Angara vs Electoral Commission

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

Associate Justice LAUREL

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,
respondents.

FACTS
 That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents,
Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member
of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;
 That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-
elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;
 That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
 That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the resolution No. 8
 That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission
a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only
protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 afore quoted, and praying, among other-things,
that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified
 That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the
aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging
(a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the
period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the
aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period;
and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;
 That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a
protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;
 That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid
"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
 That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest
ISSUES
1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and if in the affirmative

2. WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly

HELD

1. Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ,
created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the
reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were,
conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases.

In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to
take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided
and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run
prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret,
so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly
of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as “the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”

2. No. The issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

“SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated
by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated
by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of
votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly.”

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its
totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its
members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of
contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests
devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the
Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite
body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its
deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three
justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it
is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the
limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any
other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled
“Legislative Department” of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is
constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature.

If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the
proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period
within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The
Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the
regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of
totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created
with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the
Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality
without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly
has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The
power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the
ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection,
to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its
regulatory authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity
and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument
against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place,
if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with
exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of
democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We
believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this
body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme
Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the
Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own particular
sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in
accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these
constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of
human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with
in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may
not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against
whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a
limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for
the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the
power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature
cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional
power to be “the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly”, to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National
Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal
purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936,
overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua,
confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his
duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is
sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office
in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly
of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the
rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a
constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of
justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring,
and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
 The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the
admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this court.
 Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place
by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in
the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality:

1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in
attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar
(since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the
bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and
being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
Doctrine: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of check and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of
the government.