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Philosophy of Computer Science: An Introductory Course

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Teaching Philosophy, 28:4, December 2005 319

Philosophy of Computer Science:

An Introductory Course

WILLIAM J. RAPAPORT
State University of New York at Buffalo

Abstract: There are many branches of philosophy called "the philosophy of

X," where X = disciplines ranging from history to physics. The philosophy
of artificial intelligence has a long history, and there are many coursesand
texts with that title. Surprisingly, the philosophy of computer scienceis not
nearly as well-developed. This article proposestopics that might constitute
the philosophy of computer science and describesa course covering those
topics, along with suggestedreadings and assignments.

During the Spring 2004 semester, I created and taught a course on the
Philosophy of Computer Science. The course was both dual-listed at
the upper-level undergraduate and first-year graduate levels and cross-
listed in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering (CSE)
(where I am an associate professor) and the Department of Philosophy
(where I have a courtesy appointment as an adjunct professor) at State
University of New York at Buffalo ("UB").
The philosophy of computer science is not the philosophy of artifi-
cial intelligence (AI); it includes the philosophy of AI, of course, but
extends far beyond it in scope. There seem to be less than a handful
of such broader courses that have been taught: A Web search turned
up some three or four that were similar to my course in both title
and content.) There are several more courses with that title, but their
content is more accurately described as covering the philosophy of
AI. The philosophy of computer science deserves more exposure at
the university level. The UB course was popular (with an enrollment
of just under fifty), and the students found it valuable, not only for
its coverage of topics in the philosophy of computer science, but also
for the critical-thinking skills they learned (see p. 322). This article
presents my ideas on what a course in the philosophy of computer
science might look like.

@ TeachingPhilosophy. 2005. All rights reserved.0145-5788 pp.319-341

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 -f~ ..

320 WILLIAM J. RAPAPORT

Why teach the philosophy of computer science?And why teach it in

a computer science department rather than in a philosophy department?
As a professor of computer science with a Ph.D. in philosophy (and a
previous career as a philosophy professor), I've long been interested in
philosophical issues in computer science in general and artificial intel-
ligence in particular. My colleague Stuart C. Shapiro in the VB CSE
department had urged me to develop some philosophy courses for our
students. Initially, I had resisted this, not being sure that such courses
would be acceptable to my department or-more importantly-taken
by enough students. Moreover, my colleague Randall R. Dipert in our
philosophy department regularly offered an undergraduate course in
the philosophy of AI, with which I didn't want to compete.
However, there were many metaphysical, epistemological, and ethi-
cal issues that I thought were of interest in the non-AI part of computer
science, many of which have only recently begun to be examined in
detail by philosophers and philosophically-oriented computer scientists,
and many of which shed new light on classical topics in philosophy.
This article surveys them and offers some interesting readings that
deserve to be better known. Moreover, a course such as this can serve
as an introduction to philosophy for computer science students, an
introduction to issues in computer science for philosophy students, a
capstone course for senior undergraduate computer science students,
or perhaps an overview course for beginning computer-science gradu-
ate students.

Syllabus
The course syllabus was organizedaround a set of questionswhose
various answerswe examinedduring the semester:2
1. What is philosophy? In particular, what is "the philosophy of
X" (whereX = things like science,psychology,history, etc.)? (These
questions are especially important to discuss in a course primarily
aimedat computersciencestudents,who might havemisleadingideas
of what philosophy is all about-or no idea at all.)
2. What is computer science?(Although the "final" answerto this
questionmay simply be the extensional"whatevercomputerscientists
do," this is a reasonableissueto discuss,evenif thereis no intensional
answer.The following subquestionsindicate some of the interesting
issuesthat this main question raises.) (a) What is science?What is
engineering] (b) Is computer sciencea science,or is it a branch of
engineering?(c) If it is a science,what is it a scienceof? (d) Is it a
scienceof computers(as someauthorssay)?(e) What, then, is a com-
puter? (f) Or is computersciencea scienceof computation(as other
authorssay)?(g) What, then,is computation?(h) What is an algorithm?
,

"'

PHILOSOPHYOF COMPUTERSCIENCE 321

Is an algorithm different from a procedure? Many authors say that an

algorithm is (like) a recipe; is it, or are there important differences?
(i) What are Church's and Turing's "theses"? (j) Some authors claim
that there are forms of computation-often lumped together under the
rubric "hypercomputation"-that, in some sense, go "beyond" Turing-
machine (TM) computation: What is hypercomputation"?
3. What is a computer program? (a) What is the relation of a
program to that which it models or simulates? What is simulation? (b)
Are programs (scientific) theories? (c) What is an implementation? (d)
What is software? How does it relate to hardware? (e) Can (or should)
computer programs be copyrighted, or patented? (f) Can computer
programs be verified?
4. What is the philosophy of artificial intelligence? (a) What
is AI? (b) What is the relation of computation to cognition? (c) Can
computers think? (d) What are the Turing Test and the Chinese Room
Argument?
5. What is computer ethics? (This, like the philosophy of AI, is a
vast question, deserving of its own course and having many textbooks
devoted solely to it. For my purposes, I decided to focus on questions
that don't seem to be the typical ones asked in such a course.) (a)
Should we trust decisions made by computers? (b) Should we build
"intelligent" computers?
The remainder of this paper surveys these topics, suggestsreadings,
discusses the sorts of assignments I gave, and presents some student
reactions.3

Textbooks
Unfortunately,thereis no textbookthat exactlycoversthe abovetopics.
Threepossibilities were offered to the studentsas recommendedtexts:
LucianoFloridi's Philosophyand Computing(1999),Timothy Colburn's
Philosophy and Computer Science (2000), and Floridi's Blackwell
Guide to the Philosophy of Computingand Information (2004). The
first two are monographsoffering the authors' points of view. There
is nothing wrong with this, of course,but I preferred a more neutral
approachfor the sort of coursethat I had in mind. Moreover,the topics
coveredin each of thesehad a relatively small intersection with my
topics. The third book is an anthology,but-again-there was only a
small overlap with my topics, and, in any case,I preferred that my
studentsread primary sourcesrather than overviews.
There are other sources,of course:A special issue of the philoso-
phy journal The Monist (82:1 [1999]) was devotedto the philosophy
of computer science.The journal Minds and Machines: Journal for
Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Cognitive Scienceis almost
 "~" ~---

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or ~

322 WILLIAM J. RAPAPORT

entirely devoted to philosophy of computer science, broadly construed.

