PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CARLITO CLARO y MAHINAY, Accused-Appellant. (Ruled in Favor of The Presumption of Innocence)

CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CARLITO CLARO y

MAHINAY, Accused-Appellant.
(RULED IN FAVOR OF THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE)
FACTS:
AAA, a housemaid got a text from Claro, a security guard, asking if they
could meet and the former accepted the invitation. They met and boarded a
jeepney to Jollibee and ordered food. Later on, they went to a motel
however, AAA refused to go upstairs, which impelled Claro to hold her by
hand and pull her upstairs.
AAA tried to leave but Claro closed the door. He pulled her back to bed and
told her that he loves her. Instead of responding, she said that she has to go
to the toilet. Once inside, he called her cousin, German, who is a police
officer. However, she failed to give him the exact location because her
phone died. Claro suddenly barged inside the toilet and pulled her to the
bed. He forcefully undressed her and went on top of her. He forcibly
inserted his penis in her vagina. AAA resisted and tried to stop him but to no
avail. After he finished, AAA immediately put on her clothes and left. She
had to ride the jeepney with Claro because she did not know her way back.
Upon arriving home, she immediately reported the incident to German and
the latter instructed her to call back Claro and ask him to meet her so that
they could apprehend him. She did what she was asked and met with Claro.
German quickly approached Claro and introduced himself as a police officer.
Claro tried to run but German was able to seize him and bring him to NBI for
investigation.
Claro denied the accusation and claimed that he and AAA were lovers and
they agreed to go out on a date on the day of the incident. According to
Claro, they boarded the jeepney and ate at Jollibee. While eating, he asked
AAA if they would push through with their plan to go to a motel. AAA
allegedly agreed and once they entered the room, she went to the toilet.
Claro said that when AAA emerged from the toilet, she is wearing only a
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towel. They started kissing each other and AAA did not resist when he tried
to insert his penis to her vagina. Claro stopped when AAA said that she was
not ready yet so they got dressed and left the motel. Based on Claro, after
parting ways, he received a call from AAA to meet up again and once he
arrived at the place, a police officer introduced himself and arrested him.
Claro’s mother also testified for the defense that AAA was already her son’s
girlfriend prior to the incident that when she went to the police
headquarters upon learning of her son's arrest, she saw AAA but the latter
asked her to talk to German instead; that German told her: Wala nang
madami pang usapan, basta mangako ka sa akin na magbibigay ka ng ₱200,
000. 00; and that she asked AAA about what had really happened, but the
latter refused to answer her query.
The RTC found Claro guilty beyond reasonbale doubt of rape. The CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court. It regarded AAA's testimony as
credible; and ruled that the presence of bruises and abrasions on the body
of AAA proved that she had been subjected to bodily harm before he
accomplished his lustful desires. It observed that the fact that the parties
had gone home together after the incident was sufficiently explained by
AAA's statement that she had no choice but to go with him because she did
not know her way back.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution was able to overcome the presumption of
innocence in favor of Claro .
HELD:
No. The Court has reasonable doubt as to the guilt of Claro for rape.
There was noticeable contradictions on whether the sex was consensual or

not. However, whether based on his or her recollection, it was clear the AAA
willingly met with Claro. The fact that they met, rode a jeepney together and
shared a meal was undoubtedly by their prior agreement. Furthermore, they
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discussed checking in at the Aroma Motel and once she agreed, they walked
towards the motel and entered together.
The sweetheart defense is not usually regarded with favor in the absence of
strong corroboration. This is because the mere fact that the accused and the
victim were lovers does not exculpate him from criminal liability for rape. It
is a time-honored tenet that the appreciation and assessment by the trial
judge of the credibility of witnesses are given respect because the trial judge
personally observed the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses. Another
tenet of long standing is that the factual findings of the CA affirming those of
the trial judge are generally binding upon the Court, which is not a trier of
facts. It would be easy to simply affirm the conviction of the accused
especially when both the RTC and the CA regarded AAA as a credible
witness.
Yet, it is not fair to quickly reject the defense of consensual sexual

intercourse. First and foremost he and AAA were adults capable of
consenting to the sex and it was also established based on both their stories
that they agreed to meet, board a jeepney, share a meal and go to a motel.
Although AAA claimed that he had held her by the hand and pulled her
upstairs, there is no evidence showing that she resisted in that whole time,
or exhibited a reluctance to enter the motel with him.
The medico-legal findings of bruises and abrasion did not necessarily mean
that the accused had applied force in the context of forcing her to have sex
with him. The conclusion of the CA was too sweeping, for it inexplicably
ignored the probability of consensuality between the parties because
abrasions and contusions could also be suffered during consensual sex.
In every criminal case, the accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt. Moral certainty is required, or that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Reasonable
doubt is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in such a
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral
certainty, of the truth of the charge.
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The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense

importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon
conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction. Requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt necessarily
means that mere suspicion of the guilt of the accused, no matter how
strong, should not sway judgment against him.
Without the proof of his guilt being beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused herein was not overcome.
The weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the
proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of
proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying
the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. LIBERATO PENTECOSTES

y CRONICO, Accused-appellant
(DID NOT SUSTAIN THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE)
FACTS:
Liberato was having a drinking spree with Angel, Vivian’s father, together
with (4) four other people. The drinking spree ended at around 2:00pm. At
that time, Angel asked Vivian to go to the house of Auring, which was about
200 meters away, to return a chair that they borrowed.
Liberato went home at 3:00pm and at around 3:30 to 4:30pm., Antonio,
Vivian’s cousin, and his friend Jason saw Liberato carrying Vivian on his back
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at Antonio’s corn plantation heading to a nearby body of water. Jason

greeted Liberato but the latter merely looked back angrily. Angel began
searching for Vivian together with some relatives and barangay tanod, but
to no avail. The following morning, Vivian’s lifeless body was discovered
near Joel’s house, the father of Jason. Immediately, the police summoned all
those present at the drinking spree but when it was Liberato’s turn to be
questioned, he ran away. Vivian’s cause of death according to the autopsy is
drowning.
The defense presented Liberato as the sole witness and presented that he
did not know Vivian but confirmed his presence during the spree. He said
that he went home at around 3pm and arrived home at around 3:10pm. At
around 3:20pm, he claimed to have seen Joel passing by his house with
Vivian. That at arounf 3:30pm, Angel went to his house to ask for help in
searching for Vivian. Liberato then claimed that he told Angel that he saw
Vivian with Joel.
The next day, Liberato admitted to running away from the police but said
that it was because he was afraid of being shot by one of the police officers.
Later on, during his testimony in the RTC, Liberato admitted to knowing
Vivian however, upon further questioning, he suddenly claimed that he
never talked to Vivian and only learned her name from Angel. Liberato was
reviously convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was released
from prison sometime in 2003.
The RTC found Liberato guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but modified the award of damages.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution was able to overcome the presumption of

innocence in favor of Liberato.
HELD:
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Yes. Firstly, the circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves Liberato’s guilt

beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder. The rules on evidence
and jurisprudence allow the conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence alone, provided that the requisites are present. The circumstantial
evidence in this case are undisputed namely: 1. Liberato was present at the
residence of the victim when Vivian was reported to be missing; 2. Liberato
left the residence of Vivian after the drinking spree at about 3:00pm; 3.
Angel sent Vivian to return a chair also after the drinking spree and she
failed to return home; 4. Antonio and Jason both saw Liberato carrying
Vivian on his back at around 3:30 or 4:30pm at the com plantation
proceeding to the direction of a body of water; 5. On the following morning,
the body of Vivian was found in the corn plantation; 6. The cause of death of
Vivian is by drowning; and 8. Liberato fled while being investigated by the
police. Based on these, the Court ruled that these are sufficient to prove
Liberato’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Liberato’s contention that Jason and Antonio’s testimonies have

discrepancies is without merit. Both Jason and Antonio are minors when the
incident happened and it is settled that the testimonies of witnesses on
minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their
declarations, or the weight of their testimonies. The discrepancies on their
testimonies are also considered by the Court as pertaining to
inconsequential and trivial details only.
Liberato's defense of alibi and denial failed to overcome the prosecution's

evidence establishing his guilt. The defenses of denial and alibi are
inherently weak and unreliable due to the ease by which they may be
fabricated. After the prosecution successfully overcame Liberato's
presumption of innocence, it was incumbent upon him to present evidence
to the contrary. Liberato resorted only to mere denial and alibi claiming that
he was alone in his house at the time that he was seen at the corn
plantation. For alibi to prevail, it must be established by positive, clear and
satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have
been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission, and not merely
that he was somewhere else. Liberato failed to establish that it was
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physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime because
his house is not that far from the place where the body of the victim was
found.
The Court also ruled that motive is not an essential element of the crime and
the absence thereof does not preclude a finding of guilt on the part of
Liberato. Proof of motive alone will not establish guilt in the same way that
the absence thereof cannot establish innocence. The Court has held that the
question of motive only becomes material when there is doubt as to the
identity of the malefactor committing the offense charged.
The totality of circumstantial evidence on record sufficiently dispels any

