Asia Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2022

IISS
an strategic dossier THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES an strategic dossier
ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL
SECURITY ASSESSMENT 2022
ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT 2022 Key developments and trends

Key developments and trends
SECURITY ASSESSMENT
The Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment examines key regional security issues relevant
to the policy-focused discussions of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s premier defence
summit convened by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. It is published each
year in association with the Dialogue and the issues analysed within its covers are central to
discussions at the event. Key developments and trends
This ninth edition of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment focuses particularly on
developments in US−China relations, including heightened tensions over Taiwan, increased
2022
air and naval operations in maritime East Asia, and nuclear-weapons and technological
competition. It also examines the regional security roles of middle powers (India, Japan and
Europe). As this volume goes to press, the war in Ukraine overshadows the international
security landscape and many chapters in this volume touch on the conflict’s ramifications for
security in the Asia-Pacific.
This edition contains 12 detailed empirically based chapters that investigate important
dimensions of the regional security environment, supported by maps, graphs, charts and
tables. Topics include:
US Indo-Pacific strategy, alliances and security partnerships;
Chinese perspectives on regional security;
Taiwan’s security and the possibility of conflict;
the continuing challenges posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes;
the nuclear dynamics of Sino-American security relations;
air and naval operations in the Asia-Pacific;
Sino-American technology competition;
Japan’s competition and cooperation with China;
India’s role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad);
the evolving regional security engagement of European states and the
European Union;
China’s role as an upstream state in the Mekong sub-region; and
the climate crisis and Asia-Pacific security.
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THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

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an strategic dossier
published by
ARUNDEL HOUSE | 6 TEMPLE PLACE | LONDON | WC2R 2PG | UK
2 AN IISS STRATEGIC DOSSIER I ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT
an strategic dossier
ARUNDEL HOUSE | 6 TEMPLE PLACE | LONDON | WC2R 2PG | UK
DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE Dr John Chipman

EDITORS Dr Tim Huxley, Dr Lynn Kuok
ASSOCIATE EDITOR Jack May
RESEARCH SUPPORT Dr Greg Austin, Douglas Barrie, Henry Boyd, Nicholas Childs, James Hackett,
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GRAPHICS COORDINATOR Nick Fargher
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This publication has been prepared by the Director-General and Chief Executive of the Institute and his staff. It incorporates
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First published June 2022 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
© 2022 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
cover images: (top l–r) satellite image of Pratas Island, 27 July 2020 (Gallo Images/Orbital Horizon/Copernicus Sentinel
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Images); French amphibious assault helicopter carrier Tonnerre approaches Cochin Port, India, 30 March 2021 (Arun SANKAR
/ AFP via Getty Images); Indian forces in Ladakh near the disputed border with China, 13 June 2021 (Yawar Nazir/Getty
Images); Japanese soldiers near Mount Fuji, Gotemba, Japan, 15 March 2022 (Carl Court/Getty Images); a satellite image of
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(Seung-il Ryu/NurPhoto via Getty Images); a Royal Navy nuclear-powered Astute-class submarine, 17 September 2010 (Troy
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About The International Institute for Strategic Studies

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problems of conflict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important military content. The Council and Staff
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Contents 3
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 6
CHAPTER 1
US Indo-Pacific Strategy, Alliances and Security Partnerships 12
Ashley Townshend and James Crabtree
CHAPTER 2
Asia-Pacific Security: a Chinese Perspective 38
Yun Sun
CHAPTER 3
Enhancing Taiwan’s Security and Reducing the Possibility of Conflict 58
Dr Brendan Taylor
CHAPTER 4
North Korea: Options and Prospects 80
Aidan Foster-Carter
CHAPTER 5
Sino-American Security Relations: the Nuclear Dynamics 110
Dr Jeffrey G. Lewis
CHAPTER 6
Air and Naval Operations in the Asia-Pacific: Legal and Political Dimensions 134
Dr Peter A. Dutton
CHAPTER 7
Sino-American Technology Competition and the Asia-Pacific 154
Paul Triolo
CHAPTER 8
Japan–China Relations: Stabilising Intense Strategic Competition 180
Dr Michael Green and Nicholas Szechenyi
CHAPTER 9
India and the Quad 198
Dr Tanvi Madan
CHAPTER 10
Europe and the Indo-Pacific: Evolving Security Engagement 222
Dr Sheryn Lee and Dr Ben Schreer
CHAPTER 11
China as an Upstream Riparian State: Implications for Southeast Asia 248
Brian Eyler
CHAPTER 12
The Climate Crisis and Asia-Pacific Security 274
Dr Jeffrey Mazo
INDEX 296
COMMON ABBREVIATIONS
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW anti-submarine warfare
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
CCG China Coast Guard
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the US
CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
EAS East Asia Summit
EEZ exclusive economic zone
FOIP Free and Open Indo-Pacific
FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangements
HGV hypersonic glide vehicle
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

Common Abbreviations 5
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile
JSDF Japan Self-Defense Forces
MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
MRC Mekong River Commission
PAFMM People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia
PLA (Chinese) People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF PLA Air Force
PLAN PLA Navy
Quad Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)
SMIC Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation
SRBM short-range ballistic missile
THAAD Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
TSMC Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

INTRODUCTION
At the time this edition of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment goes to print, the
war in Ukraine overshadows international security, even in the world beyond Europe.
It is the most intense conflict on the continent since the end of the Second World War;
regardless of how long it lasts or how it ends, it is sure to have important consequences
for the Asia-Pacific. Some of these ramifications are already emerging. Simultaneously,
however, many of the same international-security concerns that have bedevilled the
Asia-Pacific since the beginning of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue process 20 years ago
remain salient, if in modified form.
This ninth edition of the annual Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment presents
detailed discussion and analysis of a wide range of these enduring Asia-Pacific security
concerns. Prominent among them are questions about relations between the region’s major
powers, as well as between them and the Asia-Pacific’s middle powers and small states. The
impact of US policy on the region’s security is an important focus, particularly in terms of
Washington’s evolving Indo-Pacific alliances and partnerships; the Biden administration’s
posture towards Taiwan; air and naval operations in the region; and the nuclear-weapons
and technological dynamics of US–China competition. China’s increasingly significant
geopolitical role looms large in many chapters, which highlight, among other things, the
challenge it poses to Taiwan’s security and the impact of its upstream activities along the
Mekong River on mainland Southeast Asia. Importantly, there is also a chapter that seeks
to promote a better understanding of China’s perspective on Asia-Pacific security.
While many of the chapters are concerned primarily with aspects of Chinese and US
regional security policies and with Sino-American competition, this edition also discusses
Japan’s attempts to sustain competition with China ‘without spiralling into catastrophe’,
India’s emergence as a major power in the region (and its engagement with the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue, or Quad) and the potential for Europe to become a more impor-
tant security actor in the Asia-Pacific. The concluding two chapters assess respectively
INTRODUCTION 7
environmental security as an aspect of relations between China and Southeast Asia and the
increasingly important effects that climate change promises to have on a range of existing
regional security problems, in the medium term and beyond.
THE US, CHINA AND REGIONAL SECURITY

In the opening chapter, Ashley Townshend and James Crabtree argue that for more than
a decade the US has ‘struggled to prioritise’ the region, enhance its military posture and
modernise its network of alliances and partnerships in order to advance a necessary ‘collec-
tive approach to regional defence strategy’. They write that the Biden administration has
shown strategic discipline in extricating the US from Afghanistan and managing the war in
Ukraine while simultaneously trying to prioritise its avowed objective of competing stra-
tegically with China. However, these steps have been insufficient to advance the United
States’ standing as the region’s leading power. Efforts to strengthen the US regional mili-
tary posture have been mainly incremental and defence-spending plans are inadequate.
The new AUKUS partnership and other alliance reforms ‘will take years to pay dividends’.
The authors conclude that Washington will need to intensify its ‘prioritisation, posture
and partnerships’ efforts if it is ‘to have any hope of upholding a favourable Indo-Pacific
balance of power’.
As US-based analyst Yun Sun highlights in her chapter, from Beijing’s perspective
the United States’ regional military presence, alliances and partnerships – now including
AUKUS as well as the Quad – constitute significant security challenges to China’s national-
security objectives. While China has become a stronger and increasingly active player in
its own region, its leadership calculates that the country cannot be secure while the US
works to enhance its own regional security role. The regional strategic outlooks of the two
great powers are, in Sun’s words, ‘increasingly antagonistic’. Taiwan has emerged as the
potential flashpoint where China and the US are most likely to clash militarily, although
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has almost certainly complicated Beijing’s reported plans to
use force against the island.
In his chapter on enhancing Taiwan’s security and reducing the likelihood of conflict
across the Taiwan Strait, Brendan Taylor argues that China is unlikely to attempt to annex
Taiwan by force ‘until at least the end of this decade’. He notes that the war in Ukraine
has highlighted the importance of not overlooking the challenges faced by attackers and the
strengths of defenders. In the meantime, the most serious risk to peace will be an accidental
Taiwan conflict resulting from ‘misadventure, miscalculation or misperception’, highlighting
the need for ‘more robust crisis-management and -avoidance mechanisms’. However, over
time and despite efforts by Taiwan, the US and US allies to strengthen their deterrence of an
attack, the military balance may begin to move decisively in favour of China, still a rising
superpower. According to Taylor, this shift could reduce the credibility of the US security
guarantee, with a potentially dramatic effect on the dynamics of this possible flashpoint.
Another prominent potential flashpoint in the region is the Korean Peninsula.
Returning to questions about North Korea’s nuclear-weapons and missile programmes
that he has addressed in previous editions of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment,
Aidan Foster-Carter argues that ‘global policy on the DPRK has comprehensively failed’.
North Korea’s weapons programmes continue, with Pyongyang testing an intercontinental
ballistic missile in March 2022 – ending a four-year pause in such tests. At the same time,
Beijing’s influence has grown as a result of North Korea’s economic dependence on China.
Foster-Carter concludes that although North Korea will ‘never agree to denuclearise
completely’, if the US and its allies want to challenge Beijing’s sway over Pyongyang and
exert some control over the latter’s nuclear-weapons and missile programmes, they may
need to offer ‘stronger incentives since punishments have proved ineffectual’.
North Korea is not the only nuclear challenge in the region. As Jeffrey G. Lewis high-
lights in his chapter, there is intensifying competition between US and Chinese efforts to
develop their respective strategic nuclear forces. However, each side evidently has limited
understanding of the other’s nuclear motives. It is notably unclear whether China is
seeking to restore its deterrent’s credibility or, more ambitiously, attempting to develop a
coercive nuclear capability. Nevertheless, as Lewis argues, the two major powers ‘share an
interest in avoiding nuclear war’ and this could provide the basis for them to explore how
they might stabilise their bilateral nuclear dynamics. A starting point might be a joint state-
ment on strategic stability in which the US could disown any interest in negating China’s
nuclear deterrent, while China for its part ‘might reject an interest in numerical parity
while also making clear that it does not seek to undermine the extended deterrence that the
US provides for its regional allies’.
Peter A. Dutton focuses on another dimension of Sino-American military competition:
their air and naval operations in maritime East Asia. He notes the dramatic increase in
Chinese probing flights near Taiwan since 2010; extensive Chinese naval, coastguard and
maritime-militia operations in the East China and South China seas; and US freedom-of-
navigation operations, particularly in the South China Sea, in response to Chinese actions
and based on the international law of the sea. Dutton argues that Chinese and US military
operations in the region, which are taking place in proximity to each other, are ‘the daily
INTRODUCTION 9
tactical instruments of a broader struggle for power’. There is a ‘very real’ risk of a ‘tactical
crisis’ and, as Taylor argues in his chapter, Dutton proposes that mechanisms to maintain
stability should be expanded, with increased dialogue at all official levels, as well as ‘semi-
official and non-governmental dialogues’.
Sino-American rivalry is by no means restricted to the military domain. Rather, it is
multidimensional: as Paul Triolo recognises, US technology competition with China
– conducted through Washington’s policy decisions and regulatory actions – has inten-
sified since 2015, when a US journalist first used the term ‘technological cold war’. Triolo
argues that growing pressure from technology competition on semiconductor supply
chains, combined with the ‘decoupling in emerging-technology sectors’, such as artificial
intelligence and quantum computing, could pose increasing risks to Asia-Pacific security.
A particular danger is that China could be ‘pushed into a corner’ over Taiwan’s role in
advanced semiconductor manufacturing by tightened US export controls and Washington’s
more expansive use of the Foreign Direct Product Rule. Triolo argues that in a worst-case
scenario, if Taiwan no longer has importance for China as a semiconductor-manufacturing
base, military action might become more likely.
ROLES OF JAPAN, INDIA AND EUROPE

Whereas contemporary Sino-American relations might be characterised as increasingly
confrontational in all their dimensions, many US allies and partners have attempted to
maintain relationships with Beijing in which significant cooperation remains possible.
Michael Green and Nicholas Szechenyi argue that this is certainly true for Japan. Having
encouraged, over the last decade, the US and other ‘like-minded’ countries to develop a
counterbalancing strategy towards China based on their visions for a ‘free and open Indo-
Pacific’, protecting sensitive technologies and intensifying cooperation through the Quad,
Tokyo is now attempting to define ‘how to compete with China without catastrophe’ – in
other words, how to maintain beneficial economic and diplomatic links while at the same
time strengthening Japan’s own military capabilities and developing a network of friendly
countries ‘committed to shaping a regional environment free from coercion and favouring
a rules-based order’. The authors argue that Japan’s ‘search for balance’ in its relations with
Beijing could once again ‘be an important shaper of future American strategy’.
In contrast to Japan’s close alliance with the US, India has long emphasised its ‘stra-
tegic autonomy’. However, as Tanvi Madan explains in ‘India and the Quad’, the country’s
‘changing perception of China’ – particularly influenced by its growing concerns over the
challenge from China along their disputed Himalayan border – inspired New Delhi’s deci-
sion to re-engage in the Quad format with Australia, Japan and the US from 2017−19 and
then to intensify its involvement in 2020−21. Madan explains the ‘multiple purposes’ of
the Quad for India but also points to potential impediments to New Delhi’s involvement,
including the continuing appeal of strategic autonomy, a possible urge to seek ‘stability’
with China and sensitivity to other Quad members’ levels of enthusiasm. While acknowl-
edging that it is too soon to assess the implications of the war in Ukraine for the Quad,
Madan points to reasons for thinking that the European conflict might increase the group-
ing’s ‘utility and necessity’.
In ‘Europe and the Indo-Pacific: Evolving Security Engagement’, Sheryn Lee and Ben
Schreer draw attention to the increased involvement by several European countries (most
notably France and the United Kingdom, but also Germany and the Netherlands), as well
as the European Union and NATO, in the region’s security affairs. Their greater engage-
ment is a response to the perceived challenge from China’s growing power and efforts to
reshape the regional and international order in ways that contradict European interests.
Strategic cooperation between Beijing and Moscow has become even more apparent since
the war in Ukraine began, a development that has probably ‘further hardened the mood’ in
Europe with regard to the Chinese challenge. However, the new European focus on Asian
security has been essentially tentative as well as largely uncoordinated among the various
European actors. The authors argue for a ‘geopolitical approach’ in which those actors
work more closely with the US and major regional actors.
ENVIRONMENTAL-SECURITY CHALLENGES
Military power is playing an increasingly important role in the regional security equation
and is the focus of most chapters in this volume. However, not all the important security
questions that Asia-Pacific countries face are military in nature. Brian Eyler, writing in
‘China as an Upstream Riparian State: Implications for Southeast Asia’, focuses on how
China’s large-scale programme of dam-building on its upstream part of the Mekong River,
driven by Beijing’s drive for ‘clean energy’ and emissions-reduction goals, has changed
the river system’s hydrology, causing ecological crises and water- and food-security chal-
lenges for downstream Southeast Asian states. China has modified its activities since
2018 but insufficiently to reduce significantly the threat posed by damming. Managing
this challenge more effectively, Eyler writes, requires closer collaboration between China,
downstream countries and their development partners. Attempts to make downstream
countries ‘take sides’ geopolitically could undermine such efforts.
In the final chapter, Jeffrey Mazo provides a comprehensive assessment of the
growing impact of the climate crisis on Asia-Pacific security, emphasising that the region
is highly exposed and vulnerable to climate changes produced by the global warming
anticipated over the rest of this century. These changes are likely to slow economic
growth and contribute to food, water and energy insecurity, with significant potential
effects on important elements of the regional strategic picture. In China’s case, slowing
growth could delay the anticipated shift in the regional balance of power in its favour.
Mazo writes that North Korea stands out as the most likely place in the region for ‘an
acute climate-change-related event’, which could ‘spark a major crisis or outbreak of
armed conflict’. Climate change may also increase the likelihood of a crisis in the Indus
basin, alter risk calculations in the South China Sea and affect the viability of military
bases in the Pacific and Indian oceans.
INTRODUCTION 11
WAR IN UKRAINE AND ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

Several of this volume’s chapters were updated shortly before publication to reflect
various immediate impacts of the war in Ukraine on the dimensions of Asia-Pacific secu-
rity addressed by the authors. It is possible to imagine other consequences of the war for
regional security. One concerns its potential impact on the regional balance of power,
notably in terms of whether the conflict will ultimately strengthen or weaken the align-
ment of strategic objectives and policy coordination between China and Russia; whether
those regional countries that depend on Russian arms might recalibrate their relations with
Moscow; whether it might distract the US from its Indo-Pacific security commitments; and
how it could affect burgeoning European interests in Asian security.
At the operational and tactical level, the course of the war has almost certainly surprised
Asian observers as much as it has those in Europe, the US and elsewhere. Many governments
and armed forces in the region may now need to reassess whether they genuinely possess the
military capabilities they have previously claimed. A more specific question – and one that
is linked to the war’s potential impact on the likelihood of conflict across the Taiwan Strait,
a topic addressed by several authors in this volume – concerns the capability and readiness
of China’s People’s Liberation Army to mount major offensive operations. However, these
are all merely early reflections: a more comprehensive assessment of this theme will only
become possible as the conflict in Ukraine unfolds during the course of 2022.
However the war in Ukraine progresses, the outbreak of large-scale inter-state
conflict is a stark reminder of what can happen if diplomacy and deterrence fail. It high-
lights the significant responsibility carried by governments in the Asia-Pacific to ensure
that peace and security are maintained. Security problems in the region remain as great
and as pressing as ever, and complacency regarding the danger of war – and potential
miscalculation in applying the military instrument – entails major risks and potentially
great cost. In this context, the relaunch of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in 2022 is signif-
icant, presenting ministers, policymakers and experts with superlative opportunities to
engage in public and private debate on the full spectrum of regional defence and security
challenges. We hope that the analyses provided in this edition of the Asia-Pacific Regional
Security Assessment will contribute to important, timely and policy-relevant discussions
at the Dialogue and more widely.
DR TIM HUXLEY DR LYNN KUOK

Senior Adviser, IISS–Asia Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security
Editor, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment Editor, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment
CHAPTER 1
US INDO-PACIFIC
STRATEGY,
ALLIANCES
AND SECURITY
PARTNERSHIPS
ASHLEY TOWNSHEND JAMES CRABTREE

Ashley Townshend is Senior Fellow for
Indo-Pacific Security at the Carnegie James Crabtree is Executive
Endowment for International Peace Director, IISS–Asia
The authors would like to thank Tom Corben and Alice Nason for their invaluable
research assistance and contributions to this chapter.
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all three elements of US regional defence strategy – prioritisation,
posture and partnerships – if it is to have any hope of upholding a favourable Indo-Pacific
balance of power amid China’s growing capabilities and assertiveness.
TOWARDS A STRATEGY OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

The US can no longer guarantee a favourable regional balance of power by itself. There is a growing
consensus in Washington that a collective approach to Indo-Pacific defence strategy is required –
one that strengthens US regional capacity for high-end deterrence and war fighting and actively
empowers and leverages allies and partners.
THE INDO-PACIFIC AND COMPETING PRIORITIES

It is one thing to outline Indo-Pacific ambitions and another to deliver them amid competing priorities.
In 2021 and early 2022, the Biden administration has had to navigate this trade-off in the face of
two major crises: its messy departure from Afghanistan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Balancing
simultaneous competition with Russia and China will remain a considerable challenge, complicating
plans to deploy resources and attention to the Indo-Pacific.
EMPOWERING AND INTEGRATING ALLIES AND PARTNERS

The Biden administration has sought to accelerate efforts to strengthen the military capabilities of
allies and partners as part of a framework for collective defence, which it dubs ‘integrated deterrence’.
It has also embraced minilateral efforts to deepen ties, while fostering collective resolve for a potential
Taiwan Strait crisis. However, given mounting concern that China will be able to challenge the
prevailing regional order by force in the second half of this decade, it is unclear whether current
efforts to strengthen and integrate alliances and partnerships will come to fruition in time to reinforce
deterrence and improve the balance of power in the United States’ favour.
For more than a decade, the United States Then US president Barack Obama in Australia’s parliament after
announcing the US rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, 17 November 2011
has struggled to prioritise the Indo-Pacific,
improve its military posture in the region and
modernise its network of alliances and part-
nerships to advance a collective approach
to regional defence strategy. In 2011, then
US president Barack Obama announced the
now famous ‘rebalance’ to Asia amid a draw-
down of US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.1
However, the defence-policy aims of the
rebalance were never properly realised,
undermined as they were by budget cuts,
resurgent conflict in the Middle East, Russia’s
2014 invasion of Ukraine and Washington’s
(Andrew Meares/Sydney Morning Herald/Fairfax Media via Getty Images)
complicated ties with Indo-Pacific allies.
While former president Donald Trump dropped the term rebalance and adopted a more
abrasive stance towards allies and partners, his administration similarly sought to bolster
US regional posture and defence partnerships as part of an explicit focus on ‘great power
competition’ with China.2 Yet this approach also failed to make much headway, waylaid
by US military build-ups against the Islamic State (ISIS) and Iran, ongoing defence-budget
shortfalls and the president’s own corrosive effect on alliance management. Although both
administrations presided over some improvements in the United States’ military posi-
tion, a combination of strategic distraction, inadequate resources and incremental alliance
reform stymied the timely development of efforts to balance China’s rising military power.
President Joe Biden has continued these attempts to prioritise the Indo-Pacific, vowing
to pursue ‘extreme competition’ with China, ‘modernize’ US military capabilities and ‘revi-
talize’ US alliances and partnerships.3 Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, released in February
2022, placed the region at the top of Washington’s global priorities, promising to deliver
‘intensifying American focus’.4 However, this rhetoric has been matched only partially
with the actions and resources required to transform the United States’ regional strategic
position following years of underinvestment.
Three aspects of US defence strategy highlight the administration’s mixed success in
advancing a more robust and collective approach in the Indo-Pacific. Firstly, Biden has
displayed commendable strategic discipline in extricating the US from 20 years of conflict
in Afghanistan and, so far, in managing a complex war in Ukraine while also trying to
prioritise competition with China. Yet Biden’s policies on these issues have only served to
remove impediments to a future US rebalance to Asia. They have not advanced the United
States’ standing as the Indo-Pacific’s leading power and, in the case of Ukraine, will require
ongoing restraint. Secondly, in common with its predecessors, the Biden administration’s
efforts to strengthen US military posture in the Indo-Pacific have been largely incremental
and have not been accompanied by a defence-spending plan commensurate with the aims
of US strategy. This will limit progress on reinforcing deterrence vis-à-vis China for the rest
of this decade. Finally, Biden’s team initiated important changes to the way Washington
works with close allies on collective-defence The Afghan National Army keeps watch at Bagram Air Base – formerly
the largest US military base in Afghanistan – near Kabul, 5 July 2021
objectives. Its support for the new defence-
industrial partnership between Australia, the
United Kingdom and the US (the AUKUS
agreement), which will furnish Canberra with
a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs), is the most consequential example of
this agenda.5 But AUKUS and other alliance
reforms will take years to pay dividends for
the Indo-Pacific balance of power. They are
also no substitute for robust US investment
in the capabilities and posture required for
regional defence. The result is ongoing uncer-
tainty about the United States’ long-promised
(Imaginechina via AP Images)
rebalance and the sustainability of its stra-
tegic position in the Indo-Pacific.
TOWARDS A STRATEGY OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

After nearly 75 years as the region’s pre-eminent military power, the US can no longer
guarantee a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific by itself.6 Many US strategists
have been slow to appreciate this geopolitical reality. But there is now a growing consensus
in Washington that a collective approach to Indo-Pacific defence strategy is required –
one that strengthens US regional capacity for high-end deterrence and war fighting and
actively leverages the military capabilities of its allies and partners.7
Two trends have brought US defence strategy to this point. Firstly, China’s sustained
military modernisation has transformed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a highly
capable joint force, thereby eroding the foundations of US military dominance. In addition
to fielding the world’s largest navy and air force, the PLA’s formidable anti-access/area-
denial capabilities now pose unprecedented challenges to the United States’ ability to project
power into and within the Western Pacific.8 Moreover, as the PLA is postured primarily for
Indo-Pacific contingencies, whereas the US military remains globally dispersed in support
of a multi-region grand strategy, Beijing’s home-field advantage is further tilting the US–
China regional balance. These developments are driving a fundamental rethink of US
military strategy, with new approaches set to require significantly greater involvement by
Washington’s regional allies and partners.
Secondly, the misalignment between US strategy and available defence resources has
prevented the Pentagon from responding quickly to China’s military rise. For much of
the last two decades, Washington’s focus on the Middle East has reduced military readi-
ness, distorted force-structure priorities and, until recently, left the joint force ill-equipped
and unable to prepare adequately for high-end military competition with a peer adver-
sary. Years of budget austerity and unpredictable defence funding have compounded
this problem, while Washington’s extensive global commitments have distracted succes-
sive administrations from investing sufficiently in efforts to balance China’s power.9
By 2018, the gap between US capabilities and Then US secretary of defense Chuck Hagel (left) speaking
at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, 31 May 2014
the great-power threats posed by China and
Russia had become so wide that the bipar-
tisan National Defense Strategy Commission,
mandated by Congress, warned that ‘the U.S.
military could lose the next state-versus-state
war it fights’.10 In 2022, this warning is as
relevant as ever.
Although these trends have gathered
momentum for over 20 years, Washington
has been slow to articulate the case for a
more robust and collective approach to Indo-
Pacific defence strategy. The first signs of this
(IISS)
thinking emerged in the early days of George
W. Bush’s presidency, when planners of a nascent Asia-focused ‘reorientation strategy’
quietly emphasised the need to bolster US regional posture and develop a ‘federated
network’ of allies and partners to check China’s rise.11 However, these objectives were over-
taken by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent war on terror, despite
some initial progress on realigning global force posture, improving inter-operability with
Asian allies and nurturing closer US–India strategic ties.
The push for a collective regional defence strategy re-emerged more prominently in
the lead-up to Obama’s rebalance, with the Pentagon’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
contending that Asia’s ‘emerging security landscape requires a more widely distributed
and adaptive U.S. presence … that relies on and better leverages the capabilities of our
regional allies and partners’.12 Over the next six years, the Obama administration made
the shift from a ‘hub-and-spokes’ model to a ‘networked’ model of Indo-Pacific alliances
and partnerships a defining feature of the rebalance. Speaking at the 2014 IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue, then US secretary of defense Chuck Hagel explained that this strategy involved
‘modernizing our alliances, helping allies and partners develop new and advanced capabil-
ities, and encouraging them to work more closely together’, including by ‘enhancing their
joint capabilities … and encouraging them to become security providers themselves’.13
Yet it was not until the Trump administration that the US underscored explicitly the
need for a collective approach to uphold a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
Based on a stark assessment of the United States’ ‘eroding’ military advantage vis-à-vis
China, the 2018 National Defense Strategy refocused the joint force on high-end war
fighting and on transforming US ‘alliances and partnerships into an extended network
capable of deterring or decisively acting to meet the shared challenges of our time’.14 This
marked a step change in the Pentagon’s thinking – one that advocated a truly integrated
approach in which key allies and partners would assume a far more ‘active’ and ‘equal’ role
in balancing Chinese power.15 While appealing to Trump’s preoccupation with ‘burden-
sharing’, the strategy was founded on its authors’ appreciation of the ‘asymmetric strategic
advantage’ provided by allies and partners, including as a ‘supplement [to] U.S. military
strength’.16 This applied, in particular, to Australia, Japan and India, which were seen as
integral to offsetting shortfalls in US mili- Figure 1.1: Quad and Chinese defence budgets in the
Indo-Pacific, 2021
tary power and more willing to contribute
to a collective balance of power (see Figure
1 US 2 Australia 3 India 4 Japan
1.1).17 In 2017, the revitalisation of the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad) CHINA CHINA
207.3 49.3 (PPP-adjusted)
49.3
between these four powers underlined this 65.1
34.3
65.1 332.0
34.3 4 4
3 3
approach. Although Trump’s transactional 2 2
approach to allies and partners prevented
Res
Indicative 2021
t of the world 40%

2021 defence budgets
the US from making significant progress defence budgets in the
Indo-Pacific
on implementing a collective framework, (current US$bn)
(US$bn)
the administration’s vision for a coalition
1
defence strategy was broadly welcomed in 1
60%
Canberra, New Delhi and Tokyo and took Indo-Pac
ific
754.0 452.4
root in US defence-policy circles.
Biden has embraced this collective
approach and committed to empowering allies and partners to play a larger and more 60% is a frequently used approximation
for how much of the US defence budget
integrated role in US strategy. His administration’s vision for a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ could be mobilised for Indo-Pacific
is, like its predecessor, based on a sober assessment of the limits of US power and the priorities, noting that Washington’s other
global priorities account for at least
imperative of increasing burden-sharing.18 The White House’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy 40% of the total. This is not an accurate
underlined the need for a collective approach as part of a larger effort to prevent a Chinese characterisation of how the budget works,
and is only intended to depict a rough
‘sphere of influence’ in the region, noting: regional balance of resources. China’s
defence budget is adjusted upwards to
reflect purchasing-power parity (PPP)
Changing strategic circumstances and historic challenges require unprecedented coop- rather than market exchange rates.
eration with those who share in this vision. … We will support and empower allies and Source: IISS, Military Balance+,
partners as they take on regional leadership roles themselves, and we will work in flex- milbalplus.iiss.org
ible groupings that pool our collective strength to face up to the defining issues of our
time, particularly through the Quad.19
On regional defence policy, the strategy is equally clear about the growing role for
allies and partners, explaining:
We will more tightly integrate our efforts across warfighting domains and the spectrum
of conflict to ensure that the United States, alongside our allies and partners, can dissuade
or defeat aggression in any form or domain … [in addition to] finding new opportunities
to link our defense industrial bases, integrating our defense supply chains, and co-
producing key technologies that will shore up our collective military advantages.20
Three lines of effort in US strategy are therefore clear: ‘prioritizing the PRC challenge in
the Indo-Pacific’; modernising the United States’ own ‘defence presence’ and ‘capabilities’;
and strengthening collective action with allies and partners.21 Although the Biden admin-
istration has made some progress on aspects of this strategy, more effort is needed on all
three elements — prioritisation, posture and partnerships — to bolster the United States’
regional strategic position and preserve a favourable balance of power.
THE INDO-PACIFIC AND COMPETING PRIORITIES

