Essay
Essay
Essay
the United States. Every element of the war was saturated with complexities beyond
the previous conceptions of war. From the critical perspective, for the first half
of the twentieth century, Vietnam was of little strategic importance to the United
States and, even “after World War II, Vietnam was a very small blip on a very large
American radar screen” (Herring, 14). The U.S. knew very little about Vietnam
outside of its rice production until the French colonized the country. Even after
France’s colonization of Vietnam, a great deal of America’s perspective and the
media’s perspective of Vietnam was “devoid of expertise and based on racial
prejudices and stereotypes that reflected deep-seated convictions about the
superiority of Western culture. In U.S. eyes, the Vietnamese were a passive and
uninformed people, totally unready for self government” (Herring, 13). A survey of
New York Times articles published during the First Indochina War revealed that the
U.S. foreign policy analysis, media and public overwhelmingly concentrated on the
French perspective of the conflict. Little attention was given to the Vietminh
perspective or to the perspective of the French backed government of South Vietnam.
This viewpoint continued until 1949 when China’s civil war ended and the Communist
took control of China. Shortly after taking control Mao Zedong, the Communist
leader acknowledged the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Soviet Union
quickly followed suit. After that, the U.S. media placed a greater emphasis on
Cold War rhetoric when dealing with Vietnam. As noted, the Cold War mindset
permeated much of American culture during this time period; “it was an age of
ideological consensus, and this was true above all in foreign policy” (Hallin, 50).
At the conclusion of the First Indochina War, the U.S. foreign policy, public and
media considered Vietnam as a nation that could spread Communism in Southeast Asia.
The focus of the United States foreign policy from 1954 to 1957 looked mainly at
the internal affairs of South Vietnam and at Ngo Dinh Diem, and to a smaller degree
at the Refugee Crisis after the Geneva Accords. From 1957-1961 the U.S. attention
shifted heavily on Vietnam’s fate in relation to the turmoil in Laos and Cambodi as
well as to the Soviet threat. This perception dominated the public opinion, media
and U.S. foreign policy well into President John F. Kennedy’s Administration.