her husband) for a period of 10
years.
Meanwhile, On 27 December 1960 Restituta sued Tan Queto for unlawful detainer (the lease
ontract having expired) before the Municipal Court of Ozamis City.
On 22 April 1962, as a consequence of the cadastral case, an OCT was issued in Juan’s name.
On 10 October 1962, Tan Queto and Juan entered into a barter agreement whereby Tan Queto
became the owner of the disputed lot, and the spouses in turn became the owners of a parcel of
land with the house constructed thereon previously owned (that is, before the barter) by Tan
Queto. Thereafter, Tan Queto constructed on the disputed land a concrete building, without any
objection on the part of Restituta.
The Municipal court ruled in favor of the spouses in the unlawful detainer case; but on appeal in
the CFI, the entire case was dismissed because of an understanding (barter) entered into by
Juan and Tan Queto.

Issue: WON the questioned lot with the building thereon an exclusive property of Tan Queto,
without costs.

Held:
The CFI and the Court of Appeals found the disputed lot as paraphernal and that Tan
Queto was a builder in bad faith. These findings were regarded by the Supreme Court as findings
of facts and thus ordinarily conclusive upon the Court. Tan Queto filed for a motion for
reconsideration of the Supreme Court decision dated 16 May 1983.
The Supreme Court set aside its decision promulgated on 16 May 1983, and rendered a new one
declaring the questioned lot together with the building thereon, as Tan Queto’s exclusive
property; without costs.
 G.R. No. 192268

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by its Regional Director,

vs.
DELFINA C. CASIBANG, ANGELINA C. CANAPI, ERLINDA C. BAJAN, LORNA G.
GUMABAY, DIONISIA C. ALONZO, MARIA C. BANGA YAN and DIGNA C. BINAYUG,

FACTS:

Respondents are the heirs of late Juan Cepeda, the registered owner of the property in
controversy. It is alleged that sometime in 1965, upon the request of the then Mayor Justo Cesar
Caronan, Cepeda allowed the construction and operation of a school on the western portion of
his property. The school is now known as Solana North Central School, operating under the
control and supervision of the petitioner Department of Education (DepEd).

Sometime between October 31, 2000 and November 2, 2000, the respondents entered
and occupied a portion of the property. Upon discovery of the said occupation, the teachers of
the school brought the matter to the attention of the barangay captain. The school officials
demanded the respondents to vacate the property. However, the respondents refused to vacate
the property, and asserted Cepeda's ownership of the lot.

DepEd filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Damages against respondents and the
court ruled in favor of the petitioner and directed the respondents to vacate the premises.
Respondents filed an action for Recovery of Possession and/or Sum of Money against the
DepEd. Respondents averred that since their late father did not have any immediate need of the
land in 1965, he consented to the building of the temporary structure and allowed the conduct of
classes in the premises. They claimed that they have been deprived of the use and the
enjoyment of the portion of the land occupied by the school, thus, they are entitled to just
compensation and reasonable rent for the use of property.

In its Answer, the DepEd alleged that it owned the subject property because it was
purchased by civic-minded residents of Solana, Cagayan from Cepeda. It further alleged that
contrary to respondents' claim that the occupation is by mere tolerance, the property has always
been occupied and used adversely, peacefully, continuously and in the concept of owner for
almost forty (40) years. It insisted that the respondents had lost whatever right they had over the
property through laches.

During the trial, respondents presented, inter alia, the OCT No. O-627 registered in the
name of Juan Cepeda; Tax Declarations also in his name and the tax receipts showing that they
had been paying real property taxes on the property since 1965. They also presented the
Technical Description of the lot by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Land
Management Services showing that the subject property was surveyed in the name of Cepeda
and a certification from the Municipal Trial Court of Solana, Cagayan declaring that Lot 115 was
the subject of Cad Case No. N-13 in LRC Cad. Record No. N-200 which was adjudicated to
Cepeda.
 On the other hand, despite notice and reset of hearing, the DepEd failed to present its
evidence or witness to substantiate its defense. Consequently, the RTC considered the case
submitted for decision and rendered a Decision dated January 10, 2008, finding that the
respondents are the owners of the subject property. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the
decision of the RTC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the respondents are barred to recover possession because of Prescription
and/or laches.
2. Whether or not DepEd is a builder in good faith?

RULINGS:
1. No, respondent is not barred by prescription and or/laches.

The court ruled that Laches, in a general sense, is the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each

case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches
is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since laches is an equitable
doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot work to defeat
justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.

In order to constitute laches, the following elements must be present:

1)conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in
asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the
right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.

In the present case, as registered owners of the lots in question, the respondents have a
right to eject any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible.
Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioner's occupation of the property,
and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand
the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or
merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred by laches.

Further, case law teaches that those who occupy the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an
implied promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand.

2. YES, DepEd is a builder in good faith.

To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land
on which he builds, i.e., that he be a possessor in the concept of owner, and that he be
unaware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

However, there are cases where Article 448 of the Civil Code was applied beyond the
recognized and limited definition of good faith, e.g., cases wherein the builder has
constructed improvements on the land of another with the consent of the owner. The
Court ruled therein that the structures were built in good faith in those cases that the
owners knew and approved of the construction of improvements on the property.

In the present case, despite being a possessor by mere tolerance, the DepEd is
considered a builder in good faith, since Cepeda permitted the construction of building
and improvements to conduct classes on his property. Hence, Article 448 may be applied
in the case at bar.
 G.R. No. 152423

Esmanquel
vs.
Coprada

FACTS:

On February 24, 1997, spouses Esmaquel filed an ejectment case against Coprada before
the 2nd MCTC Laguna. Petitioners claimed that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land
situated in San Miguel, Majayja. In 1945, Coprada was able to persuade the petitioners to allow
her and her family to use and occupy the land for their residence, under the condition that they
will vacate the premises should petitioners need to use the same. Coprada and her family were
allowed to construct their residential house. Since then, the petitioners never made an attempt to
drive them away out of pity, knowing that respondent and her eight children have no other place
to live in. the a few years later the financial condition of Copradas family, having acquired her
own residential house. This prompted petitioners to institute an ejectment case against Coprada.
Respondent avers that she had already acquired ownership over the contested lot when she
orally purchased it. And further avers that the claim has already prescribed and thus barred by
laches.

MCTC ruled in favor of Coprada, thus the case was dismissed. On appeal to the RTC, the
ruling of the MCTC was reversed. The CA reversed the RTCs decision and reinstated the
MCTCs ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent from the subject
property.

HELD:

As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his
property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches.

In the present case, Coprada failed to present evidence to substantiate her allegation
that a portion of the land was sold to her in 1962. Coprada's submission that there was an oral
sale is a mere afterthought.
On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject property is covered by a title,
registered in the name of the petitioners. As against the respondent's unproven claim that she
acquired a portion of the property from the petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title of
petitioners must prevail. Petitioners' title over the subject property is evidence of their ownership
thereof. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title over
a land is entitled to possession thereof.

Further, Coprada's argument that petitioners are no longer the owners of a portion of the
subject land because of the sale in her favor is a collateral attack on the title of the petitioners,
which is not allowed. The validity of petitioners' certificate of title cannot be attacked by
respondent in this case for ejectment. Under Section 48 of PD No. 1529, a certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or canceled, except in a direct
proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the
petitioners can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not
the respondent has the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the trial
court to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.
 GR No. 172410. April 14, 2008

Republic
v.
Holy Trinity Realty Development Corporation (HTRDC)

Facts:
On December 29, 2000, Petitioner, represented by Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), filed
before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against
landowners whose properties would be affected by the expansion of the North Luzon
Expressway. Respondent HTRDC was one of the affected landowner.

On March 18, 2002, TRB filed a motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession,
manifesting that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the
zonal value of the affected properties, in the total amount of PhP 28,406,700.00, with
Land Bank South Harbor Branch. The RTC issued, on March 19, 2002, the Writ of
Possession.

On March 3, 2003, HTRDC filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying that
the respondent be allowed to withdraw the amount of PhP 22,968,000.00, out of the
TRB’s advance deposit of PhP 28,406,700.00, including the interest which accrued
thereon. The RTC issued an Order, on April 21, 2003, directing Land bank South Harbor
Branch to release in favor of HTRDC the amount of PhP22, 968,000.00. However, the
issue on the interest earned by the amount deposited in the bank, if there any, should still
be threshed out.
The Republic filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC. They argued the
HTRDC is entitled only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated
property, nothing more and nothing less as provided under Sec. 4 of RA 8974. They
further argued that it is only during the determination of just compensation when the court
will appoint commissioners and determine claims for entitlements to interest.

ISSUE: W/N the interest earned by the deposited amount in the expropriation account
would accrue to HRTDC by virtue of accession?

HELD:
Yes, the Court ruled that HTRDC is determined to be the owned of only a part of
the amount deposited in the expropriation account, in the sum of PhP 22,968,000.00.
Hence, it is entitled by right of accession to the interest that had accrued to the said
amount only. When the TRB deposited the amount as advance payment for the
expropriated property with an authorized government depositary bank for purposes of
obtaining a writ of possession, it is deemed to be a constructive delivery of the amount
corresponding to the 100% zonal valuation of the expropriated property. Since HTRDC is
entitled thereto and undisputably the owner of the principal amount deposited by TRB,
conversely, the interest yield, as accession, in a bank deposit should likewise pertain to
the owner of the money deposited.

Further, the Court pointed out that TRB does not object to HTRDC’s withdrawal of
the amount of PhP22,968,000.00 from the expropriation account, provided that it is able
to show (1) that the property is free from any lien or encumbrances and (2) that it is the
absolute owner thereof. The said conditions do not put in abeyance the constructive
delivery of the said amount to HTRDC pending the latter’s compliance therewith.
 Art. 1187, NCC provides that the effects of a conditional obligation to give, once
the condition have been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the
obligation. Hence, when HTRDC complied with the given condition, as determined by the
RTC in its Order dated (April 21, 2003), the effects of constructive deliver retroacted to
the actual date of the deposit of the amount in the expropriation account of DPWH.

G.R. No. 228680

Sanchez
vs.
Divinagracia, VDA. De Aguilar (2018)
FACTS:

On July 11, 2000, Juanito Aguilar sold to petitioner spouses Francisco and Delma
Sanchez (Spouses Sanchez) a 600-square-meter portion of his 33,600-square meter lot
identified as Lot No. 71, Pls 870, located in the Municipality of Lake Sebu, South Cotabato.

On October 23, 2004, the heirs of Juanito Aguilar, namely, respondents Esther
Divinagracia Vda. de Aguilar, Juanito's spouse, and their children, fenced the boundary line
between the 600-square-meter lot of the spouses and the alleged alluvium on the northwest
portion of the land by the lake Sebu.

The Spouses Sanchez protested the act of fencing by Esther before the barangay, but
since no settlement was reached, they filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against the heirs of
Aguilar before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Surallah-Lake Sebu, Province of South
Cotabato. They claimed that under the law, they are the owners of the alluvium which enlarged
their 600-square-meter lot. It cannot, therefore, be fenced by the heirs of Aguilar.

For their part, the heirs refute the existence of the alluvium. They assert that the
"alluvium" referred to is the 800-square-meter area beyond the 600-square-meter lot of the
spouses which has been in their actual possession but was used, with their tolerance, by the
spouses in connection with their operation of fish cages in that portion of Lake Sebu abutting their
lot.

The MCTC was also unconvinced with the spouses' contention that the subject land is an
alluvium. An alluvium is an area formed by running water like a river or a creek. But in a lake like
the subject Lake Sebu, the water is stagnant. Thus, the land in question is a natural surrounding
of the lake which existed at the same time with the lake itself. Moreover, the MCTC pointed out
that the subject land is 800 square meters in size which is greater than the area purchased by the
spouses so if there could be a legal claimant, it is the government of Lake Sebu as foreshore or
salvage zone for public use.

On May 22, 2010, the spouses filed a Complaint for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Damages
before the RTC seeking to annul the June 7, 2006 Decision of the MCTC for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter or for rendering judgment over a non- existent parcel of land since there
is no excess of the 600-square-meter portion to speak of.

On July 8, 2013, the RTC granted the spouses' complaint and annulled the June 7, 2006
MCTC Decision.

However, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision

ISSUES:

 WoN the ruling of the RTC must be upheld in view of the findings of the Sheriff that since
the width of the national highway is almost 60 meters wide, the lot of the spouses must
have gone downwards towards the lake, and thus any portion of land beside said lake
must be considered as part of the land purchased by the spouses from Aguilar
o NO. The Spouses Sanchez anchored their Complaint for Annulment of Judgment on the
alleged lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC.
o Here, the Court agrees with the appellate court that the MCTC had both jurisdictions over
the person of the defendant or respondent and over the subject matter of the claim. On the
former, it is undisputed that the MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
spouses Sanchez as they are the ones who filed the Forcible Entry suit before it. On the
latter, Republic Act No. 7691 (R.A. No. 7691) clearly provides that the proper Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original
jurisdiction over ejectment cases, which includes unlawful detainer and forcible entry.
o Despite this, the Spouses Sanchez insist that the MCTC could not have had jurisdiction
over the disputed land area in excess of their 600-square-meter lot. This is because since
the District Engineer's Office found that the width of the national highway is almost 60
meters wide, the edge of their 600-square-meter lot must have gone downwards and
necessarily reached the edge of the 20-meter wide public easement abutting the Lake
Sebu. Thus, the heirs of Aguilar could not have been in "actual physical possession" of a
non-existent lot for the disputed area belongs to them.
o The Court, however, is not convinced. As duly noted by the CA, the area beyond the 600-
square-meter lot abutting Lake Sebu, whether it is a lot claimed to be in "actual physical
possession" of the heirs of Aguilar or a public easement, refers to the "alluvium" lot area
claimed by the Spouses Sanchez as their own in their forcible entry complaint. It is clear,
therefore, that the MCTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter, which, in this case, is the
600-square-meter lot and its alleged alluvium.
o It bears stressing, moreover, that the Spouses Sanchez explicitly brought the subject
matter to the jurisdiction of the MCTC. They cannot now deny such jurisdiction simply
because said court did not rule in their favor.
o Thus, the issue of whether the MCTC erred in dismissing the forcible entry complaint,
ruling that the heirs of Aguilar were in actual physical possession over the subject property
should have been raised by the Spouses Sanchez in an appeal before the RTC. But as the
records reveal, the spouses did not do anything to question the decision of the MCTC,
merely allowing the same to attain finality. In fact, the sheriff had already started its
execution. Moreover, without even providing any explanation for their delay, it was only on
May 22, 2010, or four (4) years after the issuance of the MCTC ruling on June 7, 2006, that
the spouses filed the instant Complaint for Annulment of Judgment.
 G.R. No. 681166

HEIRS OF NAVARRO
V.
IAC

FACTS:
Sinforoso Pascual sits in the midst of a land registration case. The story begins on 1946
upon his desire to register land on the northern section of his existing property. His current
registered property is bounded on the east by Talisay River, on the West by Bulacan River and
on the North by the Manila bay. Both rivers flow towards the Manila Bay. Because of constantly
flowing water, extra land of about 17hectares (that’s about the size of Disney Park!) formed in the
northern most section of the property. It is this property he sought to register.
The RTC denied the registration claiming this to be foreshore land and part of public
domain (remember, accretion formedby the sea is public dominion). His Motion for
Reconsideration likewise burned. In 1960, he attempted registry again, claiming that the Talisay
and Bulacan rivers deposited more silt resulting on accretion. He claimed this land as riprarian
owner. The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Fiscal opposed.
Then a new party surfaced. Mr Emiliano Navarro jumped into the fray opposing the same
application, stating the he leased part of the property sought to be registered. He sought to
protect his fishpond that rested on the same property. Sinforoso was not amused and filed
ejectment against Mr. Navarro, claiming that Navarro used stealth force and strategy to occupy a
portion of his land. Pascual lost the case against Navarro so he appealed. During the appeal, his
original land registration case was consolidated and tried jointly. (alas Pascual died) The heirs of
Pascual took over the case.
On 1975, the court decided that the property was foreshore land and therefore part of
public domain. The RTC dismissed the complaint of Pascual for ejectment against Navarro and
also denied his land registration request. Pascual’s heirs appealed and the RTC was reversed by
the IAC. The Apellate court granted petition for registration! The reason? The accretion was
caused by the two rivers, not manila bay. Hence it wasn’t foreshore land. (BUT the confusion lies
in the fact that the accretion formed adjacent to Manila Bay… which is sea!) Aggrieved, the
Director of Forestry moved for reconsideration (Government insists it is foreshore and hence,
public domain). The Apellate court denied all motions of the Director and the Government.
The matter went to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accretion taking place on property adjacent to the sea can be
registered under the Torrens system.

HELD:
It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain. Pascual claimed ownership under Article
457 of the Civil Code saying that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint
action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment
be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and
(3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is misplaced. If there’s
any land to be claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The law
is clear on this. Accretion of land along the river bank may be registered. This is not the case of
accretion of land on the property adjacent to Manila Bay.
Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land and the applicable
law is not Art 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. This law, while old, holds that
accretion along sea shore cannot be registered as it remains public domain unless abandoned by
government for public use and declared as private property capable of alienation.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea,
form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are
not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for
the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of
the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set aside. Registration cannot be
allowed.
 G.R. No. 92161, March 18, 1991
Binalay
v.
Manalo
Facts:
Respondent Guillermo Manalo acquired 8.65 hectares thereof from Faustina Taccad,
daughter of Judge Juan Taccad. He then purchased another 1.80 hectares from Gregorio
Taguba who had earlier acquired the same from Judge Juan Taccad. The two (2) parcels of land
belonging to respondent Manalo were surveyed and consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot
No. 307, Pls-964. Lot 307 which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole of the 1.80
hectares acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65 hectares
purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of
the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water was left unsurveyed and was not
included in Lot 307. The Sketch Plan submitted during the trial of this case and which was
identified by respondent Manalo shows that the Cagayan River running from south to north, forks
at a certain point to form two (2) branches—the western and the eastern branches—and then
unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrow strip of land. The eastern branch of the
river cuts through the land of respondent Manalo and is inundated with water only during the
rainy season. The bed of the eastern branch is the submerged or the unsurveyed portion of the
land belonging to respondent Manalo. For about eight (8) months of the year when the level of
water at the point where the Cagayan River forks is at its ordinary depth, river water does not
flow into the eastern branch. While this condition persists, the eastern bed is dry and is
susceptible to cultivation. 
There is this Lot 821 which is located directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated from the
latter only by the eastern branch of the Cagayan River during the rainy season and, during the
dry season, by the exposed, dry river bed, being a portion of the land bought from Faustina
Taccad. Respondent Manalo claims that Lot 821 also belongs to him by way of accretion to the
submerged portion of the property to which it is adjacent. 
On 24 July 1974, respondent Manalo filed a complaints before the then Court of First
Instance of Isabela, Branch 3 for quieting of title, possession and damages against petitioners.
He alleged ownership of the two (2) parcels of land he bought separately from Faustina Taccad
and Gregorio Taguba for which reason he prayed that judgment be entered ordering petitioners
to vacate the western strip of the unsurveyed portion. Respondent Manalo likewise prayed that
judgment be entered declaring him as owner of Lot 821 on which he had laid his claim during the
survey.
Issue:
WON Manolo own Lot 821 by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to which
it is adjacent? 
Ruling:
No, Manolo does not own Lot 821 by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the property to
which it is adjacent
Article 420 of the Civil Code states:
The following things are property of public dominion:
 (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of three (3) requisites: (a) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and
imperceptible; (b) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (c) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast).
Pursuant to Article 420 of the Civil Code, respondent Manalo did not acquire private ownership of
the bed of the eastern branch of the river even if it was included in the deeds of absolute sale
executed by Gregorio Taguba and Faustina Taccad in his favor. These vendors could not have
validly sold land that constituted property of public dominion. The Court considers that there was
no evidence to prove that Lot 821 is an increment to Lot 307 and the bed of the eastern branch of
the river. As it is, the claimed accretion (Lot 821) lies on the bank of the river not adjacent to Lot
307 but directly opposite Lot 307 across the river.
Hence, Manolo does not own Lot 821 by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the
property to which it is adjacent.
 GR No. L-47847 / July 31, 1981
Director of Lands
vs
CA
FACTS:
On May 8, 1974, respondent Manuela Pastor filed with the Court of First Instance
of Batangas LRC Case No. N-893, an application for confirmation of imperfect title over
thirteen (13) lots situated in Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City.
The application shows that seven (7) of the lots were allegedly inherited
byrespondent Manuela Pastor from her parents Rafael Pastor and Natalia Quinio who
died on July 1, 1938 and July 12, 1908, respectively. The other six (6) lots were allegedly
inherited by respondent from her aunt Rosario Pastor who died on January 13, 1950
without any surviving heir except respondent herein, that she and her predecessors-in-
interest had been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and notorious
possession of the lots for more than thirty (30) years.
The Director of Lands filed an OPPOSITION to the application on the ground that
applicant Manuela Pastor and her predecessors-in-interest neither had title in fee simple
nor imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Law, as amended, over the lots in
question.
During the hearings, the applicant presented as her witnesses her nephew Antonio M.
Pastor, and Geodetic Engineer Quirino P. Clemeneo.
As part of her documentary evidence, applicant Manuela Pastor presented the
certifications of the Treasurer of Batangas City showing official receipts of payments of
real estate tax on the same lots for 1975, a certification from the Land Registration
Commission stating that Lot No. 9330 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas, Province of
Batangas, was declared public land in Cadastral Case No. 41, LRC Cad. Record No.
1706. She likewise submitted another certification from the Land Registration Commission
to the effect that some lots of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas, Province of Batangas,
were the subject of a decision in Cad. Case No. 43, LRC Cad. Record No. 1712, although
no decree of registration has as yet been issued.

ISSUE:

Whether decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 41 cranad(Exhibit L) declaring

Lot No. 9330 — from which Lots Nos. 9330-A and 9330-C were derived — constitutes res
adjudicata as to the nature of the lots in question and therefore, a bar to appellee’s
application.

HELD: NO

It is clear from the evidence on record that in the proceedings had before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, acting as a land registration court, the oppositor
Director of Lands, petitioner herein, did not interpose any objection nor set up the defense
of res judicata with respect to the lots in question. Such failure on the part of oppositor
Director of Lands, to OUR mind, is a procedural infirmity which cannot be cured on appeal.
Section 2, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in no uncertain language, provides that:
“SEC. 2. Defenses and objections not pleaded deemed waived. — Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived;”
The decision in Cadastral Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to the application of
respondent Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot
public land is not the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land
Registration Act. A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude
even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the
same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains
alienable and disposable (now sections 3 and 4, P.D. No. 1073).

With respect to Cadastral Case No. 43, the evidence on record is too scanty to sustain the
view of the petitioner that the decision rendered therein constitutes res adjudicata, or in the
absence of finality thereof, litis pendentia. On the contrary, private respondent has amply
shown that no final decree whatsoever was issued in connection with said cadastral case,
even as it is not known in whose favor said decision was rendered. Morevoer, Manuela
Pastor has performed and complied with all the conditions essential to entitle her to a
confirmation of her imperfect title over the thirteen cranad(13) lots subject of her
application.

.
 G.R. No 83804 /July 18, 1991

Republic
vs.
Alon

FACTS:

The refusal of the respondent Trial Judge to grant the petitioner Republic's motion
for issuance of a writ of possession in Civil Case No. 838 is what has given rise to the
special civil action of certiorari at bar. Civil Case No. 838 was instituted by the Republic
in the Court of First Instance at Silay City for the purpose of nullifying and cancelling
resurvey/subdivision-consolidation plans, and certificates of title issued on the basis
thereof to the private respondents, on the theory that they embraced increases in or
expansions of the original areas obtained by said respondents in violation of law, and
said expanded areas form part of the unclassified public forest, not subject to private
appropriation. The private respondents' claim of title to the expanded areas was founded
on the proposition that the same were alluvial in character and therefore accrued to them
as riparian owners in accordance with Article 457 of the Civil Code. The Trial Court
rendered judgment on February 6, 1987. It made reference to the evidence presented by
private respondents consisting of "the testimonies of Dr. Virendra Pal Singh, Mr. Bart Ali
Choudray, Dr. Pedro Sangatanan, Dr. Wilfredo Espada and Miss Eufemia Sionosa, all
expert witnesses on soil except the last who is a chemist," who "all testified that based on
their examinations and laboratory tests of the soil taken from the expanded area, . . . the
same is alluvial in character and therefore the defendants owned it as riparian owner
under Art. 457 of the Civil Code." The Court also adverted in its judgment to the "similar
case of Republic vs. Heirs of Abrille, 71 SCRA 57 6 (in which) the Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the lower court cancelling the transfer certificates of title covering the
lands with the increased areas and directing the Register of Deeds of Davao to issue
new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the increased portions shall have been
segregated;" and hewing to Abrille, and observing that the increases in area were to be
found in only two (2) of the subdivided lots, the judgment disposed of the case as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 51835 and 42850 and directing the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to issue
new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the portions consisting of 100,367 square
meters and 182,656 square meters, respectively, shall have been segregated therefrom
in accordance with law.

The private respondents initially sought to appeal. They filed a notice of appeal.
However, they later filed a motion to withdraw their appeal, "electing (instead) to file a
petition for original registration of the expanded area questioned by the plaintiff . . .
(since) a favorable action on said petition will . . . make (the case) moot and
academic . . ."7In the same motion, the respondent also prayed for cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens "on their properties not included in the questioned expanded area."
By Order dated May 19, 1987, the Trial Court granted the motion, considering the appeal
withdrawn, and directing cancellation of the notice of lis pendens "on the titles subject of
this case," The judgment of February 6, 1987 consequently became final. The decision of
this Court was founded only in the propriety of the remedy resorted to by private
defendants in securing title to the expanded areas. It was found that the titling of the
expanded areas was not in accordance with Act 496 and following the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Republic vs. Abrille, 71 SCRA 57, the titles were ordered
cancelled because the law requires that to make the alluvial deposits of land come under
the Torrens System, there must be a judicial application for registration. The purpose of
registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts is merely to confirm the title
of the registrant and thereafter protect the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing
and registration under the Torrens System of that ownership is another. Ownership is
governed by the Civil Code and registration under the Torrens System is not one of the
modes of acquiring ownership (Grande vs. Court of Appeals, 115 Phil. 521). During the
trial of this case, private defendants presented expert witnesses who testified and
concluded that the expanded areas are alluvial in character. And as registered owners of
the land to which the alluvial deposits adjoined, they are therefore the lawful owners of
the said alluvial areas. In June 28, 1988 the Republic instituted in this Court the special
civil action of certiorari at bar praying that the Order of May 12, 1988 be declared null and
void, and pending adjudgment of the action, that a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issue to place it in possession of the expanded areas.

Issue: Whether or not the land is alluvial or not, or of public or private domain, and
whether or not the private respondents are riparian owners thereof within the
contemplation of the Civil Code and have occupied the land as owners for fifty years, are
issues proper for ventilation in the registration case now pending before the Regional
Trial Court at Silay City.

Held:

The decision of this Court was founded only in the propriety of the remedy
resorted to by private defendants in securing title to the expanded areas. It was
found that the titling of the expanded areas was not in accordance with Act 496
and following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Republic vs.
Abrille, 71 SCRA 57, the titles were ordered cancelled because the law requires
that to make the alluvial deposits of land come under the Torrens System, there
must be a judicial application for registration.The purpose of registration under the
Land Registration and Cadastral Acts is merely to confirm the title of the registrant
and thereafter protect the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. Ownership of a piece of land is one
thing and registration under the Torrens System of that ownership is another.
Ownership is governed by the Civil Code and registration under the Torrens
System is not one of the modes of acquiring ownership (Grande vs. Court of
Appeals, 115 Phil. 521).