The Biden administration has stated consistently that its primary security priorities lie in
the Indo-Pacific. At his confirmation hearing in January 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd
Austin underlined this focus, stating: ‘Globally, I understand that Asia must be the focus
of our effort. And I see China, in particular, as the pacing challenge.’22 Similar messages
run through the administration’s major policy documents, including its summary of the
2022 National Defense Strategy, released in March 2022, which labelled China as ‘our most
consequential strategic competitor’.23 These high-level statements are important not just
as leading indicators of resource allocation but also for strengthening US credibility in the
eyes of regional allies and partners. Yet it is one thing to outline Indo-Pacific ambitions
and another to deliver them amid competing priorities. In 2021 and early 2022, the Biden
administration has had to navigate this trade-off in the face of two major crises with the
capacity to distract the US from its Indo-Pacific focus, namely the United States’ messy
departure from Afghanistan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Entering office with a promise to ‘end the forever wars’, Biden announced the US with-
drawal from Afghanistan in April 2021 and moved swiftly to complete it four months
later.24 Justifying his actions, Biden claimed the 20-year campaign had successfully reduced
the risk of terrorist attacks against the US from Afghan soil, declaring ‘the fundamental
obligation of a President … is to defend and protect America – not against threats of
2001, but against the threats of 2021 and tomorrow’.25 The administration also framed the
drawdown as an attempt to deliver long-delayed rebalance objectives. In July 2021, Kurt
Campbell, the US Indo-Pacific coordinator at the National Security Council, described this
transition as ‘painful’ but necessary, forecasting: ‘We’ll see some real challenges in places
like Afghanistan, but a much greater focus on the Indo-Pacific.’26 In this sense, the draw-
down embodied a persuasive strategic logic, welcomed in most Indo-Pacific capitals, by
which extensive US military and diplomatic resources tied up in Afghanistan could be
redeployed to regional priorities.
This logic, however, was marred by poor execution. Beyond the chaotic scenes at
Kabul airport, US credibility was dented by failures of intelligence and capacity-building,
which led the Afghan government to fall rapidly to Taliban forces. Unlike European allies,
who were highly critical of the decision to
leave and alarmed by the ensuing humani- USS Ronald Reagan anchored near Manila, 26 June 2018
tarian crisis, the United States’ Indo-Pacific
friends adopted largely pragmatic views.
At a tactical level the drawdown sent mixed
signals about Washington’s ability to manage
simultaneous challenges – embodied by its
decision to redeploy to the Middle East the
USS Ronald Reagan, its only aircraft carrier
in Asia, to help with the evacuation.27 There
was also extensive public debate in allied and
partner countries about the implications of
the withdrawal for Washington’s Indo-Pacific
(Ted Aljibe/AFP via Getty Images)
commitments – and its willingness to endure military costs in a future crisis with China.28
These arguments had little traction in official circles where, on balance, the withdrawal was
well received by regional allies and partners – India being the prominent exception, owing
to its interests in Central Asia.29 For close allies like Australia and Japan, Biden’s decision
was taken as a sign of Washington’s belated willingness to reduce military commitments
in a secondary theatre and curb the risks of strategic overstretch.30 In this sense, Biden’s
Afghanistan policy advanced US credibility in the Indo-Pacific.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 presented a more significant chal-
lenge for Biden’s Indo-Pacific agenda – and one that cuts to the heart of the United States’
identity as a superpower that can manage ‘two-front’ global commitments.31 Faced with
overwhelming domestic and European pressure, the administration felt compelled to
respond forcefully to an aggressive act that threatened to upend Europe’s strategic order
and undermine US standing as the guarantor of global security. At the same time, the
administration’s own strategic priorities demanded that it support Ukraine in ways that
did not excessively shift attention or resources away from the Indo-Pacific or raise the risks
of escalation or entrenchment. Indeed, the crisis provided a textbook example of the diffi-
cult choices Washington will continue to face as it seeks to prioritise the China challenge.
Biden’s initial approach was reasonably well calibrated from an Indo-Pacific stand-
point. Washington supported Ukraine with extensive military and economic assistance
while ruling out direct involvement in hostilities. It deployed a small number of troops to
NATO frontlines to reassure European allies and fostered global solidarity for sanctions
designed to punish Russia and cripple its economy. Importantly, it consistently signalled, in
the words of US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, that US policies towards Ukraine
and Taiwan, Asia’s premier flashpoint, ‘are not the same’.32 In short, the administration
displayed strategic restraint under difficult circumstances. Washington’s principal Indo-
Pacific allies have been broadly, albeit cautiously, supportive of its handling of the crisis.
But risks of US overextension persist in both the Middle East and Ukraine.
Notwithstanding the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of combat operations
in Iraq, the United States’ troop presence
in the Middle East remains considerable US President Joe Biden speaks at a Lockheed Martin facility that assembles
(see Figure 1.2) and Iran still looms large FGM-148 Javelin man-portable anti-tank systems in Troy, Alabama, 3 May 2022
in US threat assessments. Nor has there

been a linear eastward shift in US defence
resources, though some high-end capabilities
– such as advanced fighter aircraft and air-
and missile-defence systems – have finally
exited the Middle Eastern theatre. The situ-
ation in Ukraine is more concerning, where
a protracted conflict appears certain. Despite
the administration’s attempts to stay focused
on Asia, the Ukraine crisis has already led
to a delay in the launch of the 2022 National
Defense Strategy to give the Pentagon time
(Peter Zay/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
Figure 1.2: US active-duty military personnel assigned by regional command, 2012–21
Number of troops
100,000
US European
Command (EUCOM)
US Indo-Pacific
80,000 Command
(INDOPACOM)
60,000
40,000
US Central
Command (CENTCOM)
20,000
Includes forces deployed
on Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO)
0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Sources: US Defense Manpower Data Center, dwp.dmdc.osd.mil; US Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), comptroller.defense.gov
to reconsider the implications of an ‘acute’ Russia threat for US defence planning.33 This
bodes ill for a sharp prioritisation of the Indo-Pacific. Of greater immediate concern is the
extent to which Washington’s support for the Ukrainian resistance is taking a toll on US
defence resources. Beyond the US$3.4 billion in military assistance already committed, at
the time of writing Congress is considering an administration request for an additional
US$33bn in wide-ranging support for Ukraine.34 Reports also suggest that the Pentagon
may need to delay the delivery of military hardware to Taiwan as a result of extensive
transfers to Ukraine.35 Balancing simultaneous competition with Russia and China will
therefore remain a considerable challenge, complicating plans to deploy resources and
attention to the Indo-Pacific.
SLOW EVOLUTION OF US REGIONAL POSTURE

The Biden administration’s rhetoric about prioritising the Indo-Pacific has delivered
only modest improvements in regional posture to date. The Pentagon’s Global Posture
Review, concluded in late 2021, failed to initiate a decisive shift in regional focus or
to better align resources with regional priorities. Instead, the review largely summa-
rised Indo-Pacific posture shifts already under way, while restoring European posture
to its pre-Trump status quo and shelving plans for further Middle East drawdowns.36
Reported revisions to internal ‘posture decision-making processes’ hinted at the possi-
bility of bolder moves in future but showed little urgency to push forward with resource
reallocations in the near term.37 As such, the review heightened concerns among US
allies and partners that the administration may be unwilling or unable to invest quickly
in a more robust forward military position and strategy of ‘deterrence by denial’ – an
approach supported by Australia and Japan.38
EUCOM
US European Command
CENTCOM
US Central INDOPACOM
Command US Indo-Pacific Command
Areas of responsibility of US regional commands ©IISS
Nevertheless, Washington began some important Indo-Pacific posture improvements

in 2021 and early 2022. Most prominently, at the Australia–US Ministerial Consultations
(AUSMIN) in September 2021, Canberra and Washington unveiled the most signif-
icant enhancements to bilateral force-posture initiatives in a generation.39 With the aim
of strengthening Australia’s position as a forward operating hub, these included plans
for a ‘combined logistics, sustainment, and maintenance enterprise to support high-end
warfighting and combined military operations in the region’, complementing ongoing
upgrades to combined fuel stockpiles and logistics enablers in the country.40 The two
sides also agreed to increase the rotational presence of US air, land and sea capabilities at
Australian facilities, to expand integrated military exercises and to deepen maritime logis-
tics cooperation. These measures will see ‘aircraft of all types’ – code for nuclear-capable
bombers – deploy to Australian airfields, as well as more frequent visits by US surface
vessels and submarines.41 While there is no timeline for the delivery of these initiatives,
they can be expected to make a meaningful if modest contribution to sustaining US mili-
tary presence over the next five to ten years.
Beyond Australia, efforts to augment US regional posture have been more piecemeal
(see Figure 1.3). Slow-moving upgrades to deployments and facilities on Guam and its
surrounding islands have continued, reinforcing the island’s role as the primary hub for
US military operations in the second island chain. These include new air and naval mili-
tary construction projects on Andersen Air Force Base and long-awaited plans to increase
the number of SSNs home-ported in Guam from two to five.42 Elsewhere, the admin-
istration has simply restored or reaffirmed prior posture arrangements. The decision
to permanently station helicopter and artillery divisions in South Korea, for instance,
marks a formalisation of existing rotations rather than a new initiative.43 Similarly, the
Figure 1.3: Selected developments in US posture in the Indo-Pacific
Date Event Status Date Event Status Date Event Status
AUSTRALIA JAPAN PHILIPPINES
Apr 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation 

Nov 2011 Then US president Barack Obama and  May 2006 Roadmap for Realignment  Agreement (EDCA) signed,
then Australian prime minister Julia Implementation signed, setting
enhancing the implementation of
Gillard announce establishment of a out conditions for the relocation
the 1951 Philippines–US Mutual
2,500-strong US Marine Rotational of Futenma Base and the
Defense Treaty
Force–Darwin (MRF–D) over five years realignment of 8,000 US marines
and a bilateral Enhanced Air Cooperation to Guam to consolidate US Nov 2015 Philippines Senate passes 
(EAC) initiative between the Royal capabilities by 2014 resolution asking the Supreme
Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the US Court to compel the executive
Air Force (USAF) Dec 2009 Then Japanese prime minister  branch to submit EDCA to the
Hatoyama Yukio postpones upper chamber
Apr 2012 First rotational deployment of 200 US  decision on relocating US Marine
marines arrive at the Robertson Barracks Corps base until May 2010 Jan 2016 Philippines Supreme Court 
in Darwin, Northern Territory, Australia upholds constitutionality of EDCA
Jun 2011 The 2011 Japan–US Security 
Nov 2013 Statement of Principles Concerning the  Consultative Committee Joint Mar 2016 Philippines and the US agree 
Implementation of the Force Posture Statement notes Futenma on five initial Philippine military
Initiatives in Australia signed relocation and realignment of US bases to construct facilities,
marines will not meet original position equipment, and rotate
Apr 2014 Third rotational deployment to  2014 completion target forces under EDCA
Darwin reaches the milestone of
1,000 US marines Apr 2012 The 2012 Security Consultative  Jun 2016 Philippines President Rodrigo 
Committee agrees to realign Duterte inaugurated; criticises
Aug 2014 Bilateral Force Posture Agreement signed  9,000 US marines from Japan, but pledges to uphold EDCA
promoting a more geographically
May 2015 US confirms additional USAF B-1  distributed and operationally Sep 2016 President Duterte instructs US 
bombers and surveillance aircraft to be resilient US posture forces to leave Mindanao and
placed in Australia terminates joint patrols with
Apr 2013 Okinawa Consolidation  the US Navy in the Philippines’
Oct 2016 Cost-sharing negotiations concluded in  Plan released, outlining the exclusive economic zone
principle for US$1.52 billion infrastructure incremental return of Futenma
investment and other costs supporting Oct 2016 President Duterte threatens to 
to Japanese control by 2022,
MRF–D stop the implementation of EDCA,
contingent upon completion of
pledging to announce a new policy
Henoko and Guam facilities
Feb 2017 EAC initiatives commenced  for Philippines–US ties
Oct 2015 Then-governor of Okinawa 
Jul 2019 Goal of 2,500 marines in Darwin reached  Dec 2016 President Duterte makes first 
Prefecture Onaga Takeshi revokes
two years later than expected threats to terminate the 1999
reclamation approval for land off
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
the coast of Henoko, sparking
May 2020 Bilateral Force Posture Working  protracted legal battle with Tokyo Nov 2017 President Duterte and then US 
Group re-established to develop
recommendations advancing cooperation president Donald Trump reaffirm
Dec 2016 Japan’s Supreme Court rules that  commitment to the Mutual
construction work at Henoko can Defense Treaty and EDCA during
Apr 2021 Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison  legally commence bilateral meeting
announces US$536m in upgrades to
four key training areas and ranges in Apr 2017 Initial construction work  Jan 2019 Ribbon cut on completed 
the Northern Territory to enhance joint commenced at Henoko construction of humanitarian
training exercises
assistance and disaster relief
Dec 2019 Japan’s Ministry of Defense says  (HADR) warehouse - the first
Sep 2021 Enhancements to bilateral force posture  relocation of US Marine Corps
initiatives, including the rotational major project under EDCA
base will cost US$8.5bn and take
deployment of US aircraft and more 12 years, adding more than a Feb 2020 President Duterte abrogates VFA, 
complex and integrated land exercises, decade to already-delayed plan rendering EDCA inoperable
announced at Australia–US Ministerial
Consultations (AUSMIN) Apr 2020 Japan’s government formally  Jul 2020 President Duterte suspends 
submits alterations to its Henoko abrogation of the VFA
Nov 2021 Two USAF B-1B Lancer bombers join  construction plans to address
RAAF for training seabed instability discovered after Nov 2020 Abrogation of the VFA suspended 
US Department of Defense completes  work began for another six months
2021 Global Posture Review confirming
Nov 2021 Okinawan government rejects the Jul 2021 Abrogation of the VFA reversed, 
infrastructure enhancements and 
central government’s proposed enabling EDCA implementation
rotational aircraft deployments
announced at AUSMIN changes to the design of military
Sep 2021 Philippines Secretary of National 
facilities at Henoko
Defense Delfin Lorenzana and US
Feb 2022 US delegation visits bases and  Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin
facilities in Australia and discusses Dec 2021 Landfill reclamation work at 
commit to resume previously
the establishment of cooperative Henoko that had commenced in
approved projects under EDCA
logistics, sustainment, and maintenance December 2018 reaches 30%
enterprises completion
 Announcement  Implementation  Enhancement  Setback

Date Event Status Selected facilities used

by the US military
GUAM
2000 US begins building up forward-deployed forces in Guam to 

increase operational presence, deterrence and power projection
in Second Island Chain
May 2006 US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) publishes the Guam 

Integrated Military Development Plan
Sea of
Japan
May 2008 US reiterates that planning efforts for the proposed build-up in  (East Sea)
Guam remain in their initial stages, with many key decisions and
challenges yet to be addressed
Sep 2008 Then US navy secretary Donald Winter presents troop-relocation 

plans to Congress, the outcome of master planning efforts for JAPAN
the military build-up in Guam
East 1 Henoko Base
Aug 2012 House Armed Services Committee recommends the stationing  China 2 Futenma Base
of additional attack submarines, the construction of a fuel Sea
pipeline and investment in civilian infrastructure in Guam 1
Lorem ipsum
Feb 2020 Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General audit reveals  2
that Guam build-up efforts are 13 years and five months behind Pacific
schedule and more than US$37.5 million over budget Ocean
Oct 2020 US marines activate first new base since 1953 – Camp Blaz – in  South
Guam, where 1,300 marines will be permanently stationed and
China Philippine 3
3,700 will rotate as part of Okinawa relocation
Sea Sea
6 4
Nov 2021 US Navy unveils plans to increase the number of nuclear-powered  7 5
attack submarines homeported in Guam from two to five
GUAM
Dec 2021 US$11bn committed in DoD funding for military construction  3 Joint Region Marianas /
projects in Guam over the next five years 9 Naval Forces Marianas
Bay of 8
Sulu 4 Andersen Air Force Base
Bengal 10
Sea 5 Naval Base Guam
PHILIPPINES
Date Event Status 11 12 6 Fort Magsaysay
7 Basa Air Base
8 Antonio Bautista Air Base
SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 9 Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base

10 Lumbia Air Base
11 COMLOG Westpac Navy Base
12 Changi Naval Base
Jul 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement signed, giving the US access to  Banda Sea
Singaporean facilities on a rotational basis
2007 US Navy Region Center Singapore officially established to  Indian

manage shore support facilities 13 14 15
Ocean
Jun 2011 Then US defense secretary Robert Gates announces that the 
US is exploring options for deploying US Littoral Combat 16 17
Ships (LCS) to Singapore within the context of the Strategic 18
19 Coral
Framework Agreement
Sea
Apr 2012 Singapore’s Minister for Defence Ng Eng Hen says that the  AUSTRALIA
rotational deployment of two US Navy LCSs has been approved
13 RAAF Base Darwin
Jun 2012 Agreement reached to rotate four LCSs through Singapore;  14 Defence Establishment Berrimah
Singapore had previously only approved rotations for two ships 15 Robertson Barracks Close Training Area
16 Kangaroo Flats Training Area
Apr 2013 First US LCS, USS Freedom, arrives at Changi Naval Base to  17 Mount Bundey Training Area
begin maiden overseas deployment 18 RAAF Base Tindal
Dec 2015 Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement announced: in 19 Bradshaw Field Training Area

statement, a third LCS deployment to Singapore is confirmed for
2016, as part of a plan to host four vessels before 2018
Dec 2015 Singapore approves inaugural operations of US Navy P-8A 

maritime-patrol aircraft out of its airbases to patrol South China Sea
2018 Plans to deploy two LCSs to Singapore simultaneously in 2018 

never come to fruition, with no deployment happening that year
Sep 2019 Singapore renews 1990 military-bases pact with the United 
States, granting US forces access to Singapore’s bases until 2035
Aug 2021 Agreement to continue rotational deployments of US P-8 aircraft 

and LCSs to Singapore
Source: United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, www.ussc.edu.au
©IISS
US–Singapore recommitment to sustaining

Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, April 2019
rotational deployments of P-8 maritime-
patrol aircraft and littoral combat ships is
not expected to lead to increased presence.44
Although Secretary of Defense Austin made
important headway in the Philippines in
June 2021 – convincing President Rodrigo
Duterte to reinstate the Visiting Forces
Agreement and paving the way for long-
delayed military construction under the 2014
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
(Justin Sullivan/Getty Images)
– even this was a return to the status quo
ante.45 Taken together, these efforts have A US P-8 Poseidon maritime-patrol aircraft parked
at Paya Lebar Air Base in Singapore, 1 August 2014
only nudged US posture in the direction of
rebalance objectives.
The Biden administration’s belated
progress on implementing the Pacific
Deterrence Initiative (PDI) provides some
grounds for cautious optimism. Conceived
in 2017 and formalised in 2020, the PDI was
developed by US lawmakers and US Indo-
Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) as a way
of directing the Pentagon to allocate more
funds to strengthening the United States’
regional military position.46 Focused on
pressing war-fighting needs west of Hawaii,
(Mohd FyroL/AFP via Getty Images)
it is intended to support a more resilient and
distributed military posture in a range of areas
– including munitions stocks, fuel, logistics, air defences and radars – while also supporting
enhanced exercises with frontline allies and partners.47 While Biden’s first budget request,
for the fiscal year (FY) 2022, overlooked PDI priorities in favour of investments in mili-
tary platforms, Congress subsequently intervened to push resources into initiatives like the
Guam Defense System, a critical air- and missile-defence project, and planning activities to
support other ‘shovel-ready’ posture enhancements.48 The resulting compromise was far
from perfect, with some experts estimating that 80% of the US$7.1bn fund was spent on
‘stuff the services were already doing’.49 However, it has led to a more focused US$6.1bn
PDI request for FY2023. Although considerable daylight persists between the Pentagon
and INDOPACOM, this is a positive development.50 The PDI’s progress will continue to be
watched carefully by US allies and partners, who regard its implementation as a barometer
of the administration’s willingness to invest seriously in a military strategy to deter China.
Developments in US regional posture also need to be viewed in the broader context
of Biden’s defence budget and strategy. The administration’s budget allocations to date
suggest it is following a ‘shrink to modernise’ approach of investing in emerging technol-
ogies and high-end war-fighting capabilities Figure 1.4: US defence budgets compared to a 3–5% annual
growth target, 2018–21
to prepare for a China threat in the 2030s at
the expense of additional capacity and capa- US$ billions (constant 2015)
bility to deter conflict in the 2020s.51 There 800

Target growth range
may be a logic to this approach in view of US % Actual growth from
previous year's budget
resource constraints. But it means substan-
700 2.62%
tial Indo-Pacific posture investments will be 0.80%
-6.03%
even more important for reducing military
risk in the near term. It also means Biden, like 600
Trump, is failing to meet the target of 3–5%

real annual defence-budget growth often
500
cited by leading defence figures as necessary
to sustain US strategy in an era of great-power
competition (see Figure 1.4).52 These shortfalls 400
alarm US planners, particularly with respect 2018 2019 2020 2021
to prospects for a future war over Taiwan. As

INDOPACOM Commander Admiral John Aquilino warned in March 2021 during his confir- Source: IISS, Military Balance+, milbalplus.iiss.org
mation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, ‘this problem is much closer to
us than most think … . We ought to be prepared today.’53 In lieu of additional US resources,
the Biden administration is turning to allies and partners to pick up some of this slack.
EMPOWERING AND INTEGRATING ALLIES AND PARTNERS

Consistent with its recognition that the US cannot deter China or maintain a favourable
regional balance of power alone, the Biden administration has sought to accelerate efforts
to strengthen the military capabilities of allies and partners as part of a framework for
collective defence, which it dubs ‘integrated deterrence’.54 At its core, it is a push for greater
burden-sharing. While Trump’s pursuit of this goal often appeared transactional, the
Biden administration argues that its aim is to ‘incorporate ally and partner perspectives,
competencies, and advantages at every stage of defense planning’.55 This approach has
led to important upgrades in strategic policy and defence cooperation with Australia and
Japan and, to a lesser extent, South Korea and India. The administration has also embraced
minilateral efforts to deepen ties among allies and partners, while fostering collective
resolve for a potential Taiwan Strait crisis.
This agenda is not without its difficulties. In common with earlier efforts to modernise
US regional ties, many of these initiatives will take years, and in some cases decades, to
deliver (see Table 1.1). Most will require difficult reforms to the outdated processes by
which Washington has previously worked with regional allies and partners, such as export
controls, technology- and data-transfer rules, so-called ‘Buy American’ provisions and the
sharing of classified information.56 Furthermore, although Canberra, New Delhi, Seoul and
Tokyo are broadly supportive of Washington’s collective-defence agenda, all still harbour
concerns, albeit to varying degrees, about the costs and benefits of integration across force
structure, strategic policy and defence-industrial arenas. Set against mounting evidence
that China will be capable of challenging the prevailing regional order by force in the
Table 1.1: Progress and challenges in US defence-industrial integration with selected regional allies and partners
Date Development Date Development
US–AUSTRALIA US–INDIA
Sep 2007 Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty signed, intended to Jun 2005 New Framework for the India–US Defense Relationship
facilitate Australia’s earlier and easier access to US technology issued to increase opportunities for technology transfer,
and technical data collaboration, co-production, and research and development
May 2013 Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty enters into force Jun 2012 US–India Defense Trade and Technology Initiative
Dec 2016 The FY17 National Defense Authorization Act adds Australia (DTTI) established to facilitate the co-production and
and the United Kingdom to the US National Technology and co-development of military systems
Industrial Base (NTIB)
Sep 2013 US–India Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation
Apr 2019 Major Atlantic Council report warns that failure to reform elevates the two sides to ‘closest of partners’ status for the
export controls and advance NTIB expansion would purposes of defence technology transfer, trade, research,
disincentivise allies from technology sharing and integrating co-development, and co-production
industrial bases with the US
Jun 2015 Updated Framework for the US–India Defense Relationship
Nov 2019 In pointed remarks in Washington DC, Australia’s then- aims ‘to achieve greater interaction and cooperation
defence minister Linda Reynolds states that deeper
between their armed forces, and to build greater
collaboration through the NTIB is required to generate the
understanding between defense establishments’
‘potent combined effect we [the US and Australia] will need
for deterrence purposes’ Oct 2015 India lodges a formal request for the purchase of five S-400
air-defence systems from Russia
Apr 2020 The Pentagon awards preliminary design and engineering
contracts to Australian rare-earth mining company Lynus Jun 2016 US designates India a Major Defense Partner to
to build a processing facility in Texas, a development facilitate India’s ‘license-free access to a wide range
which effectively amounts to a pilot project for ‘genuine of dual-use technologies’
NTIB implementation’
Aug 2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Association
Jul 2020 The NTIB mentioned in the AUSMIN Joint Communiqué for
(LEMOA) signed
the first time; Principals committed to work to reduce barriers
to industrial-base integration Oct 2016 India and Russia sign an intergovernmental agreement for
Feb 2021 The Pentagon awards Lynus a contract for a rare-earths the sale of five S-400 air-defence systems
processing facility in the US and agrees to contribute to half
Aug 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
of its development costs, but without any financial support
(CAATSA) signed into US law, to dissuade allies and partners
for corresponding infrastructure in Australia
from purchasing advanced Russian military systems
Mar 2021 Australia announces intention to establish a sovereign Guided
Sep 2018 Indian and US defence and foreign ministers hold their first
Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) capability for which
it will seek US assistance on issues such as technology transfer 2+2 meeting and sign the Communications Compatibility
and Security Agreement
Aug 2021 Australia joins US-led Precision Strike Missile co-development
India approves purchase of five Russian S-400 systems
program, contributing US$70 million of the US$907m
programme cost, though without any clear guarantee of Dec 2019 Industry-to-Industry framework signed to accelerate DTTI
domestic manufacture, maintenance, or repair rights in future projects; Industrial Security Annex added to the 2002
Sep 2021 Australian Minister for Defence Peter Dutton in a speech GSOMIA, facilitating closer cooperation between US and
to the American Chamber of Commerce states that ‘giving Indian defense firms
greater practical effect’ to Australia’s inclusion in NTIB is
Oct 2020 Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement signed to
essential to achieve shared ‘force posture and defense
facilitate India’s real-time access to US geospatial intelligence
capability objectives’
US Navy P-8A Poseidon refuels at an Indian facility in the
AUSMIN Joint Communiqué pledges to ‘expand practical
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the first time since the
engagement and integration … to streamline export controls,
and to facilitate technology transfer and protection,’ as well as signing of LEMOA in 2016
to collaborate on establishing GWEO Mar 2021 US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin suggests that India’s
New defence-industry and technology partnership between S-400 purchase could trigger CAATSA sanctions, but only if
Australia, the UK and the US (AUKUS) announced, with an it took delivery of the systems
initial focus on facilitating Australian access to submarine
nuclear-propulsion technology Sep 2021 Approval of first joint project (air-launched UAVs) under
the DTTI
Nov 2021 Officials from Australia, the UK and the US sign the Exchange
of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement Nov 2021 India begins accepting delivery of S-400 systems
Date Development Date Development
US–JAPAN US–SOUTH KOREA

May 1980 Agreement on Cooperation in Research and Development in 1979 US–South Korea ballistic-missile guidelines established,
Science and Technology signed, establishing the Systems and limiting South Korea’s missiles to 180 km in range and a
Technology Forum – the first formal mechanism for exploring 500 kg warhead payload
joint defence R&D projects
Jan 2001 Revisions to the 1979 US–South Korea ballistic-missile
Apr 2014 Japan officially relaxes its defence export regime, making
guidelines extend the permissible range of South Korean
it easier for Tokyo to join multinational defence-system
development projects such as the F-35A programme ballistic missiles from 180 km to 300 km, in exchange for
Seoul’s accession to the Missile Technology Control Regime
May 2014 Japanese firm Mitsubishi Heavy Industries supplies American
company Raytheon with radar technology for US-assembled Oct 2012 Revisions to the 1979 US–South Korea ballistic-missile
Patriot missile systems, the first export under 2011 revisions to guidelines extend the permissible range of South Korean
Japan’s defence export regime ballistic missiles from 300 km to 800 km
Jun 2016 Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Oct 2013 US officials express concern that South Korean companies
Understanding signed to ‘promote rationalization, are exploiting US technologies in the development of
standardization, and interoperability of conventional defense
anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare equipment, torpedoes,
equipment’ and to ‘provide a framework for ongoing
rocket launcher systems, and Aegis destroyers
communication regarding market access and procurement
matters that enhance effective defense cooperation’ Apr 2015 The US blocks the transfer of four out of 25 fighter-jet
Sep 2016 Amendments made to the Acquisition and Cross- technologies requested by the South Korean government,
Servicing Agreement allowing Japan to supply US forces setting back South Korea’s KF-X fighter programme in cost
with ammunition and delivery schedule
Dec 2017 Japan announces plans to acquire two Aegis Ashore batteries Jul 2016 First meeting of the Defense Technology Strategy
for an estimated US$2.15 billion to supplement its destroyers and Cooperation Group, intended to advance policy
in its ballistic-missile-defense network and discussion on technology security and defence
Aug 2018 Ruling-party defence-panel chair Nakatani Gen states that technology cooperation
‘[t]he FMS [Foreign Military Sales] program is like a black box,’
Nov 2016 Head of South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program
and questions the appropriateness of programme prices
Administration (DAPA) says the technology gap between
Apr 2019 US reportedly considers sharing F-35 source code with Japan the US and South Korea is undermining joint projects and
to incentivise selection of US firms in Japan’s next-gen fighter
that US export bans on fighter techs are hurting South Korean
project, and is prepared to integrate Japanese components
modernisation programmes
into the fighter’s mission and engine systems
Jun 2019 The US rejects Japan’s request for full membership in the F-35 Nov 2017 Then US and South Korean presidents Donald Trump and
programme’s first-tier industrial enterprise Moon Jae-in agree to remove warhead payload limits on
South Korean ballistic missiles
Oct 2019 The Standard Missile-3 Block IIA, the first US–Japan
cooperative defence-technology project, cleared for Mar 2018 Integrated Defense Dialogue directs officials to ‘strengthen
production after 13 years in development cooperation on defense industry, defense science and
Japan’s Board of Audit finds that delivery delays of up to nine technology, and the protection of defense technologies’
years on key FMS programs had undercut Japan Self-Defense
Oct 2018 The US and South Korea agree to review the ‘planning,
Forces maintenance and key modernisation programs
coordination, and execution’ of joint defense technology
Mar 2020 Japan and ten other countries (including Australia and South activities to facilitate more efficient cooperation’
Korea) lodge complaints with the US regarding cost overruns
and delivery delays associated with the FMS programme Aug 2020 South Korea develops a prototype of the advanced active
electronically scanned array (AESA), one of four technologies
Jun 2020 Japan scraps its Aegis Ashore procurement in part due to
technical shortcomings and a more than doubling of the denied for export from the US in 2015
programme’s costs Apr 2021 South Korea unveils the first prototype of its KF-X fighter
Aug 2020 Japan considers cancelling purchases of Global Hawk UAVs via (KF-21), featuring indigenous alternatives to all four
US FMS due to programme cost concerns, though eventually technologies denied for transfer by the US in 2015
proceeds fearing reprisals from then US president Trump
May 2021 US President Joe Biden and Moon announce the termination of
Oct 2020 Japan’s Ministry of Defense makes a formal request to the US the US–South Korea ballistic-missile guidelines, removing caps
Department of Defense for greater collaboration on defence on the range and payload of South Korean long-range missiles
research and development projects
Feb 2022 Head of South Korea’s DAPA identifies ‘a need for the mutually
Jan 2022 Japan and the US announce a new agreement deepening
defence capability and technology collaboration with an beneficial development of cooperation in the defense
initial focus on counter-hypersonic capabilities industry sector’ between the US and South Korea
Sources: White House; US, Department of State, www.state.gov; US, Department of Defense, dod.defense.gov; US, Department of Treasury, home.treasury.gov; India, Ministry of External Affairs, mea.gov.in; Japan, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, www.mofa.go.jp; Australia, Department of Defence, www.minister.defence.gov.au; Australia, Office of the Prime Minister, www.pm.gov.au; US Embassy and Consulate in the Republic of Korea, kr.usembassy.gov;
Australian Financial Review, www.afr.com; Defense News, www.defensenews.com; Hindu, www.thehindu.com; Wall Street Journal, www.wsj.com
second half of this decade, it is far from clear whether current efforts to strengthen and
integrate alliances and partnerships can overcome these hurdles in time to reinforce deter-
rence and restore a favourable balance of power vis-à-vis China.
Australia is at the forefront of this collective-defence agenda. Beyond the expansion
of US−Australia force-posture initiatives, Washington and Canberra have embarked on a
long list of military sales and defence-industrial projects to support Australia as it seeks
to create a ‘more potent, capable and agile Australian Defence Force’ able to play a more
active role in defending the regional order.57 In 2021 and early 2022, this has involved
efforts to ‘grow’ Australia’s ‘self-reliant ability to deliver deterrent effects’ through long-
range strike capabilities, including US BGM-109 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles for
the navy and extended-range AGM-158B joint air-to-surface stand-off missiles (JASSM-ER)
and AGM-158C long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASM) for the air force.58 Washington has
also agreed to support Canberra’s aim to produce strike capabilities domestically through
the sovereign Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Enterprise, though this initiative
hinges on future US decisions to waive export restrictions and share sensitive intellectual
property with Australia – discussions which have so far moved very slowly.59
The launch of the AUKUS agreement in September 2021 is now a focal point for
defence-industrial integration. Promising to revolutionise Australia’s high-end military
capabilities and ‘foster deeper integration of defence-related science, technology, indus-
trial bases and supply chains’, AUKUS is the clearest example of Washington’s willingness
to pursue major alliance reforms.60 Its flagship initiative to provide Australia with conven-
tionally armed SSNs marks the first time Washington has entrusted an ally with the US
Navy’s nuclear-propulsion secrets since 1958, when it reached a similar agreement with
London. SSNs will provide a stealthy, survivable and lethal capability that can deploy
to distant locations, like the South China Sea and Northeast Asia, for long periods. From
Washington’s perspective, it also guarantees that Canberra has cutting-edge capabilities to
contribute to a future high-end fight.61 These capabilities, however, will not be available
soon. While the AUKUS partners will sign off on an SSN design by March 2023, even a
‘mature design’ – like the British Astute class or US Virginia class – is unlikely to yield an
Australian SSN capability before 2035.62 The complex technical, bureaucratic and nucle-
ar-stewardship challenges associated with operating SSNs means that Australia’s future
submarines will not contribute to the military balance for 15–20 years.
Of greater near-term value is AUKUS’s parallel effort to develop ‘joint advanced
military capabilities’.63 With a dual focus on fielding new capabilities this decade and
co-developing cutting-edge technologies for the future, this effort involves a growing list
of plans for cooperation in areas ranging from autonomous undersea capabilities and
quantum technologies to hypersonic- and counter-hypersonic-missile capabilities. Officials
expect trials and experimentation in some of these areas to begin within three years, with
autonomous underwater vehicles and quantum technologies at the front of the queue. This
is a potentially positive signal. Indeed, it is only by pooling the research, innovation and
defence-industrial sectors of trusted allies that the US can hope to maintain its eroding
capability edge vis-à-vis China. If AUKUS is to succeed where previous efforts to bring
Australia and the UK into the US National Technological and Industrial Base have failed,
however, Washington will need to address the legislative, commercial and export-control
barriers that have prevented a trilateral ‘defence free-trade area’ in the past.64
In Northeast Asia, Japan is the focal point of the Biden administration’s push to integrate
regional alliances via new force posture, contingency planning and defence-technology
initiatives. In January 2022, the two sides agreed to ‘strengthen joint capabilities by fully
aligning strategies’, highlighting plans to jointly stockpile munitions and increase shared use
of US and Japanese facilities.65 Coupled with a new Special Measures Agreement that reori-
entates Tokyo’s financial support for US Forces Japan towards joint facilities and combined
military exercises, these developments foreshadow wider changes in Tokyo’s self-defence
arrangements.66 Impending revisions to Japan’s National Security Strategy and other policy
documents are expected to articulate a more active security role for its Self Defense Forces,
including through developing ‘counterstrike capabilities’ to target ‘enemy base[s]’.67 The
establishment of a new US–Japan framework for advanced defence and technology cooper-
ation – with ‘counter-hypersonic technology’ as its initial priority – is likely to support this
agenda.68 While defence-technology cooperation has historically moved slowly, in this case
Washington acted on Tokyo’s request in less than four months, signalling greater urgency.69
Implementing reforms, however, is another matter. Although Japan’s ruling party has indi-
cated its support for a more integrated alliance, Japanese and US views may diverge on
priorities when it comes to discussing revising alliance roles and missions, making changes
to the 2015 Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation difficult to achieve.70
The Biden administration has also sought new ways to help South Korea contribute
to the United States’ collective-defence aims in Northeast Asia. In May 2021, Washington
and Seoul agreed to scrap 40-year-old guidelines limiting South Korea’s ballistic-missile
programme,71 allowing the latter to produce and field longer-range strike systems and
enhance its capacity for space-based surveillance.72 This paved the way for expanded alliance
cooperation on space and counter-space projects, with Washington and Seoul signing their
first space-policy research agreement in April 2022.73 Yet closer defence-industrial and
-technology integration is largely missing
from the alliance agenda. Although South Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi meet in New
Korean officials have called for ‘mutually Delhi to agree on India acquiring Russian S-400 air-defence systems, 5 October 2018
beneficial’ collaboration on defence-industry

