G.R. No.

113886 February 24, 1998

SPOUSES MARCIANO CHUA and CHUA CHO, petitioners, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MARIANO C. MORENO and SHEILA
MORENO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

To stay the execution pending appeal of a judgment in an ejectment suit, the Rules require the
defendant to file a supersedeas bond. What is the nature of this bond? How is the amount to be
computed? In what court should it be presented? At what point in the litigation should it be filed?

The Case

The Court answers the foregoing questions as it resolves this petition for review
on certiorari assailing the December 15, 1993 Decision  of the Court of Appeals  in CA-G.R. SP
1 2

No. 32236, which disposed as follows: 3

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the orders dated June 10, 1993 and June 17,
1993 are SET ASIDE, and respondent court is ORDERED to issue a writ of execution
for the enforcement of the decision dated March 5, 1993 rendered by the Municipal
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 2592, insofar as the right to the possession of the lots is
concerned.

Petitioners also challenge the February 15, 1994 Resolution of Respondent Court which
denied their motion for reconsideration. 4

The Facts

The facts of this case are undisputed. As found by Respondent Court, they are as follows: 5

Coming now to the merits of the case, it appears that on March 5, 1993, the Municipal
Trial Court (branch II) of Batangas City rendered judgment for petitioners [private
respondents herein] with respect to four lots located in Galicano St., Batangas City,
ordering the ejectment of private respondents [petitioners herein] and ordering them
to pay monthly rentals of P50,000.00 starting April 7, 1992 until they shall have
vacated the lots and surrendered their possession to petitioners and the sum of
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.

It appears further that a copy of the decision was received by private respondents'
counsel on March 10, 1993; that on March 11, 1993 he filed a notice of appeal; and that
on March 16, 1993, the MTC ordered the records of the case transmitted to the RTC.

On March 29, 1993, petitioners moved for the execution of the decision in their favor,
alleging that although private respondents had filed a notice of appeal, the latter had
not filed a supersedeas bond nor make [sic] a deposit every month of the reasonable
value of the use and occupation of the properties as required by Rule 70, sec. 8.
 Private respondents opposed the motion, claiming that they are co-owners of the lots
from which they were ordered to be ejected and that to grant immediate execution of
the decision would render their appeal moot and academic. They later filed a
supplement to their opposition, claiming that while they were after all willing to file a
supersedeas bond, but that they had been kept busy attending to their businesses
and thus unable to secure a bond.

On June 10, 1993, the trial court issued the first of its disputed orders in which it
denied petitioners motion for execution on the ground that the transmission by the
MTC of the records of the ejectment case to the RTC, without waiting for the
expiration of the period of appeal, prevented private respondents from filing a
supersedeas bond on time. The order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the urgent Motion for Execution

filed by plaintiff-appellees is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the defendant appellants are hereby directed to:

a) To file with this Court a supersedeas bond in the amount of FIVE

HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P550,000.00) PESOS within five days
from receipt of this Order;

b) To deposit, within the period aforementioned, an amount of ONE

HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS by way of accrued
rentals for the months of April, May and June, 1993; and

c) To periodically deposit on or before the tenth day of each succeeding

months [sic], starting from July 1993, and an [sic] amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS representing the reasonable monthly
rental fixed by the lower court.

On June 17, 1993, the RTC issued another order giving petitioners an extension of five days
within which to file a supersedeas bond. After initially admitting a cash bond of P550,000, the
RTC granted on September 20, 1993 petitioners' motion for the substitution of the cash bond
with a surety bond. Private respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, questioning the said three orders.

Respondent Court's Ruling

Invoking Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, Respondent Court ruled that the RTC erred
in extending the period for filing a supersedeas bond. This error was compounded when the
same court issued its second order on June 17, 1993 which gave herein petitioners an
additional extension of five days within which to do so. The Court of Appeals held that the
said provision was mandatory and gave the said trial court no discretion with regard to its
application. In dismissing petitioner's claim that they did not know where to file the
supersedeas bond, the Court of Appeals noted that said argument was made for the first time
on appeal before it, petitioners' opposition to the motion for execution before the RTC being
based only on their alleged co-ownership of the said property. Respondent Court also
distinguished the present case from Laurel vs. Abalos,  holding that there was no basis for
6

the application of an exception to the mandatory provision of Section 8 of Rule 70.

While sustaining the order of September 20, 1993, Respondent Court set aside the two other
orders issued on June 10 and 17, 1993. Subsequently, said Court denied the motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for review.  In a Resolution dated March 11, 1996, this Court noted that
7

petitioners had no objection to the substitution of the deceased Mariano Moreno by his
surviving heirs.8

The Issues

Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals committed the following "errors": 9

The Court of Appeals committed a grave error of law when it found that petitioners
herein, the private respondents in C.A. G.R. SP NO. 32236, could have filed the
supersedeas bond on time and before June 10, 1993 when RTC; Branch I of Batangas
City fixed for the first time the amount of supersedeas bond which ruling, if
implemented, would have condoned and would have resulted to the violation of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

II

The Court of Appeals committed grave error of law when it made grossly erroneous
conclusions arising from admitted and undisputed facts which led the said Court of
Appeals to apply the general rule as stated in Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court and not the law on exceptions to said rule.

III

The Court of Appeals committed grave error of law in making findings of fact contrary
to the admitted and proven facts by the petitioners and private respondents in C.A.
G.R. SP. No. 32236 and not supported by evidence on record.

IV

The Court of Appeals committed an error of law when it ordered the RTC, Branch I of
Batangas City to issue a writ of execution which, if implemented, would necessarily
result to the deprivation of petitioners herein of their property without due process of
law in violation of Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

In the main, the case hinges on whether, after the expiration of the period for perfecting said
appeal, the RTC had the authority to set the amount of and accept a supersedeas bond to
stay the immediate execution of a decision in an ejectment suit pending appeal. This
encompasses several questions regarding the nature of a supersedeas bond: What is the
amount of the bond? Who, if any, determines the amount? Where and at what point in the
litigation should the bond be filed? We shall deal with each of these questions.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

 Main Issue: Late Filing of the Supersedeas Bond

The applicable rule in this case is Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which provides: 10

Sec. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay same. If judgment is rendered

against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been
perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the
municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of
First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of
the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court to exist. In the
absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use
and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate
determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or
period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the municipal or city court, with
the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is
appealed.

x x x           x x x          x x x

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of
the property in question.  To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the
11

appeal is pending, the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must
concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he
periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The 12

failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright
execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial and
imperative."  Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a
13

supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow.
Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the
appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the
period for the perfection of the appeal.