During the trial of this case, private defendants presented expert witnesses who
testified and concluded that the expanded areas are alluvial in character. And as
registered owners of the land to which the alluvial deposits adjoined, they are
therefore the lawful owners of the said alluvial areas. On June 28, 1988 the
Republic instituted in this Court the special civil action of certiorari at bar praying
that the Order of May 12, 1988 be declared null and void, and pending
adjudgment of the action, that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issue to
place it in possession of the expanded areas. Here, the Republic insists on the
correctness of the theory it advocated before the Trial Court and contends that the
latter, in not upholding that theory, acted beyond its jurisdiction and gravely
abused its discretion. It assails the Trial Court's findings respecting the private
respondents' rights over the expanded areas as "being totally without factual or
legal mooring, apart from being wholly extraneous to the lis mota of petitioner's
main action which was for cancellation and reversion; invokes the presumption
that all unregistered lands . . ., unless the contrary is shown, are . . . "public
lands;" and refers to 14 evidences" in

The signification and import of the Trial Court's challenged Order of May 12, 1988,
as well as of its decision of February 6, 1987, seem to the Court to be sufficiently
clear. Both the decision and the order declared that at the very least the evidence
of the private respondents established prima facie that they are owners of the
expanded areas in question –– pursuant to Article 475 of the Civil Code and in
virtue of open, continuous and exclusive possession of the land for more than 50
years in concept of owners –– but that the procedure under Section 112 of the
Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) by which they succeeded in obtaining title
 over said areas was incorrect, and that title should issue in their favor only in virtue
of regular, original registration proceedings in accordance with the same law in the
course of which, as pointed out in Republic v. Heirs of Abrille, supra, "the following
requisites should all be satisfied.

G.R. No. 6675 / July 5, 1990

Agustin
vs.
IAC

Facts:
In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these
occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents,
namely, Pablo Binayug,  and Maria Melad, who owns Lot 3351.
Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern
bank among which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457, depositing the alluvium
as accretion on the land possessed by Pablo Binayug on the western bank.
However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its
1919 bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the
spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or
Tuguegarao, side of the river.
The private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the eastern
side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of
Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the private respondents from
the premises.
On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint to
recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6-hectare accretion. Private respondent
Pablo Binayug filed a separate complaintto recover his lots and their accretions.
Trial court rendered a decision, restoring the ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo
Melad who are the only interested heirs of Macario Melad; [and Pablo Binayug in another case].
IAC affirmed the judgment of trial court in toto.

Issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the land in question had become part of private
respondents' estate as a result of accretion
 
Held:
No. The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private
respondents who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated
from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is
conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
 
 G.R. No.160453 / November 12, 2012

Republic
vs.
Santos

Facts:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio
Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the
property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area
of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City,
and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.
(Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road,
and in the Northwest by Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.
On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio,
Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the
property had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public,
continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years.

The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that
it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal
easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered
by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for
the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from
accretion.3
On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and
ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE
OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of
Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and
covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4,
Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B. With this, the
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.
The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit.
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the
Civil Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish
accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque River.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription (section
14(1) of PD 1529).

Held:

NO. (By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the
current of the water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it
forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the
State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership
in some other person.)
Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the
merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that
is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in opposition to it.11 They would be held
entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its registration under the Torrens system
only if they established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.

However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual
and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot
4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the
Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the
land which was previously part of the Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried
up."

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of
Lot 4 was issued in their mother’s name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter
as the land formed between Lot 4 and the Parañaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should
then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the
Parañaque River, resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.

The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the
effects of the current of the river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a river
bank. There are several other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The drying up of
the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words,
respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and
imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable
that the large volume of soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square
meters had been deposited in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in
the span of about 20 to 30 years – the span of time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was
registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in
existence) and the early 1950s (which respondents’ witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the
time when he knew them to have occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the
substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up bed of the Parañaque River.
Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own testimony to the effect that the property was
previously a part of the Parañaque River that had dried up and become an orchard.
The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree), which pertinently states:
Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court]
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
 G.R. No.160453 / November 12, 2012

Bagaipo
vs.
CA

FACTS
Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot No. 415, a 146,900 square
meter agricultural land situated in Ma-a, Davao City while Respondent Leonor Lozano is the
owner of a registered parcel of land located across and opposite the southeast portion of
petitioner’s lot facing the Davao River. 
On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Mandatory Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Lozano for:  
(1) the surrender of possession by Lozano of a certain portion of land measuring 29,162
square meters which is supposedly included in the area belonging to Bagaipo under TCT No. T-
15757; and
(2) the recovery of a land area measuring 37,901 square meters which Bagaipo allegedly
lost when the Davao River traversed her property.  
Bagaipo contended that as a result of a change in course of the said river, her property
became divided into three lots, namely:  Lots 415-A, the area presently occupied by Bagaipo,
415-B, which cut across Bagaipo’s land was taken up by the new course of the Davao River and
415-C, the land presently located across the river and parallel to Bagaipo’s property.
The trial court concluded that the applicable law is Article 457 of the New Civil Code and not
Art. 461and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court, hence the present case.
ISSUE
Whether the land is owned by Bagaipo due to the changing of the river’s course or by
Lozano by the principle of accretion.
HELD
The trial court and the appellate court both found that the decrease in land area was brought
about by erosion and not a change in the river’s course.  The decrease in petitioner’s land area
and the corresponding expansion of respondent’s property were the combined effect of erosion
and accretion respectively.  Art. 461 of the Civil Code is inapplicable.  Petitioner cannot claim
ownership over the old abandoned riverbed because the same is inexistent.  
 G.R. No. L-28021 / December 15, 1977

Santulan
vs.
Executive Secretary

Facts:

Julian Santulan and Antonio Lusin were rival claimants with respect to the lease of
a parcel of foreshore land of public domain. The area is about 4 ½ hectares located at
Barrio Kaingin, Kawit Cavite.

Santulan caused the survey of the land on December 5, 1942 and filed an
application on Dec. 29, 1942 to lease for five (5) years for agricultural purposes an area
of 36, 120 sq. meters and including the application for revocable permit to occupy the
said land for planting of Bakawan which later develop to fishpond seven years later after
acquiring ordinary fishpond permit from BFAR. On the other hand, private respondent
Lusin was reported and was being summoned that he was illegally entered the area
covered by the petitioners fishpond permit and was refrain from introducing
improvements.

However, Lusin filed applications in 1942 and 1945 for a revocable-permit and a
lease of a foreshore for the purpose of producing salt in the said land, contending that he
had been in the continuous and exclusive possession of the land since 1920 when it was
still under water, and that he had used it as a site of his fish corrals. He allegedly
converted two hectares into fishpond enclosed with mud dikes and provided with a
concrete sluice gate and another sluice gate made of wood. On the northern part of the
land bordering the bay were bamboo stakes placed at close intervals to serve as water
breakers to protect the mud dikes from being washed away by the action of the sea.
Lusin further claimed that he introduced the alleged improvements from 1951 to 1953.

The Director ruled that the disputed foreshore land was subject "to reparian
rights , hence rejected Lusin's application for a foreshore lease and for a revocable
permit and gave due course to Santulan's foreshore lease application. The
reconsideration was denied as well as the appeal to Acting Secretary of Agriculture.
Lusin asked for reinvestigation but decision was reaffirmed. He then appealed to the
President of the Philippines. By authority of the President, Executive Secretary sustained
Lusin's appeal and reversed the orders of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in favor of Santulan.

Santulan's motion for reconsideration was denied in the letter of the Acting Executive
Secretary then filed in the Court of First Instance of Cavite a petition for certiorari
wherein he alleged that the Executive Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The lower court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Executive Secretary's decision.
Santulan appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution elevated the record to
this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the riparian owner has preferential right over continuous possession.

Held:

Yes. In the Monzon case, the Office of the President, applying the oft-cited
paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 held that Monzon, the littoral owner
of the registered land abutting upon the foreshore land, has the preferential right to lease
the foreshore land,

Considering that the foreshore land abutting upon Santolan's lot is in the same
situation as the foreshore land abutting upon Monzon's lot, there is no reason why
Santulan should not enjoy, with respect to the disputed foreshore land, the rights given to
Monzon over the foreshore land adjacent to his lot.

That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the Spanish Law of

Waters of 1866 which provides that, while lands added to the shores by accretions and
alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such
lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary
for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast
guard service", shall be declared by the Government "to be the property of the owner of
the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof" (cited in Ignacio vs. Director of
Lands, 108 Phil. 335, 338).

The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving
accretions to the riparian owner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner
for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters
(Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by
the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession (Banks vs. Ogden 2 Wall. 57,
67, 17 L. Ed. 818, 821).

The lease application of Julian Santulan mentioned in the order of February 1,

1951 should be recorded in the names of his heirs and the obligation to make
reimbursement mentioned in the dispositive part of the Undersecretary's order should
now devolve upon the heirs of Santolan. The reimbursement should be made to the heirs
of the late Antonio Lusin The obligation to vacate the disputed land, as required in the
Director's order of October 19, 1951 devolves upon the heirs of Lusin Costs in both
instances against respondent heirs of Lusin (As amended by Resolution of February 17,
1977.
 G.R. No. 168386 / March 29, 2010

Cantoja
vs.
CA

FACTS:

Respondent Roberto Cantoja Sr. filed an application for a Foreshore Lease Contract over
the foreshore area located in Makar, General Santos City in 1989. The Lease contract was
executed on November 23, 1990 and would expire on October 21, 2015. Five years after,
petitioner Harry Lim filed a protest questioning the grant of FLA to Cantoja since according to
him, Cantoja has committed fraud and misrepresentation in declaring in his application that the
subject foreshore area adjoined his (Cantoja’s) property.To prove this allegation, Lim presented a
TCT over a lot which adjoins the foreshore area subject of the lease. Upon ocular inspection,
during which petitioner failed to appear despite notice, a Special Investigator found that Cantoja
was in actual possession of the foreshore area which was utilized as “dock-board of the Cantoja’s
Fishing Business.  It was ascertained that no portion has been occupied or possessed by any
other person or persons, nor was there any adverse claimant thereof. Like the DENR Secretary,
the Office of the President also relied on the findings of Special Investigator that the petitioner’s
titled land is an inalienable foreshore area which could not be subject of a valid patent or title.

Aggrieved, respondent Harry Lim appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
held that Cantoja committed misrepresentation amounting to fraud in his application for lease
when he declared in his application that his lot adjoins that of the foreshore area sought to be
leased. 

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in cancelling the Foreshore Lease Contract granted to
Cantoja covering the foreshore area

RULING:

No.  It is undisputed that respondent is the registered owner of the land adjacent to the foreshore
area leased to Cantoja, Thus, prior to Cantoja’s foreshore lease application in1989 and the grant
of the foreshore lease contract on November 23, 1990; respondent already owned the land
adjacent to the foreshore land. The sketch plan submitted by the Geodetic Engineer clearly
shows that respondent’s property is in between the foreshore land and Cantoja’s property. Being
the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoral owner
who has preferential right to lease the foreshore area as provided under paragraph 32 of the
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 provides that, while lands added to the shore by
accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain,
such lands, “when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the established of special industries, or for the coast guard
service,” shall be declared by the Government “to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.”
 

            In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian
according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to
the action of the sea.  The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for
giving accretions to the riparian owner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner
for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters. So, in
the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its
recession.    

          In this case, Cantoja committed fraud when he misrepresented himself as the riparian or
littoral owner in his application for the foreshore lease. Under stipulation no. 15 of the Foreshore
Lease Agreement, any fraud or misrepresentation committed by the applicant is a ground for
cancellation or rescission of the Foreshore Lease Agreement. 
 G.R. No. 182908 / August 6, 2014

Heirs of Narvasa Sr.

vs.
Imbornal
FACTS:
Basilia Imbornal+ (Basilia) had four (4) children, namely, Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and
Pablo.Francisco I. Narvasa, Sr.9 (Francisco) and Pedro Ferrer (Pedro) were the children10 of
Alejandra, while petitioner Petra Imbornal (Petra) was the daughter of Balbina.Petitioners are the
heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco, Pedro, and Petra (Francisco, et al.) Respondents
are Emiliana, Victoriano, Felipe, Mateo, Raymundo, Maria, and Eduardo, all surnamed Imbornal,
are the descendants of Pablo. Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for
and was granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m. riparian land (Motherland) adjacent to
the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan.
the fact that they were not the riparian owners (as they did not own the Motherland to which the
accretions merely formed adjacent to). Thus, bewailing that respondents have refused them their
rights not only with respect to the Motherland, but also to the subsequent accretions, Francisco,
et al. prayed for the reconveyance ofsaid properties, or, in the alternative, the payment of their
value, as well as the award of moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00, actual damages in
the amount of ₱150,000.00, including attorney’s fees and other costs.
RTC: Petitioners
CA: Reversed, ruled in favor of the Imbornals

ISSUE: Whether or not the Imbornals have the better right over the property resulting from the
FIRST and SECOND accretion

HELD:
YES, the Imbornals have the better right. Francisco et al. failed to prove their ownership
rights over the Motherland.
Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: "[t]o the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters."
Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or
littoralowner who has preferential right to lease the foreshore area as provided under paragraph
32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936, which reads: ○ 32. Preference
of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshylands or lands
covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given
preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public
service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he
applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the
Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right. That rule in paragraph 32 is in
consonance with Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides that, while lands
added to the shore by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part
of the public domain, such lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and
are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the established [sic] of special industries, or
for the coast guard service, "shall be declared by the Government "to be the property of the
owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."
In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according
to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action
of the sea.

In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners are not the
riparian owners of the Motherland to which the First Accretion had attached, hence, they cannot
assert ownership over the First Accretion.
Consequently, as the Second Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion, they also
have no right over the Second Accretion. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated November 28, 2006 and the Resolution dated May 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 57618 are hereby AFFIRMED, and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the
Amended Complaint dated February 27, 1984 filed in said case

GR No. 142595 / October 15, 2003

Celestial
vs.
Cachopero

Facts:
Cachopero filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) with the Bureau of Lands
covering a 415 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio 8, Midsayap, Cotabato and formerly
part of the Salunayan Creek in Katingawan, Midsayap. He alleged that he had been occupying
the land since

1968 whereon he built a residential house and introduced other improvements.

Celestial filed a protest against the MSA, saying that she has preferential right over the
land subject thereof since it is adjacent to, and is the only outlet from, her residential
house.
After an ocular inspection by the Bureau of Lands, it was found out that the land was
formerly part of the Salunayan Creek, but has dried up because of the NIA’s construction
of an irrigation canal. Cachopero’s application and her protest were denied because the
local department of public works and highways and the municipal government may need
the land in the future. However, Cachopero was allowed to stay on the land until such a
time that the government needs the land for road-expansion. Celestial filed an action for
ejectment against her brother, but they later reached a compromise.

Cachopero filed a second MSA with the regional Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) covering the same property, but this time he had the certification from the
mayor and indorsement from the district engineer that the land is no longer needed by the
government and that it is suitable for residential purposes.

