Autism, Constructionism and Nativism

Autism, constructionism and nativism∗
Mikhail Kissine
ACTE, Université libre de Bruxelles
September 7, 2020
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide a balanced assessment of the
significance autism has for the scientific study of language. While lin-
guistic profiles in autism vary greatly, spanning from a total absence of
functional language to verbal levels within the typical range, the entire
autism spectrum is robustly characterized by life-long deficits in inter-
subjective communication and persistent difficulties in adopting other
people’s perspective. In that sense, autism constitutes a unique profile
in which linguistic competence is dissociated from communication skills.
Somewhat paradoxically, autism is often mentioned to underscore the
importance of mind reading for language use, and of inter-subjective
communication for the emergence of language. Yet, experimental stud-
ies on pragmatics in autism indicate that many pragmatic processes
unfold without adopting one’s conversational partner’s perspective.
Moreover the patterns of language acquisition and learning in autism
represent a strong challenge to the central role constructionist theories
assign to socio-communicative skills. Data on autism thus forces a
reconsideration of the a priori conceptual boundaries on language learn-
ability that shape the foundational debates between constructionist
and nativist linguistic theories.
Target paper to appear in Language, Perspectives section

∗
I am very grateful to Language editors, to two anonymous reviewers, as well as to
Marc Dominicy, Mark Jary and Laurent Mottron for their comments on previous drafts of
this paper.
1
1 Introduction
The last three decades have seen our understanding of autism sharply
increase, in aspects ranging form behavioral to neuro-cognitive to
biological. Scientific interest in language in autism is no exception to
this welcome trend. A rapid search on Scopus, with keywords autism
AND (language OR linguistic∗ ), yields a total of 9039 publications
between 1990 and 2019, with an estimated growth of 27.16 entries
per year (se = 1.53, R2 = 0.92). Atypical language development
and use is a core aspect of autism, as well as a major predictor of
individual outcomes, and, expectedly, most of this research is part of
the ongoing effort to better delineate the clinical profiles of individuals
on the autism spectrum. However, as more and more evidence is
available from experimental and clinical studies, autism research also
becomes increasingly important for more foundational debates about
the nature of linguistic competence. In the current nosological definition
of autism, the linguistic profile is included as a diagnostic specifier,
which may span from a total absence of functional language to verbal
levels within the typical range (American Psychiatric Association,
2013). Nonetheless, and in spite of the important heterogeneity that is
otherwise inherent in the autism diagnosis, a consistent characteristic
of verbal autistic individuals1 is that their linguistic knowledge and
their use of language in context combines with lifelong difficulties in
intersubjective perspective-taking and communication. This unique
linguistic profile should prompt linguistic theory to distinguish matters
of linguistic competence from the use of language in communication.
More specifically, research on language in autism poses an important,
but somehow overlooked, challenge for two related lines of thought
that have considerable sway in contemporary linguistics. The first is
that inter-subjective, socio-communicative skills are determining for
acquiring language; the second is that these skills are indissociable
from mind reading abilities.2
A crucial premise of contemporary constructionist theories is that
inter-subjective language use underpins the acquisition of the struc-
tural properties of the child’s native tongue. This idea is also rightly
characterized as one of the most fundamental differences between these
approaches and a rationalist, Chomskian research program (Goldberg,
1
In line with the preferred usage of many individuals on the autism spectrum and of
parents of children with a diagnosis of autism (Kenny et al., 2015), throughout the paper,
I will use ‘autistic individual (or child)’ rather than ‘individual with autism’ or ‘individual
with Autism Spectrum Disorder’.
2
In this paper I will interchangeably, and in a theoretically agnostic way, use the terms
‘Theory of Mind’ and ‘mind reading’ to refer to the cognitive ability to attribute mental
states to other people.
2
2003, 2013). On the one hand, language use is seen as essential to the
development of language, as the following quote aptly illustrates:
[..] all linguistic knowledge—however abstract it may ul-
timately become—derives in the first instance from the
comprehension and production of specific utterances on
specific occasions of use. (Tomasello, 2000, 237-8)
And, on the other hand, in constructionist theories, using language
in context is unambiguously seen as being dependent on the capacity
to attribute complex mental states to other people—intentions about
other people’s beliefs or, at least, about what lies in their attentional
focus:
With regard to language in particular, the child has to under-
stand a special class of intentions known as communicative
intentions. Thus, a child might hear her father exclaim,
“Look! A clown!” To fully understand his linguistic behavior
(with an eye toward reproducing it) she must understand
that her father intends that she share attention with him
to a particular object; that is to say, understanding a com-
municative intention means understanding precisely how
another person intends to manipulate your attention [...].
It is only by understanding the communicative intention
behind these funny noises that the child can learn how to
use a particular linguistic expression appropriately when she
has ‘the same’ communicative intention (towards someone’s
attention). (Tomasello, 2000, 238)
Constructionism heavily relies on classic Gricean reconstructions of
human communication as a coordination problem, to which building a
model of the speaker’s mental states may provide an optimal solution
(e.g. Grice, 1957; Lewis, 1979; Thomason, 1990). However, construc-
tionism also endorses the transposition of such Gricean reconstructions
into a psychological theory, in which utterance interpretation is neces-
sarily a (complex) exercise in mind reading (e.g. Sperber & Wilson,
2002), and turns mind reading into the essential component of human
language acquisition (see, for instance, Tomasello, 2008, chapters 3
and 4).
The key hypothesis at the root of contemporary constructionist
models is thus that language acquisition is fundamentally constrained
by cooperative communication, rooted in the ability to adopt other peo-
ple’s mental states. However, language in autism constitutes a major
difficulty for this constructionist (or empiricist, if you wish) hypothesis,
as data from autism warrant neither the assumption that language use
is intrinsically linked with mind reading nor that language acquisition
3
is grounded in language use. In the first section of this paper, I will
briefly survey recent experimental literature on autism that provides
strong evidence that many areas of pragmatics are based on egocentric
processes, independent of Theory of Mind. The first conclusion lin-
guists should draw from data on autism, then, is that using language
is partly independent of one’s ability to understand one’s interlocutors’
minds or to adopt their perspectives. That being said, early engage-
ment in inter-subjective communicative interaction is clearly decisive
for (typical) language acquisition. However, as discussed in the second
section of this paper, at least some autistic individuals learn language
in a non-interactive way. Autism thus appears to falsify the assump-
tion that the acquisition of linguistic knowledge is a priori impossible
without inter-subjective, communicative interaction. A complex, but
far-reaching issue that I will broach in the last section of this paper
is the extent to which the data from autism can be accommodated
in non-nativist theories. Many linguistic theories include usage-based
components that are couched in terms of domain-general, statistical
mechanisms, independent of inter-subjective communication, or, for
that matter, of language. However, all these theories require some
kind of upstream constraint on such distributional learning: some au-
thors posit an innate universal grammar (Culicover & Jackendoff, 2005;
Yang, 2016), but those who reject nativism usually ground usage-based
linguistic learning in cooperative communication (e.g. Goldberg, 2003,
2013; Christiansen & Chater, 2016a; Tomasello, 2008).
2 Language use without mind reading