doubt that Liberato was responsible for the ghastly death of Vivian.
Norma A. Adbulla vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 150129. April 6, 2005. Garcia, J.
Topic: Disputable Presumptions – that an unlawful act was done with an
unlawful intent – not sustained
Facts:
Petitioner Norma A. Abdulla, along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis,
were charged with Technical Malversation under Article 220 of the RPC. It
was alleged that Abdulla, being then the President of Sulu State College
(SSC), applied for the payment of wages of casual employees the amount of
P40,000, which was originally appropriated for the payment of the salary
differentials of secondary school teachers of SSC, thus, constituting illegal
use of public funds.
The prosecution did not present testimonial evidence and only presented
several documentary evidence. On the other hand, the defense presented
four witnesses who are the officers of SCC, including the three accused.
While Aguil and Darkis, cashier and administrative officer of SCC,

respectively, were subsequently acquitted, Abdulla was found guilty by the
Sandiganbayan of the crime charged. She was meted with a fine of P3,000
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and the penalty of temporary special disqualification for six (6) years. Upon
Motion for Reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan deleted the penalty of
disqualification.
Still dissatisfied, she filed this petition for review under Rule 45 with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the defense has sufficiently disproved the criminal intent of
accused-appellant
Ruling:
Yes. The evidence presented by the accused-appellant was found by the
Supreme Court to be sufficient in disproving the existence of criminal intent
on the part of the accused-appellant.
The Supreme Court did not agree with the reliance of the Sandiganbayan on
Section 5(b) of Rule 131 [now Section 3(b), Rule 131], or the presumption
that an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent. It was held that it is
from its very language of Section 3(b), Rule 131 that the disputable
presumption of the existence of unlawful or criminal intent presupposes the
commission of an unlawful act.
The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all

charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for
public use is per se not an unlawful act. In this case, appellant cannot be said
to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu
State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such
employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. In the absence
of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by competent
evidence the existence of appellant’s criminal intent rests upon the
prosecution. However, the latter failed in doing so. Hence, the accused-
appellant is entitled to acquittal.
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Ernestino P. Dunlao, Sr. vs. CA, The People of the Philippines, and Lourdes
Du
G.R. No. 111343. August 22, 1996. Romero, J.
Topic: Section 3(b), Rule 131
Facts:
Petitioner Dunlao is charged with a violation of PD 1612 or the Anti-Fencing
Law. It was alleged in the complaint that he wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously purchased and received dismantled farrowing crates made of GI
pipes, knowing the same to be subject of thievery. The said G.I. pipes are
owned by herein private respondent Lourdes Du.
On October 25, 1986, two employees of Lourdes Du were instructed to go to

the petitioner’s premises together with police officers to verify information
received that some farrowing crates and G.I. pipes stolen from Lourdes
Farms were to be found there. The subject G.I. pipes were found in the
premises of petitioner Ernestino Dunlao, Sr., who was engaged in the
business of dealing scrap metals. Upon informing Dunlao of the nature of
the subject pipes, he surrendered the same to the police officers. He was
charged with violation of Anti-Fencing Law to which he pleaded not guilty
upon arraignment. Trial ensued and he was found guilty by the RTC. He
appealed to the CA, but the decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner can be acquitted on the basis of not having criminal
intent in the possession of the stolen G.I. pipes
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
The Court held that contrary to petitioner's contention, intent to gain need
not be proved in crimes punishable by a special law such as P.D. 1612. The
distinction between acts mala in se and acts mala prohibita was discussed by
the Court stating that intent is not necessary to be proven in the latter.
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In explaining the violation of Anti-Fencing Law, the Court cited the case of
Lim vs. Court of Appeals, wherein it was ruled that intent to gain is a mental
state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person,
citing Soriano vs. People. In the words of the Court as in People vs. Sia Teb
Ban, “the sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an
unlawful act in bringing out the tires from his bodega which were loaded on
his pick-up.”
Moreover, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen G.I.
pipes by petitioner, since it is provided that mere possession of such articles
is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing. The Court ruled that it
was incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow this presumption by sufficient
and convincing evidence but he failed to do so. All petitioner could offer, by
way of rebuttal, was a mere denial and his incredible testimony that a
person aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of his establishment and
left them there.
The presumption that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act was upheld.
Racines vs. Morallos

547 SCRA 295
Facts:
Complainant Racines was required by the Court in its Resolution dated

November 22, 2007 to show cause why he should not be held in contempt
of court for filing a baseless and unfounded administrative case. Racines
filed on December 17, 2003, a Complaint against Judge Morallos and Sheriff
Cabusao of the MTC, Branch 68 of Pasig City, for knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment,1 other deceits,2 violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act,3 violation of Article 32 of the New Civil Code, Section 1, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.4 The Court,
finding the evaluation of the OCA to be in accord with law and the facts on
record, affirmed its recommendation and dismissed Racines’s complaint.
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The Court held that there was nothing in the records to show that Judge
Morallos was moved by improper motive when he rendered the decision in
Civil Case No. 9681;5 neither was there anything to show that Sheriff
Cabusao used his position to influence the outcome of the decision; and in
any event, the proper recourse was to elevate the case to a higher court for
review, and not through an administrative case. The Court, in the said
resolution also directed Racines to show cause within 10 days from receipt
thereof, why he should not be held in contempt of court for filing an utterly
baseless and unfounded administrative case. Racines through counsel, Atty.
Manalad, filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 which the Court denied with
finality for lack of substantial argument. On March 29, 2005, the OCA
received an Earnest Motion for Clarification9 filed by Racines through Atty.
Manalad which the Court treated as a second motion for reconsideration in
the Resolution dated May 25, 2005. The Court denied the motion for being a
prohibited pleading and directed that no further pleadings or motions shall
be entertained in the case. On June 19, 2007, Racines by himself, filed
a Pagpapaliwanag claiming that the complaint and the other documents
which Atty. Manalad prepared were all written in English and because he
fully trusted Atty. Manalad, he immediately signed the same even though
Atty. Manalad did not explain it to him. Had Atty. Manalad fully explained
the documents to him, he would not have signed the same, as he had no
intention of filing a baseless administrative case against respondents. If
there was anyone who should be punished, it was Atty. Manalad because he
deceived him into filing a baseless administrative case.
Issue: Whether Racines should be held in contempt of court for filing a

baseless and unfounded administrative case.
Held:
Yes. It is presumed that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his

voluntary act22 and unless the requirements for proper substitution were
made, a lawyer enjoys the presumption of authority given him by his
client.23 Racines does not deny that the signatures in the pleadings were
his. He also does not claim that he was prevented by Atty. Manalad from
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reading the contents thereof. He only said that since he fully trusted Atty.
Manalad he immediately signed the documents. From the foregoing, it is
clear that Racines acquiesced and gave his stamp of approval to the
pleadings filed in court.
The presumption that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his

voluntary act was not upheld.
Philippine Carpet Employees Association vs. Philippine Carpet

Manufacturing Corporation
G.R. No. 140269-70
Facts:
The petitioner is the certified sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent
of all rank and file employees in Philippine Carpet Manufacturing
Corporation, a local company engaged in the business of carpet and rug
making. Jonathan Barquin is a union member who was hired by the
company as casual worker (janitor) on July 15, 1995. Seven months later, on
January 27, 1996, he was extended a probationary employment, as a helper
in the Company’s weaving department. On January 16, 1996, the Regional
Tripartite Productivity Board (NCR) promulgated Wage Order No. 4 and 4-A
granting a two-tier increase in the minimum wage as follows: (a) P16.00
effective February 2, 1996; and (b) P4.00 effective May 1, 1996. The Union
wrote the company and its officers, asking for an across-the-board
implementation of Wage Order No. 4 and 4-A. In a letter dated March 14,
1996, the company refused to grant the Union’s request on the ground that
the company is suffering from poor business situation; that all the present
workers/employees are earning above P145.00/day, hence, not covered by
Wage Order No. 4 and 4-A. The Union reiterated its demand for an across-
the-board implementation, threatening legal action against the company in
the event that the said demand is denied. In a memorandum dated March
29, 1996, the Company reiterated its position that the employees are not
covered by Wage order No. 4 and 4-A for the reason that nobody in the
company is receiving a salary of P145.00 a day. In the meantime, Jonathan
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Barquin received a notice dated March 14, 1996 from the company, advising
him that his services were to be terminated effective at the close of working
hours on April 13, 1996. The company justified Baquin’s separation from the
service as a valid act of retrenchment. While the Union averred that the
separation is tantamount to illegal dismissal resorted to by the company to
avoid compliance with the provisions of Wage Order 4 and 4-A.” Failing to
resolve the issues in the mediation level, the parties agreed to submit the
case for voluntary arbitration. The voluntary arbitrator ruled that Barquin
was hastily dismissed to avoid compliance with Wage Order Nos. 4 and 4-A,
but held that he is not entitled to reinstatement because he received his
separation pay and voluntarily signed the Deed of Release and Quitclaim
and acquiesced to his separation. The CA affirmed the decision of the
voluntary arbitrator and held that although Barquin was illegally dismissed
he was not entitled to reinstatement because of the Deed of Release and
Quitclaim that Barquin signed. The Court of Appeals added that the burden
of proof to show that the quitclaim was signed and executed involuntarily is
on the party who assails it inasmuch as a person is presumed to intend the
consequences of his voluntary act and that a person takes ordinary care of
his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular.
Issue: Whether Barquin intended the consequences of the Deed of Release

and Quitclaim that he signed.
Held:
No. When as in this case, the voluntariness of the execution of the quitclaim
or release is put into issue, then the claim of employee may still be given
due course.22 The law looks with disfa-vor upon quitclaims and releases by
employees pressured into signing the same by unscrupulous employers
minded to evade legal responsibilities. In the present case, both the CA and
the voluntary arbitrator erred in concluding that Barquin voluntarily signed
the Deed of Release and Quitclaim. Both the voluntary arbitrator and the CA
ruled that the respondent company failed to prove that it was suffering from
actual poor financial condition and that it was “doubtful if the retrenchment
of one helper in the production department earning P145.00 a day would
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avert losses of the company.” It is therefore reversible error to hold, despite

such findings, that Barquin voluntarily signed the quitclaim for the only
logical conclusion that can be drawn is that the respondent company
feigned that it was suffering business losses in order to justify retrenchment
and consequently enable it to terminate the services of Barquin in order to
prevent the wage distortion. Respondent company’s lack of candor and
good faith in informing Barquin that he was being terminated due to a valid
retrenchment and not because it sought to avoid compliance with the
mandated wage increases amounted to a deception which led Barquin to
the mistaken belief that that there was legal ground for retrenchment and
prompted him to acquiesce to his termination and sign the quit claim. Verily,
had the respondent company not misled Barquin into believing that there
was a ground to retrench, it is not difficult to believe that he would have
thought twice before signing the quitclaim inasmuch there was no reason
for the termination of his employment. Moreover, this Court has ruled
in Salonga vs. NLRC that it is the employer and not Barquin who has the
burden of proving that the quitclaim was voluntarily entered into by him.
ASTRO ELECTRONICS CORP. AND PETER ROXAS, PETITIONER, VS.

PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 136729. September 23, 2003
FACTS: PHILTRUST granted several loans amounting to P3,000,000

to Astro Electronics which were secured by 3 Promissory Notes. In each of
these promissory notes, it appears that PETER ROXAS signed twice, as
President of ASTRO and in his personal capacity. Each promissory note
provides that “I/We severally and solidarily, promise to pay to PHILTRUST
BANK or order.” PETER ROXAS also signed a Continuing Suretyship
Agreement in favor of Philtrust, in his capacity as President of Astro and as
Surety. Subsequently, respondent PHILGUARANTEE, with the consent of
Astro, guaranteed in favor of PHILTRUST the payment of 70% of Astros’s
Loan. As a result of Astro’s failure to pay its obligation, PHILGUARANTEE
paid 70% of the guaranteed loan to PHILTRUST. PHILGUARANTEE filed a
complaint for sum of money against ASTRO and ROXAS. ROXAS denied any
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liability in the promissory note but he did not deny that he signed them
twice. However, he alleged that he only signed in blanks and the phrases “in
his personal capacity” and “in his official capacity” were fraudulently
inserted without his knowledge after he placed his signatures thereon.
ISSUE: Whether ROXAS is solidarily liable with ASTRO on account

of the binding effect of the promissory notes against him?
RULING: Yes. The act of ROXAS in signing the promissory notes made him
a co-maker of such wherein he binds himself solidarily liable with ASTRO.
The Negotiable Instrument Law provides that any person who write their
names on the promissory notes are makers.
Under Section 3 (p) and (d), Rule 131 of Rules on Evidence,
private transactions are presumed to be fair and regular and that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns in the absence of countervailing
evidence.
In the case at bar, ROXAS is ASTRO’s President and a
businessman who is presumed to take ordinary care of his concerns. He
knew the nature of the transactions and documents involved as he executed
three promissory notes and a Continuing Suretyship Agreement as a co-
maker who is solidarily liable with ASTRO. Also, he did not deny the fact that
he signed the notes. His self-serving allegations that he merely signed in
blank and the phrases “in official capacity” and “in personal capacity” were
fraudulently placed without his knowledge were not proven and were even
refuted by the Court. According to the evidence, it is apparent that the
typewritten phrases were already in its placed before ROXAS affixed his
signature because the typewritten phrases do not cover the portion of his
signatures. In view of the failure of ROXAS to overcome the presumption
that their transaction is fair and regular and that he takes ordinary care of
his concerns, he is deemed to have apprised himself of the contents and
consequences of the promissory notes and Surety Agreement and has
assumed the liability of a solidary debtor in the notes with ASTRO, in
accordance with the Negotiable Instruments Law.
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POLICARPIO CAYABYAB, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, FAUSTINO, GABRIEL, SOLEDAD & FRANCISCA, ALL
SURNAMED LANDINGIN AND AMPARO FRANCISCO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 75120 April 28, 1994
FACTS: The subject lots in dispute were owned by Faustino

Landingin and Agapita Ferrer. Petitioner Cayabyab has acquired portion of
the subject lot by virtue of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Faustino and Agapita. In 1980, the children of Faustino and Agapita,
respondents in this case, learned about the sale made in favor of Cayabyab
when they received a demand to vacate one of the lands in dispute.
Subsequently, the respondents filed an action for the annulment of the
deeds of sale and recovery of possession of the lands. Respondents alleged
that Cayabyab was able to obtain the signatures of Faustino and Agapita
through fraud, undue influence, and abuse of confidence. It appears that
Faustino and Agapita were illiterate and could only speak Ilocano while the
Deeds were written in English. Also, Agapita was only able to affix her thumb
mark. Meanwhile, Faustino lost the use of his right arm to paralysis years
before the execution of the deeds. Lastly, they were already 81 years old at
that time of its execution and Agapita died from senility 6 months after. To
refute the allegations of fraud, the petitioner presented the testimonies of
two witnesses. First is that of Ceralde who testified that Faustino and
Agapita have sold a parcel of land to him years before the execution of the
subject deeds. Second, Dr. Cerezo who stated that he had no knowledge
about the eye operations of Agapita and her hospitalization. However, they
both alleged that Atty. Tandoc, one of the notaries who notarized one of the
deeds, explained in Pangasinense the contents of the deeds. Unfortunately,
any one of the three notaries were not called to testify before the court.
ISSUE: Whether the burden of proving fraud rests upon Faustino

and his children on account of the presumption that Faustino and Agapita
took ordinary care in the executions of the Deeds?
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RULING: No. The general rule is that whosoever alleges fraud or mistake
in any transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that
a person takes ordinary care for his concerns and that private transactions
have been fair and regular. Nevertheless, the general rule admits of
exceptions, one of which is Article 1332 of the Civil Code. Under the
foregoing provision, where a party to a contract is illiterate, or cannot read
nor understand the language in which the contract is written, the burden is
on the party interested in enforcing the contract to prove that the terms
thereof are fully explained to the former in a language understood by him
In the case at bar, both Faustino and Agapita were illiterate and
Agapita could only thumbmark her signature in all deeds. On the other
hand, Faustino had a paralyzed right arm. Also, the Deeds were written in
English when they could only speak and understand Ilocano dialect. Thus, it
is the burden of petitioner that the contents of the deeds were fully
explained to the couple. However, the testimonies by Ceralde and Dr.
Cerezo are not credible enough, especially when they testified that the
contents of the deeds were explained to Faustino and Agapita as Dr. Cerezo
was not present at that time. The failure of petitioner to present the
notaries public as witnesses to testify is fatal to his cause as these notaries
are the persons who can present that the contents were accurately
explained to the couple. Also, the couple was not assisted by any of their
children in the execution of the deeds nor they were invited to become an
instrumental witness. Lastly, there is no showing that the couple received a
consideration for the purported sales. These circumstances demonstrates
that the deeds of sale were done in fraud of the couple and their heirs.
People vs. Ernesto Yabut

GR No. 82263
June 26,1992
Facts
The accused was charged of violating RA 6425 otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. The prosecution alleges a civilian informant went to
Camp Olivas, Pampanga to report on the alleged drug trafficking activities of
Yabut and his co-accused Alejandrino at Pulo, Palayan, Valenzuela, Metro
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Manila. Upon evaluating the information, he formed a team composed of

S/Sgt. Ruben Bazar and four (4) others, and together with the informant,
they proceeded to the reported site of the illegal activity to conduct a buy-
bust operation. Bazar was designated to act as poseur-buyer.
Upon arrival at Pulo, Bazar and the civilian informant were allegedly
met by the appellant and brought to the house of Alejandrino who met
them there. From a distance of twenty (20) meters, witness Reyno, who had
positioned himself at the corner of the entrance of the alley leading to
Alejandrino's house, saw Bazar talk to Alejandrino after which the latter
handed over one plastic bag of marijuana to Bazar who in turn gave a
marked ten-peso bill to the appellant as payment for the drug. Thereupon,
Bazar gave the pre-arranged hand signal and Reyno proceeded to arrest the
appellant and recovered from him the marked money. The team thereafter
brought accused-appellant to Camp Olivas.
In his defense, the accused-appellant alleged that during the night and
hour in question, he was standing by the house of his co-accused
Alejandrino when a group of four (4) men arrived, looking for Alejandrino
and expressing the desire to buy marijuana. Alejandrino however said he
had nothing to sell. Since the group's efforts, insofar as Alejandrino was
concerned, had been thwarted, he then became the focus of their attention
and was subjected to a search of his person and thereafter he was brought
blindfolded to Camp Olivas, There, he was confronted with a tea bag of
marijuana, but he denied any knowledge as to the same, as well as having
received P10.00 from Sgt. Bazar.
The trial court found the accused guilty.
Issues
Whether or not the trial court erred in not considering the non-
presentation of Sgt. Ruben Bazar, the alleged poseur-buyer to the witness
stand as a fatal flaw to the cause of the prosecution.
Ruling
Yes. In the present case, accused-appellant's version of the
circumstances leading to his apprehension constitutes a total denial of the
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prosecution's allegations. In this regard, this Court has ruled that when there
is such a divergence of accounts that it becomes incumbent upon the
prosecution to rebut appellant's allegations by presenting the alleged
poseur-buyer. This it failed to do, giving rise to the presumption that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. (Rule 131, Sec.
5[e]). This failure constitutes a total flaw in the prosecution's evidence since
the so-called informant who was never presented as a witness and never
identified, is the best witness for the prosecution.
According to the prosecution's own version, Sgt. Bazar, being the
alleged poseur-buyer, was the only person who could definitely and
categorically attest to the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the
accused-appellant as he was the one who transacted with the latter and he
was the one who allegedly exchanged a marked P10.00 bill for a tea bag of
marijuana. In short, he could have provided the most accurate account of
the case. Yet, he was not presented as a witness by the prosecution, and his
failure to testify remains unexplained.
The accused was therefore acquitted on the ground that the
prosecution failed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt.
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People vs. Luciano Jumamoy