However, his application was dismissed and though the regional director agrees that it’s
residential land, he ordered for the sale of the land at a public auction because of the conflicting
interests of the parties.

Cachopero tried to seek relief from the lower court, but it was denied. However, the Court
of Appeals granted his petition for certiorari and ordered the DENR to process his MSA.

Issue: . Whether or not petitioner has a claim of ownership over the land, based on her alleged
long-time adverse possession and her right of accession (NO)

Held:
Petitioner has no claim of ownership over the land, based on her alleged long-time adverse
possession and her right of accession (NO)

a) ADVERSE POSSESSION: A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending
from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) 44
and 502(1) 45 of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the
public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by
itself, alter its inalienable character.

- Despite the fact that the municipal government later certified that said land was alienable and
disposable, the Court cited a case wherein it said, “The adverse possession which may be the
basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable
portions of the public domain.”

b) ACCESSION: Celestial cannot rely on Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code 2 and Art. 461 of
the NCC. She claimed that at the time she bought it from Basadre, the said portion already dried
up so that almost one-half of a house was already built, but she failed to allege when it really
happened which would determine the applicable provision in her case. This would be helpful in
determining the applicable law.

- Court explained that the rule in Art. 370 (‘The beds of rivers which remain abandoned because
the course of water has naturally changed belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout
their respective lands.) has been abandoned with the adoption of Art. 461. (See doctrine.) It

- Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took
effect, the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest for the
provision contemplates an abandoned river bed due to natural change in the course of waters,
but in her case, the subject land became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation canal.

- Both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river, not
where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan
Creek changed its course.

2
 GR No. 194114 / March 27, 2019

Filipinas Eslon
vs.
Heirs of Llanes

Facts:

 FEMCO (petitioner) – manufacturer of esion pipes and accessories; its

manufacturing plant is situated in Barrio Sta. Felomina, Iligan City
 Llanes’ (respondents) counsel, Atty. Busico wrote a letter to FEMCO informing
them that its planting site may have encroached into their properties
 FEMCO’s counsel, Atty. Padilla, replied that its property is covered by valid
certificate of title and concluded that Llanes’ certificate of title is fake
 FEMCO later received a letter from respondents’ new counsel informing them that
they had erroneously fenced a portion of Llanes’ lot and demanded the removal of
the fence immediately as well as payment of rental fees
 FEMCO filed a Complaint against the respondents for quieting of title and
damages
 FEMCO contented that:
o It is the registered owner of a parcel of land in question
o It has constructed its manufacturing plant for esion pipes and accessories
o All the transfer certificate of titles emanating in the lot in question are
apparently valid or effective but are in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable or unenforceable and are prejudicial to FEMCO’s title
 RTC: (1) Declared Llanes’ certificate of title as null and void ab initio and all
transfer of certificates of title as invalid and ineffective; and (2) FEMCO is to be
entitled to the ownership and possession of the land in question
 CA: Reversed RTC’s decision; (1) FEMCO’s Complaint for Quieting of Title must
be dismissed in accordance with the doctrine that a certificate of tile cannot be
subject to a collateral attack; (2) action for quieting of title is NOT the appropriate
remedy where the action would require the modification/interference with the
judgment/order of another co-equal court; and (3) FEMCO had no personality to
institute the Complaint for Quieting of Title because if FEMCO’s prayer would be
granted, the land in question would be reverted to the government.
ISSUE: Whether/not FEMCO’s Complaint for Quieting of Title is prohibited collateral
attack on a certificate of title?
HELD:
No. As a rule, an action to quiet title or to remove the clouds over a title is a
special civil action governed by the Section 1, paragraph 2 of Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court. It is a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants for the benefit of
the both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may
desire, to use and to abuse the property. Moreover, 2 requisites must concur:
(1) The plaintiff has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action
(2) The deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity
Here, FEMCO’s complaint sufficiently proved the 2 indispensable requisites of an
action to quiet title. Also, FEMCO has a legal right in the subject property and that the
deed claimed to be casting a cloud on its title is invalid, null and void.
The SC also pointed out that raising the invalidity of a certificate of title in an action
for quieting of title is NOT a collateral attack because it is central, imperative and
essential in such an action that the complainant shows the invalidity of the deed
which casts cloud on his title. Hence, the heart of the FEMCO’s complaint is the
nullification of Llanes’ certificate of title in order to remove the cloud besetting its own
title.
Therefore, the CA was mistaken in deeming FEMCO’s Complaint for Quieting of
Title a prohibited collateral attack.
 GR No. 164797 / February 13, 2006

Cruz
vs.
Court of Appeals

Facts: 

On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali de Ocampo, accompanied her
mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo
City, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day.
Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a “Myoma” in her
uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991. Rowena and her
mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on
the next day at 1pm. According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the
windows and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant fora rag to wipe the
window and floor with. Prior to the operation, Rowena tried to convince her mother to not proceed
with the operation and even asked petitioner for it to be postponed, however it still pushed
through after the petitioner told Lydia that operation must be done as scheduled. During the
operation, the assisting doctor of the petitioner, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and
asked that tagmet ampules be bought which was followed by another instruction to buy a bag of
blood. After the operation, when Lydia came out of the OR, another bag of blood was requested
to be bought, however, the same was not bought due to unavailability of type A from the blood
bank. Thereafter a person arrived to donate blood which was later transferred to Lydia. Rowena
then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breathe apparently,
the oxygen tank is empty, so her husband and petitioner’s driver bought an oxygen. Later,
without the knowledge of Lydia’s relatives,she was decided by the doctors to be transferred to
San Pablo District Hospital were she was supposed to be re-operated. After Lydia experienced
shocks, she died.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has been negligent which caused the death of Lydia Umali.

Held: 

Yes. Whether or not a physician has committed an “inexcusable lack of precaution” in the
treatment of his patient to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other
members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the
advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science.
A doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians
and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the
treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any
other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances.
It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only
the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician’s conduct in the treatment and
care falls below such standard. Further, in as much as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been
recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to the conclusion as to causation.

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant’s
negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty
on the part of the surgeon as well as  causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of
his patient.

In order that there may be recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for
which recovery is sought must be legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural reference of events, unbroken
by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of
the injury. For negligence, no matter what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is
the proximate cause of the injury complained of and the proximate cause of an injury is that
cause, which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which the result would have occurred.

The possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are: 1.) the failure of the surgeon to tie
or suture a cut blood vessel; 2.) allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of control; 3.) the
subsequent loosening of the tie or suture applied to a cut blood vessel; and 4.)and a clotting
defect known as DIC.
 G.R. No.223610 / July 24, 2017

Uy
Vs
Del Castillo

Facts:
The present case is an offshoot of an action for quieting of title, reconveyance,
damages, and attorney's fees involving a parcel of land, known as Lot 791 and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 29129, filed by Crispulo Del Castillo (Crispulo)
against Jaime Uy (Jaime) and his wife, Conchita, on November 12, 1996, docketed as
Civil Case No. MAN-2797 (Quieting of Title Case). However, since Jaime had died six (6)
years earlier in 1990, Crispulo amended his complaint and impleaded Jaime's
children, i.e., the Uy siblings, as defendants. 
Meanwhile, Crispulo died during the pendency of the action and hence, was
substituted by his heirs, respondents Paulita Manalad-Del Castillo, Cesar Del Castillo,
Avito Del Castillo, Nila C. Duenas, Nida C. Latosa, Lorna C. Bernardo, Gil Del Castillo,
Liza C. Gungob, Alma Del Castillo, and Gemma Del Castillo (respondents).

After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision dated April 4, 2003 (RTC
Decision) in respondents' favor, and accordingly: (a) declared them as the true and lawful
owners of Lot 791; (b) nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 576, as well as TCT No.
29129; and (c) ordered petitioners to pay respondents moral damages and litigation
costs in the amount of P20,000.00 each, as well as attorney's fees equivalent to twenty-
five percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before
the CA, and subsequently, to the Court, but the same were denied for lack of merit. The
ruling became final and executory on April 8, 2010, thus, prompting the Court to issue an
Entry of Judgment dated May 4, 2010. Acting on the said motion, the RTC ordered
petitioners to file their comment or opposition thereto, which they failed to comply.
Accordingly, in an Order dated November 22, 2010, the RTC granted the motion
and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Before the RTC could act upon
petitioners' Omnibus Motion, they filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution on
Jurisdictional Ground(s) (motion to quash), claiming that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the Uy siblings in the Quieting of Title Case as they were never served with summons in
relation thereto.
On December 9, 2011, the RTC issued two (2) orders: ( a) one granting petitioners'
Omnibus Motion, nullifying the Notice of Garnishment, and setting a hearing to determine
the proper computation of the award for attorney's fees; and (b) another denying their
motion to quash, since they never raised such jurisdictional issue in the proceedings a
quo.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the RTC's
twin Orders dated December 9, 2011 and the Order dated May 17, 2012. Petitioners
argued that instead of just declaring the Notice of Garnishment void, the RTC should
have also declared the writ of execution void because the Uy siblings were never served
with summons; and like the Notice of Garnishment, the Writ of Execution also altered the
terms of the RTC Decision. In a Decision dated May 26, 2015, the CA affirmed the
assailed Orders of the RTC. The CA found no merit in the claim that the Uy siblings were
never served with summons, pointing out that in a Manifestation/Motion dated November
26, 1997, their counsel in the trial proceedings, Atty. Alan C. Trinidad (Atty. Trinidad),
stated that petitioners received the summons with a copy of the amended complaint. With
respect to the validity of the writ of execution, the CA ruled that since the Writ of
Execution made express reference to the RTC Decision without adding anything else,
the same was valid, unlike the Notice of Garnishment which expressly sought to levy
P13,788,250.00 in attorney's fees and, in the process, exceeded the purview of the said
Decision.

Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld the twin Orders dated December 9, 2011
and the Order dated May 17, 2012 of the RTC.

Held:
In this case, a punctilious examination of the records, especially the Amended
Complaint. in the Quieting of Title Case reveals that the disputed Lot 791 was covered by
TCT No. 29129 in the names of Jaime and Conchita. Thus, while the Uy siblings were
indeed impleaded in their personal capacities, the fact remains that they are merely
succeeding to Jaime's interest in the said lot and title. As successors-heirs, they cannot
be personally bound to respond to the decedent's obligations beyond their distributive
shares. Verily, this is a special or a compelling circumstance which would necessitate the
relaxation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment, so as to somehow limit the liability
of the Uy siblings in the payment of the monetary awards in favor of respondents in the
Quieting of Title Case - i.e., moral damages and litigation costs in the amount of
P20,000.00 each, as well as attorney's fees, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of
the zonal value of Lot 791- within the value of their inherited shares, notwithstanding the
finality of the ruling therein. In sum, while the courts a quo correctly ruled that the Uy
siblings may be held answerable to the monetary awards in the Quieting of Title Case,
such liability cannot exceed whatever value they inherited from their late father, Jaime.
For this purpose, the RTC is tasked to ensure that the satisfaction of the monetary aspect
of the judgment in the Quieting of Title Case will not result in the payment by the Uy
siblings of an amount exceeding their inheritance from Jaime. After all, the other
party, i.e., respondents, shall not be unjustly prejudiced by the same since Jaime's
spouse, Conchita, is still alive and the rest of the monetary awards may be applied
against her, if need be. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Decision dated May 26, 2015 and the Resolution dated February 22, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07120 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION limiting the adjudged monetary liability of
petitioners Christine Uy Dy, Sylvia Uy Sy, Jane Uy Tan, James Lyndon S. Uy, Irene S.
Uy, Ericson S. Uy, Johanna S. Uy, and Jednathan S. Uy to the total value of their
inheritance from Jaime Uy.
 G.R. No.195834 May 30, 2016

Salvador
vs.
Patricia

FACTS:

This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns the
property occupied by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares. Additionally, to
prevent the defendant Patricia Inc. from evicting the plaintiffs from their respective
improvements along Juan Luna Street, plaintiffs applied for a preliminary injunction in
their Complaint pending the quieting of title on the merits. A Complaint-in-Intervention
was filed by the City of Manila as owner of the land occupied by the plaintiffs. A
preliminary injunction was granted and served on all the defendants. Based on the
allegations of the parties involved, the main issue to be resolved is whether the
improvements of the plaintiffs stand on land that belongs to Patricia Inc., or the City of
Manila. Who owns the same? Is it covered by a Certificate of Title? Since the Transfer
Certificates of Title of both Patricia Inc. and the City of Manila are admitted as genuine,
the question now is on the boundaries based on the description in the respective titles.

On May 30, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners and
against Patricia, Inc., permanently enjoining the latter from doing any act that would evict
the former from their respective premises, and from collecting any rentals from them.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC's judgment, and dismissed the complaint.
The CA declared that the petitioners were without the necessary interest, either legal or
equitable title, to maintain a suit for quieting of title; castigated the RTC for acting like a
mere rubber stamp of the majority of the commissioners; opined that the RTC should
have conducted hearings on the reports of the commissioners; ruled as highly improper
the adjudication of the boundary dispute in an action for quieting of title.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners had the sufficient interest to bring the suit for quieting of
title

HELD:

No. The joinder of the action for injunction and the action to quiet title was
disallowed by the Rules of Court Under Rule 63. Section 5 - The joinder shall not
include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules. The RTC should have
severed the causes of action, either upon motion or motu proprio, and tried them
separately, assuming it had jurisdiction over both. Such severance was pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, the petitioners did not show that they were real parties in interest to
demand either injunction or quieting of title. The competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to put
things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable
respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both. For an action to quiet
title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership
(title derived through a valid contract or relation). To determine whether the petitioner as
plaintiffs had the requisite title to bring the suit, a resort to the allegations in the complaint
is necessary.

However, none of the above reasons validly clothed them with he necessary interest to
maintain the action for quieting of title. Presidential Decree No. 1517 only granted to the
occupants of APDs the right of first refusal, but such grant was true only if and when the
owner of the property decided to sell the property. Only then would the right of first
refusal accrue. Consequently, the right of first refusal remained contingent, and was for
that reason insufficient to vest any title, legal or equitable, in the petitioners. The CA's
adverse judgment dismissing their complaint as far as the action to quiet title was
concerned was correct. The main requirement for the action to be brought is that there is
a deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding casting cloud on the plaintiffs' title that is
alleged and shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy, the eliminates the existence of the requirement. Their
admission of the genuineness and authenticity of Patricia, Inc.'s title negated the
existence of such deed, instrument, encumbrance or proceeding that was invalid, and
thus the action must necessarily fail.

