DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA

(BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN)
RAYUAN SIVIL NO: W-02(IM)(NCVC)-2341-11/2018

Antara

SARASWATHY KANDASAMI .... PERAYU

Dan

DATUK SARAVANAN A/L MURUGAN ... RESPONDEN

[Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Kuala Lumpur Dalam Guaman

Sivil No: 23NCVC-65-08/2015)

Antara

DATUK SARAVANAN A/L MURUGAN … PLAINTIF

Dan

1. SANKARAN A/L NAGAPPEN

2. CITY TEAM MEDIA SDN. BHD
(No. Syarikat: 780079-H)
3. TWINSTAR SYNERGY SDN BHD
(No. Syarikat : 987235 - X)
... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN

Dan

1
1. SANKARAN A/L NAGAPPEN
2. SARASWATHI A/P KANDASAMI
3. PERIASAMI A/L MUNISAMY
(Sebagai Pengarah City Team Media Sdn Bhd)
4. MATHIALAGAN A/K MAISLLAMANY
(Sebagai Pengarah City Team Media Sdn Bhd)
5. CITY TEAM MEDIA SDN. BHD.
(No. Syarikat : 780079-H )
… RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN]

DIDENGAR BERSAMA

DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA

(BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN)
RAYUAN SIVIL NO: W-02(IM)(NCVC)-2369-11/2018

Antara

1. SANKARAN A/L NAGAPPEN

2. PERIASAMI A/L MUNISAMY
(Sebagai Pengarah City Team Media Sdn Bhd)
3. MATHIALAGAN A/K MAISLLAMANY
(Sebagai Pengarah City Team Media Sdn Bhd)
4. CITY TEAM MEDIA SDN. BHD.
(No. Syarikat : 780079-H )
.... PERAYU-PERAYU

Dan

2
DATUK SARAVANAN A/L MURUGAN ... RESPONDEN
[Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Di Kuala Lumpur Dalam Guaman
Sivil No: 23NCVC-65-08/2015)

Antara

DATUK SARAVANAN A/L MURUGAN … PLAINTIF

Dan

1. SANKARAN A/L NAGAPPEN

2. CITY TEAM MEDIA SDN. BHD
(No. Syarikat: 780079-H)
3. TWINSTAR SYNERGY SDN BHD
(No. Syarikat : 987235 - X) ... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN

Dan

1. SANKARAN A/L NAGAPPEN

2. SARASWATHI A/P KANDASAMI
3. PERIASAMI A/L MUNISAMY
(Sebagai Pengarah City Team Media Sdn Bhd)
4. MATHIALAGAN A/K MAISLLAMANY
(Sebagai Pengarah City Team Media Sdn Bhd)
5. CITY TEAM MEDIA SDN. BHD.
(No. Syarikat: 780079-H)
… RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN]

3
 CORAM:
LAU BEE LAN, JCA
AZIZAH BINTI NAWAWI, JCA
LEE HENG CHEONG, JCA

GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT

Introduction

[1] There are two (2) appeals before this Court:

(i) Appeal No. W-02(IM)(NCVC)-2341-11/2018; and

(ii) Appeal No. W-02(IM)(NCVC)-2369-11/2018.

[2] Both appeals, Appeal No. W-02(IM)(NCVC)-2341-11/2018

(“Appeal 2341”) and Appeal No. W-02(IM)(NCVC)-2369-11/2018
(“Appeal 2369”) are against the committal order made by the
learned High Court Judge on 14.11.2018. All Appellants in both
appeals have been found to be in contempt of Court and were fined
RM10,000.00 each.

[3] Having considered the Appeal Records and the submissions of all
parties, this Court had dismissed both appeals with costs.

The Salient Facts

[4] The Appellant in Appeal No. 2341, Saraswathy Kandasami

(“Saraswathy”) is an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of
Malaya, practising under the name and style of Messrs. S.
4
 Kandasami & Co at No. 20A-1, First Floor, Jalan Ipoh Kecil off Jalan
Ipoh, 50350 Kuala Lumpur.

[5] The 1st Appellant (“Sankaran”) in Appeal No. 2369 is an individual

having an address at 38, Jalan Cecawi 6/21, Kota Damansara,
47810 Petaling Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan.

[6] The 2nd and the 3rd Appellants are the directors of the 4th Appellant,
a company registered in Malaysia and the publisher of the local
Tamil newspaper called "Tamil Malar" ("the Tamil Malar").

[7] The Respondent in both appeals is a senior member of the political

party, the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), was a Member of
Parliament for the Tapah constituency in the State of Perak and a
former Deputy Minister of the Youth and Sports Ministry.

[8] By way of the Kuala Lumpur High Court Writ Summons No. 23
NCVC-65-08/2015 dated 26.8.20159 ("the Defamation Suit"), the
Respondent commenced an action against Sankaran a/l Nagappen,
City Team Media Sdn. Bhd (“City Team Media”) and Twinstar
Synergy Sdn Bnd. City Team Media is the publisher of the daily
Tamil newspaper, Tamil Malar, whilst Twinstar Synergy Sdn Bhd is
the printer of Tamil Malar newspaper.

[9] The Respondent contended that Sankaran a/l Nagappen uttered

defamatory words against him that was published by the City Team
Media in the newspaper Tamil Malar. The Statement of Claim, inter
alia, reads as follows (the “Impugn Statements”):

5
“PENERBITAN PADA 21.6.2015

5. Pada akhir bulan Julai 2015, Defendan Pertama telah secara niat jahat,
salah, cuai dan atau melulu tanpa mengendahkan kebenaran dan
ketepatan telah mengeluarkan dan menerbitkan kata-kata tidak benar
langsung, tidak tepat dan palsu berkenaan Plaintif dan mengenai beliau
dalam pejabat dan pekerjaannya sebagai Timbalan Menteri
Kementerian Belia dan Sukan di mana Defendan-Defendan lain telah
menyebabkan penerbitan dan percetakan kata-kata ini di suratkhabar
tersebut pada 22 Julai 2015 dan 23 Julai 2015 dengan mengandungi
perkataan-perkataan berikut:-

…….

