Rule 14, Sec. 16.

Service upon defendant whose identity or

whereabouts are unknown

Facts:
Respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a cooperative
recognized under Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. It allegedly entered into a joint venture agreement with
farmer-beneficiaries through Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) in
Silang, Cavite. While respondent was negotiating with the farmer-
beneficiaries, petitioner Cathay Metal Corporation entered into Irrevocable
Exclusive Right to Buy (IERB) contracts with the same farmer-beneficiaries.
Under the IERB, the farmer-beneficiaries committed themselves to sell to
petitioner their agricultural properties upon conversion to industrial or
commercial properties or upon expiration of the period of prohibition from
transferring title to the properties.

In 1996, Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative caused the annotation of

its adverse claim on the farmer-beneficiaries’ certificates of title.

In 1999, Cathay Metal and the farmer-beneficiaries executed contracts of

sale of the properties. Transfer certificates of title were also issued in the
name of Cathay Metal.

Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, through its Vice President, Mr. dela
Peña, wrote two letters between March and April 2000 relative to its adverse
claims in an attempt to amicably settle what seemed then as a brewing
dispute. These letters were written on respondent’s letterheads indicating
the address, No. 167, Barangay Looc, Calamba, Laguna.

On September 15, 2000, petitioner filed a consolidated petition for

cancellation of adverse claims on its transfer certificates of title with the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City. It served a copy of the petition by
registered mail to respondent's alleged official address at “Barangay Mayapa,
Calamba, Laguna.” The petition was returned to sender because respondent
could not be found at that address. The postman issued a certification
stating that the reason for the return was that the “cooperative [was] not
existing.” Petitioner allegedly attempted to serve the petition upon
respondent personally. However, this service failed for the same reason.
Upon Cathay Metal’s motion, the Regional Trial Court issued an order on
December 15, 2000 declaring petitioner’s substituted service, apparently by
registered mail, to have been effected, thus Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative is hereby given a period of fifteen (15) days from the delivery of
said pleadings to the Clerk of Court within which to file their opposition to
the Consolidated petition for cancellation of adverse claim.

Respondent, through Mr. Orlando dela Peña, filed a manifestation and

motion, alleging that respondent never received a copy of the summons and
the petition. It moved for the service of the summons and for a copy of the
petition to be sent to No. 160, Narra Avenue, Looc, Calamba, Laguna.

Respondent argued that petitioner was not being fair when it served
summons to respondent’s old address despite knowledge of its actual
address.

Petitioner argued that summons could only be validly served to respondent’s

official address as indicated in its registration with the Cooperative
Development Authority. This is because respondent as a registered
cooperative is governed by Republic Act No. 6938, a substantive law that
requires summons to be served to respondent’s official address. Substantive
law takes precedence over procedural rules.

Petitioner argued that respondent was sufficiently served with summons and
a copy of its petition for cancellation of annotations because it allegedly sent
these documents to respondent’s official address as registered with the
Cooperative Development Authority.

Petitioner further argued that the Rules of Procedure cannot trump the
Cooperative Code with respect to notices. This is because the Cooperative
Code is substantive law, as opposed to the Rules of Procedure, which
pertains only to matters of procedure.

Issue:
Whether there is valid service of summons through registered mail.

Ruling:
No. Respondent was not validly served with summons.
In this case, petitioner served summons upon respondent by registered mail
and, allegedly, by personal service at the office address indicated in
respondent’s Certificate of Registration. Summons was not served upon
respondent’s officers. It was also not published in accordance with the Rules
of Court. As a result, respondent was not given an opportunity to present
evidence, and petitioner was able to obtain from the Regional Trial Court an
order cancelling respondent’s annotations of adverse claims.

The enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 is exclusive. Service of summons

upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid.
If summons may not be served upon these persons personally at their
residences or offices, summons may be served upon any of the officers
wherever they may be found.

Court governs court procedures, including the rules on service of notices and
summons. The Cooperative Code on notices cannot replace the rules on
summons under the Rules of Court. Rule 14, Section 11 of the Rules of Court
provides an-exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to receive
summons for juridical entities. These persons are the juridical entity's
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.

The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to

cooperatives’ activities as administered by the Cooperative Development
Authority. However, they are not procedural rules that will govern court
processes. A Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to have an
official address to which all notices and communications shall be sent cannot
take the place of the rules on summons under the Rules of Court concerning
a court proceeding.

