USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ROLES OF ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

by

Lieutenant Colonel Nicolae I. Ciuca

Romanian Army

Professor John Bonin

Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree.
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States
Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The
Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary
of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government.

U.S. Army War College

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
 Form Approved
Report Documentation Page OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it
does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED

2. REPORT TYPE
15 MAR 2006 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2006
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Roles of Alliances and Coalitions in the War on Terrorism 5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

Nicolae Ciuca 5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army War College,Carlisle Barracks,Carlisle,PA,17013-5050
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT

NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
See attached.
15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE
28
unclassified unclassified unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
 ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Nicolae I. Ciuca

TITLE: Roles of Alliances and Coalitions in the War on Terrorism

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 08 March 2006 WORD COUNT: 7083 PAGES: 27

KEY TERMS: Transnational Network, Global Conflict

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The September 11, 2001 attacks were interpreted in different ways by individual countries
and/or regional and international organizations. Many states pledged their willingness to take
part in countering measures against terrorism. NATO invoked Article V, collective defense
provision for the first time in its history, and other international organizations express their
decision to participate within the common effort to support the campaign against terrorism.
Starting in 2002, the first deployment of Romanian troops, for example, to join the Coalition
Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan, has represented a fundamental pace in
the Eastern European countries’ way to become members of NATO. Since that year, small and
middle countries have adopted a new system of values through their desire to join the club of
democracy and freedom.
The conflict's dimension has been modified radically in recent years through the
asymmetric characteristics of confrontations. Depending on the new geopolitics and
geostrategic developments, I intend to review and determine the roles of alliances and coalitions
in this environment. In addition, from the perspectives of the new international environmental
challenges, the growing roll of international organizations and regional arrangements, I analyze
the necessity of common values, norms and rules for its kind of organizations.
 ROLES OF ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

In the international context, a state’s security is not considered to be threatened by major

military conflicts anymore. After World War II, the international community had to reinstall peace
in numerous locations all over the world.1 In this respect, military power, as one of the main
components of national power, is manning the ramparts of freedom around the world.2 Our
world, therefore, does not have peaceful stability; rather it has a relative stability, one which is
unpredictable and susceptible to new conflicts: the rise of Non-Trinitarian War.3 In the sixteen
years following the end of the Cold War, 4 conflicts have proliferated and do not seem to be
under control, then other types of power which represents states or entities, and non-states
actors.5 These actors have developed their own capacities in a relatively thin and limited
domain, but these capacities nevertheless provide them the possibilities to start and support
“hot spots” of crises and conflicts, and influence, as a result, the security environment. Even
though all this is reflected in the news media, specifically publications, books, and governments’
studies, we must, however, still add the most spectacular acts and the most dangerous
organizations: terrorists.

Terrorism as Transnational Network in a New Global Environment

As the 19th century ended, it seemed that no one was safe from terrorist attacks.6 During
the late and early 20 th centuries, in addition to anarchist and socialist networks, a number of
nationalist movements could be considered as transnationally organized. This model continued
throughout the 20 th century in the form of transnational organized anti-imperial, anti-colonial and
separatist nationalist movements, all of which used strategies of terror and violence.7 In the
beginning of 21st century, the sudden and dramatic terrorist acts and bombings in the United
States, Spain, Russia, and United Kingdom created a general sense of understanding that no
political or ideologically–driven organization can survive and thrive without a support network.8
Researching the historical events and features of terrorism is not the aim of this paper; however,
stating that terrorism has evolved throughout modern history is nevertheless appropriate.9
Acts of terrorism carried out by any organization at any time and place 10 have emotionally
impacted populations and political decisions. As was the case in many situations through mass-
media coverage,11 the terrorist outrage produced significant impacts on some of the larger
actors which are part in the regional and global equations of power. Subsequently, through the
use of unconventional and asymmetrical means and procedures, the terrorist organizations and
the states which supported them surprised 12 the governmental structures in charge with states’
security. A new concept consequently became acceptable among international players to
engage themselves in the struggle with this scourge: the military intervention – with or without a
United Nations (UN) mandate – for preventing and combating terrorism. While “thinking out of
the box,” however, we should not consider this to be only a military issue.

We must fight terrorist networks, and all those who support their efforts to spread
fear around the world, using every instrument of national power – diplomatic,
economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military.
Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of success – some seen,
some unseen. And we will always remain vigilant against new terrorist threats.13

The newly developing pattern of terrorism, targeting forces of modernization and

globalization specifically embodied by the United States and its allies, had been characterized
by unprecedented violence. Its members must be eradicated. The history of terrorism and
counterterrorism indicated, however, that those questionable movements are not associated
with the current phase of radical religious, anti-American, anti-Western venom and may be
deserving of a more careful analysis and a more discriminating response.
Today, the world has been confronted as never before by terrorism. While terrorism is
considered to play a broader role in the international arena, world powers must consider that
terrorism remains a widely debated element of international affairs. The world's nations remain
unable even to agree on its definition.14 Furthermore, terrorism has many forms.15 By analyzing
transnational terrorism within the broader context of a new global environment, world powers
need to think about what would constitute an appropriate long-term political response to this
broader phenomenon, and this is not an easy task.16 The complexity of transnational terrorism
presents a conceptual challenge to the discipline of military strategy, which has traditionally
been concerned with understanding conflict among state actors, rather than the role that non-
state actors play in the international security environment. Yet, international terrorism is
normally an international phenomenon that impacts overall levels of international security and
international stability. Consequently, open and pluralist societies are now confronted in
fundamental ways, as they were confronted by the communism ideology. 17 In this respect it is
quite easy to assume that terrorists seek to undermine the security and prosperity of nations
and that they feel threatened by the values and aspirations which make modern countries open,
tolerant, and creative societies with confident futures.
Supposing that this analysis is close to the actual reality, one has to assume that global
efforts are necessary to adjust to a threat that is not only alien but also unconventional and
unpredictable. Moreover, its presence is largely unseen and unknown. To seek to protect and