6. Maksud sebenar perkataan-perkataan tersebut di penerbitan-penerbitan

tersebut yang di terjemahkan dalam Bahasa Inggeris seperti berikut:

6.1 PENERBITAN PADA 22.7.2015

He Made Me A Bankrupt …..!

He Became Deputy Minister …?
Sanggaran Nagappan grumbles

Kuala Lumpur, July 22 – Dato Saravanan made him a co-debtor for a

loan, failed to make prompt payments, tell lies and finally made him an
insolvent, says MIC headquarters a formal staff Sanggaran Nagappan,
who served there for a long period. In a police report against Dato M
Saravanan, he said that the Deputy Minister in the Youth and Sports
Ministry who receives grants for the betterment of youths and give talks
about the well-being of community. Dato Saravanan, made him co-
debtor, which later the latter defaulted and caused him to be tried in court
which made him to end up pauper.

He made Me A Bankrupt
6
20th March 2002, Dato Saravanan appointed me as a Director of the
company named RMW. I was a director of that company until 2nd
November 2004. During that period, through our RMW Berhad a loan of
RM7 million was obtained from Maybank Berhad. As a director I’ve been
asked to sign the loan agreement and guarantee letter. As when I was
the Director during that time Saravanan was also the director.

Since he was also the director of the company Saravanan has signed
the guarantee letter too. According to Joint Guarantee letter, he as co-
guarantor he lied to me that he was paying the loan promptly.

Maybank Berhad filed legal proceedings against me since the loan has
not been paid promptly. I have been sued for that RM7 million loan which
together with the interest became RM8.1 million. Subsequently a
judgement was obtained against me.

Many times I have been complaining this matter to Saravanan, he just

kept promising to rectify it but he did not make any effort to rectify it. After
making me an insolvent, Saravanan pretends like nothing happened.

Since both the directors signed the Joint Guarantee Letter, how was it
possible to make myself to be the insolvent and he is not taking any
responsibility and remains being a Deputy Minister? There is a
conspiracy behind it.” Sanggaran Nagappan told Tamil Malar.
“I want the answer ….. I need justice….” says Sanggaran.

PENERBITAN PADA 23.7.2015

I need Justice!

Kuala Lumpur, July 23 – “Dato Saravanan make use of me until he

obtained millions worth of loan for RMW by making me an Associate
Director and a Joint Guarantor for the loan. Later without my knowledge
he terminated me from the Director’s post and appointed his wife as a
7
Director of the company. Is this social service? asks former MIC staff
Nagappen.

I Need Justice
Sankaran Nagappen grumbles

On 20th March 2002, Dato Saravanan appointed me as a director of the

Company named RMW. I was a director of that Company until 2 nd
November 2004.

During that period through RMW Berhad, a loan amounting to few

millions were obtained from Maybank Berhad. As a director I have been
asked to sign the loan agreement and guarantee letter.

It is noted that when I was the Director, Saravanan too was also the
Director of the Company.

After having obtained the loan with both of our signatures as guarantors,
I was terminated from the post of Director without my knowledge and
after obtaining the said loan, within four months he appointed his wife as
the Director.

After doing so, he should have released me from being a Guarantor for
the loan and he should have taken steps to make his wife as a
Guarantor. But he did not do so, by making me a debtor, his true colours
have been proven. His sincerity to the community been exposed.

After being sued in court, then I obtain the legal documents from the
Company Secretary and thus found the details.

Having used my name, Dato Saravanan obtained a few millions and

made me a bankrupt.

8
 I am struggling now because my house is about to be auctioned off by
the bank. But, Dato Saravanan pretending like nothing happened and
roaming around in virtue of a ‘Deputy Minister and Community Leader’.
Anyhow so far he did not take any steps to solve this matter.

Saravanan, who always claiming to help the community and youths to

raise their standard of living, is answerable to me first as a shareholder
of his company that made me insolvent due to the debt that I owe
together with him.

While I had been made an insolvent for the loan that we took together,
what happened to the bankruptcy application again Saravanan who is
also the joint borrower? I would like to know what the judgement was.

So I did not get any reply from Saravanan’s side, I will proceed to seek
for justice” Sankran Nagappen said.

Plaintif akan merujuk kepada Penerbitan-Penerbitan tersebut dengan

terjemahannya pada ketika perbicaraan kes ini untuk kesan dan maksud
sebenarnya.

7. Plaintif menegaskan dan ingin menegaskan bahawa Defendan-

Defendan telah menerbitkan dan/atau menyebabkan terbitan Penerbitan-
Penerbitan tersebut berkenaan perkara-perkara fitnah, palsu dan/atau tidak
benar mengenai Plaintif dan/atau mengenai beliau dan dalam pejabat serta
jawatannya sebagai seorang Timbalan Menteri Kementerian Belia dan Sukan
dengan niat jahat serta kolateral untuk memberi gambaran tidak benar, palsu
dan negatif berkenaan Plaintif, di mana antara perkataan-perkataan tersebut
adalah termasuk tetapi tidak terhad kepada: -

7.1 PENERBITAN PADA 22.7.2015

…….

9
 7.2 PENERBITAN PADA 22.7.2015

…….