GR No. 101584
April 7, 1993
Facts
In 1987, the victim and his younger brother, together with three other
companions, went to the Cultural Center of Bohol, where a disco dance was
being held in connection with the commencement exercises of St. Paul
Academy. Upon reaching the Center, the victim and his companions joined
three other members of their barkada watching the disco outside. The
victim and three of his friends were leaning against a concrete post of the
Center conversing and watching the 'disco,' when all of a sudden appellant
appeared in front obliquely to the right of the victim and fired three (3)
successive shots at the latter, who slumped and fell to the ground. The
victim was brought to a hospital, but the latter expired before arrival
thereat.
Thus, two (2) separate informations for Murder and Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions were filed against accused Luciano
Jumamoy. Upon motion of the prosecution, the two (2) cases were
consolidated and jointly heard. All the prosecution eyewitnesses pointed
without hesitancy to the accused as the murderer of the victim, and there
was not even one witness wavered of his identification as the author of the
crime.
The trial court disregarded the accused's defense of alibi wherein he
states that he boarded M/B Roxan, which left for Cebu City on March 29,
1987 to look for employment. However, it is a well-settled rule that alibi as a
defense, is weak, and the accused claiming alibi as a defense must prove
that it was impossible for him to be at the place at the time of the
commission because he was elsewhere during the incident. The records in
this case will show that at the time of the incident, at the time of the police
investigation, during the preliminary investigation, as well as in the trial
proper, the accused was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses.
After trial, the court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged.
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Issues
Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to present all of the six
(6) eyewitnesses should be considered as suppression of testimony which
will give rise to the presumption that their testimonies would be
unfavorable to the prosecution.
Ruling
No. The instant appeal rests principally on the issue of the credibility
of the witnesses for the prosecution and, to a lesser extent, on the alleged
suppression of evidence.
It is settled that the issue of credibility is to be resolved primarily by
the trial court because it is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial. Thus, its findings on the matter of the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which would
have affected the result of the case. After careful review of the records and
the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of the
witnesses, the court found nothing therein to warrant a reversal of the
findings of fact of the trial court.
The accused points out that originally, there were six (6) alleged
eyewitnesses for the prosecution. Surprisingly, only three (3) took the
witness stand and testified. He alleges that the suppression of the
testimonies of the other three (3) alleged eyewitnesses raises some doubts
that their testimonies would mix up the evidence for the prosecution which
will give rise to doubts on his conviction. However, the court ruled
otherwise.
The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the
information did not constitute, contrary to the contention of the accused,
suppression of evidence. The prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to
determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the
prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the prosecutor
need not present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet
the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
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reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore,

be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature. The Court has
ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would not
constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the
prosecution's case.
Besides, there is no showing that the eyewitnesses who were not
presented in court as witnesses were not available to the accused. We
reiterate the rule that the adverse presumption from a suppression of
evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not wilful; (2) the
evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3)
the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an
exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed that the failure, to
present the other witnesses was because their testimonies would be
unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance,
by compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or even as hostile
witnesses.
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION: That money paid by one to another was due

to the latter (Sec. 3(f), Rule 131)
[ruled in favor of the presumption]
UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORPORATION

vs.
TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS: Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation (Titan)

filed an action for sum of money against Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources
Corporation (Uniwide) for non-payment of certain claims billed by Titan
after completion of three projects covered by agreements they entered into
with each other. However, the civil case was suspended for it to undergo
arbitration, Hence, Titan’s complaint was refiled with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC).
Before the CIAC, Uniwide filed an answer denying the material allegations of
the complaint, with counterclaims for refund of overpayments, among
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others. Uniwide asserted that it overpaid Titan for unauthorized additional

works in Project 1 and Project 3.
The CIAC (arbitral tribunal) found Uniwide absolved of any liability for the
claims made by Titan on Project 1. For Project 2, Uniwide absolved of any
VAT liability. However, it was held liable for the unpaid balance which is
ordered to be paid to the Titan with 12% interest per annum. For project 3,
Uniwide was likewise held liable to pay the unpaid balance plus interest, and
the VAT on this project.
The CA affirmed the tribunal’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether Uniwide is entitled to a return of the amount it

allegedly paid by mistake to Titan for additional works done on Project 1
RULING:
No.
The issue refers to the P5,823,481.75 paid by Uniwide for additional
works done on Project 1. Uniwide asserts that Titan was not entitled to be
paid this amount because the additional works were without any written
authorization.
It should be noted that the contracts do not contain stipulations on
"additional works," Uniwide's liability for "additional works," and prior
approval as a requirement before Titan could perform "additional works."
Nonetheless, Uniwide cites Article 1724 of the New Civil Code as basis for its
claim that it is not liable to pay for "additional works" it did not authorize or
agree upon in writing. The provision states:
Art. 1724. The contractor who undertakes to build a structure or any other
work for a stipulated price, in conformity with plans and specifications
agreed upon with the landowner, can neither withdraw from the contract
nor demand an increase in the price on account of the higher cost of labor
or materials, save when there has been a change in the plans and
specifications, provided:
(1) Such change has been authorized by the proprietor in writing; and
(2) The additional price to be paid to the contractor has been determined in
writing by both parties.
JD3A
The Court of Appeals did take note of this provision but deemed it
inapplicable to the case at bar because Uniwide had already paid, albeit with
unwritten reservations, for the "additional works." Instead, the Court of
Appeals applied Art. 1423 and characterized Uniwide's payment of the said
amount as a voluntary fulfillment of a natural obligation. The situation was
characterized as being akin to Uniwide being a debtor who paid a debt even
while it knew that it was not legally compelled to do so. As such debtor,
Uniwide could no longer demand the refund of the amount already paid.
Uniwide counters that Art. 1724 makes no distinction as to whether
payment for the "additional works" had already been made. It claims that it
had made the payments, subject to reservations, upon the false
representation of Titan-Ikeda that the "additional works" were authorized in
writing. Uniwide characterizes the payment as a "mistake," and not a
"voluntary" fulfillment under Art. 1423 of the Civil Code. Hence, it urges the
application, instead, of the principle of solutio indebiti under Arts. 2154 and
2156 of the Civil Code.
The Court agrees with the CA.
The distinction pointed out by the Court of Appeals is material. The issue is
no longer centered on the right of the contractor to demand payment for
additional works undertaken because payment, whether mistaken or not,
was already made by Uniwide. Thus, it would not anymore be incumbent on
Titan to establish that it had the right to demand or receive such payment.
Accordingly, Uniwide, as the owner who did pay the contractor for such
additional works even if they had not been authorized in writing, has to
establish its own right to reimbursement not under Art. 1724, but under a
different provision of law. Uniwide's burden of establishing its legal right to
reimbursement becomes even more crucial in the light of the general
presumption contained in Section 3(f), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that
"money paid by one to another was due to the latter."
Uniwide undertakes such a task before this Court, citing the provisions
on solutio indebiti under Arts. 2154 and 2156 of the Civil Code. However, it
is not enough to prove that the payments made by Uniwide to Titan were
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"not due" because there was no prior authorization or agreement with

respect to additional works. There is a further requirement that the
payment by the debtor was made either through mistake or under a cloud
of doubt. In short, for the provisions on solutio indebiti to apply, there has
to be evidence establishing the frame of mind of the payor at the time the
payment was made.
The CIAC refused to acknowledge that the additional works on Project 1

were indeed unauthorized by Uniwide. Neither did the Court of Appeals
arrive at a contrary determination. There would thus be some difficulty for
this Court to agree with this most basic premise submitted by Uniwide that
it did not authorize the additional works on Project 1 undertaken by Titan.
Yet even conceding that the additional works on Project 1 were not
authorized or committed into writing, the undisputed fact remains that
Uniwide paid for these additional works. Thus, to claim a refund of
payments made under the principle of solutio indebiti, Uniwide must be
able to establish that these payments were made through mistake. Again,
this is a factual matter that would have acquired a mantle of invulnerability
had it been determined by both the CIAC and the Court of Appeals.
However, both bodies failed to arrive at such a conclusion. Moreover,
Uniwide is unable to direct our attention to any pertinent part of the record
that would indeed establish that the payments were made by reason of
mistake.
JD3A
[did not sustain the presumption]