Furthermore, the petitioners did not have a cause of action for injunction.
Accordingly, the petitioners must prove the existence of a right to be protected. The
records show, however, that they did not have any right to be protected because they
had established only the existence of the boundary dispute between Patricia, Inc. and the
City of Manila. Any violation of the boundary by Patricia, Inc., if any, would give rise to the
right of action in favor of the City of Manila only. The dispute did not concern the
petitioners at all. Moreover, the boundary dispute should not be litigated in an action for
the quieting of title due to the limited scope of the action. The action for the quieting of
title is a tool specifically used to remove of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting
title to real property; it should not be used for any other purpose. And, secondly, the
boundary dispute would essentially seek to alter or modify either the Torrens title of the
City of Manila or that of Patricia, Inc., but any alteration or modification either way should
be initiated only by direct proceedings, not as an issue incidentally raised by the parties
herein. To allow the boundary dispute to be litigated in the action for quieting of title
would violate Section 48. of the Property Registration Decree by virtue of its prohibition
against collateral attacks on Torrens titles. A collateral attack takes place when, in
another action to obtain a different relief, the certificate of title is assailed as an incident
in said action. This is exactly what the petitioners sought to do herein, seeking to modify
or otherwise cancel Patricia, Inc.'s title.
 G.R. No.195834 / May 30, 2016

Salvador
vs.
Patricia
Facts:

The dispute involves two neighboring unregistered parcels of land located at

Roxas,Capiz, designatedas Lot1024 and Lot1025.In 1976, Benito Bertuldo (Benito)
sold Lot 1024 to Asuncion Segovia acting for her daughter, Susie Golez. They executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 10, 1976, clearly indicating the lot's metes and
bounds.

After the sale, the Sps. Golez started the construction of their house on Lot 1025,
instead of on Lot 1024.

Domingo Bertuldo (Domingo), Benito's first cousin9, claimed ownership over Lot 1025
and protested against the Sps. Golez's house construction. 10 In response, the Sps. Golez
assured Domingo that the construction was being done on Lot 1024.

Sometime in 1993 and after Domingo's death, the respondents conducted a relocation
survey on Lot 1025. The relocation survey revealed that the Sps. Golez's house stood on
Lot 1025. The respondents confronted the Sps. Golez with this result.

The Sps. Golez claimed that Benito clearly pointed to Susie Golez the natural boundaries
of Lot 1025 whose entire area was the subject of the sale between Asuncion Segovia
and Benito. To correct the alleged error in the sale, Asuncion Segovia and Benito
executed an Amended Deed of Absolute Sale in 1993 to change the stated property sold
as "Lot 1024" to "Lot 1025" including the specification of the metes and bounds of Lot
1025.
Proceeding from the Amended Deed of Absolute Sale, the Sps. Golez, on August 4,
1993, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Roxas City a Complaint for Quieting of
Title over Lot 1025 against the respondents.

The RTC dismissed the Sps. Golez's complaint and held that they purchased Lot 1024,
not Lot 1025, from Benito.

The RTC decision was subsequently affirmed by both the CA and this Court through a
resolution docketed as SC G.R. No 178990 entitled Spouses Rolando and Susie Golez
vs. Heirs of Domingo Bertuldo,namely: Genoveva Bertuldo, et al. The Sps. Golez sought
reconsideration of the Court's ruling; the Court denied the motion with finality through its
Order dated January 28, 2008.

The Sps. Golez continued their possession of Lot 1025 despite the respondents' demand
that the Sps. Golez vacate the property. On February 17, 2009, the respondents filed
a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer25 against the Sps. Golez with the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) of President Roxas, Capiz, in Civil Case No. 507,

The Sps. Golez filed their Answer and averred the following: first, the respondents'
application for free patent over Lot 1025 negates their claim of ownership since they
expressly acknowledged that the subject lot forms part of the public domain. 28

Second, the ejectment complaint must be dismissed since there was no tolerance from
the start of the Sps. Golez' possession of Lot 1025. To stress, the late Domingo Bertuldo
objected and protested against the construction of the house.

Upon motion by the Sps. Golez, the MCTC ordered the conduct of a relocation survey.
The survey result showed that 99.99% of the house of Sps. Golez occupied Lot 1025.
The Sps. Golez appealed the RTC's decision and contended that the respondents'
application for free patent over Lot 1025 is a supervening event that contradicts their
position that they are the lawful and rightful owners of the subject property. Hence, the
supervening event should be considered notwithstanding the decision in the quieting of
title case that the Sps. Golez do not own Lot 1025.

Further, the Sps. Golez argued that the prudent way to proceed with the case is for the
CA to wait for the resolution of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR resolution) on the respondents' free patent application over
Lot 1025. On April 18, 2011, the Sps. Golez filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the CA
Resolution and, on June 10, 2011, a Supplemental Motion. The Sps. Golez manifested
that the Office of the DENR Secretary rendered a decision, awarding a 400-squre meter
portion, out of the 1,484 square meter total area, of Lot 1025 to the Sps. Golez and that
the same should be considered by the CA.

In a Resolution, dated March 8, 2012, the CA denied the motions reasoning that the Sps.
Golez merely reiterated the same matters considered and passed upon in the earlier CA
resolution.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FILED BY THE RESPONDENTS AGAINST
THE PETITIONERS WAS PROPER.

Held:
We grant the petition.

The core issue in this case is whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper
remedy. The Rule defines two entirely distinct causes of action, to wit: (a) action to
recover possession founded on illegal occupation from the beginning — forcible entry;
and (b) action founded on unlawful detention by a person who originally acquired
possession lawfully — unlawful detainer.

The law and jurisprudence leave no doubt that what determines the cause of action is the
nature of the defendants' entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the cause of
action against the intruder is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but
thereafter possession becomes illegal, the cause of action is unlawful detainer. The latter
must be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.
No cause of action for an
unlawful detainer.

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property.
This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. A
complaint for unlawful detainer must allege that: (a) the possession of the defendant was
originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express
or implied contract between them; (b) the defendant's possession became illegal when
the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject property due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract; (c) the defendant
refused to heed such demand; and (d) the case for unlawful detainer is instituted within
one year from the date of last demand.

The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the
jurisdiction of the court. The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting
unlawful detainer. In the absence of these factual allegations , an action for unlawful
detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court does not have jurisdiction
over the case.

G.R. No. 180076 / November 21, 2012

Mananquil
vs.
Moico

Facts:

 Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form  part  of the land previously expropriated by the
National Housing Authority (NHA) and  placed under its Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore
Development Project – where occupants, applicants or beneficiaries may purchase  lots on
installment basis.  In October 1984, Lot 18 was awarded to  spouses Iluminardo and  Prescilla
Mananquil under a Conditional Contract to Sell.  Lot 19, on the other hand, was sold to Prescilla
in February 1980 by its occupant. When the spouses died, the heirs of Illuminardo filed for
extrajudicial settlement of estates of the spouses over lots 18 and 19. They appropriated to
themselves the properties by leasing it. However, herein respondent Moico  bought the properties
from one Eulogio who is the alleged child of Prescilla from her first marriage who in turn evicted
the tenants of the herein petitioners. Upon finding out the of the same, the Mananquils filed for an
action to quiet the title against herein Moico claiming title over the said properties.

Issue: 

Whether or not petitioners have legal title over the subject lots entitling for the relief of quieting of
title.

Held: 

No. An action  for quieting of title is  essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. 

The competent court  is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other
claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to
said  immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that  he who
has the right would see every cloud of  doubt over the property dissipated, and he could
afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to  abuse
the property as  he  deems best.  But “for an  action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable 
requisites must concur, namely: 

(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title  to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and 
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title  must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its  prima  facie  appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.”
Contrary to  petitioners’ stand,  the issue  relating to the grant of rights, title or award by the NHA
determines whether the case for quieting of title may be maintained.  If the petitioners are
legitimate successors to or beneficiaries of Iluminardo upon his death – under the certificate of
title, award, or grant, or under the special law or specific terms of  the  NHA program/project –
then they possess the requisite interest to  maintain suit; if not, then  Civil Case No. 2741-MN
must necessarily be dismissed.

From  the evidence adduced below,  it appears that the petitioners have  failed to show their
qualifications  or right to succeed Iluminardo in his rights under the NHA program/project.  They 
failed to present any  title, award, grant, document or certification from the NHA  or proper
government agency which would show that Iluminardo  and Prescilla have  become the
registered owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that petitioners are qualified
successors or beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan program/project,  taking over Iluminardo’s
rights after his death.  They  did not call to the witness  stand competent witnesses from  the NHA
who can attest  to their rights as successors to or beneficiaries of Lots 18 and 19.  They  failed to
present proof, at the very least, of the specific law, provisions, or terms that govern  the Tondo
Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project which would indicate  a modicum of interest on
their part.   For this reason, their rights  or interest in  the property  could not be established.
 G.R. No. 210607 / March 25, 2019

Sps. Pozon
vs.
Lopez

Facts:

On May 16, 1996, Dianna Jeanne Llopez filed a petition for quieting a title and
damages before RTC-Msksti against petitioners. The petition sought to declare void the
TCT No. 151522 issued to Tradex, covering a parcel of land with improvement located at
2149, Dasmarinas, Makati City. In a supplemental complaint, Lopez also sought the
declaration of nullity of marriage issued in the name of Spouses Pozon. Lopez bought
the property from Zobel in 1980 and sought the assistance of Beltran Cuasay Law Office
for the documentaion. However, the law office made it appear that the property was
acquired by Raymundo.
In 1987, Lopez was informed that Spouses Pozon wanted to inspect the propertybut she
discovered that the title was in the name of Tradex and never transferred in her name.
Lopez also refused them entry into subject property for inspection, Despite Lopez’s
warning, Tradex sold the subject property to Sps. Pozon. An action for specific
performance with damages was filed.

Issue:

WON the case is an action in personam.

Held:

Yes, an action for specific performance praying for the execution of an instrument
in connection with an undertaking in contract to sell, which is precisely similar to the
specific performance case invoked by petitioners, Sps. Pozon in the instant case, is an
action in personam, and being a judgment in personam, the judgment is binding only
upon the parties properly impleaded therein. Since it is beyond dispute that respondent
Lopez and her claim of ownership over the subject property. It is an elementary rule that
since the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case is physical or material
possession.where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon that issue only for the purposes of determining who between the
parties has the better right to possess the property. Where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to that of the possession, adjudication of ownership is not final and
binding but merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession.
 G.R. No. 170604 / September 2, 2013

Heirs of Prodon
vs.
Heirs of Alvarez

FACTS:

The heirs of Spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave claimed that
they could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797 pertaining to the land
they inherited from their parents, that the entry of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase on the original TCT did not exist, and that the entry had been maliciously
done by Prodon.

Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed the deed of sale
with right to repurchase on September 9, 1975; and this had been registered with the
Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title. She had then become the absolute
owner of the property due to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period.

The custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of sale
with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Prodon.

It opined that the contents of the deed of sale could be proved by secondary
evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its
execution or existence and of the cause of its unavailability being without bad faith when
defendant Prodon swore that she purchased the land and her testimony has been
confirmed by the Notarial Register of Notary Public Eliseo Razon and by the Primary
Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Manila.

CA reversed. It said: “a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or
primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. Xxx The correct order of
proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its
discretion may change this order if necessary."

The CA found circumstances that put doubt on the existence of the alleged deed
of sale. Evidence on record showed that Maximo Alvarez was hospitalized between
August 23, 1975 to September 3, 1975 and suffered from paralysis of half of his body
and blindness due to cataract. Maximo Alvarez was again later hospitalized and died on
October of 1975 without having left the hospital.

ISSUE:

WON the Best Evidence Rule applies in an action for quieting of title based on the
inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase. - NO

HELD:

NO. The CA and the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case.

This action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase. The principal issue was whether or not the deed of sale with right to
repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed.

The Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of sale
with right to repurchase were not the issue . The lower court should have simply
addressed and determined whether or not the "existence" and "execution" of the deed as
the facts in issue had been proved by preponderance of evidence.

The presentation of evidence other than the original document, like the
testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon,
and the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even without
first proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed.

The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish
and explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to repurchase to
establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was because the deed,
although a collateral document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for
quieting of title. Her inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her
to prove its existence and due execution by other means that could only be secondary
under the rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not required to subject
the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to which it would be
subjected had the loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting secondary
evidence to prove the terms of a writing.

A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show
the loss or explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the presentation of
secondary evidence. Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that he had given the
original to her lawyer, Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not anymore
retrieve the original because Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from his heart
ailment. Such evidence without showing the inability to locate the original from among
Atty. Lacanilao’s belongings by himself or by any of his assistants or representatives was
inadequate. Moreover, a duplicate original could have been secured from Notary Public
Razon, but no effort was shown to have been exerted in that direction.

In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the

existence of the deed. Camilon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had twice gone
to his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan, the first on September 5, 1975, to negotiate
the sale of the property in question, and the second on September 9, 1975, to execute
the deed of sale with right to repurchase.
------------------

Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of

inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.

The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the
original of the document must be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence
other than the original writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves:

(a) the existence or due execution of the original;

(b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in
court; and

(c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of
the original can be attributed.

The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a
writing are brought before the court, considering that

(a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more
than average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive
instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation in
words may mean a great difference in rights;

(b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a

copy by handwriting or typewriting; and

(c) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a
writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at
describing other situations generally. The rule further acts as an insurance against
fraud. Xx Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting from the
intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger set of
writings.
 G.R. No. 198878 / October 15, 2014

Residents of Lower Atab

vs.
Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation

FACTS:
Respondents Antonio Hermano and his wife Remedios Hermano were the
registered and lawful owners of a house and lot in Tagaytay City.

On September 1, 2001, petitioner Marcela M. Dela Cruz occupied and possessed the
questioned property pursuant to the alleged Memorandum of Agreement between her
and a certain Don Mario Enciso Benitez, without the authority and consent of the
Hermanos. On September 27, 2001, A. Hermano, through a counsel, sent a formal
demand letter to Dela Cruz to vacate and turn over the possession of the property and to
pay P 20,000 a month as rent starting September 1, 2001.

