Heirs of Tan v.

  IAC (GR No. L – 71033, July 29, 1988)

Facts:
During their lifetime, Don Eusebio and his wife engaged in various businesses and amassed
considerable properties. Don Eusebio died intestate in 1948, and his estate was judicially settled
before the then Court of First Instance of Manila. His wife "Aling Yayang" died, also intestate, on
March 2, 1965, and a petition for the settlement of her estate was filed. 
On August 27, 1965, Remigio, Aida, and Alejandro filed a complaint against their other four brothers
and sisters, Florencia, Ruperto, Brigida, and Clemente, for the recovery of their shares in properties
belonging to their mother allegedly illegally transferred to the defendants, and for damages. The
complaint was subsequently amended (first and second amended complaints) to implead other
parties (the spouses of the defendants and certain alleged family corporations) as parties-
defendants, and to include other properties of which the plaintiffs were allegedly deprived of their
legitimate shares. In their answers to the complaint, both original and amended, the defendants
asserted certain counterclaim against the plaintiffs, which, particularly in respect to plaintiff Remigio,
sought to have him deliver and reconvey to the defendants their respective shares in the realties
known as the Rosario, Folgueras, and Carriedo properties, allegedly transferred to him in trust by
their parents on January 4, 1945, December 5, 1945, and December 13, 1948, respectively, and to
recover damages.clubjuri
On September 3, 1968, plaintiff Remigio Tan died, and on motion of his widow, Rosita G. Tan, dated
October 18, 1968, the trial court ordered that she and the minor children be substituted as parties
plaintiffs. After Remigio’s death, his co-plaintiffs, Alejandro and Aida, entered into a compromise
agreement with the defendants Florencia, Ruperto, Brigida, and Clemente, and a partial decision
based thereon was promulgated by the trial court wherein the complaint of Aida and Alejandro was
dismissed. 
The then Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and granting
the defendants’ counterclaim, and ordering the plaintiffs (a) to reconvey one-seventh (1/7) portion or
share each to the defendants brothers and sisters of Remigio V. Tan of the Folgueras, Rosario, and
Carriedo properties, and in case of the properties already sold earlier by Remigio, the proceeds of
the sales should instead be distributed, with legal interest from the date of the corresponding sale up
to the time the distribution should have been fully implemented; (b) to pay to each defendant co-heir
one-seventh of the income of the Carriedo property in the amount of P15,000.00 per month from
1951, plus interest at the legal rate, until fully paid; (c) to pay the defendants P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the trial court’s decision was affirmed, with the
modification that the share of the plaintiffs-appellants in the Yayang Building was fixed at 1/16th of
the property plus income derived therefrom, and the award of attorney’s fees to defendants-
appellees was eliminated.
The above judgment became final and executory, with the dismissal by the Supreme Court of the
petition for review by certiorari.
Upon motion for execution by the private respondent, the motion for issuance of a writ of execution
was hereby granted.
On Appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the order of execution was modified.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are being denied due process of law in that they have been made liable
beyond the value of their inheritance from the deceased Remigio B. Tan, contrary to the provisions
of Articles 774 and 1311 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
The Court finds no irreversible error in the decision of the IAC. A review of the records show that the
petitioners brought up the matter of their limited liability only at the time of the execution of the
judgment, after the same had already become final and executory.
The decision of the lower court which granted the private respondents’ counterclaims condemned
the petitioners, without qualification, to pay certain amounts representing the share of the former in
the income of the Carriedo property, fixed by the Court at P15,000.00 per month, beginning January
1951, up to December 31, 1984, with interest at the legal rate, until fully paid, and their share in the
proceeds of the sale of the Folgueras and Rosario properties.

The petitioners at that point should have brought up the question which they are now raising,
namely, that their liability to the private respondents should be limited to the amount of their
inheritance from Remigio V. Tan. Instead, they allowed the decision to become final and executory
without seeking a limitation of their liability.
It is settled jurisprudence that except in the case of judgments which are void ab initio or null and
void per se for lack of jurisdiction which can be questioned at any time — and the decision here is
not of this character — once a decision becomes final, even the court which has rendered it can no
longer alter or modify it, except to correct clerical errors or mistakes.

