EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION • • • ;

* / # * ✓

Now we shall deni with the problem to1 see whether the 'definition
9

of perception given by Gautama is acceptable. In this chapter our

main task will be to examine critically his definition*of perception*.
•

Gsutam*s definition of pr-atysksf? pr<t«5ana cannot be regarded as .

%

satisfactory as it does not give a complete picture of the causal _.

situation involved. In other words, it Is not correct to say that
the aphroiom ‘knowledge born of sense object contact* is intended
to define^ pratyaksa Pramana in terms of causation. In order to
demonstrate that it is not adequate, the opponents argue that this
definition of perception is untenable because of the incomplete
statements of all its causes (Pratyaksa La kaa nanupapa11Irasamagra
•vacant s N.3 20th, 2nd adhy.) The reason,why the definition of pereeptioi
will be incomplete has been given "?s *a samagra vacs ha t * (Because of
the incomplete statements). Acaryya Uddyofcakara, with a view to
showing the intention of the opponents argues in the following
manner. Gautama introduced the definition, as mentioned earlier,
but that cannot be the proper definition, as it fails to give a
complete enumeration of the causal factors necessary, so far as
* *

the portion ‘knowledge emerging from sense-object contact1 is

concerned, it expresses only the contact between the vision and its .
respective sensory object. Other causes of perception, apart
from that, have not been mentioned in the aphorism. The other
icxxjBtodfeaxxmxacaaBpjtwdxtenett^wi.txxXhsxNyxyKsXaiaKaik^xaehQOlxthxtxfar?
1. Nyaya-Outra i 22/83.
 145 t •
%

causes responsible for the generation o£ perception includes'

j
•the conjunction between soul and inind** (Stmemanasartnyoga) and
. •

*
•the conjunction between sense «|Bd Mnd*(indriya-ra3nah-Sai*yoga)

in general. Since they* are not mentioned in the definition, it

is incomplete# Causal connections responsible for the generation
c=

of perception are absent in the narrow definition. This is the

main tenet of the opponent's objection.

The opponent shows that the contact between self and* rifanas

like the sense-object contact is a cause of perception. This is

baaed on the aphorism, •ifitmaaanaaoh 3annikars~baave Pratyaksot-

pattih'1 /"There can be no perception in the absence of. the contact

between self and snnas^/ ° ®an attempt to putjf their arguments

• in proper perspective in this way. Visual perception arises only

if Cher© is oontaot between the sensible object *nd vision. In

the absence of any one of the contacts between thetwo, it does not

occur. Hence, Just as this method of agreement and difference

between the vision and its respective object is said to be tne *($<*. Uu»'

1. Ny^ya-Sutra : 22/83. ! ~ “ * *
2. it is an accepted tenet with the Hyaya-vaisesika school th*»t for*
every positive effect (bhav*?-karya), there must be an *as^mave.yi
karanaAccording to the flyaya doctrine, the asamsvayl-karana •
of an effect like 'cognition* is constituted by tne conjunction of
soul with manss. But such a conjunction would not be possible,if
mama were an all pervasive substance like soul for conjunction •
between two ubiquitous substances is not admitted. And if it is
* not possible to point to anyother entity which could serve as the
'asamavayi-karana* of an effect like cognition, it would have to be
admitted that an effect can emerge without an “aaamavayi-Karana*.
But that is impossible. For, according to the Nyaya account, the
emergence of the state of consciousness is possible by means of the
conjunction between soul and mama. Thg absence of this conjunc-
-Jfeion will mean an unconscious atater _________
* ~ 1 ------------------------------ ""
fundamental cause of visual perception, similarly, no perception
arises wit^ut the conjunction between manas and 1tman£,

a
 • 9
146 *

And like the sense-object contact# the conjunction fcetweeh self and*
• ✓
m.ind which Is a regular antecedent of thejoccurance of perception,mast