In the present case, petitioners filed their notice of appeal on March 11, 1993, a day after their
receipt of the MTC's decision. On March 16, 1993, or five days later, the MTC transmitted the
records of the case to the RTC. On March 29, 1993, the private respondents filed a motion for
the immediate execution of the decision. As noted earlier, petitioners opposed the motion on
the ground that they were co-owners of the property. On June 10, 1993, the RTC denied the
motion for execution and directed petitioners to file a supersedeas bond. On the authority of
the RTC order, petitioners filed a cash bond, which was later substituted with a surety bond.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the bond was filed out of time. The motion for
execution was filed eighteen days from the date the petitioners received a copy of the MTC's
decision, after the appeal had already been perfected. Because no supersedeas bond had
been filed within the period for appeal, a writ of execution should have been issued as a
matter of right. Petitioners manifestly failed to adduce a compelling reason to justify a
departure from the aforecited rule.

Petitioners contend that the delay should be excused because the MTC, without fixing the
amount of the bond, transmitted the records of the case to the RTC even before the
perfection of the appeal,  i.e., the expiration of the period for filing an appeal.  Hence, they
14 15

did not know whether to file a bond with the RTC or with the MTC. Neither were they certain
of the amount of the bond.

How the Amount of Supersedeas

Bond Is Determined

Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond. They could
have computed this themselves. As early as 1947, we have held in Aylon vs. Jugo and De
Pablo that the supersedeas bond is equivalent to the amount of rentals, damages and costs
stated in the judgment: 16

. . . Under the provisions of Section 8 of the Rule, a justice of the peace or a municipal
court may require the defendant to file a bond for an amount which would cover the
stipulated rentals, as found by the judgment of the Court, or the reasonable value for
the use and occupation of the premises, at the rate determined by the judgment,
damages and costs down to the time of the final judgment in the action. The
reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises, the possession of which
is sought to be recovered, is that fixed by the Court in the judgment, because the
rental stipulated in the contract of lease that has expired or terminated may no longer
be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by
reason of the change or rise in values. But the bond together with the appeal is only to
prevent the immediate execution of a judgment rendered against the defendant in
forcible entry and detainer cases. Such execution must be prevented further by
paying to the plaintiff or depositing with the Court of First Instance, during the
pendency of the appeal, the stipulated rental due from time to time under the contract,
as found by the judgment of the Court, or, in the absence of a contract, the reasonable
value for the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month, on or
before the tenth day of each calendar month, at the rate determined by the judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)

Under Section 8 of Rule 70, the supersedeas bond shall be equivalent to the unpaid rentals,
damages and costs which accrued before the decision was rendered, as determined by the
MTC in the said decision. The bond does not answer for amounts accruing during the
17

pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, the subject of the periodic deposits to be made by
the defendant. 18

In the present case, the MTC clearly stated in its March 5, 1993 decision that petitioners
should pay rentals of P50,000 a month from April 7, 1992 until they shall have vacated the
lots. The amount comprising the supersedeas bond and the periodic deposits, therefore, is
evident and computable from the MTC's decision.

Where Is the
Supersedeas Bond Filed?

In the light of the peculiar circumstances of this case, petitioners allege that they could not
determine whether to file the supersedeas bond with the MTC or the RTC. Thus, they argue: 19

28. In the facts of the dispute involved in his petition, the court of origin cannot fix the
amount of supersedeas bond since the records are no longer with it. The RTC on the
other hand cannot fix the amount of supersedeas bond since the appeal has not yet
been perfected and, after the same has been perfected, the unlawful detainer case
 records or expediente (case folder) must first pass through several administrative
processes such as docketing, checking for completeness of expediente, raffle and
finally taking "cognizance" or initial action of the said appeal by the branch of the RTC
to which it was raffled.

Petitioners' submissions are meritless. As earlier observed, there is no need for either the
MTC or the RTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond, the same being manifest in the
face of the MTCs decision. Moreover, petitioner failed to file the bond on time not because
they did not know where to file it, but because they believed that they should not do so.
Hence, their opposition to the motion for execution was based on their alleged co-ownership
of the property. It was only before the Court of Appeals that they claimed confusion on where
the bond should be filed. The Court of Appeals discarded petitioners' argument in this wise:

Their claim that they did not know where to file the supersedeas bond is being made
only now. Indeed, in opposing petitioners' motion for execution they based their
opposition not on this ground but on the claim that since they were claiming to be co-
owners of the lots in question, their claim would be rendered moot and academic if
execution were ordered pending appeal. It is, therefore, not true that they were
prevented from filing a supersedeas bond because the MTC transmitted the records of
the case to the RTC before the expiration of private respondents' period of appeal.

Petitioners also argue that Laurel vs. Abalos  should be applied here. In that case, this Court
20

held that "[w]here supervening events occurring subsequent to the judgment bring about a
material change in the situation of the parties, which makes the execution inequitable, or
where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the
prevailing circumstances, the court may stay immediate execution of the judgment."  They21

also allege that the "immediate execution of judgment of the inferior court, will cause
irreparable injury  to the petitioners herein who stand to lose their home, business and
22

source of livelihood . . . ."

23

We are not persuaded. We do not find in this case any supervening circumstance or any
material change in the situation of the parties, which would render inequitable the immediate
execution of the judgment pending appeal. We agree with the disquisition of Respondent
Court on this point:

It is also argued that this case falls under the exception to the rule making Rule 70,
sec. 8 mandatory because of supervening events which bring about a material change
in the situation of the parties and make the execution pending appeal inequitable or
because there is no urgency for the execution under the circumstances.