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner
vs
AMADO M. MENDOZA and MARIA MARCOS VDA. DE MENDOZA,
Respondents
FACTS: BPI filed a complaint for sum of money against respondents,

alleging that the latter: (a) opened a foreign currency savings account at BPI-
Gapan Branch and deposited therein the total amount of US$16,264.00; and
(b) placed US$2,000.00 in a time deposit account. After the lapse of the
thirty (30) day clearing period on May 9 and 13, 1997, respondents
withdrew the amount. BPI thereafter received a notice from its
correspondent bank, Bankers Trust Company New York (Bankers Trust), that
the subject check was dishonored due to "amount altered". This prompted
BPI to inform respondents of such dishonor and to demand reimbursement.
The respondents allowed BPI to apply the proceeds of their time deposit
account to the their outstanding obligation. Upon the exhaustion of the said
time deposit account, respondent Amado gave BPI a promissory note
containing his promise to pay BPI-Gapan Branch the amount of ₱1,000.00
monthly. However, when respondents failed to fulfill their remaining
obligation despite repeated demands, BPI was constrained to give a final
demand letter.
The RTC ruled in favor of BPI and ordered the respondents to pay the
remaining amounts withdrawn by them. Since respondents withdrew the
money prior to the dishonor and that BPI allowed such withdrawal by
mistake, it is only proper that respondents return the proceeds of the same
pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 of the Civil
Code. The CA, on the other hand, reversed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: W/N BPI is entitled to the amount it paid to respondents which

were withdrawn by the latter
RULING: Yes.
JD3A
After a judicious review of the records, including a re-evaluation of the

evidence presented by the parties, the Court is inclined to sustain the
findings of the RTC over that of the CA.
Records evince that BPI was able to satisfactorily prove by
preponderance of evidence the existence of respondents' obligation in its
favor. Verily, Amado acknowledged its existence and expressed his
conformity thereto when he voluntarily: (a) affixed his signature in the
letters where he acknowledged the dishonor of the subject check, and
subsequently, allowed BPI to apply the proceeds of their US time deposit
account to partially offset their obligation to the bank; and (b) executed a
Promissory Note wherein he undertook to pay BPI in installments of
₱1,000.00 per month until the remaining balance of his obligation is fully
paid.
On the other hand, aside from his bare testimony, Amado did not
present any corroborative evidence to support his claim that his
performance of the aforesaid voluntary acts was subject to BPI's
presentment of the proper and authenticated proof of the dishonored
subject check. Amado's unsubstantiated testimony is self-serving at the
most, and hence, cannot be relied upon.
Overall, assessing the pieces of evidence presented by BPI as opposed to the
self-serving allegations of respondents, the weight of evidence clearly
preponderates in favor of the former.
In any event, the CA erred in concluding that BPI failed to prove the
dishonor of the subject check by merely presenting: (a) a photocopy thereof
with its dorsal portion stamped "ENDORSEMENT CANCELLED" by Bankers
Trust; and (b) a print-out of the e-mail advice from Bankers Trust stating that
the subject check was returned unpaid because the amount was altered.
Therefore, as records reveal that BPI's payment of the proceeds of the
subject check was due to a mistaken notion that such check was cleared,
when in fact, it was dishonored due to an alteration in the amount indicated
therein, such payment to respondents was clearly made by mistake, giving
rise to the quasi-contractual obligation of solutio indebiti under Article
2154 in relation to Article 2163 of the Civil Code. Consequently, respondents
must return to BPI the aforesaid amount, with legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of extrajudicial demand - or on June
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27, 1997, the date when BPI informed respondents of the dishonor of the
subject check and demanded the return of its proceeds - until fully paid.
[Section 3 (g), Rule 131: That a thing delivered by one to another belonged
to the latter.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PAULINO

CABALLERO, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
The crime under prosecution consists, according to the complaint, in that:

"In or about the month of May, 1912, the accused, Paulino Caballero, being,
as he then was, the municipal president of the municipality of Badian,
Province of Cebu, and availing himself of his office, did, with intent to obtain
gain through the employment of force and intimidation upon the person of
Macario Pellire, seize a cow valued at P35 belonging to the said Macario
Pellire, against the will of its owner.
The criminal acts charged against the accused consists in that, when Macario
Pellire passed in front of the house of Paulino Caballero, leading a cow by
the halter, the accused came down out of the house, offered him P4.50 for
the animal and tendered him the money, and, because Pellire would not
accept it, "took the rope out of his hand and kept the cow, saying besides
that he would send policemen to arrest him."
During the course of the trial the defense endeavored to prove that the
accusation made by Pellire was the work of the Agravantes and a result of
the political dissensions of the general elections. The direct defense consists
in the alleged fact that Pellire, needing money, went to defendant's house
and transferred to him his rights in the cow, for the price of P27, for which
purpose the proper certificates was issued. This document, found in the
record, appears to have been issued on June 4, 1912, and was authorized by
the treasurer who is said to be an opponent of the president herein
prosecuted.
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Issue:
Whether the cow in question belongs to the defendant Caballero.
Ruling:
Yes. One fact is certain and beyond all discussion, as having been alleged by
him who claims to be the offended party, to wit, that the cow which is the
subject matter of this action was an offspring of another that belonged to
the defendant. It is also certain, likewise because so affirmed by the party
who claims to have been offended, that the latter was a tenant of the
defendant and a herdsman charged with the care of his cows, under an
agreement in the beginning that the calves should be divided between them
in equal shares, but by a later stipulation, made at the defendant's request
that of each three calves born two of them should belong to the owner and
the third to the herdsman. Continuing his testimony, he who appears as the
offended party stated that the cow in question was the oldest, that there
were two other younger ones, and, finally, that the cow herein concerned
was his, as "his share."
The legal presumption from these facts is that the cow in question belonged
to the defendant. Article 354 of the Civil Code provides: "The following
belong to the owner: 1. Natural fruits…" Article 355: "Natural fruits are the
spontaneous products of the soil, and the brood and all other produce of
animals."
Moreover, be that as it may, and even if it be admitted as true that the

oldest offspring, the one herein concerned (and not one of the two younger
animals, for example, the youngest) might pertain to the herdsman, Macario
Pellire, as a real one-third interest alloted to him by the agreement, and
though it also be conceded as true that he had sold a half interest in that
offspring to Francisco Agravante for P15, still the owner of the cow which
produced that offspring was entitled to redeem the latter after its sale, for
the same price at which it had been sold to that third party.
JD3A
A co-owner of a thing held in common may exercise the redemption in case

the shares of all the other coowners, or of any of them, are sold to a third
party.
Furthermore, the present status of the case is that of a title of transfer upon
which, rightly or wrongly, the defendant relies, a title which, neither civilly
nor criminally, has been assailed as false and can not be passed by without
the proper judicial pronouncement thereon, inasmuch as it is in form a legal
title authorized by a public officer designated by the law, such as was the
municipal treasurer of Badian who issued it as the certificate of ownership
now required and which constitutes, pursuant to Act No. 1147, a
presumption juris tantum that the animal in question belongs to the person
designated in the said certificate.
JD3A
[Jurisprudence where the presumption in Section 3 (g), Rule 131 was

overcome]
TAN TE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. J. FRANKLIN BELL, ET AL., defendants-
appellees.
Facts:
The short decision heretofore rendered in this case affirmed the judgment
of the trial court. This opinion is intended to set forth at some length our
reasons for sustaining that judgment. The plaintiff, Tan Te, is a dealer in
second-hand merchandise. On the other hand, all of the defendants were
members of the military.
On the 21st day of May, 1912, the plaintiff was in possession of certain
property of the value of P800. The said property was seized and taken by the
defendants. It is now in possession of the depot quartermaster of the United
States Army, city of Manila. Said property was not taken for tax, assessment,
or fine pursuant to a statute, or seized on execution or attachment against
the property of the plaintiff, or in pursuance of any process of law or nay
civil court or civil authority of the Philippine Islands, but was seized and
taken pursuant to the provisions of section 3748 of the Revised Statutes of
the United States. Under para. 7 of the Agreed Facts, the said property,
consisting of clothes and military outfits, had been furnished prior to such
seizure by the United States to certain of its soldiers. Prior to such seizure,
the United States had not within the Philippine Islands, by public sale,
disposed of, or transferred any right, title, or interest in any clothing or
outfits of the particular patterns, kinds, or standards of the articles last
mentioned. All of said articles last mentioned in this paragraph were, prior
to said seizure, sold by certain of the soldiers of the United States Army or
by third parties who had received said articles by purchase, barter,
exchange, pledge or by theft from soldiers of the United States Army, to the
plaintiff.
The trial court adjudged that the plaintiff recover none of the property
described in paragraph 7 of said stipulation." Plaintiff appealed. Upon this
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point the Court thinks it sufficient to say that it is alleged in the complaint
that the "defendants illegally, wrongfully, and by force, and without any due
process of law whatsoever, took from the plaintiff" the property in question,
and "that said property is wrongfully detained by the defendants." In
Tindal vs. Wesley, the court, after reviewing many of its decisions, said: "But
the eleventh amendment gives no immunity to officers or agents of a State
in withholding the property of a citizen without authority of law. And when
such officers or agents assert that they are in rightful possession, they must
make good that assertion when it is made to appear in a suit against them as
individuals that the legal title and right of possession is in the plaintiff."
The present case is so clearly within the principles affirmed and the cases
reviewed in that opinion that the Court deems it necessary to discuss this
point further.
Issue:
Whether the plaintiff Te is entitled for the return of the property described
in para. 7.
Ruling:
No. Sections 3748 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provides that
“the clothes, arms, military outfits, and accouterments furnished by the
United States to any soldier shall not be sold, bartered, exchanged, pledged,
loaned, or given away; and no person not a soldier, or duly authorized
officer of the United States, who has possession of any clothes, arms,
military outfits, or accouterments, so furnished, and which have been the
subject of any such sale, barter, exchange, pledge, loan, or gift, shall have
any right, title, or interest therein; but the same may be seized and taken by
any officer of the United States, civil or military, and shall thereupon be
delivered to any quartermasters, or other officer authorized to receive the
same. The possession of any such clothes, arms, military outfits, or
accouterments, by any person not a soldier or officer of the United States
JD3A
shall be presumptive evidence of such sale, barter, exchange, pledge, loan,