also be the cause of perception. , •

There is no way out but to accept this fact. But .in the pratyaksa

laksana Sutra, the conjunction between the two which is cause of per­

ception has not been mentioned. So the laksana of perception being •

incomplete cannot be a satisfactory definition of perception. The _

solution of this suspicion raised by the apponent has been dealth with
in the commentary of the laksana sutra. With that purpose iff view

uddyotakara maintains 'uktottaratvat* That is to say, the answer

of the opponent’s objection is given earlier. One may ask, wha£ answer

has been provided ? It is to be answered that in the aphorism 'Sense-

object contact* has been said to be the cause of perception. But that
*does not mean that such contact alone is the cau3© of perception. On

the contarary, the special cause alone of perception has been mentioned.
But conjunction between self and manas is not the special cause of per-
ception. For the conjunction between the two is also the cause of cog-*

nitions generating from ogher means viz. inference, testmony etc.

• a.
which are other than perception. Therefore the conjunction between .

the two is the general cause and not the Special cause. So the ...

definition is not incomplete.

• Further, some opine that the factors which exist prior to the

production of an effect, are the causes of the effect. Let us

proceed to make it clear. The visu&l perception of an object arises

when there is -contact between vision and its respective object.

If this is admitted, then like the sense - object contact

£
1. Uktottaratvat - Uktoktararoetaditi-nedam Karanavadharanartham
.
Sutramapita Visista Karana Vacanamiti. N.Varttika, Chow PP.303.
 147

apace, time, desa (place) and Afcasa will.lie the chdsea of the' * „
• I . , * #
perception. For cognition emerges *in presence of apace, time',
•
akhsa etc. Whatever is present liefJre the emergence of an effect

will also l)e the cause of such effect. So, what arguments contra­

dicting this conclusion can be put forward by the propoment ?

Anticipating this objeot, Gautama attempted to answer it. He refused
or% perception
to admit the argument tlv>fc spaoe, time, afcasa etc. are the causes/

though they invariably precede the perceptual "knowledge They

lack the relevant capacity for producing perception Just as the case
of the visual perceptibility of substance wigs?* requires presence

of same manifest colour in that substance as relevant condition.

So space etc. cannot be its causes. But if the opponents assert

that in space, time etc. there is the presence of some relevant .

conditions like close-nesa or contactness, so they would be the

cuasea of the effect (like perception). This argument of the

opponent is also not tenable. For such entitles as space, time Qtc.
being eternal and ubiquitous, cannot help being in contact,
with all know&ble objects. Therefore, the opponents must- seek^soiae

other, relevant causes *the presence of which is invariably follow^

by the presence of the effect* and *the absence of which is, invk—
m

riably followed by the absence of the effect*. To remain stick

t® the principle, they must find it out. If no relevant conditions

are found to be present, then the objection of oaauality in space,

time akasa etc. must be forbidden. Because such closeness alone

cannot be sa.id to be the manipulator of cquseness. One may
reasonably ask, why do they fail to furnish the oaauality ?

• •• •
 M'Hj,

148 , • .
We aha 11 seek intfenaivel^ t.he os use of it. We perceive ^the colour
• .
of teja padartha1 like lamp, go id eto. gere colour* present in’
t • ■ . * *
teja Is considered to he the cause of its apprehension (peroeiving
colour), Touch-quality is present i*n teja pa&arfcha and remained
there with colour and though they are in proximity, but that warm .
touch (teja-sparsa) can by no means be the cause of the effect like
the apprehension of colour. Became the touch-quality present in
teja padartha though comes in contact but in the apprehension of
colour, no body admit the capacity of such apprehension in^touch.
For, we know touch is something which is apprehensible with the ——
tactile organ and not with the visual one - (Oakaurograhya -
tuagindriyagrahya). The colour presentt in fee,la (visual-organ)
is the cause of its own apprehension in the form of agreement in
presence and difference. Because, if colour is present then only,
in the next moment it is apprehended and ifl it#£»
(nSverTit icognised. So by the logic of agreement in presents
and difference, we can establish the fact that colour present in .
teja, is the cause of its apprehension, but not the touch-quality.
For, its further classification it can be argued that vision resells
the colour present in moon without the warm-touch (feel) of light.
Warm-touch though present in sense-orifioea but this can not * *’ •
serve as the cause of its manifestation without colour. Similarly,
the conjunction between self and nnnas, between sense-organ and
manas and from the conjunction or inherent-conjunction between
vision and its respective sensory-object, there will be the emergence
of cognition, There even space, akasa, fcijne etd. are in contact.