And about half of the articles in the Journal of Experimental and Theo-
retical Artificial Intelligence are on philosophy of computer science.
Finally, an excellent website, "Computational Philosophy," is moderated
by John Taylor (http: //www.crumpled.com/cp/).4 In the sections that
follow-and more extensively on the course web site (see note 3)-1
recommend appropriate readings for the topics that we covered.

Topics and Readings

What is philosophy? A typical advanced philosophy course in a phi-
losophy department normally does not need to address the question of
what philosophy is, but I felt that a course whose principal audience
was computer-science students needed to. I suspect that many such
students feel that philosophy is a "soft" subject where there are no
answers, so everyone's opinion is equally good.5 In contrast, I hoped
to present to the students a view of philosophy as an analytical and
critical discipline that could be of value to them.6
I began with a brief history of western philosophy, beginning with
Socrates' and Plato's view of the philosopher as "gadfly," challenging
others' assumptions. I offered my own definition of philosophy as the
search for truth in any field by rational means (which might be limited
to deductive logic, or might be extended to include empirical scientific
investigation). And we defined the "philosophy of X" as the study of
the fundamental assumptions and main goals of any discipline X.
I briefly covered some of the basic principles of critical thinking
and informal argument analysis, including the following notions:
1. "argument" (a set of premises and a conclusion)
2. "premise" (a Boolean proposition used to support a conclusion)
3. "conclusion" (a Boolean proposition that someone tries to con-
vince you of by means of a logical argument)
4. "valid argument" (an argument is valid iff it is impossible for
the premises all to be true yet for the conclusion to be false; this
semantic notion can also be supplemented with a syntactic one:
an argument is (syntactically) valid iff it has the form of any of
a given standard set of argument forms that are (semantically)
valid, such as Modus Ponens)
5. "factual argument" (this is a non-standard, but useful, notion:7
an argument is factual iff all of its premises are true)
6. "sound" (an argument is sound iff it is factual and valid).8
I will have more to say about this when I discuss the course assignments,
but I should point out that Computing Curricula 2001's "Social and Pro-
fessional Issues" knowledge area includes the item "Methods and Tools
 PHILOSOPHYOF COMPUTERSCIENCE 323

of Analysis" (SP3), which covers precisely these sorts of argument-analy-

sis techniques (http://www.computer.org/education/cc2001/finaVsp.htm#
SP-MethodsAndTools).
As a reading assignment, I asked the students to read at least one
of a variety of brief introductions to philosophy (e.g., Plato's Apol-
ogy; Colburn 2000: chaps. 3-4; Audi 2001), and I listed Mark B.
Woodhouse's Preface to Philosophy (2003) as another recommended
textbook for the course.
What is computer science? We began the first major section of
the course by discussing the reasons one might have for asking what
a discipline is: There are, of course, philosophical-primarily onto-
logical-reasons. But there are also political reasons, especially in
the case of a discipline such as computer science, which can be found
both in (arts-and- )science faculties as well as in engineering faculties
(sometimes in both at the same institution!), or even in its own faculty
(either accompaniedby other departments in, say, an informatics faculty
or else by itself). Then, too, there is the question of the relationship
between computer science and computer engineering.
We surveyed the following answers that have been given to the
question "What is computer science?"
. It is a science of computers and surrounding phenomena (such
as algorithms, etc.) (Newell, Perlis, and Simon 1967).
. It is the study (N.B. not "science") of algorithms and surround-
ing phenomena(such as the computersthey run on, etc.) (Knuth
1974).
. It is the empirical study ("artificial science")of the phenomena
surrounding computers (Newell and Simon 1976; cf. Simon

. 1996).
It is a natural science,not of computersor algorithms, but of
procedures (Shapiro 2001).
. It is not a science, but a branch of engineering (Brooks 1996).
. It is the body of knowledge dealing with information-transform-
ing processes (Denning 1985).
. It is the study of information itself (Hartmanis and Lin 1992).
Note that several of these (especially the first two) might be "exten-
sionally equivalent" but approach the question from very different per-
spectives: Some emphasize the computer (hardware); others emphasize
algorithms, processes, procedures, etc. (software), or even something
more abstract (e.g., information). An orthogonal dimension focuses on
whether computer science is a science or perhaps something else (a
"study," a "body of knowledge," an engineering discipline, etc.). And,
of course, the name itself varies (computer science, computing science,
informatics, etc.), often for political, not philosophical, reasons.9
 c-~ c--~~~"
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1",