Petitioner insists that it should not be made to inquire further as to the

whereabouts of respondent after the attempt to serve the summons by
registered mail to respondent’s address as allegedly indicated in its Articles
of Incorporation. The Rules does not provide that it needs to do so.
However, it provides for service by publication. Service by publication is
available when the whereabouts of the defendant is unknown.
This is not a matter of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of respondent
since this is an action in rem. In an action in rem, jurisdiction over the
person is not required as long as there is jurisdiction over the res. This case
involves the issue of fair play and ensuring that parties are accorded due
process.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172204               July 2, 2014
CATHAY METAL CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The Rules of Court governs court procedures, including the rules on service
of notices and summons. The Cooperative Code p~ovisions on notices
cannot replace the rules on summons under the Rules of Court. Rule 14,
Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides an-exclusive enumeration of the
persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities. These persons
are the juridical entity's president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
This petition under Rule45 assails the Court of Appeals’ decision dated
November 25, 2005, and its resolution dated April 5, 2006. The Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for respondent’s presentation of
evidence.
Respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a cooperative
recognized under Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.1 It allegedly entered into a joint venture agreement with
farmer-beneficiaries through Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) in
Silang, Cavite.2 While respondent was negotiating with the farmer-
beneficiaries, petitioner CathayMetal Corporation entered into Irrevocable
Exclusive Right to Buy (IERB) contracts with the same
farmerbeneficiaries.3 Under the IERB, the farmer-beneficiaries committed
themselves to sell to petitioner their agricultural properties upon conversion
to industrial or commercial properties or upon expiration of the period of
prohibition from transferringtitle to the properties. 4
In 1996, respondent caused the annotation of its adverse claim on the
farmer-beneficiaries’ certificates of title.5
On November 9, 1998, the Department of Agrarian Reform issued an order
converting the properties from agricultural to mixed use. 6
In 1999, petitioner and the farmer-beneficiaries executed contracts of sale of
the properties.7 Transfer certificates of titlewere also issued in the name of
petitioner in the same year.8 The annotations in the original titles were
copied to petitioner's titles.9
Respondent’s Vice-President, Orlando dela Peña, sent two letters dated
March 20, 2000 and April 12, 2000 to petitioner, informing it of respondent’s
claim to the properties.10 Petitioner did not respond.11
On September 15, 2000,petitioner filed a consolidated petition for
cancellation of adverse claims on its transfer certificates of title with the
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City.12 It served a copy of the petition by
registered mail to respondent's alleged official address at "Barangay Mayapa,
Calamba, Laguna."13 The petition was returned to sender because
respondent could not be found at that address.14 The postman issued a
certification stating that the reason for the return was that the "cooperative
[was] not existing."15 Petitioner allegedly attempted to serve the petition
upon respondent personally.16 However, this service failed for the same
reason.17
Upon petitioner's motion, the Regional Trial Court issued an order on
December 15, 2000 declaring petitioner’s substituted service, apparently by
registered mail,18 to have been effected,19 thus:
Acting on the "Manifestation And Motion For Substituted Service" filed by
petitioner Cathay Metal Corporation, thru counsel, and finding the reasons
therein statedto be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, this Court hereby declares that substituted service of the
Consolidated Petition for Cancellation of Adverse Claim on the President of
Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. has been effected. The latter
ishereby given a period of fifteen (15) days from the delivery of said
pleadings to the Clerk of Court within which to file their opposition to the
Consolidated petition for cancellation of adverse claim. 20
Petitioner was later allowed to present its evidence ex parte.21
Upon learning that a case involvingits adverse claim was pending,
respondent, through Mr. Orlando dela Peña, filed a manifestation and
motion, alleging that respondent never received a copy of the summons and
the petition.22 It moved for the service of the summons and for a copy of the
petition to be sent to No. 160, Narra Avenue, Looc, Calamba, Laguna. 23
The Regional Trial Court granted respondent's manifestation and motion on
March 16, 2001.24 It ordered that respondent be furnished with a copy of the
petition at its new address.25
Instead of furnishing respondent with a copy of the petition, petitioner filed
on April 16, 2001 a motion for reconsideration of the March 16, 2001
Regional Trial Court order.26 In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner
argued that the case was already submitted for decision after all of
petitioner’s evidence had been admitted, and a memorandum had been
filed.27 Therefore, it was too late for respondent to ask the court that it be
furnished with a copy of the petition.28 Moreover, because respondent was
already in default, a manifestation and motion, without allegations of
grounds for a motion to lift order of default, would not give it personality to
participate in the proceedings.29 Petitioner sent a copy of the motion for
reconsideration to respondent by registered mail and set the motion for
hearing on April 20, 2001.30 Respondent failed to appear atthe hearing on
the motion for reconsideration. On April 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court
submitted the motion for resolution.31
Respondent received a copy of the motion for reconsideration after the
hearing. On August 13, 2001, respondent filed a motion for leave to admit
attached opposition32 and opposition to petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the March 16,2001 Regional Trial Court
order.33 Respondent argued that since petitioner’s ex parte presentation of
evidence was secured through extrinsic fraud, there should be a new trial to
give respondent a fair day in court.34 This was opposed by petitioner on
September 6, 2001.35 Petitioner emphasized its alleged compliance with the
Cooperative Code rule on notices and respondent’s failure to file its comment
despite the court’s order that approved petitioner’s substituted
service.36 Petitioner further pointed out that it had always questioned the
authority of Mr. dela Peñato act for respondent.37
On January 16, 2003, the Regional Trial Court granted petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.38 It found that respondent's alleged representatives
failed to prove their authorities to represent respondent. 39 It ruled that
service should be made to the address indicated in its Cooperative