A. By ‘Teja^padartha1 we should understand lamp, light, electricity

eto. *Teja* as sense-organ is the viaual-orgnn. That is to say,*
the vision is made of the element.’tejaa*. It is to be kept in
mind that vision in the Wvaya-Vaiaeaika system is not the same
thing as the *eye' of common narlnnce. The coomdn eye is f:o !„>e
taken as the seat of vijjfinl organ. The ag organ wnich is cbmposed
of teja partiqles is located at the centre of the iris (Krahnr»wra>
 m
149 '

but they are not the causes for the emergence of cognition. Because
t • •
the contacts like self and mama, manag and sense and sense with
sensible object have the opacity for* producing cognition which ire
other th»n space, time, akaan etc. Now, the question will be raised
frj- CtrfT-wtow k>-«_pw- Cm***x~ An*4A~- tr^Xirt. ,
further, if the factors responsible for the emergence not the conjunc-
tion between self and moms, he the cause of generating perception ?
Because this oonJunction is also capable of producing sensory knowledge
Just like the sense-objeot contact. Then why Gautuma did ljot enumerate
it exactly like sense-object contact ? This objection is met l>y — —
Haharsi Gautama. For him, it is needless to mention separately#the
conjunction between self and mnnas like the ’sense-object contact’.
Because, as a matter of fact, it has been ©repressed earlier. In its
favour Maharsi Gautumn is adducing another argument ’There is no
•

exclusion (anavarodha) of the self because knowledge is its specific

mark*. It is shown tint knowledge, desire etc. -zre proban for the
inference of the self and this implies tint the oontact of the self
with nnnas is a cause of all forma of knowledge, cognition,.desire
etc. have been shown to be the proban of self in Atmaprafcarara. JCn
analogous to this, (i.e.. Just as cognition is said to be the proban of
Self), the conjunction between self ^nd raanas tna been suggested as *
the c'mae of perception. It may be asked why the cognition, desire
etc. are said to be the proinn of self ? One will plead in reply,
cognition is a special kind of property of self. It is being other .

than the self must be a proban in the inference where ’self* is subject

and the probandum is ’difference from self* (atmatarabheda). It is

m
not also reasonable to argue that this inference is not acceptable. .
Nor would it be Justified for one to say, it is not an established

J*

*
 150 i

* • * .
fact that oognition is.an attribute of self* b’edauae sorro'w,
• O . • m
•

happiness being inherent in self are also cognised by all as the

• *
attribute of the self. Similarly, cognition being present in the
self by the relation of inherence will be cognised as a property
inherent in the self. Further arguments csn be put forward in i£s
favour. Substance or action cannot be present in self in the relation
4 tm

of inherence. Hence substance, actions are not the properties of

the self exactly unl5.ke the case of Juana, The cognition of pleasure,
pain etc. being inherent in self must be a property of it. The -—
qualities like colour, taste, odour etc. are perceived by us or by
others in the substances like earth, water and the like. But oognition
does not result in it nor ia it apprehended by us. So cognition
cannot be the property of water, earth etc. Therefor^, Juana should
be the special property of self1. In the commentary also, it ia
said, it is not Justified that all the causes of perception should
be mentioned in the definition of the aphorism.

