US Vs Taylor
US Vs Taylor
US Vs Taylor
ANDERSON TAYLOR
FIRST DIVISION
SYLLABUS
DECISION
CARSON, J : p
The evidence adduced at the trial conclusively establishes the facts set out
in the complaint, and it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused,
while resisting arrest, violently assaulted one Leoncio Martinez, a municipal
policeman of the city of Manila.
Counsel for the defendant contends that the arrest was illegal, and that the
policeman was therefore the aggressor, but it appears from the record that the
accused and his companions, in violation of a lawful ordinance of the city of
Manila, made use of threatening and insulting language on the public streets of
the said city, in the presence and within the hearing of the said policeman, and
that the said policeman was in the lawful performance of his duty when he
attempted to make the arrest.
The trial court imposed the penalty under provisions of paragraph 3 of
article 250 of the Penal Code. That paragraph is only applicable to those cases
where the persons accused of an attempt upon the authority (atentado contra la
autoridad) places violent hands upon the authority himself. It is not applicable to
cases where the crime is committed against an agent of the authority agente de
autoridad.) A policeman is not an authority as defined in the Penal Code, but an
agent of the authority, and therefore the penalty should be imposed in
accordance with the last paragraph of the said article.
The trial court was of opinion that in fixing the penalty the extenuating
circumstance defined in paragraph 7 of article should be taken into consideration,
because the accused committed the offense in an uncontrollable burst of sudden
passion (arrebato y obcecacion), but the supreme court of Spain has repeatedly
held that the fact that the offense was committed under the stimulus of a
sudden burst of passion should not be taken into consideration as an extenuating
circumstance unless it appears that it was provoked by prior unjust or improper
acts. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 15, 1878; March 8,
1884; August 20, 1885; October 11, 1887.) The arrest of the accused and his
companions which gave rise to their indignation and anger was a lawful one, and
therefore the trial court erred in finding the existence of the said extenuating
circumstance.
The judgment and sentence of the trial court should be, and is hereby,
reversed, and instead thereof we impose upon the said Anderson Taylor the
medium degree of the penalty of "prision correccional in its minimum to its
medium degree" — that is to say, one year eight months and twenty-one days'
imprisonment (prision correccional) and a fine of 375 pesetas and the costs of the
proceedings on both instances.
The accused is entitled to and will be allowed a credit (abono) of one-half
the period during which he has been held in detention pending the trial of his
case and the hearing of his appeal, in accordance with the provisions of rule 93 of
t h e Ley Provisional. After the expiration of ten days from the date of final
judgment let the record be remanded to the court below for proper action. So
ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Willard, JJ., concur.