Picart v. Smith
Picart v. Smith
Picart v. Smith
RELEVANT FACTS
• On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union, the plaintiff was riding on his pony
over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction
in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour.
• As the defendant neared the bridge, he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.
He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to
him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
• The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the
rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead
of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get
over to the other side.
• As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for
the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had
not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop.
• Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he
had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant
quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it was
then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing.
• In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The
horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff
received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
• CFI of La Union absolved Smith from liability. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as it gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done
HELD:
YES. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car
to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently
far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he
was almost upon the horse. He was deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But
in view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted
with automobiles, he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When the defendant
exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in
a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
USA COLLEGE OF LAW
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. The proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent
man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable
to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly established. A
prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would, in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he
was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and rider as a reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in
such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that
the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
RULING:
Judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the plaintiff recovers of the
defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of both instances
NOTES