Development Authority Certificate of Registration.40 The case was declared
submitted for decision.41
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the January 16, 2003 order
of the Regional Trial Court.42
On March 21, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued a decision granting
petitioner’s petition for cancellation of annotations.43 The Register of Deeds
of Cavite was ordered to cancel the annotations onthe certificates of title. 44
On April 3, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an order45 rescinding its
March 21, 2003 decision for having been prematurely rendered, thus:
This is regard to the Decision dated March 21, 2003 which the Court has
rendered in this particular case.
A review of the records show that the court for reasons unexplained, has
committed an error in judgment in rendering said decision unmindful of the
fact thatthere is still a pending incident (Oppositor Laguna’s Motion for
Reconsideration) which has first to be resolved.
Fully aware that the error if allowed to remain unrectified would cause a
grave injustice and deeply prejudiced [sic] the herein respondent, the Court,
faithfully adhering to the principle enunciated by the Honorable Supreme
Court in the case of Astraquilio vs Javier, 13 CRA 125 which provides that:
"It is one of the inherent powers of the court to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. This
power includes the right to reverse itself, especially when in its opinion it has
committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its
decision will cause injustice to a party litigant."
do hereby, with deep and sincere apologies to the party-litigants, more
particularly to the herein respondent Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc., RECALL and RESCIND its Decision which was prematurely
rendered.46
In an order dated May 26, 2003, the Regional Trial Court denied
respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the January 16, 2003 order. 47
On June 23, 2003, the Regional Trial Court decided to grant48 petitioner's
petition for cancellation of annotation on the basis of the following facts: 49
. . . These annotations were subsequently copied to the Transfer Certificates
of Titles over the parcels of land subject of this suit that were issued in the
name of Cathay. . . . Upon verification, Cathay found that Laguna did not file
any claim against the farmer-beneficiaries or Cathay since the time the
annotations were made. . . . Moreover, affidavits of adverse claim and
supporting documents that Laguna supposedly submitted to the Register of
Deeds of Cavite were certified bythe Register of Deeds to be inexistent in the
registry's vault. . . . Moreover, the Cooperative Development Authority
likewise certified that Laguna has been inoperative since 1992 and during
the period when the annotations were made in 1996. The Bureau ofPosts
has also certified that Laguna's office at Barangay Mayapa, Calamba,
Laguna, its official address as indicated in its Articles of Incorporation and
Confirmation of Registration is "closed".50
According to the Regional Trial Court, since respondent was inoperative at
the time when its adverse claims were annotated, "there [was] no reason for
[it] to believe that the person who caused the annotations of adverse claim
on the titles of the farmer-beneficiaries . . . was authorized to do so." 51
The Regional Trial Court ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the
annotations on the transfer certificates of title. 52 It held that Section 70 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree declares
that "an adverse claim is effective [only]for a period of thirty (30) days and
may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition after the lapse of this
period."53 Since the 30-day period had already lapsed, the annotations were
already the subject of cancellation.54
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals based on two grounds:
1) Petitioner-appellee secured the favorable orders of the lower court
in fraud of appellant LagunaWest by sending the petition, all other
 pleadings, and notices to its former address, thus, denying its day in
court; and
2) The trial court erred in applying the rule on substituted service,
thus, it did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the appellant. 55
The Court of Appeals granted respondent's appeal on November 25, 2005.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby granted. The case is
ordered remanded for appellant's presentation of evidence and thereafter,
for the trial court to render judgment, albeit with dispatch. 56
The Court of Appeals ruled thatthere was no valid service of summons upon
respondent in accordance with Rule 14, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure.57 Hence, the "court acquire[d] no jurisdiction to pronounce a
judgment in the case."58
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on April
5, 2006.59
The issue in this case is whether respondent was properly served with
summons or notices of the hearing on the petition for cancellation of
annotations of adverse claim on the properties.
Petitioner emphasized the following points:
Summons was served upon respondentat its official registered address at
Barangay Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna.60 Since no one received the summons,
petitioner insisted that the trial court issue an order to effect substituted
service.61 Respondent still did not file its answer.62
Later, a certain Orlando dela Peña would filea manifestation and motion
dated February 27, 2001 purportedly on behalf of respondent. 63 Mr. dela
Peña claimed that he was an authorized representative of respondent and
that respondent was already holding office at No. 160, Narra Avenue, Looc,
Calamba, Laguna, which was not the official address of respondent. 64 Mr.
dela Peña never submitted proof of his authority torepresent respondent. He
was also never a memberof respondent cooperative. 65
However, Mr. dela Peña was stillallowed to file an answer or
opposition.66 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration opposing the order
allowing him to file an answer or opposition on behalf of
respondent.67 Respondent failed to oppose this. He did not participate
further.68 Later, a certain Mr. Geriberto Dragon would claim to be an officer
of respondent. He would file an opposition on its behalf after the period to
file an opposition had lapsed.69 Mr. Dragon alleged that respondent’s address
was at No. 167, Barangay Looc, Calamba, Laguna.70 Like Mr. dela Peña, Mr.
Dragon had never been a member or officer of respondent. 71
Petitioner argued that Mr. dela Peña and Mr. Dragon never submitted proof
of their authority to represent respondent. 72 They were never officers or
members of respondent cooperative.73 Therefore, petitioner cannot be
blamed for being skeptical about Mr. dela Peña’s and Mr. Dragon’s claims of
authority.74
Moreover, Mr. dela Peña and Mr. Dragon could not claim to have been
authorized to represent respondent because it was determined to be
inoperative since 1992.75 In 2002, respondent was dissolved by the
Cooperative Development Authority.76
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the trial court order allowing
respondent to file an answer or opposition to the petition for cancellation of
annotation was granted because of Mr. dela Peña’s and Mr. Dragon’s failure