2
defend world countries with the knowledge that there are no guarantees for preventing
successful attacks in democratic societies is indeed challenging. This is, as many scholars
assume, an asymmetric threat with disproportionate advantages to the smaller but determined
aggressors operating beyond any accepted rules of behavior.
An interdependent and globalized world facilitates transmission of terror to remote victims.
Borders and distance do not offer much protection from a terrorist organization that is proficient
at using technology to recruit, communicate, and operate transnationally. With more extensive
international interests than ever before, it is necessary to increase the common efforts within
international partners to protect the values shared not only by the western countries, but also by
the developing countries as well. Since economies are linked to the global system that is
exposed to terrorist sabotage,18 one must consequently adapt to living in a more dangerous
world. These new terrorists have used aircraft as weapons. They have used public transport to
indiscriminately kill innocent people. They have made bombs from materials used in kitchens,
farming, mining, and so many other things which seem to be bought from Wal-Mart. Moreover,
they have experimented with chemical and biological weapons, and these terrorists are limited
only by imagination and opportunity.
There is no doubt that the global community has to face a new international order. As
Thomas Barnett assumes, “the global conflict between the forces of connectedness and
disconnectedness is here and is not going away anytime soon.” 19 In this respect the world must
adapt to these harsh new realities in a constantly changing strategic environment. Some
scholars assume that all these changes began with the end of the Cold War and the new
strategic uncertainties that followed. In Europe, for example, the altered situation in the Balkans
region has created a fertile environment for organized crime, human trafficking, and any other
criminal activities associated with terrorism, right in Old Europe. Further more, the continuing
degradation of security and stability situations in the Middle East and Central Asia, in
conjunction with the growing levels of poverty, have contributed as much as possible to a
favorable framework for conducting deadly terrorist acts. Looking back to September 11, 2001,
it is mandatory to recognize that the people who planed, organized, and conducted those
horrible acts, had a totally different view and vision (if that can be called vision) about the future.
This problem should not be considered just a problem for United States to solve. Consequently,
the emergence of the United States as the pre-eminent military and economic power should be
considered since it, along with its allies and partners, remains the overwhelmingly dominant
factor in the global strategic balance today. As is specified within the United States Strategy for
Combating Terrorism:

3
 We will also be resourceful. This strategy relies upon the ingenuity, innovation,
and strength of the American people. We will rally others to this common cause.
We will not only forge a diverse and powerful coalition to combat terrorism today,
but work with our international partners to build lasting mechanisms for
combating terrorism and for coordination and cooperation .20

The balance the United States struck with other dominant world powers has brought
advantages and opportunities for smaller and less dominant countries, like Romania, to openly
commit to the benefits of international cooperation in an increasingly globalized world. On the
other hand, as mentioned previously in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, world
leaders must address the possibility that these transnational terrorists may acquire and use
chemical, biological, radiological, or even nuclear capability. This prospect presents dangers of
grave proportions and remains a key factor in american strategic policy, and for NATO members
and coalitions members who fight in Afghanistan and/or Iraq, and other key partners alike.
The transnational terrorist capacity to inflict harm, without restraint or warning, means the
international community’s response must be on a large spectrum in accordance with the existing
and predictable challenges. It has demanded adjustment to a new cast on the broader security
policies, including the approaches to other transnational issues such as people smuggling,
money laundering and organized crime. They are not only involved in violence, but they also
provide social services, such as welfare, policing, education, employment, membership, identity
and existential meanings to constituencies that are marginalized within the given political order.
Contemporary political science has largely relegated participation in non-state organizations as
belonging to the realm of civil society, but this misses the fact that transnationally organized
movements may have an international agenda, rather than simply an organization agenda,
and/or view themselves as directly challenging the interests and identities of existing state
interests.21
The international community’s counter-terrorism response has meant changes to the
environment in which normal people lead their everyday lives. Protection against terrorism is
essential to preserving the right of each country, of each person, for security. This allows people
to participate freely in a society based on shared values of freedom and respect for the dignity
of human life. It is necessary to recognize this and to make sure the inevitable cost of
preparedness does not also tax cultural values, tolerance and the fundamental way of life.22
The United States, however, should not be the only world power involved with defeating,
denying, diminishing, and defending against terrorism. 23 States, non-governmental
organizations, international organizations, and any others structures and/or entities, should unify
all their efforts and capabilities to face the very complex terrorism challenge. It is obviously clear

4
and sustained by many strategies, policies, ideologies, and so forth that only an integrated
counterterrorism international program will enable targeted governments to identify and
systematically neutralize the strategies of terrorist organizations. The next section of this paper
will explore the United Nations’ measures which have been taken in order to argue the need for
coordination by this organization.

The Need of United Nations for Combating Terrorism

Terrorism attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United
Nations: respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules of war that protect
civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of
conflict.24

The above extract belongs to a United Nations report which suggests how nations can
work together to meet the new challenges of the 21 st century. The report also assesses the
current threats to international peace and security and evaluates how well the existing policies
and institutions are doing in addressing those threats. It is obvious that the report argues that
the UN, as the largest international organization, can no longer afford to view problems such as
terrorism, civil wars, or extreme poverty, in isolation. The UN report also suggests, that the
organization’s strategies must be comprehensive, and that all institutions must overcome their
preoccupations and learn to work across the whole range of issues in a concerted pattern.
The United Nations has focused and engaged its entire means available, even though
there are not too many and these are not very effective, to sustain and legitimatize the
international community’s measures to combat the scourge of terrorism. Between 1963 and
1999, the international community elaborated twelve universal legal instruments on the
prevention and suppression of terrorism. Since 1999, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) has been addressing, for many years, issues pertaining to international terrorism and
international cooperation. In 2002, the General Assembly approved an expanded program of
activities for the Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) within the Division for Treaty Affairs of
UNODC.25 The TPB is focusing on the provision of assistance to countries, upon request, for
ratifying and implementing the twelve universal legal instruments against terrorism.26 It is clear
that the TPB seems to provide a prompt and efficient process to answer the requests from
countries for assistance in countering terrorism, in accordance with its mandate. This program
presents a realm to provide legal advice to countries on becoming instrumental in combating
terrorism by assisting countries to incorporate these provisions into their national penal codes,
by providing training to criminal justice officials on the new laws, and by providing assistance to
strengthen national institutions dealing with terrorism.

