I Frontiersof Achievement I

AIAA-81-0902
Cruise Missile System
I Anniversary Celebration] Design
WALTER M. LOCKE (RAdm),
Navy Department, Washington DC

AlAA 1981 ANNUAL MEETING AND

TECHNICAL DISPLAY
“FRONTIERS OF ACHIEVEMENT”
u
May 12-14, 1981/Long Beach, California
For permission to copy or republish. contact the Amsrican Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 1290 Avsnue of the Americas, New Vork. NY 10104
 development of cruise missiles is how early

Cruise Missile successes expanded the program and the

requircments and opened the doors for multi-
purpose applications of this new system. It must

System Design be added that this capacity to respond to

changing requirements is the result of early
design decisions and not a coincidence
discovered sometime after the commencement of
Full Scale Engineering Development.
Rear Admiral Walter M. Locke, USN
Director, Joint Cruise Missiles Project History
Washington. D.C.
The history of cruisc missiles has been
Abstract documented in many papers over the past few
Technology improvements in guidance, years. In speaking of cruise missiles, I a m
referring to a n armed. unmanned, self-propelled
warhead and' propulsion miniaturization, a n d
micro-processing made possible current cruise guided missile which is sustained in flight by
aerodynamic lift over most of its range. In using
missile d e ve I o p me n t . Encapsulation for
submarine torpedo tube launch permitted this definition, we can trace the cruise missile
development of a booster launched, small, light- back to World War I I and its most famous
weight airframe also capable of launch from air, parent, the German V-I. As so often happens in
ground. and ship platforms. Penetrativity military history, the German success spunoff
cnhancements were achieved through intensive U.S. developments of REGULUS I and 11,
dcsigq and fcsting le'ading to low visual, radar, MATADOR, SNARK. MACE and H O U N D
infrared and acoustic observables. Navigation DOG. This cruise missile development interest
accuracy. achieved through updates to guidance dropped off sharply however, when the
lrom on-board sensors, allowed smaller warhead development of long range ballistic missiles
yields a n d lowered collateral damage. This same showed performance characteristics more
suitable to the strategic policies being formulated
accuracy allows low level flight. which when
coupled with the low observables, permits for the era of deterrence. An additional blow to
subsonic transit t h r o u g h severe defense cruise missiles was the loss of Gary Powers and
cnvironnients, thus avoiding significant range his high altitude U-2 since it showed that high
penalties. Modular airframe design permitted flying aerodynamic vehicles could no longer
consideration of alternate guidanceiwgrhcad penetrate then current defensive missile systems
packages and subsequent development of with a high probability of success. The age of
conventionally armed land-attack and anti-ship ICBM began and funding for cruise missile
variants. development in the U.S. was sharply reduced.
Even in retrospect, the decision can hardly be
Background faulted. Defense funding has always been
carefully allocated to those programs showing
Previous papers on cruise missile development the most promise. And as the '60's began, the bal-
have discussed thc chronological history ofcruise listic missile showed a definite advantage in
missiles and havc expanded on the current cruise accuracy and penetrability. The only error made
niissilc dcvclopmcnt status and futurc plans. I , 2 was in not releasing our studies to the Soviet
'l'tiis paper will look at cruise missile Union because not only did they continue ICBM
development from the perspective of a Program development, but they also continued their
Manager who faces key design challenges and s i g n i f i c a n t p r o g r a m of c r u i s e missile
ti-adcs off individual cost, performance and developments. The difference in Soviet philosphy
schedule requirements to obtain a n optimum was that cruise missiles were not t o be developed
system development, In addition, the paper looks solely as strategic weapons but also as naval
at the early and intermediate design challenges weapons designed to enable a fledgling coastal
that must he Paced so as to produce a missile navy to compete with the powerful blue-water
system that can be of operational utility and yet navy of the United States centered around the
hc aflo~-d;rhlcin the quantities required for carrier task force, Figure I ,
combat use. Of particular interest in the