to show evidence ofauthority to act on behalf of respondent. 77
Petitioner argued that summons could only be validly served to respondent’s
official address as indicated in its registration with the Cooperative
Development Authority.78 This is because respondent as a registered
cooperative is governed by Republic Act No. 6938, a substantive law that
requires summons to be servedto respondent’s official address. 79
Substantive law takes precedence over procedural rules.80
Petitioner cites Article 52 of Republic Act No. 6938:
Article 52. Address. – Every cooperative shall have an official postal address
to which all notice and communications shall be sent. Such address and
every change thereof shall be registered with the Cooperative Development
Authority.
Further, petitioner argues that there is no law that requires parties to serve
summons to "every unsubstantiated address alleged by [a] party."81
Petitioner also argued that the Court of Appeals erred when it remanded the
case for trial because respondent already admitted that its adverse claims
were based not on a right over the property but on the "alarm[ing] . . .
possibility of losing the deal"82 with the owners of the property. There was no
agreement yet vesting in respondent any right over the
properties.83 Moreover, the annotations on the title were made in 1996 when
respondent was already inoperative.84
Meanwhile, respondent emphasized thatit entered into a joint venture
agreement with the farmer-beneficiaries.85 While in the process of
negotiations, petitioner suddenly entered into the picture by offering the
farmer-beneficiaries an IrrevocableExclusive Right to Buy (IERB)
contracts.86 It was then that respondent caused the annotation of an adverse
claim on the titles.87
Respondent, through its Vice President, Mr. dela Peña, wrote two letters
between March and April 2000 relative to its adverse claims in an attempt to
amicably settle what seemed then as a brewing dispute.88 These letters were
written on respondent’s letterheads indicating the address, No. 167,
Barangay Looc, Calamba, Laguna.89
Petitioner deliberately served summons upon respondent to its old
address.90 Later, petitioner would be allowed to present evidence ex parte. 91
Moreover, respondent was unable to appear at the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration of the court order allowing respondent to file its answer or
opposition. Basedon the records, respondent’s failure to appear was due to
petitioner setting the hearing on April 20, 2001 and mailing respondent’s a
copy of the motion on April 16, 2001 or just four (4) days before the
hearing.92
Respondent filed a motion for leave to admit attached opposition to
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. This was opposed by petitioner.
Pending respondent’s motion for leave toadmit attached opposition, the trial
court already issued its order dated January 16, 2013, granting petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of the order allowing respondent to file its answer
or opposition to the petition for cancellation of adverse claims. 93
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated January 16,
2003. While the said incidents were pending,the trial court rendered its
decision dated March 21, 2003, granting petitioner’s petition to cancel the
annotations of adverse claims.94 This, according to respondent, was a
premature decision.95
The trial court rescinded the March 21, 2003 decision. On May 26, 2003, the
trial court denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration. 96
Within the period allowed for respondent to file its petition for certiorari, the
trial court rendered judgment granting petitioner’s petition to cancel the
annotations of adverse claims on the title. 97
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court remanded
the case to the lower court so that respondent could be allowed to present
evidence.98
Respondent argued that petitioner was not being fair when it served
summons to respondent’s old address despite knowledge of its actual
address.99
Moreover, respondent argued that itsrights over the property should be best
determined after trial.100
According to respondent, had there been a trial, it would have:
4.2.1 Presented documentary evidence that its negotiation with the
former landowners had earned for it part-ownership of the properties,
or at the very least, the exclusive authority to deal with potential
buyers or developers of the properties such as petitioner.
4.2.2 Offered in evidence the actual Joint Venture Agreements ("JVA")
between the former landowners and Laguna West whereby Laguna
West had made partial payment of the former landowners’ 40% share
in the joint venture. Laguna Westhad thus acquired interest over the
properties, or had the same or better right than the registered owner
thereof.
4.2.3 Proved by competent evidence that the annotation sought to be
cancelled was not a simple adverse claim but qualifies as a registration
of an interest over the subject properties;
4.2.4 Presented Laguna West’s authorized representatives, Orlando
dela Peña, Geriberto Dragon and Ediza Saliva, and one or two of the
original landowners to testify on their dealings with Laguna West.
 4.2.5 Called on the officers of the CD on questions about a
cooperative’s address of record vis-à-vis its actualaddress as known to
the party that the cooperativehad previously been communicating
with, in this case, petitioner.101
We rule that respondent was not validly served with summons or notice of
the hearing. However, its annotations of adverse claims should be cancelled
for being based on a future claim.
I
Respondent was not validly served with summons
Republic Act No. 6938 of 1990 or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines
provides that cooperatives are mandated to have an official postal address
to which notices shall be sent, thus:
Art. 52. Address. – Every cooperative shall have an official postal address to
which all notices and communications shall be sent. Such address and every
change thereof shall be registered with the Cooperative Development
Authority.
This provision was retained in Article 51 of RepublicAct No. 9520 or the
Philippine Cooperative Codeof 2008. Article 51 provides:
Art. 51. Address. Every cooperativeshall have an official postal address to
which all notices and communications shall be sent. Such address and every
change thereof shall be registered with the Authority.
Relying on the above provision, petitioner argued that respondent was
sufficiently served with summons and a copy of its petition for cancellation of
annotations because it allegedly sent these documents to respondent’s
official address as registered with the Cooperative Development Authority.
Petitioner further argued that the Rules of Procedure cannot trump the
Cooperative Code with respect to notices. This is because the Cooperative
Code is substantive law, as opposed to the Rules of Procedure, which
pertains only to matters of procedure.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The promulgation of the Rules of Procedure is among the powers vested only
in this court. Article VIII, Section 5(5) provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law,the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged.Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modifysubstantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