5
 While examining and investigating in depth the TPB’s program itself, its influence in the
management of new challenges could never reach its intended scope. In this very complex,
vulnerable, uncertain, and ambiguous global arena, the UN should demonstrate its maturity in
order to make an evident and clear expression of globalization policy. In other words, the UN
must gather all its members to work together in order to avoid the consequences of isolationism,
and, as a mandatory request, to reunite all nations’ efforts to sustain the nonproliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). While illuminating this last aspect the UN must take very
seriously its role within the global fight against terrorism, by providing and proving its value as a
tool which is able to fulfill the will of free and innocent people. Consequently, the UN should
provide the best and the strongest example – either for state or non-state actors within the
international arena – in the field of how to approach the war against terrorist organizations and
their horrible acts.
Many efforts are made to maximize impact through operational partnerships and to avoid
duplication of efforts. Furthermore, technical assistance activities are undertaken in close
partnership and cooperation with numerous international, regional and sub-regional
organizations.27 It is clear that terrorist threats imposed upon the UN charter to respond actively
and effectively to new challenges today and tomorrow. Even now the organization is not able to
get involved in the field of combating terrorism; however, the UN should approach these new
threats directly by involving the entire international community and showing the commitment of
all its members to fight against terrorists. These efforts act as an important catalyst to facilitate
the UN’s role in these actions, as, for example, an on-going operational plan or project, with
global, sub-regional and national components and activities. The goals, motivations and
patterns of interaction with the UN and these actors are indeed quite distinctive. The UN will
have to consider under which circumstances it is possible or desirable to hand over a mandate
for action to one of the potential partners. So far, the best partners available within this huge
organization are considered to be the regional and sub-regional organizations, but in
accordance with globalization, there are to be taken into consideration other international actors
such as non-governmental and international organization, corporations, and foundations.
Given that a number of relevant organizations and entities, both internal and external to
the UN, are involved in the prevention and combat of terrorism, an integrated and coordinated
response to terrorism will serve to increase complementarities, avoid duplication of efforts and
resources, increase cost effectiveness, and broaden the audience that each entity can reach
individually. As a result, the TPB is committed to building partnerships with relevant entities on a
number of levels.28 Beyond all these assumptions regarding TPB’s importance and relevance,

6
this organization has to play a key role in the global approach to define and apply the counter-
terrorism measures which should cover more than that. It must to refer also to the social,
political, and economical development of those countries which are considered to be the cradle
of the new generation of terrorists.
Within the UN, however, it is vital to realize the importance of sustaining counter-terrorism
measures through structural measures, fated to contribute to the economical and social
development, as well as to the strengthening of the democratic system. It is also vital for the UN
to become much more involved in adopting such kinds of measures by which disasters and
emergency situations, which have resulted from terrorist acts, are to be stabilized and solved
through the coordination of all efforts made by the international community.
As mentioned previously, the UN does not have the means available either to sustain and
legitimize the international community’s measures to combat the terrorism scourge or to
implement and control all those measures described in the previous paragraph. Consequently,
conventional wisdom, reflected in many studies and thoughts, considers that the unilateral
power itself is not enough to succeed in combating not only terrorism but all disasters and other
criminal activities. Therefore, the use of alliances and arranging coalitions29 are to be the main
tools in controlling, defeating and stabilizing all kinds of bad situations. In conclusion, although
individual and/or collective state actors’ and/or international organizations’ efforts to maintain
regional and global stability and security are based upon soft power, 30 which increasingly seems
to yield positive results, military instruments (in their form of extreme manifestation) often remain
the final solution. Subsequently, in the next section NATO, as a representative political-military
alliance, will be analyzed in regards to its role and effectiveness in the war against terrorism.

NATO Strategy for Combating Terrorism

In the early 1990s, new states had been created in the Central-Eastern part of Europe. A
decade later, the global era of counterterrorism emerged following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, in Washington, D.C., New York City, and Pennsylvania. These acts
fundamentally changed the primary threats to international security and redefined the concept of
security for all states. On September 12, 2001, the member states of the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC) unconditionally condemned the terrorist attacks on the United
States of America and pledged to undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism.31
Beginning with the assumption that an alliance’s legitimacy relies on its capacities and
capabilities to provide collective defense for all its members in an international arena, the
current relevance of this type of organization can only be drawn from an analysis of how it

7
serves to deter common threats today. Searching for NATO strategy against terrorism, I couldn’t
find it, but I found instead the NATO Concept for Defense against Terrorism.32
Analyzing the NATO concept for Defense Against Terrorism, it is a broad spectrum of
measures for combating the current threats. In particular it looks at those threats posed by
international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and rising states
perceived to have the potential to upset today’s balance of power, such as the People’s
Republic of China, India, Brazil, and it provides an effective framework to set up a provisional
strategy for combating terrorism. Its analysis starts by assuming that NATO does not yet have a
strategy and that because of this, it is difficult to come to any sort of international consensus
regarding, the relevant strategy of the alliance today because national interests, threat
perceptions, and concepts of collective security remain disparate even after the September 11
attacks.33
Consequently, is important for the alliance itself and the global community as well to show
the commitment to this organization by combating the worst scourge of the beginning of the
third millennium. To accomplish such an objective, it is mandatory to have a NATO strategy
approved after reaching a consensus with all the alliance’s members. This will provide
legitimacy and reliability for any action which has to be taken and will reduce the decision-
making time according to the characteristics of new terrorists acts.