Alvarez v. IAC, G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990

Justice Fernan
Petition for review on certiorari 

FACTS: Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private
respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the
other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived
by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. There are two parcels of land which are involved in this case. Said
lots were registered in the names of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes. Fortunato D. Santiago was issued a
Transfer Certificate of Title. Santiago then sold the lots to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. The lots were
sold thereafter Rosendo Alvarez. The Yaneses filed a complaint against Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the “return” of the
ownership and possession of the lots, and prayed for an accounting of the produce of the land from
1944 up to the filing of the complaint, and that the share or money equivalent due the heirs be
delivered to them, and damages. During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold the lots to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason.
ISSUE: Whether the liability arising from the sale of the lots made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr.Rodolfo
Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.
RULING: 
NO.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made
by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or
of his estate, after his death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs.
Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations
to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received
from the decedent.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties
that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these institutions. From the
Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from
patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare
cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of
its performance by a specific person and by no other.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences
of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did
not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary
equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate, and we have ruled that
the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. 
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their
inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other
properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private
respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals.

G.R. No. L-44837             November 23, 1938

SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, 
vs.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL.,

This case is before us by virtue of an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros, the dispositive part of which reads:

For the foregoing considerations, the court renders judgment in this case declaring Ana
Quitco Ledesma an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, for
legal purposes, but absolving the defendants as to the prayer in the first cause of action that
the said Ana Quitco Ledesma be declared entitled to share in the properties left by the
deceased Eusebio Quitco.
As to the second cause of action, the said defendants are ordered to pay to the plaintiff
Socorro Ledesma, jointly and severally, only the sum of P1,500, with legal interest thereon
 from the filing of this complaint until fully paid. No pronouncement is made as to the costs.
So ordered.

FACTS:

In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while
the latter was still single, of which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter
who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems that the relation between
Socorro Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end, but the latter executed a deed,
acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter and on January 21,
1922, he issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note, of the following
tenor:
For value received I promise to pay Miss Socorro Ledesma the sum of P2,000. Philippine
currency under the following terms: P250 to be paid on the first day of March 1922; another
P250 to be paid on the first day of November 1922; the remaining P1,500 to be paid two
years from the date of the execution of this note

Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant Conchita McLachlin, with whom he
had four children, who are the other defendants. On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died
and, still later, that is, on December 15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the
latter left real and personal properties upon his death, administration proceedings of said
properties were instituted in this court, the said case being known as the "Intestate of the
deceased Eusebio Quitco," civil case No. 6153 of this court.

Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco and the appointment of
the committee on claims and appraisal, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, on August 26, 1935,
filed before said committee the aforequoted promissory note for payment.

On November 14, 1933, the court issued an order of declaration of heirs in the intestate of
the deceased Eusebio Quitco, and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among the
declared heirs, Socorro Ledesma, as mother of Ana Quitco Ledesma, asked for the
reconsideration of said order, a petition which the court denied. From the order denying the
said petition no appeal was taken, and in lieu thereof there was filed the complaint which
gives rise to this case.

ISSUE:

1. That the trial court erred in holding, that the action for the recovery of the sum of P1,500,
representing the last installment of the note Exhibit C has not yet prescribed.
2. WON the property inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by the
right of representation is subject to the debts and obligations of their deceased father who
died without any property - NO
3. That the trial court erred in condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiff Socorro Ledesma the sum of P1,500.

RULING:
1.The claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note should not have been
presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being the one who executed the
same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should have been instituted by the said
Socorro Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor to
institute said case through the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of collecting his
credit. More than ten years having thus elapsed from the expiration of the period for the payment of
said debt of P1,500, the action for its recovery has prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore, well-founded.

2. while it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a children
presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or
grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations
contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the
benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their
predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father
Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they did
not inherit anything.
The second assignment of alleged error is also well-founded.

3. Being a mere sequel of the first two assignments of alleged errors, the third assignment of error is
also well-founded.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That the filing of a claim
before the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of the father, for a monetary
obligation contracted by a son who died before him, does not suspend the prescriptive period of the
judicial action for the recovery of said indebtedness; (2) that the claim for the payment of an
indebtedness contracted by a deceased person cannot be filed for its collection before the
committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of his father, and the properties
inherited from the latter by the children of said deceased do not answer for the payment of the
indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of said person.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendants are absolved from the complaint,
with the costs to the appellees. So ordered.