Around 70% of the individuals on the autism spectrum do eventu-
ally reach functional language (Anderson et al., 2007; Wodka et al.,
2013; Kim et al., 2014), but pragmatic deficits—which are out of step
with the developmental level of phonological and morpho-syntactic
skills—represent a lifespan hallmark of autism, as even fully verbal
autistic children and adults experience difficulties in all areas of lan-
guage use that require adapting to one’s conversational partner’s
perspective. Furthermore, recent literature on pragmatics in autism,
to be surveyed in this section, indicates that context-dependent com-
prehension of language in autistic individuals remains limited to an
‘egocentric’ perspective by the difficulties in mind reading that are
inherent in the autism diagnosis (for detailed discussions, see Kissine,
2012, 2016; Andrés-Roqueta & Katsos, 2017; Geurts et al., 2020).
Let me start with metaphor comprehension, which emerges, across
studies, as impaired in autism (Kalandadze et al., 2019). Interestingly,
the extent to which metaphor comprehension is impaired in autistic
4
individuals is predicted by language level, and, more specifically, by
lexical knowledge, rather than by Theory of Mind (Norbury, 2005a;
Adachi et al., 2004; Kalandadze et al., 2016). At its core, under-
standing a metaphor boils down to flexible lexical interpretation (e.g.
Glucksberg, 2007; Carston, 2012). Some metaphors probably require
more advanced mind reading abilities to be understood than others
(Lecce et al., 2019), but there is nothing inherent in metaphor in-
terpretation that would make it unaccessible to autistic individuals
with a deficient Theory of Mind. Since autistic individuals are able to
use linguistic context to resolve lexical ambiguities (Norbury, 2005b;
Brock et al., 2008; Hahn et al., 2015), it is therefore plausible that
context-sensitive activation processes allow them to reach metaphoric
interpretations without necessarily engaging in reasoning about the
speaker’s communicative intentions. However, the fact that autistic —
and, probably, non-autistic — people may process metaphor without
using Theory of Mind, does not entail that such an ‘egocentric’ prag-
matic processing is always optimal. Adopting the speaker’s perspective
— making hypotheses about her communicative intentions — provides
particularly valuable cues as to the direction in which metaphoric
interpretation should unfold (Wearing, 2010). It is therefore not sur-
prising that, in spite of performing in the same way as neuro-typicals in
decontextualised metaphor tasks, autistic participants may also report
significant difficulties in understanding figurative language in everyday
conversations (Hermann et al., 2013).
In the same vein, autistic children and adults can use context to
understand indirect requests (Kissine et al., 2012, 2015; Deliens et al.,
2018). However, such conversational inferences can be correctly reached
simply because the linguistic content makes certain assumptions ac-
cessible, without there be any need to reason about the speaker’s
communicative intentions (Kissine, 2013; Jary, 2013; Ruytenbeek et al.,
2017; Ruytenbeek, 2017). Several independent studies also found that
autistic participants derive quantity implicatures to the same extent
as neuro-typicals (Chevallier et al., 2010; Pijnacker et al., 2009; van
Tiel & Kissine, 2018). But again, it is likely that autistic individuals’
derivation of quantity implicatures does not involve mind reading, and
is less accurate in more complex cases that require reasoning about the
speaker’s epistemic state (Hochstein et al., 2018; van Tiel & Kissine,
2018).
Finally, autistic individuals, even those with structural language
levels within the typical range, are known to struggle with irony (Happé,
1993; Kaland et al., 2002; Martin & McDonald, 2004). This is to be
expected, given that irony usually involves keeping track of multiple
perspectives, which pile up on each other (e.g. Bryant, 2012). In
5
a discrimination task, in which ironic items are associated with a
distinctive intonation contour (while non-ironic ones are uttered in a
neutral tone of voice), autistic participants do perform above chance
(Chevallier et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2006; Colich et al., 2012). However,
when ironic stimuli are not systematically associated with distinctive
prosody, contextual incongruence, or facial expression, Deliens et al.
(2018, Exp. 2) found that autistic participants perform at chance in
identifying the meaning intended by the speaker. Interestingly, the
same autistic participants appear to have no difficulties in interpreting
requests cast in an indirect way (Deliens et al., 2018, Exp. 1), which
confirms that unlike irony interpretation, some indirect speech acts
may be grasped from an egocentric perspective. Likewise, van Tiel
et al. (2020) provide evidence that while autistic adults may use
strategic deception, they do so by relying on compensatory, cognitively
costly learning strategies, which do not involve mind-reading. This
dissociation between preserved ego-centric pragmatic processing and
impairment in areas that require perspective-shifting is unlikely to be
explained away in terms of a deficit in lexical knowledge or morpho-
syntax, as autistic and non-autistic participants in Deliens et al. (2018);
van Tiel & Kissine (2018) or van Tiel et al. (2020) did not differ on
verbal (and non-verbal) IQ measures.3
There is a no dispute that both form and content typically need to be
tailored to the communicational context and to one’s interlocutor. Nor
would it make sense to deny that linguistic structure contains referential
and cohesive devices — such as connectives or discourse markers —
geared towards optimizing the processing of one’s verbal production
by the audience. Such aspects of language use are precisely those
that remain problematic even for highly verbal autistic individuals.
Scarce use of referential expressions, difficulties in constructing a
coherent narrative or avoiding redundant messages, and, more generally,
poor tuning in to the conversational dynamics have consistently been
attested in autistic children and adults (e.g. Surian et al., 1996; Colle
et al., 2008; Eales, 1993; Asp & de Villiers, 2010; Fine et al., 1994;
Baltaxe & D’Angiola, 1992; Baixauli et al., 2016; Diehl et al., 2008;
Geelhand et al., forthcoming).4
Claiming that language can be wielded from an egocentric perspec-
3
I am not denying that some individuals on the autism spectrum may also have impaired
morpho-syntax (e.g. Ambridge et al., 2015), even though areas of strength in purely syntactic
processing have been attested in autism (Eigsti & Bennetto, 2009; Janke & Perovic, 2017),
including at a young age (Tovar et al., 2015).
4
Some proponents of the social motivation theory of autism (Chevallier et al., 2012)
speculate that in autistic individuals, pragmatic processing is rooted in Theory of Mind,
but appears deficient due to lack of motivation to engage in inter-subjective communication
(see Chevallier et al., 2011, 2014). However, experimental data clearly show that while
6
tive does not entail, then, that mind reading is not required for much
of our successful communication. Incidentally, neither do I claim that
attributing communicative intentions to other people should necessarily
be a cognitively effortful process—at least for non-autistic individuals
(see Geurts & Rubio-Fernández, 2015, for a lucid discussion). While
relying on mind reading in conversation may be effortless for many
people, it is indisputably challenging for autistic individuals. The
point is that when autistic individuals use and interpret language in
context, they do so without projecting themselves in the minds of their
conversational partners.
3 Language learning in autism