matters since the establishment of a high-
level bilateral mechanism in 2016, this has
produced little tangible progress, limiting
both countries’ ability to pool their defence-
industrial sectors.74
The administration is also working
hard to advance defence integration with
India, including through enhanced infor-
mation-sharing, maritime cooperation and
defence trade.75 Washington and New Delhi
announced their first project under the 2012
Defense Technology and Trade Initiative
(Sonu Mehta/Hindustan Times via Getty Images)
(DTTI) in July 2021, providing a test bed for deepening defence-industrial cooperation.76
In April 2022, the two sides flagged the potential for cooperation on ‘underwater domain
awareness’ and for Indian shipyards to support US Maritime Sealift Command vessels.77
Despite this, efforts to deepen the US−India partnership remain slow given the rapidly
deteriorating balance of power.78 Such efforts are also becoming more challenging to imple-
ment in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which, from a US perspective, has cast
New Delhi’s defence ties with Moscow as a growing liability.79 Although the Biden admin-
istration has tried to protect US−India defence ties from domestic criticism – for instance,
it has so far declined to sanction India for acquiring Russian S-400 air-defence systems
despite the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, which mandates
sanctions against countries engaging in significant transactions with certain countries,
including Russia – substantive progress is unlikely to be rapid.80
More broadly, the Biden administration has accelerated Washington’s embrace of
minilateral strategic-policy initiatives to deepen what Jake Sullivan calls a new ‘lattice-
work’ of alliance and partner relations.81 Most prominently, Biden’s elevation of the Quad
to the leader level in March 2021 injected new momentum into the grouping, with progress
on vaccines, public health, critical technologies, infrastructure and other priorities.82 This is
important in the competition for influence with China. Far less progress has been made in
advancing the Quad’s potential as a military-balancing coalition, with action on building
blocks like information-sharing and maritime-domain awareness still largely confined to
the bilateral level.83 The Biden administration has also invested significant time in reviving
trilateral cooperation with South Korea and Japan, convening at least 18 cabinet-level or
senior officials’ meetings since taking office. While animosities between Seoul and Tokyo
continue to limit progress, the talks secured a commitment to deepen cooperation on North
Korea and regional stability more broadly.84
Washington has enjoyed some success in building international support for Taiwan.
The administration secured references to the importance of ‘peace and stability’ across
the Taiwan Strait in joint statements with the leaders of Japan in April 2021 and the
leaders of South Korea in May 2021. The statement following the US−South Korea−Japan
trilateral in February 2022 echoed these words. In each of these cases, the reference was
unprecedented.85 Similarly, the 2021 AUSMIN communiqué by Canberra and Washington
emphasised ‘Taiwan’s important role in the Indo-Pacific region’ and both sides’ intent to
strengthen ties with Taipei.86 This consensus has also been reflected in high-level expres-
sions of support for Taiwan by US allies
Senior officials from the US, Japan and South Korea
and in various joint statements between
hold a trilateral meeting in Tokyo, 14 September 2021
Australian, British, French and Japanese offi-
cials.87 Coupled with the administration’s
ongoing efforts to bolster Taiwan’s mili-
tary capabilities, this ‘minilateralisation’ of
concerns about Taiwanese security marks
a critical part of Washington’s strategy to
forge collective resolve on this potential
flashpoint. It also complements an uptick in
(David Mareuil/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
major combined military exercises, such as INDOPACOM’s theatre-level Large Scale Global
Exercise in August 2021, which are working to operationalise deeper integration among key
US allies in preparation for potential high-end war-fighting needs in the future.88
CONCLUSION
A year is not a long time in the sweep of ongoing US efforts to chart a more robust and
collective-defence strategy for the Indo-Pacific. While Biden’s stewardship of this agenda
has been far from perfect, the administration deserves credit for advancing important lines
of effort and working to prioritise the region under difficult geopolitical circumstances. On
this score, its withdrawal from Afghanistan, initial restraint in Ukraine, incremental posture
investments and support for the ground-breaking AUKUS partnership represent signature
achievements. The administration’s restoration of productive relations with regional allies
and partners has also been critical to operationalising its embrace of a collective-defence
framework. More can be expected on this front in the forthcoming 2022 National Defense
Strategy and 2022 National Security Strategy.
However, Washington will have to intensify its efforts on all three elements of US
strategy – prioritisation, posture and partnerships – if it is to have any hope of upholding
a favourable Indo-Pacific balance of power amid China’s growing capabilities and asser-
tiveness. This will require far more significant investments in US capabilities and forward
military presence, as well as sustained strategic discipline – particularly in Europe – as calls
for greater US attention and resources mount in response to grinding hostilities in Ukraine.
Above all, the US will need to do more to empower and integrate allies and partners, in
particular by providing incentives to these countries to play a larger role in collectively
defending the regional order. This means allaying lingering doubts about Washington’s
ability and willingness to invest in the military rebalance and deliver a credible deterrence
strategy. While the Biden administration has made valuable down payments on a more
effective strategy, time is not on its side to accelerate this collective agenda.
NOTES
1 White House, ‘Remarks by President Obama 11 July 2019, https://www.democracyinaction.

to the Australian Parliament’, 17 November us/2020/biden/bidenpolicy071119foreignpolicy.
2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ html; ‘Full transcript of “Face the Nation” on
the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-presi- February 7, 2021’, CBS News, 7 February 2021,
dent-obama-australian-parliament. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/full-tran-
2 US, Department of Defense, ‘Remarks script-of-face-the-nation-on-february-7-2021/;
by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session and White House, ‘Interim National Security
of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue’, 2 June Strategy Strategic Guidance’, 3 March 2021,
2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/ https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1538599/ uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-plenary-session- 4 White House, ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy of
of-the-2018-shangri-la-dialogue/. the United States’, February 2022, p. 18,
3 See Joe Biden, ‘Remarks as Prepared for https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
Delivery by Vice President Joe Biden in New uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
York City, New York’, Democracy in Action, 5 White House, ‘FACT SHEET: Implementation
of the Australia–United Kingdom–United Strategy to Preserve the Power in Asia’, International

States Partnership (AUKUS)’, 5 April Security, vol. 40, no. 4, April 2016, pp. 45–88.
2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/brief- 12 US, Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial
ing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/ Defense Review Report’, February 2010, p.
fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-unit- 59, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/
ed-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/. Documents/quadrennial/QDR2010.pdf?ver=v-
6 Ashley Townshend, Brendan Thomas-Noone VJYRVwNdnGb_00ixF0UfQ%3d%3d.
and Matilda Steward, ‘Averting Crisis: American 13 Remarks delivered by then US secretary of
Strategy, Military Spending and Collective defense Chuck Hagel at the 2014 IISS Shangri-La
Defence in the Indo-Pacific’, US Studies Centre, 19 Dialogue, 31 May 2014. A transcript is avail-
August 2019, https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/ able via ProQuest: https://www.proquest.com/
averting-crisis-american-strategy-military-spend- docview/1531468767?accountid=14757&par-
ing-and-collective-defence-in-the-indo-pacific. entSessionId=P954Li3d1Kjah%2F%2BmDhR-
7 See, for example, Elbridge Colby, ‘Testimony SWObhwvpcGYdfszEN0U271xQ%3D&pq-orig-
Before the House Armed Services Committee site=primo&forcedol=true.
Hearing on the Role of Allies and Partners in US 14 US, Department of Defense, ‘Summary of the
Military Strategy and Operations’, US House of 2018 National Defense Strategy’, January 2018,
Representatives, 23 September 2020, https://docs. pp. 1, 8, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/
house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20200923/110884/ Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strate-
HHRG-116-AS00-Wstate-ColbyE-20200923.pdf; gy-Summary.pdf.
Rachel Ellehuus and Colin Wall, ‘Leveraging 15 Colby, ‘Testimony Before the House Armed
Allies and Partners’, Center for Strategic and Services Committee Hearing on the Role of
International Studies (CSIS), 28 January 2021, Allies and Partners in US Military Strategy and
https://www.csis.org/analysis/leveraging-al- Operations’, p. 4.
lies-and-partners; Elbridge Colby and Walter 16 See US, Department of Defense, ‘Summary of
Slocombe, ‘The State of (Deterrence By) Denial’, the 2018 National Defense Strategy’, p. 8; and
War on the Rocks, 22 March 2021, https:// Kori Schake et al., ‘Defense in Depth: Why US
warontherocks.com/2021/03/the-state-of-deter- Security Depends on Alliances – Now More
rence-by-denial/; and Ely Ratner, ‘Statement Than Ever’, Foreign Affairs, 23 November 2020,
by Dr. Ely Ratner Before the 117th Congress https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/unit-
Committee on Foreign Relations’, US Senate, 8 ed-states/2020-11-23/defense-depth.
December 2021, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/ 17 US, White House, ‘US Strategic Framework for
imo/media/doc/120821_Ratner_Testimony1.pdf. the Indo-Pacific’, 5 January 2021, p. 4, https://
8 Office of the Secretary of Defense, US Department trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/
of Defense, ‘Military and Security Developments uploads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf.
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021’, 18 Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin III, ‘America’s
November 2021, pp. VII, 77–80, https://media. Partnerships are “Force Multipliers” in the World’,
defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/- Washington Post, 14 March 2021, https://www.
1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/14/ameri-
9 For a full-length discussion of the strategy– cas-partnerships-are-force-multipliers-world/.
resource mismatch, see Townshend, 19 White House, ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy of the
Thomas-Noone and Steward, ‘Averting Crisis: United States’, pp. 5–9.
American Strategy, Military Spending and 20 Ibid., pp. 12–13.
Collective Defence in the Indo-Pacific’. 21 US, Department of Defense, ‘Fact Sheet: 2022
10 US, National Defense Strategy Commission, National Defense Strategy’, 28 March 2022, p. 1,
‘Providing for the Common Defense: The https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-
Assessment and Recommendations of the 1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF.
National Defense Strategy Commission’, 13 22 See ‘Nomination – Austin III’, US Senate
November 2018, p. 14, https://www.usip.org/ Committee on Armed Services, 19 January 2021,
sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the- https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hear-
common-defense.pdf. ings/21-01-19-nomination (see p. 27 of transcript).
11 Nina Silove, ‘The Pivot Before the Pivot: US 23 US, Department of Defense, ‘Fact Sheet: 2022
National Defense Strategy’, p. 1. 2021, https://twitter.com/tanvi_madan/

24 See ‘Former Vice President Joe Biden Speech on status/1435275754330284037; Kuni Miyake’s
Foreign Policy’, C-SPAN, 11 July 2019, https:// remarks during a Johns Hopkins School of
www.c-span.org/video/?462515-1/vice-presi- Advanced International Studies webinar on
dent-joe-biden-speech-foreign-policy. ‘Asia After Afghanistan’, 10 September 2021,
25 White House, ‘Remarks by President Biden https://sais.jhu.edu/news-press/event-recap/
on the End of the War in Afghanistan’, 31 asia-after-afghanistan; and Frances Mangosing,
August 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ ‘Taliban Not Yet Source of Worry for PH War
briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/ on Terror, Officials Say’, Inquirer, 3 November
remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the- 2021, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/200075/
war-in-afghanistan/. taliban-not-yet-source-of-worry-for-ph-war-on-
26 Asia Society, ‘A Conversation with Kurt terror-say-officials.
Campbell, White House Coordinator for the 31 For more on this, see Ashley Townshend,
Indo-Pacific’, YouTube, time stamp: 18:53, ‘US Indo-Pacific Power Depends on Restraint
6 July 2021, https://www.youtube.com/ in Ukraine’, Foreign Policy, 9 February 2022,
watch?v=on5brIIInrI. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/09/us-in-
27 Nancy A. Youssef and Gordon Lubold, ‘Sole do-pacific-russia-ukraine-geopolitics/.
US Aircraft Carrier in Asia-Pacific to Help with 32 Keoni Everington, ‘Taiwan and Ukraine Not
Afghanistan Troop Withdrawal’, Wall Street Same, US to Ensure Chinese Invasion “Never
Journal, 26 May 2021, https://www.wsj.com/ Happens”’, Taiwan News, 15 April 2022, https://
articles/u-s-aircraft-carrier-leaving-asia-to-help- www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4508152.
with-afghanistan-troop-withdrawal-11622034089. See also Council on Foreign Relations, ‘A
28 See, for example, Brahma Chellaney, ‘Pax Conversation with Jake Sullivan’, 17 December
Americana Died in Kabul’, Strategist, Australian 2021, https://www.cfr.org/event/conversa-
Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), 18 August tion-jake-sullivan.
2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ 33 Connor O’Brien, Paul McLeary and Lee Hudson,
pax-americana-died-in-kabul/; ‘US Indo- ‘Russia Crisis Forces Pentagon to Rework
Pacific Allies Maintain Trust in Biden Despite Defense Strategy on the Fly’, Politico, 4 March
Afghanistan Exit’, Financial Times, 28 August 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/03/
2021, https://www.ft.com/content/1c9d4a90- russia-ukraine-defense-strategy-peng-
c87e-4a90-a364-e0a7288b7b16; and Yoichi tagon-00013449; and US, Department of Defense,
Shimada, ‘Following US Lead No Longer ‘Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy’.
an Option for Japan After Biden’s “Strategic 34 Trevor Hunnicutt and Steve Holland, ‘Biden
Failure”’, Center for Security Policy, 13 October Seeks $33 Billion War Chest to Support Ukraine,
2021, https://centerforsecuritypolicy.org/ Zelenskiy Wants Quick Approval’, Reuters, 28
following-us-lead-no-longer-an-option-for-ja- April 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/
pan-after-bidens-strategic-failure/. biden-looks-congress-oligarchs-more-cash-help-
29 See, for example, ‘India Has Divergences with ukraine-2022-04-28/; and Dave Lawler, ‘Biden
US on Afghanistan: EAM S Jaishankar’, Times Unveils New Weapons Package for Ukraine’,
of India, 16 August 2021, https://timesofindia. AXIOS, 21 April 2022, https://www.axios.com/
indiatimes.com/india/india-has-divergences- biden-announces-military-aid-ukraine-weapons-
with-us-on-afghanistan-eam-sjaishankar/ 2b33b6c8-16e3-4745-99db-395bb080de2b.html.
articleshow/85356796.cms. 35 Yu Nakamura, ‘Taiwan Faces Delays in US
30 See, for example, Lee Hsien Loong, ‘PM Arms Deliveries Due to Ukraine War’, Nikkei
Lee Hsien Loong’s Responses During Q&A Asia, 4 May 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/
Segment at Joint Press Conference with US Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/
Vice President Kamala Harris’, Singapore Taiwan-faces-delays-in-U.S.-arms-deliveries-
Prime Minister’s Office, 23 August 2021, due-to-Ukraine-war.
https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/ 36 Jack Detsch, ‘“No Decisions, No Changes”:
PM-Lee-responses-during-Joint-Press- Pentagon Fails to Stick Asia Pivot’, Foreign
Conference-with-US-VP-Kamala-Harris; Tanvi Policy, 29 November 2021, https://foreignpolicy.
Madan (@tanvi_madan), tweet, 7 September com/2021/11/29/pentagon-china-biden-asia-pivot/.
37 US, Department of Defense, ‘DoD Concludes Defense News, 15 April 2022, https://www.
2021 Global Posture Review’, 29 November defensenews.com/news/your-navy/2022/04/15/

2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/ navy-bolsters-submarine-force-in-guam-to-sup-
Releases/Release/Article/2855801/dod-con- port-indo-pacific-missions/.
cludes-2021-global-posture-review/. 43 ‘US Says Deployment of Latest Apache
38 See Ashley Townshend, ‘Biden’s Defense Helicopters to S. Korea Complete’, Yonhap
Budget Will Worry America’s Indo-Pacific News Agency, 21 February 2022, https://en.yna.
Allies’, Defense One, 22 June 2021, https:// co.kr/view/AEN20220221005800325.
www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/06/ 44 White House, ‘FACT SHEET: Strengthening
bidens-defense-budget-will-worry-americas-in- the US–Singapore Strategic Partnership’, 23
do-pacific-allies/174870/; and Elbridge Colby, August 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
The Strategy of Denial (New Haven, CT: Yale briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/23/
University Press, 2021). fact-sheet-strengthening-the-u-s-singa-
39 See Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs pore-strategic-partnership/; Mike Yeo, ‘US
and Trade, ‘Joint Statement Australia–US Has “No Plans Right Now” to Increase
Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2021’, LCS Presence in Singapore, Says Navy
16 September 2021, https://www.dfat.gov. Chief’, Defense News, 28 July 2021, https://
au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/ www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/07/28/
joint-statement-australia-us-ministerial-consul- us-has-no-plans-right-now-to-increase-lcs-pres-
tations-ausmin-2021; and Ashley Townshend, ence-in-singapore-says-navy-chief/.
‘Far from Breaking with the Past, AUKUS 45 US, Department of Defense, ‘DOD
Advances Australia’s Commitment to Collective Statement on Philippines’ Suspension of
Defence’, Strategist, ASPI, 24 September Visiting Forces Agreement Termination’,
2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ 14 June 2021, https://www.defense.gov/
far-from-breaking-with-the-past-aukus-advanc- News/Releases/Release/Article/2656723/
es-australias-commitment-to-collective-defence/. dod-statement-on-philippines-suspen-
40 See Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and sion-of-visiting-forces-agreement-termination/;
Trade, ‘Joint Statement Australia–US Ministerial and US, Department of Defense, ‘Readout
Consultations (AUSMIN) 2021’; and Melissa of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin
Mackay, ‘Work Begins on $270 Million US Fuel III’s Meeting with Philippine Secretary of
Storage Facility on Darwin’s Outskirts’, ABC National Defense Delfin Lorenzana’, 10
News, 18 January 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/ September 2021, https://www.defense.gov/
news/2022-01-19/work-begins-on-us-jet-fuel-fa- News/Releases/Release/Article/2771441/
cility-outside-darwin/100764194. readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-
41 Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and iiis-meeting-with-philippine-sec/.
Trade, ‘Joint Statement Australia–US Ministerial 46 For context, see Randy Schriver and Eric Sayers,
Consultations (AUSMIN) 2021’. ‘The Case for a Pacific Deterrence Initiative’,
42 Alex Wilson, ‘Navy Awards Contracts Worth War on the Rocks, 10 March 2020, https://
Nearly $580 Million for Marine Barracks, warontherocks.com/2020/03/the-case-for-a-pacif-
Fire Station on Guam’, Stars and Stripes, ic-deterrence-initiative/; and Jim Inhofe and Jack
11 August 2021, https://www.stripes.com/ Reed, ‘The Pacific Deterrence Initiative: Peace
theaters/asia_pacific/2021-08-10/marine-corps- Through Strength in the Indo-Pacific’, War on
camp-blaz-barracks-fire-station-2518839. the Rocks, 28 May 2020, https://warontherocks.
html; Mila Cisneros, ‘Air Force Moves com/2020/05/the-pacific-deterrence-initiative-
Forward with $28.9M Contract Award at peace-through-strength-in-the-indo-pacific/.
Anderson AFB’, Air Force Civil Engineer 47 See US Indo-Pacific Command, ‘National Defense
Center, 7 January 2022, https://www.afcec. Authorization Act (NDAA) 2020: Section 1253
af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2892957/ Assessment, Executive Summary – Regain the
air-force-moves-forward-with-289m-contract- Advantage’, 15 March 2020, https://int.nyt.
award-at-andersen-afb/; and Diana Stancy com/data/documenthelper/6864-national-de-
Correll, ‘Navy Bolsters Submarine Force in fense-strategy-summ/8851517f5e10106bc3b1/
Guam to Support Indo-Pacific Missions’, optimized/full.pdf.
48 Dustin Walker, ‘Pacific Deterrence Initiative: A Alliance Repair: Biden Must Do More in
Look at Funding in the New Defense Bill, and the Indo-Pacific’, Diplomat, 13 September
What Must Happen Now’, Defense News, 15 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/

December 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/ beyond-alliance-repair-biden-must-do-more-in-
opinion/commentary/2021/12/15/pacific-deter- the-indo-pacific/.
rence-initiative-a-look-at-funding-in-the-new- 57 See Australia, Department of Defence, ‘2020
defense-bill-and-what-must-happen-now/. Defence Strategic Update’, 1 July 2020,
49 ‘Defense & Aerospace Podcast [Washington https://www.defence.gov.au/about/publica-
Roundtable Dec 17, 2021]’, Defense & Aerospace tions/2020-defence-strategic-update. See also
Report, 17 December 2021, https://defaeroreport. Ashley Townshend, ‘Australia’s New Regional
com/2021/12/17/defense-aerospace-pod- Security Posture’, in IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional
cast-washington-roundtable-dec-17-21/. Security Assessment 2021: Key Developments and
50 See Office of the Undersecretary of Defense Trends (London: IISS, 2021), pp. 91–114.
(Comptroller), US Department of Defense, 58 See Australia, Department of Defence, ‘2020
‘Pacific Deterrence Initiative: Department of Defence Strategic Update’, p. 27; US, Defense
Defense Budget, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023’, April Security Cooperation Agency, ‘Australia –
2022, p. 5, https://comptroller.defense.gov/ Defense Services Related to Future Standard
Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2023/ Missile Production’, 25 August 2021, https://
FY2023_Pacific_Deterrence_Initiative.pdf; and www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/Press%20
Jason Sherman, ‘DOD Advances $27 Billion, Release%20-%20Australia%2021-55%20CN.
Five-year Package to Deter China; $50 Billion pdf; Prime Minister of Australia, ‘Australia to
Gap with INDOPACOM’, Inside Defense, Pursue Nuclear-powered Submarines Through
19 April 2022, https://insidedefense.com/ New Trilateral Enhanced Security Partnership’,
daily-news/dod-advances-27-billion-five-year- 16 September 2021, https://www.pm.gov.au/
package-deter-china-50-billion-gap-indopacom. media/australia-pursue-nuclear-powered-sub-
51 See ‘State of the United States: Biden’s Agenda marines-through-new-trilateral-enhanced-se-
in the Balance’, United States Studies Centre, 16 curity; and Marcus Hellyer, ‘Making Sense of
March 2022, pp. 81–2, https://www.ussc.edu.au/ Australia’s Salvo of Missile Announcements’,
analysis/state-of-the-united-states-bidens-agenda- Strategist, ASPI, 7 April 2022, https://www.
in-the-balance; and Townshend, ‘Biden’s Defense aspistrategist.org.au/making-sense-of-australias-
Budget Will Worry America’s Indo-Pacific Allies’. salvo-of-missile-announcements/.
52 See Aaron Mehta, ‘“DoD Needs 3–5 Percent 59 See Prime Minister of Australia, ‘Media Release:
Annual Growth Through 2021”, Top Officials Sovereign Guided Weapons Manufacturing’,
Say’, Defense News, 13 June 2017, https:// 31 March 2021, https://www.pm.gov.au/media/
www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/06/13/ sovereign-guided-weapons-manufacturing;
dod-needs-3-5-percent-annual-growth-through- and Christopher Mouton et al., Establishing a
2023-top-officials-say/; and US, National Sovereign Guided Weapons Enterprise for Australia
Defense Strategy Commission, ‘Providing for (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2022),
the Common Defense: The Assessment and https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
Recommendations of the National Defense research_reports/RRA1700/RRA1710-1/RAND_
Strategy Commission’, p. xii. RRA1710-1.pdf.
53 Alex Ward, ‘Why There’s Talk about China 60 Australia, Department of Defence, ‘AUKUS:
Starting a War with Taiwan’, Vox, 5 May 2021, Trilateral Security Partnership’, https://www.
https://www.vox.com/22405553/taiwan-china- defence.gov.au/about/taskforces/nuclear-pow-
war-joe-biden-strategic-ambiguity. ered-submarine-task-force/fact-sheets.
54 White House, ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy of the 61 Charles Edel, ‘What Drove the US to Make
United States’, p. 12. See also White House, a Nuclear Submarine Deal with Australia?’,
‘Interim National Security Strategic Guidance’, Maritime Executive, 7 November 2021, https://
pp. 9–10. www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/
55 US, Department of Defense, ‘Fact Sheet: 2022 what-drove-the-u-s-to-make-a-nuclear-subma-
National Defense Strategy’. rine-deal-with-australia.
56 Ashley Townshend and Tom Corben, ‘Beyond 62 Colin Clark, ‘Aussies to Pick “Mature”
Nuke Sub Design; Is UK’s Astute Class www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/

Frontrunner?’, Breaking Defense, 2 November statements-releases/2021/05/21/u-s-rok-leaders-
2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/11/ joint-statement/; and US, Department of State,
aussies-to-pick-mature-nuke-sub-design-is-uks- ‘Joint Statement on the US–Japan–Republic
astute-class-frontrunner/. of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Meeting’,
63 White House, ‘FACT SHEET: Implementation 12 February 2022, https://www.state.gov/
of the Australia–United Kingdom–United States joint-statement-on-the-u-s-japan-republic-of-ko-
Partnership (AUKUS)’. rea-trilateral-ministerial-meeting/.
64 See Brendan Thomas-Noone, ‘Ebbing 72 See Josh Smith, ‘S. Korea Says It Successfully
Opportunity: Australia and the US National Test-fired First Solid-fuel Space Rocket’, Reuters,
Technology and Industrial Base’, United States 30 March 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/
Studies Centre, 25 November 2019, https://www. asia-pacific/skorea-says-it-successfully-test-
ussc.edu.au/analysis/australia-and-the-us-na- fired-first-solid-fuel-space-rocket-2022-03-30/;
tional-technology-and-industrial-base. and Juho Lee, ‘South Korea Conducts Second
65 See US, Department of State, ‘Joint Statement of SLBM Test from KSS-III Submarine’, Naval
the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee News, 25 April 2022, https://www.navalnews.
(“2+2”)’, 6 January 2022, https://www.state. com/naval-news/2022/04/south-korea-conducts-
gov/joint-statement-of-the-u-s-japan-secu- second-slbm-test-from-kss-iii-submarine/.
rity-consultative-committee-22/; and Ken 73 ‘S. Korea, US Agree on First Joint Space
Moriyasu, ‘US and Japan to Jointly Stockpile Policy Research’, Yonhap News Agency,
Munitions, Including Near Taiwan’, Nikkei Asia, 26 April 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/
16 January 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/ AEN20220426001500325?section=national/defense.
International-relations/U.S.-and-Japan-to-jointly- 74 See US, Department of State, ‘Joint Statement
stockpile-munitions-including-near-Taiwan. of the 2016 United States–Republic of Korea
66 See US, Department of State, ‘US–Japan Joint Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting’, 19
Press Statement’, 16 March 2021, https://www. October 2016, https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/
state.gov/u-s-japan-joint-press-statement/; and US, pa/prs/ps/2016/10/263340.htm; and ‘Arms
Department of State, ‘Joint Statement of the US– Agency Chief Says S. Korea Open to Joining US
Japan Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”)’. Defense Supply Chains’, Yonhap News Agency,
67 Jesse Johnson, ‘LDP Proposal Heralds Big 11 February 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/
Changes for Japan’s Security Policies’, Japan AEN20220211006400325?section=national/defense.
Times, 27 April 2022, https://www.japantimes. 75 See US, Department of Defense, ‘Readout
co.jp/news/2022/04/27/national/japan-strike-ca- of 16th US–India Defense Policy Group’, 8
pability-budget-proposal/. October 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/
68 US, Department of State, ‘Joint Statement of the US– Releases/Release/Article/2806246/readout-of-
Japan Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”). 16th-us-india-defense-policy-group/; and US,
69 Daniel Wasserbly, ‘AUSA 2021: Japan Seeking Department of Defense, ‘Readout of US–India
More Military Co-development Work with 2+2 Intercessional Dialogue’, 2 September
US DoD’, Janes, 12 October 2021, https:// 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/
www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/ Release/Article/2762541/readout-of-us-in-
ausa-2021-japan-seeking-more-military-co-de- dia-22-intercessional-dialogue/.
velopment-work-with-us-dod. 76 US, Air Force, ‘India and US Sign Project
70 See, for example, Daniel Sneider, ‘The Hidden Agreement for Air-launched Unmanned Aerial
GAP in American and Japanese Defense’, Vehicle’, 3 September 2021, https://www.
Oriental Economist, 17 January 2022, https:// af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2764069/
toyokeizai.net/articles/-/503647. india-and-us-sign-project-agreement-for-air-
71 White House, ‘US–ROK Leaders’ launched-unmanned-aerial-vehicle/.
Joint Statement’, 21 May 2021, https:// 77 US, Department of State, ‘Fourth Annual US–
India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue’, 11 April 2022, 84 US, Department of State, ‘Joint Statement on
https://www.state.gov/fourth-annual-u-s-in- the US–Japan–Republic of Korea Trilateral
dia-22-ministerial-dialogue/. Ministerial Meeting’.
78 See Grand Tamasha, ‘US–India Ties After the 85 See White House, ‘US–Japan Joint
“2+2” Summit’, Carnegie Endowment for Leaders’ Statement: “US–JAPAN GLOBAL
International Peace, April 2022, https://carneg- PARTNERSHIP FOR A NEW ERA”’, 16
ieendowment.org/grandtamasha/. April 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
79 See Poulomi Ghosh, ‘US Wants India to Cut briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/16/u-
Defence Buying from Russia; Congressman
s-japan-joint-leaders-statement-u-s-japan-
Says “Gruesomely”’, Hindustan Times, 6 April
global-partnership-for-a-new-era/; and White
2022, https://www.hindustantimes.com/
House, ‘US–ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement’.
world-news/us-wants-india-to-cut-defence- 86 Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and
buying-from-russia-congressman-says-grue-
Trade, ‘Joint Statement Australia–US Ministerial
somely-101649203816164.html; and Rachel
Consultations (AUSMIN) 2021’.
Oswald, ‘Democrats Call Out India for Buying
87 See, for example, Prime Minister of Australia,
Russian Oil and Weapons’, Roll Call, 26
‘Australia–Japan Leaders’ Meeting Joint
April 2022, https://rollcall.com/2022/04/26/
Statement’, 6 January 2022, https://www.
democrats-call-out-india-for-buying-russian-oil-
pm.gov.au/media/australia-japan-leaders-meet-
and-weapons/.
ing-joint-statement; Australia, Minister for
80 See ‘India Says Deliveries of Russian S-400
Foreign Affairs, ‘Ninth Japan–Australia 2+2
Defence System Have Begun’, Al-Jazeera, 6
Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations’,
December 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/
9 June 2021, https://www.foreignminister.
news/2021/12/6/india-russian-s-400-missile-de-
gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/
fence-system-delivery; US, Department of State,
ninth-japan-australia-22-foreign-and-de-
‘Department Press Briefing – March 22, 2022’,
fence-ministerial-consultations; Australia,
22 March 2022, https://www.state.gov/briefings/
Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘Inaugural
department-press-briefing-march-22-2022/;
Australia–France 2+2 Ministerial Consultations’,
and Dinakar Peri, ‘India Gets S-400 Training
30 August 2021, https://www.foreignminister.
Equipment’, Hindu, 16 April 2022, https://
gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/
www.thehindu.com/news/international/
inaugural-australia-france-22-ministerial-con-
russia-starts-delivery-of-some-components-of-
sultations; Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2nd-regiment-of-s-400-missile-systems-to-india/
article65324899.ece. ‘Sixth Japan–France Foreign and Defense
81 Jake Sullivan, ‘2021 Lowy Lecture’, Lowy Ministers’ Meeting’, 21 January 2022, https://
Institute, 11 November 2021, https://www. www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_003078.
lowyinstitute.org/publications/2021-lowy-lec- html; and Australia, Minister for Foreign
ture-jake-sullivan. Affairs, ‘AUKMIN 2022 Joint Statement’, 21

82 White House, ‘Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: January 2022, https://www.foreignminister.
“The Spirit of the Quad”’, 12 March 2021, gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ aukmin-2022-joint-statement.
statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders- 88 US Indo-Pacific Command, ‘With Allies

joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/. and Partners, US Indo-Pacific Command
83 See Tom Corben and Ashley Townshend, ‘Quad Successfully Completes LSGE 2021’, 2
Must Be a Seagoing Deterrent’, Australian September 2021, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/
Financial Review, 24 September 2021, https:// News/News-Article-View/Article/2763318/
www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/quad-must- with-allies-and-partners-us-indo-pacific-com-
be-a-seagoing-deterrent-20210923-p58u6e. mand-successfully-completes-lsge-20/.
CHAPTER 2
ASIA-PACIFIC
SECURITY: A CHINESE
PERSPECTIVE
YUN SUN
Yun Sun is Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program
and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center
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Pacific has key implications for China’s regional security policy.
DRIVERS AND INFLUENCERS OF CHINA’S REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Beijing wishes to be more capable of protecting its interests within its borders and in the region.
A strong military is considered essential to secure China’s sea lanes of communication, including trade
routes. Domestically, there is a strong conviction that an assertive security policy serves President
Xi Jinping’s power consolidation. Following the coronavirus pandemic, China has emerged more
confident of its ‘destiny’ to displace the US in the Asia-Pacific.
CHINA’S SECURITY OBJECTIVES: COUNTERING THE US PRESENCE