G.R. No. 182839               June 2, 2014

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
vs.
JOSE GARCIA and CHILDREN NORA GARCIA, JOSE GARCIA, JR., BOBBY GARCIA and
JIMMY GARCIA and HEIRS OF ROGELIO GARCIA NAMELY: CELEDONIO GARCIA, DANILO
GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA, HEHERSON GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA,
IMELDA GARCIA and JANE GARCIA
BRION, J.
 
Facts:
The subject of the present case is a parcel of residential land with all its improvements located in
Barrio Olango, Mallig, Isabela. The land is covered by TCT No. T-44422 under the name of Jose
Garcia Sr. who acquired the subject property during his marriage with Ligaya Garcia. Ligaya died on
January 21, 1987.

The children of Jose Sr. and Ligaya are Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, all surnamed Garcia, the
respondents in the present case.

Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses Garcia) obtained a loan
facility from the petitioner, Philippine National Bank, initially for ₱150,000.00. When spouses Garcia
increased their loan to ₱600,000.00, TCT No. 75324 and the subject property covered by TCT No.
T-44422 (with the consent of Jose Sr.) were offered as security for the loan.
Jose Sr. then executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) expressly authorizing the Spouses
Garcia to apply for, borrow, or secure any loan from the petitioner bank, and to convey and transfer
the subject property by way of mortgage. Jose Sr. also executed an Amendment of Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of the petitioner bank. The SPAs and the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage are
both inscribed on TCT No. T-44422. All of these transactions, however, were without the knowledge
and consent of Jose Sr.’s children.

Upon maturity of the loan, the spouses Garcia failed to pay their loan to the petitioner bank despite
repeated demands.

In 1996, the respondents filed a Complaint for Nullity of the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage,
Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the spouses Garcia and the petitioner bank. They
claimed that the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage was null and void as to respondents Nora,
Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy as they were not parties to the contract.

The respondents alleged that the subject property was a conjugal property of Jose Sr. and his
deceased spouse, Ligaya, as they acquired the subject property during their marriage; that upon
Ligaya’s death, Jose Sr., together with his children Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, by law,
became owners pro indiviso of the subject property; that the petitioner bank was at fault for not
including Jose Sr. as payee to the check representing the loan despite its knowledge that Jose Sr.
was a signatory to the real estate mortgage; that the real estate mortgage executed by Jose Sr.
could not bind his children as they did not give their consent or approval to the encumbrance; and
that the real estate mortgage was also void as to Jose Sr. since he never benefited from the loan.

In their answer, the Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr. was indebted to them in the amount of
₱133,800.00. To settle this indebtedness, Jose Sr. volunteered to give the subject property as
additional security for their loan to the petitioner bank.

The petitioner bank, on the other hand, claimed that the mortgage was made in good faith and for
value, and maintained that the respondents’ complaint stated no cause of action against it. It alleged
that the real estate mortgage over the properties was duly registered and inscribed on their titles and
was thus binding on the whole world.

In the course of the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy executed an SPA authorizing
Jose Sr. to act as their attorney-in-fact during the pretrial of the case.

Issue:
Whether or not Jose Sr. can mortgage the entire subject property in favor of petitioner bank.

Ruling:
No, Jose Sr. cannot mortgage the entire subject property in favor of petitioner bank.

Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, their property
relations were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains as provided under Article 119 of the
Civil Code. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife."
Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature.
What is material is the time when the property was acquired. Although the property appears to be
registered in the name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal property if it was
acquired for valuable consideration during marriage.
Upon the death of Ligaya, the conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and terminated
pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as
provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that"[t]he rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."

Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership
between the surviving spouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other. This
resulting ordinary co-ownership among the heirs is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership." 

Under this provision, each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or share in the co-ownership
and may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it except when personal rights are involved. Should
a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall
remain valid but only to the extent of the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. 

In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject property after the
death of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. While under Article 493 of the
Civil Code, even if he had the right to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the
disputed property, he could not dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his children’s
consent. As correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose Sr.’s right in the subject property is limited
only to his share in the conjugal partnership as well as his share as an heir on the other half of the
estate which is his deceased spouse’s share. Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void insofar as it
extends to the undivided shares of his children (Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy) because they did
not give their consent to the transaction.

Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage constituted by Jose Sr. over the entire
property without his co-owners' consent is not necessarily void in its entirety. The right of the
petitioner bank as mortgagee is limited though only to the portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr.
in the event of a division and liquidation of the subject property.