Sow, the question will be raised, the contact between self

•
and tnanas is not inserted in the definition of perception. This
we have considered so far. But why does the contact between sense-
org^n and tnanas has not been incorporated in the apphorism ?
Gautctaa said in reply, 'There is no exclusion of the a^nas because
it a* specific mark is the absence of a intuit* neons oognition. That
the contact with mams i® a cause of perception. Knowledge is already
implied by theassertion that mams is inferred from the sbaenoe
of the oocurance of simultaneous cognitions! (Tafcyaugapa&hyalinga-
tvutcfta na mg^vaaah)g. Here also the portion no exclusionJanayaypdfr*)
1. Tatra pratyaksam Svasamvedyam nat^fcra prfchi vyadigunah. Yatha
aukhadi, yane protyoks^ra sva parasamvedyim tat prtfcivyadi gunah
yaths ntipadi, na caivam Juanara tasmatsdatma gunn etc.
fee Kx2x8ndxx$aixxi±xsxtx8i.H. V. PP.20d, Chow. Sans, ’series. • . .
2. n,n. 2nd. Vol. ii-1-20. .
• .• •
 r
151 #

of the earlier aphorism, should be* taken iQto consideration. Ift 'the
• , # • •
aphorism, (lot. adh. 1st, arhf 10th autra), it ia said, 'The absence
of the oocuranoe of simultaneous cognition is a proban for the inference

of mams'®. This aphorism is purported to show that sense-object

contact requires the contact of meras as the esuse of the perceptual

character of knowledge4,. Though in that aphroism, mams as the

'fact of being instrument' of cognition has not been s id directly

but the consistency of the aphorism cannot be maintained unless the

* *

'fact of being instrument' of cognition is conceded. Pec-use Jirna -

requires some cause for its emergence and so it is not independent.

The sense-object contact required for the emergence of perception

being subservient to the contact of ra->ms and sense is not independent,

• Here the opponent will raise an objection. Notwithstanding the

fact that the conjunction of self with manaa and the conjunction of

sense with manaa are the .causes of perception, still they are left

out of the aphorism. Then why does the sense-object contact will
* •
be mentioned in the aphorism on the same ground ? The solution is
offered by Maharai Gautama in this way. Sense-object oontaot is*fche
m

cause of perception alone. So in the definition the words appropriate

•
for conveying the sense of different horaal oontaot like conjunction,

inherent conjunction etc, have been inserted. The inplioafcion of

the’argumsnt ia that the conjunction between self and manas is the

general cause of cognition. For,it ia also a cause of inferential

cognition, compasison (upnraiti), sabdavodha (verbal comprehension)

o, '•wgapatjuananufeputtin raanaso iingata : N.G. 1.1.1G.

40

%
 152
• « • ,
and membra no e. Not* only, that, It*is also t*he cause’oV desire, happiness, .
. ' • . ’ '
pain etc. Because apart from the conjunction between self and manas,
no knowledge of happiness, sorrow etc.* can emerge in the self. Hence
the conjunction between self and mrmas is the general o^uae of perception
and no special cans*13 *2of* *it.
* * But sense-object contact being the only
cause of perception, is the special cause of it and no ordinary oasfnse.
.That is why Gautama in the definition provided only the special cause
(sense-object contact) omitting the other causes, .
m •

A wrangler may raise a further question here. If the eonJunction

between self and mams is not enumerated and left out as it is ndt
the cause of perception alone, then the conjunction between sense and
manas being the cause of perception in general. Why is it not mentioned
fn the definition ? The problem is solved in exactly t*sax the ’same
manner aa before, by the Nyoya fcheoriei^ Since sense-object contact is
the instrumental cause and not in general cause like ‘Self-mams
*

contact* and ’sense-aanas contact* etc, they are omitted. The Nyaya •
theorist is offering another reason for mentioning the 'sense-object
m
contact* in the aphorism. It is prominent or fundamental than the
*3elf-manas contact* or 'Sense-manas contact*. In order to show its
fundamentslity or prominence, the aphorism 'Suptavyasakta raamaan
oendriyarthayoh sannikarsaniraittatvat11 has been introduced lyy Gautama. .
The meaning is that2, if a person^ at a certain time goes to sleep after
A •
deciding upon a particular time” for waking up, he wakes up, in the
1. "n.O. : 87/88 PP.i.30, Vol.2. Ed. P.TarkRvagiaa.
2. “Xndriyartha Sannlkarsssya grahanam na tmanjanaaoh Sannikarsyetl*.
N.D. Sutra fthasya 27/80 PP. loQ.
3. P^anidhaya Samkalpya Fradosa Supfcahar&haratra aayotthatavyameti
Sohardharatgra evava Vudyafee. Pravodha Juamaiti Pravodhanidravicceda
Juatiti dravyasparsasya Samjnanam pravocLha JmnaraltyanthahJNVTT-
Vacaspati Miara
d. i.e,» with the determination that I will woke up in the midnight *
after sleeping in the evening. • • . . *
 153
* • # * •
nick of time because 6f his previous decision. Again, sometimes l.oud
♦ • * #