A. Scope of the Strategy.

After September 11, 2001, the fight against international terrorism reached unprecedented
proportions and now also covers a broad spectrum of new areas. Many measures 34 – on a
global, regional and individual scale – strongly suggest that a strategy for combating terrorism is
also an important element in the joint efforts of the alliance to control and defeat these criminal
acts, as is the assessment of the use of weapons of mass destruction and the identification of
ways of combating them. Clearly it is impossible for one country alone to deal with all these
aspects in depth.35 Furthermore, internal cooperation and the general consensus within the
alliance is imperative to determine a clear and reliable strategy for combating terrorism on a
global scale. Moreover, looking and searching within other international actors’ measures,
almost all international organizations have set up more working groups and other committees to
tackle some aspect of terrorism.
NATO is a collective defensive mechanism, so an attack against any single member of
NATO automatically constitutes an attack against all member states and requires a reaction
from all members in the form of collective action. Illustrating this, Article 5 of the North Atlantic

8
Treaty emphasizes that the core mission of NATO is the collective defense of its members.36
Some NATO members, including the United Kingdom and Germany, have assisted the United
States in military actions to remove the Taliban regime from Afghanistan. After that NATO, as a
whole, has continued to assist in leading a UN-mandated mission, especially within Kabul, but
the organization itself has not been able to react in any way to the terrorist attacks against the
alliance’s members which have occurred first in Madrid and then in London. Those horrible
attacks have resulted in the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. Consequently, these kinds
of issues are momentous and can undermine the alliance’s unity and relevance. NATO needs a
clear Strategy for Combating Terrorism based upon the NATO Treaty and Partner Action Plan
against Terrorism,37 in order to defend all its members and partnership countries against
terrorist attacks and preserve the peace by building good relations among other international,
governmental and/or non-governmental organizations.

B. Objectives, Ways and Means.

The alliance’s objectives can be derived from the first articles of the NATO Treaty. 38 But
these have been created primarily to deter and defend against Cold War threats. Then, on the
occasion of NATO’s 50th anniversary in April 1999, its 19 members approved the “Strategic
Concept of the Alliance.” This agreement has effectively redefined the mission of the alliance as
one that dedicates it to responding to a broad spectrum of threats.39 Consequently, this policy
transforms the alliance to place greater importance on political dimensions and to expand its
geographical focus beyond NATO territory. In addition, NATO has an open door policy on
enlargement. Any European country in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic
Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area can become a member of the Alliance
when invited to do so by the existing member countries.40
For the past eleven years, NATO has promoted military and political interoperability
across the European continent through the Partnership for Peace and EAPC. It is clear that
NATO wants to continue to engage other new countries by offering them cooperation to face the
new security and stability challenges which are threatening the alliance itself and its members
as well. Beyond Europe, the alliance is focusing primarily upon the Caucasus and Central Asia
as regions which have enormous strategic importance, but regions which also face serious
endemic problems, including terrorism. NATO will continue to keep its doors open for the next
enlargement, not just as a simple option, but for increasingly unifying efforts for combating
terrorism, considered among all the alliance’s members as a major threat to regional and global
stability and security. To face these challenges, the alliance’s leadership must develop new

9
strategies, new ways of cooperation, and new instruments according to its profound
transformation which occurred in the beginning of the third millennium. It is a challenge which
encompasses both the relevance as well as the reliability of the Alliance itself. In accordance
with the Partner Action Plan against Terrorism, the EAPC has established the main objectives
for combating terrorism,41 but based upon the analysis at the evolution of the regional and
global security environment I propose the following objectives:
1. NATO must secure the alliance as a whole and its individual members from direct
terrorist attacks. The Alliance will call for all of its members and other actors from the
international arena to defend the fundamental values of civilized societies.
2. NATO must increase the alliance’s strength and partnership. NATO should continue to
build a successful political and military system in a free and democratic world. It is to be seen in
a practical field, within the alliance and outside as well, in the light of its essential values which
support and preserve NATO’s integrity.
3. NATO should build a stabile and favorable security environment. Beyond affirming its
values, the organization should foster changes in the nature of the terrorism system. The
enlargement policy will create conditions for a favorable international system by demonstrating
the alliance’s resolve and commitment to working with other nations to identify terrorists and the
best means to defeat them:
In order to enhance peace and stability in Europe and more widely, the European
Allies are strengthening their capacity for action, including by increasing their
military capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and capacities of the
European Allies with respect to security and defense enhances the security
environment of the Alliance. The stability, transparency, predictability, lower
levels of armaments, and verification which can be provided by arms control and
non-proliferation agreements support NATO's political and military efforts to
achieve its strategic objectives.42

Although the above excerpt from The Alliance’s Strategic Concept was written prior to
September 11, 2001, it provides the framework for the wide variety of challenges faced by
NATO in providing the full spectrum of power in its approach to security in the 21st Century. In
that strategic concept the alliance has adequately described the objectives, ways and means to
accomplish them. Analyzing the specific action items which are contained within the Action
Plan demonstrates the effectiveness and validity of the above objectives and implemented as
follows:
• Intensify Consultations and Information Sharing . This will provide a broad realm for its
members to work through political consultation, information sharing, scientific
cooperation in identifying and mitigating new threats and challenges to security. 43 All

10
 of these will contribute to fulfill the alliance’s commitment and help the fight against
terrorism.
• Enhance Preparedness for Combating Terrorism. In pursuit of its goals the alliance
and its partners through their common efforts against terrorism will focus on: defense
and security sector reform, force planning, air defense and air traffic management,
information exchange about forces, training and exercises, armaments cooperation
and logistics cooperation.44 All these facts will enhance the ability of the alliance as a
whole and of each of its members and partners to develop plans for alerting,
containing, coordinating, and responding rapidly to any kind of terrorist attacks.
• Impede Support for Terrorist Groups. NATO and its partners must develop
mechanisms, techniques, and procedures which will eradicate terrorism wherever it
has roots. In this respect, the alliance will focus its efforts on: Border control, the
Economic dimension, Arms Control, Small Arms and Light Weapons, Enhance
Capabilities to Contribute to Consequence Management (WMD-related terrorism),
Enhance co-operation in Civil-Emergency Planning, Military contribution to
consequence management, Cooperation in non-classified scientific activities for
reducing the impact of terrorism, Cooperation in equipment development and
procurement), Assistance to Partners’ efforts against terrorism (Use of the Political
Military Steering Committee (PMSC) Clearing House mechanism and
Establish/contribute to PfP Trust Funds, Mentoring programs).45 The third component
of the alliance’s ways is comprised of the Action Plan and seeks the collective efforts
to diminish conditions that terrorists can exploit.
By accomplishing these objectives, the alliance should continue to expand and coordinate
the multilateral efforts on combating terrorism. In particular, I also recommend that it is
necessary to broaden the scope and strength of combatant measures. Moreover, NATO should
not forget that in this war against terrorism there will be no quick or easy end, and NATO must
constantly reassess this to create the architecture to face the challenges of the twenty-first
century.
A free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends.46 Although this
statement was written many years ago, it is considered relevant in the present day, especially
for multinational organization such as NATO. This organization contributes to the fight against
terrorism through military operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans and the Mediterranean and by
taking steps to protect its populations and territory against terrorist attacks.47 The use of its
means in the field is not an easy issue. Because of the lack of a real strategy for combating