324 WILLIAM J. RAPAPORT

Is "computer science" science or engineering? The question of

whethercomputerscienceis really a scienceor else is really a branch
of engineeringhas beenthe subject of severalessays.It has had spe-
cial relevanceat VB ever since our former Departmentof Computer
Science,housedin the Faculty of Natural Sciencesand Mathematics,
mergedwith severalcomputerengineerslofrom our former Department
of Electrical and ComputerEngineeringto form a new Departmentof
ComputerScienceand Engineeringhousedin the Schoolof Engineer-
ing and Applied Sciences.This is not only confusing to read about,
but hasgiven rise to a certain identity crisis for both our studentsand
faculty, and I thought it would provide interesting local color to an
investigationof the nature of scienceand of engineering.
We first turned to the question"What is science?"discussingboth
its goals(shouldit merely describethe world-as Ernst Mach thought
[cf. Alexander1967:118-119]-or explain it?) as well as the natureof
its theories(are they merely instrumentalist,or realist?).We looked at
debatesover scientific method (is it experimentaland cumulative, or
doesit proceedby paradigmandrevolution?)andits branches(is math-
ematicsa science?).The primary readingson sciencewere selections
from David Papineau's"Philosophy of Science" (1996) and chapters
from John G. Kemeny'sA PhilosopherLooks at Science(1959).
We next looked at the history of engineering (Michael Davis's
Thinking Like an Engineer [1998] is especially useful), discussing
engineeringas applied science, as defined in terms of professional
education,and as a design activity (Petroski 2003). And we looked
at a definition of computerscienceas a new kind of engineeringthat
studiesthe theory, design, analysis, and implementationof informa-
tion-processingalgorithms (Loui 1987, 1995).
What is a computer?-Part I. Insofar as computerscienceis the
science(or study) primarily of computers,the next reasonableques-
tion is: What is a computer?This is a large topic, and I divided it into
two parts.
The first part was a surveyof the history of computers.I presented
this in terms of two parallel goals: the goal of building a computing
machine,and the goal of providing a foundation for mathematics.As
I seeit, thesewere two more-or-lessindependentgoalsthat converged
in the first half of the twentieth century.(Whetheror not this is a his-
torically accurateway of looking at the matter is itself an interesting
question;in any case,it is certainly a convenientway to organizethe
topic pedagogically.)Our discussionof the first goal involved the con-
tributions of Babbage,Aiken, Atanasoff and Berry, Turing, and Eckert
andMauchly.The contributionsof Leibniz, Boole, Frege,Hilbert, Tur-
ing, Church, and Godel madeup the overview of the secondgoal.
'"
 -

PHll..OSOPHYOF COMPUTERSCIENCE 325

The history of computers is a large topic, and we did not spend much
time on it. Consequently, the assigned readings were intended only to
give the students a flavor of the main events. I prepared a website, "A
Very Brief History of Computers,"11 based on the IEEE's "Timeline
of Computing History"12 and containing links for further information,
\ and I asked the students to read O'Connor and Robertson 1998 (on
Babbage), Simon and Newell 1958 (pp. 1-3 are also on Babbage), and
Ensmenger 2004 (on the controversy over who deserved the US patent
for the first computer).
What is an algorithm?-Part I. The other main answer to the
question of what computer science studies is: algorithms. So, what
is an algorithm? We began our two-part investigation of this by first
considering what computation is. One informal, introductory-computer-
science-style explanation proceeds as follows: A function f (viewed as
a set of ordered pairs, or "inputs" and "outputs") is computable means
by definition that there is an "algorithm" that computesf, i.e., there is
an algorithm A such that for all input i, A(i)=.f(i), and A specifies how
f's inputs and outputs are related (or howl's outputs are produced by
its inputs). Then an algorithm for a problem P can be characterized
as a finite procedure (i.e., a finite set of instructions) for solving P
that is:
1. unambiguous for the computer or human who will execute it;
i.e., all steps of the procedure must be clear and well-defined
for the executor, and
2. effective; i.e., it must eventually halt, and it must output a cor-
, . rect solution to P .13

It became an interesting exercise as we went through the semester to

compare the different (informal) explications of 'algorithm,' no two
of which seem to be equivalent. This makes Turing's accomplishment
all the more interesting!
With this informal exposition in mind, we then turned to a careful
reading of Turing's magnum opus, "On Computable Numbers" (1936).
There are several versions on the Web, though the most trustworthy is
the one reprinted in Davis 1965. When I say "careful reading," I mean
it: We spent an entire eighty-minute class doing a slow, "active," line-
by-line reading of as much of it as we could.14I strongly recommend
that all computer-science students (as well as computationally-oriented
philosophy students, of course) do this at least once in their lives. In
addition to being one of the most significant scientific papers of the
twentieth century, it is also fascinating, well-written, and contains many
interesting philosophical insights. The students told me afterward that
this slow reading was one of the highlights of the course.