sound or violent push are the causes of waking up. Then the^e is fch«
• *
primacy of 3ense-obJect contact to the sleeping person for all on a

sudden there being sudden contact between ear and. the loud sound, he .

woke up. At that time, there is no prominenoe of the contact between _

self c.nd monas. Bo it is understood that in such perception the contact

between oacse-organ and object in prominent ^nd the oontnot between self

and manas is not so prominent, • .

Further, it is seen that a person whose mama is pre-ocoupied

with a different object ana who had the desire to know aomethingelae,

because of his conaeions resolution knows that soraethingaio^ l?y way of

relating the sense with the msnas which is led by motivation. Again^

if is seen, when he is however, without any causeions resolution, without

any deaSir© for knowledge and is inattentive, acquires the knowledge

of an object presented before him. In suoh a case, there is b the

primsoy of sense-object contact2-. Because at that time, he did no desire

of having that knowledge guiding the manaa through motivation. Therefore

the sense-object contact is to be mentioned because it is primary and not

the contact of the 3elf with manas or the oontact of the monas with.fch$

senses because all those are secondary,

Gautama put forward another reagon in support of enumerating

•sensd-objecfc contact' in the aphorism and argued for its primacy impor­

tance than the other two types of contact. The argument ia based on the

aphorism, 'the different perceptions are differently designated by the

p
senses "and their^objects", The implication ia that the perceptual
1, Jada tu kholvasya nihsamkalpaaya nijjijuasaaya oa vyasektamanaso
Vakya vieaya prasup.2tinai Jnammit pradyate, N.G. Snd.Vol.PP.loO.
2, "Taiscapadesa Jnara Visesanam1* etc, tf,8, 28/89, , •
 154
cognition is designated by the word *»sense->organ' and ‘object*1 (vis^yaj.
* •
Whey*is it so designated (vyapadista) ? .One 'can suggest answer in. tills
way. When the sensible object like smell, is apprehended by,the offactery
sense then 'ghranena Jighrati* i.e., 'one smells with the olfactory sense'
- in this way we express it. %ain, when the visual perseption of oqlour
takes place then we -say *one -sees-eolr&ur-irith yi^ion-'^tfcakgirrgr-^paa
then we say 'one sees colour with vision' (cakausa rupam pasyati). In
this way, in the case of the apprehension of taste, we use 'one f«stes
with the gustafory sense* (Rasana rasayati), This Is the usually of
expressing our apprehension. Exactly like this, this, the perception of
o bject with the respective senses are expressed through 'gandha vijnensm',
nupa vijanam', ‘Rasa vijnanam'. Here the operative relation.between
sense and object must be accepted as prominent than the other two onuses
•
like the contact between 'soul and manas* and that between 'sense afnd
manae'. Because between two primary or fundamental and secondary or
non-fundamental (apradbana), the designation ie done by the fundamental.
/
• ^

The instrumental cause ia the Sadhakatama and that is fundamental. So

with th^t instrumental cause, designation is seen to be made, an
example of it, Uddyotakarn cities the case of 'Sallyankura*. In that
germination of a seed, there may be many causes like water, air, fir^..
etc, but the 'salt seed' is the 'sadhakutan^' and so It is the instru­
mental c<use. So we designate it as 'anllyankura' omitting other names ,
like 'Jalyankura' or Ksityankura'. Similarly, when a particular percep­
tion is designated by 'sense' and 'object*, are fundamental and nothingelae.
So the contact between 'sense' and artha' seem3 to be fumdataental than
the contact between 'aanaa * and 'self or the 'contact between sense and’
manas*. +