11
terrorism48 and an excessive bureaucratic decision process, NATO has not, at least after the
Madrid and London terrorist attacks used its full capabilities in the war against terrorism. By its
concept for defense against terrorism, the organization has nominated the follow capabilities:
• Effective Intelligence.
• Deployment ability and Readiness. Once it is known where the terrorists are or what
they are about to do, military forces need the capability to deploy there. Due to the
likelihood that warnings will be received only after a cursory notice, forces need to be
at a high state of readiness.
• Effective Engagement. Forces need to be able to engage effectively. This means
precision-guided weapons and weapons able to reduce the risk of collateral damage.
• Force Protection. There is a constant requirement for Force Protection to ensure
Alliance forces’ survivability.
• CBRN Defense. 49 Given the possible terrorist use of CBRN weapons, CBRN defense
equipment needs to be given a high priority. 50
These capabilities are to be taken into relevant consideration, but as the alliance itself has
recognized, there is room for improvements and these are described within the Defense Against
Terrorism Program.51 Applying the alliance’s capabilities through waging global war against
terrorism should gain acceptance from all members. While there may be members within the
NATO organization which are currently reluctant in regard to the field engagement of their
forces, all members and the alliance itself should change the approach in applying the use of
force in order to support the commitment and will to act decisively to counter the threats
represented by this scourge.

C. Threats and Risks.

Threats are well distinguished within NATO’s Military Concept for Defense Against
Terrorism and have been transcribed here from the written assessment:
• Although religious extremism, especially from large numbers of Muslims in NATO
countries, is likely to be the source of the most immediate terrorist threats to the
Alliance, other motivations for terrorism could emerge from economic, social,
demographic and political causes derived from unresolved conflicts or emerging
ideologies.
• In addition, although state sponsorship of terrorism is currently in decline, political
circumstances could lead to its rise, providing terrorists with safe havens and
considerable resources.

12
 • Although the predominant form of terrorist attack remains the creative use of
conventional weapons and explosives, terrorist groups are expected to strive for the
most destructive means available, including Weapons of Mass Destruction.52
Beyond these threats, emphasizing the existing risks from NATO’s serious involvement in
the war against terrorism, especially in Iraq, it is crucial that NATO continues its effective results
obtained in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Mediterranean. Meanwhile NATO has conducted
a restructuring and reforming process. Consequently, if it is not to be overload by engaging in a
campaign against terrorism, it is possible that some allies will not agree. If all members agree to
engage their capabilities into the war, however, then NATO may expect terrorists to conduct
attacks against one and/or more countries. Consequently, as happened with the withdrawal of
Spanish troops after Madrid’s horrible attacks, it is possible to affect the consensus and unity of
the alliance.53
Last, but not least, it is important to underline, as a major risk, the fact that not placing
enough importance on the expected reactions after terrorist attacks, as happened after the
Madrid and London attacks, demonstrates the alliance’s weaknesses and subsequently
encourages terrorism in order to determine and influence the organization’s unity of action and
efforts.
All the above should not to be taken into consideration as permanent conditions. They
are, however, to be adapted and considered in accordance with the evolution of real facts within
the international arena, while at the same time taking into consideration not only the state actors
but the non-state actors, agencies, and other international factors which are going to influence
the regional and global environment. In short, clarifying and covering all threats and risks,
proves difficult but necessary in order to analyze possible conclusions and recommendations.

D. Conclusions and Recommendations

A comprehensive and decisive strategy for combating terrorism and winning the peace by
NATO should be designed as clearly, effectively and proactively, as possible so that it can be
sustained for as long as necessary in order to achieve the goal of defeating one of the worst
scourges to strike innocent people. Member nations must all support this defense strategy. I
argue that establishing objectives and setting-up an Action Plan is not enough. Of course this
does not mean that the strategy itself is the solution, more is needed than that. This strategy
should include objectives to match the means available, and then it is very important to pursue
the improvement of the preparedness of individual countries and of NATO as a whole to
respond rapidly and effectively to the consequences of terrorist attacks (including WMD

13
attacks). Some of the specific issues written above refer to a better coordination of the alliance’s
efforts itself, the protection of individual countries, and then the specific issue to reach the
consensus and maintain the unity of action within the organization.
Time is critical. NATO and its member nations face the very real threat of terrorism and
countering this, in most circumstances, is crucial. To become more involved this fight is a
necessity which has its roots in the nations’ primary responsibility for defense of their own
people and infrastructures. Therefore NATO should have a clear strategy and should increase
its efforts and participation into field campaigns for combating terrorism. Consequently, the
Alliance needs a strategy because it needs to be prepared to conduct military operations to
engage terrorist groups and their capabilities, whenever and wherever required, as the
international situation requires and as the North Atlantic Council decides.

Coalition’s Role for Combating Terrorism

It is well known that the United States has asked not only European countries, but others
as well, to provide military support, intelligence, logistic support, and any other abilities which
can be effectively used in the war against terrorism. As mentioned above, neither NATO nor
other multinational organizations have provided support for combating terrorism in the field, at
least, as much as United States expected. Consequently, the tendency is to conclude that
multinational organizations are perceived as being less effective than individual countries
because they require the unanimous consent of their members, and then a long process of
decision making before involving their capabilities into action. As a result, in the last two major
theatres of operations for combating the terrorist scourge, the United States has seen itself in
the position of asking individual countries, to join the club and express openly their resolve and
commitment to defeat the terrorists and bring back peace within free world.
Specifically, the role of a coalition is represented by the difficulties which are to be
overcome in order to set it up. It is evident how frustrating it is to gather international support
and then how difficult is to maintain its cohesion and unity of efforts. Another difficult piece is
maintaining the coalition’s members involved all the way to the final victory. It is not always
possible to rely upon traditional allies, on a specific issue, if they do not share the same
interests as the founder of the coalition.54 In our specific case, while the campaign is to be run
for a long time, is to be considered that success will be ensured by a continually and
increasingly need of partners. A coalition consists of the role of each individual country. It
doesn’t matter how small or big the country is. Its participation brings into the organization the
most important issue which contributes to increase its role.