,
 c~ ",,""r' "0':"1
i" ~ ,. ~

326 WILLIAM J. RAPAPORT

We also discussed the history of the mathematical investigation

of the concept "computable," and discussed the relationship of (1)
Turing's thesis that a function is (informally) computable if and only
if it is TM-computable to (2) Church's thesis that a function is (in-
formally) computable if and only if it is lambda-definable (which is
logically equivalent to being recursive and, of course, to being TM-
computable).
Besides Turing 1936, I also asked the students to read Leon Henkin's
"Are Logic and Mathematics Identical?" (1962), which has a good
discussion of the history of logic and the foundations of mathematics
that led up to Turing's analysis, and Gabor Herman's "Theory of Algo-
rithms" (1983), which discussesthe informal notions of "algorithm" and
"effective computability" and provides a good background for Turing
1936. I also especially recommend (to instructors, if not to students)
Robert I. Soare's "Computability and Recursion" (1996) for the clar-
ity it brings to the history of the competing analyses of 'computable'
(e.g., how Turing's Thesis differs from Church's Thesis).
What is a computer?-Part II. Armed with this background, we
turned to philosophical questions surrounding the nature of computers.
John Searle's "Is the Brain a Digital Computer?" (1990) argues that
everything is a digital computer (which seems to trivialize the ques-
tion), and Patrick Hayes's "What Is a Computer?" (1997) is a sym-
posium that responds to Searle. Hayes's own view is that a computer
is a machine that can take, as input, patterns that describe changes to
themselves and other patterns, and that causes the described changes
to occur. (A related definition-a computer is a device that "change[s]
variable assignments"-is offered in Thomason 2003: 328.) It turns
out that it is surprisingly difficult to give a precise characterization of
what a computer is.
A closely related topic for which a relevant reading did not appear
till after the semester was over is the question of whether the universe
itself is a computer (or whether parts of the universe compute; e.g.,
does the solar system compute Kepler's laws?). On this, see Seth Lloyd
and Y. Jack Ng's "Black Hole Computers" (2004). This issue also
concerns the nature of simulation (see Rapaport 1998, Perruchet and
Vinter 2002 [esp. §1.3.4], and the discussion of programs as scientific
theories, below).
What is an algorithm?-Part II. As hard as it is to define 'com-
puter,' the notion of "algorithm" is even murkier, despite the accom-
plishments of Church, Godel, Kleene, Markov, Turing, Post, and others.
Introductions to computer science often liken algorithms to recipes,
and, indeed, there are clear similarities. But the differences are even
more illuminating, given the informality with which recipes are usually
presented. An interesting unpublished paper by Beth Preston (2000)
 PHILOSOPHY
OFCOMPUTER
SCIENCE 327
suggeststhat recipes are more like specificationsthan they are like ,,"
algorithms.And Carol Cleland has written a series of papers(1993,
1995,2001, 2002) that exploresthe relationshipsbetweenalgorithms,
recipes,andprocedures,introducinga notion of "mundane"procedures
(causalprocesses,including recipes), which are effective procedures
that (she argues) are not TM-computable, since their effectiveness
dependson the external world.
What is hypercomputation? "Hypercomputation"is a namegiven
by the philosopherJack Copeland(2002) to the computationof func-
tions that can't be TM-computed. We briefly investigated Turing's
"oracle" machines,Putnam's and Gold's "trial and error" machines
(Turing machineswhere it is the last answerthat counts,not the first
answer),Boolos and Jeffrey's infinitely accelerating"Zeus" machines,
andWegner's"interaction" machines(suchas automatic-tellermachines
or airline-reservationsystems)(see Copeland2002 for citations and
other models).We also looked at Kugel's (2002) thesis that Putnam-
Gold machinesmay be neededfor AI to succeed.
What is a computer program? We focusedon five aspectsof this
question:the natureof implementation,whetherprogramsare theories,
the natureof software(vs. hardware),whether softwarecan or should
be copyrightedor patented,andwhetherprogramscanbe verified. Each
is discussedbriefly, below, with a digressionon courseevaluation.
What is Implementation?"Implementation" is a ubiquitous notion
in computerscience,but one that is rarely defined,and thus crying out
for philosophicalanalysis.We saythat programsimplementalgorithms,
yet high-level programscan be implementedin machinelanguage.We
saythat particular data structures(e.g., arrays)can implementabstract
data types (ADTs) (e.g., stacks),yet someADTs (e.g., stacks)can be
implementedin other ADTs (e.g., linked lists). Is implementationa
relation between an abstractionand something "concrete," or can it
(also) be a relation betweentwo abstractions?Is it an isomorphism,or
a homomorphism?In rebuttal to Searle'sargumentthat everythingis a
computer(seeWhat is a Computer?-Part II, above),David Chalmers
(1994) developsa notion of implementationas isomorphism. I have
urgedthat implementationis bestviewedas the semanticinterpretation
of an abstractformal system(Rapaport1999andforthcoming-a).These
issueswere all touchedupon, and I also usedthis opportunity to care-
fully developthe notions of syntax, semantics,and formal systems.
Are ProgramsScientific Theories?Somecomputationalcognitive
scientists (e.g., Pylyshyn 1984: 76, Johnson-Laird 1988: 52) have
claimedthat cognitive theoriesarebestexpressed,not in the languages
of statisticsor mathematics,or even in natural language,but in com-
puter programs.These programs, being simultaneouslytheories and
models (or implementationsof the theories), can then be executed,
 "

328 WILLIAMJ. RAPAPORT

in order to test whether the theory is a good model of cognition. It

h~s also been argued, of course, that such a program is more than
merely a model or simulation of the cognitive phenomenon under
investigation; some have argued that it actually exhibits the cognitive
ability. As background, we also discussed the relationships between
theories and models, simulations and "the real thing,"and simulations
and emulations; philosophical theories of scientific explanation; and
philosophical theories of scientific models. Relevant readings here also
include Joseph Weizenbaum's Computer Power and Human Reason
(1976: chaps. 5 and 6 are on models and theories) and Herbert Simon's
Sciences of the Artificial (1996: chap. 1, which discusses scientific
theories, is also good reading for the question of whether computer
science is a science).

What is Software?
Introductory computer science courses often assume that the distinc-
tion between software and hardware is clear. Computer scientists and
philosophers know otherwise. JamesMoor's "Three Myths of Computer
Science" (1978) points out the inadequacies of the usual "abstract"
software vs. "concrete" hardware distinction, arguing that software
is a computer program that is changeable by a person. This allows
for the "software" to be "hardwired," as long as it can be changed.
The "software is abstract" point of view is well argued by Peter Su-
ber (1988), who considers it to be "syntactic form" (and this ties in
nicely with the discussion of syntax vs. semantics in the section on
implementation). Finally, Colburn (1999) views software as a "concrete
abstraction": It has a "medium of description" insofar as it is a text in
a formal language (which is an abstraction), and it has a "medium of
execution" insofar as it is implemented in circuits and semiconductors
(which are concrete).