Respondent filed an ejectment case against the petitioner at the MTCC; however, the
court dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction. The court also stated that
respondent’s proper remedy should be an action for recovery and not of a summary
proceeding for ejectment, because there was no showing of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer.

Respondent appealed the decision at the RTC; the said court, however, affirmed the
decision of the lower court en toto. The same filed a petition for review at the CA, of
which, granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision of RTC. Furthermore, the
court rendered a decision declaring Hermano as the lawful possessor of the property and
order Dela Cruz to vacate the same. With the CA’s decision, petitioner filed a petition for
review at the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent has adequately pleaded and proved a case of forcible
entry.

HELD:
The burden of sufficiently alleging prior physical possession carries with it the
concomitant burden of establishing one’s case by a preponderance of evidence. To be
able to do so, respondents herein must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not on
the weakness of that of petitioner. It is not enough that the allegations of a complaint
make out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff must prove prior physical possession. It is
the basis of the security accorded by law to a prior occupant of a property until a person
with a better right acquires possession thereof.

The Court has scrutinized the parties’ submissions, but found no sufficient evidence to
prove respondents’ allegation of prior physical possession.

To prove their claim of having a better right to possession, respondents submitted their
title thereto and the latest Tax Declaration prior to the initiation of the ejectment suit. As
the CA correctly observed, petitioner failed to controvert these documents with
competent evidence. It erred, however, in considering those documents sufficient to
prove respondents’ prior physical possession.

Ownership certainly carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated is
not exactly the same as that which is in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in a
forcible entry suit refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession,
and not one flowing out of ownership. These are different legal concepts under which the
law provides different remedies for recovery of possession. Thus, in a forcible entry case,
a party who can prove prior possession can recover the possession even against the
owner. Whatever may be the character of the possession, the present occupant of the
property has the security to remain on that property if the occupant has the advantage of
precedence in time and until a person with a better right lawfully causes eviction.

Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proofs of
possession. They are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of owner based
on the presumption that no one in one’s right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in one’s actual or constructive possession.

Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds that the proofs submitted by respondents only
established possession flowing from ownership. Although respondents have claimed
from the inception of the controversy up to now that they are using the property as their
vacation house, that claim is not substantiated by any corroborative evidence. On the
other hand, petitioner’s claim that she started occupying the property in March 2001, and
not in September of that year as Antonio alleged in his Complaint, was corroborated by
the Affidavit of petitioner’s caretaker. Respondents did not present any evidence to
controvert that affidavit.

Therefore, respondents failed to discharge their burden of proving the element of prior
physical possession. Their uncorroborated claim of that fact, even if made under oath, is
self-serving. It does not amount to preponderant evidence, which simply means that
which is of greater weight or is more convincing than evidence that is offered in
opposition.

As noted at the outset, it bears stressing that the Court is not a trier of facts. However,
the conflicting findings of fact of the MTCC and the RTC, on the one hand, and the CA on
the other, compelled us to revisit the records of this case for the proper dispensation of
justice. Moreover, it must be stressed that the Court’s pronouncements in this case are
without prejudice to the parties’ right to pursue the appropriate remedy.
 G.R. No. 200042/ July 7, 2016

Gunatalilib
vs.
Dela Cruz

Facts:
On July 14, 2009, respondents Aurelio and Salome dela Cruz filed a Complaint for
"Quieting Of Titles; Annulment and Cancellation of Unnumbered OCT/Damages," against
petitioner Felizardo Guntalilib and other heirs of Bernardo (or Bernardino) Tumaliuan.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6975 and assigned to Branch 28 of the RTC of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.

The subject property is Lot 421 located in Nueva Vizcaya consisting of 8,991
square meters and which, as respondents claimed in their Complaint, was originally
registered on August 7, 1916 as Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 213. Respondent
Aurelio's grandfather, Juan dela Cruz, later acquired the property in 1919, and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. R-3 was issued in his name; when he passed away, the
property was inherited by Aurelio's father, Leonor, and, in lieu of TCT R-3, TCT 14202
was issued in Leonor's favor. Later on, Leonor conveyed the property to Aurelio and his
brother, Joseph, and TCT T-46087 was then issued in their favor. In turn, Joseph waived
ownership in favor of Aurelio by deed of quitclaim dated December 31, 2001, in which
case a new title, TCT T-126545, was issued in Aurelio's name as sole owner.

Respondents claimed further that all this time, the dela Cruz family was in full
possession, occupation and enjoyment of the property, and petitioner and his co-heirs
have never set foot on the property; that later on, Lot 421 was subdivided and new titles
were issued in lieu of TCT T-126545; and that Aurelio sold portions thereof to several
individuals, but he remains the registered owner of the remaining portion.

Respondents likewise alleged that on February 20, 2008, petitioner filed in court a
petition, docketed as LRC Case No. 6544 and assigned to the Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya RTC, Branch 29, for reconstitution or issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu
of an allegedly lost unnumbered OCT which was issued on August 29, 1916 in the name
of petitioner's predecessor, Bernardo Tumaliuan, and covering the very same property,
or Lot 421, which they owned; that said petition was eventually granted, and the Nueva
Vizcaya Register of Deeds was ordered to issue another owner's duplicate copy of their
predecessor's supposed unnumbered OCT; and that said unnumbered OCT constituted
a cloud upon their titles that must necessarily be removed.

Petitioner and his co-defendants filed a Motion to Dismis Civil Case No. 6975,
arguing that the Complaint stated no cause of action; that the case constituted a
collateral attack on their unnumbered OCT; that respondents failed to implead all the
heirs of Bernardo Tumaliuan, who are indispensable parties to the case; and that the
Complaint's verification and certification on non-forum shopping were defective.

Respondents filed a Motion for Admission of Amended Complaint, with attached

Amended Complaint  for "Quieting Of Titles; Cancellation of Unnumbered
OCT/Damages." Apart from incorporating the same allegations contained in their original
Complaint, respondents further alleged in said Amended Complaint that their mother title,
OCT 213 which was issued on August 7, 1916, should prevail over the petitioner's
unnumbered OCT which was issued only on August 29, 1916; that petitioner and his co-
heirs had prior knowledge of the dela Cruzes' previous and existing titles, and were never
in possession of Lot 421; and that through fraud, false misrepresentations, and
irregularities in the proceedings for reconstitution (LRC Case No. 6544), petitioner was
able to secure a copy of his predecessor's supposed unnumbered OCT.

Issue:
WON the CA committed a reversible error of law in failing to declare the Court a
quo’s orders null and void based on the action of issuing OCT with decree no. 54584 in
the name of Bernardino Tumaluan for an action to quiet title, thus the complaint states
no cause of action warranting the timely dismissal of case.

Held:
The Court denies the Petition.
Petitioner's claim that respondents' Amended Complaint must be disallowed for failure to
implead all indispensable parties has been rendered moot by the parties' agreement that
respondents shall further amend their complaint after petitioner and his co-defendants
furnish them with the complete list of Bernardo Tumaliuan's heirs. Pursuant to this
agreement, the trial court issued its June 29,2012 Order, which petitioner does not assail.
Next, petitioner's claim that the trial court should not have admitted respondents'
Amended Complaint since the original Complaint on which it was based is void for being
a mere scrap of paper as it contained a defective verification and certification against
forum-shopping, is fundamentally absurd. A party to a civil case is precisely given the
opportunity to amend his pleadings, under certain conditions, in order to correct the
mistakes found therein; if one were to follow petitioner's reasoning, then the rule on
amendment of pleadings might just as well be scrapped, for then no pleading would be
susceptible of amendment. In the present case, respondents' Complaint was amended
even before petitioner could file any responsive pleading thereto; under the 1997 Rules,
a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive
pleading is served. No motion to admit the same was required; as the amendment is
allowed as a matter of right, prior leave of court was unnecessary. Indeed, even if such a
motion was filed, no hearing was required therefor, because it is not a contentious
motion. On the final procedural matter that must be tackled, suffice it to state, as the CA
did, that as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned
through a special civil action for certiorari.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case; it is interlocutory as it leaves something to be done by the court
before the case is finally decided on the merits. The denial of a motion to dismiss
generally cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, as this remedy is
designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a
denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an appeal which is available only after a
judgment or order on the merits has been rendered. Only when the denial of the motion
to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion can the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari be justified.

Such a rule applies especially when, as in this case, the petition is completely lacking in
merit.

Moving on to the substantive issues raised, the Court finds without merit petitioner's
claim that respondents' quieting of title case constitutes a prohibited attack on his
predecessor Bernardo Tumaliuan's unnumbered OCT as well as the proceedings in LRC
Case No. 6544. It is true that "the validity of a certificate of title cannot be assailed in an
action for quieting of title; an action for annulment of title is the more appropriate remedy
to seek the cancellation of a certificate of title." Indeed, it is settled that a certificate of title
is not subject to collateral attack. However, while respondents' action is denominated as
one for quieting of title, it is in reality an action to annul and cancel Bernardo Tumaliuan's
unnumbered OCT. The allegations and prayer in their Amended Complaint make out a
case for annulment and cancellation of title, and not merely quieting of title: they claim
that their predecessor's OCT 213, which was issued on August 7,1916, should prevail
over Bernardo Tumaliuan's unnumbered OCT which was issued only on August 29,
1916; that petitioner and his co-defendants have knowledge of OCT 213 and their
existing titles; that through fraud, false misrepresentations, and irregularities in the
proceedings for reconstitution (LRC Case No. 6544), petitioner was able to secure a
copy of his predecessor's supposed unnumbered OCT; and for these reasons, Bernardo
Tumaliuan's unnumbered OCT should be cancelled. Besides, the case was denominated
as one for "Quieting Of Titles; Cancellation of Unnumbered OCT/Damages."

It has been held that "[t]he underlying objectives or reliefs sought in both the quieting-of-
title and the annulment-of-title cases are essentially the same — adjudication of the
ownership of the disputed lot and nullification of one of the two certificates of
title."Nonetheless, petitioner should not have been so simplistic as to think that Civil Case
No. 6975 is merely a quieting of title case. It is more appropriate to suppose that one of
the effects of cancelling Bernardo Tumaliuan's unnumbered OCT would be to quiet title
over Lot 421; in this sense, quieting of title is subsumed in the annulment of title case.
 G.R. No. 195908 / August 15, 2018

Bernas
vs.
Estate of Yu

FACTS:

The present case involves a parcel of land known as Lot 824-A-4 (subject
property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-28758 (30627) PR-9639
(TCT No. 30627), located at Brgy. Matandang Balara, Quezon City, consisting of 30,000
square meters, more or less, which is part of Lot 824 of the Piedad Estate containing an
area of 147,072 square meters registered in the name of respondent Felipe Yu Han Yat
(Yu Han Yat).

Yu Han Yat subdivided the subject property into 60 lots under Subdivision Plan
Psd-13-018013, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands on August 13, 1991, as part of
his plan to develop and convert the subject property.[4] As a consequence, TCT No.
30627 was cancelled and derivative titles, namely TCT Nos. 47294 to 47353 (Yu Han Yat
TCTs), were issued in his name.

To finance his plan of developing the subject property, Yu Han Yat applied for
loans with several banks using some of the Yu Han Yat TCTs as security. However,
when the mortgage instruments were presented for registration, the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City refused to record the same on the ground that the Yu Han Yat
TCTs overlapped with the boundaries covered by another title: TCT No. 336663
registered in the name of Esperanza Nava (Nava). However, in Consulta No. 2038[9]
issued on October 15, 1992, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) reversed the action
taken by the Register of Deeds, and ordered the registration of the mortgage instruments
on Yu Han Yat's TCTs.

Meanwhile, petitioners Jose A. Bernas (Bernas) and Felomena S. Mejia (Mejia)

claimed ownership over the subject property. They claim that Nava was the registered
owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 336663 until she sold parts of the said lot
to Mejia and Gregorio Galarosa (Galarosa). On September 15, 1986, Mejia executed
with Nava a Deed of Sale with Right of Redemption by virtue of which Mejia acquired the
real property covered by TCT No. 336663, subject to Nava's right to redeem the same.
When Nava failed to redeem the property, Mejia then filed a petition for
consolidation of title under her name. The petition was granted in a Decision dated June
28, 1990 in Civil Case No. Q-90-5211 rendered by Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City.

Since TCT No. 336663 bore the annotation "subject to verification," the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City referred the matter to the LRA for consultation. In a Resolution
dated March 15, 1991, in LRA Consulta No. 1890, the LRA upheld the registrability of
TCT No. 336663 in the name of Mejia. In LRA Consulta No. 1890, the LRA reasoned that
a court decision is needed to categorically determine that the titles from which TCT No.
336663 were derived were spurious before it could order that the encumbrance was not
registrable. Hence, the Deed of Sale with Right of Redemption was annotated on the title
of the subject property.

On February 21, 1992, Bernas, for and on behalf of Wharton Resources Group
(Philippines), Inc. (Wharton), entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Mejia
whereby the latter agreed to sell to Wharton the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
336663. Subsequently, a Deed of Sale was entered into between Mejia and Wharton
conveying to the latter the subject property.

In April 1992, Bernas discovered that there was another title covering about
three hectares which overlapped a portion of the property registered under TCT No.
336663. This other title, TCT No. 30627, indicated Yu Han Yat as the registered owner
pursuant to subdivision plan Psd-2498 of a parcel of land located in Bayanbayanan,
Marikina.

On June 24, 1992, Bernas filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim on Yu Han Yat's
TCTs, claiming that a Deed of Sale was executed between himself, for and on behalf
of Wharton, and Mejia over the realty covered by TCT No. 336663 which overlaps
portions covered by Yu Han Yat's TCTs.

On the basis of this adverse claim filed by Bernas, the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City refused to record the subject mortgages affecting the Yu Han Yat TCTs.
This prompted Yu Han Yat to file another consulta with the LRA which, in a Resolution
dated October 15, 1992, ordered the registration of the mortgage to the properties.

Afterwards, on September 18, 1992, Yu Han Yat filed a Petition for Quieting of
Title before the RTC of Quezon City docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-13609 against the
Estate of Nava (represented by Antonio N. Crismundo), Galarosa, Mejia, Bernas, and the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City (Estate of Nava, et al.).