14
 A very important point is that the military is not the only pillar which supports coalition
strength and roles. There are multiple and multilateral pillars and channels, such as: diplomacy,
information, financial, economy, law, and intelligence which have grown and evolved in ways
that changed the landscape of coalition. Therefore, even not offering substantial military
capabilities by joining the coalition, but offering the availability to take part within the coalition, at
least, through one of those domains, each country which cares and wants to fight against this
scourge can offer much more sustainability, credibility and reliability to the coalition within the
international arena. For example, European Union does not have military capabilities to offer the
coalition in Iraq, but it has taken any other measures within diplomacy, justice and home land
security. But this is not an easy issue; while counterterrorism is considered to be a very complex
threat, building and leading a coalition is a much more complicated goal.
Normally, bilateral agreements are easy to be conducted and are more effective. While
not only United States, but any other actor prefers this way of arrangements, the international
realm for combating terrorism is imposing a different approach which has to be adopted by the
main and/or secondary actors. Consequently, the bilateral approach will remain the number one
priority through military and intelligence areas, but the multilateral approach must be utilized and
increasingly developed in order to achieve robust capabilities within all areas mentioned above.
Subsequently, a multilateral approach within regional and global arenas will enhance the ability
of the coalition to identify and defeat individual and/or organized terrorists all over the world.
Analyzing Afghanistan and Iraq coalitions’ contributors, it is easy to realize why some
individual states, especially from Eastern Europe and Latin America participated. Some do not
yet belong to an organization such as NATO, the European Union or any other institutions and
were trying to prove by participating within these coalitions for combating terrorism their resolve
and commitment to demonstrate their relevance and how necessary is the role of each country
in defeating terrorism. On the other hand it is not so difficult to find out how easy some individual
countries can withdraw from the team as a result of violent actions against innocent people back
home, as happened in Spain. In addition, almost all the other countries which were supported
by Spain have decided to withdraw their troops as well.
In conclusion, the role of a coalition does not consist only in legitimacy and/or number of
powerful countries which join it. The role of coalition consists in its ability to exploit as much as
possible the momentum of relevancy. Then, the coalition should provide useful alternatives for
peace and stability in the region, which seems to appear an important benefit for attracting
international support. Another point which has relevance for the coalition’s role and dimension is
the opportunity provided to some of the small and/or middle countries to consider their short-

15
term or perhaps long-term interests. The price paid by those countries through the participation
within the coalition has already provided the chance to enter the club which considers
democracy and freedom as supreme values of life. The long-term success of the coalition will
depend on concerted cooperation either from individual countries or regional organizations
and/or international institutions as well, having as a key factor the multilateral engagement of
this scourge.

Conclusion

Terrorism itself and in conjunction with weapons of mass destruction proliferation and
regional conflicts are considered to be the major current challenges which individual states,
alliances and coalitions have to face in this heterogeneous global environment. Terrorism’s
threats flow from the construction of the expanded “caliphate” to the use of weapons of mass
destruction, especially targeting United States and its allies. In accordance with the content of
the Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi (October 11, 2003), the international community has
found out not only the strategic vision of al Qaeda’s, but also its political goals. Consequently,
we can assume that the nature of the threat is a global one and this makes it difficult to ensure
effective countermeasures by the individuals, alliances and/or coalitions.
NATO envisages two ways of involving the alliance in the war against terrorism: “one
where NATO is in the lead and one where NATO supports national authorities.”55 It is too soon
to assume that these efforts will succeed or not. So far, under UN mandate, NATO has proved
not only its relevance within engagement in Afghanistan, but also the UN influential contribution
to the international consensus for combating terrorism. The necessity of a new strategy for
combating terrorism is available not only for NATO, but for UN as well. Though the recent
involvements of NATO and UN in Iraq could be considered to be not really effective, it is
recommended that both organizations enhance their participation in the area. Time is critical
and the involvement and a declaration of a clear strategy of these organizations are necessities
which have their roots in the nations’ primary responsibility for defense of their own people and
infrastructures.
The role of coalitions in the war of combating terrorism comprises a very complex set of
individual, regional and/or international interests. Each category retains primacy in a certain
area of interests. As a result it is very important that the leading nation or organization of the
coalition to have the power to maintain the balance within each approach. Finally, it is very
important to assume that the individual, bilateral, and multilateral approach of this scourge can
develop the counterterrorism capabilities over short and long-term objectives and would lead to

16
increase international cooperation against terrorism. Also, the involvement of organizations such
as UN, NATO, and/or coalitions, and their increasingly efforts focused to defeat the terrorism will
encourage other individuals or other organizations to involve themselves or increase their
participation in activities to counter terrorism.

Endnotes
1
We are referring here to: Korean War, Vietnam War, the continuously Israeli-Arabic
Conflicts, then United Kingdom-Argentina conflict, Iran-Iraq War, Russian invasion into
Afghanistan, the first Persian Gulf War (the first Coalition Intervention after The Fall of Berlin
Wall), and not the least we want to mention to the interethnic and religious conflicts from
Balkans.
2
For example: in the Balkans, Sinai, Kuwait, South Korea, Angola, Mozambique, Georgia,
Congo, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.
3
Martin Van Creveld, “The Transformation of War Revisited,” in Non-State Threats and
Future Wars, Robert J. Bunker (ed. London: frank Cass & Co., 2003), 3-14.
4
“When the Cold War Ended, we thought the world had changed. It had – but not in the
way we thought. When the Cold War ended, our real challenge began. The United States had
spent so much energy during those years trying to prevent the horror of global war that it forgot
the dream of global peace.” Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace
in the Twenty-First Century (New York, Berkley Books, 2004), 1.
5
For example: in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Colombia, in Congo, Kashmir, Liberia,
Macedonia, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Sudan.
6
In 1894 an Italian anarchist assassinated French President Sadi Carnot. In 1897
anarchists fatally stabbed Empress Elizabeth of Austria and killed Antonio Cnovas, the Spanish
prime minister. In 1900 Umberto I, the Italian king, fell in yet another anarchist attack; in 1901 an
American anarchist killed William McKinley, president of the United States. Terrorism became
the leading preoccupation of politicians, police chiefs, journalists, and writers from Dostoevsky
to Henry James, available from http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2003/09/07/
the_president_and_the_assassin?mode=PF
7
For more details, see Fiona Adamson, International terrorism, Non-State Actors and the
Logic of Transnational Mobilization: A Perspective from International Relations (Stanford
University, Center for International Security and Cooperation – CISAC), available from
http://www.ssrc.org/programs/gsg/gsg_activities/adamson.page
8
“The terrorist threat is a flexible, transnational network structure, enabled by modern
technology and characterized by loose interconnectivity both within and between groups. In this
environment, terrorists work together in funding, sharing intelligence, training, logistics,
planning, and executing attacks. ” George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating terrorism
(Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003), 8
9
For more details, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, The Historical and Political Conceptualization
of the Concept of Terrorism (November, 2002), available from http://www.ssrc.org