%
 . • * . -LUO •
The oomraentatof vatsyayana hsfe put forward one ra'or® argument* to*
i • * * •
• •
reinforce the conclusion that in perception •aeme-ohject ooptaet' #ia.
fundamental. The five types of perception occurs being caused by fiv«

external senses. The reason of it can be atatedin this wpy. The number
of sense-organ ia five and ita respective viaaya are also five in number

like smell* taste, colour etc. we say, *one smells with the olfactory -

sense*, *one sees with the vision* etc. Again, we say, the olfactory
perception, the visual perception, ’the guestafcory perceptiom.etc.
Again there is *the perception of smell* * the perception of ooSOur* and
• m

*the perception of taste* etc. with that speciality of panontva aamkhya

(the fact of being five in number) about aenoe-organ and object, the

perception resulting from it, will also Ire designated aa of.five types.

Hence with this argument also, we understood the fundament?lity of sense-

0b3ect contact knowing the supremacy of five senses and their respective

sensible object.

The opponent is further raising an objection that in the aphorisms

no. 2Gth, 2?th and 28th, it has been demonstrated that *sense-objjot

contact* alone is the cause of perception and other probans we not res­
ponsible for perception. Gautama is now pointing out this mistake of *

the opponent and introduces the opponent*s argument giving its solution
thereof. Vatsyayana explains that it is not reasonable to hold the view
that t.he cause of perception is *3eose-obJeot contact* alone neglecting

the other causes like the contact between *Self end mams* etc. Then

there results the eontr-diction for, the emergence of oonsoioue state

requires the contact between self ana manas. The absence of it will

mean avt unconscious state i.e. ,no perceptual cognition can born in the
0
absence of self-manas conjunction. It will not be reasonable to any *

that the sense of perception of a man in sleep and an inalternative

• • •
■ person is sense-objeefc contact. flhe acaeotan*ae of 'senae-bbjeet
• " # • • * •
contact1 alone to be the cause of perception will mean negligence*of
the consultation between self and mama, But if sense-object contao*
ia not accepted to be the cause of perception then* the.argument 'Non-
aiiaultaneoua occurs nee of cognition is a proban for the inferenoe of*
mams*1 will be vitiated by the law of contradiction and as such it i*
illogical, That is, the idea that the conjunction between 'self and
•

manas' is not responsible and so not the cause of perception, would

mean the ooouranoe of simultaneous cognition, This is based bn the
aphorism 'VyahatafcvatThe Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers in order to,
obviate this suspicion of contradiction (yyagnata) hold that fchift
objection is not reasonable because of the ‘predominance of the specifi
effect* (arfcha-visesa-pravalya), The significance is that the con-
• •
irradiation in suspicion is no hindrance to held the contact between
self and mams responsible for the emergence of cognition. The purpose
of Gautama ia that the aphorism provides only the 'sense-abject contact
as predominance than the contact of self with manas and the contact of
sense with mams. At this, the other causes are not denied (apafcapa) *
only the predominance of sense object contact is shown* in the iJphorijstn
As a matter of fact, a person in deep sleep and inattentive (vyas dqta
•
inana) can acquire knowledge, due to the predominance of 'artha * (object)
The word 'predominance5 (Pravalya) refers to the prominence (tuirata)
and coeroivenesa (Patuta) inherent in the sense and object. This
'predominance relating to object* emerges from the 'sense-organ*
'object* and 'the contact' between the two and does not make the
•conjunction between self and annas' etc. its object. Hence we cen lie
see amongst tlTe three types of contact responsible for the emergency of
cognition, like sense and aanaa*, between 'self and manas * and the
contact between 'sense and object', the latter one is predominant, and
 /
157
fundamental. There la no way out but to aooepjs this Tao.t, * * *
i • •
■ •