8. …

ERTIKATA ATAU MAKNA SEMULAJADI DAN SEBENAR

9. Perkataan-perkataan yang terkandung dalam Penerbitan-Penerbitan

tersebut dalam ertikata atau makna semulajadi dan sebenar dan biasa
bermaksud bahawa:-

9.1 Plaintif telah melakukan perbuatan-perbuatan yang salah dan

adalah seorang yang tidak jujur, kekurangan integrity, penipu dan
tidak bertanggungjawab;

9.2 Plaintif telah gagal melaksanakan tugas-tugas nya kepada orang

umum terutamanya masyarakat India;

9.3 Plaintif tidak layak untuk mewakili kaum India dalam apa cara
atau rupa;

9.4 Plaintif merebut apa sahaja beliau boleh dapati untuk keuntungan
sendiri;

9.5 Plaintif tidak layak memegang jawatan sebagai Timbalan Menteri

Kementerian Belia dan Sukan; dan

9.6 Plaintif tidak boleh dipercayai sama sekali dan harus dijauhi.

[10] However, the Defamation Suit did not proceed for trial, as the parties
(the Respondent/Plaintiff and Appellants Sankaran a/l Nagappen,
City Team and Twinstar Synergy) have agreed to enter into a

10
 consent judgment on 29.12.2016 (“Consent Judgment”) on the
following terms:

“PENGHAKIMAN PERSETUJUAN

TINDAKAN INI setelah didengar di hadapan YA Dato’ Mohd Zaki Bin Abdul
Wahab Peguamcara bagi pihak Plaintif dan Venushah a/p Nadarajan,
Peguamcara bagi pihak Defendan Pertama dan Ke-2, MAKA ADALAH
DIHAKIMI SECARA PERSETUJUAN bahawa:-

a) Plaintif menarik balik tindakan ini dengan kebebasan untuk menfailkan

semula;

b) Plaintif membayar kos sebanyak RM5,000 kepada Defendan Ke-2;

c) Defendan Pertama dan Ke-2 aku janji untuk tidak mengulangi atau
menerbitkan kenyataan-kenyataan berkaitan dengan kes ini;

d) Kos tertakluk kepada alokatur.

Bertarikh 29 Disember 2016

NORFAUZANI BINTI MOHD NORDIN
Timbalan Pendaftar,
Mahkamah Tinggi, Kuala Lumpur.

PEGHAKIMAN PERSETUJUAN ini difailkan oleh Tetuan S. Kandasamy & Co,

Peguamcara Defendan Pertama dan Ke-2 yang mempunyai alamat untuk
penyampaian di lot No. 20A, Tingkat 1, Jalan Ipoh Kecil, Off Jalan Ipoh, 50350
Kuala Lumpur”

[11] About nine (9) months after the Consent Judgment, the Respondent
discovered that Sankaran was going to hold a press conference on
26.9.2017 to repeat and publish the Impugn Statements referred to

11
in the Defamation Suit. The Respondent’s solicitors immediately
issued a notice to the Appellants’ solicitors on 26.9.2017 to state
that any act of repeating and publishing of the Impugn
Statements as identified in the Defamation Suit will be a breach of
the undertaking in the Consent Judgment and amounts to contempt
of Court. The notice, inter alia reads as follows:

“Re: KUALA LUMPUR HIGH COURT SUIT NO: 23 NCVC-65-08/2015

Datuk Saravanan Murugan - vs - Sankaran a/l Nagappen & 2 Ors
- Consent Judgment dated 29.12.2016.

The above matter and the Consent Judgement recorded in Court on 29.12.2016
by parties has reference (a copy of the approved draft enclosed for your
attention).

Our client has informed us that your clients, Sankaran a/l Nagappen, intends to
publish or cause the publish by way of a press conference matters in relation
to the RMW Manufacturing Sdn Bhd loan with Maybank where your client was
a Guarantor to the said Loan (“the said Matters”). These matters had been
raised in detail in the above said action and by consent, it was the adjudged
that your clients, both Sankaran and City Team Media Sdn Bhd (the publisher
of Tamil Malar news daily), undertook not to publish or cause to publish words
relating to the said Matters.

Kindly take note that the attempt by your client to call for a press conference
and to publish or cause to the publish the said Matters amounts to a contempt
of the Consent Judgement dated 29.12.2016 and we trust you will advise your
clients to refrain from acting in breach of the Consent Judgement dated
29.12.2016.

Our client reserve his rights.”

12
[12] In response, Saraswathi informed the Respondent that Sankaran
has a right to state the factual matters to the public. The Appellants’
response, inter alia, reads as follows:

“RE: KUALA LUMPUR HIGH COURT SUIT NO: 23NCVC-65-08/2015

DATUK SARAVANAN MURUGAN … PLAINTIFF

VS
SANKARAN A/L NAGAPPEN & 2 OTHERS … DEFENDANT

We refer to the above matter and your letter dated 26.9.2016.

Please be informed that your Order is clear in it’s term that our ‘client had
agreed not to repeat or make statements relating to the case’ and clearly not
the factual averments contained in the said suit. This was clearly not the matter
consented for which you should be aware of.

Our clients have the right to make any statements pertaining to the factual
averment for which they had pleaded justification as Defence.
Please also take note it was a client who wanted to withdraw the case under
the pretext of pending investigation.”

[13] Despite the exchange of correspondences, Sankaran and

Saraswathy proceeded with the press conference, and the Impugn
Statements referred to in the Defamation Suit were repeated by
them. At all material times, Saraswathy was representing both
Sankaran and City Team, the 4th Appellant.

[14] The Statements uttered at the press conference was only published
in the 4th Appellant’s newspaper, Tamil Malar on 27.9.2017.

13
[15] The Respondent filed an application for leave to issue Contempt
proceedings on 19.2.2018 pursuant to Order 52 of the Rules of
Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”). Leave was granted on 13.3.2018. The
Appellants did not file any application to set aside the leave granted
by the Court on 19.2.2018.

[16] With the agreements of parties, the Contempt Application was heard
by way of affidavit evidence.

[17] After hearing the submissions of parties, the Learned Judge made
the Contempt Order against the Contemnors and Saraswathy.

[18] Hence, the appeal before this court.