Heirs of Spouses Remedios Sandejas and Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. G.R. No. 141634, February
5, 2001

FACTS: On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court for
the letters of administration to be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife,
Remedios. The lower court issued and appointed Eliodoro as administrator.
On November 19, 1981, the Manila City Hall burned down and in it were the records of the
Court where Sandejas filed his petition. Subsequently, a motion to intervene and petition-in-
intervention was filed by Alex Lina alleging that Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, obligated to sell
to Lina 4 parcels of land.
Eliodoro died on 1984 in Canada. His counsel, waiting for official word on the fact of the
death of the administrator, alleged that the claim of Alex becomes a money claim to be filed in
Eliodoro’s estate. The lower court issued an order directing the heirs of Sandejas to move for the
appointment of a new administrator. But no one appeared. Subesquently, Alex filed a motion for his
appointment as new administrator of the estate of Sandejas on the following reasons: that Alex has
not received any motion for the appointment of an administrator in place of Eliodoro; that his
appointment will be beneficial to the heirs; and that he is willing to give way as administrator as long
as the heirs will present one. Hence, after some convincing, Sixto Sandejas was chosen as the
administrator with the court’s approval.
On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale
executed between Alex Lina and Elidioro and to compel the heirs to execute a deed of absolute sale
in favor of Alex. This was granted by the lower court.
The CA, however, overturned the lower court’s ruling. It held that the contract between
eliodoro and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that
the ownership of the 4 lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios until the approval of the
sale was obtained from the settlement court.
ISSUE:What is the settlement court’s jurisdiction?
HELD: Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court. Reference to judicial approval, however, cannot adversely affect the substantive
rights of heirs to dispose of their own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership. In other
words, they can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A
stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as
regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken out of custodia legis, but
only with the court's permission. It would seem that the suspensive condition in the present
conditional sale was imposed only for this reason.
Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences alleged by
petitioners have no bearing on the intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject
conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74
& 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and
the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or
otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate.
As to the issue of the computation of Eliodoro’s share, the proper determination of the seller-
heir's shares requires further explanation. Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the decedent's entire estate - under
the concept of conjugal properties of gains -- must be divided equally, with one half going to the
surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased. Hence, petitioner’s contention is
correct, that the CA's computation of Eliodoro Sr.'s share in the disputed parcels of land was
erroneous because, as the conjugal partner of Remedios, he owned one half of these lots plus a
further one tenth of the remaining half, in his capacity as a one of her legal heirs. Eliodoro's share
should be 11/20 of the entire property. Respondent poses no objection to this computation.

Felipe vs. Heirs of Aldon

Facts:
Maximo Aldon and Gimena Almosara are spouses who bought several pieces of land. In 1951, the
wife (Almosara) sold the subject lands to spouses Eduardo and Hermogena Felipe. This sale was
without the consent of the husband, Maximo.
In 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow Gimena and their children Sofia and Salvador
Aldon, filed a complaint against the Felipes alleging that they were the owners of the subject lots.
They claim that it is a mortgage and they were not allowed by the Felipes to redeem their property.
The Felipes argued that what transpired between them was a sale.
The CFI ruled in favor of the Felipes saying that what transpired was a contract of sale but the CA
reversed it saying that even if it was a sale, it was invalid as it lacked the necessary consent of
Maximo Aldon.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the land was valid.

Ruling:
No. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. Subject to certain exceptions, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's
consent. And the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in
cases provided by law.
In the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging to the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the husband and the sale is not covered by the phrase "except in cases provided by law."
The sale made by Gimena is certainly a defective contract but of what category? The answer: it is a
voidable contract.
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband only during the marriage
because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the party
responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the
annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right to
the lands sold.
The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership by the death of
Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation of Gimena. What she could not do during the marriage,
she could not do thereafter.