The case in which this exception was applied was that of Laurel v. Abalos, 30 SCRA
281 (1969). The present case is, however, a far cry from that case. In Laurel
v. Abalos there was probability that the plaintiff in the ejectment case would lose the
property and therefore, his right to eject the defendant became doubtful because,
while the appeal of the defendant was pending, another court declared the plaintiff's
title to be null and void at the instance of plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest. In the
present case, no such probability exists. What is there is only an allegation by private
respondents' ejectment suit, that they are co-owners of the lots in question. What is
noteworthy in this case is that the titles to the lots are in the names of petitioners and,
except for the claim of ownership put up as a defense by the defendants, there is
otherwise no action questioning the validity of petitioners' titles. Indeed no heirs of
Chua Hai has ever claimed ownership of the lots in question.
 There is, therefore, no basis for private respondents' contention that because of a
supervening event — of which there is none — there is no compelling necessity for
ordering execution of the decision in the ejectment case based on private
respondents' failure to file a supersedeas bond and deposit the monthly rentals within
the time provided by law.

The allegation of Petitioner Marciano Chua that he, as a co-owner of the subject property, has
filed an action for partition does not constitute a compelling reason to further delay the
execution of the judgment. An ejectment suit is conclusive only on the issue of material
possession or possession de facto of the property under litigation,  not on the issue of
24

ownership. Section 7  of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is clear on this:

25

Sec. 7. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving

title or ownership. — The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer
shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or
affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall it be held
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a
different cause of action not involving possession.

The pendency of the action for partition, where ownership is one of the principal issues, does
not preclude the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit. Such action for partition is
entirely independent of the ejectment suit.  On the other hand, the issue of ownership is
26

considered in an ejectment suit only for the limited purpose of determining who between the
contending parties has the better right to possession. Moreover, it should be stressed that
27

we are not being called upon here to decide which of the parties has a better right of
possession, let alone, a better title to the property. The only issue in this case is whether or
not a writ of execution should be issued pending appeal of the ejectment suit.

In any event, it is erroneous to characterize the partition suit as a compelling reason to stay
the execution of the judgment pending appeal. On the contrary, the fact that the titles to the
disputed lots are in the name of Private Respondent Mariano C. Moreno, and not in the name
of petitioners or their father Chua Hai, justifies the transfer of possession of the said property
to the private respondents, at least during the appeal. The question of "irreparable injury" to
petitioners, on the other hand, cannot be discussed at this forum, for this Court is not a trier
of facts.  In any case, this question of "irreparable injury" is, at best, speculative and
28

conjectural, and deserves no further disquisition.

Coming back to the original question, the bond should be filed before the MTC or, where the
records have been forwarded to the RTC, before the latter court. In either case, it should be
done during the period of appeal.

Secondary Issue:

Deprivation of Property Without Due Process

Petitioners submit that they are "the exclusive and absolute owners of successful and
profit[-]generating businesses located in [the] parcel of land in question." Thus, if the
judgment of ejectment is to be executed, private respondents will get possession not only of
the parcel of land, but also of the improvements thereon which are integral to the business of
petitioners.  They further argue that the rights of the petitioners over the improvements
29
located in the land are still to be resolved in the ejectment suit on appeal and in the partition
case.30

Petitioners' submissions are irrelevant. In the first place, the present case involves only the
propriety of issuing a writ of execution pending the appeal. It is not conclusive on the right of
possession of the land — let alone the improvements therein  — which is the main issue in
31 32

the appealed ejectment suit. In the second place, any of the perceived injuries to their
business could have been avoided by the simple expedient of filing a supersedeas bond
pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 70. Petitioners had an opportunity to file the bond, but they did
not do so on time. They cannot now complain of alleged deprivation of property without due
process.

In an action for ejectment or for recovery of possession of real property, it is well-settled that
the defendant's claims for the value of the improvements on the property or necessary
expenses for its preservation should be interposed as compulsory counterclaims. 33

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. 120784-85        January 24, 2001

SPOUSES WARLITO BUSTOS and HERMINIA REYES-BUSTOS, petitioners, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES VENANCIO VIRAY and CECILIA NUNGA-VIRAY, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the Court of
Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 552 and the
resolution denying reconsideration.3

Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2, 1957.4 He had four (4) children, namely: Manuela, Trinidad,
Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo.

On September 30, 1964, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition5 of the estate of Paulino
Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela sold her share to Moses6 G. Mendoza, husband of Beatriz by
deed of absolute sale.7 The description of the property reads as follows:

"A parcel of an irrigated riceland located in the barrio of San Isidro, Masantol, Pampanga.
Bounded on the North, by Paulino Fajardo; on the East, by Paulino Fajardo; on the South, by
Paulino Guinto. Containing an area of 5,253 sq. mts., more or less. Declared under Tax
Declaration No. 3029 in the sum of P710.00."

At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in Masantol, Pampanga. Later, the cadastre
was conducted and the property involved in the partition case were specified as Lots 280, 283, 284,
1000-A and 1000-B. The share of Manuela, which was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of the
Masantol Cadastre and Lot 284 was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B.

Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to her brother-in-
law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands.
On September 3, 1971, Moses filed with the Court of First Instance, Pampanga a complaint for
partition claiming the one fourth (1/4) share of Manuela which was sold to him.8

During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died. On December 15, 1984, the
heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo. On February 16, 1987,
Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-
Viray.

On February 8, 1989, the Regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55 rendered a
decision in favor of Moses G. Mendoza, the dispositive portion of which provides:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs

and against the defendants, and hereby orders. 1âwphi1.nêt

"1. The division and partition of the parcel of land identified and described earlier with the aid
and assistance of a qualified surveyor, segregating therefrom an area equivalent to 1/4
portion to be taken from the vacant right eastern portion which is toward the national road
the same to be determined by one (or the said surveyor) standing on the subject land facing
the municipal road, at the expense of the plaintiffs;

"2. The said 1/4 portion segregated shall be a fixed portion, described by metes and bounds,
and shall be adjudicated and assigned to the plaintiffs;

"3. In case of disagreement as to where the said right eastern portion should be taken, a
commission is hereby constituted, and the OIC-Clerk of Court is hereby appointed chairman,
and the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of Branches 54 and 55 of this Court are hereby appointed
members, to carry out the orders contained in the foregoing first two paragraphs;

"4. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the
costs of the proceedings.

"SO ORDERED."9

On September 13, 1991, Moses sold the subject land to spouses Warlito Bustos and Herminia
Reyes-Bustos.

In the meantime, on November 6, 1989, spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray, buyers of
Lucio Ignacio's share of the property, filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Macabebe-
Masantol, Pampanga an action for unlawful detainer10 against spouses Bustos, the buyers of Moses
G. Mendoza, who were in actual possession as lessees of the husband of Trinidad, Francisco
Ignacio, of the subject land.