This means that on matters relating toprocedures in court, it shall be the
Rules of Procedure that will govern. Proper court procedures shall be
determined by the Rules as promulgated by this court.
Service of notices and summons on interested parties in a civil, criminal, or
special proceeding is court procedure. Hence, it shall be governed by the
Rules of Procedure.
The Cooperative Code provisions may govern matters relating to
cooperatives’ activities as administered by the Cooperative Development
Authority. However, they are not procedural rules that will govern court
processes. A Cooperative Code provision requiring cooperatives to have an
official address to which all notices and communications shall be sent cannot
take the place of the rules on summonsunder the Rules of Court concerning
a court proceeding.
This is not to say that the noticescannot be sent to cooperatives in
accordance with the Cooperative Code. Notices may be sent to a
cooperative’s official address. However, service of notices sent to the official
address in accordance with the Cooperative Code may not be used as a
defense for violations of procedures, specially when such violation affects
another party’s rights.
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules ofCourt provides the rule on service of
summons upon a juridical entity. It provides that summons may be served
upon a juridical entity only through its officers. Thus:
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the
laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on
the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.
We have already established that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14
is exclusive.102 Service of summons upon persons other than those officers
enumerated in Section 11 is invalid.103 Even substantial compliance is not
sufficient service of summons.104
This provision of the rule does not limit service to the officers’ places of
residence or offices. If summons may not be served upon these persons
personally at their residences or offices, summons may be served upon any
of the officers wherever they may be found.
Hence, petitioner cannot use respondent's failure to amend its Articles of
Incorporation to reflect its new address as an excuse from sending or
attempting to send to respondent copies of the petition and the summons.
The Rules of Court provides that noticesshould be sent to the enumerated
officers. Petitioner failed to do this. Nonotice was ever sent to any of the
enumerated officers.
Petitioner insists that it should not be made to inquire further as to the
whereabouts of respondent after the attempt to serve the summons by
registered mail to respondent’s address as allegedly indicated in its Articles
of Incorporation. The Rules does not provide that it needs to do so.
However, it provides for service by publication. Service by publication is
available when the whereabouts of the defendant is unknown. Section 14,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are
unknown. – In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown
owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such
places and for such time as the court may order. (Emphasis supplied)
This is not a matter of acquiringjurisdiction over the person of respondent
since this is an action in rem. In an action in rem, jurisdiction over the
person is not required as long asthere is jurisdiction over the res. This case
involves the issue of fair play and ensuring that parties are accorded due
process.
In this case, petitioner served summons upon respondent by registered mail
and, allegedly, by personal service at the office address indicated in
respondent’s Certificate of Registration. Summons was not served upon
respondent’s officers. It was also not published in accordance with the Rules
of Court. As a result, respondent was not given an opportunity to present
evidence, and petitioner was able to obtain from the Regional Trial Court an
order cancelling respondent’s annotations of adverse claims.
Respondent was, therefore, not validly served with summons.
II
Respondent’s alleged non-
operation does not bar it from
authorizing a person to act on
its behalf in court
proceedings
Petitioner argues that failure to serve the summons upon respondent was
due to respondent's non-operation and failure to amend its Articles of
Incorporation to reflectits new address. Petitioner's conclusion that
respondent was no longer operating was based only on the postmaster's
certification. According to the postmaster’s certification, it failed to serve the
petition for cancellation of annotation to respondent’s official address
becauseof respondent’s nonexistence or closure. Petitioner failed to consider
that the postmaster was not in the position to make a reliable statement as
to the existence or closure of an entity.
Moreover, the Cooperative Development Authority's certification stating that
respondent was not submitting any financial report since 1992, which was
proof of its non-operation, was a mere statement of what was indicative of
non-operation. It was not yet a conclusive statement that respondent was
not in operation.
In any case, even assuming that respondent was not operating, it might still
exercise its powers as a cooperative until it would get dissolved. Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 6938 provides the powers and capacities of registered
cooperatives.
Section 9. Cooperative Powers and Capacities.- A cooperative registered
under this Code shall have the following powers and capacities:
(1) To sue and be sued in its cooperative name;
(2) Of succession;
(3) To amend its articles of cooperation in accordance with the
provisions of this code;
(4) To adopt by-laws not contrary to law, morals or public policy, and
to amend and repeal the same in accordance with this Code;
(5) To purchase, receive, take orgrant, hold, convey, sell, lease,
pledge, mortgage, and otherwise deal with such real and personal
property as the transaction of the lawful affairs of the cooperative may
reasonably and necessarily require, subject to the limitations
prescribed by law and the Constitution;
(6) To enter into division, mergeror consolidation, as provided in this
Code;
(7) To join federations or unions, as provided in this Code;
(8) To accept and receive grants, donations and assistance from
foreign and domestic sources; and
(9) To exercise such other powers granted in this Code or necessary to
carry out its purpose or purposes as stated in its articles of
cooperation.
Prior to dissolution, a cooperative isentitled to the exercise of these powers.
It may engage indeals involving its properties or rights. It may cause the
annotation of claims it deems to have in order to protect such claim.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, respondent is not prevented from authorizing
persons to act on its behalf.
In any case, even if petitioner alleged that respondent was already dissolved
by virtue of a November7, 2002 resolution of Cooperative Development
Authority, the relevant acts of respondent had occurred before such
resolution.
The resolution of the issue of representation could have facilitated the
resolution of the case on the merits.
III
The trial court could have
resolved the issue of
representation; premature
decisions elicit suspicion
The court must not trifle with jurisdictional issues. It is inexcusable that a