Beijing seeks to check the US military presence and security alliances to become safer and more
secure. Countering the US Indo-Pacific strategy, regional frameworks – such as the Quad – and military
cooperation plans – such as AUKUS – have emerged as significant challenges.
CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE US ALLIANCE SYSTEM

Key to China’s broader Asia-Pacific security outlook is countering the AUKUS agreement and its implications
for new-found coalition-building by the US and its allies. For Chinese strategic thinkers, the real danger is
how AUKUS (and the United States’ coalition-building) will contribute to the regional arms race.
POTENTIAL FLASHPOINT: TAIWAN

Short of war, China considers itself unable to prevent growing US–Taiwan ties. It can only escalate its
show of force, hoping that Washington and Taipei will be compelled to show restraint. Although the
prevailing sense in the Chinese policy community is that peaceful unification is becoming less likely,
few anticipate that Xi will attack Taiwan in the immediate future. The fragile peace could nonetheless
be affected by an accidental conflict or escalation.
China’s regional security outlook has evolved significantly in recent years, with the vast
theatre to China’s west receiving more attention as a result of the introduction of the Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI, leading into Central Asia, the Middle East and eventually Europe)
and the escalating competition with India in South Asia. However, the immediate area to
the east of China’s coastal lines – the Western Pacific – is the theatre that dominates China’s
national-security strategy. In this sense, for China not all sub-regions in the Asia-Pacific are
created equal.
In the Western Pacific, China has identified four primary theatres that harbour or
constitute security threats that could pose critical challenges to its national security.
From north to south, these theatres are the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, Taiwan
and the South China Sea. Since the end of the Cold War, China’s Asia-Pacific security
policy has evolved in response to threats emanating from these theatres and they have
alternated as the most pressing security challenge at different historical junctures. For
example, during the first year of the Trump administration in the United States, China
was most concerned about a North Korea contingency. Beijing’s focus shifted towards
Taiwan and the South China Sea during the last year of Donald Trump’s presidency.
In the first year of the Biden administration, Taiwan was China’s highest priority given
what Beijing perceived to be mounting US support for the island in the context of great-
power competition. While this development does not necessarily mean that China
anticipates a war over the Taiwan Strait in the immediate future, it does suggest that
Beijing’s security-policy planning has to prioritise national unification, or at least the
prevention of ‘Taiwan independence’, over competing agendas. None of these four thea-
tres will see the swift resolution of China’s security concerns in the foreseeable future;
they will remain the first priorities of Beijing’s Asia-Pacific security policy for years, if
not decades, to come.
China’s Asia-Pacific security policy is US-centric. The US is perceived as the most
significant threat to China’s national security. As China’s immediate neighbourhood, the
Asia-Pacific is the key battleground of US–China competition for global influence, leader-
ship and dominance. This is not only because the US is perceived to be the main obstacle
to the most important item on China’s national-security agenda – unification with Taiwan
– but also because a growing China, flexing its muscles and reaching out, inevitably runs
into the US and its alliance system, which spans the first and second island chains (see
Map 2.1). This last point is increasingly relevant as China develops its blue-water navy and
reaches further into the maritime domain.
Since 2017, the most significant change in Asia-Pacific regional affairs has been the
rise of great-power competition between the US and China. The competitive theme has
overtaken previous narratives of ‘engagement’, ‘containment’ or ‘co-petition’ (coopera-
tion and competition), saturating all aspects of US–China relations. This tectonic change
has key implications for all aspects of China’s security policy towards the Asia-Pacific.
These aspects include the drivers and influencers of China’s regional security policy; its
evolving security objectives in the region; its assessment of the US and, specifically, its
regional security framework; potential flashpoints; and Beijing’s military preparation for
potential conflict.
Asia-Pacific Security: A Chinese Perspective 41
Map 2.1: Island chains of defence in the Pacific Ocean as conceived by Chinese strategists
RUSSIA
Kuril Islands
Sea of
Japan
(East Sea)
JAPAN
Korean
Peninsula
SOUTH
CHINA KOREA
East Ogasawara Islands (Japan)

China
Sea
Ryukyu Islands/
Okinawa (Japan) Pacific
Ocean
Taiwan
South
China Philippine Northern Mariana
Sea Sea Islands (US)
THAILAND
PHILIPPINES Guam (US)

VIETNAM
Bay of Yap (Federated States

Bengal Sulu of Micronesia)
Sea
MALAYSIA PALAU
SINGAPORE INDONESIA
PAPUA NEW
Banda Sea GUINEA
Indian
Ocean
Coral
Sea
AUSTRALIA
First Island Chain

Second Island Chain
Key areas of security concern NEW ZEALAND
Military allies of the US
Source: PLA Navy Headquarters ‘Zhongguo haijun junren shouce’ [Handbook of PLA Navy Personnel], (Beijing: Haichao chubanshe, 2012)
©IISS
DRIVERS AND INFLUENCERS OF CHINA’S REGIONAL SECURITY POLICY

China’s regional security policy aims to enhance ‘security’ as Beijing understands the term.
This understanding has been evolving and expanding in recent years. Simply put, China
wishes to grow more capable of protecting its interests not only within its borders but also
in the region. As China has become more capable and feels less vulnerable at home, the
scope of its security has expanded outwards, first onto its periphery. China has sought to
increase its security through addressing the security challenges posed by the US, its allies
and other security actors in the region. Beijing perceives the US alliance system that encom-
passes Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan as the primary threat to China’s
national-security interests. The territorial and maritime disputes between China and US
allies and partners are simply one manifestation of the conflict between China’s expanding
influence and the United States’ traditional regional security arrangements.
The security dilemma, however, is that the enhancement of security by a state – in
this case China – inevitably prompts other states to react. This in turn decreases the orig-
inal state’s (China’s) security. Furthermore, the zero-sum nature of certain issues, such as
national unification or territorial and maritime disputes, means that ‘win–win’ scenarios
are unlikely to emerge. China’s efforts to mitigate its own vulnerability and fulfil its core
national agenda – which includes sovereignty, unification with Taiwan and territorial
integrity – are the most important drivers of Beijing’s regional security policymaking.
China’s regional security policy is also driven by economic interests. According to a
Chinese white paper published in 2017, ‘China’s Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation Policy’,
increasing economic integration is an important foundation for relations among nations
and the ‘master key’ to solving security issues.1 While economic cooperation – and the
complex interdependencies that result from it – helps to stabilise security relations, China’s
security policy is also actively driven and motivated by its economic interests. For example,
a strong military (especially a strong navy) is believed to be essential to securing China’s sea
lanes of communication, including its trade routes through the South China Sea, the Strait
of Malacca and the Indian Ocean. With a Taiwan contingency becoming an increasingly
probable event, countering a potential US-led blockade of China’s trade routes – especially
its energy transportation (see Map 2.2) – has become a key challenge that China’s national-
security apparatus is pressed to address. The same concern extends to China’s economic
assets, now widely disbursed throughout the region, from oil and gas pipelines through
Myanmar to fisheries and other assets in the South China Sea.
Security policies are inevitably driven by political goals. Speculation about China’s
political agenda under President Xi Jinping is abundant. Domestically, there is a strong
conviction that an assertive foreign and security policy serves Xi’s power consolidation by
boosting his foreign-policy credentials and image as a strong leader. The reasoning goes
that if Xi can advance China’s security and geopolitical interests in a highly contested Asia-
Pacific, it will improve his chances of succeeding in a domestic power struggle to secure his
vision of a leadership tenure beyond the traditional ten-year limit.
In terms of China’s political goals in the Asia-Pacific, security policies constitute the
foundation of China’s bid for a regional-leadership role and are an integral component
of the ‘rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation’ and China’s return to its self-perceived
Map 2.2: China’s key oil and natural-gas import routes, 2019
China’s top five sources of oil

China’s top five sources of natural gas RUSSIA 2nd
1.55m
Oil (barrels per day)
KAZAKHSTAN 5th 0.25trn
Natural gas (cubic feet per year)
TURKMENISTAN 2nd
TURKMENISTAN 2nd
IRAQ 3rd 1.16trn
CHINA
1.04m
SAUDI ARABIA 1st Strait of Hormuz

1.67m
South China Sea

Bab el-Mandeb Strait
0.33trn
0.40trn
QATAR 3rd Malacca Strait
BRAZIL 5th
0.80m ANGOLA 4th
MALAYSIA 4th
0.95m
AUSTRALIA 1st 1.34trn
©IISS
‘rightful’ leadership position in the region. Beijing is aware that the historical tributary Note: All import routes shown are
for illustrative purposes only.
system – the concept of tianxia – no longer has appeal in a world dominated by nation-
Source: US Energy Information
states. However, deference, particularly in the context of the US–China rivalry, remains Administration, www.eia.gov
China’s key demand of countries on its periphery, especially in East Asia. In this sense,
military diplomacy as an instrument of regional security policies (including but not limited
to arms sales, military assistance, joint military exercises with regional countries and port
calls during naval escort missions) serves the important dual purpose of demonstrating
capabilities and advancing political ties between states.
As an authoritarian state, China’s foreign policy and security policy are inevitably
imbued with its political convictions and heavily influenced by its political agenda. This
link is reflected in both the defensive and offensive contexts. In terms of the defensive
context, China’s security policy is driven by the desire to protect its ideological interests,
manifested mainly through the one-party authoritarian system dominated by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). This relationship can be seen in the Chinese response to the Trump
administration’s delegitimisation campaign against the CCP and its party-state. Brookings
Institution scholar Cheng Li notes that the Trump administration’s campaign had three
objectives: the rhetorical separation of the Chinese state from the CCP; calls for over-
throwing the CCP regime; and containment of China’s rise through treating the country as
a ‘whole-of-society threat’.2 These objectives

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi
poked at the CCP’s sensitivities over regime Jinping in Pyongyang during their fifth summit, 21 June 2019
legitimacy and confirmed for Beijing that the
US objective was indeed regime change in
China. Consequently, China’s security policy
was steered to counter potential US plans to
create instability both regionally and domes-
tically to undermine CCP legitimacy. This
has been evident in China’s heavy-handed
security response to the political turmoil in
Hong Kong since 2019, as well as its active
(Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, File)
preparation for a military conflict in the
Taiwan Strait and South China Sea in 2020. Commander-in-chief of Myanmar’s armed forces Senior General Min
The influence of ideology over China’s Aung Hlaing poses with Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi
during their meeting in Naypyidaw, Myanmar, 12 January 2021
Asia-Pacific security policy is also reflected
in Beijing’s security relations with undem-
ocratic, authoritarian states in the region.
For decades, China has propped up and
supported North Korea through arms sales
and security cooperation. Although Beijing’s
and Pyongyang’s views differ signifi-
cantly on North Korea’s nuclear-weapons
programme, their interests closely align on
the need to prevent regime change and main-
(Myanmar Military Information Team via AP, File)
tain solidarity between the two authoritarian
regimes. This need is a fundamental motive
informing People’s Liberation Army (PLA) contingency planning on North Korea, which
aims to preserve the North Korean state and regime even in the event of a military conflict.
Similar examples are more abundant in mainland Southeast Asia, where China’s
security ties with and policy towards authoritarian states keep these regimes on critical
life support. At a minimum, these would include China’s arms sales to the Thai military
government, the maintenance of security ties with Myanmar’s military government and
arms sales and military assistance to Cambodia’s Hun Sen government. These security
ties and policies are not only aimed at competing with the US for influence and partners
in the region but also play a genuine and practical role in propping up the authoritarian
regimes in question. While China’s moral criteria regarding regime legitimacy are much
more flexible than those of the West, protecting and shielding these authoritarian regimes
from international intervention and influence is an indisputable Chinese goal.
The experience of the coronavirus pandemic has led to changes in China’s security
outlook and policy towards the region. In absolute terms, China has faced tremendous
difficulties in its domestic economy and foreign relations as a result of COVID-19.
Internationally, much of the BRI was halted, and while China’s aggressive ‘wolf-warrior
diplomacy’ might have shut down foreign complaints temporarily, Beijing hardly won
hearts or minds across the globe. In this A passenger is swabbed for COVID-19 at a high-speed-railway
station in Huai’an, Jiangsu province, eastern China, 11 May 2022
sense, the pandemic has weakened China’s
comprehensive national power and
tarnished its international image. However,
although China’s experience of COVID-19
has been difficult, Beijing assesses that the US
and its allies – or the West in general – have
been more adversely affected in terms of
domestic-crisis management, disease control
and economic performance. After an initial
period following the coronavirus pandemic
in which there was growing confidence that
the global power equilibrium was changing
in China’s favour, China’s positive outlook
has been dampened in 2022 by the war in
(CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images)
Ukraine and the lockdowns in Shanghai
and other cities in China due to the spread of COVID-19. These events have triggered a
perceived strategic low tide in the view of many Chinese strategists.
The absolute and relative impact of COVID-19 will jointly determine China’s grand
strategy in the post-coronavirus world. There is no doubt that China has emerged more
confident about its status and its ‘destiny’ to displace the US after the pandemic. The
pandemic is thus regarded by Chinese leaders as a historic opportunity for China to
improve its strategic position and expand its influence in Asia and beyond. This judgement
has had a tremendous impact on China’s security objectives and policies.
CHINA’S SECURITY OBJECTIVES: COUNTERING THE US PRESENCE

China’s security objectives in the Asia-Pacific have been expanding in terms of both
their content and their geographical scope. Two decades ago, its security objectives were
primarily limited to the homeland. Prominent Chinese strategists now define the region
adjacent to the country’s borders as ‘relevant areas of China’s security interest’.3 What
this means is that the US security presence – especially its deployment of military forces
and advanced weapons systems to China’s immediate periphery – is perceived as a major
threat to national security. The logic continues that in order for China to become safer and
more secure, it must check the United States’ military presence and security alliances.
Beijing aims to dispel and displace the US security presence in China’s immediate
neighbourhood and in the Asia-Pacific more generally. This goal is evident in its response
to the US deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) to
South Korea in 2016. The deployment was a response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear
test, conducted in January 2016. From Seoul’s perspective, it was a decision of last resort
because – despite the warming of China−South Korea relations under the latter’s pres-
ident Park Geun-hye – China had rejected a South Korean request for a coordinated
response. In fact, following North Korea’s nuclear test on 6 January, President Xi refused
to answer phone calls from president Park until 5 February.4 However, in July 2016, when
) e
Fil
AP
via
p
ha
on
/Y
o m
be
n-
Ju
im
(K
A US Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense system (THAAD) is set up in
Seongju, South Korea, 7 September 2017
South Korea announced the decision to deploy the THAAD system to better detect and
defend against the North Korean threat, Beijing voiced its opposition vehemently, citing
the potential application of the radar to detect and monitor China’s missile activities.5 As
punishment, China imposed ‘unofficial’ economic sanctions on South Korea, the lingering
effects of which are still felt today.6
Chinese efforts to displace the US can also be identified in Southeast Asia, particularly
in the South China Sea. China had been concerned with US military reconnaissance and
surveillance in the South China Sea for decades before US–China disputes in the South
China Sea intensified. Chinese strategists recall the EP-3 incident of 2001, which involved
a mid-air collision of a US Navy aircraft and a Chinese fighter aircraft near Hainan Island.
Beijing’s construction and militarisation of artificial islands aims to increase Chinese deter-
rence vis-à-vis the US military presence and surveillance activities in the South China
Sea.7 Chinese experts anticipate that the artificial islands may be insufficient to completely
deter US military activities and that there could be more of such activities in the future as
Washington tries to offset their impact. However, as one Chinese expert stated, in the long
run these islands will ‘inevitably form a barrier, a deterrence, and another layer of consid-
erations in the US military decision-making and activities in the South China Sea, pushing
such activities further away from China’s coastline’.8
China capitalised on the Trump administration’s ‘America First’ moment to undermine
the US alliance system in the Western Pacific. Beijing cheered Philippines President Rodrigo
Duterte’s repeated threats to end the Visiting Forces Agreement with the US.9 China sought
to provide military assistance, including light weapons, drones and counter-terrorism
equipment, to Manila during the Trump years to increase the appeal of alignment with
China and to promote its image as an alternative security provider.10 Similarly, Beijing also
Figure 2.1: Defence budgets of selected actors in the Indo-Pacific, 2015–21
US$ (billion, constant 2015)
800
700
US
600 China
India
Japan
300 South Korea
Australia
Taiwan
200
100
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Source: IISS, Military Balance+, milbalplus.iiss.org
intensified efforts to increase South Korea’s neutrality between the US and China by under-
mining Seoul’s confidence in Washington’s commitment, citing US attempts to measure the
alliance’s merits in dollar terms and its demands that allies increase their cost-sharing contri-
butions. As Brookings Institution expert Jung H. Pak maintains, China’s primary approach to
South Korea is to ‘try to loosen the linchpin’ of the US security alliance in East Asia.11
China’s security objectives are focused therefore on countering and undermining the
US security presence in the region – especially its military presence. Countering the US
Indo-Pacific strategy, regional frameworks – such as the Quad – and specific military-coop-
eration plans – such as the AUKUS agreement – have emerged as key challenges to China’s
security objectives in the Asia-Pacific.
CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE US ALLIANCE SYSTEM

One of the Biden administration’s most significant strategic initiatives aims to strengthen
US alliances and partnerships to leverage the collective power of like-minded countries
to counter the challenges posed by China. Biden organised the first virtual Quad Leaders’
Summit in March 2021 and the first in-person summit in September 2021, attended by
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and
Japanese prime minister Suga Yoshihide. Diversifying away from the regional security
focus of the Quad under president Trump, the summits in 2021 focused on ‘21st-century
challenges’, including the financing, production and distribution of vaccines to address the
coronavirus pandemic; promoting high-standard infrastructure; combatting the climate
crisis; working together on emerging technologies, space and cyber security; and gener-
ating ‘next-generation talent’ in Quad countries.12 Hard military security no longer appears
to be a focus of the Quad.
The AUKUS agreement The US Navy’s nuclear-powered attack submarine USS Illinois (SSN-
786), which is assigned to the Indo-Pacific region, enters its home port
Key to China’s broader Asia-Pacific security
of Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam, Hawaii, 13 September 2021
outlook is countering AUKUS and its impli-
cations for new-found coalition-building by
the US and its allies.13 China’s reactions to
and strategic view of AUKUS are still devel-
oping, given the grouping’s wide scope
and extended time frame to implement its
provisions. Nevertheless, since AUKUS was
announced, China has sought to undermine
its geopolitical legitimacy by calling into ques- (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Michael B. Zingaro/U.S. Navy via AP)
tion the trilateral agreement’s motivations. As

with its criticism of the Western pushback against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February
2022, Beijing has accused AUKUS of fomenting a ‘Cold War mentality’. In Beijing’s view,
this mentality inherently threatens China’s national security and is synonymous with mili-
tary blocs and ‘group confrontation’.14 Some Chinese thinkers have equated AUKUS with an
‘Asian NATO’, which elevates the importance of countermeasures in the Chinese mindset.15
On AUKUS’s goal of supplying nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, China is
hopeful that the new Australian fleet will be built from scratch rather than retrofitted from
retired US vessels, therefore providing China additional time to modernise its own fleet.
The Chinese also hope that domestic politics and leadership changes in Australia will
disrupt the rollout of the strategic assets. They would have observed that previously high-
ranking Australian politicians have wavered in their view of AUKUS, casting doubt on the
robustness and longevity of the agreement.16
China’s long-term strategic concern lies in the agreement’s impact on the ongoing arms
race in Asia. Although aware of the steady increase in regional military expenditures (see
Figure 2.1) and the almost inevitable ‘second nuclear age’, the Chinese perceive AUKUS
as a step towards there being a greater number of countries that pose a security challenge
to China, as well as an expanded number that are augmenting their tactical capabilities.
China expects that, beyond the addition of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, other
US-aligned countries will seek newer and more advanced weapons systems, which the US
will deliver. This scenario adds substance to the notion of an anti-China coalition in the
Asia-Pacific and puts an essential question before Beijing: should China engage in the arms
race? Or should it follow its own pace? Chinese strategic thinkers recall how Soviet efforts
to keep up with the US in military spending led to economic mismanagement and, ulti-
mately, the Soviet Union’s demise. However, the unprecedented security challenges China
faces in the twenty-first century may cause Beijing to believe it has no option but to engage.
Impact on a potential Taiwan contingency

A key Chinese concern regarding AUKUS (and also the Quad) is directly related to the
issue of a Taiwan contingency. The deal is one indicator of what China sees as the growing
likelihood of a regional reaction to its use of force to achieve national unification. As Beijing
prepares for a military takeover of Taiwan, an issue that has complicated its military
planning is the increased likelihood of coordinated action by regional players, especially

the Quad countries, to deter or counter China’s plans. Beijing used to believe that with
the exception of the US, regional states were unlikely to become involved in the event of a
military conflict across the Taiwan Strait.
However, recent developments have increasingly pointed in a different direction. Despite
internal debates over whether to respond to Chinese aggression against Taiwan,17 Japan is
faced with a real possibility that China will strike Japanese territory in the event of a Taiwan
contingency if the US uses its military bases in Japan to plan and conduct a counterstrike
against China. The Taiwan Strait featured in a number of key joint statements between the US
and Japan in 2021, including one released following the Biden–Suga summit of April 2021.18
There have also been a series of high-level pronouncements in Japan regarding Taiwan.19
In late 2021, it was reported that the US and Japan were drawing up plans for a Taiwan
emergency. The plan involved the US Marine Corps establishing temporary bases on Japan’s
Nansei Island at the initial stage of a Taiwan emergency and deploying troops.20
In 2020, during the peak of the Ladakh crisis with India, China worried about a
two-front war – with India in the west over their disputed territory and with the US in the
east over Taiwan.21 In a Taiwan contingency, China will have to be prepared for the real
possibility of an Indian blockade of Chinese vessels in the Indian Ocean. Last but not least,
for some time (and before the US commitment to provide nuclear-powered submarines
to Australia) Washington has consulted with Canberra on strategic planning for a Taiwan
contingency.22 In short, Beijing faces a significant chance that its military actions against
Taiwan will be met with a collective reaction from the region.
Impact on proliferation
Since AUKUS was announced, Beijing has objected to the deal on the basis of its potential
impact on non-proliferation norms. In September 2021, the Chinese permanent represent-
ative to the United Nations in Vienna made reference to AUKUS’s ‘undisguised nuclear
proliferation activities’ and demanded that the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) take action. Although AUKUS does not violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), as the IAEA Safeguarding Glossary excludes nuclear-powered submarines, China
still argues that AUKUS violates the NPT’s mission and spirit. One Chinese arms-control
expert asserted that AUKUS violates the mission of the NPT by contributing to changing
the norms that define and serve as the foundation of the international non-proliferation
regime.23 He also echoed the fear that AUKUS could lead to a regional arms race.
POTENTIAL FLASHPOINT: TAIWAN

There is much concern in the Asia-Pacific regarding the potential flashpoints between
China and the US (and its allies). During the United States’ presidential-election season
in 2020, Chinese leaders genuinely believed that president Trump would seek military
conflict with China in an effort to enhance the United States’ security, prompting Beijing
to prepare for this eventuality. Among US and Chinese leaders, the theatres speculated to
be most likely to host such a conflict were Taiwan and the South China Sea. Since Biden’s
inauguration the Chinese have observed the continuation of US efforts to support Taiwan.
These efforts have included senior-level visits, support for Taiwan’s international participa-
tion and public acknowledgement of the deployment of US troops to the island (see Figure
2.2), which China sees as highly provocative.24
Although the US policy community is vigorously debating whether Washington should
abandon its policy of strategic ambiguity vis-à-vis Taiwan, the Biden administration is
adamant on maintaining it as a core foundation of US Taiwan policy.25 More importantly,
Washington still adheres to its ‘One China’ policy, which acknowledges Beijing’s position
that Taiwan is a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) without acknowledging that
Taiwan is indeed a part of the PRC (an assertion that China’s One-China Principle does
make).26 However, in an era of great-power competition, Taiwan inevitably factors into
the United States’ broader foreign policy. Moreover, Washington’s enhanced support for
Taiwan has elevated China’s anxieties over the future of the island. For China, the saying
goes that ‘the (desired) peaceful unification has no hope, and the unifi-
cation has no chance’.27 In these circumstances, it is perceived that
the only policy option remaining
is a campaign of intimida-
tion and coercion to force
Taiwan in the direc-
tion of unification.
Figure 2.2: Timeline of

Un
growing US support for

ite
d
St
Taiwan, 2021
at
es
tro
op
si
n
jo
in
tt
ra
in
US State Department lifts self-

in
g
01
in
Ta
imposed restrictions on contacts

iw
an
,s
between US and Taiwanese officials

cr
ee
n-
gr
9.1.2021
a
bb
ed
fro
m
Taiwan’s representative to the US Hsiao

av
id
02
eo
Bi-khim invited to attend Joe Biden’s

po
ste
presidential inauguration Bipartisan

d
on
07
Fa
US Senate
ce
20.1.2021
bo
ok
delegation visits
,J
un
e2
US State Department issues statement Taiwan and announces a

02
0(
03 donation of 750,000 doses

U.
supporting Taiwan against China’s incursions

S.
Ar
m
into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone of COVID-19 vaccines

y1
st
Sp
23.1.2021 6.6.2021
e cia
lF
or
ce
sG
Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act introduced G7 Summit communiqué mentions Taiwan

ro
08
u
p/
04 for the first time

Ta
to the US Senate
iw
an
Ne
22.2.2021 13.6.2021
w
s)
US and Taiwan sign agreement to US State Department issues statement warning China
05 strengthen maritime cooperation by 09 against military activities across the Taiwan Strait
establishing the Coast Guard Working Group 3.10.2021
25.3.2021
President Biden says at a CNN ‘town hall’ meeting that US has
US Ambassador to Palau John Hennessey- 10 a commitment to defend Taiwan against any attack by China
06 Niland visits Taiwan as part of Palauan 22.10.2021
President Surangel Whipps Jr’s delegation,
becoming the first sitting US ambassador to US State Department issues statement in support of Taiwan’s
visit Taiwan in an official capacity in 42 years 11 participation in United Nations forums
28.3.2021 26.10.2021
Source: The Stimson Center, www.stimson.org

In 2021, there was an unprecedented

Map 2.3: PLA air sorties
number of PLA air incursions into the
into Taiwan’s Air Defence
Taiwanese Air Defence Identification Zone Identification Zone
(ADIZ), September
(ADIZ) (see Map 2.3). In four days during
2020–August 2021
the first week of October there were 149
incursions, including 38 on 1 October, 39 on
2 October, 16 on 3 October and a record 56 Taiwan Strait
incursions on 4 October (the largest one-day Taipei

sortie to date).28 By comparison, there were CHINA Xiamen
Kinmen
380 incursions in total in 2020.29 islands
A tactical explanation for the incur- Taiwan
sions would argue that China felt a need

to demonstrate its military power in light
of the joint training being conducted by
aircraft carriers USS Carl Vinson, USS Ronald
Reagan, HMS Queen Elizabeth and vessels
from Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and
Taiwan Strait
New Zealand in the Philippine Sea in early median line
Taiwan’s ADIZ Km 100 200 300
October. According to Chinese analysts,
Area of sorties Miles 50 100 150 200
the Chinese drew a link between the US
©IISS
aircraft carriers passing through the Bashi
Month(s) Number of sorties
Channel (located between Taiwan and the
Philippines) and PLA aircraft’s incursions
around Taiwan.30 The fact that the first week Sep–Dec 2020 149
of October also saw China’s National Day Jan 2021 81
holiday, while Taiwanese President Tsai Feb 2021 38

Ing-wen was scheduled to deliver remarks Mar 2021 54
for Taiwan’s own National Day on 10 Apr 2021 106
October, likely further incentivised China to
May 2021 29
carry out the incursions. The PLA’s move-
Jun 2021 43
ments are regarded as both a show of force
Jul 2021 17
to boost morale domestically and to deter
Aug 2021 34
any calls for Taiwanese independence.
Note: Taiwan’s defence ministry reported a total of 551 PLA sorties in the indicated area and
Beijing’s tactics, however, do not disguise time period. There are slight discrepancies between the ministry’s National Defense Report
mainland China’s sense of powerlessness at 2021 and its day-by-day Twitter updates since January 2021 – the National Defense Report
adds two more sorties in February and one more in April 2021, for a total of 554 – but the
the strategic level regarding Taiwan. Short of lower figures compiled from Twitter have been preferred for this graph.
Sources: Taiwan, Ministry of National Defense, www.mnd.gov.tw/English; 國防部 Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C.
a war, China assesses that it lacks the ability (@MoNDefense), twitter.com/MoNDefense
to stop growing US–Taiwan ties, which have
occurred through small, incremental steps,
such as arms sales and troop deployments. Beijing can only escalate the frequency, inten-
sity and scale of its show of force in the hope that Washington and Tsai’s Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) will be compelled to ‘pull back from the precipice’.31 However,
behind the escalation is an accumulating frustration and sense of powerlessness.
China on Taiwan: peace or war? China’s President Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen give
parallel speeches commemorating the Xinhai Revolution and
Interestingly, soon after the PLA’s incur-
Taiwan’s National Day respectively, 9–10 October 2021
sions into Taiwan’s ADIZ in October 2021,
Xi delivered important remarks on Taiwan
at an event marking the 110th anniversary
of the Xinhai Revolution, which overthrew
the Qing Dynasty and founded the Republic
of China. Xi stated that China continues to
seek peaceful unification with Taiwan as its
preferred and primary approach and that
the resolution of the Taiwan question will
only occur as the natural result of China’s
‘rejuvenation’. According to his remarks, (L: The Yomiuri Shimbun via AP Images; R: Chiang Ying-ying/AP Photo)
China has not abandoned the peaceful-

unification formula but understands unification to be predicated on the continued
growth of China’s comprehensive national power, which will eventually make the cost of
the United States’ defence of Taiwan so high that it becomes prohibitive. While there is
no guarantee that the peaceful formula is not a feint, as it stands, China’s stated national
agenda – expressed in its ‘Outline of the Vision for 2035’ – does not show national unifi-
cation as the priority.
That said, the challenge for China is the innate tension between ‘preventing independ-
ence’ (反独) and ‘promoting unification’ (促统). Theoretically, these two agendas should be
mutually complementary if Taiwanese public opinion were neutral. However, because the
Taiwanese people do not desire unification with China under the control of the CCP and
would prefer independence if cost-free,32 China feels it has to employ intimidation and
coercion lest Taiwan slide towards independence. Beijing might scare the Taiwanese away
from independence but its approach is also removing any desire in Taiwan to be unified
with (i.e., absorbed by) China.
The fundamental reason why China has not yet resorted to force is that it cannot guar-
antee a victory. Losing is not an option for the CCP. Even if Beijing could abandon its
‘no-first-use’ policy and threaten nuclear war, this would just increase the risks and uncer-
tainty involved. Mutually assured destruction with the US over Taiwan is apparently not in
the CCP’s interest either. The PLA is strengthening its military preparedness for a war but
most observers do not believe it will launch an offensive attack without being provoked.
China has been intentionally vague about what constitutes a provocation. In the 2005 Anti-
Secession Law, the three triggers for the use of force are defined as Taiwan’s secession;
major events that will lead to Taiwan’s secession; and the complete loss of the possibility of
peaceful unification.33 According to private conversations with mainland officials, the last
condition is deliberately vague to maximise Beijing’s flexibility.
The prevailing sense in the Chinese policy community is that peaceful unification is
becoming less likely. However, few anticipate that Xi will attack Taiwan soon: with a Party
Congress scheduled for late 2022 and Xi due to begin his third term as general secretary in
2023, he is likely to focus on maintaining stability. The election of Eric Chu as chairman of
the Kuomintang has also reignited Beijing’s The beaches of the Taiwan-controlled Kinmen Islands lined with anti-tank
spikes, just 3.2 kilometres off the coast of mainland China, 20 October 2020
hope that a pro-unification voice could
prevail in Taiwan by the island’s next pres-
idential election, no matter how unrealistic
this hope might be. Xi sent a letter of congrat-
ulations to Chu almost immediately after his
election. Chu’s response, which emphasised
that the peoples on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait were all descendants of Yanhuang (an
ancient ethnic Chinese people that inhabited
the Yellow River basin), is viewed by Beijing
with great hope.
The fragile peace and stability across the
Taiwan Strait could nonetheless be disturbed
(Sam Yeh/AFP via Getty Images)
by two scenarios. The first is an accidental
conflict or escalation of tensions driven by events on the ground. Presumably, if Beijing and
Washington are interested in keeping the escalation under control, they would resort to
their hotline for communications and de-escalation. However, there is no guarantee that this
will happen. The second is China’s vigorous acceleration of its nuclear-arsenal expansion.34
At current assessments, China may not be aiming for the use of nuclear weapons, but it is
prioritising building a sufficient number to deter the US from intervening militarily in the
event of a Taiwan contingency.
THE UKRAINE CRISIS AND CHINA’S REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK

A black-swan event, the Ukraine crisis has generated tremendous uncertainty regarding
the future of the global order and the security outlook in the Asia-Pacific. Aside from
causing damage to the rules and norms of the post-Second World War order, the conflict
is likely to have a direct impact on the power balance in and future trajectory of the Asia-
Pacific. At the time of writing the war is ongoing, making it difficult to assess its effects.
However, the Ukraine crisis is already affecting the Chinese regional security outlook in
at least three ways.
Firstly, the crisis has raised questions about US priorities. The Biden administration
released its Indo-Pacific strategy days before the war in Ukraine broke out. With a signif-
icant security crisis erupting in Europe, it remains unclear how Washington will divide
its attention and resources between the traditional European theatre and the Asia-Pacific.
Many Chinese policy analysts are hopeful that the US will be weakened in the Asia-Pacific
by trying to look in two directions at once. In refusing to condemn Russia, China also
calculates that Russia may help to counterbalance and check the US in the future.
Secondly, if the US is indeed distracted by Europe – or if it has to divide its attention
and resources between China and Russia – this is not all good news for China. If coun-
tries in the Asia-Pacific are less assured about the US security presence – and if US allies
have less confidence in the US security guarantee – they will have to develop their own
capabilities to boost their national defence. Former Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzo
openly called for Japan to consider NATO-like nuclear-weapons sharing the day after
Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine.35 South Korea is also considering strengthening
its defence capabilities in light of the Ukraine crisis, particularly considering the incoming
government’s North Korea policy and the ongoing North Korean provocations.36 Such
developments would inevitably heighten the regional arms race, which would not work
in China’s interests.
Thirdly, the Ukraine crisis also directly complicates China’s future plans relating to
the use of force against Taiwan. Although the war in Ukraine may not expedite China’s
plan to achieve unification by force, it has in fact raised many questions and scenarios for
which China will need to study and prepare. The Ukraine war has made a Chinese attack
on Taiwan extremely unlikely in the near term. If Beijing were planning to invade Taiwan
in the near term (and many do not believe that it has such plans), such a plan would
likely have been complicated and postponed by what China has learned from the war
in Ukraine. In many ways, the war is seen by Chinese policy experts as a rehearsal for a
possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan – less in the sense of battlefield operations than with
regard to how certain aspects would likely play out, such as local resistance, external
assistance, modern warfare and international reactions. According to Chinese interloc-
utors and internal discussions, because of the similarities between China and Russia as
primary strategic threats to the US and because of the similarities between Taiwan and
Ukraine as the targets (both are democracies claimed by a larger authoritarian state, both
enjoy Western support, and both suffer from a vast power imbalance with China and
Russia respectively), the Russian experience in Ukraine offers multiple revelations and
lessons for the Chinese.
China is studying the conflict in Ukraine closely to understand the ramifications for
its own possible military campaign to take over Taiwan. It is a rehearsal for China in that
Beijing can observe the consequences and prepare accordingly. However, the biggest
problem for China is that if and when China does invade Taiwan, the world would already
have had the experience of dealing with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and it will apply its
experiences and lessons to combat Chinese actions more effectively. For China, that is a
critical strategic loss.
CONCLUSION
In a context of escalating great-power competition between the US and China, the latter’s
Asia-Pacific security policy is increasingly tilting towards a US-centric threat perception
and strategic planning. This is the case for Chinese policy on the four contentious areas of
the Western Pacific: the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, Taiwan and the South China
Sea. The US and China have conflicting visions for the Asia-Pacific’s security framework,
making their relationship increasingly antagonistic. China is watching with concern as the
US works to ramp up its security alliances and partnerships in the region, while Beijing’s
greatest concern is the risk of an arms race in the Asia-Pacific. In the near future, Taiwan
appears to be the most contentious, dangerous and consequential flashpoint between the
US and China. How to manage the intense competition between Washington and Beijing
in the Asia-Pacific will be the most pressing task for all regional actors for years to come.
NOTES
1 State Council Information Office of the People’s Seong-hyon, ‘Why Xi Jinping Didn’t Answer
Republic of China (PRC),‘Zhongguode yatai Park’s Call?’, Korea Times, 5 February 2016,
anquan hezuo zhengce baipishu’ 《中国的亚太 http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/
安全合作政策》白皮书（全文）[‘China’s Asia- opinon/2016/02/197_197434.html.
Pacific Security Cooperation Policy’ White Paper 5 ‘China Says South Korea’s THAAD Anti-missile
(full text)], 11 January 2017, http://www.scio. Decision Harms Foundation of Trust’, Reuters,
gov.cn/37236/38180/Document/1626688/1626688. 25 July 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/
htm. Full quote: ‘Kuoda Jingji Liyi Ronghe us-southkorea-thaad-china-defence/china-says-
shiguojiajian guanxi de zhongyaojichu, shixian south-koreas-thaad-anti-missile-decision-harms-
gongtong fazhan shi weihuhepingwending de foundation-of-trust-idUSKCN1050Y7.
genbenbaozhang’ ‘扩大经济利益融合是国家间 6 See, for example, Jethro Mullen, ‘China’s
关系的重要基础，实现共同发展是维护和平稳定 “Unofficial” Sanctions Rattle South Korea’,
的根本保障，是解决各类安全问题的“总钥匙’ CNN, 3 March 2017, https://money.cnn.
[Expanding the integration of economic interests com/2017/03/03/news/economy/china-south-ko-
is the key foundation of inter-state relations; rea-thaad-tourism-trade-sanctions/.
Achieving common development is the funda- 7 Author’s interview with Chinese experts,
mental guarantee of the maintenance of peace Beijing, June 2015.
and stability, and the ‘master key’ to the solution 8 Ibid.
of all types of security issues.] 9 Derek Grossman, ‘China Just Botched
2 Cheng Li, ‘Avoiding Three Traps in a Monumental Opportunity with the
Confronting China’s Party-state’, in Ryan Philippines’, RAND Corporation, 18 June
Hass, Ryan Mcelveen and Robert D. Williams 2020, https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/
(eds), The Future of US Policy Toward China: china-just-botched-a-monumental-opportuni-
Recommendations for the Biden Administration ty-with-the.html.
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 10 ‘Fei xiang zhongguo tijiao fangwu yuanzhu
November 2020), p. 8, https://www.brookings. qingdan. Zhuanjia: Jiefeifankong dangwuzhiji’
edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Cheng-Li.pdf. 菲向中国提交防务援助清单专家:解菲反恐当务
3 Yan Li and Wei Da, ‘Zhongmei zai yataidiqu 之急 [Philippines Submits Defence Aid List to
de anquan maodun: Yanbian yu Luoji’ 中 China. Expert: Help Philippines’ Fght Against
美在亚太地区的安全矛盾：演变与逻辑 [The Terrorism Is the Current Objective], People’s
Sino-US Security Dilemma in the Asia- Daily, 9 February 2017, http://military.people.
Pacific: Evolution and Logic], International com.cn/n1/2017/0209/c1011-29069899.html.
Security Studies国际安全研究, vol. 2, 2020, 11 Jung H. Pak, ‘Trying to Loosen the Linchpin:
p. 9, http://gjaqyj.cnjournals.com/ebook/ China’s Approach to South Korea’, Brookings
gjaqyj/2020_2/files/basic-html/page11.html. Institution, July 2020, https://www.brookings.
Full quote: ‘Zhongguo de anquan henan jinzai edu/research/trying-to-loosen-the-linchpin-chi-
guojingxian yinei shixian. Guojingxian zhiwai nas-approach-to-south-korea/.
de linjin diqu yeshi zhongguo anquan liyi de 12 White House, ‘Fact Sheet: Quad Leaders’
xiangguan diqu’ 中国的安全很难仅在国境线 Summit’, 24 September 2021, https://
以内实现。国境线之外的临近地区也是中国安 www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
全利益的相关地区 [The security of a country statements-releases/2021/09/24/fact-sheet-quad-
is difficult to achieve only within its borders. leaders-summit/.
Adjacent areas beyond the border are also 13 For a more detailed account, see Yun Sun,
related to China’s security interests.] ‘PacNet #50 – Fold, Call, or Raise? China’s
4 See China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Xi Potential Reactions to AUKUS’, Pacific Forum,
Jinping tong hanguo zongtong piaojinhuui 26 October 2021, https://pacforum.org/
tongdianhua’ 习近平同韩国总统朴槿惠通 publication/pacnet-50-fold-call-or-raise-chinas-
电话 [Xi Jinping Holds Phone Call with potential-reactions-to-aukus.
South Korean President Park Geun-hye], 5 14 China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Vice
February 2016, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ Foreign Minister Le Yucheng Attends and
zyxw/201602/t20160205_336562.shtml; and Lee Addresses the Fourth International Forum on
Security and Strategy’, 19 March 2022, https:// China Morning Post, 25 June 2021, https://www.
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202203/ scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3138682/
t20220320_10653531.html. taiwan-security-directly-linked-japan-de-
15 Zihan Lin, ‘Meiguo gao “Yazhou ban fence-minister-kishi?module=perpetual_
Beiyue” hui ruyuan ma?’ 美国搞’亚洲版北 scroll_0&pgtype=article&campaign=3138682.
约’会如愿吗？[Will the US Engage in an 20 ‘Japan, US Draw Up Plan for any Taiwan
‘Asian Version of NATO’?], International Emergency – Kyodo’, 24 December 2021,
Review, 18 October 2021, https://kns.cnki. Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/
net/kcms/ detail/detail.aspx?dbcode= japan-us-draw-up-joint-operation-plan-any-tai-
CCND&dbname=CCNDLAST2021&filename= wan-emergency-kyodo-2021-12-23/.
RMRH202110180060 &uniplatform= 21 Yun Sun, ‘China’s Strategic Assessment of the
NZKPT&v=WnrFtdFKlpxb2bU8Kp GadeKf_ Ladakh Clash’, War on the Rocks, 19 June 2020,
MBE48Nnw YE73kL0pbCng7jteXSBBfQn https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/chinas-stra-
Ah4aAW0dUqcwtko2tSA%3d. tegic-assessment-of-the-ladakh-clash/.
16 Daniel Hurst, ‘”Throwing Toothpicks at 22 See, for example, Jason Scott, ‘US in Talks
the Mountain”: Paul Keating Says Aukus with Australia on Responses to War over
Submarines Plan Will Have No Impact on Taiwan, Diplomat Says’, Bloomberg, 1 April
China’, Guardian, 10 November 2021, https:// 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/ articles/2021-04-01/u-s-in-talks-with-australia-
nov/10/throwing-toothpicks-at-the-mountain- on-taiwan-response-diplomat-says.
paul-keating-says-aukus-submarines-plan-will- 23 Guo Xiaobing, ‘He bu kuosan dixian burong
have-no-impact-on-china. tupo’ 核不扩散底线不容突破 [Guo Xiaobing:
17 See, for example, Scott W. Harold and Satoru the Bottom Line of Nuclear Non-proliferation
Mori, ‘A Taiwan Contingency and Japan’s Cannot be Breached], Global Times, 18
Counterstrike Debate’, RAND Corporation, September 2021, https://3w.huanqiu.com/a/
23 July 2021, https://www.rand.org/ de583b/44oOUkVjGlj?agt=11.
blog/2021/07/a-taiwan-contingency-and-ja- 24 Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘US Special Forces
pans-counterstrike-debate.html. Secretly Train Taiwan’s Military’, Financial
18 White House, ‘US–Japan Joint Leaders’ Times, 8 October 2021, https://www.ft.com/
Statement: “US–JAPAN GLOBAL content/46794116-7355-4669-b947-ce32bc5aff1a.
PARTNERSHIP FOR A NEW ERA”’, 16 25 David Brunnstrom and Michael Martina,
April 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ ‘Strategic Clarity on Taiwan Policy Carries
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/16/u- “Significant Downsides” – US’, Reuters, 4
s-japan-joint-leaders-statement-u-s-japan-global- May 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/
partnership-for-a-new-era/. asia-pacific/significant-downsides-strategic-clar-
19 See, for example, David Brunnstrom, ‘Japan ity-over-taiwan-us-2021-05-04/.
Minister Says Necessary to “Wake Up” 26 See ‘The United States *One China
to Protect Taiwan’, Reuters, 1 July 2021, Policy* Is NOT the Same as the PRC
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ *One China Principle*’, US–Taiwan
japan-minister-says-necessary-wake-up-protect- Business Council, 1 January 2022,
taiwan-2021-06-28/; Ben Blanchard, ‘Former PM https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/
Abe Says Japan, US Could Not Stand By if China faq-the-united-states-one-china-policy-is-not-
Attacked Taiwan’, Reuters, 1 December 2021, the-same-as-the-prc-one-china-principle/.
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ 27 Chuanyi Tan, ‘2020 Liangan guanxi huigu,
former-pm-abe-says-japan-us-could-not-stand- “hetong” wuwang’, 2020两岸关系回顾
by-if-china-attacked-taiwan-2021-12-01/; and |两岸“和统”无望？ [Recap on 2020
Bloomberg, ‘Taiwan Security Directly Linked Cross-strait Relations: Cross-strait ‘Peaceful
to Japan, Defence Minister Kishi Says’, South Reunification’ Without Hope?], Huaxia
華夏經緯, 30 December 2020, https://www. from the precipice, it will push Taiwan into a
huaxia.com/c/2020/12/30/497077.shtml. Full more dangerous situation].
quote: ‘Hetongwuwang, wutongmeixi’ 和统 32 See, for example, ‘Taiwan minyidiaocha
无望，武统没戏 [The (desired) peaceful xianhi; Taiwanren rentong chuangxingao, dan
unification has no hope, and the unification weichixianzhuang rengshi zhuliuminyi’ 台湾民
has no chance]. 意调查显示：台湾人认同创新高但维持现状仍
28 Adrian Ang U-Jin and Olli Pekka Suorsa, 是主流民意 [Taiwan public opinion poll shows
‘Explaining the PLA’s Record-setting Air the Taiwanese identity is unprecedentedly high,
Incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ’, Diplomat, 14 although status quo is still the mainstream pref-
October 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/ erence], BBC, 14 July 2021, https://www.bbc.
explaining-the-plas-record-setting-air-incur- com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-53391406.
sions-into-taiwans-adiz/#:~:text=From%20 33 Embassy of the PRC in the US, ‘Anti-Secession
October%201%20to%204,data%20publicly%20 Law (Full text) (03/15/05)’, https://www.mfa.gov.
available%20last%20September. cn/ce/ceus/eng/zt/999999999/t187406.htm.
29 AFP, ‘Taiwan Says Chinese Jets Made 34 Amanda Macias, ‘China Is Rapidly Expanding
Record 380 Incursions in 2020’, France 24, Its Nuclear Arsenal, Pentagon Says in New
1 May 2021, https://www.france24.com/en/ Report’, CNBC, 3 November 2021, https://www.
live-news/20210105-taiwan-says-chinese-jets- cnbc.com/2021/11/03/china-is-rapidly-expand-
made-record-380-incursions-in-2020. ing-its-nuclear-arsenal-pentagon-says.html.
30 Author’s interview with Chinese official. 35 ‘Ukraine Crisis: Japan Should Discuss NATO-
31 Guotaiban Xinwen Fabuhui Jilu国台办新闻发布 like Nuclear Weapons Sharing, Shinzo Abe
会辑录 [Taiwan Affairs Office Press Conference], Says’, South China Morning Post, 27 February
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, 13 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/
October 2021, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/m/ east-asia/article/3168567/ukraine-crisis-japan-
speech/202110/t20211013_12384221.htm. Full should-discuss-nato-nuclear-weapons.
quote: ‘Tangruo Minjindang dangju zhimibuwu, 36 In-Bum Chun, ‘South Koreans Could Learn
buzhixuanyalema, zhihuiba Taiwan tuixiang a Lot from the War in Ukraine’, 38 North, 31
gengjia weixian jingdi’ 倘若民进党当局执迷不 March 2022, https://www.38north.org/2022/03/
悟，不知悬崖勒马，只会把台湾推向更加危险 south-koreans-could-learn-a-lot-from-the-war-
境地。[If the DPP is too stubborn to pull back in-ukraine/.
CHAPTER 3
ENHANCING TAIWAN’S
SECURITY AND REDUCING
THE POSSIBILITY
OF CONFLICT
DR BRENDAN TAYLOR
Brendan Taylor is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and

Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University
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confidence in its capacity to prevail in a conflict over Taiwan

will start to grow as key military balances begin tilting in China’s
favour, undermining the United States’ ability to credibly commit to Taiwan’s defence, with
dire implications for the island’s security prospects.
CRUMBLING CONSENSUS
The cross-strait status quo, which has traditionally prevented tensions over Taiwan spilling into conflict, is
under strain as the main parties to this flashpoint – most notably China – adopt more assertive postures.
WINDOWS FOR WAR

Contrary to mounting speculation, China is unlikely to attempt to annex Taiwan until such time as
Beijing can be more confident of military victory. The dynamics of this flashpoint will dramatically shift
when that tipping point is reached – most likely towards the end of the decade – when key aspects
of the military balance could tilt decisively in China’s favour.
US CREDIBILITY
Successful deterrence will require that Washington convince Beijing of its ability and willingness to
come to Taiwan’s defence. To do so, some commentators assert that the US must avoid commitments
elsewhere and assemble a strong coalition of Asian allies and partners. However, focusing on a single
theatre runs counter to America’s identity as a superpower and holding together such a coalition will
be difficult given economic dependencies upon China and deeply ingrained non-aligned traditions.
TAIWANESE DETERRENCE
Taiwan has sought to augment its military capabilities but the widening gulf between its defence
spending and that of the mainland severely limits its ability to deter Beijing.
In May 2021, The Economist – a publication generally not prone to hyperbole – characterised
Taiwan as ‘the most dangerous place on Earth’.1 Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine
has heightened this sense of trepidation. While visiting Australia in March, Commander
of US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral John Aquilino observed with reference to Taiwan: ‘I
don’t think anyone five months ago would have predicted an invasion of the Ukraine. So
I think the number one lesson is: “Hey, this could really happen” … . Number two, don’t
be complacent … . We have to be prepared at all times.’2 Given the horrendous economic
and social costs that would be involved in any war over Taiwan, however, conflict is still
far more likely to occur by accident than design. ‘Accidental conflict’ – resulting from mili-
tary misadventure, miscalculation or misperception – will remain the greatest threat to
peace for the rest of this decade, highlighting the need for robust crisis-management and
-avoidance mechanisms (‘guardrails’, in the vernacular of the Biden administration). Yet
as the Taiwan flashpoint’s key military balances continue to shift almost inexorably in
China’s favour (see Table 3.1), and as Beijing’s confidence in its ability to prevail in a mili-
tary conflict increases, the medium- to long-term durability of efforts to bolster the island’s
security through enhanced deterrence are increasingly in doubt.
CRUMBLING CONSENSUS
Since the normalisation of Sino-American relations in the 1970s, a series of tacit commit-
ments made by Beijing, Taipei and Washington – often referred to as the cross-strait
status quo – have prevented tensions over Taiwan from spilling into full-blown conflict.
Beijing was resigned to its inability to forcibly seize Taiwan; Taipei committed to
accepting a political status short of formal statehood; and Washington maintained this
uneasy equilibrium by deterring Chinese military action and dissuading a Taiwanese
declaration of independence.3
The cross-strait status quo was always vague. Beijing, Taipei and Washington offered
differing interpretations, and these evolved over time. During the past decade, however,
the status quo has begun to unravel as each of the three main parties to this flashpoint have
adopted more assertive postures.
Beijing has been more aggressive in its treatment of Taiwan, a development consistent
with China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy elsewhere – in the South and East China
seas, along its disputed land border with India, and towards Australia. China’s President
Xi Jinping signalled his intent early in his tenure, breaking with his predecessors’ approach
in October 2013 when, ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit
in Bali, he warned Taiwanese representative Vincent C. Siew (a former premier and vice-
president) that the dispute ‘cannot be passed on from generation to generation’.4
This message has been a mainstay of the Xi era. Indeed, Xi regards the so-called
‘reunification’ of Taiwan with the mainland as central to the ‘China Dream’ – his vision
to make the Middle Kingdom wealthy and powerful again. In January 2019, Xi gave an
address marking the 40th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s famous ‘Letter to Compatriots
in Taiwan’. He asserted that ‘China must be, will be reunified’. He continued: ‘It is a
historical conclusion drawn over the 70 years of the development of cross-strait
relations, and a must for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the new era.’5
ENHANCING TAIWAN’S SECURITY AND REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT 61
More recently, in a major address delivered Chinese President Xi Jinping delivering a major
address on Taiwan policy in Beijing, 2 January 2019
in October 2021, Xi reiterated that ‘the
historical task of the complete reunification
of the motherland must be fulfilled, and will
definitely be fulfilled’.6
While maintaining that Beijing’s pref-
erence is for ‘peaceful reunification’, Xi has
refused to rule out the use of force. This
(Mark Schiefelbein/AFP via Getty Images)
position is consistent with his predecessors’
approach. In March 2005, during the Hu Jintao administration, Beijing passed the Anti-
Secession Law. The legislation requires that China use non-peaceful means ‘to protect
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’ in the event that
the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any
means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents
entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful
reunification should be completely exhausted.7
Threats of a forceful solution to Beijing’s so-called ‘Taiwan problem’ have intensified

during the Xi era. For example, in an address to the 2019 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Chinese
Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe warned that ‘if anyone dares to split Taiwan
from China, the Chinese military has no choice but to fight at all costs for national unity’.8
In another break with tradition, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang omitted the word ‘peaceful’
when referring to ‘reunification’ with Taiwan in his May 2020 state-of-the-nation work
report.9 Moreover, during a virtual meeting with US President Joe Biden in November
2021, Xi reportedly likened American support for Taiwanese independence to pyromania.
‘Whoever plays with fire will get burnt’, Xi cautioned. He continued that ‘should the sepa-
ratist forces for Taiwan independence provoke us, force our hands or even cross the red
line, we will be compelled to take resolute measures’.10
Xi has backed words with deeds. He has further squeezed the island’s so-called ‘inter-
national space’ since Tsai Ing-wen’s January 2016 election as Taiwan’s first female president,
convincing more governments to sever diplomatic ties (see Figure 3.1). As a result, a mere
13 countries (and the Holy See) have full diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Chinese coer-
cion of Taiwan has intensified even in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. Beijing
continues to block Taiwanese participation as an observer at the World Health Assembly, a
status previously afforded to the island from 2009−15 during the tenure of its China-friendly
Ma Ying-jeou administration. Furthermore, reports surfaced in March 2021 suggesting that
Chinese intermediaries had offered pandemic-hit Paraguay millions of vaccine doses to
switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.11
Chinese military coercion has also stepped up. One notable pressure tactic has been
the growing number of military aircraft flying close to Taiwan. These flights have taken
three forms. The first is ‘circumnavigation patrols’ of the island. These flights began in
November 2016 and involve H-6 strategic bombers flying around the island – sometimes
operating alone, sometimes in combination with fighter and electronic-warfare aircraft.12

The second type – taking place since March 2019 – has seen Chinese aircraft breach the
Taiwan Strait’s median line, which served as an unofficial air and maritime boundary for
the previous two decades. In September 2020, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson
denied the median line’s existence.13 Lastly, Chinese incursions into Taiwan’s so-called
Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) have also increased. From September 2020 to
September 2021, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ on
nearly 250 days.14 Significantly, over a four-day period in October 2021 coinciding with
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) National Day celebrations, 149 PLA aircraft flew
into the southwestern portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ.15
Taipei has stood resolute in the face of Chinese intimidation. Immediately following
Beijing’s March 2019 median-line violation, Tsai promised a ‘forceful
expulsion’ of any future such incursions.16 In September 2020,
Taiwan’s air force made good on this
pledge when two Taiwanese
F-16 fighters reportedly
drove a PLA Sukhoi
Su-30 away.17 Tsai
was similarly
Figure 3.1: Countries that
have switched diplomatic
recognition from Taiwan to
China, 2016–21
SÃO TOMÉ
01 AND PRÍNCIPE
Dec 2016
PANAMA
02 Jun 2017
13 countries (and
the Holy See) have full
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
03 Apr 2018
diplomatic relations with Taiwan:
BELIZE
BURKINA FASO
04
(iS
ESWATINI
to
c k/
May 2018
Ge
tt y
GUATEMALA
Im
ag
e
sP
HAITI
lu
s)
EL SALVADOR
05 Aug 2018 HONDURAS
MARSHALL ISLANDS
SOLOMON ISLANDS NAURU

06 Sep 2019 PALAU
PARAGUAY
KIRIBATI
07 Sep 2019
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS
SAINT LUCIA
SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES
NICARAGUA
08 Dec 2021 TUVALU Source: IISS
forthright in an October 2021 National Day A Taiwanese F-16 fighter aircraft during training, 15 September 2021
address, asserting that
there should be absolutely no illusions

that the Taiwanese people will bow to
pressure. We will continue to bolster
our national defense and demonstrate
our determination to defend ourselves
in order to ensure that nobody can force
Taiwan to take the path China has laid
out for us.18
In a similar vein, in April 2021 Taipei

warned that Chinese uninhabited aerial vehi- (Ceng Shou Yi/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
cles operating near the Taiwanese-controlled

Pratas Islands in the South China Sea could be shot down if they entered the islands’
‘restricted waters and airspace’, while Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu publicly
declared Taiwan’s willingness to ‘fight the war if we need to fight the war’ and to ‘defend
ourselves to the very last day’.19
Nevertheless, Taipei’s stated policy is to avoid such a conflict through maintaining
the cross-strait ‘status quo’.20 Taiwanese public opinion appears to support this stance.
According to a January 2022 poll conducted by Taiwan’s National Chengchi University
(NCCU), an overwhelming 86.8% of respondents favoured maintaining some form of the
cross-strait status quo. Yet precisely what the status quo means is increasingly contested
among the key parties to this flashpoint, not least Taiwan. Whereas Taipei has traditionally
accepted a status short of formal statehood as the necessary price for avoiding conflict, the
Tsai administration has pushed this tacit understanding to its limit. For example, following
her landslide victory in the January 2020 election, Tsai called upon Beijing to ‘face reality’,
observing that ‘we don’t need to declare ourselves an independent state … . We are an
independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China (Taiwan).’21
These remarks notwithstanding, Tsai has rightly earned a reputation as a prudent and
pragmatic decision-maker. Nonetheless, she must manage an influential pro-independence
(or so-called ‘deep green’) faction within her own Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
Moreover, voters across the political spectrum overwhelmingly oppose unification – in
2021, a mere 1.4% of the population supported unification as soon as possible22 – while an
increasing share of the electorate support formal independence. The January 2022 NCCU
poll revealed that 25.1% of Taiwanese supported maintaining the status quo but moving
towards independence, marking a threefold increase in such sentiment since NCCU
polling on this issue commenced in the mid-1990s.23
The US has traditionally played an important stabilising role in cross-strait relations
by simultaneously deterring a Chinese attack and dissuading Taipei from declaring inde-
pendence. However, in the past five years Washington has taken various pro-Taiwan steps
– although its official position on Taiwan remains unchanged, reflected most recently
in its February 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Taiwanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu speaking at the
press conference during which he declared the island’s willingness
which states that the US approach ‘remains
to defend itself against any future Chinese invasion, 7 April 2021
consistent with our One China policy and
our longstanding commitments under
the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint
Communiqués, and the Six Assurances’.24
The pro-Taiwan shift began at the
start of the Trump administration, as the
president-elect became the first US leader
since Sino-American normalisation to speak
directly with his Taiwanese counterpart when
he took a congratulatory phone call from
Tsai.25 Trump subsequently approved the
transfer of a record US$18 billion-worth of US
(Daniel Tsang/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)
weaponry to the island during his turbulent
term in office.26 From October 2018 onwards,
US Navy vessels transited the Taiwan Strait
on a monthly basis. During the administration’s dying days, even as pro-Trump protesters
stormed the US Capitol building in Washington DC, then-secretary of state Mike Pompeo
abruptly lifted decades-old diplomatic protocols limiting interactions between US officials
and their Taiwanese counterparts.27 Washington further challenged the cross-strait status
quo with references that may be regarded as supporting Taiwan’s independence. In its June
2019 ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy Report’, the US Department of Defense took the unprecedented
step of characterising Taiwan as a country.28
Contrary to speculation that Biden would adopt a more moderate approach to Taiwan
policy, the new administration has largely maintained Trump’s trajectory. Secretary of
State Antony Blinken has twice referred to Taiwan as a ‘country’, including during congres-
sional testimony in September 2021.29 In statements issued in January and October 2021 in
response to Chinese coercion of Taiwan, the US State Department characterised its commit-
ment to the island as ‘rock solid’.30 Likewise, during congressional testimony in December
2021, Assistant Secretary of Defense Ely Ratner described Taiwan as a ‘beacon of demo-
cratic values and ideals’, juxtaposed against ‘deepening authoritarianism and oppression
in the PRC’. In terms reminiscent of those used by then-vice president Mike Pence in his
October 2018 address to the Hudson Institute – a speech some commentators have likened
to Winston Churchill’s famous ‘iron curtain’ address at the beginning of the Cold War31
– Ratner went on to observe that ‘Taiwan has proven the possibilities of an alternative
path to that of the Chinese Communist Party’.32 In the week following Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, the US sent a guided-missile destroyer through the Taiwan Strait and a delegation
of former senior defence and security officials to Taiwan as a sign of support for the island.
Biden’s (mis)statements of US Taiwan policy have attracted considerable attention.
During an August 2021 interview on ABC News, Biden likened the United States’ obliga-
tions to Taiwan to its ‘sacred commitment’ to NATO allies.33 Again in October, this time
during a CNN ‘town hall’ broadcast, Biden spoke of the United States’ ‘commitment’
US President Joe Biden referring to the United States’ US President Joe Biden and Chinese President
Taiwan policy during a CNN interview, 21 October 2021 Xi Jinping meeting virtually, 15 November 2021
(Nicholas Kamm/AFP via Getty Images) (Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images)
to protect Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack.34 On each occasion, the White House
promptly walked back the president’s comments, maintaining that there had been no
change in US Taiwan policy.35 Biden reiterated this message in his November 2021 meeting
with Xi, stating America’s continued commitment to its traditional ‘one China’ policy.36
However, in response to media questioning regarding Taiwan immediately following the
meeting, Biden cast doubt on this commitment: ‘We have made very clear we support the
Taiwan Act, and that’s it. It’s independent. It makes its own decisions.’37
WINDOWS FOR WAR

Following Xi’s 2013 assertion that the Taiwan issue could not be shelved indefinitely,
commentators wondered whether he had a schedule for ‘reunification’ in mind. The
centenary of the PRC’s founding in 2049, which Xi has set as the deadline for realising the
China Dream, has often been floated as one possible time frame.38 However, as tensions
over Taiwan have burgeoned, projections for when Xi might seek to annex the island have
become increasingly ominous. Testifying before the US Senate Armed Services Committee
in March 2021, the outgoing commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip
Davidson, suggested that China could seek to take control of Taiwan ‘in the next six
years’.39 In early October 2021, following the PLA Air Force’s record-setting sorties into
the island’s ADIZ, Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng suggested that
a Chinese annexation could occur even sooner, estimating that Beijing would possess the
capability to execute such an attack by 2025.40
Other analysts believe that Xi will instead pursue a more traditional Chinese approach
of ‘winning without fighting’, employing so-called ‘grey-zone’ tactics that fall below the
threshold of conflict. Such tactics would be designed to further undermine the status quo
and to create, over time, new ‘facts on the ground’. Xi has successfully employed such
tactics elsewhere in Asia, most notably in the South China Sea.41 Long-time China watcher
)
ies
og
ol
c hn
Te
ar
ax
M
21
20
e©
ag
im
ite
ell
at
(S
Satellite image of a Chinese missile
silo under construction, 7 July 2021
Linda Jakobson argues that China will use ‘all means short of war’ as part of a campaign to
force Taipei to the negotiating table on Beijing’s terms. This effort, according to Jakobson,
might involve a combination of economic pressure, an embargo, cyber attacks, covert
action or subversion, and even political assassinations.42
Although Xi may indeed prefer a non-military solution, for the time being it may also
be his only credible option. Unless he is completely backed into a corner, for example by
a formal Taiwanese declaration of independence following a referendum, Xi is unlikely to
move to annex Taiwan until he can be relatively confident of military victory. This is due
to the potentially negative ramifications of a defeat or humiliating backdown on his own
credibility as leader and, potentially, the very legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.
The prospect of US military intervention in a Taiwan conflict must weigh heavily on
Xi’s mind. He cannot be confident of victory unless and until China can either deny the
US the option of coming to Taiwan’s defence or dissuade it from doing so given the costs
and risks involved. China’s continuing development of so-called anti-access/area-denial
(or A2/AD) capabilities is central to this effort. So too are Beijing’s rapid augmentation of
its nuclear forces and the more robust second-strike capability these will provide.
To be sure, Beijing enjoys considerable geographical advantages over Washington in rela-
tion to Taiwan. Taiwan is 11,000 kilometres away from the continental US, but a mere 128 km
from the mainland at its closest point. China can concentrate its forces in theatre, unlike the
US, meaning they are more readily available in the event of conflict. Yet China remains up to
a decade behind the US in several key areas of military capability. According to a recent IISS
assessment of states’ cyber power – an area that many analysts regard as increasingly central
to military capability – China is still at least ten years behind the US.43 Moreover, its six Type-
094 Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) are considerably ‘noisier’
Table 3.1: The cross-strait military balance, 2021
CHINA TAIWAN
Total In the Eastern and Total
Southern Theater
Commands*
Personnel 2,035,000 850,000 169,000
Attack submarines 52 33 4
Aircraft carriers 2 1 0
Cruisers, destroyers and frigates 84 57 26
Bombers 221 145 0
Fighter and ground-attack aircraft 1,942 822 407