The municipal circuit trial court decided the case in favor of spouses Viray. Subsequently, the trial
court issued writs of execution and demolition, but were stayed when spouses Bustos filed with the
regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55,11 a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction.

On December 18, 1992, the regional trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
 "WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is as it is hereby, dismissed. The
preliminary injunction is ordered dissolved and the petitioners and Meridian Assurance
Corporation are hereby ordered jointly and severally, to pay the private respondents the sum
of P20,000.00 by way of litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and to pay the cost of the
proceedings."12

In time, the spouses Bustos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.13

On February 27, 1989, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio also appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.14

Upon motion for consolidation of the petitioners, on August 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals resolved to
consolidate CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 and CA-G.R. CV No. 37606.15

On August 26, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in the two cases, the dispositive
portion of which provides:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, consolidated judgment is hereby rendered for
bot CA-G.R. SP No. 37607 and CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 as follows:

"1. The appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 37607 is dismissed; Moses Mendoza is
declared as owner of the 1/4 undivided share previously owned by Manuela Fajardo; and the
decision of the Regional Trial Court dated February 8, 1989 in Civil Case No. 83-0005-M is
affirmed but MODIFIED as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs and against the defendants, and hereby orders.

"1. A relocation survey to be conducted (at the expense of the plaintiffs) to retrace
the land subject of the deed of sale dated September 30, 1964 between Manuela
Fajardo and Moses Mendoza;

"2. The division and partition of said relocated land by segregating therefrom an area
equivalent to 1/4 portion to be taken from the vacant right eastern portion which is
toward the national road, the same to be determined by one standing on the subject
land facing the municipal road, at the expense of the plaintiff-appellees;

"3. The said 1/4 portion segregated shall be a fixed portion, described by metes and
bounds, and shall be adjudicated and assigned to the plaintiffs-appellees;

"4. In case of disagreement as to where the said right eastern portion should be
taken, a Commission is hereby constituted, with the OIC/present Clerk of Court as
Chairman, and the OIC/present Branch Clerk of Court of Branches 54 and 55 of the
Court (RTC) as members, to carry out and implement the Orders contained in the
second and third paragraphs hereof;

"5. The defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P500.00 as attorney's
fees, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

"2. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 92-0421-M is AFFIRMED but the reasons for its dismissal
shall be effective only as to the issue of possession. CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 is DISMISSED.
 "3. No. pronouncement as to costs.

"SO ORDERED."16

On September 9, 1994, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration;17 however, on June 21, 1995,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion.18

Hence, this petition.19

The issue raised is whether petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land.

The petition is meritorious.

In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the unlawful
detailer case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession on the
ground that the decision has become final and executory. This means that the petitioners may be
evicted. In the accion reinvindicatoria, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ownership of petitioners
over the subject land. Hence, the court declared petitioners as the lawful owners of the land.

Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the ministerial duty of
the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment admits of exceptions. In Lipana vs.
Development Bank of Rizal,20the Supreme Court reiterated the rule "once a decision becomes final
and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain
exceptions as in cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher
interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution (Vecine v. Geronimo, 59 O. G. 579);
whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice (Pascual v. Tan 85 Phil. 164); or when
certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could render the
execution of the judgment unjust (Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354)."

In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal
owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting
petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the issue
of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses Bustos by
virtue of a valid deed of sale.

Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical consequence of
the decision declaring them as the rightful owners is possession. It follows that as owners of the
subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of the same. "An owner who cannot exercise
the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of ownership-the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or
consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits is a crippled
owner."22

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals I Ca

G.R. SP No. 30609 for being moot and academic. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. CV No. 37606.

G.R. No. 221071

EDDIE E. DIZON and BRYAN R. DIZON, Petitioners, 

vs.
YOLANDA VIDA P. BELTRAN, Respondent.
 DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari,   under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with
1

prayer for the issuance of a temporary Restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, filed by
Eddie E. Dizon (Eddie) and Bryan James R. Dizon (Bryan) (collectively, the petitioners) to challenge
the Decision  rendered on January 23, 2015 and Resolution  issued on September 7, 2015 by the
2 3

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 05256-MIN. The dispositive portion of the assailed
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 13 June 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
11 November 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Davao City, Branch 1, in Civil Case No.
21 [,]755-A-10, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14, is hereby
ORDERED to issue a writ of execution for the en Corcemen1 of the MTCC Decision dated 11
November 2011.

SO ORDERED.  4

The assailed resolution denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents

Eddie started working as a seafarer in the 1980s.  He has two children, namely, Bryan and James
5

Christopher R. Dizon (James). 6

Eddie and Verona Juana Pascua-Dizon (Verona) (collectively, the Spouses Dizon) got married on
March 8, 1995. Verona was a housewife.  She and her mother, together with Bryan and James,
7 8

resided in the house erected on a 240-square-meter lot (disputed property) at No. 42 Mahogany
Street, Nova Tierra Subdivision, Lanang, Davao City. The disputed property was covered by
9

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-351707  issued in 2002. The registered owners were
10

"[Verona], married to [Eddie]."

In 2008, Verona filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City a petition for the issuance
of Temporary and Permanent Protection Orders against Eddie and James.  11

On ,April 9, 2008, the Spouses Dizon entered into a Compromise Agreement,   whereby they
12

contemplated selling the disputed property in the amount of not less than ₱4,000,000.00, which price
shall be increased by ₱100,000.00 for every succeeding year until the same is finally sold. They
would thereafter equally divide the proceeds from the sale.