Interlude:
Midsemester Course Evaluation and Course Correction
The previoustopic brought us more or lessto the midsemesterpoint in
the course.Borrowing an idea from my colleagueStuart C. Shapiro,I
traditionally give a midsemestercourseevaluation.I strongly recom-
mendthis for any course:It is far more useful than an end-of-course
evaluationthat is not seenuntil the courseis over and henceis of no
use in improving the coursethat just ended.For this course,I asked
two simple, open-endedquestions:What aspectsof the coursewould
you like to seechanged?and What aspectsof the course do you es-
pecially like? The answerslet me know what neededto be fixed and
 -

PHILOSOPHYOF COMPUTERSCIENCE 329

what was going well. I summarized the answers and posted a response
to the course newsgroup.
For this course, the major complaint was the amount of reading. I
told the students that I would try to comply with their request for less
reading, but that there were just so many exciting things that I wanted
them to read that I would compromise: From then on, I only assigned
one (sometimes two) required readings for each of the remaining top-
ics, per class session, but I recommended (sometimes strongly) other
things to look at-if not now, then at their leisure after the semesterwas
over. Thus, for example, instead of requiring the students to read Moor
1978 and Suber 1988 (which is a very long paper) and Colburn 1999
(which is philosophically challenging), I only required them to read
Moor 1978 (which is well-written and also discusses other important
topics), strongly recommended Suber 1988 (which is wide-ranging and
has lots of things to think about), and recommended Colburn 1999. In
lecture, however, I discussed all three.
I hasten to add that there were many compliments, too! Students
were pleased with the topics and organization, and especially liked the
writing assignments, which I discuss below.
Can Software Be Patented? Or Should it Be Copyrighted? The topic
of whether computer programs are copyrightable entities or patentable
entities 15 is a fascinating one, because it combines legal, social, and
metaphysical issues.We concentrated on the last of these, since it flows
nicely from the previous topic of what software is.
Here is the fundamental paradox: If a computer program is viewed
as a written text, then it is, by definition, copyrightable. But the very
"same" program, engraved on a CD-ROM and, hence, executable on
a computer, can be viewed as a machine that is, by definition, patent-
able (as well as subject to legal limitations on exportation to foreign
countries; see Colburn 1999). Yet, also by definition, nothing is both
copyrightable and patentable. (Whether one should copyright or patent
a program vs. whether programs should be "open source" is one of the
interesting social issues that we did not have time to consider.)
We looked at the legal definitions of copyright and patent (available
from various US government websites)16and read a fascinating-and
little known-essay by computer scientist Allen Newell ("The Mod-
els are Broken, the Models are Broken") that appeared as part of a
symposium on this topic in the University of Pittsburgh Law Review
(1985-1986). Newell argues that we computer scientists need to devise
better models-i.e., better ontological theories-of such computer-
science entities as algorithms, programs, etc. In contrast, some legal
scholars (e.g., Koepsell 2000) have argued that lawyers need to devise
better methods of legal protection that better match the unique natures
of computer software and hardware. The point in both cases is that
 "'

330 WILLIAM J. RAPAPORT

thereis a mismatchbetweencomputer-science entities,on the onehand,

and legal forms of protection, on the other (or betweencomputational
ontology and legal ontology); something'sgot to give.
Can ProgramsBe Verified?We endedour investigationsinto the
natureof computerprogramswith an inquiry into whetherthey can be
formally verified. Thereis a subfield of computerscienceand software
engineeringthat looks into formal methodsfor proving programcorrect-
ness(see,e.g., Gries 1981for a classic treatment).Two philosophers
havewritten essaysthat critique this approach.I am a firm believer in
the value of such formal proofs (despite somevery real limitations),
and I have severaltimes taught our department'scourse on program
verification. Consequently,I spentsometime introducing someaspects
of formal verification before turning to the criticisms.
Brian Cantwell Smith's (1985) "Limits of Correctnessin Comput-
ers" is, in my opinion, one of the most significant paperson all as-
pects-moral, legal, semantic,ontological, etc.-of the philosophy of
computerscience,and shouldbe requiredreadingfor all computersci-
encemajors.Among other things, he arguesthat thereis a gap between
the world andour modelsof it andthat computersare doubly removed,
relying on models of the models,yet must act in the real world.
The other critique is JamesFetzer's explosive essay,"Program
Verification: The Very Idea," that appearedin the Communications
of the ACM in 1988 and that launcheda vicious public debateon the
pros and cons of verification. Briefly, Fetzer arguesthat programs
can't be verified becauseyou can't logically prove that causalsystems
won't fail; at best, you can verify an algorithm. Note that, in order to
properly evaluateFetzer'sargument,you must havea firm graspof the
relationshipof algorithm to program,which, by this time, my students
were well preparedfor.
Philosophy of AI: Could we build artificial intelligences? As I
indicated above,the philosophy of AI deservesa full courseto itself
(see,e.g., Moulton and Voytek 1979,Rapaport 1986), and one of my
motivationsfor creatinga coursein the philosophyof computerscience
(andnot merelythe philosophyof AI) wasthat thereweremanynon-AI
philosophicalissuesof interest. Nevertheless,the philosophy of AI is
a properpart of the philosophyof computerscience,it is my own area
of expertise,and the studentsintensely wantedto discussit.
I limited myself to two topics: the Turing Test and the Chinese-
Room Argument.A casecan be madethat an excellent courseon the
philosophyof computersciencecould consist solely of closereadings
of Turing's two major essays:his 1936paperon computability andhis
1950paperon whethercomputerscan think. So, for this topic, we read
Turing's "ComputingMachineryandIntelligence"(1950) aswell asthe