case involving issues that the trial court had full control of had to be
elevated to this court for determination.
The trial court had every opportunityto resolve the validity of Mr. dela Peña’s
and Mr. Dragon’s alleged authority to act on behalf of respondent. The trial
court had, in fact, already allowed respondent to file its answer and oppose
petitioner’s petitionfor cancellation of annotation. It could have easily
ordered Mr. dela Peña or Mr. Dragon to produce evidence of their authority
to represent respondent.
Moreover, there had been at least two motions for reconsideration filed
before the trial court finallydecided the petitioner’s petition for cancellation
of annotation.
The first was filed by petitioner when the trial court granted respondent’s
manifestation and motion on March 16, 2001. The trial court could have
heard the parties on the issue of representation at this instance had it noted
petitioner’s non-compliance with the rule that the notice of hearing must "be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least
three (3) days before the date of the hearing."105 Section 4, Rule 15
provides:
Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act
upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written
motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion
required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in
such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3)
days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the
hearing on shorter notice.
In this case, petitioner set the case for hearing on April 20, 2001. It served a
copy upon respondent by registered mail only on April 16, 2001 or four (4)
days before the set date for hearing. To be covered by the three-day rule
under Rule 15, Section 4, petitioner should ensure respondent’s receipt of
the notice by April 17, 2001. We take judicial notice that service by
registered mail in our jurisdiction does not take place in one day. Service of
notice by registered mail only four (4) days before the date of hearing,
therefore, does not amount to ensuring the other party’s receipt at least
three (3) days before the hearing.
The second motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent when the
Regional Trial Court granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of its
order of March 16, 2001.Hence, for the second time, the trial court had an
opportunity to hear whether Mr. dela Peña or Mr. Dragon was properly
authorized to act on behalf of respondent.
On one hand, nobody’s rights would have been prejudiced had respondent
been allowed to prove the alleged representatives’ authorities. On the other
hand, there is a likelihood ofprejudice, in this case, if the court relied purely
on technicalities.
Thus, we reiterate this court’s ruling in Alonso v. Villamor:106
. . . In other words, [processes] are a means to an end. When they lose the
character of the one and become the other, the administration of justice is at
fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their
obvious duty.
. . . To take advantage of [a purely technical error] for other purposes than
to cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal
to [a party]’s case smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is not a game
of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle
art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather,
a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the
court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and
indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that
justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by
a rapier’s thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as anaid to
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deservesscant
consideration from courts. There should be no vested rights in technicalities.
No litigant should be permitted to challenge a record of a court of these
Islands for defect of form when his substantial rights have not been
prejudiced thereby.
Both motions for reconsideration filed in the trial court were opportunities to
hear the parties on the issue of representation and to ensure that all parties
were given their fair opportunity to be heard. The trial court ignored both
opportunities and chose to rule based on technicalities to the prejudice of
respondent.
The rules cannot be interpreted asa means to violate due process rights.
Courts should, as much as possible, give parties the opportunity to present
evidence as to their claims so that decisions will be made based on the
merits of the case.
The trial court issued a decision pending incidents yet to be resolved. We
take this opportunity to remind courtsthat the issuance of fair decisions is
the heart of our functions. The judiciary is expected to take seriously its task
of crafting decisions with utmostjudiciousness. Premature decisions only
elicit suspicion of the courts and diminish our role as administrator of justice.
IV
Rights still under negotiations
are not adverse claims
Ordinarily, this case would be remanded to the trial court for the
presentation of respondent’s evidence. However, this case has been pending
in this court for about eight (8) years.In the interest of judicial economy and
efficiency, and given that the court records are sufficient to make a
determination on the validity of respondent’s adverse claim, we shall rule on
the issue. Respondent had been assailing the lack of service of summons
upon it and the resulting cancellation of its alleged adverse claim on the
titles. Its claim is anchored on its disrupted negotiations with the farmer-
beneficiaries involving the properties. In its memorandum filed on March 1,
2007, respondent stated:
1.2 Some ten (10) years ago, Laguna West entered into [sic] Joint Venture
Agreement ("JVA") with various farmer-CLOA beneficiaries in the Kaong-
Kalayugan area of Silang, Cavite for a total lot area of Eight Hundred Fifty
Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Fourteen (855,914) square meters.
1.3 To hold the CLOA beneficiaries to their commitment to submit their
respective lots to the JVA, Laguna West promised them a guaranteed share
of 40% in the proceeds of the project.
1.4 But, while Laguna West was still in the process of finalizing the
negotiations with these farmer-beneficiaries, petitioner entered the picture
by offering an alleged "Irrevocable Exclusive Right to Buy (IERB)" contracts
with the same farmer-landowners for the purpose of converting the subject
vast track [sic] of land into an industrial, commercial and residential area.
1.5 Alarmed with the possibility that it could lose the deal to a big and
moneyed corporation, Laguna Westcaused the annotation of adverse claims
on the thirty-nine (39) TCTs in 1996. 107 Respondent’s annotations on
petitioner’s certificates of title are similarly worded, thus:
Entry No. . . . -AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM- Covering the parcel of land
described in this title as per Affidavit of Adverse Claim executed by Calisto
M. Dela Pena [sic] of Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative Inc., wherein
the registered owner entered into a Joint Venture Agreement, as per
Affidavit ofAdverse Claim, subs. and sworn to before the Not. Public for . . .,
a copy is on file in this registry.
Date of inst.- . . . .
Date of inscription- . . . .
NOTE: The foregoing annotations were copied from TCT. . . . 108
