Globalization and Nation-Building in The Philippines: State Predicaments in Managing Society in The Midst of Diversity
Globalization and Nation-Building in The Philippines: State Predicaments in Managing Society in The Midst of Diversity
Globalization and Nation-Building in The Philippines: State Predicaments in Managing Society in The Midst of Diversity
ROMMEL C. BANLAOI
Introduction
When the Philippines acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, the
country demonstrated its determination to face the challenges of globalization.
Recognizing that globalization is the buzzword of the 21st century and inevitably
affects the growth and governance of many nation-states, the Philippines bravely
entered the WTO to prepare itself for global competitiveness and reap the benefits
that globalization may bring.
Despite its great optimism on joining the WTO, the Philippines is still lagging
behind its Southeast Asian neighbors in terms of economic performance. Whereas
Philippine economic growth was second only to Japan’s in the 1960s, the Philippines
at present is viewed as one of the sick men of Asia.
This chapter argues that the difficulties encountered by the Philippines in meeting
the challenges of globalization stem from the nature of the Philippine state. The
Philippines entered the global economic arena with its domestic political economy
unprepared. The Philippine state has failed to create the kind of fertile socioeconomic
environment that would have prepared the country for global competition.
1 See Temario C. Rivera, Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family and State in Philippine Manufacturing (1994).
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1. The ends and purposes of government have become settled and
founded on a significant ideological consensus;
2. Most social groups (ethnic, religious, linguistic, and the like) have
been successfully assimilated, or have achieved protection, equality,
or self-determination through autonomy, federalism, or other
special devices;
3. Secessionism no longer constitutes a major goal of minorities.
Territorial frontiers have become legitimized and sanctified
through legal instruments;
4. Leaders are selected on the basis of a regular procedure like
elections. No group, family, clan or sector can hold power
permanently;
5. Military and policy organizations remain under effective civilian
control;
6. The mores of governance preclude personal enrichment through
various political activities.2
A Premature State
The Philippine state is a premature state because its claim to statehood is
predominantly based on anti-colonial sentiment rather on the “natural” bonds formed
through common historical experience, consanguinity and identification with a
common language or a common religion.3 The anti-colonial sentiment in the
Philippines was not even anchored on a popularly accepted notion of “nationalism”
but rather on a limited or narrow elite conception articulated by 19th century Filipino
thinkers initially spearheaded by Jose Rizal.4 Anti-colonial sentiments developed in the
Philippines not as a result of a natural blossoming of “national consciousness” but as
a result of overwhelming exasperation with the three centuries of oppression under
the Spanish colonial administration and a half-century of resentment under American
rule with a four-year colonial interruption during the Japanese occupation.5
Another characteristic of a premature state is that its legitimacy is challenged. The
Philippine state is considered legitimate by virtue of international recognition and
“popular” support. However, as in other premature states in the world, resistance
groups such as local communists and Muslim secessionist groups are contesting the
legitimacy of the Philippine state. 6
2 See K. J. Holsti, “War, Peace and the State of State”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1995), pp. 332-
33.
3 Ibid., p. 327.
4 See Floro C. Quibuyen, Rizal, American Hegemony and Philippine Nationalism: A Nation Aborted (Quezon City: Ateneo de
Manila Press, 1999). Also see Leon Ma. Guerrero, The First Filipino: A Biography of Jose Rizal (Quezon City: Guerrero
Publishing, 1998) and John N. Shumacher, The Making of a Nation: Essays on Nineteenth-Century Filipino Nationalism
(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1991).
5 See Onofre D. Corpuz, The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Volumes 1 and 2 (Quezon City: Aklahi Foundation, Inc.,
1989).
6 C.B. O’Briend, “The Show of State in a Neo-Colonial Twilight: Francophone Africa,” in J. Manor (ed), Rethinking
A Weak State
The Philippine state is a weak state because its apparatus has constantly been under
the control of a powerful family, clan or prevailing group for the primary purpose of
personal aggrandizement.12 The Philippine state continues to fail to insulate itself
from the parochial interests of traditional families, clans and groups that have
7 Rommel C. Banlaoi and Clarita R. Carlos, Political Parties in the Philippines: From 1900 to the Present (Makati City: Konrad
Adenauer Foundation, 1997). Also see Clarita R. Carlos and Rommel C. Banlaoi, Elections in the Philippines: From
Precolonial Period to the Present (Makati City: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1997).