The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of Maximo they acquired the right
to question the defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father's
share in the lands. The father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3)
thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining to the widow.
The petitioners have been in possession of the lands since 1951. It was only in 1976 when the
respondents filed action to recover the lands. In the meantime, Maximo Aldon died.
On the topic of prescription and statute of limitations.
Anent the first question, We quote with approval the following statement of the Court of Appeals:
We would like to state further that appellees [petitioners herein] could not have
acquired ownership of the lots by prescription in view of what we regard as their bad
faith. This bad faith is revealed by testimony to the effect that defendant-appellee
Vicente V. Felipe (son of appellees Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena V. Felipe)
attempted in December 1970 to have Gimena Almosara sign a ready-made
document purporting to sell the disputed lots to the appellees. This actuation clearly
indicated that the appellees knew the lots did not still belong to them, otherwise, why
were they interested in a document of sale in their favor? Again why did Vicente V.
Felipe tell Gimena that the purpose of the document was to obtain Gimena's consent
to the construction of an irrigation pump on the lots in question? The only possible
reason for purporting to obtain such consent is that the appellees knew the lots were
not theirs. Why was there an attempted improvement (the irrigation tank) only in
1970? Why was the declaration of property made only in 1974? Why were no
attempts made to obtain the husband's signature, despite the fact that Gimena and
Hermogena were close relatives? An these indicate the bad faith of the appellees.
 Now then, even if we were to consider appellees' possession in bad faith as a
possession in the concept of owners, this possession at the earliest started in 1951,
hence the period for extraordinary prescription (30 years) had not yet lapsed when
the present action was instituted on April 26, 1976.
As to the second question, the children's cause of action accrued from the death of their father in
1959 and they had thirty (30) years to institute it (Art. 1141, Civil Code.) They filed action in 1976
which is well within the period.

Medina vs CA
Facts:
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages with prayer for Preliminary Attachment
and docketed as Civil Case No. 3561. In a Decision dated 27 December 1985, the RTC ordered
Arles Castañares (Arles), now deceased and represented by his heirs, to pay damages for running
over and causing injuries to four-year old Wenceslao Mahilum, Jr. The four-year old victim was left in
the custody of petitioner Jose I. Medina, who also represented the victim’s father, Wenceslao
Mahilum, Sr. In Civil Case No. 3561 became final and executory on 3 June 1987. The motion for
issuance of a writ of execution3 filed by petitioner was granted on 29 September 1987 and the
corresponding Writ of Execution4 was issued on 1 October 1987. The Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of
the RTC served a Notice of Levy and Seizure on Arles’ two (2) parcels of lands located at Goldbag,
Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate
Andres Castañares (Andres), brother of Arles and representing the heirs of the late Abundio
Castañares (Abundio), filed an Opposition claiming that after the death of his father Abundio, the tax
declaration of the property was cancelled and in its place, a tax declaration was issued in his favor;
that during the lifetime of his father and up to his death, Andres had been in peaceful, open,
notorious, public and adverse possession of the lot; that sometime in 1988, petitioner, through
stealth and strategy, encroached and occupied practically the entirety of the property in question by
encircling it with barbed wires, destroying in the process scores of fruit-bearing coconut trees. 
Andres testified that upon Abundio’s death, the latter left his children a parcel of agricultural land with
an area of 18 hectares, declared for taxation in Abundio’s name under Tax Declaration No. 1106.
Petitioner insisted that the lots contained in Tax Declaration Nos. 1107 and 1106 are not separate
and distinct, but refers to only one parcel of land, Lot 224. The lot in Tax Declaration No. 1107 is
denominated as Lot 224-A and is derived from Tax Declaration No. 1106, as certified by the wife of
Arles, Patricia Castañares (Patricia).20 Petitioner likewise submitted a sketch plan prepared on 12
March 1992 to show the real location of the lot described in Tax Declaration No. 1107.

Issue: Whether or not Abundio’s heirs have an actual right over the subject lot

Ruling:
No. An heir’s right of ownership over the properties of the decedent is merely inchoate as long as the
estate has not been fully settled and partitioned.
The two sketches are purportedly referring to only one lot. Hence, the pith and core of the
controversy is the ownership of the disputed property.
The appellate court is correct in stating that there was no settlement of the estate of Abundio. There
is no showing that Lot 224 has already been partitioned despite the demise of Abundio. It has been
held that an heir’s right of ownership over the properties of the decedent is merely inchoate as long
as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. 
It has been held that an heir’s right of ownership over the properties of the decedent is merely
inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. This means that the
impending heir has yet no absolute dominion over any specific property in the decedent’s estate that
could be specifically levied upon and sold at public auction. Any encumbrance of attachment over
the heir’s interests in the estate, therefore, remains a mere probability, and cannot summarily be
satisfied without the final distribution of the properties in the estate. Therefore, the public auction
sale of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107 is void because the subject property is still
covered by the Estate of Abundio, which up to now, remains unpartitioned. Arles was not proven to
be the owner of the lot under Tax Declaration No. 1107. It may not be amiss to state that a tax
declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership. 
Against a mere tax declaration, respondents were able to present a more credible proof of
ownership over Lot 224. The Court of Appeals relied on the Certification issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) Officer of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) which certifies that Abundio, and now the heirs, is the holder of a
homestead application and an order for the issuance of patent had already been issued as early as
7 July 1952. 

Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario

G.R. No. 1027 May 19,1903

Facts:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the CFI. It originated from an action to compel payment of
legacies filed by Ramon del Rosario (plaintiff) to claim the allowance, his rights to the share, and the
legacies left to him. 

Nicolas del Rosario died and left a last will, giving his nephews Ramon and Enrique legacies. They
were pointed out by name in the will, but were also described as the natural children of Clemente
(defendant), his executor and brother. However, Ramon cannot prove such recognition.

Under the will, in case Ramon and Enrique should still be engaged in study at the time of the death
of Honorata Valdez, Nicolas’ wife, they should continue to be supported at the expense of the estate
if they desire to continue the same studies. Furthermore, in the event that Honorata remarries, they
should be authorized to separate from her and be given an allowance of Php 25.00 per month and
should they continue their studies or be in poor health.

On the other hand, Honorata’s will provided that upon the death of Luisa, her sister-in-law, Ramon
and Enrique are entitled to the share of the estate after deducting Php 1,000 for Luisa’s male
children. It further declared that she leaves Php 3,000.00 to Ramon and Enrique in equal parts. Both
were also described under the will as the natural children of Clemente.

Luisa died one year after Nicolas and two years before Honorata and Enrique.

CFI ordered judgment in favor of Ramon in respect of the allowance, the right to live in the house,
and part of the estates left to Luisa.

Issue: 
1. WON Ramon is entitled to get the legacies left by the wills of Nicolas and Honorata even when
they are regarded as natural children? Yes 

2. WON Ramon is entitled to an allowance from the death of Honorata and to live in the house
where she was living? No

3. What is the effect of Enrique’s death on the share of Ramon in Honorata’s legacy? Enrique’s
share accrues to him

4. WON Ramon can direct to render accounts and to proceed to the partition of the said estates? No

Held: Judgment reversed

1. Yes, Ramon is entitled to get the legacy left by the wills of Nicolas and Honorata.

Where legatees are pointed out by name in the will, the fact that they are referred to as the
natural sons of a third person does not make the legacy conditional upon proof of such
relationship but is descriptive merely.

Here, it is distinctly declared that Ramon and Enrique shall take certain parts of the estate. They are
pointed out by name as the legatees. It is true that they are called the natural sons of Don Clemente.
But this is merely a further description of persons already well identified, and, if false, can be
rejected.

Thus, Ramon can still get the legacies.

2. No, Ramon is not entitled to an allowance from the death of Honorata and to live in the house
where she was living.

In the interpretation and construction of testamentary provisions, the intention of the testator
controls.

In the instant case, while under the will, the support of Ramon and Enrique is charged against the
estate, it is also made plain that this unconditional right was to last only during the lifetime of
Honorata. After her death, the right to this allowance is made to depend on the continuance of their
studies. 

The will further provided that in case of their separation from their aunt by her remarriage, they are
entitled to the specified allowance of Php 25.00 a month only on condition that they were pursuing
their studies or were in poor health. Here, there is no finding that Ramon was still pursuing his
studies for he had already obtained his bachelor of arts degree in 1898.

Hence, Ramon should not be paid an allowance from the death of Honorata and be allowed to live in
the house where she was living.

3. Ramon is entitled to be paid the sum of Php 1,500.00, in addition to the Php 1,500.00 already
received by him under will.

A legacy of a certain sum to two nephews in equal shares is payable in its entirety to the survivor of
them in case one dies before the testator

Here, Ramon was entitled to one-half of this legacy in his own right. This has been paid to him.
However, upon Enrique’s death before that of the testatrix, the right of accretion exists as to the
other half in favor of Ramon and he is entitled to have it paid to him.
4. No, Ramon cannot direct to render accounts and to proceed to the partition of the said estates

An executor who is also an heir is not qualified to make partition of the estate, and a legatee who
seeks the payment of a legacy involving a partition must sue all persons interested in the estate.

