A.M. No.

01-12-01-SC January 16, 2003 IN RE: BADOY JR

ISSUE:

IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGED IMPROPER CONDUCT OF SANDIGANBAYAN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

ANACLETO D. BADOY, JR., TAKING AN AMBULANCE BUT PROCEEDING TO THE GMA TV STATION FOR AN
INTERVIEW INSTEAD OF PROCEEDING FORTHWITH TO THE HOSPITAL.

FACTS:

 On November 29, 2001, Justice Badoy, aboard an ambulance, "whisked himself" to the GMA
Broadcast Station in Quezon City for a live interview in the news program Saksi. There, he
announced the loss of a Resolution he penned in connection with the plunder case against former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and others.
 The media sarcastically referred to the event as a "staged comedy" or a "television tryst." Leading
newspapers contained facetious headlines, such as "Ambulance rushes Badoy — to TV Station",
"What's with Justice Badoy?," and "Unorthodox Behavior — Analyze Badoy, Erap Lawyers ask SC."
 Justice Badoy alleged that three days prior to the incident, he could not find his Resolution ordering
that former President Estrada be detained at Fort Sto. Domingo. So he requested the National
Bureau of Investigation to conduct an investigation, but to no avail. Thus, on November 29, 2001,
agitated that someone might have stolen the Resolution and claimed that he (Justice Badoy) sold it
for a fee, he decided to go to the GMA-7 Broadcast Station and report its loss, in order that the
public may know he is honest. In going there, he chose to ride in an ambulance because he felt very
sick and cold, intending to proceed to a hospital after the interview.

A.M No. SB-02-10-J is set on a different factual milieu, to wit:

Subsequent to the descent of former President Estrada from power, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
several criminal cases against him, his family, and friends. One of them is Criminal Case No. 26558
wherein he, his son Jose "Jinggoy" and Atty. Edward Serapio stand accused for violation of Republic Act
No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder Law. The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan
composed of Justice Badoy, as Chairman, and Justices Teresita Leonardo-De Castro and Ricardo M.
Ilarde, now retired, as members.

On September 13, 2001, after the termination of a series of pre-trial conference between the parties,
the Sandiganbayan furnished them and their counsel with a copy of the Pre-trial Order for their
signatures. The defense panel composed of Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag (lead counsel), Justice Serafin R.
Cuevas, Attys. Jose B. Flaminiano, Felix D. Carao, Jr., Cleofe V. Verzola, and Delia H. Hermoso, refused to
sign it on the grounds that:

1) there is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring them to sign a Pre-trial
Order;

2) they were not given ample time to read it; 10 and 3) it incorporates a statement that they admitted
the existence of certain exhibits although there was no such admission.

In the course of an argument between Sandiganbayan Justice De Castro and Justice Cuevas, Atty.
Saguisag intervened. In the process, he argued simultaneously with Justice Cuevas. Despite Justice De
Castro's request to wait for his turn, Atty. Saguisag persisted, prompting her to bang the gavel twice and
order him to stop arguing. 13 This led Justice Badoy to order four Sheriffs to take Atty. Saguisag out of
the courtroom.

Thereafter, Justice De Castro ruled in open court that the assailed portion of the Pre-trial Order could be
deleted. The prosecution manifested its acquiescence. However, Atty. Flaminiano objected, insisting
that the defense needs more time to study the Pre-trial Order. 16 Notwithstanding the objection, Justice
Badoy terminated the pre-trial and set the trial proper on October 1, 3 and 4, 2001 and thereafter, every
Monday, Wednesday and Thursday of the week, all at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

On October 1, 2001, the defense lawyers did not appear. Determined to proceed with the trial, Justice
Badoy appointed Atty. Sabino Acut, Jr. and Atty. Martin Pison, counsel for accused Atty. Serapio, to
represent the Estradas. Former President Estrada objected, insisting that he has the right to choose his
counsel. Atty. Acut and Atty. Pison declined because of a possible conflict between their client's interest
and that of the Estradas. As a last recourse, Justice Badoy appointed lawyers from the Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) as counsel de officio for the Estradas.