The Findings of the High Court

[19] The learned Judge made a finding that the Appellants have
breached the Undertaking in the Consent Judgment and have
therefore committed an act of contempt of court. The learned Judge
then ordered each Appellant to pay a fine of RM10,000.00. The
learned Judge findings, inter alia, are as follows:

“….. Saya dapati penghakiman persetujuan yang dimasuki menghalang

Defendan Pertama dan Kedua (Responden Pertama dan Kelima) dari
mengulangi dan menerbitkan semula pengataan yang menjadi asas fitnah iaitu
Pemohon telah menyebabkan Responden Pertama dijadikan seorang bankrap
kerana menjadi penjamin kepada pinjaman syarikat RMW.

Saya dapati sidang akhbar yang dibuat oleh Responden Pertama pada
26.9.2017 yang turut dihadiri oleh Responden Ketua telah mengulangi isu

14
 Pemohon menyebabkan Responden Pertama dijadikan seorang bankrap,
perkara yang menjadi teras tuntutan fitnah terdahulu. Oleh itu Responden
Pertama telah mengingkari terma penghakiman persetujuan yang dimasuki
dan Responden Kedua telah membantu Responden Pertama mengingkari
terma penghakiman persetujuan tersebut.

Kandungan sidang akhbar ini telah diterbitkan oleh Responden Kelima pada
27.9.2017. Adalah jelas Responden Kelima telah mengingkari terma
penghakiman persetujuan tersebut. Responden Ketiga dan Keempat yang
menjadi pengarah Responden Kelima dengan jelasnya mempunyai kawalan ke
atas Responden Kelima.

Berasaskan kedudukan tersebut saya dapati kelima-lima Responden telah

melakukan perbuatan ‘menghina Mahkamah kerana mengingkari terma
persetujuan yang telah dipersetujui…”

Our Decision

[20] The central feature of appellate intervention is trite, that is to

determine whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or
finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and/or the
established evidence. This had been explained by the Federal Court
in the case of Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin @ Lee
Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1, where the Federal Court held as
follows:-

[14] In our view, the Court of Appeal in citing these cases had
clearly borne in mind the central feature of appellate
intervention, ie to determine whether or not the trial court had
arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the
relevant law and/or the established evidence. In so doing, the

15
 Court of Appeal was perfectly entitled to examine the process of
evaluation of the evidence by the trial court. Clearly, the phrase
'insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence' merely related to such
a process. This is reflected in the Court of Appeal's restatement that
a judge who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive
at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for
good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of
the evidence placed before him. The Court of Appeal further
reiterated the principle central to appellate intervention, ie that a
decision arrived at by a trial court without judicial appreciation of the
evidence might be set aside on appeal. This is consistent with the
established plainly wrong test.” (emphasis added.)

[21] In another case, the Federal Court in CIMB Bank Bhd (formerly
known as Bumiputera Commerce Bank Bhd) v. Sebang
Gemilang Sdn Bhd & Anor [2018] 3 MLJ 689 held as follows:-

“[38] The issue of knowledge of the equitable assignment is entirely

a question of facts. Both the courts below concluded that the
appellant had knowledge of the equitable assignment based on the
facts and circumstances of the case. It is trite law that an appellate
court will not, generally speaking, intervene unless the trial
court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its judicial
decision or there has been no or insufficient judicial
appreciation of evidence (see Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee
Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1).” (emphasis
added.)

16
[22] Bearing in mind the above cases, we will now deal with the issues
raised by the parties.

Preliminary Points of Law.

[23] The Appellants have raised three (3) Preliminary Points of Law. The
first Preliminary Point of Law is on the issue of service. It is the
submission of the Appellants that the contempt proceedings were
misconceived and bad in law for the following reasons:-

(i) The Consent Judgment had not been perfected on the date of
the Press Statement and the said Publication;

(ii) Hence, as at the date of the said Press Statement and the said
Publication, the Consent Judgment had not been served on
the 1st and the 4th Appellants, who were the parties to the main
suit;

(iii) The Consent Judgment had not been served on the 2nd and
3rd Appellants as the directors of the 4th Appellant with the
requisite penal notice;

(iv) The Consent Judgment was only perfected on 3.11.2017,

about 38 days after the said Press Statement and the said
Publication; and

(v) The sealed Consent Order was served on the 1st to 4th
Appellants on 30.11.2017, which is more than 2 months after
the date of the said Press Statement and the said Publication.

17
[24] Therefore, the Appellants took the position that there cannot be a
breach of the undertaking of the Consent Judgment when the said
Consent Judgment was yet to be perfected and served on the
Appellants.

[25] On the issue of service of the Consent Judgment, it is common

ground that Order 45 rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”)
provides that where a person disobeys a judgment or order requiring
him to abstain from doing an act, the enforcement of such judgment
or order can be made via an order for committal with the leave of
court.

[26] Order 45 rule 7 (2) of ROC 2012 provides that such judgment or
order shall not be enforced unless the same had been served
personally on the person required to do or abstain from doing the
act in question.

[27] The above rule is however subject to the following exception as

found at Order 45 rule 7 (6) of ROC 2012, which provides the
defendants to have notice of the terms of the court order. Order 45
rule 7 (6) of ROC 2012 reads:

“(6) An order requiring a person to abstain from doing an act may

be enforced under rule 5 notwithstanding that service of a copy of
the order has not been effected in accordance with this rule if the
Court is satisfied that, pending such service, the person against
whom or against whose property it is sought to enforce
the order has had notice thereof either-

18
 (a) by being present when the order was made; or

(b) by being notified of the terms of the order, whether by

telephone, telegram or otherwise.” (emphasis added)

[28] The application of Order 45 rule 7 (6) of ROC 2012 was considered
by Justice Azahar Mohamed (now CJM) in the case of Visiber Sdn
Bhd vs Tan Meng Them & ors (2009) 1 LNS 963 where His
Lordship held:

“It is equally important to note that the order in this matter is

prohibitory in nature in that it restrained the Defendants from
carrying out the infringing acts. In my view, pursuant to Order 45 rule
7(6) of the RHC, the order may be enforced by way of committal
notwithstanding that it has not been served personally on all the
Defendants. Nevertheless, there is this very important qualification
to be made. The order can only be enforced if all the Defendants
have had notice thereof by being notified of each of the terms
of the order. This must be emphasized.” (emphasis added)

[29] The same position was taken by the Supreme Court in Puah Bee
Hong @ Bee Hong (F) & Anor v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah
Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur & Anor (Robert Teo Keng
Tuan, Intervener) & Another Case [1994] 2 CLJ 705, where the
Court held that service of the relevant court order was not essential
and all that was required was for the proposed contemnor to have
notice of the order that was said to have been breached.