*
Thlf p a p I s doelmred w o k of lhe US
Government and therefore 1s In the publ!e dnrnsln.
 CRUISE MISSILE BACKGROUND submarine launch and yet penetrate to significant
targets within the Soviet Union. These early
studies. by the way, tend to explain the apparent
low priority the Soviets place on sea launched
\wJ
missile range since the geographic disparity is
quickly evident from a cursory examination of
the map. Thecluster of U.S. populationalong the
eastern and western seaboards presents a n easily
reachable target to Soviet seabased missiles.
Nevertheless, the TOMAHAWK cruise missile
had to have at least a 1200 N M range, had to fit
into a cylindrical 21 inch torpedo tubeand had to
provide a n accuracy a t t h a t distance
UNITED STATES
Figure I commensurate with the payload yield. And, of
course, the missile had to minimize costs and
The wisdom of this philosophy was dramatically development schedule. In minimizing costs, a n
demonstrated to the world when the Egyptians effort was made to design notjust to development
used a Soviet SS-N-2 STYX cruise missile to sink cost, but to provide the lowest life cycle costs. A
the Israeli destroyer ELATH. And most major requirement to minimize production and
importantly, fired the STYX from a gunboat operational costs is to maximize missiles on
outside the range of the destroyer's weapons. The target.This means high system reliability and
immediate free world response was accelerated high probability of surviving enemy defenses.
development programs to counter the STYX There were additional design challenges to be
within the STYX operational scenario. The result worked within the majorareasalreadydescribed.
of this immediate reaction was the development For example the intrinsic radiation of the nuclear
of cruise missiles such a s P E N G U I N , warhead had to be sufficiently low to preclude a
OTTOMAT, EXOCET, GABRIEL, and health ha7ard to submarine crew members and
HARPOON. The lessons learned in these initial t h e t e r m i n a l a c c u r a c y / p a y l o a d yield v'
crash programs were significant and of lasting combination had to be selected to minimize
importance to the later developments. The first collateral damage.
lesson was that cruise missiles designed to strike
surface targets could, and should, be designed Design Approaches
with the capability to be launched from a family
of launch platforms - surface ship, aircraft, Given these early technical requirements, a
submarine and ground-based and the second series of trade studies were conducted to zero in
lesson was that technology improvements in the on design alternatives. The range requirements
'60's had greatly reduced the disadvantages of could have been met by a high flying supersonic
large size, heavy weight and inaccuracy that had missile, but still remembering the U-2 incident, it
made the ballistic missile a preferable weapon was decided that low altitude was preferable.
system only ten years earlier. Because of my However, low altitude and supersonic speeds
i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of could not produce the required range. And
H A R P O O N and my responsibilities for lurthermore, a low altitude, subsonic missile
advanced anti-ship missiles in the Naval Air demanded a very low, terrain following flight
Systems Command, the task of heading a n effort profile coupled with low observables to defeat
to develop a long range cruise missile was enemy defenses. Subsonic speeds dictated
assigned to me in 1972. additional design constraints. Because the
accuracy of inertial navigation systems is
Design Challenges inversely related to time since alignment,
subsonic speeds and long range mean extremely
Technical Requirements accurate (and expensive) inertial systems or a
method of updating the,inertial system in flight.
The initial technical requirements for a There have been a family of updating techniques
submarine launched strategic cruise missile were L/
explored over the years and initial studies to
impressive. The missile had to have a range of at examine the operational utility of these
least 1200 nautical miles in order to provide safe techniques were conducted. Given the then
 curl-eiit state-of-the-art. and using rcasonahlc components and thcir unique testing
~xtrapolations,the method of Terrain C o n t o u r requirements. In 1973, tlie N a q strategic cruise
missile development wits e.xp;inded to include a