The data from autism discussed in the previous section show that,
however important intersubjective, shared intentionality may be for
efficient conversation management, it is not inherent in context-based,
pragmatic interpretation processes. Now, it could be that even though
adopting other people’s perspective is not always required to use
language, without an innate disposition for cooperative interaction
and shared intentionality, language cannot be acquired in the first
place. Clearly, such a view should, at the very least, be able to account
for the linguistic profiles of verbal autistic individuals, who combine
functional structural language with life-long difficulties in adopting
other people’s perspective.
If, as presupposed by constructionist theories, acquired language
structures gradually emerge from interactional experience of form-
meaning pairs, one should expect language skills in autism to be
negatively correlated with the strength of interaction symptoms. On
this conception, in sum, when (and if) language emerges in autism,
its acquisition should essentially follow the same route as in typically
developing children, gradually overcoming difficulties in processing
social stimuli. Unfortunately, as will be discussed now, current evidence
for such a hypothesis is rather weak. Moreover, there are a few case
studies in autism that strongly suggest that communicative interaction
is not even required for language to emerge.
the determining factor in autistics’ performance is whether the pragmatic task requires
adopting somebody else’s perspective, no clear motivational factors seem to emerge (see
van Tiel & Kissine, 2018; Kissine, 2019, for a critical discussion).
7
3.1 Language acquisition and joint attention
in autism
Difficulties in attending to and processing social information already
emerge as a robust behavioral manifestation of autism towards the
end of the first year of life (e.g. Elsabbagh & Johnson, 2010; Jones
& Klin, 2013; Zwaigenbaum et al., 2015). In comparison with their
typically developing peers, infants later diagnosed with autism appear
to look and smile less at people, to rarely gaze in the direction of a
human voice, even when called by their name, and to almost never
produce sounds or babbling directed at another person (e.g. Baranek,
1999; Clifford & Dissanayake, 2008; Maestro et al., 2002; Osterling
& Dawson, 1994). Retrospective analyses of home videos, as well
as parental reports, indicate that between one and two years of age
autistic children display significantly less attention-sharing behaviors
than typically developing children or children with other developmental
delays. For instance, infants later diagnosed with autism rarely switch
their eyes back and forth between an adult and some object they find
interesting or point at an object to draw the adult’s attention to it
(Clifford & Dissanayake, 2008; Stone & Lemanek, 1990). Consistently
with these reports, eye-tracking studies suggest that during the first
two years of life, autistic children tend to spend less time looking at
the eyes and the mouth regions of speaking faces (Campbell et al.,
2013; Chawarska et al., 2015; Jones & Klin, 2013).
Acquisition of structural language in autism is also atypical, both
quantitatively and qualitatively. In at least 50% of autistic children,
expressive language appears with a considerable delay, usually after
the age of three, and around 30% of autistic individuals never achieve
functional verbal communication altogether (Anderson et al., 2007;
Wodka et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2014). These linguistic deficits resist a
reduction to a co-morbid condition, a form of Developmental Language
Disorder, distinct from a ‘core’ symptomatology of autism (Boucher,
2011). The current consensus is rather that the causal origins of
atypical language development in autism are at least partly inherent
in the socio-pragmatic properties of the disorder itself. Precocious and
persistent difficulties in attending to and processing social information
are then likely to impact language acquisition in autism.
As alluded to in the Introduction, constructionist approaches to
typical and atypical linguistic development assign a central role to the
capacity to share a common ground with one’s interactional partners.
The most conspicuous early manifestation of such shared intentionality
is the ability to respond to social cues, such as gaze direction or
pointing, to establish joint attention (e.g. Farroni et al., 2002; Csibra,
8
2010; Luyster et al., 2008; Tomasello, 2008). In a sense, language
development delays and deficits in autism underscore the importance
of socio-pragmatic factors for language acquisition. Low sensitivity
to social information in the early stages of the life of an autistic
child certainly has a cascading effect on the acquisition of language.
However, life-long interactional and pragmatic deficits are robustly
attested across the otherwise greatly heterogeneous autism spectrum.
And, as argued in the previous section, when autistic individuals use
and interpret language in context, they most probably do so without
adopting their interlocutor’s perspective. Early-onset socio-pragmatic
deficits likely cause language delays, but a very different explanation
may be needed to understand how verbal autistics eventually do acquire
language.
Many experimental studies have sought to causally link joint at-
tention and language in autism by implementing some version of the
discrepant labelling task (Baldwin, 1993). Such paradigms feature
two novel objects, one of which is labelled by the experimenter. The
condition of interest is when a new label is provided while the object
in the attentional focus of the experimenter is different from the one
to which the child is attending. Typically developing children between
18 and 24 months usually associate the new label with the object the
experimenter is looking at, even though this is not the object in their
own attentional focus (for a review, see Tomasello, 2008, 158-161). By
contrast, many authors report that autistic children tend to associate
the new label with the object they, and not the experimenter, are
attending to, thus proving unable of sharing attention with the adult
to acquire new words (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Preissler & Carey,
2005; Luyster & Lord, 2009; Parish-Morris et al., 2007; Akechi et al.,
2011, 2013).5 However, a noticeable, but seldom acknowledged feature
shared by all these studies is that autistic children are matched by
vocabulary levels to the comparison groups. Therefore, if anything, this
literature indicates that whereas autistic children do not rely on joint
attention to acquire new words, they may reach a receptive vocabulary
comparable to those of children who do so. 6
Some retrospective analyses do suggest that, in autistic children,
lower social impairment or better joint attention skills correlate with
later language levels (Wodka et al., 2013; Yoder et al., 2015). However,
in a significant number of other large longitudinal or prospective studies,
5
For conflicting or more nuanced results, see Norbury et al. (2010), Gillespie-Lynch
et al. (2013) and McGregor et al. (2013).
6
It is also important not to overestimate the importance of joint attention in typical
language development, where it is mainly limited to early stages of the acquisition of nouns
(Akhtar & Gernsbacher, 2007; Tsimpli, 2013).
9
socio-communicative variables do not systematically predict language
outcomes, especially once non-verbal IQ is factored in (Anderson et al.,
2007; Bennett et al., 2015; Ellis Weismer & Kover, 2015; Thurm et al.,
2015). In this connection, it is interesting to observe that the most
prominent interventions programs are currently grounded in the the
constructionist models of typical language acquisition, and prioritize
joint attention or social communication in the hope to enhance linguistic
development (Dawson et al., 2010; Green et al., 2010). Improving an
autistic child’s socio-communicative and joint attention abilities can
clearly have beneficial consequences for her interaction skills. Yet,
where it comes to predicting the acquisition of vocabulary and morpho-
syntax, there is no unambiguous evidence that intervention techniques
specifically targeting joint attention skills have an effect on language
outcomes (Rogers et al., 2019; Sandbank et al., 2020).
None of this, of course, is to deny the significance of the link
between language and socio-pragmatic factors. Better language skills
allow more opportunities for meaningful interaction, which may further
foster language development. However, a significant proportion of
autistic children also end up acquiring structural language in spite of
the persisting interactional, socio-pragmatic difficulties. It is possible,
therefore, that these children take a route to acquire language which
does not relate to its inter-subjective function. And, as we will see
now, important, albeit somewhat overlooked data from autism rather
strongly suggests that language can be acquired in a non-interactive
way.
3.2 Non-interactive language learning in autism