19
[30] Added to that, the Federal Court in T O Thomas v. Asia Fishing
Industry Pte Ltd [1977] 1 LNS 126 held that if the contemnor has
knowledge of the terms of the court order though it had not been
served, the court has the discretion to dispense with the requirement
of personal service. This discretion is provided for under Order 52
rule 4(4) of the ROC 2012.

[31] Therefore, the issue here is whether the Appellants have knowledge
of the terms of the Consent Judgment.

[32] It is common ground that both Sankaran and the 4th Appellant (City
Team Media) were represented by Saraswathy’s legal firm, Messrs
S. Kandasami & Co in the Defamation Suit. It is also not in dispute
that both Sankaran and the 4th Appellant had given instructions to
Saraswathy on the terms of the Consent Judgment. The 2nd
Appellant, Periasami a/l Munisamy, a director of the 4th Appellant
had admitted in his affidavit that he had given instructions to
Saraswathy on the terms of the Consent Judgment. There is no
affidavit filed by the 3rd Appellant, Mathialagan a/k Maisllamany,
another director of the 4th Appellant. In fact, the draft Consent
Judgment was prepared by Messrs S. Kandasami & Co. Therefore,
we are of the considered that all the Appellants have knowledge of
the terms of the Consent Judgment.

[33] Added to that, the Appellants have admitted to having knowledge of

the Notice issued on 26.9.2017 by the Respondent’s solicitors to
refrain the Appellants from acting in breach of the Consent
Judgement by calling for a “press conference and to publish or

20
 cause to the publish the said Matters amounts to a contempt of the
Consent Judgement ..”.

[34] Therefore, on the factual matrix of these appeals, we find no merit

in the Appellants’ contention that the contempt proceedings were
misconceived as the Appellants were not served with the Consent
Judgment. The sealed Consent Judgment was all along in the
possession of the Appellants’ solicitor firm, Messrs S. Kandasami &
Co.

[35] There is also no issue with regard to the fact that the Consent
Judgment was only sealed after the date of the Press Statement and
Publication. This is because the draft Consent Judgment was
prepared by the Appellants’ Solicitor’s firm, Messrs S. Kandasami &
Co on 29.12.2016. The draft Consent Judgment was forwarded to
the Respondent’s solicitor for approval. The Respondent’s solicitor
had approved and returned the draft Consent Judgment to Messrs
S. Kandasami & Co on 30.12.2016. Messrs S. Kandasami & Co only
served the sealed Consent Judgment on the Respondent’s Solicitor
on 10.11.2017 (11 months later). As such, it is misconceived for the
Appellants to now complaint on the late service of the sealed order
when the same was due to the delay on the part of their own
solicitors in serving the sealed Consent Judgment on the
Respondent’s solicitors.

[36] The second preliminary point of law raised by the Appellants is that
the Respondent was misleading on the term of the Undertaking, as
the contents of the Undertaking in the Statement filed pursuant to
Order 52 rule 3(2) ROC 2012 is different from the Undertaking in the

21
 Consent Judgment. In the Consent Judgment, the Undertaking,
inter alia, reads “…kenyataan-kenyataan berkaitan dengan kes ini”,
whereas in the Statement, it was referred to as “…kenyataan-
kenyataan tersebut berkaitan kes ini”.

[37] Having considered the Statement filed, we find that the only
difference is the word ‘tersebut’, and on a proper reading of the
Statement, we find the word ‘tersebut’ is not misleading nor does it
change the characteristics of the Undertaking. The core issue in
these appeals is on the interpretation of the words in the
Undertaking, that is, “…kenyataan-kenyataan berkaitan dengan kes
ini”.

[38] The third preliminary point of law raised by the Appellants is that the
contempt proceedings is defective and bad in law because in
paragraph 8.6 of the Statement, the Respondent was referring to
“...perkara-perkara berkaitan Syarikat tersebut yang telah
ditimbulkan sebelum ini”, whilst the Consent Judgment clearly
states “berkaitan dengan kes ini.” It must be emphasised here that
paragraph 8.6 is merely a narration of events, and it refers to the
fact that it was brought to the Respondent’s attention that Sankaran
wanted to make a press statement on 26.9.2017 with regards to the
Defamation Suit. Paragraphs 8.7 refers to the Notice issued by the
Respondent’s Solicitor, whilst paragraph 8.8 is the response from
Messrs S. Kandasami & Co. Paragraph 8.9 narrates the event of the
press statement on 27.9.2017, which forms the basis of the
contempt proceedings.

22
[39] Based on the reasons enumerated above, we are of the considered
opinion that there are no merits in the Appellants’ preliminary points
of law.

[40] Added to that, we find that the Appellants have failed to challenge
the leave granted by the High Court, on the procedural issue of
service and on the ambiguity of the Statement. The Appellants had
the opportunity to make an application to set aside the leave, but
they have failed to do so. Since the leave was not challenged
directly by an application to set it aside, the Appellants should not
be allowed to indirectly attack the grant of leave by way of
preliminary points of law.