-
Matching (TERC'OM) WBS cliosen a s the inertial
platlorm update technique. In essence, the hasic tactical version. Sincean anti-ship missile is faced
strategic cruise missile was designed. It was to be with a mobile target. a lioniingscekcrvice inertial
a terrain following, low observable, subsonic platform is required, and this homing seeker can
vchiclc powered with either a turbofan or compensate for inertial drift during flight if the
turhujct engine and utili7ing a n inertial initial target position is well known. The practical
navigation platform updated in flight by solution was to modify and adopt the most
7 E K C O M . I t was time to determine if such a t qc h n ica 1 I y a d va n ced c o m p o n e n t , t h e
system could be produced. H A R P O O N active radar seeker, for
TOMAHAWK use. This teclinologyarea will be
Desirrn Imnlemcntation discussed later in chronological order but the
seeds for development complexity begin here.
In a n elfort to maximize competition (and thus
Another concurrent development was the Air
ensure lowest cost) and t o obtain the benefit of
Force Air I.ntinc1icd C r u i x Missile (ALCM),
industry ideas. multiple concept definition
begun i n 1073 11s a n outgrowth of the cancelled
contracts were awai-ded. From these contracts,
S C A D p r o g r a m . T h e m a j o r technology
two final competitors were chosen for the
hreakthrougli in the SCAD/AL.CM program
airframe competition. General Dynamics,
was thc small turbofan engine hcingdeveloped by
Convair and 1,'I'V. and two finalists, E Systems
Sam Williamso! WRC. .Thisengineshowedgreat
and McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Carp.
promise in reducing specific fuel consumption
were selected f o r the guidance competition. In
and hod itnother advantage in that the one-to-one
response to the requirements lor minimum life
turbofan bypass ratio significantly reduced the
cycle cost and development time,each contractor niissilc's inlr;i-red signature. one of a number of
was encouraged to make maximum use of
ohservahles to be minimized. In the interest of
existing technology and proven hardware. To
- convince the contractors that the program office
was serious in this regard, the contractors were
further directed to take a criticallook a t military-
conimonality. it wds decided to evaluate the
Williams engine for use in Navy cruise missiles.
'I'liese decisions began to tie together several
cruise missiles programs. There was a sharing of
unique specifications and encouraged to take
guidance and engines components from both the
exception to these requirements if they precluded
HARPOON and the Air Force ALCM.
cost saving engineering a n d p r o d u c t i o n
techniques. Since there were two small engine Competitive Development
developments already underway, the Teledyne
CAE turbojet engine and the Williams Research Airframe. The competitive airframe design
Company turbofan, the advantages of off-the- produced some innovative design solutions. T o
shelf hardware and commonalitydictated against begin with the design problem was to protect the
separate development of a unique missile from the submarine high shock
TOMAHAWK sustainer engine. The R-52 requirements while minimizing vehicle weight.
launched Subsonic Cruise Attack Decoy The e~eiitiialwinner, General Dynamics, was to
(SCAD) turbofan engine candidates were ciiclose tlie cruise missile in a cylindrical capsule
integrated i n t o the c o m p e t i n g a i r f r a m e which would serve as a n environmental
contractor's design for the competition phase. At protection device. This capsule would remain in
this point some cxplanation as to the concurrent the torpedo tube (like a shotgun shell) thereby
dcvclopment effort is required so that the full pcrniitting the missile airframe to he constructed
complexity of the technical design options can he ol light weight material. I.ike a torpedo, the
re-crc;itcd. 'I'he prior Navyefforts in HARPOON niissilc would he launched from the tube and
liad shown that t h e cylindrical torpedo-tube was capsulc by compressed air. A lanyard would be
the trptimal shape for launch platform Ilexibility. attached to the torpedo tube and the missile, and
In addition, the practicality of developing an when the lanyard reachcd full travel, it would
anti-ship. conventional payload version of the ignite the solid booster motor. The use of a
2. strategic cruise missile was obvious. With 'I~lirtist Vcctor Controlled booster motor for
iiirtrame and engine commonality directed and underwater t o sustaincr enginc speed was
enlot-ced hy the Program Office. tlie development itnother unique General Dynamics design
c(rs[s would he limited t o guidance and warhead leatui-e. 'l'lic boostcr could also he used to launch
from surface-ship or ground launchers and could were Configured to simulate T O M A H A W K
be removed for air launch. The light weight a e r o d y n a m i c characteristics a n d t e r r a i n