Active child-directed interaction, as opposed to passive exposure to
linguistic input, has for long been acknowledged as a crucial factor
in language acquisition. Early evidence came from hearing children
whose deaf parents extensively exposed them to radio and television,
in the hope that they acquire speech. In spite of passive exposure
to spoken English, these children exhibited severe language delays
(Sachs et al., 1981). Later on, a landmark experimental study revealed
that while American infants were capable of acquiring phonological
categories of Mandarin Chinese from live exposure to speakers of the
language, no such acquisition resulted from watching comparable video
recordings (Kuhl et al., 2003; Lytle et al., 2018). Such data are crucial
for constructionist models, according to which shared communicative
experience allows language structures to be gradually induced from
communicative experience.
A recent study, however, indicates that non-interactive language
10
acquisition from television does occur in some autistic children. Kissine
et al. (2019) thoroughly documented five cases of Tunisian autistic boys
who spontaneously and productively used the Standard, non-colloquial
variety of Arabic. Such a linguistic profile is very intriguing because
Tunisia, like the rest of Arabic-speaking communities, is inherently
diglossic: a vernacular, colloquial variety, is used in everyday interac-
tion, while the significantly distinct Standard Arabic is reserved for
very formal, mostly written settings. Importantly, before (or unless)
protracted and explicit instruction takes place at school, children fail
to master Standard Arabic, be it at the level of comprehension, produc-
tion, phonology or morpho-syntax (Amayreh, 2003; Khamis-Dakwar
et al., 2012; Saiegh-Haddad et al., 2011; Leikin et al., 2014). Yet,
the autistic children in Kissine et al. (2019) displayed a striking profi-
ciency in the Standard Arabic: they productively and correctly used
phonemes, case-marking, complex negation forms and verbal moods
that characterize Standard Arabic, but are inexistent in the Tunisian
colloquial variety. As Standard Arabic is never used in everyday com-
munication, learning the Standard variety had no communicative value
for these children. Furthermore, the only source of exposition from
which this learning could have stemmed is non-interactional. Many
cartoons and television programs that are broadcast across the Arabic-
speaking world are in Standard Arabic. Given their young age, this is
the only possible source of exposure from which the autistic children
described by Kissine et al. (2019) could have learned Standard Arabic.
While the diglossic context of Tunisia renders non-interactional
language learning more apparent, the same phenomenon may also
occur but be less visible in non-diglossic environments. A study in
progress in our lab is currently documenting profiles of autistic children
who would acquire a foreign language, not used in their environment,
from exposure to internet. It is too early to report quantitative data on
such ‘YouTube bilinguals’, but one among the profiles we documented
so far may be worth briefly mentioning here. B is a twelve-year-old
autistic boy, with a non-verbal IQ slightly below the norm (67 on
Leiter-3; Roid et al., 2013), who attends primary school in French (in
the French-speaking part of Belgium) and whose familial environment
is exclusively French-speaking. B has an intense interest in watching
videos in English on internet. In spite of the fact that none of his care-
givers reported ever using English with him, B insists on speaking only
English with his parents, siblings and schoolmates. B’s competence in
French and English — sentence comprehension, sentence production,
sentence repetition, morphology — was formally assessed using the
same standardized scale (CELF-V; Wiig et al., 2013a,b). While delayed
for his chronological age, B’s scores are identical in French and English,
11
which strongly suggests that B’s non-interactive learning of English
unfolded on par with his acquisition of French.
To the cases just evoked one should also add EV, an autistic
Bulgarian girl who, by the age of nine, reached impressive mastery
of German exclusively from passive exposure to television programs
(Vulchanova et al., 2012). Another, extensively described language
savant with autistic traits, Christopher, demonstrated an exceptional
ability to learn new languages from limited exposure and with a
preference for written input (Smith & Tsimpli, 1995; Smith et al., 2011).
Interestingly, both EV and Christopher seemed to enjoy the experience
of learning a new language for its internal, structural properties, rather
than for the communicative potential it could offer; and both acquired
foreign language morphological paradigms with a striking ease.
3.3 The significance of non-interactive language