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PHILOSOPHY
OFCOMPUTER
SCIENCE 331
current (and probably perennially most popular) reply: John Searle's
Chinese-RoomArgument (Searle 1980).
Turing 1950,as is well known, arguedthat a computerwill be said
to be able to think if we cannot distinguish its linguistic (hencecog-
nitive) behavior from a human's.Searle 1980proposeda now-classic
counterexamplethat allegesthat a computercould passa Turing Test
without really being able to think.l? (A good sourcefor both of these,
and related,papersis Shieber2004; cf. Rapaport,forthcoming-b.)We
closed this topic with my own attempt at a rebuttal of Searle(Rapa-
port 2000), arguingthat syntactic symbol manipulationof the sort that
computersdo can sufficefor semanticinterpretationof the kind needed
for computationalcognition.
Computer ethics. Our final topic was computer ethics. As noted
above, and as with philosophy of AI, this is often the topic of full
coursesby itself and is the subjectof numeroustexts and anthologies.
I gave a brief overview of (computer)ethics, basedon Moor's "What
Is ComputerEthics?" (1985).We focusedon his claim that we needto
havemetaphysicaland ontologicaltheoriesof computers(in particular,
their "logical malleability") and relatedphenomenain order to answer
ethical and social questionsabout their nature and use.
I choseto concentrateon two issuesthat are not often coveredin
suchcoursesor books:Are theredecisionsthat computersshouldnever
make?and Should we build artificial intelligences?
We turnedto Moor's "Are ThereDecisionsComputersShouldNever
Make?" (1979). One of his main points is that there are no decisions
computersshouldn't make, at least as long as their track record is
better than that of humans,but it's up to us to acceptor reject their
decisions.An interesting contrastingopinion is that of Friedman and
Kahn's "PeopleAre Responsible,ComputersAre Not" (1992), which
arguesthat there are decisionsthat computersshould not make, be-
causeonly humansare capableof being moral agents.But "to err is
human,"and we looked at a recent caseof an airline crashcausedby
following a human's decision insteadof a computer's(as reportedin
qeorge Johnson's"To Err Is Human," 2002).
On ethical issues in AI, we read Michael R. LaChat's "Artifi-
cial Intelligence and Ethics: An Exercise in the Moral Imagination"
(1986). First, I outlined the plot of StanislawLem's "Non Serviam"
(1971)-which should be required reading for all researchersin ar-
tificial life!-in which what we would today call an Artificial Life
researcheris forced to pull the plug on his creationswhen his research
grant ends. LaChat considerswhether such researchshouldn't even
begin but agreesthat consideringthe possibilities enablesus to deal
with important issuessuch as: What is a person?Would an AI with
personhoodhaverights? Could it be moral?
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332 WILLIAM J. RAPAPORT

Philosophy of computer science: A summary and a unifying

theme. In closing the semester, I asked the students to read two recent
overviews of issues in the philosophy of computer science, as a way to
gauge what they had learned-Matthias Scheutz's "Philosophical Issues
about Computation" (2002) and Smith's "The Foundations of Comput-
ing" (2002)-and we reviewed the semester's readings and discussion,
with an eye towards themes that connected the several topics.
One such theme that the students and I became aware of as the
semester progressed is the relation of an abstract computation to the
real world. This theme is addressedexplicitly in some of the papers we
read, and is implicit in many others. It emerges in Cleland's discussion
of the causal nature of "mundane" procedures, which produce some
actual product or physically affect the real world in some way. This is
also one of Smith's themes in his "Limits of Computation" essay, as
well as an underlying reason of Fetzer's arguments against program
verification. It is, of course, the subject matter of implementation, and
underlies the paradoxical nature of software vs. hardware, and hence the
issue of whether software is copyrightable or patentable. I recommend
an exploration of this theme as a unifying idea for a future course in
philosophy of computer science.

Assignments
A difficulty. I wanted the students to do a lot of reading and thinking.
Thinking is best done by active reading (Rapaport 2005a), discussion,
and writing-lots of writing. There is a well-known drawback to as-
signing a lot of writing to students: The instructor has to read it all
and, ideally, comment on it. When this course was first advertised, I
expected about ten to fifteen students, in a small seminar-like setting.
The first preliminary enrollment report said that thirty students had
signed up. Thinking that they thought that this might be a "gut" course
("A philosophy course in a computer science department? Oh, this'll be
easy to ace!"), I posted a note to the undergraduate newsgroup spell-
ing out the large quantities of writing that I would expect. Enrollment
doubledto sixty! It finally settled down at just under fifty students.IS
Still, fifty ten-page term papers plus frequent short writing assignments
during the semester was not a prospect that I looked forward to.
Nor could I rely on help from graduate teaching assistants or reci-
tation sections (a problem I was familiar with from my days teaching
at a primarily undergraduate institution). No recitation sections had
been assigned to the course, since I had not expected such a large
enrollment. They would have been useful for discussion purposes, but
that was not to be. I did have an excellent graduate teaching assistant,
but he was a computer-science grad student, not a philosophy grad
~--

PHILOSOPHY
OFCOMPUTER
SCIENCE 333

student(althoughhe did have someundergraduatephilosophy experi-

enceand was philosophically sophisticated),and, in any case,he had
no recitation sectionsto lead. Consequently,he was of most useto me
in keeping records,though he did hold office hours and studentsfelt
comfortablegoing to him for advice on writing.
But how to have studentswrite a lot without having to read it all?
And how to have discussionswithout special time allotted for them?
Of course,faculty at undergraduateinstitutions face this problem all
the time, unlike we faculty at researchuniversities. And so I drew
upon my experiencesas a philosophy professor at an undergraduate
institution with no TAs and no recitation sections.
A solution: Required, short position papers. . . I assignedthe
studentsfive one-pageposition papersthroughoutthe semester,roughly
one everytwo or three weeks.A first draft of eachassignmentwas due
one week after it was announced.The day it was due we set asidefor
"peer editing" (adaptedfrom techniquesusedin English composition
classes;cf. Cho and Schunn2004): Studentswere askedto bring five
copies of their position papers,one for me, one for themselves,and
one eachfor three other students.I put the studentsinto small groups
of three or four "peers," each of whom had written a responseto the
sameassignment.I askedthem to spendabout ten to fifteen minutes
on each paper, reading it, critiquing it, and making suggestionsfor
improvement.The studentswere then given another week to revise
their papersto be handedin for credit.19To easemy burden of grad-
ing, I read and put copiouscommentson only about40 percentof the
papersfor eachof the five assignments;eachstudentreceivedat least
two papersfully critiqued by me (the other three paperswere recorded
as being handedin).
Peer editing accomplishedseveralgoals simultaneously:The stu-
dentshadplenty of opportunitiesto discussthe materialwith eachother.
In fact, probablymore studentsparticipatedin thesesmall groupsthan
would haveordinarily spokenout in a large classroomsetting (though
such full-class discussionswere encouraged,as well). Moreover, all
studentsgot multiple feedbackon eachpaper,in addition to my feed-
back on a subsetof their papers.Another advantageof peer editing in
classis that I had the freedom (and responsibility) to walk aroundthe
room, listening to the studentdiscussionsand occasionallyfacilitating
one or answeringa questionon a one-on-onebasis.
The position paperswere designedto supplementthe lectures and
readings,as well as to foster the students'critical-thinking skills. In
particular, the topics always involved an argumentthat the students
were askedto evaluatein terms of factuality (i.e., truth value of the
premises)and validity (i.e., reasoning).Studentswere encouragedto
presenttheir opinions and to support them with reasons.As one ex-
 --'~-,""~