airframe. coupled with high density hydrocarbon following capabilities were proven. The system '.
fuels and low turbofan specific fuel consumption was beginning to take shape. "d
proved capable of meeting and surpassing the
Payload
range requirements. Another innovative design
which contributed to the attainment of the re-
Nuclear. Not all of the design innovations were
quired range was the aerodynamic wing and its
created by private industry. In some cases, the
deployment. G D used a scissors-type wing
design was driven by exogenous factors. Because
employment design which also provided
the McDonnell Douglas guidance efforts
aerodynamic sealing after the wing was opened.
produced such excellent results, the Deputy
The use of a popout air inlet, while costing a
Director of Defense, in 1974, directed that
penalty in radar cross section and drag, proved
existing Air Force and Navy cruise missile
beneficial in reducing inlet distortion. I n the area
of observable reduction, it has been mentioned developments utilize a joint guidance system.
Since achieved accuracy is the prime factor in
that the turbofan engine greatly reduced the 1R
determining payload yield for similar targets, it
signature. There were no truly innovative design
was reasonable to combine nuclear warhead
techniques employed during development in the
reduction of radar cross-section,just a lot of hard developments and the Navyjoined the Air Force
work. Radar absorbent materials were used in development efforts for the W80 nuclear
inlet and nose surfaces. In some areas such as the warhead. This decision created immediatedesign
problems for the Los Alamos Scientific
tail fins. radar conductive material proved a
better choice. Screw heads were filled and Laboratory because of the service unique
manufacturing tolerances were squeezed to requirements caused by different operational
preclude gaps and protrusions. Wing sweep was environments. One of the prime Navy concerns
was the warhead intrinsic radiation, a concern
thoroughly investigated and discarded since
since the submarine environment requires daily
varying wing sweep simply moved hills and
valleys around, it did not reduce the overall exposure to the stored nuclear weapons. It is a '. 4
signature. In the visible spectrum, the small credit to the D O E labs that theywereable to meet
missile size provided a n excellent starting point, these unique requirements and a t the same time
design to the low weight and volume demands of
and the reduction efforts were largelyconfined to
paints and contrasts. The acoustic signature both cruise missiles. The design solution centered
proved so low that no effort was expended to around the judicious choice of critical materials.
reduce it. A complementary design requirement, solved by
the combined efforts of Sandia and McDonnell
Guidance. The competition in the guidance Douglas, was the in-flight arming of the nuclear
systems required less innovative design in warhead. The long range cruise missile family is
hardware b u t increased emphasis o n unique in that a new .arming problem was
implementation and software. The Litton inertial apparent. The requirement t o achieve safe
platform and computer chosen by McDonnell separation from the launch platform is still valid,
Douglas were a proven hardware system that was but in addition, the concerns engendered by a
flying commercially. The radar altimeter was a computer driven, long flight time missile center
Honeywell design with extensive aircraft use. The around arming the missile only when you are
input data for TERCOM was prepared by the positive that the missile is on track toward its
Defense Mapping Agency. As in the airframe designated target. The design solution was to use
competition, the validation phase started with the microprocessor to sense a series of time
decouplcd testing and led to a final test, the oriented events and then to use the sequence to
system fly-off, McDonnell Douglas first proved perform both warhead fuzing and arming.
the TEKCOM concept in a company owned :
Queen Air private aircraft. The system was then Conventional. The anti-ship TOMAHAWK
pdlletized and loaded on a'C-141 aircraft where it was following .a parallel development with one
literally flew the aircraft around a predetermined unique component being the unitary warhead.
course. The results of this test were to The baseline warhead chosen was the BULLPUP
demonstrate an accuracy well below the warhead, then in storage. However, to provide a
requirement level and in fact better than design hedge, a design competition was instituted
originally hoped for. And finally, target drones between Navy labs to come up with a new
 CRUISE MISSILES DEVELOPMENT
warhead based upon technology improvements.
Both the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake
and the Naval Ships Weapons Center. Dahlgren
._A pursued reactive case warhead developments.
P W E C T TO " S l l