learning in autism
The case studies discussed in the foregoing should not be relegated to
some kind of linguistic Kunstkammer. The prevalence of autism, in one
form or another, may exceed one child in 70 (Christensen et al., 2016,
2019); among these children, around 60% end up acquiring functional
structural language (Wodka et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2014). As yet,
there is no estimate of the extent to which language acquisition in these
individuals is non-interactive. The absence of a clear link, discussed in
3.1, between joint attention and language outcomes in autism strongly
suggests that language is acquired in a non-interactive way in many
more autistic individuals than currently documented (for a defense of
this view from the perspective of early intervention, see Mottron, 2016,
2017). To be sure, one could argue that the way language is learnt
by the autistic individuals described above is intrinsically distinct
from the neuro-typical pathway to language. However, it is highly
implausible and scientifically questionable to posit two drastically
different neuro-cognitive mechanisms for a skill as complex as language
acquisition.
Language learning in autism unquestionably displaces the concep-
tual boundary on linguistic learnability endorsed by constructionist
models. Both quantitative and case studies discussed in this section
indicate that the impetus to engage in communicative exchanges with
others is not the only possible motivational factor for acquiring lan-
guage. These data also unambiguously show that language structures
may be acquired without the support of an inter-subjective commu-
nicative experience. In this respect, language acquisition in autism is
clearly an important challenge for constructionist models.
12
4 Autism and the nativism debate in
linguistics
Studying language learning in autistic individuals — in whom the
apprehension of linguistic stimuli is mediated by an inherent socio-
pragmatic deficit — can illuminate one of the deepest theoretical divides
in the field of linguistics. Contrary to constructionist models, which
posit that an innate drive to communicate allows language structures to
be gradually induced from communicative experience (Tomasello, 2008),
Chomskian nativist approaches hold that essential aspects of linguistic
knowledge are innate. For nativists, early linguistic input is crucial, but
its role is bounded to activating one among the few possible structural
possibilities this innate competence allows (e.g. Berwick & Chomsky,
2016; Chomsky, 2000, 2005). Both approaches assign a central role
to early linguistic interaction, but whereas in constructionist models
a precocious impetus to engage in inter-subjective communication is
a prerequisite for the emergence of linguistic structures, in nativism
its role is limited to drawing the child’s interest towards linguistic
evidence. In a slightly alternative formulation, in theories of the latter
brand, the primary role of linguistic input is to provide the learner with
evidence for the structural features of the language, while the former
emphasize socio-pragmatic interaction, and joint attention processes,
from which meaning-form pairings emerge. The remainder of this
section is devoted to assessing the extent to which data from autism
may be invoked as evidence for nativism.
4.1 Statistical learning