*I.e., the theatre commands closest to Taiwan
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2022
than their US and Russian counterparts,44 while their JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14) submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) would not reach the continental US if fired from Chinese coastal
waters given their 7,200 km range.45 China’s nuclear arsenal of an estimated 350 warheads
is also currently only a fifth of the size of the approximately 1,800 deployed US warheads.46
China is nevertheless catching up with the US. Beijing places a high priority on modern-
ising its submarine fleet, with work on its next-generation SSBN (the Type-096) already
under way.47 It is anticipated that the Type-096 will be significantly quieter than its prede-
cessor and that it will incorporate technology present on US and Russian SSBNs, such as
teardrop hulls, which enhance submerged performance. They will also be armed with a
new SLBM (the JL-3) capable of being equipped with multiple independently targetable
re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The JL-3 is expected to have sufficient range to reach the conti-
nental US.48 In mid-2021, three fields of under-construction missile silos were discovered at
separate locations in northern and western China (Yumen, Hami and Ordos), suggesting a
shift away from Beijing’s traditional posture of minimum nuclear deterrence.49 Consistent
with this, the Pentagon’s most recent annual report on Chinese military power assesses
that Beijing could expand the size of its nuclear arsenal to 700 warheads by 2027 and to
1,000 by 2030.50 Additionally, in July 2021 China reportedly tested a new Fractional Orbital
Bombardment System (FOBS) that incorporated a glide body with the potential to evade
US missile defences. US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley contro-
versially described the development as a ‘Sputnik moment’ in reference to the Soviet
Union’s October 1957 launch of a satellite into space.51
Despite the impressive pace and scale of China’s military modernisation, its new capa-
bilities will take time to become operational. If it is to be relatively confident of military
victory, Beijing will need to carry on augmenting those capabilities of most direct relevance
to a Taiwan contingency. This will require continuing to bring more capable combat aircraft
(J-20, J-16 and J-10C fighters, for example) into service together with improved armaments
such as the PL-15 air-to-air missile; better intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities, including in space; more realistic training; better integration of services;
and more exercises for multi-domain operations. Most importantly, having witnessed the
difficulties encountered by Russian forces invading Ukraine in early 2022 against opposing
armed forces that, on paper, looked significantly weaker, Beijing will need to continue
augmenting its amphibious-assault capabilities in case these are ultimately required for an
invasion of Taiwan.
Some observers remain perplexed that the PLA has not developed more urgently the
amphibious-transport capacity needed to ferry the estimated 1–2 million troops that would
be needed for an invasion. According to one school of thought, that is because China is
instead relying upon support from civilian vessels as part of its larger programme of
‘military–civil fusion’. While there is certainly evidence of civilian shipping being integrated
into PLA exercises and even into auxiliary military units, more extensive training will be
required to overcome the significant coordination challenges that would be involved in
sending a large, motley armada comprising both military and commercial vessels across
the turbulent waters of the Taiwan Strait, especially during battle.52
In the meantime, the risk of a Taiwan conflict cannot be discounted completely.
While it is virtually impossible to anticipate precisely how such a conflict would play
out, its outcomes would most likely be devastating. Modelling produced by the RAND
Corporation suggests that a hypothetical year-long conflict between China and the US in
2025 would likely see both sides experiencing ‘very heavy’ military losses. Chinese trade
would drop sharply, causing China’s GDP to plummet by 25–35%. Chinese cyber attacks
on the US could inflict damage in the range of US$70bn–900bn. Nor is this a worst-case
scenario: RAND presupposes that the fighting would be confined to East Asia, that China
would not target the US homeland except via cyber attacks, and that conflict would not
cross the nuclear threshold – none of which can be assumed.53
However, assuming Beijing recognises the dangers implicit in launching a major attack
on Taiwan in circumstances where it cannot prevent US military intervention, in the short
to medium term a Taiwan conflict is far more likely to occur by accident than by design.
Indeed, as Chinese coercion of Taiwan intensifies, the risk of inadvertent escalation is
rising. While Beijing’s likely ‘red lines’ concerning Taiwan are often contemplated, much
less attention is given to Taipei’s thresholds. If PLA aircraft begin flying into Taiwan’s
sovereign airspace – as opposed to its self-declared ADIZ, which ultimately has little legal
standing – or should they begin routine overflights of the island, Taiwan’s air force has
reportedly been instructed to either intercept the intruding aircraft or force them to land.54
Were China to start routine overflights of Taiwan-controlled offshore features, such as the
Pratas Islands or Itu Aba in the South China Sea, with a view to challenging Taipei’s terri-
torial claims, there would also be a heightened risk of close military encounters. A collision
between Chinese and Taiwanese fighters or, perhaps worse still, between US and Chinese
ships or aircraft operating in close proximity, could prove difficult to manage and contain,
especially in this era of deepening Sino-American rivalry.
Map 3.1: Selected Chinese missile ranges
≤ 2,000 km
CHINA DF-17 (CH-SS-22)
Medium-range ballistic
missile / hypersonic glide
vehicle combination
Kadena Air Base
DF-21 (CH-SS-5)
Taiwan Okinawa, Japan
Medium-range ballistic
missile
< 4,000 km
DF-26 (CH-SS-18)
Intermediate-range
ballistic missile
©IISS
Note: ranges drawn from

US CREDIBILITY China’s national borders
During their November 2021 virtual meeting, Biden and Xi discussed the need for Source: IISS
as-yet-unspecified ‘guardrails’ to reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation and to maintain

clear communication in the event of major crisis or conflict.55 Yet many commentators
doubt the utility of such mechanisms, querying Beijing’s commitment to using them
during a crisis and pointing to the risk that these measures might ultimately encourage
Chinese military adventurism and undermine US deterrence. As US analysts Jacob Stokes
and Zack Cooper have observed,
although crisis management mechanisms might seem to be a classic opportunity for

‘win-win cooperation’, this is not always the case. Counterintuitively, crisis manage-
ment mechanisms might sometimes encourage risk-taking. This logic was best
explained by Thomas Schelling, who described how brinksmanship (including deter-
rence) often relies on the ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.56
For much of the modern history of the Taiwan flashpoint, the United States’ ability to
deter a Chinese attack was rarely in question. Despite having one of the largest armies in
the world, for the most part China’s air and naval forces have been weak and antiquated
relative to those of the US. At the time of the Chinese DF-26 missiles on parade in Beijing, 3 September 2015
Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995−96, Beijing had

few if any missiles capable of striking even
nearby US bases in Guam and Okinawa.
Modelling conducted by RAND on how a
US–China conflict over Taiwan would have
played out during the mid-1990s suggested
that the US would have prevailed quickly
and relatively easily. For instance, RAND
estimates suggested that it would have
taken less than a single wing of 72 US fighter
aircraft as little as a week to achieve air supe-
riority over the Taiwan Strait.57
However, the 1995−96 crisis forced a step
(Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)
change in China’s strategic mindset. Building
upon a quarter-century of impressive economic growth, Beijing initiated a massive military-
modernisation programme. As US strategic analysts quickly recognised, of particular
significance to the Taiwan flashpoint was its development of A2/AD capabilities designed
to substantially increase the costs and risks for Washington of coming to Taiwan’s defence.58
China’s now formidable A2/AD capabilities include powerful anti-ship missiles – such as
the dual-capable (i.e., nuclear and conventional) DF-26 (CH-SS-18) intermediate-range
ballistic missile, which has an estimated range of 4,000 km (see Map 3.1) and is sometimes
referred to as a ‘carrier killer’ given its ability to strike both land and sea targets, including
aircraft carriers.59 Beijing has also developed an array of platforms to deliver its new suite
of anti-ship missiles – mobile land-based launchers, fast and stealthy short-range surface
ships, quiet diesel-powered submarines, as well as fighter aircraft and bombers – along
with significantly improved radar, sonar and satellite capabilities to improve targeting.
US defeat in a Taiwan contingency, which was for a long time considered unthinkable, is
becoming increasingly conceivable due to Chinese military advances. Since at least 2018, the
Pentagon and prominent US think tanks, including RAND and the Center for a New American
Security, have regularly run war games that end in US defeat.60 It is important not to read too
much into such exercises, which are generally designed to test participants playing the part
of a US ‘blue team’ confronting a hypothetical ‘red team’ Chinese opponent. However, it is a
sobering fact that US forces have reportedly even struggled in scenarios set a decade into the
future where they have been given access to military technologies still under development.61
As Washington’s long-standing ability to deter a Chinese attack is increasingly ques-
tioned, calls have grown louder for the US to abandon its purposefully ambiguous posture in
favour of a clearer defence commitment to the island. Richard Haass and David Sacks of the
Council on Foreign Relations argue that US deterrence could be reinforced by a new policy
of ‘strategic clarity’ that explicitly states Washington’s intent to respond to any Chinese use
of force against Taiwan. They argue that greater strategic clarity need not necessarily entail
an abandonment of America’s traditional ‘one-China policy’ and could ultimately benefit
US–China relations by reducing the risk of miscalculation.62 Interestingly, public support for
this shift is seemingly building – with a record Figure 3.2: Defence budgets of China and of the US plus its allies and
partners in the Asia-Pacific, 2021 (US$bn)
46% of 2,086 respondents favouring such a
commitment in an August 2021 poll of the
US public conducted by the Chicago Council
US partners
China
on Global Affairs.63 The United States’ chaotic
207.3
withdrawal from Afghanistan in September US allies
2021 and its failure to deter Russia’s February
2022 invasion of Ukraine have raised some
doubts regarding Washington’s willingness
to commit its armed forces to defend Taiwan
and, indeed, its other Asian allies, in the event US
Japan 49.3 India 65.1
754.0
of a conflict with China.64 However, the utility
of such inferences is questionable as far as
Taiwan 16.2
Taiwan is concerned; a strong case can also South Korea 46.7
be made that the American withdrawal from Singapore 11.6

Afghanistan and Washington’s unwilling- Australia 34.3
Indonesia 8.4
ness to become directly involved in the war
Philippines 5.7 Malaysia 3.9
in Ukraine might ultimately enable the US to
direct greater resources and attention to the
China
Asian theatre.65 Taiwan, moreover, is consid-
US allies
ered more strategically important to the US and partners
than Ukraine. US
An important book by former senior US
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
defence official and lead author of the 2018 US$bn
National Defense Strategy Elbridge Colby
argues that successful deterrence ultimately requires that Washington convince Beijing not Source: IISS, Military Balance+,
milbalplus.iiss.org
only of its willingness to come to Taiwan’s defence, but also of its ability to do so. According
to Colby, for US deterrence vis-à-vis Taiwan to be credible, the US must do two things. Firstly,
given the scale of the Chinese challenge and the importance of denying Beijing hegemony
over Asia, the US should ‘avoid, reduce, or eliminate costly or demanding commitments in
other parts of the world, including the Middle East, so that it can concentrate on the most
demanding theater’.66 Secondly, the US must also assemble and lead a coalition of allies
(Australia, Japan, the Philippines and South Korea) and partners (India, Indonesia, Malaysia
and Singapore), including Taiwan. This coalition’s combined military power should outweigh
that of China and therefore be able to deny it dominance over the critically important Asian
region (see Figure 3.2 for a comparison of China’s defence budget against that of the US and
its allies and partners).67 While elegant in theory, this prescription will be hard to imple-
ment. As highlighted by the war in Ukraine, focusing so intently upon a single theatre runs
counter to the United States’ identity as a superpower with the capacity to project military
power to all corners of the globe. Perhaps more importantly, holding together such a coali-
tion would be demanding, if not impossible, across the diverse and highly variegated Asian
region, where many countries remain economically dependent upon China and continue to
cleave tightly to deeply ingrained non-aligned traditions.
TAIWANESE DETERRENCE Figure 3.3: Taiwan’s defence budget, 2015–21

Many commentators, Colby included,
maintain that Taiwan must also contribute
15 Tsai Ing-wen assumes office as president
significantly more towards buttressing cross-
strait deterrence by augmenting its own 14
military capabilities. Indeed, successive US

13
administrations from Barack Obama onwards
have called upon US allies and partners to 12
assume a much greater share of the burden for

11
security in the Asia-Pacific region.68 Ostensibly
at least, Taipei has responded positively 10
to these calls. Under Tsai’s leadership, the 9

island’s defence budget has grown steadily
8
(see Figure 3.3), both in absolute terms and as
a proportion of total government spending, 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
following a quarter of a century of stagnation

and decline as successive governments responded to domestic pressures for increased social Source: IISS, Military Balance+,
milbalplus.iiss.org
spending.69 In November 2020, Taiwan announced a new Indigenous Defense Submarine
(IDS) programme, which will see eight diesel-powered submarines designed and built locally
over the next decade at an estimated cost of US$16bn.70 In October 2021, Taipei allocated a
further US$9bn to defence spending – on top of its regular defence budget – which will be
spent over the next five years.71
Taipei has also started investing in some of the asymmetric capabilities long advo-
cated by US strategists. In 2008, US Naval War College Professor William Murray
famously prescribed a ‘porcupine’ strategy for Taiwan, wherein the island would
completely rethink and redesign its force posture to ‘emphasiz[e] the asymmetrical
advantage of being the defender’ and seek ‘to deny the People’s Republic its strategic
objectives rather than … to destroy its weapons systems’.72 In 2017, Taiwan quietly
introduced its own version of the ‘porcupine strategy’, known officially as the Overall
Defense Concept (ODC).73 Some subsequent acquisitions appeared to reflect a shift
towards a more asymmetric approach favouring large numbers of smaller, cheaper
capabilities and geared towards denying a Chinese amphibious assault – at least until
such time as US assistance arrived. In August 2020, for example, Taiwan launched the
first of four locally built fast mine-laying ships.74
However, Taiwan’s new asymmetric strategy has not been universally embraced by
the senior ranks of the island’s military, Tsai’s public endorsement of the ODC notwith-
standing. Service chiefs continue to advocate for large, prestigious (and expensive)
platforms, including the navy’s IDS programme, the army’s M1A2T Abrams tanks (which
the US approved for transfer to Taiwan in July 2019) and the air force’s F-16C/D (Block
70) aircraft (which the US approved for transfer in August 2019). The latter two transfers,
valued at an estimated US$2bn and US$8bn respectively (see Table 3.2), are seen as having
the added benefit of signalling US commitment to Taiwan’s defence, thereby arguably rein-
forcing cross-strait deterrence.75
Table 3.2: Selected US approvals of possible arms sales to Taiwan, 2010–21
Date of Equipment Type Maximum Value Notional prime contractor

approval quantity (US$)
Jan 2010 Osprey-class Coastal minehunter 2 105m US Navy stocks
Jan 2010 UH-60M Black Hawk Medium transport helicopter 60 3.1bn Sikorsky
Dec 2015 AAV-7A1 Amphibious assault vehicle 36 300m BAE Systems Land & Armaments
Dec 2015 FGM-148 Javelin Man-portable anti-tank missiles (MANPAT) 208 57m Lockheed Martin and Raytheon
Dec 2015 Mk 15 Phalanx Close-in weapons system 13 416m Raytheon
Dec 2015 Oliver Hazard Perry-class Frigate 2 190m US Navy stocks
Jun 2017 AGM-154C JSOW Inertial/satellite-guided bombs 56 185.5m Raytheon
Jun 2017 AGM-88B HARM Anti-radiation missile 50 147.5m Raytheon
Jul 2019 FIM-92 Stinger Point-defence surface-to-air missiles 254 223.6m Raytheon
Jul 2019 M1A2T Abrams Main battle tank 108 2bn General Dynamics Land Systems
Aug 2019 F-16C/D (Block 70) Fighter ground-attack aircraft 66 8bn Lockheed Martin
Fighting Falcon
May 2020 Mk 48 Heavyweight torpedo 18 180m US Navy stocks
Jul 2020 PAC-3 Long-range surface-to-air n.k. 620m Lockheed Martin

missile life-extension
Oct 2020 RGM-84L Harpoon II Land-based anti-ship missile launcher 100 2.4bn Boeing
Oct 2020 AGM-84H SLAM-ER Air-to-surface missile 135 1.0bn Boeing
Nov 2020 MQ-9B Sky Guardian Combat intelligence, surveillance and 4 600m General Atomics Aeronautical
reconnaissance uninhabited aerial vehicle Systems (GA-ASI)
(ISR UAV)
Aug 2021 M109A6 155mm self-propelled howitzer 40 750m BAE Systems Land & Armaments
Sources: US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, www.dsca.mil; IISS
Interestingly, internal contestation regarding the merits of a more asymmetric

approach appears to have led to the ODC being omitted altogether from Taiwan’s most
recent defence-policy documents: the March 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review and the
November 2021 National Defense Report. Likewise, in August 2021, Taipei abandoned a
US$1.1bn project to build 60 small assault vessels that were originally intended to support
the ODC.76 There are also hints that the island may now be shifting away from the ‘deter-
rence by denial’ approach envisaged in the ODC towards a ‘deterrence by punishment’
strategy, relying partly upon the threat of devastating counter-strikes on the mainland to
dissuade Beijing from initiating military action.77 For instance, in March 2021, Minister
of National Defense Chiu revealed that the island had begun series production of a new
long-range ground-launched missile – and is presently working on three other long-range-
missile designs – capable of striking targets deep inside China.78 That said, the example of
Ukraine’s all-volunteer ‘Territorial Defense A Russian tank on the road outside Mariupol, southern Ukraine, 29 March 2022
Force’ has also prompted speculation that

conscription could be reinstated and the
island’s four-month period of compulsory
military service extended to two years.79
Regardless of the strategy to which
Taiwan ultimately commits, the widening
gulf between its defence spending and that
of the mainland severely limits Taipei’s
ability to deter Beijing. China’s estimated
2021 defence budget of US$207bn was
almost 13 times larger than Taiwan’s
US$16.2bn allocation. Moreover, even the
(Maximilian Clarke/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)
increase in the mainland’s military budget
from 2020 to 2021, from US$189bn to US$207bn, exceeded Taiwan’s entire US$13.9bn defence
budget for 2020 and its US$16.2bn defence budget for 2021.80 Time is also not on Taiwan’s side.
For example, the first of Taiwan’s new submarines will not arrive until 2024 at the earliest
assuming it arrives on time, which appears increasingly unlikely. Likewise, the last of the
Abrams main battle tanks that Taiwan ordered from the US in 2019 will not arrive until 2027.81
CONCLUSION
Contrary to mounting speculation, China is unlikely to attempt to annex Taiwan until at
least the end of this decade. During this period, the potential risks of failure will remain too
great for President Xi due to persistent – albeit narrowing – asymmetries between China
and the US in key areas of military capability. During this window, the greatest risk to peace
will be ‘accidental conflict’ as a product of military misadventure, miscalculation or misper-
ception that spirals out of control. To avoid this, Washington should continue urging Beijing
to establish new ‘guardrails’ to improve crisis communication and avoid inadvertent escala-
tion. Other Asian capitals should support and actively encourage this endeavour.
The medium- to long-term outlook for this democratic Asian bastion appears more bleak.
To be sure, as the Ukraine conflict has highlighted, it is critical not to overlook the great
challenges that an attacker faces or to underestimate a defender’s strengths. Yet it is equally
important not to overdraw similarities between these two quite different cases. Despite
efforts to modernise its military over the past decade,82 Russia is ultimately a great power in
decline whereas China is a rising superpower. Russia’s defence budget is less than one-third
of the size of China’s, for instance, while its economy and population are only a tenth as
large. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s population is nearly double that of Taiwan.83 Despite continuing
efforts by Taiwan, the US and its allies (especially Australia and Japan) to reinforce cross-
strait deterrence, the US–China military balance in this flashpoint may begin to tilt decisively
in Beijing’s favour towards the end of this decade, barring some as-yet-unanticipated
military-technological breakthrough. This development could lead to the US commitment
to defend the island gradually losing credibility. If US credibility is eroded beyond a certain
but unknowable point, the dynamics of the Taiwan flashpoint could be dramatically altered.
NOTES
1 ‘The Most Dangerous Place on Earth’, The Corporation, 2018), pp. 20–5.
Economist, vol. 439, no. 9,243, 1 May 2021, p. 7. 13 Kelvin Chen, ‘China Denies Existence of
2 Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘China Threat to Taiwan Median Line in Taiwan Strait’, Taiwan News, 22
Highlighted by Ukraine War, Warns US September 2020, https://www.taiwannews.com.
Admiral’, Financial Times, 25 March 2022, https:// tw/en/news/4014231.
www.ft.com/content/28b96d50-de47-4fa3-add1- 14 Thomas J. Shattuck, ‘Assessing One Year of
df7ba4331f1f. PLA Air Incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ’, Global
3 For further reading on the cross-strait status Taiwan Brief, vol. 6, no. 20, 20 October 2021,
quo, see June Teufel Dreyer, ‘Understanding the https://globaltaiwan.org/2021/10/vol-6-issue-20/.
Status Quo: Perception and Reality on China– 15 Adrian Ang U-jin and Olli Pekka Suorsa,
Taiwan Relations’, RUSI Journal, vol. 152, no. 1, ‘Explaining the PLA’s Record-setting Air
2007, pp. 48–52. Incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ’, Diplomat, 14
4 ‘China’s Xi Says Political Solution for Taiwan October 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/
Can’t Wait Forever’, Reuters, 6 October 2013, explaining-the-plas-record-setting-air-incur-
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-apec- sions-into-taiwans-adiz/.
china-taiwan-idUSBRE99503Q20131006. 16 Lawrence Chung and Liu Zhen, ‘Taiwan Will
5 ‘Highlights of Xi’s Speech at Taiwan Message Forcefully Expel PLA Warplanes Next Time: Tsai
Anniversary Event’, China Daily, 2 January 2019, Ing-wen’, South China Morning Post, 1 April 2019,
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/02/ https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/
WS5c2c1ad2a310d91214052069.html. article/3004119/chinese-jets-incursion-across-tai-
6 ‘China–Taiwan Tensions: Xi Jinping Says wan-strait-beijings-way.
“Reunification” Must Be Fulfilled’, BBC News, 17 Keoni Everington, ‘Taiwanese F-16s Outflank
9 October 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/ Chinese Su-30 over Taiwan Strait’, Taiwan News,
world-asia-china-58854081. 15 October 2020, https://www.taiwannews.com.
7 ‘Anti-Secession Law Adopted by NPC (Full tw/en/news/4030883.
Text)’, China Daily, 14 March 2005, https://www. 18 Office of the President, Republic of China
chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/14/ (Taiwan), ‘President Tsai Delivers 2021 National
content_424643.htm. Day Address’, 10 October 2021, https://english.
8 See General Wei Fenghe’s address, Fourth president.gov.tw/News/6175.
Plenary Session, 18th Asia Security Summit, IISS 19 Yimou Lee, ‘Taiwan Says May Shoot Down
Shangri-La Dialogue, 2 June 2019, https://www. Chinese Drones in South China Sea’, Reuters,
iiss.org/-/media/files/shangri-la-dialogue/2019/ 7 April 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/
speeches/plenary-4---general-wei-fenghe-minis- us-southchinasea-taiwan-idUSKBN2BU1CV;
ter-of-national-defence-china-transcript.pdf. and AP/Reuters, ‘Taiwan Will Defend Itself “To
9 Yang Sheng, ‘Taiwan Separatists Panic as the Very Last Day” if China Attacks, Foreign
Mainland Drops “Peaceful” in Reunification Minister Warns’, ABC News, 7 April 2021,
Narrative’, Global Times, 23 May 2020. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-04-08/
10 People’s Republic of China (PRC), Ministry taiwan-will-defend-itself-to-the-very-last-day-if-
of Foreign Affairs, ‘President Xi Jinping china-attacks/100054768.
Had a Virtual Meeting with US President 20 See, for example, Office of the President,
Joe Biden’, 16 November 2021, https://www. Republic of China (Taiwan), ‘President Tsai
fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202111/ Delivers 2021 National Day Address’.
t20211116_10448843.html. 21 John Sudworth, ‘China Needs to Show Taiwan
11 Nick Aspinwall, ‘Paraguay Says Chinese Brokers Respect, Says President’, BBC News, 14 January
Offered Vaccines for Diplomatic Recognition’, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
Diplomat, 27 March 2021, https://thediplomat. asia-51104246.
com/2021/03/paraguay-says-chinese-brokers-of- 22 Election Study Center, National Chengchi
fered-vaccines-for-diplomatic-recognition/. University, ‘Taiwan Independence vs.
12 For further reading, see Derek Grossman et Unification with the Mainland’, 10 January
al., China’s Long-range Bomber Flights: Drivers 2022, https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/
and Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Detail?fid=7801&id=6963.
23 Ibid. the 117th Congress, Committee on Foreign

24 White House, ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy of Relations, United States Senate’, US Senate
the United States’, February 2022, p. 13, Committee on Foreign Relations, 8 December
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ 2021, p. 1, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/
uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf. media/doc/120821_Ratner_Testimony1.pdf.
25 Anne Gearan, Philip Rucker and Simon 33 See ‘Full Transcript of ABC News’
Denyer, ‘Trump’s Phone Call Was Long George Stephanopoulos’ Interview with
Planned, Say People Who Were Involved’, President Joe Biden’, ABC News, 19 August
Washington Post, 4 December 2016, https:// 2021, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-tai- full-transcript-abc-news-george-stephanopo-
wan-phone-call-was-weeks-in-the-planning- ulos-interview-president/story?id=79535643.
say-people-who-were-invovled/2016/12/04/ According to Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic
f8be4b0c-ba4e-11e6-94ac-3d324840106c_ Treaty, NATO members are required to regard
story.html. the use of violence against one or more of its
26 Susan V. Lawrence, ‘Taiwan: Political and members, either in Europe or North America,
Security Issues’, In Focus, Congressional as an armed attack against them all, and to
Research Service, 29 November 2021, https:// support the attacked member(s) accordingly –
sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10275.pdf. including through the use of force – to restore
27 See Jessica Drun, ‘Taiwan Needs Allies, Not and maintain security in the North Atlantic area.
Partisans’, Foreign Policy, 13 January 2021, See ‘The North Atlantic Treaty’, NATO, 10 April
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/13/taiwan- 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
contact-guidelines-pompeo-partisan-china/. official_texts_17120.htm. No such collective-
28 US, Department of Defense, ‘Indo-Pacific defence arrangement exists in the case of the
Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, US–Taiwan security relationship. According
and Promoting a Networked Region’, 1 June to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the US presi-
2019, p. 30, https://media.defense.gov/2019/ dent is only required to inform Congress of any
Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/department-of-de- threat to Taiwan’s security and its implications
fense-indo-pacific-strategy-report-2019.pdf. for American interests, following which the
29 Keoni Everington, ‘US Secretary of State Calls president and Congress determine an appro-
Taiwan “Country” Again’, Taiwan News, 16 priate US response. See ‘Taiwan Relations Act’,
September 2021, https://www.taiwannews.com. American Institute in Taiwan, https://www.
tw/en/news/4288972. ait.org.tw/our-relationship/policy-history/
30 US, Department of State, ‘PRC Military Pressure key-u-s-foreign-policy-documents-region/
Against Taiwan Threatens Regional Peace taiwan-relations-act/.
and Stability’, 23 January 2021, https://www. 34 Kevin Liptak, ‘Biden Vows to Protect Taiwan
state.gov/prc-military-pressure-against-tai- in Event of Chinese Attack’, CNN, 22 October
wan-threatens-regional-peace-and-stability; and 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/21/politics/
US, Department of State, ‘Increasing People’s taiwan-china-biden-town-hall/index.html.
Republic of China Military Pressure Against 35 Jeff Mason and David Brunnstrom, ‘White
Taiwan Undermines Regional Peace and House Repeats No Taiwan Policy Change;
Stability’, 3 October 2021, https://www.state. Experts See Biden Gaffe’, Reuters, 22 October
gov/increasing-peoples-republic-of-china-mil- 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/
itary-pressure-against-taiwan-undermines-re- white-house-repeats-no-taiwan-policy-change-
gional-peace-and-stability/. experts-see-biden-gaffe-2021-10-22/.
31 See, for example, Walter Russell Mead, ‘Mike 36 White House, ‘Readout of President Biden’s
Pence Announces Cold War II’, Wall Street Virtual Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the
Journal, 8 October 2018, https://www.wsj. People’s Republic of China’, 16 November 2021,
com/articles/mike-pence-announces-cold- https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
war-ii-1539039480. statements-releases/2021/11/16/readout-of-pres-
32 See ‘Statement By Dr. Ely Ratner, Assistant ident-bidens-virtual-meeting-with-president-xi-
Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.
Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Before 37 Amy Mackinnon and Anna Weber, ‘Biden
Struggles to Stick to the Script on Taiwan’, 1, 2021, pp. 43–63.

Foreign Policy, 17 November 2021, https:// 47 US, Department of Defense, ‘Military
foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/17/biden-taiwan-chi- and Security Developments Involving the
na-misspoke-policy-mistake/. People’s Republic of China 2021’, November
38 See, for example, Jacob Stokes, ‘When and Why 2021, p. 49, https://media.defense.gov/2021/
China Might – or Might Not – Attack Taiwan’, Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-
Defense One, 11 May 2021, https://www. FINAL.PDF.
defenseone.com/ideas/2021/05/when-and-why- 48 Ibid., p. 91.
china-mightor-might-notattack-taiwan/173937/. 49 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda,
39 Mallory Shelbourne, ‘Davidson: China Could ‘China’s Nuclear Missile Silo Expansion:
Try to Take Control of Taiwan in “Next Six From Minimum Deterrence to Medium
Years”’, USNI News, 9 March 2021, https://news. Deterrence’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1
usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try- September 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/09/
to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years. chinas-nuclear-missile-silo-expansion-from-min-
40 Kathrin Hille and Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘Taiwan imum-deterrence-to-medium-deterrence/; and
Warns that China Will Be Able to Invade Taiwan Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, ‘Nuclear
by 2025’, Financial Times, 6 October 2021, https:// Notebook: United States Nuclear Weapons, 2021’,
www.ft.com/content/212f44b9-a271-425b-a7cf- Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 12 January 2021.
608d43d46288. 50 US Department of Defense, ‘Military and
41 For further reading, see Michael J. Green et al., Security Developments Involving the People’s
Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory Republic of China 2021’, p. 90. See also
and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence (Washington Kristensen and Korda, ‘Nuclear Notebook:
DC: Center for Strategic and International Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2021’. It is worth
Studies, 2017). noting here that some analysts dispute these
42 Linda Jakobson, ‘Why Should Australia Be estimates and assert that the PLA Rocket
Concerned About Rising Tensions in the Force may not fill all available silos as part
Taiwan Strait?’, China Matters Explores, January– of a so-called ‘shell game’ strategy. See, for
February 2021, https://chinamatters.org.au/ example, James M. Acton, ‘Don’t Panic about
wp-content/uploads/2021/02/CME-Feb-2021- China’s New Nuclear Capability’, Washington
Taiwan-Jakobson.pdf. Post, 27 July 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.
43 International Institute for Strategic Studies com/politics/2021/06/30/dont-panic-about-chi-
(IISS), Cyber Capabilities and National Power: A nas-new-nuclear-capabilities/.
Net Assessment, June 2021, p. 174, https://www. 51 Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘China’s Nuclear Build-up:
iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2021/06/cyber-ca- “One of the Largest Shifts in Geostrategic Power
pabilities-national-power. Ever”’, Financial Times, 15 November 2021,
44 See US Office of Naval Intelligence, ‘The https://www.ft.com/content/d7c50283-18c8-4f2e-
People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern 8731-970d9a547688. For an opposing view, see
Navy with Chinese Characteristics’, August Sanne Verschuren, ‘China’s Hypersonic Weapons
2009, p. 22, https://irp.fas.org/agency/oni/ Tests Don’t Have to Be a Sputnik Moment’,
pla-navy.pdf. War on the Rocks, 29 October 2021, https://
45 Matthew P. Funaiole, Joseph S. Burmudez Jr warontherocks.com/2021/10/chinas-hypersonic-
and Brian Hart, ‘A Glimpse of Chinese Ballistic missile-tests-dont-have-to-be-a-sputnik-moment/.
Missile Submarines’, Center for Strategic and 52 For further reading, see Thomas Shugart,
International Studies, 4 August 2021, https:// ‘Mind the Gap: How China’s Civilian Shipping
www.csis.org/analysis/glimpse-chinese-ballis- Could Enable a Taiwan Invasion’, War on the
tic-missile-submarines. Rocks, 16 August 2021, https://warontherocks.
46 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, ‘Nuclear com/2021/08/mind-the-gap-how-chinas-civilian-
Notebook: Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2021’, shipping-could-enable-a-taiwan-invasion/.
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 77, no. 6, 53 See David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos
2021, pp. 318–36; and Hans M. Kristensen and and Cristina L. Garafola, War with China:
Matt Korda, ‘United States Nuclear Weapons, Thinking Through the Unthinkable (Santa Monica,
2021’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 77, no. CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).
54 Bonny Lin and David Sacks, ‘How to Prevent an game-shows-what-the-service-needs-to-hold-