or gift.
Section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the following
presumptions are satisfactory, if uncontradicted, but they are disputable,
and may be contradicted by other evidence: xxx (7) That a thing delivered by
one another belonged to the latter; xxx.
However, the Court finds it proper to inquire into the purpose of seizure and
the title to the property now in question. According to the Court, the real
purpose of the procedure followed in this seizure was to break up this
practice of purchasing clothing from soldiers, which had been issued to
them by the United States for military purposes. It was believed that civil
actions in the courts pursuant to search warrant and regular procedure had
failed to remedy the situation. The military authorities claimed in this case
that they proceeded in accordance with the express provisions of section
3748 which they insist not only grants authority, but goes further and makes
mere possession of such military outfits by any person not a soldier or
officer of the United States Army evidence of an unlawful sale, etc.
The procedure followed by the defendants constituted under the provisions

of section 3748 "due process of law" and therefore, the search and seizure
were not "unreasonable" and a "warrant" was not necessary to justify their
action. In considering the foregoing provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
and the Civil Code it must be borne in mind that section 3748 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States is the "supreme law of the land" on this
subject, and that the plaintiff had no "right, title, or interest" in the property
now in question.
Having held that the seizure of those articles which had been issued
originally by the United States Army to its soldiers, acquired by the plaintiff
through other parties than the United States Government, was unlawful, it is
at once apparent that the plaintiff can claim no damages for such seizure
unless there was a wanton abuse or excess of authority in making the
seizure. None such is claimed. As to those articles, plaintiff was holding them
unlawfully and cannot be heard to complain if his business was disturbed, in
JD3A
so far as there may have been a reasonable necessity therefor during the
process of seizure. From the evidence of record there is no substantial
ground for concluding that the search for and seizure of those articles was
not conducted in the manner least calculated to disturb the plaintiff's
business, consistent with the object to be attained.
As to those article seized which were admitted by the defendants not belong
to the United States Government, even though we were disposed to award
damages for such wrongful seizure, there appears to be no trustworthy
basis upon which they could be allowed. In two recent cases we discussed
the question of the allowance of damages to an established business, and
there stated that satisfactory evidence of the amount of business transacted
before and after the injury complained of must be submitted, as a general
rule, in all such cases, before damages can be awarded. No such evidence
was submitted in the case at bar. Furthermore, were such evidence before
us, it would be necessary to determine what portion thereof was occasioned
by the seizure which was lawful as distinguished from the damages caused
by the seizure which subsequently proved to be unlawful. In some
jurisdictions this might be a case for the award of at least nominal damages
for the articles wrongfully seized. But merely nominal damages are never
considered in this jurisdiction. Under all the circumstances of this case and
after a careful examination of the evidence before us, we are of the opinion
that no adequate and reliable basis for the assessment of damages is
available.
Rule 131, Sec. 3 (h): Disputable Presumption that an obligation delivered

to the debtor has been paid. (OVERCOME)
G.R. No. 158621 December 10, 2008

ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION vs. DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC
FACTS:
Petitioner Royal Cargo Corporation, and the defendant DFS Sports Unlimited
are domestic corporations organized under the laws of the Philippines.
Petitioner is an international freight forwarder, which offers trucking,
brokerage, storage and other services to the public, and serves as conduit
between shippers, consignees, and carriers for the transportation of cargos
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from one point of the globe to another. Respondent, on the other hand, is
one of the concessionaires of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).
Sometime in October 1993, DFS engaged the services of the Royal Cargo to
attend and undertake the former's brokerage and trucking requirements.
The petitioner rendered trucking, brokerage, storage and other services to
the respondent in connection with the latter's importation business, and as
a consequence it incurred expenses for brokerage forms, stamps, notarial
fees, arrastre charges, wharfage fees, storage charges, guarding fees,
telegrams, LCL charges, photostat copies, trucking charges, processing fees,
ocean freight charges, collection fees, brokerage fees, insurance premiums,
and 10% VAT, which the respondent fails and refuses to pay despite
petitioner's demands.
Royal Cargo filed against respondent a Complaint for Collection of Sum of

Money with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The respondent
contends that, except for a single occasion, it never engaged the services of
petitioner for the importation of various products and that it is under no
legal obligation to heed the demand of plaintiff. DFS also filed a
counterclaim alleging that petitioner owes it a sum for the value of the
imported goods respondent lost by reason of the gross negligence as well as
illegal activities of petitioner in the transshipment of respondent's goods
and the amount that it gave to the petitioner for the payment of taxes and
customs.
Trial ensued, and petitioner presented as part of its evidence, 34 carbon
copies of invoices. Despite objection of the respondent that it was self-
serving, the same was admitted by the RTC. On the other hand, respondent
presented, 28 original copies of the 34 invoices submitted by petitioner for
the purpose of proving payment of the amount sought to be recovered by
the latter. RTC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint. CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE LIES WITH THE DEBTOR TO
PROVE THAT PAYMENT HAS BEEN MADE.
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WHETHER OR NOT AN INVOICE IS DEEMED A CREDIT INSTRUMENT WHICH,

UPON PRESENTATION BY THE DEBTOR, RAISES THE DISPUTABLE
PRESUMPTION OF PAYMENT AS PER RULE 131, SECTION 3(h) OF THE RULES
OF COURT THAT STATES THAT A DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF PAYMENT IS
RAISED WHEN AN OBLIGATION IS DELIVERED TO A DEBTOR.
HELD:
Yes. The settled rule is that one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it. Even where the creditor alleges non-payment, the general rule is
that the onus rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather than on the
creditor to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with
legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment. Where
the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going
forward with the evidence – as distinct from the general burden of proof –
shifts to the creditor, who is then under a duty of producing some evidence
to show non-payment.
Since respondent claims that it had already paid petitioner for the services
rendered by the latter, it follows that the former carries the burden of
proving such payment.
The Court rules in the negative. Accordingly, an invoice or bill is a
commercial document issued by a seller to the buyer indicating the
products, quantities and agreed prices for product or services the seller has
provided the buyer. An invoice indicates the buyer must pay the seller
according to the payment terms. From the point of view of a seller, an
invoice is a sales invoice. From the point of view of a buyer, an invoice is a
purchase invoice. The document indicates the buyer and seller, but the term
"invoice" indicates money is owed or owing. The context of the term
"invoice" is usually used to clarify its meaning, such as "We sent them an
invoice" (they owe us money) or "We received an invoice from them" (we
owe them money).
The Court held in accordance with the foregoing definition that an invoice,
in and by itself, and as opposed to a receipt, may not be considered
evidence of payment. In addition, it does not mean that possession by a
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debtor of an invoice raises the presumption that it has already paid its
obligation. An invoice is simply a list sent to a purchaser, factor, consignee,
etc., containing the items, together with the prices and charges, of
merchandise sent or to be sent to him; a mere detailed statement of the
nature, quantity and cost or price of the things invoiced.
Disputable Presumption that an obligation delivered to the debtor has

been paid. (UPHELD)
FELIX VELASCO vs. MARTIN MASA (G.R. No. L-3717)
FACTS:
Felix Velasco alleged that Martin Masa loaned from him payable on the
following year. The debt, he alleged, was set forth in a private document
signed by the debtor, but that the defendant, Masa, taking advantage of the
conditions then prevailing on account of the late revolution, and by means
of coercion and trickeries exercised with respect to his wife, managed to
obtain possession of the document of indebtedness while the plaintiff was
detained as a prisoner in the jail. That one year and some months after the
condition of things had become normal, he filed his claim before the provost
court for the robbery of the said document, but, as said court considered
that it had no jurisdiction in the premises, the plaintiff
The defendant in his answer denied all the main points of the complaint,
inasmuch as the aforesaid document, which was the subject of the same,
had been voluntarily handed over to him through Luis Ocseña. Furthermore,
he alleged that the Court of First Instance acquitted him from the charge of
robbery for the reason that it was proven that the same had been delivered
to the latter for reasons of gratitude. The Court entered judgment dismissing
the complaint against Masa. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
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WHETHER OR NOT THE POSSESSION BY THE DEFENDANT OF THE PRIVATE

DOCUMENT EVIDENCING DEBT CONSTITUTES REMISSION OR
CONDONATION THEREFROM.
HELD:
Yes. ART. 1189. Whenever the private instrument from which the
debt appears should be in the possession of the debtor, it shall be presumed
that the creditor delivered it of his own will, unless the contrary is proven.
It is an unquestionable fact, duly proven at the trial, that the instrument
proving the debt now claimed passed to the possession of the debtor and
for this reason, unless the contrary be proven, it must be presumed, in
accordance with the provisions of law, that the delivery of the instrument
was voluntarily made, and that this fact implies a renunciation of the action
which the creditor had for the recovery of his credit. It should be noted that
the document returned to the debtor is of a private nature, the only case
subject to the provisions of the above-quoted articles of the Civil Code, so
that a tacit renunciation of the debt may be presumed, in the absence of
proof that the document was delivered for some other reason than a
gratuitous waiver of the debt and the complete extinction of the obligation
to pay.
Under Article 1250 of the Civil Code, Presumptions established by law
exempt those favored thereby from producing any further proof. And article
1251 of the same code reads: Presumptions established by law may be
destroyed by proof to the contrary, except in the cases in which it is
expressly prohibited.
Therefore, considering that the delivery of the document, made by the
plaintiff's wife to the defendant Masa, through Luis Ocseña, was approved,
though tacitly, by the said plaintiff creditor, for the reasons stated in the
judgment appealed from, and no proof appearing in the record that the
delivery of the document was not voluntarily made, it appears from the
whole of the foregoing that the debt now claimed was remitted for reasons
of gratitude and in acknowledgment of the services rendered by the debtor
to the plaintiff creditor.
JD3A
G.R. No. 4468 August 21, 1908