There is currently no clearly formulated account of how non-interactive
language learning in autism may unfold, but it is instructive to consider
which ingredients such an account could include. Exceptional abilities
are well documented in individuals with autism, albeit more often in
non-linguistic domains, such as calendar calculation, absolute pitch
or graphic memory (Pring, 2005; Howlin et al., 2009; Mottron et al.,
2006a, 2009). These savant skills in autism are usually explained in
terms of preferential attention to detail, enhanced processing of local
structural properties, as well as of a superior capacity to detect and
analyse domain-specific, systematically recurring patterns (Happé &
Frith, 2006; Baron-Cohen et al., 2009; Pellicano & Burr, 2012; Mottron
et al., 2006b, 2009, 2013). It is therefore plausible that those autistic
individuals who learn language outside any interactional frame, do so
by relying on a superior sensitivity to structural properties in processing
language input. In fact, this explanation has been suggested both for
13
EV (Vulchanova et al., 2012) and Christopher (Tsimpli et al., 2017).
Since the seminal studies on probabilistic acquisition of word bound-
aries in infants (Saffran et al., 1996), a rich body of experimental work
highlighted the importance of statistical learning in language acqui-
sition. Statistical learning should most probably be thought of as a
domain-general capacity to detect the distribution of structural proper-
ties, which applies but is not limited to the processing of the linguistic
input. Even though the exact nature and scope of the role played
by statistical learning in language learning remains an open question,
probabilistic extraction of structural regularities is likely to play an im-
portant role in language development (Siegelman & Frost, 2015; Frost
et al., 2019; Siegelman, 2020). Using slightly different methods two
relatively recent meta-analyses concluded to an absence of impairment
in implicit statistical learning in autism (Foti et al., 2015; Obeid et al.,
2016). Language delays in autism are thus not associated with an
impaired ability to induce the structural properties of the linguistic
input (probably in contrast to Developmental Language Disorder; see
Haebig et al., 2017; Lammertink et al., 2020).
Along with joint attention and shared intentionality, usage-based
linguistic theories put a great emphasis on probabilistic and associative
learning mechanisms (e.g. Goldberg, 2003, 2006). The data from autism
that has been discussed in the foregoing could be integrated within
these models by assigning more weight to probabilistic mechanisms
over joint attention. It could be that, because of the unavailability
of socio-communicative cues, at least some autistic individuals learn
language exclusively by relying on probabilistic, associative processes.
Such a compensatory strategy could, of course, be facilitated by the
hyper-systematizing, enhanced processing of local structural properties,
independently attested in autism.
The unavailability of socio-communicative feedback may prompt
autistics to exploit some learning pathways to a greater extent than
their typical developing peers. Carving phonological categories out of
the acoustic stream is an essential step towards language (e.g. Kuhl,
2004), which could be partly determined by the statistical frequency
of co-occurrence of certain sounds in infant-directed speech (Vallabha
et al., 2007). However, in typical language development such dis-
tributional learning is supplemented by communicative, referential
intentions.7 In autism, referential bootstrapping of language learning
7
The classic example is that of the acoustic variability between dental [d ”] and retroflex
[ã] dental voiced stops, which in Hindi goes along with different referential intentions (e.g.
[d
”al] lentils vs [ãal] branch), but corresponds in English to non-phonological co-articulatory
variation (e.g. [d ”6l] in this doll vs [ã6l] in your doll ). The intersubjective experience of
language as a communicative tool is thus essential for helping Hindi speaking infants learn
14
is clearly compromised by poor social orientation. It is likely, therefore,
that autistic children should rely, to a greater extent than their typically
developing peers, on probabilistic learning—or, on other, bottom-up
mechanisms non-specific to language, such as, audio-visual integra-
tion (see, e.g. Stevenson et al., 2017; Righi et al., 2018; Robertson &
Baron-Cohen, 2017)—to acquire phonological and word boundaries.
Christiansen & Chater (2016b) emphasize that rehearsing pre-
viously heard linguistic material can help reanalyze it and, in this
way, facilitate the chunking of new sequences of speech. Interestingly,
intense echolalic repetition of a limited number of previously heard lin-
guistic segments—often excerpts from cartoons or internet videos—is
extremely widespread in autism. Such delayed echolalia may serve a
variety of communicative functions, unrelated to the compositional
meaning of the echoed linguistic sequence (Prizant & Rydell, 1984).
More importantly for the present discussion, though, echolalia also
often transits to more compositional and productive language (Gerns-
bacher et al., 2016; Mottron, 2016, 2017). Phonological categories
can be modeled as density distributions over a parametric (acoustic
and articulatory) space, which are gradually shaped by perception-
production loops (Pierrehumbert, 2003). Typically developing children
acquire these categories, to an important extent, by mirroring and then
adapting the phonological templates used by adults in interaction with
the child (Vihman & Croft, 2007). A reasonable hypothesis is that
in autistic children, for whom verbal interaction is often challenging,
delayed echolalia constitutes a non-interactional opportunity to induce
phonological categories from iterated perception-production loops.
4.2 Third factors