On September 27, 2009, Eddie left the Philippines to work on board a ship.  Sometime in October of
13

2009, Verona was confined at the Adventist Hospital in Bangkal, Davao City. She was transferred to
Ricardo Limso Medical Center on November 30, 2009.   She died on December 8, 2009 due to
14

cardio-respiratory arrest, with "leukonoid reaction secondary to sepsis or malignancy (occult)" as

antecedent cause.  15

Eddie claimed that he was unaware of Verona's hospital confinement. On December 9, 2009, his
brother Jun Dizon (Jun), called him through the Telephone and informed him about Verona's death.
Eddie intended to promptly return to the Philippines before Verona's burial. Hence, he advised Jun to
ask Verona's relatives to wait for his arrival. 
16

It took a while before Eddie's employer finally permitted him to go home. Verona was already buried
before Eddie's arrival on December 21, 2009.  17

Thereafter, a copy of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed),  dated December, 1, 2009, was shown to
18

Eddie. Its subject was the disputed property conveyed to herein respondent, Yolanda Vida P. Beltran
(Vida), for ₱1,500,000.00. 19

Eddie alleged that the Deed was falsified, and his and Verona's signatures thereat were
forgeries.  In January of 2010, Eddie filed two complaints against Vida. One was a civil case for
20

nullification of the Deed, and for payment of damages and attorney's fees.  The other was a criminal
21

complaint for falsification of public document.  He also caused the annotation of a notice of lis
22

penden upon TCT No. T-351707. 23

On April 6, 20 l 0, TCT No. T-351707 was cancelled, and in its place, TCT No. T-146-2010002236
was issued in Vida's name.  Eddie belatedly discovered about the foregoing fact sometime in May
24

2010 after Davao Light and Power Company cut off the electrical connection purportedly upon the
advice of the new owner of the disputed property.  25

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

In June of 2010, Vida filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Davao City an action
for unlawful detainer  against the petitioners, James and their unnamed relatives, house helpers and
26

acquaintances residing in the disputed property.  27

Vida alleged that she is the registered owner of the disputed property. While the Deed evidencing
the conveyance in her favor was executed on December 1, 2009, Eddie pre-signed the same on
April 9, 2008 before he left to work abroad. The Spouses Dizon's respective lawyers witnessed the
signing. After Verona's death, Vida tolerated the petitioners' stay in the disputed property. On May
18, 2010, Vida sent a formal letter requiring the petitioners to vacate the disputed property, but to no
avail. 
28

The petitioners sought the dismissal of Vida's complaint arguing that at the time the Deed was
executed, Verona was already unconscious. Eddie, on the other hand, could not have signed the
Deed as well since he left the Philippines on September 27, 2009 and returned only on December
21, 2009. Further, Verona's signature appearing on the Deed was distinctly different from those she
had affixed in her petition for the issuance of a temporary protection order and Compromise
Agreement, elated March 26, 2008 and April 9, 2008, respectively. Besides, the purchase price of
₱l,500,000.00 was not in accord with the Spouses Dizon's agreement to sell the disputed property
for not less than ₱4,000,000.00.  29

On November 11, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision  directing the petitioners and their co-
30

defendants to turn over to Vida the possession of the disputed property, and pay ₱1,000.00 monthly
rent from July 12, 2010 until the said property is vacated, ₱20,000.00 as attorney's fees and cost of
suit. Vida was, however, ordered to pay therein defendants ₱414,459.78 as remaining balance
relative to the sale. 
31

The MTCC rationalized as follows:

The claim of [the petitioners] as to the falsity of the sale is a collateral attack on the generated title
itself, which can only be impugned in a direct proceeding litigated for that matter. The fact that
[Eddie] presigned the [Deed] prior to the death of [Verona], in the presence of counsels[,] which
remained unrebutted[,] was in fact giving consent to the act of disposing the property to answer for
any exigency or impending situation that will arise later[,] which may or may not be entirely
connected with the medical requirements of his ailing spouse[,] whose health condition at that time
of the execution [of the Deed] ha[d] apparently started to deteriorate. Records show [that] [Vida]
incurred a hefty sum of One Million Eighty-Five Thousand Five Hundred and Forty pesos and
twenty-one centavos (₱1,085,540.21) for both medical and burial expenses of the deceased of
which [Eddie] failed to support in violation of the Civil Code on the rights and, [sic] obligation of the
husband and wife to render mutual support.

xxxx

While evidences were presented to prove the existence of fraud in the execution of the instrument[,]
the same cannot be appreciated in this summary action for want of jurisdiction.

x x x [A] notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption
of regularity. x x x.

xxxx

x x x The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not defendants unlawfully withheld the property
sold to [Vida.]

xxxx

While it is true that defendants herein filed both civil and criminal cases for the Nullification of the
[Deed] and Falsification alleging forgeries, the issues therein are entirely different from this
ejectment case. The criminal case, [sic] only proves the existence of probable cause to determine
criminal culpability. The nullification tackles the validity or invalidity of the sale on grounds of falsity.

The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of sale; title or document do not
abate any ejectment action respecting the same property x x x.

xxxx

x x x [C]onsidering the conjugal nature of the property and the subsequent dissolution of the
conjugal partnership upon the death of [Verona] on December 08, 2009, with the execution of
conveyance in favor of [Vida], this Court deemed it equitable and just for [Vida], to return to [Eddie],
[sic] the remaining balance of the sale representing the net amount less the total actual medical and
burial expenses of [Verona] from the proceeds of the sale, in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED,
FOURTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED, FIFTY-NINE PESOS AND SEVENTY-NINE centavos
(P414,459.79) in the absence of evidence to that effect and for reasons of equity. 32

Ruling of the RTC

The petitioners filed an appeal  before the RTC. During its pendency, Vida filed a motion for the
33

issuance of a writ of execution. On June 13, 2012, the RTC reversed the MTCC ruling, dismissed
the complaint for unlawful detainer and denied Vida's motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution.  The RTC explained that:
34

Under Republic Act No. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCCs],
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending Batas Pambansa [Blg.] 129,
otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,["] paragraph 2, of Section 33 therein
provides that the court of first level has "x-x- Exclusive Original jurisdiction over cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, that when, in such cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot he resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership[, the latter shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession[.]["] x x x

In the pleadings of the [petitioners] filed before the court a quo, and even in their memorandum on
appeal, they vigorously raise[d] the question of ownership of [Vida] based on the alleged notarized
[Deed] signed by [Eddie] in favor of [Vida] where the latter derived her so-called ownership over the
subject premises[.] Truly indeed upon examination by any sensible man[,] it would reveal that the
signature[s] of [the Spouses Dizon] appearing at the bottom of the al1eged Deed [were] falsified x x
x. Thus, a document challenged by a party in litigation as falsified may be proved without resorting to
an opinion of handwriting experts. x x x.