The Undertaking

[41] On the substantive appeal, the Appellants took the position that the
Respondent had misinterpreted the Undertaking in the Consent
Judgment. It is the submission of the Appellants that the
Undertaking was not to repeat the words complained of by the
Respondent in the articles referred to in the Statement of Claim in
the Defamation Suit. The Undertaking was only not to repeat or
publish “kenyataan-kenyataan berkaitan dengan kes”, which means
not to make any statements pertaining to the case, which had been
withdrawn. The Appellants relied on the correspondences leading
to the entering of the Consent Judgment to support their contention
that the Undertaking was only not to make any statements
pertaining to the case.

[42] The Undertaking in the Consent Judgment reads as follows:

23
 “c) Defendan Pertama dan Ke-2 aku janji untuk tidak mengulangi
atau menerbitkan kenyataan-kenyataan berkaitan dengan kes ini;”

[43] In view of the opposing stand taken by the parties, the duty is on us
to read and interpret the said Order/Consent Judgment itself. In
Newacres Sdn Bhd v. Sri Alam Sdn Bhd [2000] 2 CLJ 833 FC, it
was held by the Federal Court, per Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah &
Sarawak) citing Sir George Rankin in Seth Manakchand v. Chaube
Manoharlal & Anor AIR [1944] Privy Council 46, that "For the
purpose of interpreting a decree no other document is so directly in
point as the judgment or case in the nature of things have
comparable force".

[44] In order to interpret the Undertaking in the Consent Judgment, the

duty of this court is to ascertain the intention of the Court which
made it. In Vellathussseri v Vellathuseri (1931) 2 MLJ 596, the
High Court decided at page 605 that the duty is upon the assessing
Court to interpret an order:

“The Court which makes the decree should always make its
meaning clear but sometimes does not do so. The executing Court
has then the duty of interpreting the decree… There again the
executing Court has to interpret the decree and so ascertain
the intention of the Court which made it.” (emphasis added)

[45] In Tiew Kun v. Tneu Seng Bee & Another Appeal [2010] 2 CLJ
68, the Court of Appeal held as follows:

24
 "In accordance with the general rules of interpretation, the language
used in a judgment or order must be construed according to its
ordinary meaning and not in some unnatural or obscure sense"

[46] Therefore, the Order of the Court, the Consent Judgment herein, is
to be ascertained primarily from the language of the order itself. We
are of the considered opinion that the Undertaking in the Consent
Judgment is not ambiguous as submitted by the Appellants. We find
that the Undertaking, in plain and ordinary meaning, simply means
that 1st Defendant (Sankaran) and the 2nd Defendant (City Team
Media) undertake not to repeat or publish the statements in relation
to this case, namely the Defamation Suit. The use of the word
“mengulangi” clearly shows there should be any repetition of the
Impugn Statements in the defamation suit.

[47] We do not agree with the Appellants’ contention that the

Undertaking was not to repeat or publish about the case or about
the terms of the Consent Judgment. This is because there is nothing
to show that the parties had wanted the terms of the Consent
Judgment to be kept private and confidential. The Consent
Judgment is not protected by any non-disclosure agreement.

[48] However, the Appellants sought to rely on their Solicitor’s letter

dated 7.12.2016, issued on a strictly without prejudice basis, which
reads, inter alia:

“4. The 2nd Defendant undertakes not to publish this settlement

agreement in its newspaper.”

25
[49] We are of the considered opinion and we agree with the Respondent
that the above paragraph (4) in the said letter was not incorporated
in the Consent Judgment. Instead, the Undertaking binds both the
1st Defendant/Sankaran and the 2nd Defendant/4th Appellant not to
repeat or publish the Impugn Statements in relation to the
Defamation Suit.

[50] In any event, the Federal Court in Newacres Sdn Bhd (supra) held
that it is permissible to look at the pleadings, that is, the statement
of claim to resolve any uncertainties in a judgment. The Federal
Court had cited with approval the Indian case of Topanmal v Messrs
Kundomal Gangaram [1960] AIR 388 SC where the Indian Supreme
Court the following observation:

“At worst, the decree can be said to be ambiguous. In such a case

it is the duty of the executing Court to construe the decree. For the
purpose of interpreting a decree, when its terms are
ambiguous, the Court would certainly be entitled to look into
the pleadings and the judgment.” (emphasis added)

[51] Therefore, based on the case of Newacres Sdn Bhd (supra), the
Appellants cannot rely on their Solicitor’s letter dated 7.12.2016,
issued on a strictly without prejudice basis, for the purpose of
interpreting the Consent Judgment.

[52] In any event, the hand written minutes of the learned Judge dated
29.12.2016 also shows the same wordings, that “…. Defendan-
Defendan membuat aku janji tidak akan mengulangi atau
menerbitkan kenyataan berkaitan kes ini.” There is nothing in the

26
 learned Judge’s minutes to show that the Undertaking was only
limited to the publication of the terms of the Consent Judgment.

[53] Added to that, there is no ambiguity in the terms of the Consent

Judgment as the draft order was prepared by the Appellants’
solicitors. The draft order was then forwarded to the Respondent’s
solicitors for their approval. The approved order is reflected in the
Consent Judgment. Despite preparing the draft order as reflected in
the Consent Judgment, the Appellants are now saying that there is
ambiguity in the Undertaking, and that what the parties meant was
to limit the Undertaking to the publication of the case or the Consent
Judgment.

[54] Further, we cannot agree with the Appellants’ construction as the

purpose of the Consent Judgment was to settle the Defamation Suit.
The Defamation Suit is premised on the statements made by
Sankaran in the newspaper Tamil Malar, which the Respondent
complained to have defamed him. The relief sought in the
Defamation Suit included a prayer to injunct the defendants from
repeating and publishing the Impugn Statements. Therefore, it is
simply incredible if the Consent Judgment allows Sankaran and City
Team Media to continue repeating and publishing the same Impugn
Statements with impunity.

[55] Added to that, the word “mengulangi” or repeat, simply means an

act done in the past and this can only refer to the Impugn
Statements in the Defamation Suit.