Two important and intertwined theoretical consequences arise at this
stage. First, language learning in autism appears to vindicate the
famous, but often derided claim by Chomsky that communication is
not the primary function of language. Second, a crucial question is
whether in the absence of access to social, intersubjective cues, the
way autistics learn language can be exclusively explained in terms of
domain-general learning skills. To better grasp these two issues, it may
be helpful to frame the discussion against the three factors with which
Chomsky (2005) associates linguistic knowledge:
1. Language-specific genetic endowment;
2. Experience;
3. Cognitive factors not specific to language.
the contrastive function of the [d
”]-[ã] opposition (Yeung & Werker, 2009).
15
The content of the first factor varies across different instantiations of
nativism, and is fairly frugal in the latest version of Chomsky’s model
of language (Chomsky, 1995; Hauser et al., 2002). In constructionist,
usage-based models, the first factor is, by hypothesis, defined as vacu-
ous, so that cognitive mecanisms determining for language acquisition
are necessarily included within general-domain factors of the third
type.
In constructionist theories, joint attention, mind reading and early
drive towards inter-subjective communication are viewed as domain-
general skills, whose role is posited to be essential for language de-
velopment. From the perspective of the nativist program such socio-
communicative skills also clearly belong to third factors, but with a
more modest role, on par with, say, executive functions. Poor executive
functioning will without doubt compromise language acquisition and
functioning. Yet, as important as it is for language, to the best of
my knowledge, no theory holds that executive functioning is the core
ingredient that makes human language what it is. Data from autism
indicates that the role of socio-communicative and mind-reading skills
in language acquisition should be characterized in similar terms: even
though the cognitive skills required for perspective-taking and inter-
subjective subjective communication are impaired, many individuals
with autism manage to learn language in a non-interactive way and
use it from an egocentric perspective.8
Christiansen & Chater (2016a, chapter 2) contrast two types of
learning: C-induction, ‘acquiring the ability to co-ordinate with others’
and N-induction, ‘acquiring the ability to understand and manipulate
the natural world’ (p. 69). They propose that language acquisition is
an instance of C-induction — and hence is intrinsically communicative.
However, in the case of at least some autistic individuals, language
8
Hinzen et al. (2020) recently argued that autism — especially in non-verbal individuals
— constitutes a counter-example to Chomsky’s refusal to see communication as the primary
function of language. Hinzen et al. (2020) insist that the absence of language in autism
(almost) universally co-occurs with intellectual disability (note that gaining a precise idea
of the general intellectual level in non-verbal autistic individuals is notoriously difficult;
see, e.g. Bishop et al., 2015; Tager-Flusberg et al., 2016; Courchesne et al., 2019), and
claim that nativism should predict that such individuals could ‘be linguistic thinkers, while
language is only missing externally’ (p. 13). That language should not be equated with
communication does not affect the obvious fact that for language acquisition to unfold
— or, in less theory-neutral terms, for the linguistic faculty to become instantiated as a
particular language in the learner’s mind — the learner has to be able to process linguistic
stimuli, which necessarily represent the externalization of somebody else’s language. This
ability is certainly dependent on non-verbal IQ, which, incidentally, is the most robust
predictor of language outcomes in autism (Anderson et al., 2007; Ellis Weismer & Kover,
2015; Thurm et al., 2015; Brignell et al., 2018; Pecukonis et al., 2019).
16
learning would rather belong to N-induction, as it amounts to detecting
the underlying structure of what, from the learner’s perspective, are
non-communicative stimuli. A particularly illuminating aspect of
Christiansen and Chater’s distinction between C- and N-induction is
that it cuts across the nativist/empiricist divide. Some instances of C-
induction are clearly innate, such as the dance of honey-bees, and some
aspects of N-induction are learned, such as the location of edible food
in some environments or food preparation techniques in chimpanzees
and gorillas (p. 71). It is therefore possible for constructionist models
to accept that language acquisition is, or may be, an instance of
non-interactive learning — of N-induction —, without necessarily
conceding that linguistic knowledge is underpinned by language-specific