In another case[,] the Supreme Court held that: "x-x- A finding of forgery does not entirely depend on
the testimony of handwriting experts. Although it is useful[,] the judge still exercises independent
judgment on the issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny by comparing the
alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signatures of the person whose
signature is theorized upon to have been forged. x x x

This court x x x took occasion in comparing and examining the signature of [Verona] in the [Deed] x
x x vis-a-vis her signature appearing in the compromise agreement executed [with Eddie] x x x[.]
[The comparison] lucidly showed that the signatures of [Verona] [were] x x x very different from each
other and [the differences are] detectable by a human eye. x x x.

xxxx

Another thing that caught the curiosity of this court is the stipulation contained in the compromise
agreement x x x wherein [the Spouses Dizon] agreed x x x that the "x-x- net selling price of the said
conjugal property should be sold not lower than FOUR MILLION (P4,000,000.00) PESOS for the
year 2008 x x x."

xxxx

x x x [T]here was never proof adduced that the compromise agreement adverted to was rescinded or
modified by the [Spouses Dizon]. To the view of this Court[,] the consideration of the said [Deed] x x
x has an indicia of fraud x x x [and] the signature[s] of the [Spouses Dizon] as falsified. [A] [f]alsified
document cannot give right or ownership to a party who uses it.

xxxx

x x x To justify an action for unlawful detainer[,] the permission or tolerance must have been
present at the beginning of the possession[.]-x-x-x- Since the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the [MTCC] had no jurisdiction over
the case. x x x.  (Emphasis and underlining in the original)
35
Ruling of the CA

Vida assailed the foregoing via a petition for review, which the CA granted in the herein assailed
decision and resolution. The CA's reasons are cited below:

[Vida] was able to sufficiently allege and consequently established the requisites of unlawful
detainer.

First, [Vida] alleged that she is the registered owner of the [disputed] property and she merely
tolerated the continuous possession of the [petitioners] [of] the [disputed] property after she
purchased it and had it titled in her name. Second, [the petitioners'] possession became illegal upon
notice by [Vida] to [the petitioners] of the termination of the [petitioners'] right of possession as
shown by the Notice to Vacate dated 18 May 2010 sent by [Vida's] counsel to [the
petitioners]. Third, [the petitioners] refused to vacate the [disputed] property x x x thereby depriving
[Vida] of the enjoyment thereof. And fourth, [Vida] instituted the complaint dated 03 June 2010 for
unlawful detainer within one (1) year from demand to vacate the premises. x x x.

xxxx

x x x While the said [Deed] was questioned by [the petitioners] for being a nullity in a separate case,
yet, it should be emphasized that the determination of the validity or the nullity of the [Deed] should
be properly threshed out in that separate proceeding and not in the summary action for unlawful
detainer. x x x.

xxxx

x x x Nothing is more settled than the rule that "[i]n an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for
resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim
of ownership by any of the parties. However, where the issue of ownership is· raised, the courts may
pass upon the issue of ownership in order to determine who has the right to possess the property.
The Court stresses, however, that this adjudication is only an initial determination of ownership for
the purpose of settling the issue of possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked
thereto. The lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. It is,
therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the subject matter of a separate case
for annulment of [the Deed] filed by [the petitioners].

x x x [T]he RTC[,] in resolving the issue of possession in the unlawful detainer 'case[,] has not only
provisionally passed upon the issue of ownership of the [disputed] property but it in fact made a
determinative and conclusive finding on the ownership thereof, contrary to the settled rule that in [an]
unlawful detainer case, the only issue to be resolve[d] by the court is the physical or material
possession or the property involved x x x.

x x x [W]hile the Court may make provisional determination of ownership in order to determine who
between [Vida] and [the petitioners] had the better right to possess the property, yet, the court is
proscribed from making a conclusive finding on this issue. x x x [T]he RTC has already made a
preemptive finding on the validity or invalidity of the document, [but] the resolution thereof properly
pertains to a separate proceeding pending before it in a separate case. x x x.

xxxx
x x x [T]his Court agrees with the contention of [Vida] that the RTC's pronouncement that the
signatures in the [Deed] were forged and [Vida's] title issued pursuant thereto is void is a collateral
attack on [Vida's] title which violates the [principle of] indefeasibility of the Torrens title. x x x.

xxxx

Verily, unless and until [Vida's] title over the [disputed] property is annulled in a separate proceeding
instituted by [the petitioners], the same is valid and [Vida] has the right to possess the subject
property, being an attribute of her ownership over it. x x x.

xxxx

x x x [T]o stay the immediate execution of judgment in ejectment proceedings, the defendant-
appellant must: (a) perfect his appeal, (b) file a supersedeas bond, and (c) periodically deposit the
rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.

x x x [T]he supersedeas bond was paid by [the petitioners] only on 02 May 2012. x x x [T]he bond
filed by [the petitioners] in order to stay the: immediate execution of the MTCC Decision was filed out
of time as it was not filed within the period to appeal.

x x x [T]he failure of the [petitioners] in this case to comply with any of the conditions provided under
Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the
duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial and imperative." x x x.

Thus, as the supersedeas bond was filed out of time or beyond the period to appeal, [Vida's] motion
for immediate execution should have been acted upon by the RTC and the writ of execution should
have been issued as a matter of right.   (Citations omitted and italics in the original)
36

The CA, through the herein assailed resolution,  denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 
37 38

Issues

The instant petition is anchored on the issues of whether or not:

1. Vida has a cause of action for unlawful detainer against the petitioners considering that the
Deed she relied upon in filing her complaint was falsified, hence, null; and
2. the RTC correctly ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, the MTCC can resolve the issue of
ownership. 39

In support thereof, the petitioners point out that relative to the falsification case filed by Eddie against
Vida, the Office of the Davao City Prosecutor issued a Resolution,   dated June 11, 2010, stating
40

that no expert eye is needed to ascertain that the signatures appearing in the Deed were different
from the standard signatures of the Spouses Dizon. Further, on September 20, 2010, another
resolution  was issued finding probable cause to indict Vida for the crime of falsification of public
41

documents. Thereafter, the MTCC issued a Warrant of Arrest  against Vida.