RUBERT & GUAMIS, plaintiff-appellees
vs.
C. A. SMITH, defendant-appellant
PONENTE: WILLARD, J.
FACTS:
On September 12, 1904, the plaintiffs, defendant Smith, and Miss A. Hunter
made a contract in which it was provided, among other things, that certain
rent for July to October due to the plaintiffs from Miss Hunter for the
occupation of a certain building belonging to them, may be paid as follows:
P850 within the first three days of October, 1904; P850 within the first three
days of November, 1904; and the balance of P700 to be paid within the first
three days of December, 1904. The effect of the agreement was to extend
the time for the payment of these sums, as indicated therein.
The contract also contained a clause that defendant Smith also further
agreed that the failure of said Miss A. Hunter to faithfully execute the
contract will render defendant’s liability fixed and absolute, and that said
plaintiffs may immediately proceed against defendant to enforce the same
without first proceeding against said Miss A. Hunter. This action was brought
against the allegation of defendant that Miss Hunter had paid the P850
payable within the first three days of November, 1904, and the P700
payable within the first three days of December. However, appellant has not
caused the evidence to be brought in the Court.
The defendant alleged in the answer that Miss Hunter had paid the P850
due within the first three days of November, 1904 and that when he signed
the contract, she gave him security to protect him against loss thereon; that
on the second day of November, Miss Hunter showed him a receipt signed
by the plaintiffs to the effect that he, believing that all the rent for the
property had been paid, surrendered to her the security which she had
given him. The defendant in his answer relied upon Article 1110 of the Civil
Code (now Article 1176 of the New Civil Code), which provides that, the
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receipt for the last installment of a debt by the creditor, shall also extinguish
the obligation with regard to the previous installments.
ISSUE: Whether the receipt of payment for November’s rental in this case
had already extinguished prior rents to which defendant is liable?
RULING:
No. The Court ruled there was nothing in the case to show that the P850
payable in November on account of the rent for July to August had been
paid, except a receipt, dated November 2, 1904.
The Court cannot see how the article cited by defendant could in any event
have any application to this case, or prove the payment of the rent for the
months of July to October, because the time for the payment of a part of
that rent had been extended, and the amount sued for here was not due on
the second day of November, when the receipt in question was signed. The
obligation to pay the rent was not based entirely upon the contract of lease,
but was based upon a subsequent agreement, namely, the agreement of
September 12, 1904. Moreover, the provision of law applicable to the case is
Section 334, paragraph 9 of the Code of the Civil Procedure (now Sec 3(i),
Rule 131 of the 2019 Amended Revised Rules on Evidence), which provides
one of the disputable presumptions that may be contradicted by other
evidence which is the presumption that when a receipt for the later ones is
produced, it is presumed that former rent or installments had been paid.
Against the defendant's theory, the Court also ruled that the case falls
exactly within the provision of the section last cited, by the terms of which
the receipt in question was only prima facie evidence of the payment of the
rent and as held in the case of Perez vs. Garcia, such receipt was not
conclusive evidence of payment thereof. Moreover, there is nothing in the
decision of the court to show that Miss Hunter ever gave the defendant any
security, or that he never surrendered any security to her relying on the
receipt in question, or that the security was of any value. The doctrine of
estoppel invoked by the defendant has, therefore, no application to the
case.
JD3A
G.R. No. L-3078 December 7, 1906

FERNANDO PEREZ, plaintiff-appellant
vs.
JUAN GARCIA BOSQUE, defendant-appellee
PONENTE: J. WILLARD
FACTS:
On January 15, 1904, defendant Bosque, sold to the plaintiff the house in
question under an agreement that he should have the right to repurchase it
at any time before the March 31, 1905. It was also stated in the agreement
of sale that Bosque should occupy the house as a tenant until said date, or
until he repurchased it before that time, and that he should pay P40 as a
rent.
On the August 24, 1904, the parties made another contract, by the terms of
which they canceled the contract first contract and the defendant sold to
plaintiff the house absolutely for P4,000. The instrument in was notarized
and it was duly recorded in the Registry of Property. On the same day the
plaintiff signed a paper in which he gave to the defendant the right, until the
May 31, 1905, to repurchase the property. Nothing was said in either of
these two agreements of the August 24 as to the further occupation of the
house. The defendant continued his occupation thereafter until May 31,
1905, when he abandoned it. He never exercised his right to repurchase.
Defendant here offered as evidence to show that between January 15, 1904
and May 31, 1905, defendant Bosque had paid three months rent. One of
the payments was evidenced by a receipt dated the June 1, 1904, for rent
corresponding to that month. He alleged that said receipt is the evidence
that prior rent has been paid. Thus, this action was brought to recover the
sum of P580 as rent for the house.
ISSUE: Whether the receipt of June rental renders prior rents already been
paid?
JD3A
RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that by the provisions of Article 1110 of the Civil Code
(now Article 1176) and of Section 334, paragraph 9, of the Code of Civil
Procedure (now Sec. 3(i), Rule 131) the said receipt was evidence that the
prior rents been paid and that the defendant is liable for the rent from July 1
to August 24, 1904 by the express terms of the contract of January 15. It is
also to note that the contract of lease found in that document expired on
August 24, 1904 and nothing having been said in the two contracts of
August 24, 1904 with regard to the occupation of the house, and therefore
when the defendant have occupied it for fifteen days after the termination
of the original contract, there was an implied renewal of that lease in
accordance with the provisions of article 1566 of the Civil Code. Thus, the
defendant in addition thereto is liable for the rent from the August 24 1904
to May 31, 1905, at the rate of 40 pesos a month.
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION: A person found in possession of a thing taken

in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole
act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, is owned by him.
G.R. No. 209137 July 1, 2015

EDUARDO CELEDONIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Eduardo Celedonio was charged with the crime of Robbery with Force Upon
Things by Carmencita De Guzman for allegedly stealing her pieces of jewelry,
gadgets and other personal belongings. According to the prosecution, a
certain Adriano Marquez witnessed the robbery perpetrated by Celedonio in
the house of De Guzman while she was away to attend to the wake of her
deceased husband. Marquez, whose house was opposite the house of De
Guzman and Celedonio, which were adjacent to each other, identified
Celedonio as the culprit. Upon learning of the incident, De Guzman reported
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it to the police and requested that Celedonio be investigated for possibly

having committed the crime. Later, a follow- up operation was conducted by
P01 Roque and SP02 Sugui accompanied by Marquez. On their way,
Marquez pointed to a man on a motorcycle whom he positively identified as
Celedonio. The police immediately flagged down Celedonio. After being
informed of the complaint for robbery against him and Celedonio was asked
as to the whereabouts of the stolen items. Celedonio alighted from his
motorcycle and opened its compartment where PO1 Roque saw some of the
stolen items.
A demurrer to evidence with leave of court was filed by the accused on the
ground of the alleged illegality of his arrest and the illegal search on his
motorcycle. However, it was denied considering that the question of the
legality of his arrest had been mooted by his arraignment and his active
participation in the trial. The seizure of the stolen items was also legal not
only because of Celedonio’s apparent consent to it, but also because the
subject items were in a moving vehicle. In his defense, he said that he was in
his house with his wife at the time of the incident. The RTC found Celedonio
guilty of the charge which the CA affirmed in toto. Hence, his petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution was able to sufficiently lay down the

circumstances that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio was the
taker of the stolen items
RULING:
Yes. The prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when
taken together, constituted an unbroken chain that led to a reasonable
conclusion that Celedonio was the taker of the stolen items making him
guilty of the crime charged.
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The facts from which the following circumstances arose such as: (1) accused
was a next door neighbor of private complainant; (2) he was seen by
another neighbor going over the concrete fence separating their houses and
ransacking a room in complainant’s house; (3) during the time, no one was
inside complainant’s house; (4) two (2) days after, most of the items
discovered to have been stolen that night were found in the compartment
of the accused’s motorcycle which he was riding on when accosted by the
police; (5) the items recovered from him were identified by the complainant
as her stolen property; (6) during the trial accused denied that the stolen
items were found in his possession and claimed that they were "planted" by
the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery, have been proved,
Despite having caught in exclusive possession of some of the stolen items

when the police officers flagged down his motorcycle during their follow-up
operation, he failed to give a reasonable explanation as to his possession of
the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing
which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is owned by
him. Celedonio never claimed ownership of the subject items. When the
alleged stolen items were found in his motorcycle compartment which he
had control over, the disputable presumption of being the taker of the
stolen items arose. He could have overcome the presumption, but he failed
to give a justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only plausible scenario
that could be inferred therefrom was that he took the items.
G.R. No. 142039 May 27, 2004