acquisition mechanisms.
More precisely, language learning in autism forces constructionists
to posit that in the absence of top-down communicative feedback,
probabilistic and associative mechanisms still allow the acquisition
of structural language. But this is a consequence that rather heavily
shifts the burden of proof towards constructionist models. Statistical
learning is clearly a third factor in the nativist program (e.g. Lidz &
Gagliardi, 2015; Yang, 2016). For the linguistic input to determine the
direction in which the grammar of the language learner will develop,
this learner has to be able to detect regularities in the linguistic inputs
and to chunk it in structurally meaningful units. Therefore, assuming
that the core linguistic faculty is intact and that there is sufficient
linguistic input, nativism clearly allows for language learning in autism
to unfold in a non-interactive way. Given language-specific genetic
endowment, the structure of the linguistic input — independently of
how and why it is used — may provide enough evidence for an autistic
individual to build one’s own internal language competence.
By contrast, in order to accommodate data from autism, construc-
tionist models have to show that the weight of statistical, associative
learning processes in language learning is sufficient to dispense with
the idea of any kind of innate mechanism specific to language. In
the case of autistic language learning, such a deflationary position
would require that, without any socio-communicative bootstrap and
without any innate specifically linguistic predisposition, language ac-
quisition be modeled as a fully unsupervised statistical learning, in
which most of the lowest-level parsing of the acoustic stream occurs
without any kind of top-down guidance. For instance, Christiansen &
Chater (2016a, chapter 5) review an impressive array of experimental
and computational studies which indicate how different aspects of lin-
guistic structure may be acquired by integrating multiple distributional
cues. However, in none of these experimental paradigms or simula-
17
tions does learning starts from the scratch, viz. from a non-parsed
acoustic stream, and goes all the way up to morphology and syntax (cf.
also Goldberg, 2006, chapters 4-6). Furthermore, the whole suite of
multi-cue integration learning mechanisms, put forth by Christiansen
& Chater (2016a), is explicitly situated within a framework where lan-
guage acquisition is viewed as a solution to a coordination problem, as
in instance of C-induction. Conversely, some nativist models assign a
central place usage-based or probabilistic mechanisms, but complement
them with an innate universal grammar component (e.g. Culicover &
Jackendoff, 2005; Yang, 2016). The challenge for non-nativist theories,
then, is to show that non-interactive language acquisition in autism
can be modeled in terms of fully probabilistic learning, with no reliance
on a priori defined phonological features, word boundaries, parts of
speech or hierarchical relations and no (or very minimal) access to the
form-meaning pairings intended by the speakers of the linguistic input.
5 Conclusion
Once relegated to the backstage of phonology and morpho-syntax,
pragmatics has been brought to the fore of linguistics by the consid-
erable progress that has been made in understanding the cognitive
mechanisms that underlie language use. As pragmatics was becoming
a cognitive science in its own right (see Noveck, 2018), however, also
grew the temptation to link — and, to some extent, reduce — the core
aspects of language to communication. Language in autism invites
a critical examination of linguistic theories that put mind reading at
the core of language use, and language use at the source of linguistic
knowledge.
The study of the way autistic individuals acquire and use language
should not be confined at some periphery of ‘serious’ linguistics. The
prevalence of autism is far from negligible; therefore, verbal autistic
individuals represent an important proportion within the variety of
instantiations of human language. Careful investigation of linguistic
profiles in autism is crucial to better map the heterogeneity of the
autism spectrum or to predict individual developmental trajectories
and outcomes. But taking language in autism seriously may also bring
linguistic theory a step closer to answering foundational questions
about the nature of linguistic competence.
18
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Autism, constructionism and nativism∗

ACTE, Université libre de Bruxelles

Target paper to appear in Language, Perspectives section

2 Language use without mind reading

3 Language learning in autism

3.2 Non-interactive language learning in autism

3.3 The significance of non-interactive language

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