Feeling aggrieved, former President Estrada, "Jinggoy" Estrada and all their counsel of record in Criminal
Case No. 26558 filed the instant administrative complaint charging Justices Badoy and De Castro with:

1) dishonesty and misrepresentation for incorporating in the Pre-trial Order a statement that "the
defense admitted Plaintiff's Exhibit A up to Exhibit C-45 and its submarkings as to its existence"
notwithstanding the fact that they did not admit the same;

2) oppression and gross misconduct for "throwing" Atty. Saguisag out of the courtroom;

3) violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars for setting the hearing of the plunder case
three times a week, at one o'clock in the afternoon, without prior consultation with the defense counsel;

4) denial of the accused's right to counsel for appointing PAO lawyers as counsel de officio of the
Estradas during the hearing of October 1, 2001; and

5) penchant for late rulings 23 as shown in the following instances:

1. The release of the Resolution denying complainant Jinggoy Estrada's Motion to Quash (filed as early
as April 2001) after office hours and on the eve of the July 10, 2001 arraignment.

2. The release of the Resolution denying complainant Estradas' Petition to Recuse on the scheduled date
of the pre-trial or on September 3, 2001.

3. Respondents' failure to resolve complainants' Motion to Cancel the October 1, 2001 hearing filed as
early as September 19, 2001.

4. The release of the Resolution denying complainant Jinggoy Estrada's Motion to be Allowed to
Administer the Oath of Office to Senator Luisa "Loi" Estrada, on June 29, 2001, past beyond the
scheduled hour of oath-taking, thus, prompting Justice Ricardo M. Ilarde (Ret.) to write the following
annotations on the Resolution: "What is there to deny? This resolution was brought to us only at 4:45
p.m. The matter has been rendered moot and academic."

Respondents filed their separate comments.

Justice De Castro explains as follows:

First, in issuing the Pre-trial Order, the court merely relied on the parties' Joint Stipulations of Facts and
on the notes of the five (5) stenographers recording the pre-trial conferences held before the Division
Clerk of Court. Nonetheless, when complainants called the court's attention regarding the assailed
statement in the Pre-trial Order, she ordered its deletion. 24 Second, it was Atty. Saguisag's
contumacious conduct of "loudly speaking simultaneously with Atty. Cuevas" that prompted respondent
Justices to order him to leave the courtroom. 25 Third, they consulted the complainants before they set
the hearing of the plunder case three times a week, resulting in the revision of the trial settings
embodied in the court's Order dated September 14, 2001. 26 Fourth, the appointment of three (3) PAO
lawyers was intended to provide the accused with adequate legal assistance during the hearing. And
fifth, they resolved the accused's three motions to quash only on July 9, 2001 because the parties' last
pleading was filed only on July 5, 2001. 27

For his part, Justice Badoy maintains that the Pre-trial Order has not prejudiced the accused since they
were not obliged to sign it and that they are free to object to the presentation of any evidence during
trial. 28 He ordered Atty. Saguisag to leave the courtroom because he ignored Justice De Castro's
repeated order to stop arguing. 29 On the setting of the hearing of the plunder case three times a week,
he stressed that the court was merely complying with the Speedy Trial Act. 30 And lastly, on the alleged
late rulings, he explains:

"Regarding the release of the Resolution of the undersigned on the Motion for Recusation of the
Estradas on the recusation issue. At the time, the undersigned had no intention of releasing it yet in
order to fine-tune the same further. However, he was informed just before going out for the hearing
that the Estradas were going to use the pendency of their Motion for Recusation as a reason, again, to
ask for the postponement of the setting for that day, one of their several motions for postponement.

As regards the delay in the Resolution of the undersigned on the permission to have Mayor Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada go to San Juan City to administer the oath to both his mother as Senator and his
brother as the new Mayor of San Juan City, the reason was because the undersigned was looking hard
for a justification to grant the request since the undersigned sympathized with the same. The
undersigned went to the extent of requesting a copy of the Rules and Regulations from both the Bureau
of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) as well as the Bureau of Corrections (BOC). Hence, the delay in
the Resolution of the ponencia. But, even late, there was still a chance for then Mayor Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada to administer the oaths of office."

xxx xxx xxx

The undersigned stated that, with every Justice having 100% load and 100% staff, with the plunder case
(equivalent easily to 500%), the undersigned now had a load of 600% but with his support staff
remaining in the same level. That is why he asked for additional staff.”