Another version of the annotation is worded as follows:
Entry No. . . . -ADVERSE CLAIM- Signed and executed by Calixto M. dela
Pena [sic], president and Chairman of Cooperative, [alleging] therein the
existence of Joint Venture Agreement with the registered owner and that
there are aboutto dispose said lot, exec. before the Not. Public . . . Copy is
on file in this registry. Date of inst.- . . . . Date of inscription- . . . . 109
NOTE: The foregoing annotations were copied from TCT. . . .
The purpose of annotations of adverse claims on title is to apprise the whole
world of the controversy involving a property. These annotations protect the
adverse claimant's rights before or during the pendency of a case involving a
property. It notifies third persons that rights that may be acquired with
respect to a property are subject to the results of the case involving it.
Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree governs adverse claims. It describes an adverse claim as a
statement in writing setting forth a subsequent right or interest claimed
involving the property, adverse tothe registered owner. Thus:
Section 70. Adverse claim. – Whoever claims any part or interest in
registered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the
date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this
Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth
fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a
reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the
name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the
right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimant’s residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon
him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on
the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of
thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse ofsaid period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified
petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after
cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be
registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a
petition in the court of First Instance where the land is situated for the
cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing
upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render
judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to
be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case,
the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim thus
registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than
one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion.
Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim
by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
A claim based on a future right does notripen into an adverse claim as
defined in Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. A right still subject to
negotiations cannot be enforced against a title holder or against one that has
a legitimate title to the property based on possession, ownership, lien, or
any valid deed of transfer.
Respondent’s claim was not based on any of those.1awp++i1 Its claim was
based on a deal with the CLOA farmer-beneficiaries, which did not
materialize.
Respondent alleged that had there been a trial, it could have "[p]resented
documentary evidence that its negotiation with the former landowners had
earned for it part-ownership of the properties, or . . . the exclusive authority
to deal with potential buyers or developers." 110 Respondent contradicts itself.
For there to be a contract, there must be a meeting of the minds between
the parties. There could not have been any contract earning for respondent
part-ownership or any right since it was still undergoing negotiations with
the farmer-beneficiaries. At that stage, meeting of the minds was absent.
The terms were not yet final. Hence, no right or obligation could attach to
the parties. In essence, parties cannot claim, much less make an adverse
claim of any right, from terms that are still under negotiations.
Respondent also alleged that had it been allowed to offer as evidence the
joint venture agreement it entered with the farmer-beneficiaries, it would
have shown that it "had made partial payment of the former landowners’
40% share in the joint venture,"111 acquiring for itself an "interest over the
properties, or . . . better right than the registered owner[s]." 112 Respondent
was mistaken.
Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law prohibits
its own circumvention. The prohibition on disposition includes all rights
relating to disposition such as sale, and promise of sale of property upon the
happening of conditions that remove the restrictions on disposition.
Republic Act No. 6657 prohibits the sale, transfer, or conveyance of awarded
lands within ten (10) years, subject only to a few exceptions. Section 27 of
the Act provides:
SECTION 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. —Lands acquired by
beneficiaries underthis Act may not be sold, transferred or conveyed except
through hereditary succession, or to the government, or the LBP, or to other
qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years: provided, however, that
the children or the spouse of the transferorshall have a right to repurchase
the land from the government or LBP withina period of two (2) years. Due
notice of the availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the
land is situated. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee
(PARCCOM) as herein provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by
the BARC.
If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to the
land may be transferred orconveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to any
heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for
such transferor conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing
compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to the LBP which shall
give due notice of the availability of the land in the manner specified in the
immediately preceding paragraph.
In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate the
beneficiary in one lump sum for the amounts the latter has already paid,
together with the value of improvements he has made on the land Republic
Act No. 6657 also provides that the awarded lands may be converted to
residential, commercial,or industrial use if these are not economically
feasible anymore or because of urbanization, greater economic value will be
derived with their conversion. Section 65 of the Act provides:
SECTION 65. Conversion of Lands. — After the lapse of five (5) years from
its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will
have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner,
with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may
authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition:
provided, that the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
These provisions imply the following on rules on sale of awarded lands:
1) Subject to a few exceptions, landsacquired by beneficiaries may be
conveyed to non-beneficiaries after ten (10) years.
2) Before the lapse of ten (10) years but after the lapse of five (5)
years, a beneficiary may dispose of the acquired land if it "ceases to
be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the
locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value"113 with its residential, commercial, or industrial use.