... .,..

334 WILLIAM J. RAPAPORT

ample, Position Paper 1, on "What is computer science?" asked the

students to evaluate the following argument (embedded in the context
of a story about a dean moving a computer science department from
a school of science to a school of engineering):
1. Science is the systematic observation, description, experimental
investigation, and theoretical explanation of natural phenomena.
2. Computer science is the study of computers and related phe-
nomena.
3. Therefore, computer science is not a science.
(All assignments and peer-editing guidelines are on the Web at http://
www.cse.buffalo.edu/-rapaport/510/pospapers.html.)
As one student observed later, the argument-analysis format of the
position papers made them somewhat easier to grade than an ordinary
essay would have been. Since the students were required to examine
a rigid structure of an argument, they had fewer "degrees of freedom"
in writing their responses. Thus, grading such papers can be closer to
grading a mathematical problem set than a typical essay. It also made
grading somewhat more impartial and somewhat less controversia}.2°
. . . And two optional assignments. In addition to the required
position papers, there was an optional term paper, whose topic had to
be approved by me in advance. I supplied a list of some possible topics,
but I encouraged the students to explore areas of interest to them. As
a default topic, a student could write a summary of the philosophy of
computer science in the style of an encyclopedia article or else pres-
ent his or her own answers to the syllabus questions (see "Syllabus"
above). An exclusive-alternative option was a final exam (students could
do the exam or the term paper, but not both). This was a take-home,
short-answer, essay-style exam, asking for analytic and evaluative sum-
maries of the possible answers to the topic-questions.
A required reading journal. In addition, in order to provide
evidence that the students were really reading the material, as well
as to encourage them to read slowly and actively, I required them to
keep a "reading journal." For each essay they read, they were to copy
interesting passages (or at least full references to them) and-most
importantly-to provide their own comments on them and on the is-
sues raised in each item read. (Suggestions on how to do this can be
found in Rapaport 2005a.) I collected these Journals at the end of the
semester, and included them in the grade calculation.
Students who attended almost all classes and turned in a Reading
Journal could get a C; students who did that plus all five position
papers could get a B; and students who did all of that plus either the
term paper or final exam could get an A. All but one student wrote the
 -

"

PHILOSOPHYOF COMPUTERSCIENCE 335

position papers. Over 80 percent of the students chose the exam/paper

option, with about 70 percent choosing the exam option.

What the Students Did and Didn't Like

The students' favorite part of the course was the writing, peer-edit-
ing, and revising of the one-page position papers: They enjoyed the
discussions, the ability to revise (including an option to re-revise for
a higher grade), and-most importantly-the skills they learned, and
the practice they got, in critically analyzing and evaluating informal
arguments. In addition, well after the course ended, some students told
me that they have continued keeping reading journals in their other
courses and research.
They also appreciated the course website, which has links to the
syllabus and a directory of documents that, in turn, has a large bibli-
ography, links to other relevant websites, and links to the assignments,
position papers, term-paper topics, and final exam. I began each new
section of the course by putting up a webpage containing recommended
readings for that topic. I then gave a quick overview in lecture about
each of the readings. Students informed me that this was very useful
because it provided a summary of what was to come, including the
different positions that have been taken on each issue.
Here is what one student said, in an unsolicited e-mail message I
received after the course was over:
I'd like to thankyoufor puttingtogethersucha greatcoursethissemester. I'll
admit,knowingvery little aboutit, I neverhadmuchrespectfor philosophy
in thepast-but. this coursehasprovidedme with an entirelynewperspec-
tive. In fact,I'd saythat I learnedasmuchin your courseasanyotherI've
takenin my graduatecareerat VB (not to mentionthe fact that the skills I
learnedin [it] arefar moretransferable thanthe skills of the moreesoteric
CScourses).. . . I urge[you] to offerthis courseagainin thefuture.It offers
exactlythekind of breadthof educationthatthe department needsto stress,
andwith its CSflavor,it cantaptheinterestof students whowouldotherwise
blow it off. Thanksagainfor a greatsemester, andpleaseconsidermaking
Philosophyof CS a regularoffering:)
Another student observed that "I don't think there was a single
student in the class whose critical thinking/writing/reading skills didn't
improve as a result of taking this course."
As noted above, the students' least favorite part of the course was
the amount of reading. Of course, this is something that students almost
always complain about, but, in this case, the complaint really was about
the quantity, not the quality: By and large, they found all of the read-
ings to be interesting and useful; their complaint was that they didn't
have enough time to read them all as carefully as they (and I) would
have liked. Fortunately, on the basis of the mid-semester course evalu-

;,:'.:2
 . "
..