8 F. Sionil Jose, We Filipinos: Our Moral Malaise, Our Heroic Heritage (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1999), p. 2.
9 Renato Constantino, The Making of a Filipino: A Story of Philippine Colonial Politics (Quezon City: Foundation for
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dominated and benefited from Philippine politics. These forces compete with the
Philippine state in exercising effective control over its diverse population.13
As a result of the weakness of the Philippine state, “preferential access to state
resources and state-conferred economic opportunities have traditionally been given to
political elite, friends and relatives of the regime in control of the state power.”14 A
weak Philippine state results in the “politics of privilege,” a rent-seeking activity
causing corruption and mismanagement of the Philippine political economy.15 One
scholar describes this as “booty” or “crony” capitalism in which private interests are
pursued using public resources and in which economic and political oligarchs abuse
the apparatus of the state.16
A premature and weak Philippine state has produced weak institutions of
governance; thus, it is unable to manage the ethnic, religious and socioeconomic
diversities in its society. The advent of globalization not only aggravates these
diversities but also makes the Philippine state and its institutions of governance even
weaker for their failure to forge a national consensus necessary for nation-building
and socioeconomic development.
Ethnic Diversity
Filipinos are products of an ethnic mix composed of Malay, Chinese and indigenous
groups with Muslim, Spanish and American influences. Of the three external
influences, the mark left by the Americans is regarded as the most pervasive and
visible.17 It is even argued that because of the great impact of American culture, it
13 The author’s use of a weak state concept is heavily influenced by Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States
Philippines,” Philippine Political Science Journal, Numbers 33-36 (June 1991-December 1992), pp. 81-82.
15 Paul D. Hutchcroft, “The Politics of Privilege: Assessing the Impact of Rents, Corruption, and Clientelism on
Philippine Development,” Institute for Popular Democracy Occasional Paper No. 1 (February 1997).
16 Paul D. Hutchroft, Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press,
1998).
17 F. Landa Jocano, Filipino Prehistory: Rediscovering Precolonial Heritage (Metro Manila: Punlad Research House, 2000), p.
37.
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almost succeeded in replacing Filipino native cultures.18 This prompted one American
writer to describe Filipino culture as a “damage culture.”19 Filipino scholars, of
course, vehemently denounce this.20
While the Malay group may dominate this ethnic mix, the most influential group is
that of Chinese descent. Ethnic-Chinese Filipinos represent around 1.2 percent of the
total population, and more than half can be found in Metro Manila (primarily because
the greater number of Chinese associations are in Metro Manila).21 Most of the
leading families controlling the Philippine economy and politics have Chinese blood,
including Jose Rizal, the Philippine national hero, and former President Corazon
Aquino. Her cousin, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., once viewed as a crony of the former
president Ferdinand Marcos crony, chairs one of the biggest corporations in the
Philippines—the San Miguel Corporation. Lucio Tan, identified as a crony of former
president Joseph Estrada, is one of the wealthiest Filipino Chinese businessmen,
having owned Philippine Airlines, Air Philippines, Asia Brewery, Tanduay Distillery,
and Fortune Tobacco Company.
The ethnic diversity of the Philippines is exemplified by the distribution of
Filipino indigenous ethnic communities, called the Lumad. These indigenous groups
are generally marginalized. The total number of indigenous ethnic communities in the
country has not yet been accurately reported (party due to their relative geographical
isolation which makes them inaccessible to census takers).22 But there are at least 106
ethnic groups.23 Most of these are found in peripheral areas of the Philippines living
in abject poverty and, more often than not, victims of government developmental
projects.24
Religious Diversity
While the dominant religion in the Philippines is Christianity (which is split into
Roman Catholicism and Protestantism with its various denominations), the rise of
Islam in the Philippines is a serious security concern not only because of the surge of
Islamic fundamentalism being propagated by the minority but also because of the
increasing confidence of Filipino Muslims in asserting their identity as a Bangsa Moro,
or Moro Nation. Many Muslim Filipinos refuse to call themselves Filipinos, viewing
themselves more as members of the Bangsa Moro. But the term “Moro” itself, like
18 Ibid.
19 James Fallows, “A Damaged,” Atlantic Monthly (November 1987), pp. 49-58.
20 See Paz P. Mendez and F. Landa Jocano, Culture and Nationhood: A Philosophy of Education for Filipinos (Manila: Centro
(Singapore and London: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), p. 174. For additional readings on Filipino ethnic
Chinese, see Chinben See, “The Ethnic Chinese in the Philippines” in Leo Suryadinata (ed), The Ethnic Chinese in the
ASEAN States: Bibliographical Essays (Singapore and London: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1989), pp. 203-220.