42

The petitioners also insist that no Deed was executed conveying the disputed property in Vida's
favor. When the Deed was purportedly executed on December l, 2009, Verona was already
unconscious, while Eddie was abroad. Having been simulated, the Deed was void and inexistent. It
produced no effect and cannot create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation. Hence, Vida had no
right to transfer the title in her name using the falsified Deed. Perforce, her complaint for unlawful
detainer against the petitioners had no leg to stand on and should be dismissed.

Citing Spouses De Guzman v. Agbagala, the petitioners claim that the rule on non-collateral attack
43

of a Torrens title does not apply in a case where the title is void from the start. An action to declare
the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral
attack. 
44

Anent the belated posting of the supersedeas bond, the petitioners stress that fault cannot be
ascribed to them. They waited for the MTCC's order approving and fixing the amount. When the
order was finally issued, the petitioners were required to post the bond before the RTC and deposit
the monthly rental as well. The petitioners complied before the RTC rendered its Decision dated
June 13, 2012. 45

As counterclaims, the petitioners impute malice and bad faith against Vida in filing the complaint for
unlawful detainer. The petitioners, thus, pray for the award of ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages,
₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and ₱2,000.00 for each
appearance of their counsel. 46

In Vida's Comment,  she argues that the petitioners' claim of forgery is yet to be proven in court by
47

clear, positive and convincing evidence. Having been notarized, the Deed enjoys the presumption of
due execution, and shall remain valid unless annulled in a proper proceeding. Besides, the
allegation of forgery and nullity of the Deed are immaterial in a summary action for unlawful detainer.
Allowing the foregoing claims to be litigated amounts to a collateral attack on Vida's title.

Vida also points out that the petitioners paid the supersedeas bond only on May 2, 2012, beyond the
period to perfect an appeal. 48

Ruling of the Court

On matters of procedure

While the petitioners explicitly raise only two substantive issues, in the body of the petition, they
discuss procedural matters anent their payment of the sudersedeas bond and an alleged error on
the part of the CA in concluding that the RTC should have issued a writ of execution relative to the
MTCC's decision in Vida's favor.  49

The petitioners admit that they posted the supersedeas bond beyond the period to perfect an
appeal, but claim that it was the MTCC, which belatedly fixed the amount. Pending the appeal they
had filed before the RTC, they promptly posted the bond after the amount was determined by the
MTCC. 50

In Spouses Chua v. CA, the Court ruled that:

51

Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond. They could have
computed this themselves. As early as 1947, we have held in Aylon vs. Jugo and De Pablo that the
supersedeas bond is equivalent to the amount of rentals, damages and costs stated in the
judgment. 52

If the cited case were to be applied, the petitioners' failure to post the supersedeas bond within the
allowable period shall result in the immediate execution of the MTCC judgment. Nonetheless, in City
of Naga v. Hon. Asuncion, et al., the Court has carved exceptions to immediate execution of
53

judgments in ejectment cases, viz.:

Petitioner herein invokes seasonably the exceptions to immediate execution of judgments in

ejectment cases cited m Hualam Construction and Dev't. Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Laurel v.
Abalos, thus:

Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a material change in
the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling
urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court may
stay immediate execution of the judgment.

Noteworthy; the foregoing exceptions were made in reference to Section 8, Rule 70 of the old Rules
of Court which has been substantially reproduced as Section 19, Rule 70  of the 1997 Rules of Civil
54

Procedure. Therefore, even if the appealing defendant was not able to file a supersedeas bond, and
make periodic deposits to the appellate court, immediate execution of the MTC decision is not
proper where the circumstances of the case fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions. x x
x.  (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
55

In Laurel, et al. v. Hon. Abalos, etc., et al.,   therein respondent filed an action for reformation of the
56

deed of sale against therein petitioners pending the appeal of the unlawful detainer case before the
RTC. The RTC thereafter denied therein petitioners' motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
relative to the MTCC judgment, and required therein respondent to post a supersedeas bond.
According to the Court, the peculiar environmental circumstances obtaining in the case justify the
non-immediate execution of the MTCC's judgment pending appeal. The Court further expounded as
follows:

[T]his Court took pains at length to explain that this provision (regarding immediate execution of the
judgment of inferior courts in cases of unlawful detainer) can be availed of only if no question of title
is involved and the ownership or the right to the possession of the property is an admitted fact.
Through Mr. Justice Labrador, this Court said in De los Reyes vs. Castro, et al.:

.... The provision for the immediate execution of a judgment of the justice of the peace court in
actions of unlawful detainer under Section 8 of Rule 72 of the [old] Rules of Court, is not applicable
to an action of detainer like the present, where there is no immediate urgency for the execution
because it is not justified by the circumstances. This view is based on the history of the action of
forcible entry. This action originated in the English common law where it was originally in the form of
a criminal proceeding whereby ands or properties seized through the use of force could immediately
be returned. x x x.

It is 'the opinion of the writer that inasmuch as the prope1iy now subject of litigation was originally
sold only with right to repurchase to the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff was not really and originally the
owner and possessor of the property, and since there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
contract entered into between them was not one of lease but one of loan with mortgage of the
property, the right of the plaintiff to the immediate possession of the property is not apparent, clear or
conclusive, and neither should his right to the immediate execution of the property [be] allowed until
opportunity to settle the question of ownership is had. In other words, the writer of the opinion holds
that while Section 8 of Rule 72 is applicable also in cases of unlawful detainer, the immediate
execution it provides for may be availed of only if no question of title is involved and the ownership
and the right to the possession of the property is an admitted fact.

xxxx
Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a material change in
the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling
urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court may
stay immediate execution of the judgment.

The assertion by Laput of "ownership" of the house she is occupying, the appeal pending in the [CA]
from the decision in Civil Case 1517 which declared null and void from the beginning the deed of
sale in favor of the petitioners, the latter's unexplained silence in the face of the manifestation filed
by Laput informing this Court of the supervening occurrences, and their failure to submit their
comment as required by this Court, are strong and sufficient additional reasons, cumulatively, to
justify the :dismissal of the present petition.  (Citations, emphasis and italics omitted, and underlining
57

ours)

By analogy, in the unlawful detainer case from which the instant petition arose, Eddie was originally
a co-owner of the disputed property, and he remains in possession thereof. Vida, on the other, is not
even a resident of Davao City.  Moreover, prior to Vida's filing of the unlawful detainer case, Eddie
58

had already instituted actions for nullification of the Deed and falsification of public documents. The
Office of the Davao City Prosecutor had likewise made a preliminary determination of probable
cause that forgery was committed. Eddie, thus, insists that no valid conveyance was made by
Verona to Vida. In the mind of the Court, the foregoing are persuasive; reasons justifying the non-
immediate execution of the MTCC judgment despite the petitioners' belated posting of the
supersedeas bond. Hence, the CA erred in declaring that the RTC improperly denied Vida's motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal.