Trial ensued, and on March 15, 2004, the RTC issued a Decision ruling in favor of
the Estate of Nava, et al., and Wharton.

Aggrieved, Yu Han Yat appealed the above Decision of the RTC to the CA.

In its Decision, the CA granted Yu Han Yat's appeal and held that: (a) the petition
for quieting of title, and the petition for annulment of title are essentially the same; and (b)
Bernas and Mejia's title was void as they source their ownership from Dominga
Sumulong's title to the property which had been declared as null and void by the CA in
previous cases. The CA also awarded actual damages, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees in favor of Yu Han Yat.

After the denial of their MR, petitioners appealed to the SC.

ISSUES:
 a.) WoN Yu Han Yat's Amended Petition constitutes a collateral attack
on the validity of the title of petitioners (and their predecessors-in-
interest) over the property subject of TCT No. 336663
b.) WoN the CA ruling that the property covered by respondent's title is
the same as the property subject of TCT No. 336663 is supported by
the evidence on record

HELD:

a.) NO. The CA was correct in holding that the petition for quieting of title
filed by Yu Han Yat was not a collateral attack on TCT No. 336663, and
was, in fact, a direct attack on the same.
The test is not the name of the action, but the ultimate objective of the
same and the relief sought therein. Applying the said test in this case, the
petition for quieting of title filed by Yu Han Yat was a direct attack on
the petitioners' title as the petition specifically sought to annul TCT No.
336663 in the name of Nava. Thus, even as petitioners correctly claim that
in assailing the validity of a Torrens title, there must be a direct proceeding
expressly instituted for the purpose, the fact of the matter is that the petition
for quieting of title was exactly that proceeding as it was filed precisely to
question the validity of TCT No. 336663.
b.) YES. First, petitioners' argument that Yu Han Yat's title, TCT No. 30627,
does not cover the same property as their title, TCT No. 336663, is
because TCT No. 30627 came from TCT No. 8047 which, in turn, bears
an annotation that it is "a transfer from TCT No. 3633/T- R," a title that
covers a property situated in Murphy, Quezon City. They point out that,
in contrast, TCT No. 336663 covers a parcel of land located in Piedad
Estate in Quezon City.
The SC ruled that both TCT No. 30627 and TCT No. 336663 cover the
same property as shown by their respective technical descriptions
stating that the parcel of land covered is Lot 824 of the Piedad Estate. The
fact that TCT No. 8047, from which TCT No. 30627 was derived, bears an
annotation that it was a transfer from TCT No. 3633/T-R which covers a
property in Murphy, Quezon City casts little doubt on the title of Yu Han Yat
 G.R. No. 136803 / June 16, 2000

Malilin
vs.
Castillo

FACTS:

Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still subsisted.
During their union, they set up Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation. The business
flourished and the couple acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely
in Castillo's name. Due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed a
complaint for partition and/or payment of Co-ownership share, accounting and damages
against Castillo. Castillo, in her answer, alleged that co-ownership could not exist between
them because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-ownership shall govern
the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not
married, they are not capacitated to marry each other because of their valid subsisting
marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and personal properties involved
in Mallilin's action of partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely  out of her own
money and registered solely in her name.

ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.

RULING:

Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are
incapacitated to marry each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not cover parties living
in an adulterous relationship. Their property regime falls under Article 148 of the Family
Code where co-ownership is limited, properties acquired by them through their joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.
 G.R. No. 150707. April 14, 2004

Ocampo

v.

Ocampo

Facts:
The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and
Juana Llander-Ocampo, they begot ten (10) children. Two of them, Fidela, and Felicidad are
respondents herein.
During the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Luisa Llander-Ocampo, they
acquired 3 parcels of land. Upon their death, they left the properties. Only one of them, Lot A
is the subject of this case, a parcel of residential/ commercial land situated in the poblacion
of Nabua, Camarines Sur. These lands are actually owned in common by the children of the
late spouses although the land denominated as parcel A of the complaint, it is ostensibly
registered in the name of Fidela Ocampo alone but acknowledged by her as a property
owned in common by all of them, brothers and sisters. Plaintiffs’ desire to partition said
properties but defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and unreasonably refuse
to do so; that the same defendants have been receiving the fruits of the properties to the
exclusion of their co-heirs.
In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered ordering the partition of
the properties; ordering defendants Fidela and Felicidad to release or otherwise cancel any
and all encumbrances which they had caused to be annotated on the TCT; to refrain from
further encumbering said properties; and to indemnify plaintiffs.
The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Helen Ocampo-Barrito and
Vicente Barrito are spouses; that in 1987, the TCT in the name of defendant Fidela and
covering the lot described as parcel A was cancelled and, in lieu thereof a TCT was issued
to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, on the strength of an allege[d] Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos ostensibly executed by defendant Fidela in their favor.
At the time the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos was presented for registration and when
a TCT was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, both the donor and donees were
notoriously aware that said properties were owned by the Ocampo brothers and sisters, and
that the donor Fidela was not the exclusive owner thereof.
The RTC holds and declares that defendant spouses are the true and lawful
exclusive owners of the following properties. The CA affirmed with modifications (for
damages) the said ruling.

Issue:

Whether or not RTC erred for holding and declaring defendant spouses as true and
lawful exclusive owners of the disputed property?
Ruling:
Petitioners’ chief evidence of co-ownership of the property in question is simply the
Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier, both the trial
and the appellate courts were correct in finding that this piece of documentary evidence
could not prevail over the array of testimonial and documentary evidence that were adduced
by respondents, such as:
First, Belen presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land, referring to the subject
property, executed between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix Ocampo as buyer. The
document dated in 1948, was acknowledged before a notary public. Likewise, in this Deed of
Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo declared his “exclusive ownership” of the property, “having
been acquired by purchase[;] and [having] been in [his] continuous, public, peaceful, adverse
and material possession for more than 50 years together with [his] predecessors in rights
and interest, in [the] concept of owner without any claim of other persons.”
Second, Respondent Belen proved that on February 1953, this property had been sold to
Fidela by Felix Ocampo for a valuable consideration; and that Fidela had entered the
property, actually occupied it, and exercised all powers of dominion over it to the exclusion of
petitioners.
To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the property, Belen also presented
a Real Estate Mortgage executed by the former as absolute owner. Fidela had executed it in
favor of her sister Apolonia Ocampo, one of the original petitioners in this case, who is now
represented by her heirs. Belen correctly argues that in agreeing to be a mortgagee,
Apolonia admitted and recognized Fidela as the true owner of the land in question.
third, Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed in 1984, between
herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the immediate source of the former’s
claim of sole ownership of the property
Finally, Finally, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1365431 as proof of her
ownership of the property. To be sure, the best proof of ownership of the land is the
Certificate of Title (TCT). Hence, more than a bare allegation is required to defeat the face
value of respondent’s TCT, which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance.
In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as evidence the Tax Declaration indicating
that she, as owner, had been paying real estate taxes on the property, all to the exclusion of
petitioners.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to
the property from the donor to the donee. Petitioners stubbornly rely on the
Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings.
What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution of the Acknowledgement —
assuming that its authenticity and due execution were proven — the property had already
been donated to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly
inconsistent with the document (Acknowledgement of Co-ownership) relied upon by
petitioners.
On the other hand, petitioners could not show any title, tax receipt or document to
prove their ownership. Having filed an action involving property, they should have relied on
the strength of their own title and not on the alleged weakness of respondents’ claim.
Neither can we accept petitioners’ contention that co-ownership is shown by the fact
that some of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed, lived, and even put up businesses on
the property. The appellate court correctly found that since the litigants in this case were
blood relatives, fraternal affection could have been a good motive that impelled either Belen
or Fidela to allow petitioners to use the property. Without any proof, however, co-ownership
among the parties cannot be presumed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
 GR No. 165427, March 21, 2011

Lacbayan
vs.
Samoy

FACTS:

During Betty Lacbayan and Bayani Samoy’s illicit relationship, they, together with
three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company, by which
they acquired 5 parcels of land, registered in their names, ostensibly as husband and wife.
Having parted ways eventually, both of them agreed to divide the said properties and
terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, Samoy
agreed to Lacbayan's proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be
assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to
Samoy. However, when Lacbayan wanted additional demands, Samoy refused. 
Thus, Lacbayan filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties before the
Quezon City RTC. In his Answer, however, Samoy denied Lacbayan's claim of cohabitation
and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any
contribution from her.

ISSUES:

Does an action for partition preclude a settlement on the issue of ownership?

HELD:

No. While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner
insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the TCTs
covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until
and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature
to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will not even
lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the
subject properties.
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that
the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic
of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among
themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioner's argument would be to
allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as
well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is
not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed
properties. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement
after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have
any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
 GR No. 174727, August 12, 2013

Ining
vs.
Vega

FACTS:
 Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a parcel of
land in Kalibo, Aklan covered by OCT RO-630. Leon and Rafaela died without issue.
Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan
Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
 RESPONDENTS are the heirs of ROMANA. PETITIONERS are the heirs of
GREGORIA.
 In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as
Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the RTC of Kalibo a case for partition,
recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs.
Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he demanded the partition of the
property but Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed his demands; that the matter reached
the level of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a court
action sometime in 1980; that Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole ownership of the
property; that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which
portions must be collated and included as part of the portion to be awarded to
Gregoria’s heirs. Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the
subject property.
 In their Answer, herein petitioners claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action
against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property; that
they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the
property with a just title; that they have been paying the taxes on the property; that
Leonardo’s claim is barred by estoppel and laches.
 The trial court dismissed the complaint of Leonardo on the ground that his right right
of action has long prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. Declaring Lot
1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630 (24071) to be the common property of the heirs of
Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered
cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to issue a
transfer certificate of title to the heirs of Gregoria. It also found that the April 4, 1943
and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never
sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo
Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leon’s estate at the time of his
death in 1962. Leon’s siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the subject
property in equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to Romana’s
share as the latter’s successors.
 However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon’s
death in 1962 – or up to 1992 – within which to file the partition case. Since
Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was already barred
by prescription. It held that under Article 1141 of the Civil Code, an action for
partition and recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land is a real action
over immovable property which prescribes in 30 years. In addition, the trial court held
that for his long inaction, Leonardo was guilty of laches as well. Consequently, the
property should go to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively.
The CA did not agree with the trial court’s pronouncement that Leonardo’s action for
partition was barred by prescription. The CA declared that prescription began to run
not from Leon’s death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of
Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of
the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,"
the CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of
Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely
in his name that a repudiation of his co-ownership with Leonardo was made, which
repudiation effectively commenced the running

Issue:
W/N case should be dismissed on the ground of prescription/laches. NO

Held:
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus
inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – the parties
herein – became entitled to the property upon the sisters’ passing. Under Article 777 of the
Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death.

Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property.Thus, having
succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and respondents
became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property owned in common,
provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a
way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from
using it according to their rights. They have the full ownership of their parts and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even
substitute another person in their enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned. Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs
against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.

Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share
of the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the
title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-
owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-
owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners;
and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing."
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial court erred in reckoning the
prescriptive period within which Leonardo may seek partition from the death of Leon
in 1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that prescription shall
begin to run in favor of a co-owner and against the other co-owners only from the
time he positively renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to
the other co-owners.

Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardo’s co-ownership of the property only sometime in 1979 and
1980, when the former executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax
declaration exclusively in his name, and informed the latter – before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa – of his 1943 purchase of the property. These apparent acts of repudiation
were followed later on by Lucimo Sr.’s act of withholding Leonardo’s share in the fruits of the
property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself claims in his Amended Complaint.
Considering these facts, the CA held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in
1979 – or even in 1980 – when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has
renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA
thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted
from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141.
What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice, however, is that while it may be argued
that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a repudiation of the co-
ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of
Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter
Teodora. Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession,
exclude relations by affinity.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is.
Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he
was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against
Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-
ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the property at any time.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14, 2006 Decision and the
September 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687are
AFFIRMED.
 GR No. 160994 / July 27, 2006

Aromin
vs.
Floresca

FACTS:

The present case arose from three civil cases pending before the RTC of Bauang, La
Union which originated when respondent Paulo Floresca sold several portions of Cad. Lot
No. 4894 to petitioner spouses Aromin as evidenced by several deeds of sale executed by
both parties. All these deeds of sale were not registered with the Register of Deeds.
The first civil case was filed by the Aromin spouses for specific performance against
Paulo to compel the latter to formally execute the corresponding deed of sale covering the
entire property. Respondents siblings Victor, Juanito and Lilia filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene alleging that although Cad. Lot No. 4894 was declared in the name of Paulo alone
in the tax declarations, it was actually owned in common by him and the siblings. It was
further alleged that the said land was the subject of an action for partition involving Paulo
and the siblings before the RTC. Based on a compromise agreement, it was later on
declared that Paulo will have one-half share over the lot and the other half to the siblings.
The second civil case was an action for quieting of title filed by the spouses Aromin
against the siblings. In their complaint, the spouses Aromin alleged that they are the owners
and in actual physical possession of the subject property which they purchased from Paulo.
They alleged further that the judgment with regard to the partition based on compromise
agreement is not binding on them as they were not parties thereto. On the other hand, the
siblings raised the affirmative defense that the judgment had already become final and
executory and that the spouses had no cause of action because they have not acquired any
legal title over the portions of the subject property sold to them by Paulo.
The third case was filed by the siblings against Paulo and spouses Aromin for the
annulment of sale. The siblings alleged that Paulo fraudulently secured Tax Declarations in
his name to the exclusion of the siblings who were the co-owners of the subject lot. They
further alleged that despite the spouses’ knowledge that the lot was the subject of a
complaint for partition, they still executed the deed of sale. The spouses Aromin raised the
defense that they were buyers in good faith as they believed that Paulo was the sole owner
of the subject property. The spouses Aromin further alleged that they have been in actual
and physical possession thereof, and have been actually appropriating for themselves the
fruits thereof for the past years.
The trial court decided in favor of spouses Aromin. In nullifying the judicial
compromise in the action for partition, the RTC gave credence on the testimony of Paulo that
the agreement does not include the properties he sold to the spouses and that the siblings
failed to adduce any evidence to support their claim that the spouses were purchasers in
bad faith.
The appellate court, however, reversed the decision of the RTC explaining that the
judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata and is immediately executory and the court
cannot set aside such judgment without having declared in an incidental hearing that such a
compromise is vitiated by any of the grounds for nullity enumerated in Article 2038 of the
Civil Code. It also disclaimed petitioners’ claim of good faith due to their failure to inquire with
the Register of Deeds about the ownership of the subject property but it declared the sale
valid as to the one-half share of Paulo.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are bound by the compromise agreement, particularly on
the question of the co-ownership of the subject property, and thus barred by res judicata.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners are Paulo’s privies-in-interest or successors-in-interest who acquired most
of the portions of the subject property after the filing of the complaint of partition as such they
are bound by the agreement. To invoke res judicata, absolute identity of parties is not
required. A substantial identity of parties is sufficient. And there is substantial identity of
parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and that in the
second one, even if the latter party was not impleaded in the first. As his privies-in-interest or
successors-in-interest, the petitioners clearly had a community of interest with that of Paulo
who was party to the action for partition.
The Court further held that having established that the subject property was owned in
common by Paulo and the siblings, it necessarily follows that Paulo could only dispose to the
petitioners his share in the subject property. Following the well-established principle that the
binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so, the
disposition affects only Paulo’s share pro indiviso, and the transferee, in this case the
petitioners, gets only what corresponds to Paulo’s share in the partition of the subject
property.
 G.R. No. 154322 / August 22, 2006

Figuracion

v.