At the outset, it must be stressed that the retirement of Justice Badoy from the Judiciary does not divest
this Court of its jurisdiction over these cases. In Perez vs. Abiera, 33 this Court ruled:

We shall resolve A.M No. 01-12-01-SC first.

An introspective appraisal of the "ambulance incident" yields reasons for this Court to adjudge Justice
Badoy guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice.

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "a judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities." He should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary. 34 Concomitant with this is the express mandate of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics that "justice should not be bounded by the individual idiosyncrasies of those
who administer it." A judge should adopt the usual and expected method of doing justice, and not seek
to be spectacular or sensational in the conduct of his court.

Justice Badoy tramples upon the foregoing judicial norms. We see no reason why he should rush to the
GMA-7 Broadcast Station just to inform the public about the loss of a Resolution. This is an internal
office incident which should not be reported to the whole nation. His claim that the Resolution might
have been stolen and sold by someone (using his name) for a fee is a wild conjecture. Not only did his
conduct give an image that he could not manage his work effectively, but it also indicated that he had
corrupt personnel. Moreover, it dragged innocent parties as possible culprits.

Justice Badoy's aberrant behavior deserves administrative sanction. As the Chairman of the Division
hearing the plunder case against the former President of the Philippines, he should have been more
circumspect in his actuation. A short pause for reflection might have yielded a better judgment. The loss
of the Resolution, being an internal matter, could have been addressed inside his own chamber. That he
brought it to the arena of public opinion is pure vanity. It cannot be countenanced. If lawyers are
prohibited from making public statements in the media regarding a pending case to arouse public
opinion for or against a party, 35 with more reason should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity.
Judges are not actors or politicians who thrive by publicity. Publicity undermines the dignity and
impartiality of a judge. 36 Thus, at no time should he be moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to
the detriment of the administration of justice." 37
The fact that Justice Badoy, just three (3) weeks prior to the "ambulance incident," was strictly ordered
by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., "to cease and desist from holding press conferences, issuing press
statements, or giving interviews to the media on any matter or incident related to the issues subject of
the controversy" 38 all the more punctuates his indiscretion.

As we mentioned earlier, judges are subject to human limitations. Imbedded in their consciousness is
the complex of emotions, habits and convictions. Aware of this actuality, it behooves them to regulate
these deflecting forces and not to let them loose, either to their own detriment or to that of the courts
they serve. This is the high price they have to pay as occupants of their exalted positions.

We now resolve AM No. SB-02-10-J.

At this juncture, let it be stressed that the administration of justice is primarily a joint responsibility of
the judge and the lawyer. The judge expects a lawyer to properly perform his role in this task in the
same manner that the lawyer expects a judge to do his part. 39 Their relation should be based on
mutual respect and on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of the other. Only in this manner can
each minimize occasions for delinquency and help attain effectively the ends of justice. 40

The conflict between the herein parties could have been avoided if only they heeded the foregoing
clarion call.

Respondents are not guilty of the charges of dishonesty and misrepresentation. Dishonesty connotes a
disposition to deceive, 41 while misrepresentation means a statement made to deceive or mislead. 42
Obviously, both imply an "intention" to deceive. Complainants failed to prove that respondents acted
with deceit or with malice or bad faith in stating in the Pre-trial Order that the defense admitted the
existence of certain exhibits. Other than their bare allegation, no sufficient evidence was adduced to
support the charge. 43 That respondents did not intend to deceive complainants is clear from the fact
that the Pre-trial Order states verbatim the Joint Stipulations of Facts submitted by both parties.
Furthermore, when complainants expressed their objection to the inclusion of the assailed statement,
respondents immediately ordered its deletion. The transcript of stenographic notes is revealing, thus:

"AJ BADOY:
The Court would appreciate if you can point out some grammatical errors.

Atty. Flaminiano:

Yes, Your Honor. I am going to do that.

On page 20, the last paragraph states: "The defense admitted exhibit "A" up to exhibit "C-45" and its sub
markings as to its existence but not as to the truth of the content." In the very first place there never
was any admission made by the defense as even to the existence of the document. And the sentence
also we believe not grammatically appropriate. It should be their sub markings or as to their existence
because this involved several documents, Your Honors.

AJ DE CASTRO:

That portion may be deleted.