On substantive issues

Being interrelated, the two substantive issues raised shall be discussed jointly. Essentially, the
petitioners allege that the MTCC should have dismissed Vida's complaint for unlawful detainer for
lack of basis as the Deed she relied upon is falsified and void. It is also claimed that the CA erred in
not upholding the RTC's ruling that the latter can take cognizance of the issue of ownership in an
unlawful detainer case.

The Court finds merit in the petitioners' arguments.

In Consolacion D. Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo v. Engracia D. Singson, where there were
59

similar allegations of forgery and the issue of ownership was raised in the ejectment case, the Court
pronounced:

In arriving at its pronouncement, the CA passed upon the issue or claim of ownership, which both
parties raised. While the procedure taken is allowed - under Section 16, Rule 70  of the 1997 Rules
60

of Civil Procedure, the issue of ownership may be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession - the CA nonetheless committed serious and patent error in concluding that based solely
on respondent's TCT 12575 issued in her name, she must be considered the singular owner of the
subject property and thus entitled to possession thereof - pursuant to the principle that "the person
who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof." Such provisional determination
of ownership should have been resolved in petitioners' favor.

When the deed of sale in favor of respondent was purportedly executed by the parties thereto and
notarized on June 6, 2006, it is perfectly obvious that the signatures of the vendors therein, Macario
and Felicidad, were forged. They could not have signed the same, because both were by then long
deceased: Macario died on February 22, 1981, while Felicidad passed away on September 14,
1997. This makes the June 6, 2006 deed of sale null and void; being so, it is "equivalent to nothing; it
produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation."

And while it is true that respondent has in her favor a Torrens title over the subject property, she
nonetheless acquired no right or title in her favor by virtue of the null and void June 6, 2006
deed. "Verily, when the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's
duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the
assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the property."

xxxx

Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the
property in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property. A
certificate of title merely confirms or' records title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of
the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real
property. Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be an
exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-
standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal
principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is
registered holds it as a mere trustee.

Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the same remained in the name of the
original registered owners, Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners, petitioners and
respondent thus became, and remain co-owners - by succession - of the subject property. As such,
petitioners may exercise all attributes of ownership over the same, including possession -
whether de facto or dejure; respondent thus has no right to exclude them from this right through an
action for ejectment.

With the Court's determination that respondent's title is null and void, the matter of direct or collateral
attack is a foregone conclusion as well. "An action to declare the nullity of a void title does not
prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack;" petitioners were not precluded
from questioning the validity of respondent's title in the ejectment case.  (Citations and emphasis
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omitted and underlining ours)

In the case at bar, when the Deed was executed on December 1, 2009, Eddie claimed that he was
abroad while Verona was already unconscious. Vida did not directly refute these allegations and
instead pointed out that the Deed was pre-signed in April of 2008. The foregoing circumstances
reduced the Deed into the category of a private instrument as can be drawn from the Court's
discussion in Adelaida Meneses (deceased) v. Venturozo,  viz.:
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As notarized documents, [Deeds] carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their
clue execution and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so
clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity. The presumptions that attach
to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was
regular. A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a
private instrument. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear
and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed
with, and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of
evidence.  (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
63

Further, in Dela Rama, et al. v. Papa, et al., the Court elucidated that:
64
Papas['] admissions, refreshing in their self-incriminatory candor, beat legal significance.  With
1âwphi1

respect to deeds of sale or conveyance, what spells the difference between a public document and a
private document is the acknowledgment in the former that the parties acknowledging the document
appear before the notary public and specifically manifest under oath that they are the persons who
executed it, and acknowledge that the same are their free act and deed. x x x

xxxx

The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular. We cannot ascribe that conclusion at bar to the deed of
sale. Respondent failed to confirm before the RTC that he had actually appeared before the notary
public, a bare minimum requirement under Public Act No. 2103. Such defect will not ipso facto void
the deed of sale. However, it eliminates the presumptions that are carried by notarized public
documents and subject the deed of sale to a different level of scrutiny than that relied on by the
[CA]. This consequence is with precedent. In Tigno v. Sps. Aquino, where the public document in
question had been notarized by a judge who had no authority to do so, the Court dispensed with the
clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to duly notarized documents, and
instead applied preponderance of evidence as the measure to test the validity of that
doctiment.  (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
65

In the instant petition, Vida impliedly admits the irregularity of the Deed's notarization as both of the
vendors were not personally present.  Consequently, clue execution can no longer be presumed.
1avvphi1

Besides, the extant circumstances surrounding the controversy constitute preponderant evidence
suggesting that forgery was committed. Eddie promptly filed a criminal case for falsification of
documents and a civil case to nullify the Deed. Later, the Office of the Davao City Prosecutor found
probable cause to indict Vida for falsification. Consequently, the issue of ownership cannot be
disregarded in the unlawful detainer case. It bears stressing though that while the RTC aptly
resolved the issue of ownership, it is at best preliminary and shall not be determinative of the
outcome of the two other cases filed by Eddie against Vida.

Other matters

The Court observes that the MTCC ruling, which the CA affirmed, is based partly on equitable
grounds. Notably, the MTCC referred to Verona's medical expenses of ₱l,085,540.21, which Vida
had shouldered.  The Court commiserates with Vida, if indeed she remains unpaid by Eddie for
66

Verona's medical and burial expenses. However, a creditor cannot resort to procedural shortcuts to
collect in kind for sums of money owed by a debtor.

In sum, the Court agrees with the RTC that the dismissal of Vida's complaint for unlawful detainer is
in order.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution, dated January 23,
2015 and September 7, 2015, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 05256-MIN,
are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 13, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch. 14, in Civil Case No. 34,450-2012, is REINSTATED. Consequently, Yolanda Vida P.
Beltran's complaint for unlawful detainer is DISMISSED.