MODESTO "Moody" MABUNGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
JD3A
FACTS:
On October 2, 1994, employees of the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP)

including Davy Villaruel discovered that the hasp of the door of the BFP
office in Romblon was destroyed and that the only typewriter in their office,
a "Triumph" bearing Serial Number 340118640, was missing.
According to Diana, one of the prosecution’s witnesses, on October 15,

1994, Modesto was seen carrying a box with a marking “HOPE” tied with
gray straw string and boarded a pedicab. Considering that she learned from
her husband who also works for the BFP that Modesto was the prime
suspect for the alleged robbery, she immediately informed him of what she
saw. She also noticed that the pedicab was heading for the pier so she went
to the house of Villaruel. After the lapse of about 5 minutes, Villaruel
proceeded to the pier. By that time, Modesto already reached the pier and
unloaded the “HOPE” box. Not long after alighting from the tricycle,
Modesto boarded the same tricycle and headed for his house. Villaruel was
also able to verify from the tricycle driver that the latter conveyed Modesto
to the pier with a box of “HOPE”. Major Madrona instructed SPO2 Eleazar
Madali and PO2 Eustaquio Rogero to surreptitiously watch a box of Hope
brand cigarettes placed under a bench inside the PPA passengers terminal
owned by Modesto and wait until somebody gets said box and load it
aboard the vessel M/V Peñafrancia. On Villaruel’s entering the terminal, he
was told by Sylvia, the cashier on duty at the restaurant therein, that
Modesto entrusted the box to her, he telling her that it contained a
damaged electric fan. The investigating officers kept watch over the box
until M/V Peñafrancia departed for Batangas with appellant on board the
same. About an hour later, PPA officers arrived at the terminal and the box
was turned over by them to SPO2 Madali and PO2 Rogero. The box, when
opened, contained the lost BFP typewriter.
In his defense, while he admitted bringing to the pier a box on on October

15, 1994, he claimed, however, that it bore the marking "CHAMPION” and
not “HOPE”. In addition, he also stated his whereabouts particularly his
arrival in Palo, Leyte on October 1, 1994 and that on the next day, he went
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to Tacloban City and purchased materials for polishing marble as it is his

business. He allegedly returned to Palo and supervised his marble "project
and when it was finished, he returned to Cebu on October 6, 1994 and
reached Romblon on October 9, 1994. In support of his alibi, he presented
bus tickets and purchase receipts of materials with dates indicated thereon.
Modesto further claimed that on the afternoon of October 15, 1994, he,
along with his son, boarded the pedicab of Bernardo to which they loaded a
box marked "CHAMPION" containing marble novelties to be brought to
Manila via Viva Penafrancia and on reaching the pier, he laid down the box
at the gate of the PPA and stood beside it as he waited for the ship to dock.
When he later boarded the ship, he placed the box at the back of his cot.
The RTC convicted him of the crime of robbery with force upon things.
The CA, in affirming the decision of the trial court, relied on the disputable
presumption that a person in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise,
that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over,
are owned by him. Hence, a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense failed to overcome the presumption that since
Modesto is the person found in possession of the missing typewriter then,
he is the taker of it making him guilty of the crime robbery
RULING:
No. Basic is the rule that it is for the prosecution, upon which lies the onus,
to establish all the elements of a crime to thereby hold him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Admittedly, the evidence for the prosecution is
circumstantial. On the sole basis of the presumption laid down under above-
quoted Section 3(j) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the
appellate court affirmed the conviction of appellant.
JD3A
In criminal cases, presumptions should be taken with caution especially in

light of serious concerns that they might water down the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. As special considerations must be given to
the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, there should be limits on
the use of presumptions against an accused. Although possession of stolen
property within a limited time from the commission of the theft or robbery
is not in itself a crime, it being possible to possess the same and remain
innocent, such possession may be sufficient for the formation of an
inference that the possessor is the thief unless the evidence satisfactorily
proves that the property was acquired by the accused by legal means.
The presumption under Section 3(j) Rule 131 was explained in a case law
that convictions in cases of this kind are not sustained upon a presumption
of law as to the guilt of the accused. The conviction rests wholly upon an
inference of fact as to the guilt of the accused. If as a matter of probability
and reasoning based on the fact of possession of the stolen goods, taken in
connection with other evidence, it may fairly be concluded beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the theft, judgment or
conviction may properly be entered. The inference of guilt is one of fact and
rests upon the common experience of men. But the experience of men has
taught them that an apparently guilty possession may be explained so as to
rebut such an inference and an accused person may therefore put witness
on the stand or go to the witness stand himself to explain his possession,
and any reasonable explanation of his possession, inconsistent with his
guilty connection with the commission of the crime, will rebut the
inference as to his guilt which the prosecution seeks to have drawn from his
guilty possession of the stolen goods. It is in this sense that it is sometimes
said that the unexplained possession of recently stolen goods will sustain a
conviction of the crime of larceny.
Before an inference of guilt arising from possession of recently stolen goods

can be made, however, the following basic facts need to be proven by the
prosecution: (1) that the crime was committed; (2) that the crime was
committed recently; (3) that the stolen property was found in the
possession of the defendant; and (4) that the defendant is unable to explain
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his possession satisfactorily. For purposes moreover of conclusively proving

possession, the following considerations have to be emphasized: (1) the
possession must be unexplained by any innocent origin; (2) the possession
must be fairly recent; and (3) the possession must be exclusive.
In the present case, the People failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant was caught in exclusive possession of the recently stolen
good. While possession need not mean actual physical control over the
thing for it may include constructive possession, it is still necessary that for
possession to be deemed constructive the accused knowingly has the power
and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a
thing, either directly or through another person. The "HOPE" box was not
concealed and anyone entering and leaving the PPA terminal had access to
it, it having been placed just below one of the benches, around three meters
from the cashier, Sylvia. To assume that in a busy place, such as the PPA
terminal, the "HOPE" box that was opened by the police authorities and
found to contain the missing typewriter is the same box allegedly entrusted
by appellant to the cashier is to form an inference which is, however,
doubtful, more than six hours having elapsed from the time the box was
allegedly left at around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon until it was opened by
the police authorities at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening after appellant
had already boarded the ship. A presumption cannot be founded on another
presumption. It cannot thus be concluded that from the time the box was
left under the bench, appellant was still in constructive possession thereof,
the exercise of exclusive dominion or control being absent.
The mere possession by the accused of items allegedly stolen, without

more, cannot conduce to a single conclusion that robbery indeed took place.
In the absence of positive and indubitable evidence showing unlawful taking
by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, the
prosecution cannot rely with certitude on the fact of possession alone.
Since the appellate court sufficiently established that Modesto was in

possession of the typewriter two weeks after it was stolen, he had the
burden of proving that he was not the one responsible for the heist. While
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the presumption imposes upon a party against whom it is directed to rebut

such presumption, the burden of producing evidence of guilt does not
extend to the burden of proving the accused’s innocence of the crime as the
burden of persuasion does not shift and remains throughout the trial upon
the prosecution. In this case, inconsistencies were apparent when the police
officer testified that the box was opened at the police station but the cashier
said that the police officers opened the same inside a room in the terminal.
Finally, logic, common knowledge and human experience teach that it is

unlikely that a robber would represent himself to be the owner of a stuff
which he knows contains stolen property and seek the help of a third person
to look after it.
The decision on review is hereby reversed and set aside and Modesto

"Moody" Mabunga, is hereby acquitted of the crime of robbery.
JD3A

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CARLITO CLARO y MAHINAY, Accused-Appellant. (Ruled in Favor of The Presumption of Innocence)

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CASTAÑAGA, JEZREEL D.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CARLITO CLARO y

There was noticeable contradictions on whether the sex was consensual or

Yet, it is not fair to quickly reject the defense of consensual sexual

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at Antonio’s corn plantation heading to a nearby body of water. Jason

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ISSUE: Whether ROXAS is solidarily liable with ASTRO on account

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FACTS: The subject lots in dispute were owned by Faustino

ISSUE: Whether the burden of proving fraud rests upon Faustino

People vs. Ernesto Yabut

Manila. Upon evaluating the information, he formed a team composed of

People vs. Luciano Jumamoy

reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore,

DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION: That money paid by one to another was due

UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORPORATION

FACTS: Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation (Titan)

others. Uniwide asserted that it overpaid Titan for unauthorized additional

ISSUE: Whether Uniwide is entitled to a return of the amount it

"not due" because there was no prior authorization or agreement with

The CIAC refused to acknowledge that the additional works on Project 1

[did not sustain the presumption]

FACTS: BPI filed a complaint for sum of money against respondents,

ISSUE: W/N BPI is entitled to the amount it paid to respondents which

After a judicious review of the records, including a re-evaluation of the

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PAULINO

The crime under prosecution consists, according to the complaint, in that:

Moreover, be that as it may, and even if it be admitted as true that the

A co-owner of a thing held in common may exercise the redemption in case

[Jurisprudence where the presumption in Section 3 (g), Rule 131 was

shall be presumptive evidence of such sale, barter, exchange, pledge, loan,

The procedure followed by the defendants constituted under the provisions

Rule 131, Sec. 3 (h): Disputable Presumption that an obligation delivered

G.R. No. 158621 December 10, 2008

Royal Cargo filed against respondent a Complaint for Collection of Sum of

WHETHER OR NOT AN INVOICE IS DEEMED A CREDIT INSTRUMENT WHICH,

Disputable Presumption that an obligation delivered to the debtor has

FELIX VELASCO vs. MARTIN MASA (G.R. No. L-3717)