27
 Breach of the Undertaking

[56] It is common ground that a civil contempt of court includes an act to

disobey a judgment or order requiring a person to abstain from doing
a specified act. In Wee Choo Keong v. MBF Holdings Bhd. &
Anor. [1993] 3 CLJ 210 his Lordship Abdul Hamid Omar LP had this
to say on what amounts to an act of contempt:

“It is established law that a person against whom an order of court

has been issued is duty bound to obey that order until it is set aside.
It is not open for him to decide for himself whether the order was
wrongly issued and therefore does not require obedience. His duty
is one of obedience until such time as the order may be set aside or
varied. Any person who fails to obey an order of Court runs the risk
of being held in contempt with all its attendant consequences.”

[57] In Tan Sri Dato' (Dr) Rozali Ismail & Ors v. Lim Pang Cheong &
Ors [2012] 2 CLJ 849 (FC) held as follows:

[26] Contempt has been reclassified either as (1) a specific

conduct of contempt for breach of a particular court order; or
(2) a more general conduct for interfering with the due administration
or the course of justice. This classification is better explained in the
words of Sir Donaldson MR in Attorney-General v. Newspaper
Publishing Plc, (supra) at p. 362:

Of greater assistance is the reclassification as (a) conduct

which involves a breach, or assisting in the breach, of a
court order; and (b) any other conduct which involves an

28
 interference with the due administration of justice, either in a
particular case or, more generally, as a continuing process,
the first category being a special form of the latter, such
inference being a characteristic common to all contempt per
Lord Diplock in Attorney-General v. Leveller Magazine Ltd
[1979] AC 440 at 449.

[27] This reclassification was adopted by the Court of Appeal in Jasa

Keramat Sdn Bhd v. Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 CLJ 549.

[28] Hence, the law of contempt is wide enough to cover not

only those who are bound by the court order, but other parties
who assist the disobedience to the court order. It was reported
in Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd [1991] 2 All ER 398
that a person, who knowingly impeded or interfered with the
administration of justice in an action between two other parties, was
guilty of contempt of court notwithstanding that he was neither
named in any order of the court nor had assisted a person against
whom an order was made.” (emphasis added)

[58] The burden of proof in contempt of court proceedings is proof

beyond reasonable doubt. In re Bramblevale Ltd [1970] Ch 128 his
Lordship Lord Denning, inter alia stated as follows:

“A contempt of Court is an offence of a criminal character. A man

may be sent to prison for it. It must be satisfactorily proved. To use
the time-honoured phrase, it must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt.”

29
[59] The next issue is whether the Respondent had proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the contemnors had committed an act of
contempt of court by refusing to comply with the Undertaking in the
Consent Judgment. The Appellants would have committed an act of
contempt of court by breaching of the Undertaking, which is not to
repeat or publish the Impugn Statements in the Defamation Suit.

[60] It is not in dispute that the Impugn Statements in the Defamation

Suit is with regards to Sankaran’s statement that he was made a
director of a company named RMW, which took a loan from
Maybank. As the director of that company, he was asked to sign the
loan agreement and guarantee letter involving millions of ringgit.
Sankaran alleged that the Respondent had cause him to become a
bankrupt.

[61] It is also not in dispute that both Saraswathy and Sankaran attended
the press conference on 26.9.2017. The statements issued during
the press conference was published by the 4th Appellant in the Tamil
Malar newspaper the next day, on 27.9.2017. Having considered
the press report in the Tamil Malar, we are of the considered opinion
and we agree with the learned Judge that the Impugn Statements in
Defamation Suit were repeated and published in the Tamil Malar,
and this includes the loan taken by the company RMW from
Maybank, the acts of the Respondent causing Sankaran to
guarantee the loans, which led to the bankruptcy proceedings
against him.

[62] As such, we find that there is a breach of the Undertaking in the

Consent Judgment not to repeat the Impugn Statements in the

30
 Defamation Suit. When Sankaran issued the Impugn Statements
during the press conference on 26.9.2017, Sankaran was in breach
of the Undertaking and is therefore guilty of contempt of court. When
the 4th Appellant published the impugn statement in the Tamil Malar
newspaper on 27.9.2017, the 4th Appellant was in breach of the
Undertaking and is therefore guilty of contempt of court. Since the
4th Appellant is guilty of contempt of court, the directors of the 4th
Appellant, that is the 2nd and the 3rd Appellants are also guilty of
contempt as they are the directing mind and will of the 4th Appellant
in permitting the breach of the Undertaking by the 4th Appellant.

[63] With regards to Saraswathy, it is the finding of the learned Judge

that Saraswathy had aided and abetted the Contemnors in
breaching the Undertaking given in the Consent Judgment.

[64] Both the draft and the sealed Consent Judgment was prepared by
Saraswathy’s legal firm, Messrs S. Kandasami & Co. By the Notice
dated 26.9.2017, Saraswathy was notified that any act of repeating
and publishing of the Impugn Statements will breach the
Undertaking in the Consent Judgment that tantamount to a
contempt of Court.

[65] However, instead of advising her clients not to breach the

Undertaking, Saraswathy responded to the Notice dated 26.9.2017
by stating that her client, Sankaran has a right to state the factual
matters to the public and denied the terms of the Undertaking in the
Consent Judgment.

31
[66] Added to that, Saraswathy had attended and participated in the
press conference where the Impugn Statement in the Defamation
Suit were repeated and subsequently published by the 4th Appellant
in the Tamil Malar newspaper the next day. In fact, Saraswathy
made the following statement during the press conference:

“…..This case and that case is the same. Because we are continuously
pursuing the case, the bankruptcy case which the bank has commenced
against Saravanan and our case are the connected.

We are going to continuously report about that. Even if you beat them up
they will still write. Even if you murder them they will still write. The paper
will not be scared. Because we come from background who doesn't know
what is fear."