336 WILLIAM J. RAPAPORT

ation, I found this out early enough to be able to do something about

it. As discussed above, subsequent reading assignments were limited
to at most two required readings, with suggestions for recommended
(but optional) follow-up readings.

Conclusions
I believe this to have been a worthwhile course, both for me and-more
importantly-for the students. It gave many of the computer science ma-
jors the option to think about many issues that they either hadn't thought
of before or had thought about but had no venue for discussing. It also
gave them an opportunity to (learn how to) think critically, and to find
out what philosophy could be like. The philosophy majors, in addition,
had the opportunity to learn somethings about computers,computing, and
computer sciencethat they probably would not have come acrossin more
traditional philosophy courses, as well as the opportunity to apply some
of their philosophical skills and knowledge to a different domain.

Notes
I am grateful to my studentsDima Dligach and Albert Goldfain, to my colleagues Peter D.
Scott and Stuart C. Shapiro, and to an anonymous reviewer for comments on earlier drafts.
1. In particular, CD5650, Swedish National Course on Philosophy of Computer
Science, at Miilardalen University (Sweden), coordinated by Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
(http://www.idt.mdh.se/-gdc/Pl-network-course.htm); Selected Topics in the Philosophy
of Computer Science, at Tel Aviv University (Israel), taught by Eli Dresner (http://www.
tau.ac.il/humanities/digicult/english.htm); and PHI 3 I 9, Philosophy of Computing, at Ari-
zona State University, taught by Bernard W. Kobes (http://www.asu.edu/clas/philosophy/
course_descripts.htm).
2. I am grateful to Timothy Colburn, Randall R. Dipert, Eli Dresner, James H. Fetzer,
Luciano Floridi, Bipin Indurkhya, James Moor, Robert Stainton, and Chris Viger for (e-
mail) discussions on the questions that such a course might focus on.
3. The home page for the course, with links to the complete syllabus, assignments,
and other course web pages, is at http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/-rapaport/philcs.html and
archived as Rapaport 2005b.
4. Pointers to these and other sources are at my course Web page "What is Philosophy
of Computer Science?" (http: //www.cse.buffalo.edu/-rapaport/510/whatisphilcs.html).
5. This claim is based on a not unreasonable assumption that computer-science
students tend to be "Dualists" who see (and fear?) philosophy as being a "Multiplistic"
discipline. These are terms from William Perry's (1970, 1981) "scheme" of intellectual
and ethical development. For a quick online glimpse of Perry's views, see my website,
"William Perry's Scheme of Intellectual and Ethical Development" (http://www.cse
.buffalo.edu/ -rapaport/perry. positions.htrnl).
Roughly, "Dualists" believe that all questions have correct answers and that the
student's job is to learn these answers, whereas "Multiplists" believe that most ques-
tions have no known answers and, consequently, that everyone's opinion is equally
 .
PHILOSOPHYOF COMPUTERSCIENCE 337
good.However,
thosearevastoversimplifications,
andtheinterested
readeris urgedto ""-"

consultPerry's writings, or any of the other sourceslisted on my website.On whether

therecan be answersto philosophicalquestionsand, thus, real progressin philosophy,
seeRapaport1982.
6. In Perry'sterminology,philosophyis a "ContextuallyRelativistic"discipline,i.e.,
onethat critically evaluatesclaimson the basisof evidence(the truth-valueof a claim is
"relative" to its evidential"context").
7. Learnedfrom my former philosophycolleague,KennethG. Lucey.
8. Therearemanyexcellenttextbookson critical thinking and informal logic, and,
of course,it is the subjectof many full courseson its own. A useful short introduction
for a coursesuchas this is Longview CommunityCollege'swebsite"Critical Thinking
Acrossthe CurriculumProject" (http://www.kcmetro.cc.mo.us/longview/ctac/toc.htm).
9. Another (morerecent)view is that computerscienceis the studyof virtual phe-
nomena(Crowcroft 2005).
10. Someof whom had their doctoratesfrom departmentsof computerscience!
II. http: //www.cse.buffalo.edu/-rapaport/510/history.html.
12. http: //www.computer.org/computer/timeline/.
13. This is an adaptationof StuartC. Shapiro'sinformal characterization;personal
communication.
14. On this sort of Talmudic,slow-but-activereadingsty~e,seeRapaport2005a,§5.
15. Thereis a third possibility:thattheyaretrademarkableentities;we did not consider
this option.
16. For 'copyright,' seethe US Copyright Office Circular 1 at http://www.copyright
.gov/circs/circl.html#Wci;for 'patent,'seethe US PatentandTrademarkOffice Glossary
at http://www.uspto.gov/main!glossary/index.html#p.
~ 17. Mention shouldbe madethat a very early versionof Searle'sthoughtexperiment
appearsas a way of explicating Turing machinesin Rogers 1959 (part I, reprinted in
1969: 131,133; basedon a 1957lecture).
18. The breakdownof studentmajorswas asfollows:
CSE PHI Other
unde!:&.fads 72% 10% 12%
[g!"ads 75% 15% 10%
total 73% 12% 15%
CSE = Computer Science and Engineering majors; PHI =Philosophy majors; Other =
studentsmajoringin Biology,Economics,ElectricalEngineering,Management,Manage-
ment andInformation Science,andMathematics.
19. My writing guidelinesand a brief guide to grammarandpunctuationareon the
Webat http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/-rapaport/howtowrite.html.
20. For morethoughtson grading,anda "triage" theoryof grading,seemy website,
"How I Grade,"http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/-rapaport/howigrade.htrnl.

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William J. Rapaport, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Department of

Philosophy, and Centerfor Cognitive Science,State University of New York at Buffalo, Buf-
falo NY 14260-2000, rapaport@cse.buffalo.edu, http://www.cse.buffalo.edul-rapaport/

;'

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