Here, Clemente was not only an heir as a life tenant but also in fee. Upon the death of Honorata, it
became his duty to divide the estate into three parts, or at least to set off the third, which was to pass
to Ramon by the death of the Honorata and Luisa. In this partition he was directly interested, for he
had a life interest in the part of the estate not set off to Ramon. Since the partition should be made
impartially, Clemente as the executor can not be required to render in this suit his accounts as such.

Furthermore, not all persons interested in the estate are parties. Thus, Ramon’s share of the estate
left by the will of Honorata to Luisa during her life, after deducting Php 1,000.00 cannot be set off to
him.

LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant

vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee

G.R. No. L-15737             February 28, 1962

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS:

Don Nicolas Villaflor (on October 9, 1908), a wealthy man of Castillejos Zambales, executed a will in
Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don
Fausto Villaflor.

Clause 8th of subject Will provided that subject property would be enjoyed by his wife Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno its use and possession while living and not marrying in second marriages, otherwise,
said legacies would become the property of his granddaughter niece Leonor Villaflor. 

Don Nicolas Villaflor died childless on March 3, 1922.  His widow Doña Fausta Nepomuceno later
became the administratrix of her husband’s testate estate. Much later after partition received by
virtue thereof the ownership and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate.
By virtue also of the said project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and
personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will of Nicolas Villaflor.

On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage, and
without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled
with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial administrator.

Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor, who is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas
Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor”, instituted the present action against the
administrator of the estate of Fausta Nepomuceno contending that upon the widow's death, she
(Leonor Villaflor) became vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed
by his late grand uncle Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. 
The trial court, however, disagreed and ruled that the title to subject properties became absolutely
vested in the widow, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno, upon her death, on account of the fact that she
never remarried.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the title to subject properties became absolutely vested to Fausta Nepomuceno, the
widow of plaintiff’s grand uncle – Nicolas Villaflor upon his death?

RULING:

No, the title to subject properties did not absolutely vest to Fausta Nepomuceno upon the death of
her husband Nicolas Villaflr.  The plain desire and intent of testator Nicolas Villaflor manifested in
clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties
described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition that if the widow remarried, her
rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. 

Legal Bases
ART. 791 (CC). The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of
two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." .

SEC. 59 of Rule 123 (ROC) Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In the
construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction
is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.

The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the
following: .

ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear
intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." .

Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates
a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator,
and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)

In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon, 26
Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute
the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. 

Application
Here, that the widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she
did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion
mientras viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion"
instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). 

The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only
the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the
remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother
(clause 6). 
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of his
testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words,
which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the testator had
intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion
mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her own
lifetime.

As already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his
widow should have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It
necessarily follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should
pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow
never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the
aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return,
unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third
parties have intervened.

Sobrina nieta = granddaughter or niece

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.

SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. v. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-7188, August 9, 1954
MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS:
Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his
Last Will and Testament. Before his death on January 14, 1943, he left properties estimated at
P8,000 in value. Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for its probate in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if
he left no will, filed opposition.

During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out
the will in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand
margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed,
and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing
at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his
last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation
clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any
evidence.

The trial court found and declared the will to be a holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of
the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death,
holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the
case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the
execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator
which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said
trial court by order admitted to probate the will as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho
Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only questions of law are
involved in the appeal, the case was certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a will which purportedly is a holographic will executed before the New Civil Code
may be considered for probate as such during the effectivity of the same.

RULING:
NEGATIVE. At the time that the will was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in
1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for
the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and
signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements
which were not complied with in the will because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were
not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front
pages, they were signed only by the testator.

Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form
depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but
an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be
judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is
presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon
and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed,
and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. 

Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling
factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out
said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the
testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes
should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time
of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he
leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under
the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new
legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning,
when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at
the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having died
intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more
liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to
validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate
succession. The general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills.

G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had
5 legitimate children with his first wife  Mary Mallen to whom he divorced, and had 3 illegitimate
children with his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him; and finally 3 illegitimate children.
He executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and
expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner:
a. $240,000.00 to his first wife;
b. P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children;
c. after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second wives.

Subsequently, Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate
in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the
will, paid all the bequests therein.

However, appellants Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

The lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Consequently, their motion for
reconsideration was denied.

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
WON the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s
successional rights.

HELD:

No.
In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing
that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas
has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the
place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are
found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi.

As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their
case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article
16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
 ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.