Accidental War Over Taiwan’, Foreign Affairs, 12 off-or-win-against-china-in-2030/.
October 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 62 Richard Haass and David Sacks, ‘American
articles/taiwan/2021-10-12/how-prevent-acciden- Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous’,
tal-war-over-taiwan. Foreign Affairs, 2 September 2020, https://www.
55 White House, ‘Readout of President Biden’s foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/ameri-
Virtual Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the can-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous.
People’s Republic of China’. 63 Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura, ‘For First Time,
56 Jacob Stokes and Zack Cooper, ‘Thinking Half of Americans Favor Defending Taiwan
Strategically about Sino-American Crisis if China Invade’, Lester Crown Center on US
Management Mechanisms’, War on the Rocks, Foreign Policy, The Chicago Council on Global
30 September 2020, https://warontherocks. Affairs, 26 August 2021, https://www.thechi-
com/2020/09/thinking-strategically-about-si- cagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/
no-american-crisis-management-mechanisms/. first-time-half-americans-favor-defending-tai-
57 Eric Heginbotham et al., ‘The US–China wan-if-china-invades.
Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography and the 64 See, for example, Sophie Wushuang Yi and
Evolving Balance of Power 1996–2017’, RAND Changkun Hou, ‘Afghanistan Withdrawal Has
Corporation, 2015, p. 333, https://www.rand. Taiwan Pondering Its Alliance with the US – and
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/ China Is Upping the Pressure’, Conversation, 8
RR300/RR392/RAND_RR392.pdf. September 2021, https://theconversation.com/
58 See, for example, Andrew Krepinevich, Barry afghanistan-withdrawal-has-taiwan-ponder-
Watts and Robert Work, ‘Meeting the Anti- ing-its-alliance-with-the-us-and-china-is-up-
access and Area-denial Challenge’, Center ping-the-pressure-166713. For an opposing
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, perspective, see Stephen M. Walt, ‘Afghanistan
Washington DC, 20 May 2003, https:// Hasn’t Damaged US Credibility’, Foreign
csbaonline.org/research/publications/a2ad-an- Policy, 21 August 2021, https://foreignpolicy.
ti-access-area-denial. com/2021/08/21/afghanistan-hasnt-dam-
59 The Pentagon’s 2021 report on Chinese military aged-u-s-credibility/; and Oriana Skylar
power estimates that the DF-26 has a maximum Mastro, ‘Invasions Are Not Contagious’,
range of 4,000 km. See US, Department of Defense, Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2022, https://www.
‘Military and Security Developments Involving foreignaffairs.com/articles/taiwan/2022-03-03/
the People’s Republic of China 2021’, pp. 61–2. invasions-are-not-contagious.
60 See Chris Buckley and Steven Lee Myers, 65 See, for example, Walt, ‘Afghanistan Hasn’t
‘“Starting a Fire”: US and China Enter Damaged US Credibility’.
Dangerous Territory over Taiwan’, New York 66 Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial:
Times, 9 October 2021, https://www.nytimes. American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict
com/2021/10/09/world/asia/united-states-chi- (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University
na-taiwan.html; and Richard Bernstein, ‘The Press, 2021), p. 72.
Scary War Game over Taiwan that the US Loses 67 Ibid., pp. 246–53.
to China Again and Again’, National Interest, 17 68 For further reading, see Mira Rapp-Hooper,
August 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/ Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of
reboot/scary-war-game-over-taiwan-us-loses- America’s Alliances (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
china-again-and-again-167085. University Press, 2020).
61 Valerie Insinna, ‘A US Air Force War Game 69 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China
Shows What the Service Needs to Hold Off – or (Taiwan), ‘ROC National Defense Report 2021’, 9
Win Against – China in 2030’, Defense News, November 2021, p. 131, https://www.ustaiwande-
12 April 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/ fense.com/tdnswp/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/
training-sim/2021/04/12/a-us-air-force-war- Taiwan-National-Defense-Report-2021.pdf.
70 ‘Taiwan’s Submarine-building Plan’, IISS dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/

Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 1, January 2021, taipei-economic-and-cultural-representa-
https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-com- tive-office-united-states-11.
ments/2021/taiwans-submarine-building-plan. 76 Lawrence Chung, ‘Taiwan Scraps US$1.1 Billion
71 Mike Yeo, ‘Taiwan Is Spending an Extra $9B on Mini Missile Assault Boat Project’, South China
Its Defense. Here’s What the Money Will Buy’, Morning Post, 10 August 2021, https://www.
Defense News, 7 October 2021, https://www. scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3144420/
defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2021/10/07/ taiwan-scraps-us11-billion-mini-missile-assault-
taiwan-is-spending-an-extra-9b-on-its-defense- boat-project.
heres-what-the-money-will-buy/. 77 On the distinction between ‘denial’ and
72 William S. Murray, ‘Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense ‘punishment’ deterrence, see Glenn H. Snyder,
Strategy’, Naval War College Review, vol. 61, no. 3, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of
2008, p. 2. National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
73 For further reading, see Drew Thompson, University Press, 1961), pp. 14–16.
‘Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to 78 Steven Stashwick, ‘Taiwan Mass Producing New
Lose’, Strategic Forum, no. 310, October 2021, p. Long-range Missile’, Diplomat, 26 March 2021,
2, https://www.ndu.edu/News/Article-View/ https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/taiwan-mass-
Article/2833332/winning-the-fight-taiwan-can- producing-new-long-range-missile/.
not-afford-to-lose/. 79 Lee Hsi-Min and Michael A. Hunzeker, ‘The
74 Matteo Scarano, ‘Update: Taiwan Launches First View of Ukraine from Taiwan: Get Real about
“Fast Minelayer” for RoCN’, Janes, 7 August Territorial Defense’, War on the Rocks, 15 March
2020, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/ 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/
news-detail/update-taiwan-launches-first-fast- the-view-of-ukraine-from-taiwan-get-real-about-
minelayer-for-rocn. territorial-defense/.
75 See US Defense Security Cooperation 80 IISS, The Military Balance 2021 (Abingdon:
Agency, ‘Taipei Economic and Cultural Routledge for the IISS, 2021), pp. 249, 301.
Representative Office in the United States 81 Michael A. Hunzeker, ‘Taiwan’s Defense Plans
(TECRO) – M1A2T Abrams Tanks and Are Going Off the Rails’, War on the Rocks,
Related Equipment and Support’, 8 July 18 November 2021, https://warontherocks.
2019, https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/ com/2021/11/taiwans-defense-plans-are-going-
major-arms-sales/Taipei-economic-and- off-the-rails/.
cultural-representative-office-united-states-9; 82 For further reading, see IISS, Russia’s Military
and US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Modernisation: An Assessment, September 2020,
‘Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/09/
Office in the United States (TECRO) – F-16C/D rmm-introduction.
Block 70 Aircraft and Related Equipment 83 IISS, The Military Balance 2022 (Abingdon:
and Support’, 20 August 2019, https://www. Routledge for the IISS, 2022), pp. 192, 211, 255, 308.
CHAPTER 4
NORTH KOREA:
OPTIONS AND
PROSPECTS
AIDAN FOSTER-CARTER
Aidan Foster-Carter is Honorary Senior Research Fellow in
Sociology and Modern Korea at Leeds University, and a freelance
writer, consultant and broadcaster on both Koreas
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It is clear that global policy on the

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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

ril
yd
ar
(DPRK) has comprehensively failed. If the

ilit
am
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US and South Korea wish to challenge China’s

rt
pa
ke
hegemony over the DPRK, they must be more flexible

ta
es
in
in engaging Pyongyang, offering stronger incentives since

ar
m
US
punishments have proved ineffectual.
ENGAGING PYONGYANG: TWO PROCESSES, NO LASTING PROGRESS

In 2022, the separate efforts to curb the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions and to improve inter-Korean relations
lie in ruins. There is no longer any pretence of nominal unity in the UN on tackling Pyongyang’s nuclear
and missile activities. Meanwhile, following the change of government in Seoul in May, South Korea’s
DPRK policies may now become more grounded in reality.
KIM JONG-UN: CONTINUITY, NOT CHANGE

Early hopes that a new, young and foreign-educated leader would bring change to North Korean
policies have been dashed. Despite claiming to prioritise the economy, WMD programmes have
continued unabated (and accelerated) and the reforms essential to revive the economy are lacking.
BIGGER, BETTER AND MORE DIVERSE MISSILES

In March 2022, North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), ending a more than
four-year pause on nuclear and ICBM testing. Pyongyang’s missile programme now includes ICBMs
deemed capable of striking anywhere in the continental US, as well as newer weapons that challenge
existing missile defences.
PROSPECTS FOR KIM’S SECOND DECADE AND BEYOND

Pyongyang will benefit from growing US–China tensions (and indeed now US–Russia tensions), which
will increasingly threaten the post-Cold War geopolitical and economic order. The collapse of superpower
unity on North Korea can only enhance its freedom of manoeuvre. US President Joe Biden will be less
likely to engage Pyongyang if the Democrats lose the upcoming mid-term elections, while Seoul too will
be less likely to engage given how Kim treated former president Moon Jae-in. Depending on China will
carry risks for North Korea; the question now is in what future circumstances Beijing might use its power.
Like many other countries, North Korea celebrates the new year with fireworks. In 2022
it did so in two senses. The usual brief televised show in Pyongyang,1 for local consump-
tion, was just the warm-up for a much larger and more impressive display targeting a
global audience.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched more missiles in
January 2022 than in any previous month. A range of different projectiles were fired,
including short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and IRBMs) and
claimed hypersonic missiles fitted with manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles. One test
launched a missile from a train. Some of these systems, or variants of them, had been
tested in 2019 or in a smaller flurry of launches in late 2021.2 Many of these systems
have the potential to pose an additional challenge to existing missile-defence systems.
Apparently, none of the tests in January failed.3
What did fail was the international response. Following North
Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006,
the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) banned all
ballistic-missile activity
by the DPRK.4
Figure 4.1: US-organised joint

‘statements of the willing’ at the
UN Security Council condemning
North Korea’s January 2022 ballistic-
missile launches
UNSC MEMBER STATES NOT SIGNING:
Permanent members:
2
CHINA RUSSIA
Fla
g
of
Elected (non-permanent) members:

th
eU
ni
5
te
d
Na
tio
ns
(A
r tu
GABON GHANA INDIA KENYA MEXICO

rW
id
ak
/N
ur
Ph
ot
o
via
TOTAL DATE OF DATE OF SIGNATORIES

Ge
tty
STATEMENT DPRK TEST(S)

Im
ag
es
)
6 10.1.22 5.1.22
ALBANIA FRANCE IRELAND JAPAN UK US
11.1.22
8 20.1.22 14.1.22
17.1.22
ALBANIA FRANCE IRELAND JAPAN UK US BRAZIL UAE
9 4.2.22 30.1.22
ALBANIA FRANCE IRELAND JAPAN UK US BRAZIL UAE NORWAY
Sources: US Mission to the United Nations, usun.usmission.gov; UN, www.un.org

NORTH KOREA: OPTIONS AND PROSPECTS 83
Pyongyang wholly ignored this and a similar ban on nuclear testing, so repeated UNSC
censure and sanctions duly followed.5 This was not the case in January 2022. The UNSC
met three times but issued no resolution, or even a Presidential Statement (Norway held
the presidency that month). Instead, the United States organised what might be called
‘statements of the willing’, who turned out to be few (see Figure 4.1). The first mustered
just six signatories, including Japan (not a current UNSC member).6 The second added two
more, while Norway belatedly joined for the third.7 For whatever reason, almost half the
UNSC members were reluctant to formally condemn Pyongyang’s latest flagrant violations
of multiple UNSC resolutions. The third joint statement chided the non-signers:
The cost of the Council’s ongoing silence is too high. It will embolden the DPRK to
further defy the international community; to normalize its violations of Security
Council resolutions; to further destabilize the region; and to continue to threaten inter-
national peace and security. This is an outcome that we should not accept.8
Such unprecedented invertebracy on the part of the UNSC could just be a blip. In
choosing his moment to fire, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un knew that the world was
fixated on the risk that Russia might invade Ukraine. China and Russia, both increasingly
at odds with the US, might have vetoed any fresh resolution – just as they blocked a US
bid to impose UN measures against six named North Koreans, whom Washington sanc-
tioned in January as key figures involved in the DPRK’s efforts to procure weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) equipment.9
Alternatively (and more probably), the UNSC’s silence marks a turning point and the
end of an era. Even two years ago, this publication noted that while ‘the North Korean
challenge has deepened across multiple domains, international and regional responses
to it have … dissipated’.10 Beijing and Moscow have their own reasons, but what made
the other five non-signers hesitate is unclear (all are broadly pro-Western, so they were
surely asked).11
One reason for their hesitation may be tacit recognition that passing endless resolu-
tions has not worked. North Korea’s menacing armoury has only grown and new thinking
is urgently needed. Yet quiescence risks being taken for acquiescence. As a former British
ambassador in Pyongyang and ex-member of the UN Panel of Experts (PoE) on North
Korea put it, the UNSC is now ‘effectively de-fanged’ and the joint statements ‘are own
goals’.12 Indeed, the statements serve only to show Pyongyang how little backing there is
for resolute action – or even active resolutions – against it. In light of what may be a major
policy watershed, it is an apt time to stand back and take stock.
ENGAGING PYONGYANG: TWO PROCESSES, NO LASTING PROGRESS

In 2010, the Guardian newspaper ran a front-page story headlined: ‘Wikileaks cables reveal
China “ready to abandon North Korea”’. The sub-heading explained: ‘Leaked dispatches
show Beijing is frustrated with military actions of “spoiled child” and increasingly favours
reunified Korea.’13 That was perhaps the high-water mark of a once powerful strand of
wishful thinking: what many in Seoul, Tokyo and Washington believed and hoped would
happen. In this script, the Kim regime’s menace and intransigence would eventually unite
all interlocutors – including China – against it. The DPRK would (somehow) leave histo-
ry’s stage and South Korea – the Republic of Korea (ROK) – would absorb it, broadly along
the lines of German reunification in 1990.
In the real world this sequence of events was never plausible. To understand why
requires not only jettisoning pipe dreams, but also distinguishing two different strands of
engagement with the DPRK: one global, the other local. On the Korean Peninsula, for 50
years Seoul and Pyongyang have made fitful efforts, almost all initiated by the former, to
improve their relations. In a separate but often practically intertwined endeavour, since the
1980s the US has led attempts to curb North Korea’s nuclear and other WMD ambitions.14
In 2022, both these lines of effort lie in ruins. There is no functioning inter-Korean relation-
ship and Kim Jong-un’s arsenal is stronger than ever.
The nuclear issue: from AF to 6PT and beyond

The nuclear issue has seen two main bouts of substantial engagement.15 The first centred on
the 1994 US–DPRK Agreed Framework (AF). This was negotiated after a crisis when then
US president Bill Clinton had considered a military strike and former president Jimmy
Carter flew to Pyongyang to reduce tensions. Nominally bilateral, in fact the AF had wider
input (especially financial), mainly from South Korea and Japan via the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) consortium.16 Neither China nor Russia partic-
ipated. By contrast, the avowedly multilateral Six-Party Talks (6PT) were hosted by Beijing
and included Russia.
The AF had elements unthinkable in 2022. In essence, the DPRK’s foes collaborated to
build it nuclear power plants. This bold plan rested on a fiction and a bet: that Pyongyang’s
nuclear goals were peaceful (to generate electricity); and (sotto voce) that plutonium previ-
ously illicitly diverted for military purposes need not be addressed since the DPRK would
soon collapse. In the event, it was the AF that collapsed when it emerged that North Korea
was covertly enriching uranium as an alternative route to the bomb.
As US president from 2001–09, George W. Bush never liked the AF. Fatefully – and
against the advice of his secretary of state Colin Powell – he also ended new bilateral talks on
missiles, which Clinton had begun, despite Pyongyang’s hints that it might be bought off.17
On the nuclear front, Bush eventually accepted a need for dialogue, this time fully multilat-
eral, beginning the second phase of substantial engagement. While they lasted (2003–09),
the 6PT offered a tantalising glimpse of what a Northeast Asian security architecture might
look like. Despite persuading the DPRK to re-join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), with resumed inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), this
process also fell apart: North Korea withdrew after the UNSC condemned its launch in
April 2009 of a Taepodong missile.
Both the AF and 6PT illustrate the obstacles democracies face in pursuing foreign-policy
aims over time. One obstacle is the separation of powers. Hostile to the AF, a Republican-
controlled US Congress delayed energy aid promised to Pyongyang. Another is the risk
of mixed messaging if different parts of an administration pursue conflicting policies. For
example, George W. Bush’s Treasury Department froze DPRK accounts in Macao’s Banco
Delta Asia but then embarrassingly had to back off and return the money when Pyongyang
threatened to withdraw from nuclear talks in the 6PT.18
A third problem is regime change – the democratic kind – when a new leader changes
course, as with Bush after Clinton or in the case of several successions in Seoul. Fourthly,
mismatches can also arise between countries – even close allies like the US and South
Korea – if the government of the day in each holds different views on how to tackle North
Korea. No two states ever see wholly eye to eye, nor are their priorities identical. Japan, for
instance, still stresses the historical abductions issue above all else.19
Between democracies as within them, no bipartisan policy consensus exists on how to
handle North Korea. To oversimplify only slightly, hawks and doves tend to clash over
policy, dispensing various admixtures of stick and carrot. In relation to North Korea, this
lack of consensus has prevented the US, South Korea and others from maintaining a united
or consistent approach over time. Seen from Pyongyang, such interlocutors are inherently
untrustworthy: tomorrow a new leader may reverse what was previously agreed.
Even in better times, it proved impossible for Western allies to devise a coherent North
Korea policy – one that they could assure Pyongyang would be fully and smoothly deliv-
ered. This problem will only get worse. In a global order that is becoming more Hobbesian,
assertive nationalism threatens to outweigh the importance of maintaining alliances. When
he was US president, Donald Trump’s contempt for allies like South Korea did real damage
to the US–ROK alliance, barely papered over by his and South Korean president Moon
Jae-in’s shared desire to court Kim.20
However, the most significant (and possibly fatal) problem is that efforts to tackle
the DPRK can hardly be monopolised by Pyongyang’s foes. The AF was unusual in that
regard – perhaps a small quid pro quo for the comprehensive new relations Seoul was
forging with Pyongyang’s traditional allies. By contrast, the 6PT were fully multilateral,
a trend that continued after the 6PT collapsed. The third phase (2009–17) saw more sticks
than carrots: scant engagement but ever-stronger UNSC sanctions against Pyongyang’s
continued WMD provocations.
Those sanctions remain in place despite a fourth period (2018–21) that raised hopes for
peace and progress but ultimately proved to be a mere pause of Pyongyang’s nuclear and
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests. Having conducted no such tests since late 2017,
in January 2022 the DPRK threatened to end that moratorium. On 25 March, it launched an
ICBM.21 Kim’s summitry in 2018, dramatic at the time, produced no lasting peace process.
A new phase, the bleakest yet, began in 2022. As developments in January highlighted,
there is no longer any pretence of nominal unity in the UN on tackling the DPRK. In any
case, drafting successive (and, crucially, unanimous) UNSC resolutions against North
Korean WMD tests had always entailed hard bargaining behind the scenes: the US usually
tried to strengthen wording and sanctions, while China sought to water down both. Now
Beijing and Moscow may no longer cooperate at all.
In September 2021, media accounts claimed that Beijing was obstructing a related
UN function: the PoE tasked with reporting regularly on enforcement (or lack thereof)
of UNSC sanctions against the DPRK.22 Its eight members are supposedly independent
but here too Washington’s zeal to pin down and name violators has met ever-stronger
Chinese resistance, almost to the point of sabotage. Although Beijing denies obstruction,
it is unclear how much longer the PoE’s revealing, if depressing, catalogues of how North
Korea evades sanctions will continue to be issued under the UN’s imprimatur.23
Looking back, these varied efforts by the world’s great powers were no match for a small
but determined and cunning adversary. North Korea consistently pursued a viable nucle-
ar-weapons capacity: initially dissembling, yielding tactically if need be but never deflecting
for long nor changing its underlying goal, which it has now triumphantly achieved.24
Inter-Korean relations
According to the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus, nobody ‘ever steps in the same
river twice’. Half a century of fitful inter-Korean dialogue suggests otherwise. Repeated
fresh starts, most recently in 2018, have made no cumulative progress. Like the DPRK’s
denuclearisation, North–South reconciliation – let alone reunification – looks more remote
than ever in 2022.25
New leaders in Seoul often start afresh without acknowledging or learning from
their predecessors’ experiences. Here again there is no bipartisan consensus on how to
deal with North Korea, so a successor leader or administration may reverse prior policy
to Pyongyang’s chagrin – as when Lee Myung-bak (the South Korean president from
2008–13) failed to implement the joint economic projects agreed by his predecessor, Roh
Moo-hyun, at the second North–South summit in 2007. Had these gone ahead, each side
(but especially North Korea) would have had material reasons not to let political quarrels
harm mutually beneficial cooperation.26
However, as on the nuclear front, missteps by the parties trying to engage Pyongyang
are not the primary obstacle. On both issues, far more often it has been North Korea that
has broken off talks and reneged on accords. After 50 years of false dawns, the ineluctable
lesson is that ultimately North Korea is no keener for better ties with South Korea than it
is on denuclearisation. Otherwise, ways could have been found to maintain some contact
across the Demilitarized Zone. Family reunions are an obvious example. Even during the
‘sunshine’ decade (1998–2007), when the Korean Peninsula did seem to have turned a
new page, progress was slow and uneven. Importantly, security issues remained almost
wholly unaddressed.
Moreover, any assumption that the two processes (inter-Korean and denuclearisation)
have proceeded in tandem is dubious. Sometimes they have hindered each other. Roh
Tae-woo (ROK president, 1988–93) was the architect of wider South Korean rapproche-
ment with the major communist powers; having successfully forged relations with the
Soviet Union and China, he then negotiated a wide-ranging inter-Korean agreement on
cooperation and a nuclear accord.27 Signed in 1991, neither was implemented. As the IAEA
and US began to press harder regarding its nuclear intentions, Pyongyang walked away.
Evaluating the Moon era

In mid-2022, as a new South Korean president begins his five-year term, it is timely to assess
his predecessor’s performance. Moon Jae-in was dedicated to engaging North Korea. In
2018 his dream briefly came true: he held three summits with Kim and signed three seem-
ingly substantial accords.28 However, bilateral Kim Jong-un and then US president Donald Trump at
their second summit in Hanoi, Vietnam, 28 February 2019
relations soured soon afterwards, rendering
Moon’s ultimate achievement questionable.
One problem was Moon’s failure to
admit failure. Right to the end, he carried on
as if a peace process was still possible and
just needed resuscitating.29 In reality, the
peace process died in February 2019 at the
second Kim–Trump summit in Hanoi, if not
earlier. The 2022 Work Plan of the Ministry
of Unification, its last under Moon, is largely
fiction: full of lofty aspiration unrelated to real-
ities on the ground.30 Fantasy thus substituted
for admitting that dialogue was dead and
(Vietnam News Agency/Handout/Getty Images)
reflecting on why this was the case. The unpal-
atable truth was surely that Kim had merely used Moon to secure access to Trump and then
discarded him – especially after the US did not ease sanctions as Kim and Moon had hoped.
A second issue was the equally misguided effort of Moon’s government – following
the Hanoi summit – to find potential inter-Korean projects that could circumvent sanc-
tions. The prime case was ‘individual tourism’.31 This was a complete non-starter and
drew specific criticism from Kim. All that such pointless ploys achieved was to irritate
Washington and Pyongyang in equal measure, to no good purpose.
Thirdly, another idea – more serious, but equally flawed – was Moon’s pursuit during
his final year as president of an end-of-war declaration on the Korean Peninsula. With the
US lukewarm and Pyongyang calling it premature (only China was keen) this endeavour
also failed to make any progress.32 Amid deep mutual mistrust, critics saw no realistic
grounds to expect that a peace declaration – not to be confused with a full peace treaty,
which would replace the 1953 Armistice – would solve anything or bring denuclearisation
closer. Yet Moon insisted to the last that it was the way forward, even suggesting the deal
was almost done, which generated some misleading headlines.33
Seoul veers to the right

In March 2022, South Korea’s presidential election produced a significant change of govern-
ment: Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative opposition People Power Party (PPP) narrowly
defeated Lee Jae-myung of the hitherto ruling liberal Democratic Party of Korea (DPK). A
margin of under 1% is hardly a mandate for change and the DPK’s control of the National
Assembly until at least April 2024 threatens to block PPP legislation. However, in foreign
policy, where South Korean presidents exercise considerable autonomy, policy and espe-
cially tone are likely to harden significantly.
Yoon is a former prosecutor-general, new to politics and somewhat gaffe-prone. In
January he drew attention by seeming to advocate a pre-emptive strike on North Korea’s
hypersonic missiles.34 Yet he also says he is open to dialogue with Pyongyang. Ambiguity
aside, North Korea is evidently not a priority for Yoon: unusually, his transition team
included no inter-Korean portfolio. What is unambiguous is his enthusiasm for the US

alliance. While South Korea must tread carefully with China given their close bilateral
economic ties, there will be no more rhetoric about balancing between Washington and
Beijing. Yoon will also try to improve relations with Japan, which would strengthen tripar-
tite allied cooperation against North Korea’s growing threats.
South Korea’s policies towards the DPRK will now become less idealistic and more
grounded in reality. Otherwise, as North Korea becomes ever more of a global threat,
Washington and others may no longer defer to Seoul’s claimed special role vis-à-vis
Pyongyang, especially if Seoul’s policies keep changing. Korea’s division was a tragedy
but after almost eight decades it is a solid fact. Besides, as a global economic power, South
Korea today faces increasingly outwards.35 Its northern backyard need no longer be a
priority, except for deterrence. Moon’s experience shows that political capital invested in
the North is wasted.
In sum, the separate efforts to curb the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions and to improve
inter-Korean relations may converge after all – in shared irrelevance. Looking to the future,
China holds all the cards. South Korea and the US alike risk becoming marginalised as
interlocutors, while North Korea’s future is increasingly shaped by Beijing.
KIM JONG-UN: CONTINUITY, NOT CHANGE

In December 2021, Kim Jong-un completed his first decade in power. Still only 38 years
old, he may have many years left as the DPRK’s leader: in all probability, he is the North
Korea the world will face for the foreseeable future. It is therefore vital to understand him,
his motives and his system.36
Despite a very short apprenticeship, the third Kim seems firmly in charge.37 Securing
power meant eliminating rivals, such as his powerful uncle Jang Song-thaek, executed in
2013,38 and his older half-brother Kim Jong-nam, brazenly killed with a nerve agent at
Kuala Lumpur International Airport in 2017. Kim Jong-un rules via a resuscitated Workers’
Party of Korea (WPK) rather than the generals favoured under his father Kim Jong-il. A
hallmark of Kim Jong-un’s rule are frequent large formal meetings, often with lengthy
speeches where he sets tasks: admitting some Kim Jong-un attends a meeting of the Workers’
problems but mostly haranguing. The style Party of Korea in Pyongyang, 26 February 2022
deliberately recalls his grandfather, North

Korea’s founding leader Kim Il-sung.
Early hopes that a new, young and
foreign-educated leader would bring change
to North Korean policies have been dashed.
WMD programmes have continued and
accelerated, while the reforms essential to
revive the economy are lacking (indeed, the
word ‘reform’ remains forbidden). Some
40 years after China and Vietnam began to
explore how adding market elements to their
economies could yield fast growth while
(Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
preserving party rule, the DPRK remains in denial. Though the DPRK no longer has a
fully centrally planned system since famine in the 1990s forced the regime to tacitly permit
de facto market activities, the latter are chronically insecure. Unlike the slogan associated
with China’s former leader Deng Xiaoping, no Kim has ever proclaimed that ‘to get rich
is glorious’. Since 2021 even small steps towards change have been rolled back, with Kim
re-establishing state control.39 None of this works, nor ever can. In 2022, amid an acknowl-
edged food crisis, the declared priority is agriculture. Yet collective farms remain in place,
with only limited and unclear incentives for ‘sub-work teams’ (code for families). This situ-
ation cannot possibly yield transformative results.
Two further factors exacerbate North Korea’s systemic economic problems. One is
regular flooding and other damage caused by summer typhoons; 2020 was an especially
bad year in these respects.40 The other is COVID-19, or rather the regime’s draconian
response.41 In January 2020 the DPRK closed its land borders, even to goods. Trade, already
limited, all but ceased.42 In early 2022 North Korea still claimed to have no coronavirus
cases, though some reports challenged this,43 and the regime’s public-health measures
suggest a state combating an extant threat rather than keeping it at bay. It is also one of
only two countries (Eritrea is the other) not to have administered any vaccines. While the
exact medical situation is unclear, the economic impact is undoubted. In early 2022 – for
the first time in two years – goods trains crossed the Yalu River between Sinuiju in North
Korea and Dandong in China. It remains to be seen how soon full-scale trade will resume
and how far this will go towards improving living conditions.44
In his first public speech as leader in April 2012, Kim pledged that his people would ‘not
tighten their belts again’.45 That statement was a hostage to fortune. Two subsequent five-
year plans proclaimed in 2016 and 2021 remain unpublished.46 Kim has admitted that the
former failed.47 Reports in October 2021 claimed that citizens are now being told to tighten
their belts until 2025.48 The government blames these privations on natural disasters, the
coronavirus pandemic and international sanctions. Sanctions have certainly compounded
suffering in North Korea, but its root cause is a failed political and economic system.
BIGGER, BETTER AND MORE DIVERSE MISSILES

Kim’s signal and fateful achievement has been to fulfil the WMD ambitions begun by his
grandfather and continued by his father. In particular, he has transformed a previously
abstract nuclear threat that allowed complacency – ‘they have the bomb but can’t deliver
it’ (and therefore no great cause for alarm) – into a clear and present danger by hugely
advancing the DPRK’s missile programme. This now includes ICBMs deemed capable of
striking anywhere in the continental US, as well as newer weapons that challenge existing
missile defences.49
Four of North Korea’s six nuclear tests to date have taken place under Kim Jong-un: the
first in 2013 and the rest during 2016–17. The latter two years saw intense missile testing too,
revealing an ICBM capability for the first time. Also tested was a new US president, who
riposted with rhetorical volleys of his own. The insults they traded – ‘dotard’, ‘little rocket
man’50 – were puerile but the tension was real.51 In November 2017 Kim declared a mora-
torium on ICBM and nuclear tests that lasted until March 2022. However, testing never
stopped for short-range missiles and other

An image provided by the North Korean government showing a
weapons, such as multiple rocket launchers, missile test launched from a train, North Korea, 15 September 2021
raising concern in Seoul and Tokyo if not in
Trump’s self-centred Washington.
A fresh phase of launches began in
September 2021. These included two ballistic
missiles launched in one event from a
train-mobile system and, in October, a new
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
(see Table 4.1).52 The pace quickened in
January 2022 and continued in March after
a brief pause during the Beijing Winter
Olympic Games.
In March 2022 the focus shifted to ICBMs.
Following two launches officially described (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, File)
as space-related but which US official state-

ments assessed to be partial initial tests of the An image distributed by Pyongyang showing what it claimed
was a test-firing of a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic
Hwasong-17 ICBM, an unreported but widely missile at an undisclosed location in North Korea in March 2022
witnessed explosion near Pyongyang airport
on 16 March53 may have been a failed launch
of a Hwasong-17. On 24 March Pyongyang
announced a successful Hwasong-17 launch
the previous day and issued an unusual
movie-style video.54 Outside analysts believe
that glitzy edits to the video covered up the
fact that the launch did not really involve a
Hwasong-17 but rather a disguised and previ-
ously tested Hwasong-15; Kim could not take
the chance of a second failure.55 If that is so,
more tests of a real Hwasong-17 ICBM can
be expected. It was claimed that the missile
reached an altitude of 6,248.5 kilometres and
had a lateral range of 1,090 km.56 (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, File)
Much of North Korea’s new missile
arsenal was foreshadowed in Kim’s speech
at the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021,57 which laid out plans for future weapons
development. Belying hopes that this was an abstract or long-term wish list, several kinds
of projectile mentioned by Kim have since been unveiled, including hypersonic, cruise and
submarine-launched missiles. The fear is that other items Kim specified may also be in
the works; these include a nuclear-powered submarine, ‘solid-fuel engine-propelled inter-
continental underwater and ground ballistic rockets’, a military reconnaissance satellite
‘in the near future’, reconnaissance drones and (ominously) both ‘super-sized’ and smaller
tactical nuclear warheads.58
Multiple targets
Kim Jong-un speaks in front of what the North Korean
Decoding Pyongyang’s purposes requires government reported was an ICBM, Pyongyang, 11 October 2021
precision. ‘Attention-seeking’ – the verdict of
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken59 – is
insufficiently exact. US National Intelligence
Officer for North Korea Sydney Seiler has
suggested that such missile launches serve
goals relating to development and demon-
stration, as well as diplomatic and domestic
goals.60 The challenge is to assess the balance
among these goals at any given juncture.
They may also interact.
Development and demonstration are
linked. Pyongyang must test to ensure
its missiles work – and let its enemies see (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, File)
that they do. In September 2021, analysts

An image provided by the North Korean government showing what
wondered how these new missiles enhanced
it said was a test-firing of a tactical guided missile on 17 January 2022
the DPRK’s existing deterrent.61 By January
2022, consensus had grown that some new
weapons were indeed game changers.62
Another aim is to demonstrate oper-
ational readiness. The two launches from
train-mobile systems in January were carried
out at short notice.63 While some interpreted
this as a swift riposte to US sanctions imposed
two days earlier, it is just as plausible that
January’s entire schedule was pre-planned to
test a variety of weapons and situations.
Demonstration also links to diplomacy, in
ways more subtle than the frequent presump-
tion that everything North Korea does aims
to get Washington’s attention. Pyongyang’s
propaganda is often big on menace and (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)
bluster; on this occasion, it was not. Most offi-
cial reporting was factual and professional, portraying a responsible state doing nothing
untoward. That was especially so for the IRBM launch on 30 January. Earlier Hwasong-12
tests, for example in 2017 at the height of ‘fire and fury’, overflew Japan.64 Pyongyang also
threatened to target waters near Guam.65 In January 2022, the rocket was lofted vertically
out of ‘consideration [for] neighbouring countries’ and sent images back from space in what
was billed as a routine evaluation test.66
Seiler’s ‘domestic’ category is also relevant. In October 2021, many recently tested systems
– and others hitherto undisclosed – were displayed in Pyongyang at the so-called ‘Defense
Development Exhibition Self-Defense 2021’. Unlike South Korea’s simultaneous International
Table 4.1: North Korean ballistic-missile launches, 2021–22
Year Date Type Classification Distance Altitude Outcome Comments

(local) (km) (km)
2022 7 May KN-23 (Mod 2) (Suspected) SLBM (SRBM) 600 60 Success
4 May Hwasong-17 (Suspected) Unconfirmed 470 780 Unconfirmed
16 Apr Unnamed SRBM SRBM Success ‘New tactical guided missile'