[67] As an advocate and solicitor, Saraswathy’s primary duty as officer

of the Court is to ensure the rules of court are observed, and to
respect the order issued by the Court. Therefore, we agree with the
Respondent that Saraswathy had failed in her professional duty as
an officer of the Court when she proceeded with the press
conference on 26.9.2017 with Sankaran. Any reasonable
professional advocate and solicitor, having been issued with a
Notice of possible contempt would not have taken a cavalier attitude
over the seriousness of a possible contempt action. If Saraswathy
takes the position that the press conference would not be breach of
the Undertaking, she should have advised her Client to postpone
the press conference pending clarifications from the learned
Judge on the terms of the Consent Judgment. We are of the
considered opinion and we agree with the learned Judge that
Saraswathy had committed an act of contempt of court when she

32
 had aided and abetted Sankaran and the 4th Appellant in breaching
the Undertaking given in the Consent Judgment.

[68] In MBf Holdings Bhd & Anor v. Houng Hai Kong & Ors [1994] 4
CLJ 1002, Anuar bin Dato' Zainal Abidin J (as he then was)
emphasised the duties and responsibilities of an advocate and
solicitor:

“As a member of the Bar he is also an officer of the Court. He has

an onerous duty as an advocate and solicitor to see that justice is
upheld. At the same time as an officer of the Court he has a duty
towards the Court. Indeed his duty to the Court is most important. It
is his duty to protect the dignity of Court. It is therefore expected of
him to show respect for the administration of justice.”

[69] His Lordship added further:

“As a member of the Bar he should have shown greater respect for
an order of Court. On the contrary he had blatantly challenged the
validity of the order. The defendant obtrusively defied the power of
the Court and therefore has committed contumelious conduct
against the order of Court.

… He has completely brushed aside the order of Court. He

manipulated and schemed an action to suit his own purpose
ignoring the supremacy of the order of Court.”

33
[70] The case of T.O.Thomas (supra) affirms the principle that a solicitor
(being a stranger to the proceedings) can be committed for
contempt of Court. The court held as follows:

"It is true to say that "the court order" is not directed at appellant.
But, as the learned judge pointed out correctly that a stranger
to an action who aids and abets the breach of a
prohibitory order would be obstructing the course of justice.
Seaward v. Paterson [1897] 1 Ch. 545 is authority for the proposition
that the court has undoubted jurisdiction to commit for contempt
a person not included in an in junction or a party to the action
who, knowing of the injunction, aids and abets a defendant in
committing a breach of it…”

“As regards the law, I have myself no doubt that if a person who
knows that an injunction has been granted aids and abets in
committing a breach of it the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction
to commit him for contempt, although he is not a defendant in the
action, and is not a person against whom the injunction has
been granted .That Murray knew of the injunction is clear".

“In more recent times Seaward v. Paterson [1897] 1 Ch 545 was

cited by Lord Dennin g MR in Acrow (Automation) Ltd v. Re
Hainbelt Incorporated & Anor. [1971] 3 All ER 1175 , 1180 to show
that "it has long been held that the court has jurisdiction to
commit for contempt a person , not a party to the action, who
knowing of an injunction, aids and abets the defendant in
breaking it. The reason is that, by aiding and abetting the

34
 defendant, he is obstructing the course of justice. The leading case
is Seaward v. Paterson [1897] 1 Ch 545". (emphasis added)

Punishment

[71] We are of the considered opinion that the learned Judge had
considered all the relevant factors in not imposing an imprisonment
sentence on the Appellants and had only imposed a fine of
RM10,000.00 each Appellant.

Conclusion

[72] Premised on the reasons enumerated above, we are of the

considered opinion that there are no merits in these appeals that
warrant an appellate intervention. The appeals are dismissed with
costs.

Dated : 13 December 2021 sgd

(AZIZAH BINTI NAWAWI)
Judge
Court of Appeal, Malaysia

35
Parties Appearing:

RAYUAN SIVIL NO: W-02(IM)(NCVC)-2341-11/2018

For the Appellant : Saraswathy Kandasami

Tetuan S Kandasami & Co

For The Respondent : Premshangar Venugopal / Muralidharan

Balan Pillai
Tetuan Lewis & Co.

RAYUAN SIVIL NO: W-02(IM) (NCVC)-2369-11/2018

For the Appellant : M Manoharan/ P. Thavamalar

Sathiya Devi & Co

For The Respondent : Premshangar Venugopal / Muralidharan

Balan Pillai
Tetuan Lewis & Co.

Cases Referred

1. Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors
[2005] 2 MLJ 1

2. CIMB Bank Bhd (formerly known as Bumiputera Commerce Bank

Bhd) v. Sebang Gemilang Sdn Bhd & Anor [2018] 3 MLJ 689

3. Visiber Sdn Bhd vs Tan Meng Them & ors (2009) 1 LNS 963

36
4. Puah Bee Hong @ Bee Hong (F) & Anor v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah
Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur & Anor (Robert Teo Keng Tuan,
Intervener) & Another Case [1994] 2 CLJ 705

5. T O Thomas v. Asia Fishing Industry Pte Ltd [1977] 1 LNS 126

6. Newacres Sdn Bhd v. Sri Alam Sdn Bhd [2000] 2 CLJ 833 FC

7. Vellathussseri v Vellathuseri (1931) 2 MLJ 596

8. Tiew Kun v. Tneu Seng Bee & Another Appeal [2010] 2 CLJ 68

9. Wee Choo Keong v. MBF Holdings Bhd. & Anor. [1993] 3 CLJ 210

10. Tan Sri Dato' (Dr) Rozali Ismail & Ors v. Lim Pang Cheong & Ors
[2012] 2 CLJ 849 (FC)

11. Bramblevale Ltd [1970] Ch 128

12. MBf Holdings Bhd & Anor v. Houng Hai Kong & Ors [1994] 4 CLJ 1002

37