Atty. Flaminiano:

Well, I'm not sure about it. Your Honor. I only pointed that there is a need for us to go over page by page
because we got a copy only after there was an incident —

xxx xxx xxx

OMB Desierto:

We can have this deleted.

Atty. Flaminiano:

But there are several others.

AJ DE CASTRO:

What are those?

OMB Desierto:

After on (1) hour they should be able to determine that. After all Your Honor, I would like to emphasize
the fact that the Joint Stipulation of Facts were signed — stipulations which we had a week ago were
signed by the parties, by the counsels for the accused. And now, the things that are reflected here, are
found in this Pre-trial Order. If there is any delineation from what stipulated then and were signed by
the counsels for the defense and also the prosecution, then we can correct that, but it cannot be
possible major changes will have to be made in the Pre-trial Order since this is only copied anyway from
the Joint Stipulation of Facts. If there are such thing as that particular sentence which should be
objectionable to the defense, the prosecution is ready to agree to its deletion.

xxx xxx xxx

AJ DE CASTRO:

You know what we did here is simply copy verbatim every document that we found on record pertaining
to the Pre-trial conference. We did not add. We did not subtract. So, anything that you will state now
will simply be corrections of some clerical errors, that is all. Giving you enough time to go over." 44
(Emphasis supplied)

On complainants' refusal to sign the Pre-trial Order, Section 2, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that "All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference
shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used
against the accused." Considering that the Pre-trial Order contains the recital of the actions taken by the
parties, agreements and admissions, the facts stipulated, and the evidence marked, 45 the parties must
sign it. A party who participates in the pre-trial conference and who signs the Joint Stipulation of Facts is
expected to sign the Pre-trial Order. If a party believes that the Pre-trial Order is not an honest
representation of what transpired in the pre-trial conference, then he must specify his objections
thereto and the court may modify it to prevent injustice. This was what respondents exactly did when
complainants pointed out the assailed statement in the Pre-trial Order.
II

We now come to complainants' allegation of oppression and gross misconduct. Oppression is a

"misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any
person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury." It is an "act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use
of authority. 46 Upon the other hand, the word "misconduct" implies wrongful intention. For gross
misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to
violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. 47 We find no evidence to prove
complainants' charges of oppression and misconduct.

Records show that Atty. Saguisag was asking the court for a copy of the Pre-trial Order so that he could
follow up the court's discussion He did not utter any disrespectful remark against respondents nor attack
their integrity or authority. However, he kept on speaking simultaneously with Justice Cuevas and
refused to yield to the court's repeated order to stop. Such actuation must have constrained
respondents to lose their cool and order the sheriffs to take him out of the courtroom. At that point,
what respondents should have done was to cite him in direct contempt of court pursuant to Rule 71 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. 48 In Romero vs. Valle, Jr., 49 this Court ruled:

"Precisely, judicial officers are given contempt powers in order that without being arbitrary,
unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to
the court. Respondent judge could very well have cited complainant in contempt of court instead of
indulging in tantrums by banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and unceremoniously walking out of
the courtroom."

It has been consistently stressed that the role of a judge in relation to those who appear before his court
must be one of temperance, patience and courtesy. In this regard, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct states: "A judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the
inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the
courts for the litigants."

In Echano vs. Sunga, 50 respondent judge, during the course of an argument in his sala, lost his cool and
called the sheriff to take away the arguing attorney. And when the attorney kept on talking, respondent
judge countered, "Submitted, Buntalin kita dian." This Court admonished him to be more prudent and
restrained in his behavior.
For his part, pursuant to Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Saguisag should have
observed the respect due to respondent magistrates for the maintenance of the court's supreme
importance. Upon being ordered to stop arguing simultaneously with Justice Cuevas, he should have
complied and behaved accordingly. Had he done so, he would not have been ordered to leave the
courtroom. Indeed, he failed to comport himself in a manner required of an officer of the court.

III

The setting of the hearing of the plunder case three times a week is in order, not only because the case
is of national concern, but more importantly, because the accused are presently detained. 51 Contrary
to complainants' assertions, the continuous trial is in accordance with the mandate of the law. This
Court, in Administrative Circular No. 3-90 dated January 31, 1990, ordered all trial courts to adopt the
mandatory continuous trial system in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 4 dated September
22, 1988 and Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989. It was adopted precisely to minimize delay in the
processing of cases. This delay was attributed to the common practice of piecemeal trial wherein cases
are set for trial one day at a time and thereafter the hearing is postponed to another date or dates until
all the parties have finished their presentation of evidence. 52 Section 2 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure provides:

"SEC. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements. — Trial once commenced shall continue from
day to day as far as practicable until terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for
good cause.