These implications are easily abused. Hence, Republic Act No. 6657 included
among the prohibitions any act that will circumvent its provisions. Thus:
SECTION 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. — The following are prohibited:
(a) The ownership or possession, for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Act, of agricultural lands in excess of the total retention
limits or award ceilings by any person, natural or juridical, except those
under collective ownership by farmer-beneficiaries. (b) The forcible entry or
illegal detainer by persons who are not qualified beneficiaries under thisAct
to avail themselves of the rights and benefits of the Agrarian Reform
Program. (c) The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into
any nonagricultural use with intent to avoid the application of this Act to his
landholdings and to dispossess his tenant farmers of the land tilled by them.
(d) The willful prevention or obstruction by any person, association or entity
of the implementation of the CARP. (e) The sale, transfer, conveyance or
change of the nature of lands outside of urban centers and city limits either
in whole or in part after the effectivity of this Act. The date ofthe registration
of the deed of conveyance in the Register of Deeds with respect to titled
lands and the date of the issuance ofthe tax declaration to the transferee of
the property with respect to unregistered lands, as the case may be, shall be
conclusive for the purpose of this Act. (f) The sale, transfer or conveyance
by a beneficiary of the right to use or any other usufructuary right over the
land he acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to circumvent the
provisions of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
The prohibition from disposition of the properties encompasses all rights
relating to disposition, including the right to convey ownership or to promise
the sale and transfer of property from the farmer-beneficiaries to anyone
upon the happening of certain conditions that will remove the conveyance
restrictions.
The conveyance of the property withinthe prohibited period or before its
conversion to non-agricultural use isan outright violation of Republic Act No.
6657. Meanwhile, the promise of sale of properties upon the happening of
conditions that will remove restrictions carry with it an intent to circumvent
the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. This law prohibits its circumvention.
In this case, the CLOAs were awarded to the farmer-beneficiaries between
1990 and 1992.114 Since the affidavit of adverse claim annotated on
petitioner’s certificates of title was annotated in 1996 and the properties
were converted only in 1998, respondent’sjoint venture agreement with the
farmer-beneficiaries could not have validly transferred rights to respondent.
The 10-year period of prohibition against conveyance had not yet lapsed at
that time.1âwphi1 Neither were the properties already converted to non-
agricultural use at that time. Respondent's adverse claim, therefore, based
on its alleged payment of the farmer-beneficiaries' 40% could not be valid.
In sum, whether or not there were provisions on transfer of rights or
promise to transfer rights in the joint venture agreement, there could be no
basis for respondent’s adverse claim. Lack of that provision means that
respondent does not have any valid claim or right over the properties at all.
Meanwhile, inclusion of such provision is illegal and, therefore, void.
This ruling is also applicable to petitioner, which entered into irrevocable
exclusive right to buy contracts from the farmer-beneficiaries. These
contracts provided that the farmer-beneficiaries committed themselves to
selling their properties to petitioner upon expiration of the period of
prohibition to transfer or upon conversion of the properties from agricultural
to industrial or commercial use, whichever comes first. These contracts were
execl!ted between farmer-beneficiaries and petitioner during the period of
prohibition and before the properties' conversion from agricultural to mixed
use. Upon conversion of the properties, these were immediately sold to
petitioner. Intent to circumvent the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657 is,
therefore, apparent. Petitioner's contracts are, therefore, also illegal and
void. Hence, this decision is without prejudice to the right of interested
parties. to seek the cancellation of petitioner's certificates of title obtained in
violation of the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Register of Deeds of Cavite is
ORDERED to cancel the annotations of adverse claims on the transfer
certificates· of title.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above·
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Villarama, Jr., J., designated as Acting Member per Special Order No.
1691 dated May 22, 2014 in view of the vacancy in the Third Division.
1
 Rollo, p. 34.
2
 Id. at 34 and 82.
3
 Id. at 12 and 34.
4
 Id. at 12 and 305.
5
 Id. at 34 and 958.
6
 Id. at 318–324.
7
 Id at 325–865.
8
 Id.; see also rollo, p. 1081; see for example rollo, p. 315.
9
 Id. at 1081; see for example rollo, p. 317.
10
 Id. at 34 and 973–976.
11
 Id. at 34.
12
 Id. at 35 and 173–304.
13
 Id. at 35 and 304.
14
 Id. at 35.
15
 Id. at 872.
16
 Id. at 35.
17
 Id.
18
 Id. at 35, 872, 875, 882, 959, 1040, and 1094.
19
 Id. at 35 and 873.
20
 Id.
21
 Id. at 35.
22
 Id. at 977.
23
 Id. at 35 and 977–978.
24
 Id. at 980.
25
 Id. at 35 and 980.
26
 Id. at 981–989.
27
 Id. at 982.
28
 Id.
29
 Id. at 985–986.
30
 Id. at 988.
31
 Id. at 35–36.
32
 Id. at 36 and 990–993.
33
 Id. at 36 and 994–998.
34
 Id. at 996–997.
35
 Id. at 999-1009.
36
 Id. at 1000–1003.
37
 Id. at 1003.
38
 Id. at 874–880.
39
 Id. at 879.
40
 Id. at 878–879.
41
 Id. at 36 and 880.
42
 Id. at 1080.
43
 Id. at 1020–1044.
44
 Id. at 1044.
45
 Id. at 1045–1046.
46
 Id.
47
 Id. at 1080–1081.
48
 Id. at 1045.
49
 Id. at 1081–1084.
50
 Id. at 1080–1082.
51
 Id. at 1082.
52
 Id. at 36.
53
 Id. at 1082–1083.
54
 Id. at 1083.
55
 Id. at 34.
56
 Id. at 38.
57
 Id. at 37.
58
 Id. at 38.
59
 Id. at 40.
60
 Id. at 1175.
61
 Id.
62
 Id.
63
 Id.
64
 Id. at 1176.
65
 Id.
66
 Id.
67
 Id.
68
 Id.
69
 Id.
70
 Id.
71
 Id. at 1177.
72
 Id. at 1194 and 1197.
73
 Id. at 1194 and 1196.
74
 Id. at 1197.
75
 Id. at 1189.
76
 Id.
77
 Id. at 1177.
78
 Id. at 1182–1183.
79
 Id. at 1184–1185.
80
 Id. at 1185.
81
 Id. at 1187.
82
 Id. at 1191–1192.
83
 Id. at 1192–1193.
84
 Id. at 1198.
85
 Id. at 1209.
86
 Id. at 1210.
87
 Id.
88
 Id.
89
 Id.
90
 Id.
91
 Id. at 1211.
92
 Id. at 1212.
93
 Id. at 1213.
94
 Id. at 1214.
95
 Id.
96
 Id.
97
 Id. at 1215.
98
 Id.
99
 Id. at 1218.
100
 Id. at 1219.
101
 Id. at 970.
102
 See for example Paramount Insurance Corp. v. A.C. Ordoñez
Corporation and Franklin Suspine, 583 Phil. 321, 327 (2008) [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, Third Division; JJ. Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and Reyes concurring].
103
 Id.
104
 Id. at 328.
105
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 15, sec. 4.
106
 16 Phil. 315, 321–322 (1910) [Per J. Moreland, En Banc].
107
 Rollo, pp. 1209-1210.
108
 Id. at 90.
109
 Id. at 100.
110
 Id. at 970.
111
 Id.
112
 Id.
113
 Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), sec. 65.
114
 Rollo, p. 318.