Even In the absence of a resolution and in the absence of thoughtful

consideration of a person asleep or a person inattentive, 'the contact
of the self ^nd mams and the ‘contact between seme and aanas* should
be conceded aa the cause of perception. Vatsyayana shows that the *
•

primary cause of perceptual cognition is sense-object^ contact in the

case of a person asleep or inattentive person. The contact of the
self with the m^nus and of the unme with the senses remain in these
• •
oases, without actively contributing to the knowledge. Wh^t then
activate the nnms to come in contact with the self and the censes in
such cases ? Vatpyayana answers that it la a&t$sta or the unseen merits
4 9- *9

and demerits resulting from action. In the cage of a person who is

awake or ins tfeenti.ve, the manag ia activated by motivation which rasijlty
• •

in his self from the desire to know such object. Such a desire being
absent in the case of aperson asleep or inattentive, it must be admitted
that there must be some other qualities to activate the mm-s to come.in
contngt with the self ond the objects. Such a quality is adrsjta which
<3 the universal cause of everything and is itself the result of a good
and actions and evils like attachment etc. G-utama pleads why umeerf
A—
merit or demerit are to be regarded as the universal cause and therefor®
there is nothing wrong in admitting the fact that it leads the mams
to eojss in contact with the self and the senses.
 1 Critical Sxamlnatioft of«the Pratvaksa Vigate . $ * *

• •
* Goutama has not only offered a definition of percept! on, he'also

maintains the view that this knowledge is a kind of valid knowledge.

And he defends this view by rejecting certain anticipated objection* one

•

such /objection to the effect that though by the given definition our

knowledge of a tree* say* is perceptual, yet strong reasons are there to

maintain this knowledge to be inferential* Thus Gautama's definition of

perception applies to a case of knowledge which is really inferential.

• •
In other words, the objection maintains Gautamas* definition of perepp-_

tion is too wide* Of course the objection is based on the belief*

•

supposed to have strong argument in favour, that knowledge under refe­

rence is really an inference* If this belief is incorrect,* then the

objection becomes palpalely unsound* So Vatsyayana has considered

• •

arguments that are supposed to lead support to his belief*

One reason for holding the knowledge under reference to be inferen- ,

tial is that while it is not perceived* its knowledge under reference

results from the knowledge of some other thing having necessary relation
. •
with it* •

let us explain. Suppose, w® are standing in front of a tree, lur .

knowledge of the tree in this case are ordinarily supposed to be per-

«

ceptudl. True, our senses are in contact with the tree* If we consider

carefully, we find that the relevant sense-organ (the eye or touch) cannot

come in contact with all the parts of the tree. Sense-organ cannot be

conjoined with those parts between which on the one hand and the sense*

organ, on the o^her, some other parts are inter-poaed. So at the most

the sense-organ can be in contact with certain parts of the tree only.
 • «
But these parts whatever be theix* number are not al£ the warts of c&a
* . . * •
• • '
the tree and or because of that not the tree itself# So the sense-*>rgan

is not in contact with the tree and ya#t we are having th^ knowledge* of

the tree. This is the conclusive proof that the knowledge of the tree

is hot caused by or doesnot result from sense-contact with the tree.* On

the’ otherhand, it must have to be so produced, if it is to be a percep­

tual knowledge* So the opponent concludes the Naiyasika definition of

‘percepti on has no application. They on the ocherhand, explain the know­

ledge of the*tree* under reference as a case of inference* *0Ut the

account of inference that takes place will be differently given by those

who accept things like ‘'tree" as distinct from and in addition t& its

parts (i*e*# who adroit avayavi) and by those who donot a-Jmi t the whole

(tree to be different from its parts)*

The Naiyayikas, therefore seek to point out that none of these

two accounts is consistent or is faithfuil to fact* Those who donot admin

a whole or "tree" to be distinct from its parts will have to say that^

some of the parts which come in contact with the sense-organ erg per- .

ceived and on the basis of such perception the other parts are inferred
but the Kaiyayika points out just as the perceivdd parts are not tree"