22 F. Landa Jocano, Filipino Ethnic Indigenous Communities: Patterns, Variations, and Typologies (Metro Manila: Punlad
25 Peter Gowing, Mosque and Moro: A Study of Muslims in the Philippines (Manila: Federation of Christian Churches, 1964).
Also see Cesar Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973).
26 John Pelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959).
27 David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1988), p. 2.
28 Ibid. Also see Peter Gowing (ed), Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publishers,
1988).
29 Patricio N. Abinales, “Mindanao in the Politics of the Philippine Nation-State: A Brief Sketch,” Philippine Political
Philippines, 2000).
35 See Margarita Cojuangco, “The Role of the MILF in the Mindanao Problem” (MA Thesis: National Defense
Socioeconomic Diversity
Pervasive poverty is the main security problem of the Philippines.37 According to the
latest Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS) conducted by the National Statistics
Office (NSO), of the 14.37 million Philippine families in 1998, 5.75 million belonged
to the lower 40 percentile on the income scale, while 8.62 million belong to the upper
60 percentile. Families in the upper 60 percentile on the income scale scored best in
almost all socioeconomic indicators. But in terms of the number of families belonging
to each income strata, families in the lower 40 percentile are almost as numerous as
those in the upper 60 percentile.38 These figures indicate that a significant number of
Filipino people are living below the minimum basic needs framework, which states
that:
36 Jukpili M. Wadi, “Philippine Political Islam and the Emerging Fundamentalist Strand,” in Carmencita C. Aguilar
(ed), Cooperation and Conflict in Global Society (Quezon City: International Federation of Social Science Organization,
1996).
37 For an excellent conceptual l and practical reading of Philippine poverty, see Arsenio M. Balisacan, “What Does it
Take to Win the War Against Poverty in the Philippines?” in Eduardo T. Gonzales (ed), Reconsidering the East Asian
Economic Model: What’s Ahead for the Philippines (Pasig City: Development Academy of the Philippines, 1999), pp. 83-109.
Also see Anna Marie A. Karaos, “Urban Governance and Poverty Alleviation in the Philippines”, in Emma Porio (ed),
Urban Governance and Poverty Alleviation in Southeast Asia: Trends and Prospects (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University,
1997).
38 NSO Website, “Annual Poverty Indicators Survey” of the National Statistics Office.
http://www.census.gov.ph/data/sectordata/ap98.html.
39 Ibid.
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Filipinos were severely affected by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. In the latest
survey, about 94 percent of all Filipino families reported that they were affected by
the crisis. In response to the crisis, one in every two families in the lowest 40 percent
income bracket changed their eating patterns while three out of ten families increased
their working hours.40
40 Ibid.
41 See Romulo M. Espaldon, “Towards a National Muslim Development Policy” (undated manuscript). Espaldon was
a Minister of Muslim Affairs and Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
42 Jerry Mander, Debi Baker and David Korten “Does Globalization Help the Poor?”IFG Bulletin (San Francisco,
Market: Essays on a Socially Oriented Philippine Economy (Quezon City: Action for Economic Reforms, 1998), p. 28.
44 Ibid.
210
There are countries in which globalization has had a positive effect on the
economy and politics. It has been noted that “effective adaptations to globalization
are well under way in a number of developing countries.”45 As a result of
globalization, some developing countries “have increased their share of trade in goods
and services, and new technologies have created jobs and stimulated dynamic local
economies.”46 Globalization is also said to have facilitated the spread of democratic
governments in developing countries and helped sustain “the legitimacy of those that
have been created in recent years.”47 As a consequence of global integration brought
by the process of globalization, improvements in the real incomes of people in
developing economies can be expected.48
Globalization is not the root cause of the tensions in Philippine society. Poverty
causes these tensions, and poverty is the result of weak institutions of governance.49
This weakness stems from the premature and weak nature of the Philippine state.