Vda. De Figuracion

FACTS:
On August 23, 1955, Leandro Figuraciom executed a deed of quitclaim over his
real properties in favor of his six children. When he died in 1958, he left behind two
parcels of land. Leandro had inherited both lots from his deceased parents.
What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between
petitioner and her sister, respondent Mary, over the eastern half of Lot.
While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she
and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only legal heirs, she does not dispute the
finding of the CA that “certain expenses” including those related to her father’s final
illness and burial have not been properly settled.
ISSUE: Is an action for partition appropriate in this case?

HELD:
No. In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable
to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is
allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only legal
heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that “certain expenses” including those
related to her father’s final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the
heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father’s estate to settlement
because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.

In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all
expenses for which the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner,
the heirs or distributees of the properties may take possession thereof even before the
settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of
the estate’s obligations.
 G.R. No. 168970 / January 15, 2010

CELESTINO BALUS
vs.
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD

FACTS:

Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and
Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July 6, 1984.

On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land which he owns, originally

covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788), as security for a loan he obtained
from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank)

Rufo failed to pay his loan, thus the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was
subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that purpose.
On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale was executed by the sheriff in favor of the
Bank. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years
after the auction, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale4 in the Bank's favor.
Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank.

On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial

Settlement of Estate5 adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject
property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained
provisions wherein the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the
subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest
possible time.

Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents
bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of
Registered Land was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-39,484(a.f.) was issued in the name of respondents.
Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.
On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact
that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to
surrender possession of the same to them. Respondents claimed that they had exhausted
all remedies for the amicable settlement of the case, but to no avail.

Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact that the title over
the disputed property was already in the name of the Bank, they still proceeded to execute
the subject Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the intention of purchasing back the
property together with petitioner and of continuing their co-ownership thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether co-ownership over the subject property persisted even after the lot was
purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was
eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank.
HELD:

NO. At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the
fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father,
Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the
hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a Definite
Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of
redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's
name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired
exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.

Pursuant to Art. 777 of the New Civil Code, the rights to a person's succession are
transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person
consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his
death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.

In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his
lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no
longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently,
petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.

Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners
of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner
of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the
disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of
Rufo at any given point in time.
 G.R. No. 188145 / April 18, 2016

SPOUSES PRIMO INALVEZ AND JULIANA INALVEZ, PETITIONERS,

VS.

BAYANG NOOL, ALLAN NOOL AND CELESTINO NOOL, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

The petitioners' filed an action for recovery of possession grounded on their alleged
exclusive ownership of the subject property which they merely purchased from Tarlac
Development Bank (TDB). They contend that TDB's consolidation of ownership over the
subject property effectively ended and terminated the co-ownership. The respondents,
however, counter that they are co-owners of the subject property and their co-ownership was
by virtue of their inheritance, which was registered in the names of the petitioners by way of
an agreement. Bayang also asserted that she never sold her share to the petitioners and
Zamora nor was she aware of any mortgage over the subject property.

The trial court dismissed the respondents' claim of ownership over the subject property. CA
reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint for recovery of
possession upon finding that a co-ownership existed between the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether co-ownership by the petitioners and the respondents over the subject
property continued even after the subject property was purchased by TDB and title thereto
transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the petitioners from
TDB.

HELD:

Yes. A co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his
share is mortgaged by another co-owner without the former's knowledge and consent as in
the case at bar. The mortgage of the inherited property is not binding against co-heirs who
never benefited. Petitioners' right in the subject property is limited only to their share in the
co-owned property. When the subject property was sold to and consolidated in the name of
TDB, the latter merely held the subject property in trust for the respondents. When the
petitioners and Spouses Baluyot bought back the subject property, they merely stepped into
the  shoes  of TDB  and  acquired whatever rights  and obligations appertain thereto.

Be that as it may, the rights of the respondents as co-owners of the subject property were
never alienated despite TDB's consolidation of ownership over the subject property. Neither
does the fact that the petitioners succeeded in acquiring back the property from TDB and
having a new title issued in their name terminate the existing co-ownership. Besides, it
seems that petitioners knew of the fact that they did not have a title to the entire lot and
could not, therefore, have validly mortgaged the same, because of the respondents'
possession of the subject portion.
 GR No. 217611, March 27, 2019

Logrosa
vs.
Spouses Azares

Facts:
Petitioner Logrosa alleged that he and together with the respondents are co-owners
of 8 parcels of land with TCT. All TCTs indicate that Petitioner Logrosa, together with other
respondents are co-owners of the subject properties.
Logrosa alleged that on 1987, the original owner of the subject properties. Benjamin
Gonzales sold the subject properties, one Benjamin Gonzales, sold the subject properties
collectively to Logrosa and other respondents. The records showed that notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed by parties, bearing the signatures of Gonzales, petitioner
Logrosa, respondents Cleofe, Nelson, Bonifacio and Abundio.
Respondents Sps. Azares contended that while it may be true that petitioner’s name
appeared on the titles of the properties aforementioned, however , they belied petitioner’s
claim that he is a co-owner of the same, as he never contributed as to its acquisition and
never contributed for their maintenance, much less paid the taxes due thereon.
They further alleged that Petitioner Logrosa, being their cousin used to work for them
as their trusted laborer together with other respondents at their gold mining tunnel. They also
allowed Petitioner to construct his house upon condition that Petitioner would pay and
reimburse them for all his expenses thereto when petitioner Logrosa’s finances allow.
It is the main contention of respondents Sps. Azeras that despite the inclusion in the
documents of title of petitioner Logrosa and other parties.
Issue: WON Petitioner Logrosa is a co-owner of the subject property
Held:
No. Since it is a basic principle in land registration that the Certificate of title serves as an
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to property in favor of person whose
name appears therein and hence, a best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. The principle
of indefeasibility is the has been weell settled in this jurisdiction and it is only the acquisition
of the title which is attended with fraud of bad faith that the doctrine finds no application, In
the case at bar, there was no accusation that petitioner Logrosa was included as the co
owner of in the TCT through bad faith or fraud. Moreover a duly notarized DOAS was also
executed by all parties, wherein it clearly states that withour ambiguity that one of the
vendees of the subject properties is Petitioner Logrosa. It is stressed that respondents, Sps.
Azares don’t deny that petitioner is a co-vendee in the DOAS.
The Court held that if there is a public document (DOAS. Duly otarized) proving one’s
ownership then the same is presumed to be valid.
Hence, with the strong legal presumption created by 8 TCTs and duly notarized DOAS that
Logrosa is a co-buyer and a co-owner of the subject properties, the burden to prove
otherwise was shifted to respondents Sps. Azares.
The Court, however, did not find Sps. Azares to have successfully hurdled this burden.
 G.R. No. 183546, September 18, 2009

Wilson Go

vs.

Harry Go

Facts:

Wilson instituted an action for partition with accounting against Harry Go in RTC
Valenzuela City. Wilson alleged that they are among the five children of Spouse Sio Tong
Go and they are the registered owner of a parcel of land in Valenzuela City. On the said
land, there are 7 warehouses being rented by various businesses without proper authority
from Wilson. He also alleges that Harry collected the rental payments for the warehouse
without giving Wilson his share to the rental.
Harry countered that there was no co-ownership because he acquired the ownership
of the land through extra-judicial settlement between their father and certain Wendell
Simsim. That before a partition may be decided, it must be ascertain first whether there is
co-ownership.
RTC: ruled in favor of Wilson and ordered Harry to deposit in court the receipt of all
the amounts collected by him from the leases. Harry, moved for reconsideration but was
denied by the RTC. Harry filed then a petition for certiorari with CA.
CA: ruled in favor of Harry.
It was premature for the respondent court to act favorable on private respondent's motion to
deposit in court all rentals collected from the date of death of the said decedent, which
according to petitioner is the true owner of the property under co-ownership.

Issue: WON private respondent (Harry Go) is bound to deposit 1/12 of the monthly rentals
collected by him from the buildings on TCT No. V-44555 until it is finally adjudged who is
lawfully entitled thereto.

Held:
The Court emphasizes that these are preliminary findings for the sole purpose of resolving
the propriety of the subject order requiring the deposit of the monthly rentals with the trial
court.  The precise extent of the interest of the parties in the subject land will have to await
the final determination by the trial court of the main action for partition after a trial on the
merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.  The April 21, 2008 Decision and July
4, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100100 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.  The May 4 and July 4, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
City, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 179-V-06 are SET ASIDE and a new Order is entered
directing private respondent to deposit 1/12 of the monthly rentals collected by him from the
buildings on TCT No. V-44555 with the trial court from the finality of this Decision and every
month thereafter until it is finally adjudged who is lawfully entitled thereto. 
 G.R. No. 193374 June 08, 2016

Ecarma
vs
CA

Facts:

Spouses Natalio and Arminda owned 4 properties designated as Kitanlad, Cuyapo and Lala
consisting of 2 lots. They have 7 children among them were Gerry Ecarma and private
respondent Renato Ecarma. Natalio predeceased Arminda, and therefater their children
executed Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate. No physical division of properties was
effected and they remained in co-ownership even after the death of Arminda. Renato
Ecarma as the Special Administrator in the intestate proceedings filed a Project of Partition
because of the conflict between Gerry and the other heirs over actual division of their
inherited properties. The legal heirs except Gerry expressed their desire to have the property
partitioned. 

Gerry objected because the proposed partition is not feasible, impractical and detrimental.
The planned partition is not accordance with the wishes of decedents, but however, it was
denied by the lower court. He brought up the case to the CA but before the controversy has
been settled, he died. Therefore, the heirs of Gerry Ecarma filed their Appellant’s Brief in
substitution of the deceased.

Issue:

1. WON the Order of Partition is proper where one of the co - owners refuse to accede to
such proposed partition on the ground that it is not feasible, impractical and detrimental. -
YES

Held:

1. Upon Arminda's death, her heirs' rights to the succession (covering Arminda's share in the
subject properties) vested and their co-ownership over the subject properties has
consolidated by operation of law. Effectively, without a valid will of Arminda, and as
Arminda's compulsory heirs, herein parties (specifically Gerry Ecarma prior to his death and
substitution by herein petitioners) all ipso facto co-owned the subject properties in equal
proportion being compulsory heirs of the deceased spouses Natalio and Arminda. 

Their objection to the actual partition notwithstanding, herein petitioners and even Rodolfo
Ecarma cannot compel the other co-heirs to remain in perpetual co-ownership over the
subject properties. Article 494, in relation to Article 1083, of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned. 
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement. 
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years. 
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. 
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs
so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. 
Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate unless the testator
should have expressly forbidden its partition, in which case the period of indivision shall not
exceed twenty years as provided in Article 494. This power of the testator to prohibit division
applies to the legitime. 
Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership terminates when any of the causes
for which partnership is dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for compelling
reasons that division should be ordered, upon petition of one of the co-heirs.
 GR No.213192, July 12, 2017

Ignacio
vs.
Reyes

FACTS:

Angel Reyes and Oliva R. Arevalo filed before the then CFI of Rizal (now RTC of
Pasig City, intestate court) a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of their father
Florencio Sr.Thereafter, Teresa became the administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate.
Teresa executed several lease contracts over properties in Baguio City.

Herein respondents filed before the RTC three complaints for partition, annulment of
lease contract, accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against Teresa and the lessees of the subject Baguio properties. They alleged in
their Complaints that, with the exception of the lessees, the parties and the Florencio Sr.
estate own one-tenth (1/10) of each of the Session Road, Loakan and Military Cut-off, and
Magsaysay properties. They claimed that Teresa misrepresented that the Florencio Sr.
estate is the sole owner of the properties and leased the same to the other parties without
their conformity. They also asserted in one of their complaints that the Florencio Sr. estate is
different from the Heirs of Florencio Sr. and Heirs of Salud. They averred that, as co-owners,
they have not received their share in the monthly rentals of the properties aforementioned.
RTC – manifested that it shall await a Request Order from the intestate court regarding the
possible distribution of the subject properties. Intestate Court – denied respondent’s motion
CA – annulled order of intestate court. Granted respondent’s petition for partition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in its decision? NO.

HELD:

Petition denied. CA affirmed with modification to resume trial to determine the

question of ownership and if partition is proper.
Respondents presented certificates of title of the properties registered under their names
and the Florencio Sr. estate, and their respective shares. As such, they are considered the
owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action. The co-ownership of the said properties by virtue of the certificates of title is a
common issue in the complaints for partition led before the Baguio RTC. Thus, the
intestate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it asserted jurisdiction over the
subject properties since its jurisdiction relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons.

In this regard, the RTC shirked from its duty when it deferred the trial to await a
request order from the intestate court regarding the possible distribution. In fact, it has not
yet made a definite ruling on the existence of co-ownership. There was no declaration of
entitlement to the desired partition either because a co-ownership exists or a partition is
not legally prohibited. As this Court is not a trier of facts, it is for the trial court to proceed
and determine once and for all if there is co-ownership and to partition the subject
properties if there is no legal prohibition. It is also best for the Baguio RTC to settle
whether the respondents are claiming ownership over the properties by virtue of their title
adverse to that of their late father and his estate and not by any right of inheritance.