The court shall, after consultations with the prosecutor and defense counsel, set the case for continuous
trial on weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy
trial. In no case shall the entire period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial,
except as otherwise authorized by the Supreme Court." (Emphasis supplied)

Corolarilly, the "consultations" referred to in the foregoing provisions does not necessarily mean that
the court has to secure first from the prosecution and defense their approval before it can set the date
of hearing. To rule otherwise is to subject our trial system to the control of the parties and their counsel.

Complainants also assail respondents' act of setting the hearing at one o'clock in the afternoon. Again,
there is nothing irregular in it. The schedule of hearing is regarded as a matter necessarily at the
discretion of the trial judge. As a matter of fact, a court may even hold night sessions, and a court of
review will not interfere unless it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of the power of the judge
and that injustice has been done. 53 This is because the good of the service demands more toil and less
idleness, and the limitations imposed by law are aimed to cut indolence and not the other way around.
54

IV

Our minds cannot sit easy with regard to the charge of violation of the accuseds' right to counsel. A PAO
lawyer is considered as independent counsel within the contemplation of the Constitution considering
that he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal
attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused. In People vs. Bacor, 55 we ruled
that the assistance of a PAO lawyer satisfies the constitutional requirement of a competent and
independent counsel for the accused.

Finally, we find that Justice Badoy incurred delay in resolving Jinggoy Estrada's motion to be allowed to
administer the oath of his mother, a newly elected Senator. Every judge is required, at all times, to be
alert in his rulings and in the conduct of the business of the court, so far as he can make it useful to
litigants and to the community. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A
judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." A
judge must cultivate a capacity for quick decision and habits of indecision must be sedulously overcome.

While we commend Justice Badoy's persistence in searching for precedents that would help him resolve
Jinggoy Estradas' motion to be allowed to administer the oath of office of his mother, nonetheless, he
should not have delayed resolving the same. As a result, the members of his Division failed to vote on
his Resolution. He knew very well that the oath taking was to be held at 2:00 P.M. of June 29, 2001. Even
if he had to deny the motion, he should have consulted his members before 2:00 P.M. so as to give them
the opportunity to consider Jinggoy Estrada's arguments. When he submitted the Resolution to his
members at 4:45 P.M., he rendered their votes inconsequential. Even Justices De Castro and Ilarde
made notes in the same Resolution to the effect that the matter subject of the Resolution had become
moot before it reached them. Justice De Castro stated: "The matter is now moot and academic;" while
Justice Ilarde wrote: "What is there to deny? This resolution was brought to us only on 4:45 P.M. The
matter has been rendered moot and academic." Clearly, Justice Badoy should be held liable for such
delay.

In sum, we find Justice Badoy guilty of the following administrative offenses:

1) conduct unbecoming a Justice for going to GMA-7 Broadcast Station aboard an ambulance and
reporting the loss of a Resolution, classified as a light charge under Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended; 56 and

2) undue delay in resolving Jinggoy Estrada's motion to be allowed to administer his mother's oath of
office, a less serious charge under Section 9 of the same Rule. 57

Likewise, we find that both Justice Badoy and Justice De Castro failed to exhibit judicial temperament.
Such conduct deserves admonition.

One last word. The members of the bench and the bar ought to be reminded that the people expect
from them a sense of shared responsibility in the administration of justice — a crucial factor in the
speedy and fair disposition of cases. Each of them must do his share for in the last analysis the quality of
justice meted out by the courts cannot be higher than the quality of the lawyers practicing in the courts
and of the judges who have been selected from among them.

WHEREFORE, respondent Justice Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. (Retired), is hereby FINED in the sum of
P13,000.00 for conduct unbecoming a Justice and for delay in issuing an Order, to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.

Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro is hereby ADMONISHED to be more tolerant of counsel's

demeanors which do not detract from the dignity and solemnity of the court proceedings.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondents' records with this Court.

SO ORDERED.