(for otherwise we could have said to have perceived the tree), according^

to the opponent so also the inferred parts are not “tree**# How can they
•
therefore, maintain the knowledge of tree under reference is a case of
inference?* If, on the otherhand, the tree is not a mere collection of •

parts and is inferred on the perception of it3 parts we need have to have

knowledge of vy.aptl of the parts with the tree and there is no evidence
i« 1% cannot be said that ' fi'rat a few 'parts are percelvea’and then a few .
other parts^are inferred and tnen is another act of knowledge - these .
two knowledges are synthesized and the synthesis is the knowledge#o£
the tree* Vatsyayana argues that we have no reason to say that this
knowledge is inferential.
 160 •
. ’ * .
• • .
I i
wa have such knowledge Vyapfci. Thus whether the tree is a distinct y&ole

or as a mere collection of parts* >xr knowledge of tree cannot be said

to be a case of inference* Thus even if the opponent ca$e show that it is

not perceptual, they cannot prove the positive thesis (inferential). *In
fact, they failed to account for the knowledge of the tree which we most

evidently have* Of course, this by itself is not enough to prove the

Positive contention of the Naiyayika that knowledge of the tree is per­

ceptual. And both Gautama and Vatsyayena found it necessary *t» show

that on the Nyaya Theory of perception an ontological distinctness of

avayavi, the knowledge under reference can very well be a case of'percep­

tion*

* Appendix - A '

The commentateojg_ Vatysyayana offered arguments to the effect

that objects of perception cannot be known by inference as a source ^

_ •
(Prantana)*
t
Wo infer fine on the locus mountain by means of the
•
proban

smoke. The cause of such inferential cognition is the perceptual charac-

. •
ter of cognition of the proban in the subject and the Vyipti jnaha between

the proban '-smoke*and the probandum 'fine* as required for inference.* .

•
But that knowledge of the rule of concomitance is primarily accepted by

all as perceptual. Hence the opponent claim to recognise the perceptual *

objects as knowable by inference is absolutely meaningless* Because

•

before the inference of the probandum fine in the subject mountain, these
must be an apprehension of the rule of concomitance* Unless the is so,
• .
one Crjnnot resort to an inference* So the opponents seeking inference
m
as a source and who tried to ascertain knowability by inference violating
the norms and principles of perception and its object is like searching •
 • . 161 ' • ' • .
•
• . t
lotus In the sky#
* * ,
So we see the wrong arguments of the, opponents.have
• * *

put* them to their die consequence. Maher si Gautama, himself • in the* lSt
Chap. 1st. anil, in the apphorism of inference as a source, * utters, *
*Tat purvakam trividhem anuraanam1. He argues inferential'cognition as
•

belonging to perception. So if the perceptual character cognition is not

4

admitted then its inferential character is bound to be distorted. Moreover,

perception is about present while inference is about past, present and
future* Here perception cannot be said as inference, t/ddyotakara gave
• •
9 further arguments in this way. Inference is characterised by purnavat,
Sesavat arid Samanytadrstavat. But perception has no such classification •
ffihererore, perception cannot be said as inference. And there is a kind
of perve-’er-perveding (Vyapye-vyapaka) relationship between*the proban
and the probandum in case of inference. But in perceitpion, there is no
• . - •
such relationship. Hence perception connect be said as inference. The
thane of the argument is that no cognition can emerge In absence of per­
ception. At the basis of all non eternal, cognition, there is some sort
of perception. When inference apart from perception is absurd and impo-
ssible, than to say perception an inference b> distarting the real indo-
. •
pendent existence of perception is impossible. Hence we can assert •
strongly that perception is not inference. So perception is an indepen­
dent source. Gautama echoes s
Na tvetadamunanaro indriyartha Sazncnikarsaja Ha cameraeyasyen
driyena sannikarsa danumanara bhavati. So yam pratyaksanumanayo laksana
bheda mahanasayitva, etc.1.

1. PP. 149, 14.3.* 2nd Vol. Bd« Phanibmsan Tarkabagisa#