45 Merilee S. Grindle, “Ready or Not: The Developing World and Globalization,” in Joseph Nye and John Donahue
(eds), Governance in a Globalizing World (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 178.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Frankel, pp.45-71.
49 This assertion is contrasting the argument of James Petras, “Globalization: A Critical Analysis,” Journal of
and the Market: Essays on a Socially Oriented Philippine Economy (Quezon City: Action for Economic Reforms, 1998), p.
257.
51 Alfred McCoy (ed), An Anarchy of Families: State and Families in the Philippines (Madison: University of Wisconsin-
Electoral Reform
Philippine elections are characterized by irregularities, fraud, manipulation, vote
buying, intimidation and violence.54 The prevalence of election fraud during the
counting of ballots, the use or threat of force by political warlords to compel people
to vote in their favor, and vote buying among politicians are undermining the
democratic process. Although the Philippines is among the few Asian countries with a
long historical experience in electoral politics, Philippine elections are nothing more
than overt expressions of competing personal interests and ambitions of party leaders
belonging to or allied with dominant families, clans, landlords and business groups.55
Despite the introduction of a Party-List Law to allow more room for sectoral
representations in the House and to encourage small political parties to participate in
local elections, marginalized sectors are still underrepresented because of patronage
politics and a strong kinship system in the Philippines. Ironically, many “small
parties” participating in the party-list system are “satellite” parties of traditional
politicians.56 Among the measures needed to reform Philippine elections are:
1992) and Ma. Aurora Catillo, et. al., Manipulated Elections (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1985).
55 Renato S. Velasco, “Campaign Tactics in the 1987 Legislative Elections” in Renato Velasco and Sylvano Mahiwo
(ed), The Philippine Legislature Reader (Quezon City: Great Books Publishers, 1989), p.62.
56 See Soliman M. Santos, Jr., “The Philippine Tries the Party-List System: A Progressive Approach” and David
Wurfel, “The Party-List Elections: Sectoral or National? Success or Failure?” both in Kasarinlan: A Philippine Quarterly of
Third World Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fourth Quarter, 1997).
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Political Party Reform
Philippine political parties are ideologically undifferentiated, except for the
underground communist party. There is only one ideology guiding all electoral parties
in the Philippines, the liberal ideology. As a result, Philippine political parties are
highly personalistic rather than programmatic.
The most notable features of Philippine political parties are the minimal intraparty
solidarity, endemic interparty switching, and party similarities in terms of programs,
organizations and campaign strategies.57 Filipino political party leaders are usually
political patrons from wealthy families and clans. These politically undifferentiated
and oligarchic parties have created a party environment characterized by “political
butterflies,” or party turncoats. Despite the constitutional mandate allowing a multi-
party system in the Philippines, political parties in the Philippines, in general, are
either administration parties or opposition parties.
As such, Philippine political parties are weak. Their weakness mirrors that of the
Philippine state, which prevents the effective management of ethnic, religious and
socioeconomic tension in the country. Without a strong party system with a clear
program of government, the Philippines will continue to be plagued by persistent
national crises.
Since political parties are vital instruments in the articulation of the demands and
desires of the people and important vehicles to mobilize the people to achieve
successful economic growth and effective governance, there is a move to reform and
strengthen the Philippine party system. The suggested measures include:
Socioeconomic Reform
To bridge the gap between the rich and poor, the Philippine government has
formulated a series of medium-term development plans with socioeconomic reform
packages. The Philippine government even accepts the view that successful economic
growth and effective governance cannot be achieved without a strategy for
socioeconomic reform. However, the weakness of the Philippine state is preventing
implementation of socioeconomic reform programs. Thus, implementation of
socioeconomic reform programs is a function of institutional reform, which has been
discussed above.
57 Banlaoi and Carlos (1997), p. 34. Also see Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics
(New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series No. 6, 1964).
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Conclusion
The Philippine state is in the predicament of having to face globalization while at the
same time undergoing the painful process of nation-building in a highly diverse
society. The weakness of the Philippine state in facing these challenges is causing the
pervasive poverty that results in ethnic, socioeconomic and religious tension. To
overcome these challenges, there is a need to strengthen the Philippine state and its
institutions of governance through bureaucratic, electoral, party, and socioeconomic
reforms.
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