17
 10
I did not restrict my research only to al-Qaeda, its horrible act from September 11, 2001
and to the events which have occurred after that. Unfortunately terrorism has a long history and
very well known by governments and people as well.
11
As it happened on September 11, 2001 in Washington but especially in New York when
we were watching those horrible events live on many television news channels.
12
For more details see how local governments have responded to such events as: Madrid –
March 11, 2004; London – July 7, 2005; Amman – November 9, 2005.
13
Bush, 1.
14
There is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism. Not even the United Nations
has been able to achieve consensus on this contentious issue. The old adage that “one man's
freedom fighter is another man's terrorist” goes to the root of the ongoing debate. Individual
states, therefore, have been compelled to develop their own definitions for the purposes of
enacting legislation to counter the threat.
15
“Attempts to understand terrorism in strategic terms highlight the unity of all strategic
experience. Terrorism is different in its actions, and menace of actions, from regular military
conquest or attrition of enemy’s military strength, but then guerilla warfare and nuclear
deterrence also are different. But all these types of military conduct generate strategic effect.
That effect can be produced upon the mind, the military muscle, or both, of the foe, but in either
case there has to be a transition from the use of force, from violent acts and the threat thereof,
to political consequences.” Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), 296.
16
“It is an enduring conflict between those who want to see disconnected societies like
Saddam’s Iraq join the global community defined by globalization’s Functioning Core and others
who will do whatever it takes in terms of violence to prevent these societies from being – in their
minds – assimilated into a “sacrilegious global economic empire” lorded over by the United
States. The most frightening form this violence takes in the current age is religious-inspired
transnational terrorism, or what Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon dub “the age of sacred
terror.” Over the long run, the real danger we face in this era is more than just the attempts by
terrorists to drive the United States out of the Middle East; rather, it is their increasingly
desperate attempts to drive the Middle East out of the world.” Barnett, 43.
17
“From its origins in the late 1960s, politically inspired or ideologically driven terrorist
groups slowly ramped up their attacks worldwide, in no small measure because of systematic
support from the Soviet bloc. When that aid disappeared in the late 1980s, global terrorism
nosedived, leading many experts (including me) to surmise it would no longer constitute a
significant security threat for the international community as a whole. What really happened in
the 1990s is that many of these terrorists groups, cut off from Soviet material and ideological
support, fundamentally reinvented themselves as religiously motivated terror movements.” Ibid.,
44.
18
“Global economic integration means that a major terrorist attack anywhere in the
developed world would have devastating consequences for the well-being of millions of people
in the developing world. The World Bank estimates that the attacks of 11 September 2001 alone
increased the number of people living in poverty by 10 million; the total cost to the world

18
economy probably exceeded 80 billion dollars. These numbers would be far surpassed by an
incident involving nuclear terrorism.” Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Chance, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (United Nations, 2004), 14.
19
Barnett, 46.
20
Bush, 29.
21
“Groups such as the PKK, the FLN, the IRA, Hamas, al Qaeda and other transnational
organized non-state political actors fall somewhere on the continuum of transnational social
movements, de-territorialized proto-states, and organized networks of terror and crime.” Fiona
Adams.
22
“We understand that a world in which these values are embraced as standards, not
exceptions, will be the best antidote to the spread of terrorism. This is the world we must build
today.” Bush, 30.
23
“The first tenet of the 4D strategy (Defeat, Deny, Diminish and Defend) calls for defeating
terrorist organization of global reach through the direct or indirect use of diplomatic, economic,
information, law enforcement, military, financial, intelligence, and other instruments of power”.
Ibid., 15.
24
Report, 48.
25
Terrorism Prevention Branch, Delivering Counter-terrorism Assistance (United Nations
Office of Drug and Crime), available from http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/
Brochure_GPT_April2005.pdf
26
“Since 2002, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice have reiterated the mandate of the
Terrorism Prevention Branch in providing technical assistance to counter terrorism. Upon the
recommendation of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the
Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly, in December 2004, adopted resolution
59/153, entitled “Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in promoting
the implementation of the universal conventions and protocols related to terrorism within the
framework of the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.” In that resolution,
the Assembly requested the Terrorism Prevention Branch “to intensify its efforts to provide
technical assistance in preventing and combating terrorism, including training judicial and
prosecutorial personnel, where appropriate, in the proper implementation of the universal anti-
terrorism instruments.” The Secretary General, in his speech to the International Summit on
Democracy, Terrorism and Security in Madrid, stated that the UN Office on Drugs and Crime is
experienced at providing technical assistance to states to develop and maintain an efficient
criminal justice system capable of fighting terrorism.” Ibid., 2.
27
Here I include the following organizations: “the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth Secretariat, the International Monetary
Fund, the African Union (AU), the International Organization of la Francophone, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the League of Arab