Full Scale Engineerine DeveloDment (FSEDI

-
REM. As the validation phase ended, the
o p p o r t u n i t i e s for m a j o r design changes
decreased, but performance a n d cost
improvements still existed. Because of the
modularity of the TOMAHAWK design, it was
possible to design and develop a Recovery
Exercise Module. This module would carry, in
the payload section, the telemetry required for Figure 2
test and evaluation. Of almost equal importance,
Over-the-Horizon. As the development of the
however, it carried a recovery package of
long range anti-ship TOMAHAWK progressed,
parachutes and flotation equipment, thereby
it was apparent that deficiencies existed in the
permitting the reuse of engineering missilesand a
Navy's capability to target this new weapon. This
corresponding cost savings.
turned out to beaconcernfor DSARCprincipals
DSARC 11. The results of the Defense System also, and a t DSARC 11 the Navy was tasked to
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) meeting develop an over-the-horizon support system for
to review readiness to enter FSED ensured that the newly evolving long range weapon systems of
design i n n o v a t i o n was n o t over. T h e which TOMAHAWK was in the vanguard.
TOMAHAWK anti-ship and strategic missiles While no operational system existed, there had
-.' and the Air Force ALCM were authorized to been exercises such as Outlaw Hawk which
begin FSED. In addition, however, the DSARC, indicated that the basic information and
impressed with results to date, directed the procedures were a l r e a d y available a n d
development of a Ground Launched Cruise , a m e n a b l e to a systematic development
Missile ( G L C M ) system using the approach. Building upon the lessons learned in
TOMAHAWK missile as the basic element. This the Outlaw Hawk demonstration and utilizing
GLCM system was to be operationally deployed .existing submarine capabilities and equipment,
by Air Force elements to increase theater nuclear the Outlaw Shark OTH system was developed.
firepower, release dual-capable aircraft for The Outlaw Shark consists of off-board
conventional tasking and enhance survivability correlation of multi-sensor data with a feedback
of the theater nuclear force. At the same review, to operational platforms (Figure 3). This
the DSARC directed that all cruise missile TOMAHAWK ANTISHIP POTENTIAI, EXPANUS AS
developments be combined in a Joint Program OVER-THE-IIORIZON CAPABILITY GROWS
Office with the participants collocated in the
Washington area. This action was taken to
ensure the transfer of technology among
programs, to emphasize the benefits of
component commonality, and to permit the cost
reductions inherent in joint development testing.
With this DSARC direction, the separate cruise
missile developments came together into the
Joint Cruise Missiles Project (Figure 2).
 .
approach relies on information which is already T E R C O M correlation algorithms showed
being collected from various sources including dramatic accuracy improvements but a C E P
air, surface and sub-surface platform sensors.
This information is transmitted to a shore based
compatible with conventional warheads could
not be reached by TERCOM alone. As in early
L’
facility where the information is correlated. This 1972, correlation schemes were again visited and
part of the system is not a new development; it this time the Naval Avionics Center (NAC) work
has been operating. The major change is t o take on optical correlation seemed promising. A
this data and transmit it to the operating breadboard of the Scene Matching Area
platforms as well as to the shore based command Correlator (SMAC) was installed and flown in
centers. While equipment such as the USQ-81 the TOMAHAWK missile. This time we were
link processor has been part of the Outlaw Shark more optimistic and the test results proved us
development, the design innovation has not been correct. The NAC system was analog and had to
in hardware or software so much as in be redesigned for digital use, but the basic
communications concepts. This Outlaw Shark concept was proven; a conventional land attack
1
development has further expanded TOMAHAWK was feasible-with
~~~~ ~.~ .......,
~~ ~
the proper
~~~~~~~~~~~ ~