19
States, Interpol, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Counter-Terrorism
Working Group of the European Union (COTER), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and
the Counter Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) of the G-8.” The United Nations in Brief, The
Specialized Agencies, available from www.un.org/Overview/brief6.htlm.
28
“Exchange of expertise and information with other international and regional
organizations and national institutions is emphasized. Moreover, where appropriate, the TPB
works with other international organizations, as well as with regional and sub-regional
organizations.” Terrorism, available from http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism.html
29
“One of diplomacy’s key tasks is to arrange coalitions so that one’s power and its
reputation are multiplied through them.” Colin L. Powell, “The craft of Diplomacy,” Wilson
Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 3, (Summer 2004), 64.
30
“The use of “soft power” (moral suasion) will be more and more influential in diplomatic
and military arenas, even as “hard power” (weapons and military technology) grows more
prominent in the American federal budget.” Peter Schwartz, Inevitable Surprise (New York:
Gotham Books, 2003), 3.
31
Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (Prague, 22 Nov. 2002), available from
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122e.htm
32
NATO and the fight against terrorism, Prague Summit – adapting to the threat of
terrorism, available from http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/evolve_c.html
33
“Some have argued that NATO is irrelevant in meeting the threat posed by terrorism
because of its refusal to participate in the 2003 U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein’s regime
in Iraq. This argument confuses the purpose of an alliance as a legitimate agreement among
nations on collective defense for an illegitimate one on collective offensive action…. Washington
considers terrorism and WMD proliferation, especially the lethal combination of the two, as the
foremost threats facing not just the United States but the greater international community today.
As disagreements over whether to go to war with Iraq show, however, different nations view the
collective threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and WMD differently. Yet, many would agree
that each poses a formidable current threat to international security and thus merits discussion
here. ” Dingli Shen, Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats? available from
http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_shen.pdf
34
Here refer to: means of arrests, surveillance, intelligence gathering, special laws and so
forth; taking added precautions in connection with air, maritime and land transport as well as
public health - to guard against biological, chemical or nuclear attacks; tightening controls on
bank transfers and investigating the impact of terrorist activities on the economy and on
insurance companies in particular.
35
“Success will not come by always acting alone, but through a powerful coalition of nations
marinating a strong, united international front against terrorism…In the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks we have reaped the rewards of the investments made in our major
alliances during the past 50 years. These rewards are evident in NATO’s unprecedented
invocation of Article V of the NATO Treaty, Australia’s invocation of Article IV of the ANZUS
Treaty, and in the way both our NATO and ANZUS allies have matched words with deeds on

20
every front in the war against terrorism.” George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating
terrorism (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003), 20.
36
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations , will assist the Party
or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the
security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and
maintain international peace and security.” The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, 4 April,
1949), available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm
37
“On 12 September 2001, the Member States of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC) condemned unconditionally the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on 11
September 2001, and pledged to undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism.
Building on this commitment, member States of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(hereinafter referred to as EAPC States) hereby endorse this Partnership Action Plan against
Terrorism with a view to fulfilling their obligations under international law with respect to
combating terrorism, mindful that the struggle against terrorism requires joint and
comprehensive efforts of the international community, and resolved to contribute effectively to
these efforts building on their successful co-operation to date in the EAPC framework.” Partner
Action Plan against Terrorism (Prague Summit 21-22 September, 2002), available from
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122e.htm
38
“The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations , to settle any
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations. The Parties will contribute toward the further development of
peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing
about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by
promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their
international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of
them.” Ibid.
39
Here are included threats such as: regional conflicts, WMD proliferation as well as their
means of delivery, and transnational threats such as terrorism. For more details see: NATO
Summit, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (Press Release NAC-S(99)65 – April 24, 1999),
available from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm
40
NATO Topics, Enlargement, available from http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.
41
“The principal objectives of the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism are to:

- reconfirm the determination of EAPC States to create an environment unfavorable to the

development and expansion of terrorism, building on their shared democratic values, and to
assist each other and others in this endeavor;

21
 - underscore the determination of EAPC States to act against terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations and their willingness to co-operate in preventing and defending against terrorist
attacks and dealing with their consequences;

- provide interested Partners with increased opportunities for contributing to and supporting,
consistent with the specific character of their security and defense policies, NATO's efforts in the
fight against terrorism;

- promote and facilitate co-operation among the EAPC States in the fight against terrorism,
through political consultation, and practical programs under EAPC and the Partnership for
Peace; upon request, provide assistance to EAPC States in dealing with the risks and
consequences of terrorist attacks, including on their economic and other critical infrastructure.”
Partner Action Plan against Terrorism (Prague Summit 21-22 September, 2002), available from
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122e.htm
42
NATO Summit, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (Press Release NAC-S(99)65 – April
24, 1999), available from http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm
43
Partner Action Plan against Terrorism (Prague Summit 21-22 September, 2002),
available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122e.htm
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council, by Naval War College Review in
National security Policy and Strategy, Volume 2 – Readings (Department of National Security
and Strategy, U.S. Army War College-Carlisle Barracks, Academic Year 2006), 257.
47
NATO Topics, NATO and the fight against terrorism, available from
http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index.
48
Here I also refer to the lack of common agreement and different position regarding the
alliance’s involvement in the “central field to fight against terrorism – Iraq.”
49
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear.
50
NATO, International Military Staff, NATO’s military concept for defense against terrorism,
available from http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm
51
For more details see: NATO Topics, Defense Against Terrorism Program, available from
http://www.nato.int/issues/dat/in_practice.htm
52
NATO, International Military Staff, NATO’s military concept for defense against terrorism,
available from http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm
53
Then we have to consider the very specific interests which one or more members of
alliance could have in the area where the campaign is to be conducted. Here we want to
emphasize the Turkish position before and during the Operation Iraqi Freedom. This happened

22
not only because it is a Muslim country, but also because it has territorial problems with the
Kurds.
54
“Some key NATO members could not support Washington because they did not believe
that Saddam posed an imminent threat. NATO’s failure to act simply does not prove that the
role of alliances will diminish as long as military action is taken for legitimate reasons. Given the
abuse of a legitimate use of the policy of preemption, some NATO allies, such as France and
Germany, strongly disagreed with the Bush administration on the war and on employing NATO
for this purpose.” Ibid, 168-169.
55
Nora Bensahel, The Counter Terror Coalitions. Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the
European Union, available from http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1746/MR1746.pdf, 26.

23
24