communications capabilities and has had an warhead, of course. An extensive list of payload^
impact on the operational concepts f o r developments was examined, a n opportunity
transmitting mission planning data to deployed possible only because of the early insistence on
TOM A HAWK platforms. the design feature of modularity. The design that
appeared most promising for the
Mission Planning. A system similar to the TOMAHAWK’S role was the Lawrence
over-the-horizon system was required for the Livermore Lab airfield attack munition. The
land attack cruise missiles, whether air, ground, submunition is 4 inches in diameter, 15 inches
or sea launched. The land attack missile requires long and weighs 18 pounds and is designed t o ’
ground clearance data for terrain following, cut runways. The submunitions will be dispersed
digitized terrain data for TERCOM fixing, and radially from the TOMAHAWK airfield attack
defensive deployment information for route module with a parachute retarded deployment.
,J
navigation. The entire set of missile directions This concept of optical correlation a n d
must be pre-planned and sent to the missile-the submunition deployment was demonstrated in a
missile does not have the capability to re- TOMAHAWK missile in May 1978. The
program in flight. In the past, it was infrequent combination fulfills a n existing need for Navy
that the weapon system developer entered the and Air Force tactical aircraft weapons and adds
domain of the operational planner. Aircraft and a new member to the cruise missile family (figure
weapon developers did not tell the user how to 4) the Medium Range Air to Surface Missile
plan his mission. The innovation in this area was (MRASM).
to develop a mission planning system for the user
which both met his requirements and yet satisfied CRUISE MISSILE FAMILY
the missile data needs. Basically the system uses SEA. GROUND. AIR.
LAUNCHED LAUNCHED LAUNCHED
a n interactive graphic display which helps the
mission planner to juggle such dependent SLCM GLCM MRASM ALCM
I I . . .
variables as probability of clobber, probability of
penetration and navigational accuracy. The
system can plan a mission, verify the data and
format the data into the proper transfer device
for thc specific platform.
Conventional Land Attack.’Not all of the
innovative design features required are foreseen GENERAL DYNAMICS
at the beginning of a project. Some are caused by TOMAHAWK
development failures, but in the case of the cruise ‘NUCLEAR ARMED
missile more were caused by program success. As Figure 4 w
mentioned earlier, the early demonstrations of
terminal accuracy created new alternatives. If the Launch Platforms. One of the early design
terminal accuracies could be improved by a n decisions was to develop a system that could be
order of magnitude, conventional warheads integrated into existing launch platforms. The
would become feasible. Efforts on improved primary concern was to prevent a major cost
impact o n the Services’ weapon platforms. The lowered cost and with substantial improvements
submarine was the best example of this in shelf-life-a significant factor for missiles.
philosophy since the existing torpedo tube and General Dynamics is investigating -a new
fire control system (MK-117) was used to T O M A H A W K wing design which shows
perform fire control and launch functions. The promise in increasing the maximum lift
surface ship was more difficult. The armored box coefficient a n d thereby improving terrain
launcher was designed so that the missiles could following performance. If past trends are
be installed with the minimum cost and reliable, these new ideas, could lead to additional
disruption. A new fire control system was members of the cruise missile family, perhaps a
necessary to monitor this offensive weapon ground launched anti-ship missile or missiles
system and to initialize the inertial platform. The devoted to ECM or reconnaissance. As
same problem was recognized in developing a technology improves, the innovations may be
GLCM system; there was a need for a mobile fire limited only by our imaginations.
control system, The wisdom ofjoint development
and commonality were again proven, as both I . US. Cruise Missile Development, Astronauticsand Aeronatuics,
September 1979, page 24.
requirements were met with a Common Weapon 2. Cruise Missile Development: The Competition Is Fierce -
Control System development. As the Everywhere, Government Executive, January 1980.
understanding of cruise missile capabilities
grows, there is a desire t o increase the numbers of
TOMAHAWK per launch platform and this
factor has led to new design concepts in a Vertical
Launch System (VLS). This design will result in
increased rate of fire, increased ship fills and in
common launcher equipment for shipboard
missiles.
Summary
The cruise missile history is studded with
innovative design features. Some features such as
the TVC booster and the REM are hardware
design, some features are implemented through
softwarc, i.e. mission planning systemand terrain
correlation algorithms. But some innovative
designs are the result of a new way of
approaching common practices. Challenging
military specifications was an early innovation;
the Outlaw Shark OTH-T system a later one.
And some of thc success of the cruise missile
development belongs to innovative management
techniques, a subject not explored in this paper
since arcas such as acquisition strategy, design-
to-cost, warrantyiguarantee programs, and
Production Readiness Reviews are worthy of
separate treatment. And how about the future? Is
the need f o r i n n o v a t i o n g o n e a s the
TOMAHAWK approaches operation
d e p l o y m e n t ? P r o b a b l y n o t . New design
improvements continue to present themselves as
technology improves. The ring laser gyro shows
promise in replacing standard inertial gyros at a