110 25
Unnamed SRBM SRBM Success
24 Mar Hwasong-15 (reported) ICBM >1,000 >6,200 Success Claimed to be Hwasong-17
16 Mar Hwasong-17 (suspected) ICBM - 20 Failure
04 Mar Hwasong-17 (reported) ICBM 270 560 Success Claimed reconnaissance satellite test
26 Feb Hwasong-17 (reported) ICBM 300 620 Success Claimed reconnaissance satellite test
30 Jan Hwasong-12 IRBM 800 2,000 Success
27 Jan KN-23 SRBM Success

190 20
KN-23 SRBM Success
17 Jan KN-24 SRBM Success

370 42
KN-24 SRBM Success
14 Jan KN-23 SRBM Success Rail mobile

430 36
KN-23 SRBM Success
11 Jan Unnamed MaRV Unconfirmed 1,000 60 Success Claimed HGV
05 Jan Unnamed MaRV Unconfirmed >700 50 Success Claimed HGV
2021 19 Oct KN-23 (Mod 2) SLBM (SRBM) 590 60 Unconfirmed SLBM based on KN-23
28 Sep Hwasong-8 with HGV Unconfirmed <200 60 Unconfirmed Claimed HGV
15 Sep KN-23 SRBM Success Rail mobile

800 60
KN-23 SRBM Success
25 Mar KN-23 (mod) SRBM Success

600 50
KN-23 (mod) SRBM Success
KEY: SRBM: short-range ballistic missile; ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile; IRBM: intermediate-range ballistic missile; SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile;
HGV: hypersonic glide vehicle; MaRV: manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle.
Source: IISS
Aerospace and Defence Exhibition (ADEX), which is a regular biennial arms fair,67 no
foreigners were invited and no business transacted. (UNSC sanctions have long banned
all DPRK weapons sales.) Although this unprecedented show was intended for domestic
consumption, it was also reported on and pictured in detail for an international audience.68
Fostering pride was one aim of the defence exhibition. Kim praised ‘the military
hardware displayed in fine array … . The more we stroke them and the more we see
them, the greater dignity and pride we feel and the more valuable we feel they are;
they are ours.’69 Pride has a price. A closing speech on 22 October by Kim’s close aide
Pak Jong-chon called achievements so far a mere ‘springboard’ to the second stage of
what Kim described as the ‘do-or-die revolution in the defence industry’.70 Both stressed
the sacrifices required; Pak even termed this the ‘start of a new forced march’.71 That is
bad news not only for ordinary North Koreans but also for anyone who believed Kim’s
comment following November 2017’s ICBM test that the DPRK had ‘finally realized the
great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force’.72 Far from it: there is much
more to come.
The flurry of tests in January 2022 also suggests a fifth goal: distraction. The timing
seemed odd given harsh winter conditions and the fact that the US was focused on the
Ukraine crisis. Yet perhaps testing in these circumstances was actually the point, demon-
strating that freezing conditions were no obstacle to seizing an opportunity while
Washington was distracted by events elsewhere. Kim may not expect much from US
President Joe Biden. The UNSC’s silence, a bonus he might not have anticipated, was diplo-
matic victory enough. Moreover, in the current climate it is possible that neither China nor
Russia minds Kim staging a sideshow that creates fresh headaches for the US.73
A final goal is deterrence. Though more often seen as the object of deterrence, for North
Korea itself to feel threatened and cite self-defence is not wholly specious. Moon Jae-in
talked of peace but he also increased the ROK’s defence spending faster than his conserva-
tive predecessors.74 He had several motives, the DPRK threat being but one. In September
2021 South Korea conducted its own mini-flurry of missile tests, coinciding with the Seoul
ADEX.75 Though Pyongyang mocked Seoul’s efforts and equipment, such as its SLBM,76
it must worry about its far richer sibling, which vastly outspends it and is allied to the
mightiest country on Earth. Some analysts see the Korean Peninsula’s burgeoning arms
race as not wholly driven by the DPRK, despite Seoul’s assertions that its procurement and
defence spending are focused on self-defence.77
It remains unclear what precisely Kim wants from Washington. During Trump’s
presidency the DPRK was notably reluctant to move from vague pledges to the detailed
working-level talks that constitute serious negotiation. The Biden administration has said it
is open to talks while offering no specific innovative proposals.78 Facing numerous foreign-
policy challenges elsewhere, in practice this stance begins to resemble Barack Obama’s
‘strategic patience’,79 which was seen by critics as tantamount to inaction. If Biden was
galvanised into giving Pyongyang higher priority, the US would need to work out what
Kim seeks, what form any talks should take and at what level they should be held, and
how some common ground might be found.
STATE CRIMINALITY UPDATED: THE DPRK CYBER THREAT

The DPRK’s unrelenting pursuit of WMD, going far beyond any defensive needs, contra-
dicts Kim’s disingenuous claim that ‘our arch-enemy is … war itself, not south Korea,
the United States or any other specific state or forces’. (He had just called South Korea
‘avaricious … double-dealing, illogical and brigandish’.)80 If Pyongyang’s record did not
already disprove such hollow assurances, they are further undermined by a fresh threat:
cyber crime.
In February 2021, the US Department of Justice indicted three North Koreans for
multiple cyber crimes, including the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures and the 2017 WannaCry
Table 4.2: US official reporting of North Korea’s criminal cyber activities, 2017–22
Date Description Date Description
18 Apr 2022 The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 2 Oct 2018 CISA, the DHS, the US Treasury Department and the
Agency (CISA), the FBI and the US Treasury FBI publish a technical alert detailing a North Korean
Department report cryptocurrency thefts and ATM cash-out scheme active since at least late 2016
tactics used by North Korean state-sponsored against banks in Africa and Asia. In one incident in
advanced persistent threat (APT) ‘Lazarus Group’ 2017, state-sponsored actors could draw cash from
against various entities in the blockchain- over 30 countries
technology and cryptocurrency industries
9 Aug 2018 The DHS and the FBI identify a Trojan malware
17 Feb 2021 CISA, the FBI and the US Treasury report that APT variant used by the North Korean government
Lazarus Group or the North Korean government
targeted individuals and companies, including 14 Jun 2018 The DHS and the FBI identify a Trojan malware
cryptocurrency exchanges and financial-service variant used by the North Korean government
companies, in over 30 countries during 2020
29 May 2018 The DHS and the FBI publish a technical alert
27 Oct 2020 CISA, the FBI and the US Cyber Command Cyber detailing two families of malware used by the North
National Mission Force release a report detailing Korean government since at least 2009 to target
global intelligence-gathering activity by North entities worldwide – including in the US – in media
Korean APT ‘Kimsuky’ against targets such as and the aerospace, financial and other critical-
individual experts, think tanks and South Korean infrastructure sectors
government entities
28 Mar 2018 The DHS and the FBI identify a Trojan malware
26 Aug 2020 CISA, the FBI, the US Treasury and US Cyber variant used by the North Korean government
Command publish a technical alert detailing a
North Korean cash-out scheme using automated 13 Feb 2018 The DHS and the FBI identify a Trojan malware
teller machines (ATM) and remote access tools variant used by the North Korean government
19 Aug 2020 CISA and the FBI identify a new malware variant – 21 Dec 2017 The DHS and the FBI identify a Trojan malware
used by a threat group associated with the North variant used by the North Korean government
Korean government – targeting US government
14 Nov 2017 The DHS and the FBI publish a technical alert
contractors for intelligence relating to key military
identifying a malware used by the North Korean
and energy technologies
government since 2016 to target the aerospace,
12 May 2020 CISA, the FBI and the Department of Defense (DoD) telecommunications and finance industries; another
publish three reports detailing three malware malware identified is reported to have been used
variants used by the North Korean government by North Korean actors since 2013 to target the
– one of which is used to target cryptocurrency US government and the financial, automotive and
exchanges and related entities media industries
15 Apr 2020 The State Department, Treasury Department, 23 Aug 2017 The DHS releases a report detailing a malware
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and variant used to manage North Korea’s distributed
the FBI issue a comprehensive advisory detailing denial-of-service botnet infrastructure
the North Korean government’s reliance on
13 Jun 2017 The DHS and the FBI report on tools and
global cyber crime – especially targeting financial
infrastructure used by North Korean government
institutions worldwide – to fund its ballistic-missile
actors to target media, aerospace, financial and
and nuclear programmes
critical-infrastructure sectors globally, including in
14 Feb 2020 CISA, the FBI and the DoD identify seven malware the US
variants used by the North Korean government
12 May 2017 The DHS, the National Cybersecurity and
9 Sep 2019 CISA, the FBI and the DoD identify two malware Communications Integration Centre and the
variants used by the North Korean government FBI release a joint alert regarding WannaCry
ransomware
Source: US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, cisa.gov

ransomware attacks.81 In February 2021, the US assistant attorney general for national secu-
rity, John Demers, bluntly called North Korea ‘the world’s leading 21st-century nation-state
bank robbers’.82
As that characterisation suggests, North Korean cyber crime goes far beyond using
cyber attacks as a weapon for political purposes. The devastating assault on Sony was
widely seen as revenge for The Interview: a comedy caper in which Kim Jong-un is assassi-
nated.83 Many states engage in unacknowledged ‘black ops’, whose toolkit includes cyber
weapons. Yet most DPRK cyber crime has no such direct political dimension; it is sheer
theft (see Table 4.2). Besides ransomware, Demers cited heists from banks on four conti-
nents, targeting over US$1.2 billion, ‘using keyboards rather than guns, stealing digital
wallets of cryptocurrency instead of sacks of cash’. In his judgement, this ‘regime has
become a criminal syndicate with a flag’.84 More recently, in April 2022 the US attributed a
single cryptocurrency heist worth US$615 million to DPRK state actors.85
Demers’s phrasing ‘has become’ implies something new. To be sure, the means are
novel, using technology unavailable in the past. Yet Pyongyang’s wider criminal procliv-
ities stretch back more than four decades and have included smuggling (alcohol, ivory
and much else), trafficking drugs including heroin and methamphetamines, counter-
feiting (pharmaceuticals, cigarettes, even US$100 bills) and insurance fraud. Most of these
activities have ceased in the past decade as cyberspace offers richer pickings and greater
convenience with much lower risk.86
This persistent pattern of criminality, unique for a nation-state, is oddly under-
acknowledged. Many prefer to de-emphasise or even deny it. North Korea’s WMD
programmes and its human-rights abuses87 have long commanded more policy attention
than its criminality. In 2022, such neglect looks mistaken on two counts. The first is
expressed in a 2021 Foreign Policy headline: ‘While North Korean Missiles Sit in Storage,
Their Hackers Go Rampant.’88 Pyongyang’s WMD threat is ghastly but hypothetical; its
cyber menace is real and active. The second is related to a wider, pessimistic lesson. How
can a regime that engages in bare-faced criminality be trusted to negotiate seriously over
WMD, much less give them up? If dialogue with the DPRK is to be worthwhile, cyber crime
must go on the agenda with a view to stopping it. South Korea, the DPRK’s original and
primary target, is a case in point. The DPRK’s cyber attacks, relentless for two decades,89
continued even during 2018’s thaw in relations. That year’s accords did not mention the
cyber domain. Worse, local cyber-security firms felt reluctant to publicise the continuing
onslaught ‘considering Seoul’s latest push for peaceful reconciliation’.90
There are two reasons why interlocutors are loath to raise this issue. The first is that
some of them conduct their own covert cyber activities and are mindful that Pyongyang
(which of course pleads innocence) could point its finger in return.91 Secondly, the multiple
concerns relating to North Korea have to be prioritised and sequenced. Hitherto the nuclear
realm loomed largest for obvious reasons, causing other issues – notably human rights – to
be de-emphasised.92 However, the cyber menace from Pyongyang provides a compelling
reason to rethink the full extent of the North Korean threat holistically, considering how its
various elements interact. Some linkages are possibly direct: for example, proceeds from
cyber theft may be funding WMD programmes.93
MOTIVATION: HOW FAR WOULD KIM GO?

Why does North Korea behave as it does? And how far might Kim go? These questions
cannot be answered definitively: a spectrum of theories exists. At one end, the view that
the DPRK is unjustly demonised remains surprisingly persistent but is hardly convinc-
ing.94 Another relatively optimistic view posits self-defence as the regime’s main goal.
If that were true then in principle international concerns could be addressed. Yet Kim’s
weapons-development plans, steadily being realised, go far beyond what defending his
realm requires.95
At the opposite extreme, tabloid clichés portray Kim as a sinister James Bond villain,
plotting global domination by devising mighty weapons to blackmail the world. This
perspective exaggerates the DPRK’s power and reach: it is a poor country impover-
ishing itself further by prioritising WMD. A more plausible concern is local rather than
global: does Pyongyang still dream of taking over South Korea? Some observers believe
so, arguing variously that fidelity to the aims of Kim Il-sung, ideological imperatives or
ethno-nationalism render this an abiding and seriously pursued goal.96
Between these extremes, most observers see a regime bent on self-preservation rather
than driven by ideology – cognisant that it cannot swallow South Korea, much less
digest it97 – but with a blinkered vision of what futures are possible. Taking autonomy
to extremes, the DPRK chooses to operate on the fringes of the international system and
sometimes outside the law. Long ago, Kim Il-sung prioritised guns over butter.98 Kim
Jong-il continued this approach and Kim Jong-un is taking it to alarming new heights. All
three Kims have shared a propensity to do whatever they can get away with. Therefore, the
deterrence that has kept an uneasy peace on the Korean Peninsula since 1953 will remain
vital. The challenge for interlocutors is to combine upholding deterrence with incentives
for Pyongyang to seek a better path. Such incentives will not be easy to devise.
PROSPECTS FOR KIM’S SECOND DECADE AND BEYOND

Predicting North Korea’s future is fraught with complexity. One safe comment is that, for
Kim, the current international situation is excellent and will only get better. Instead of the
DPRK being the odd one out and under pressure to adapt to global norms, if anything
the rest of the world is becoming more like North Korea. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s
undoing of past domestic reforms so he can rule for life is one example.
Such trends well suit a loner regime, long suspicious of multilateralism. As US–China
tensions grow and increasingly threaten the post-Cold War geopolitical order and the
geo-economic structures (such as supply chains) forged by globalisation, the prospect of ‘a
prolonged period of strategic contestation’ – as an IISS study forecasts – suits Pyongyang
very well.99 In particular, the collapse of any semblance of superpower unity on North
Korea can only enhance Kim’s freedom of manoeuvre.
It is possible to imagine darker scenarios. Should a major conflict break out elsewhere
– in the Taiwan Strait for instance – Kim might take advantage of this development and
consequent US distraction to escalate his own provocations. In recent years these have
been mainly symbolic100 but it would be in character for the DPRK to seek to test US ‘red
lines’ and, indeed, those of the new South Korean administration. Possibilities include a
resumption of nuclear testing, or missile launches too close for comfort to the US.101 The
ICBM test on 24 March was a warning, albeit in that case the missile was lofted vertically
so as not even to overfly Japan (unlike in 2017). Future North Korean ICBM launches may
appear more threatening. The risk of overreach and miscalculation is ever-present, though
mercifully avoided so far. Rising tensions in 2017 prompted a leading nuclear expert to
pen a ‘speculative novel’ warning how these developments could potentially precipitate
an actual nuclear war between the US and the DPRK, with apocalyptic consequences for
both countries.102
Meanwhile, electoral cycles have changed the guard in Seoul. In 2024, they may do so
in Washington. All new South Korean presidents attempt some form of outreach to the
North, and Yoon Suk-yeol is unlikely to be an exception. However, having seen how Kim
treated Moon, no future ROK leader will commit much political capital to Pyongyang.
More ominously, were the DPRK to try anything like 2010’s sinking of the ROK Navy
corvette Cheonan, South Korean opinion might demand a counterstrike, which Washington
may be unable to prevent. In increasingly febrile times and with old alliances strained, it
cannot be guaranteed that cool heads and caution will prevail.
It remains to be seen whether the latest DPRK missile volleys will elicit a reaction from
Washington and, if so, what form this will take. In any case, if the Democrats lose the mid-term
elections in November 2022, which seems likely, Biden will be even less inclined to engage
Pyongyang. A Republican-controlled Congress would surely oppose further engagement.
(How it would react if a second-term Donald Trump did the same is another matter.) The
potential return of Trump in 2025 is a wild card for the Korean Peninsula. During his pres-
idency, he expanded the boundaries
of what was
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Yoon Suk-yeol, then South Korean president-

elect, talks with US and South Korean soldiers
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deemed possible or desirable in the realms of rhetoric and policy in two opposite direc-
tions: mocking ‘little rocket man’ and threatening ‘fire and fury’ in 2017 when North Korea
launched its largest ICBMs, before abruptly changing gear in 2018 to become the first serving
US president to meet a DPRK leader – with whom he developed an odd ‘bromance’.103 It is
difficult to predict how Trump’s approach would evolve if he is re-elected. Threatening fire
and fury would be even more perilous in the current climate. A new Trump–Kim summit
(their fourth) could create possibilities provided Trump does not waste them, as he did on
previous occasions by lurching in contrary directions.
Though humiliated when Trump walked out of their talks in Hanoi, months later Kim
accepted Trump’s invitation to meet briefly at Panmunjom. By 2025 the North Korean
leader may be ready for something more substantial: the DPRK’s economic woes will not
improve and Kim could use a counterweight to China. So far he has departed from his
father and grandfather’s practice of playing off powers against each other. Kim Il-sung
manoeuvred skilfully in the Sino-Soviet dispute, while Kim Jong-il encouraged South
Korean president Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine’ policy (for a time, inter-Korean trade rivalled
China–DPRK trade volumes).104 It is puzzling and perhaps a misstep that Kim Jong-un did
not use Moon’s deep reservoirs of goodwill to offer Seoul at least some small concession:
family reunions would have sufficed. It could be that Kim was counting on success in his
meeting with Trump in Hanoi and had no alternative plan if that failed.
The DPRK has become overwhelmingly reliant economically on China. Russian diplo-
matic support is not matched by financial aid; only in 2012 did Russia agree to write off
US$10bn in debts dating from the Soviet era.105 Then again, Moscow now has surplus oil
and gas and might choose to reward one of its very few remaining allies.106
The DPRK’s dependence on China might be a deliberate choice. With Chinese power
and Sino-American tensions both rising, Kim may deem Beijing his best bet. Indeed, China
exerts no pressure on human rights; tolerates North Korea’s WMD and missile tests, as
long as these are not too destabilising; and, above all, offers the implicit reassurance that
Xi will not allow Kim’s regime to collapse. By contrast, engaging with the West brings tire-
some conditionalities and challenges.
Yet depending so completely on China carries risk for North Korea. It gives Xi instru-
ments that could be used to squeeze Pyongyang, especially economically. (At least once
in the past China has briefly cut off oil supplies to show its disapproval of DPRK behav-
iour.)107 The question now is in what future circumstances Beijing might use its power. One
way might be to set a WMD ‘red line’ – for example, missile tests are tolerable but nuclear
tests less so, since they alarm the Chinese public (tremors can be felt in border areas) and
strengthen those in Seoul and Tokyo who want South Korea and Japan, respectively, to
have their own nuclear deterrents. When Kim decides he needs a seventh nuclear test,
China may bridle – privately rather than publicly, if he is lucky.
In addition, China may not prop up North Korea indefinitely, even if it can afford to
do so. Evolving China–DPRK trade patterns over time illustrate Beijing’s efforts, briefly
successful, to transform one-sided mendicancy into mutual benefit by expanding North
Korean mineral exports.108 And Xi will not have forgotten that Kim had Jang Song-thaek,
who oversaw this positive period, executed (Kim blamed him for selling off national assets
to ‘a foreign country’109). For almost four decades, North Korea’s perverse refusal to be
economically sensible has riled successive Chinese leaders from Deng Xiaoping onwards.110
China’s bullet trains and motorways now reach the border at Dandong, where a Chinese-
built and -financed bridge across the Yalu River, costing US$350m, was finished in 2014 yet
still stands unused.111 Until 2019 it ended in a field on the DPRK side near Sinuiju.112 Even
now, the road from Sinuiju to Pyongyang is not fully paved.
It is hard to imagine China tolerating such recalcitrance forever. Beijing may also worry
about an impoverished North Korean population growing restive, risking instability. Hence
Xi is likely to press Kim to modernise North Korea’s economy so that it becomes more like
China’s. If Kim remains reluctant, others in Pyongyang may prove more receptive. Either
way, North Korea is now China’s problem: no other power wields any effective influence.
That stark message is unpalatable, especially in Seoul, but the question is whether any
alternative future can still be engineered.
It might just be possible. There is no love lost between North Korea and China. If
Kim jibs at the prospect of indefinite de facto vassalage – embarrassingly akin to impe-
rial China’s traditional hegemony over the Korean Peninsula – in principle he still has the
option of reaching out to other powers. In practice, after a long litany of deceptions and
disappointments, the question is whether Kim can offer any credible basis for fresh negoti-
ations. Arms-reduction talks are one possibility, in theory.113 However, the problem is that
the DPRK will never agree to denuclearise completely; Western interlocutors still refuse to
acknowledge this reality.
Eventually, however, reality must be acknowledged, as with the three other non-NPT
nuclear powers (India, Israel and Pakistan). In a more Hobbesian world, even democratic
countries may pursue their goals with less heed to alliances or international law. If Japan,
South Korea or the US sees a chance to loosen China’s grip on Pyongyang, they may take
it, in concert or individually. This need not mean a retreat on WMD. One potential opening
is the recent suggestion that it advances US national interest to offer North Korea corona-
virus vaccines because an unvaccinated country poses a health risk to others as a potential
breeding ground for new variants.114 It is conceivable that such an offer could be made,
given sufficient imagination in Washington. However, any future progress on developing
links with Pyongyang – and thereby reducing China’s influence there – may mean tacitly
accepting the DPRK nuclear fait accompli.
The dilemma is most acute for South Korea. Since the ROK’s constitution claims sover-
eignty over the entire Korean Peninsula, seeing the DPRK fall under Chinese sway is
challenging in many ways. Hence despite the unpromising history of North–South ties,
future leaders in Seoul may still attempt outreach to Pyongyang. Meanwhile, they will
certainly also boost their own state’s deterrent posture. Most South Koreans have long
supported the ROK having its own nuclear weapons; the DPRK’s latest missile tests and
Russia’s invasion of non-nuclear Ukraine have reanimated debate on this topic.115
KIM JONG-UN’S HEALTH AS A RISK FACTOR

A further, quite different factor potentially affecting North Korea’s future is the health of its
leader. Though young, Kim is morbidly obese and, contrary to DPRK law, smokes in public.
His father and grandfather both died of heart Kim Jong-un and his sister, Kim Yo-jong, attend an inter-
Korean summit, Panmunjom, South Korea, 27 April 2018
conditions, albeit aged 69 and 82 respectively.
In 2014 Kim reappeared walking with a cane
after five weeks’ unexplained absence.116
Another temporary disappearance in 2020
may have been for a heart procedure, though
the facts are unclear.117
These matters are more than tabloid
fodder. The DPRK has set the bar very high
for who may legitimately lead it. Having
abandoned bureaucratic selection in favour
of hereditary succession, the ‘Mount Paektu
bloodline’ – biological descent from Kim (Pool/Getty Images)
Il-sung – is now a prerequisite. This narrows
the field. Should anything befall Kim, it is unclear who would succeed him: he has children
but they are very young. With the potential for power struggles, North Korea’s next succes-
sion could be a dangerous moment for the Korean Peninsula and beyond.
Such topics are taboo inside North Korea, yet there are signs the regime recognises the
risk. In 2021 Kim visibly lost weight.118 Also of note is the increasing prominence of his
sister Kim Yo-jong; since 2019 she has become a spokesperson on relations with the US and
South Korea and attended key national events, including missile launches.119 Yet gender
prejudice pervades the DPRK and a female leader may be hard for some to swallow.
No doubt Japan, South Korea, the US and others maintain contingency plans – updated
since the 1990s, when the DPRK’s collapse was widely expected – for sudden disconti-
nuities in North Korea.120 In particular, the issue of securing its nuclear weapons would
become urgent if the power structure in Pyongyang became uncertain or contested.
One complication is that China too has a legitimate interest in such matters.
Unfortunately, even in better times there is no evidence that US–China or ROK–China rela-
tions were ever such that this eventuality could be discussed, much less a joint plan of action
agreed. Absent such a plan, the dangers and uncertainties of discontinuity in Pyongyang
would be compounded by the alarming prospect of China and the US confronting each
other militarily on the Korean Peninsula – as they did 70 years ago, when their respective
strengths were very different.
For some North Koreans, Kim’s death or incapacitation might seem an unprecedented
opportunity. The DPRK has accomplished two outwardly smooth successions – no mean
feat – but the next will be far harder. Not only is there no obvious successor, but a long-
suffering and more knowing population, sick of privation and oppression and aware that
people in other countries nearby live much better, may at last find its voice.121 Though
anticipation that North Korea might ‘collapse’ was premature in its 1990s heyday, the
alienation and popular cynicism that ultimately rendered Eastern European communist
regimes brittle is also likely to take root in the DPRK if nothing improves.122 Tellingly, the
regime sees young people as a problem, berating and punishing them for adopting South
Korean slang and hairstyles. Moreover, pirated ROK media must still be finding their way
into the DPRK, despite draconian penalties – reportedly including execution – for those
involved in their circulation.123
As for the DPRK elite, despite the striking invisibility of overt factions it is not hard
to imagine the contours of future debate in Pyongyang – which may have already begun
behind closed doors – about how a North Korea genuinely seeking prosperity should
proceed, and in particular how it should align itself regionally and internationally. North
Korea’s situation today partially resembles the twilight of Korea’s Joseon dynasty in
the late nineteenth century, when China, Japan and Russia had their partisans at court.
Today neither Japan nor Russia has any significant influence on the Korean Peninsula;
the main question for North Korea would be whether to cleave to China or South Korea,
with the latter option not necessarily entailing immediate unification. (A decade ago, one
fictional scenario posited a future where Seoul called the shots behind the scenes in a still
separate North.124)
Quite possibly none of these scenarios will occur. Kim may live until 2050 or longer,
with his son eventually succeeding him. However, by then China may have used its
economic leverage to ensure that the DPRK reforms, thereby generating modest prosperity
and a degree of personal (but not political) freedom. Beijing might also find some way to
tackle and neutralise the North’s WMD. None of this will be easy, but Kim may see that
he has no other realistic choice, for his country’s future and indeed his own (fearing that
otherwise China might seek a more pliable alternative leader for North Korea).
CONCLUSION
In 2022, candour on North Korea is long overdue. Global policy on the DPRK has compre-
hensively failed. Neither intermittent negotiations nor ever-tighter sanctions have stopped
Pyongyang from first getting the bomb, then continuously building its nuclear and missile
arsenal. Nor have outside policies helped ordinary North Koreans to become more pros-
perous or freer. Meanwhile, the capacity of South Korea, the US and their allies and
partners to influence North Korea has declined, while China’s sway there has grown.
If the US and South Korea wish to challenge China’s hegemony over the DPRK,
they must be more flexible in engaging Pyongyang, offering stronger incentives since
punishments have proved ineffectual. This approach might be unpalatable and risk
moral hazard. Yet the old cycle of WMD tests provoking censure and sanctions, which
in turn beget more WMD tests, achieved little or nothing and has now broken down.
Alternatives need to be found if the West and other concerned powers wish to have any
influence on North Korea’s future.
NOTES
1 Martyn Williams, ‘KCTV Production of the 2 See Mitch Shin, ‘Why Is North Korea Launching
New Year’s Eve Event’, North Korea Tech, 4 So Many Missiles?’, Diplomat, 19 October 2021,
January 2022, https://www.northkoreatech. https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/why-is-north-
org/2022/01/04/kctv-production-of-the-new- korea-launching-so-many-missiles/.
years-eve-event/. 3 For a summary analysis, see Tianran Xu,
‘January 2022: Missile Tests of the DPRK’, Open in IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment
Nuclear Network, 1 February 2022, https:// 2020: Key Developments and Trends (London:
oneearthfuture.org/research-analysis/january- IISS, 2020), pp. 57–70, 60.
2022-missile-tests-dprk. 11 Puzzlingly, one of them, India, days later
4 In UNSC Resolution 1718 (14 October 2016). joined its fellow ‘Quad’ members (Australia,
This gave its name to a committee tasked Japan and the US) in condemning ‘North
with monitoring enforcement of sanctions Korea’s destabilising ballistic missile launches
against the DPRK. See Security Council in violation of UN Security Council resolu-
Report, ‘Fact Sheet on the 1718 Democratic tions’ and reaffirming ‘our commitment to the
People’s Republic of Korea Sanctions complete denuclearisation of North Korea’.
Committee (2006)’, 9 June 2020, https://www. See India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Joint
securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF- Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Australia,
CF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/ India and Japan and the Secretary of State
dprk-north-korea-sanctions-fact-sheet.pdf. of the United States Following the 4th Quad
5 The nine major UNSC resolutions (all unan- Foreign Ministers’ Meeting’, 11 February 2022,
imous) passed between 2006 and 2017 and https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.
their main provisions are summarised at ‘UN htm?dtl/34854/joint+statement+by+the+for-
Security Council Resolutions on North Korea’, eign+ministers+of+australia+india+and+-
January 2022, Arms Control Association, https:// japan+and+the+secretary+of+state+of+the+unit-
www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security- ed+states+following+the+4th+quad+fore-
Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea. ign+ministers+meeting.
6 US Mission to the UN, ‘Joint Statement on the 12 John Everard, ‘The UN Has Little Appetite
January 5 Democratic People’s Republic of for More Sanctions, and North Korea Knows
Korea’s Ballistic Missile Launch’, 10 January It’, NK News, 8 February 2022, https://www.
2022, https://usun.usmission.gov/joint-state- nknews.org/2022/02/the-un-has-little-appetite-
ment-on-the-january-5-democratic-peoples-re- for-more-sanctions-and-north-korea-knows-it/.
public-of-koreas-ballistic-missile-launch/. 13 Simon Tisdall, ‘Wikileaks Cables Reveal China
7 US Mission to the UN, ‘Joint Statement on the “Ready to Abandon North Korea”’, Guardian, 29
January 11, 14, and 17 Democratic People’s November 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/
Republic of Korea’s Ballistic Missile Launch’, world/2010/nov/29/wikileaks-cables-china-re-
20 January 2022, https://usun.usmission.gov/ unified-korea.
joint-statement-on-the-january-11-14-and-17- 14 Among a large literature, a still valuable over-
democratic-peoples-republic-of-koreas-ballistic- view is Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North
missile-launch/. Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security,
8 US Mission to the UN, ‘Joint Statement on the IISS Adelphi 418 (Abingdon: Routledge for the
January 30 Democratic People’s Republic of IISS, 2011). For more recent times, see Ankit
Korea’s Ballistic Missile Launch’, 4 February Panda, Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and
2022, https://usun.usmission.gov/joint-state- Deterrence in North Korea (London: Hurst, 2020).
ment-on-the-january-30-democratic-peoples-re- 15 For a detailed timeline from 1985 through 2020,
public-of-koreas-ballistic-missile-launch/. see Arms Control Association, ‘Chronology
9 See ‘China, Russia Block US Bid to Sanction of US–North Korean Nuclear and Missile
North Koreans at UN’, Al Jazeera, 20 Diplomacy’, April 2022, https://www.armscon-
January 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/ trol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.
news/2022/1/20/china-stalls-us-bid-to-sanc- 16 See KEDO’s website at: http://www.kedo.
tion-north-koreans-at-united-nations; and org/. See also Charles Kartman, Robert Carlin
US, Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury and Joel Wit, A History of KEDO 1994–2006
Targets Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Stanford, CA: Center for International Security
Individuals Supporting Weapons of Mass and Cooperation, 2012), https://fsi-live.
Destruction and Ballistic Missile Programs’, 12 s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/A_
January 2022, https://home.treasury.gov/news/ History_of_KEDO-1.pdf.
press-releases/jy0555. 17 See Arms Control Association, ‘Bush’s Deferral
10 Brendan Taylor, ‘Diplomacy and North Korea’, of Missile Negotiations with North Korea:
A Missed Opportunity’, 23 March 2001, 24 True, hypothetical counterfactuals can be

https://www.armscontrol.org/events/2001-03/ adduced. What if Donald Trump had rejected
bush%E2%80%99s-deferral-missile-negotia- his national security advisor John Bolton’s
tions-north-korea-missed-opportunity. advice to walk out, and instead accepted Kim
18 Jay Solomon and Neil King Jr, ‘How US Used a Jong-un’s offer – made in Hanoi at their second
Bank to Punish North Korea’, Wall Street Journal, summit in February 2019 – to give up the main
12 April 2007, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ nuclear site at Yongbyon in return for compre-
SB117627790709466173. hensive sanctions relief? This approach would
19 Besides condemning North Korea’s missile have led to a better place than the current situ-
launches, the Quad Foreign Ministers’ joint ation, especially for ordinary North Koreans
statement of 11 February 2022 ‘reconfirm[ed] the whose privations – exacerbated by sanctions
necessity of immediate resolution of the issue – would have eased. Inter-Korean projects
of Japanese abductees’. See Japan, Ministry of would have continued rather than stopping
Foreign Affairs, ‘Joint Statement of the Foreign dead. However, two caveats must be made.
Ministers of Australia, India and Japan and Closing Yongbyon would have meant gruelling
the Secretary of State of the United States’, 11 ‘salami-slicing’ over each individual facility,
February 2022, p. 3, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ while highly enriched uranium and other WMD
files/100301156.pdf. For Japan’s official posi- programmes continued unabated at other,
tion on this long-standing issue, see Japan, unknown locations. And with hindsight, just a
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan–North Korea year later the start of the coronavirus pandemic
Relations’, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia- would have given Kim Jong-un a perfect excuse
paci/n_korea/abduction/index.html. See also to end inspections of North Korean facilities.
Robert S. Boynton, The Invitation-only Zone: The 25 The website ‘North Korea in the World’ presents
Extraordinary Story of North Korea’s Abduction detailed data on inter-Korean relations over time
Project (London: Atlantic, 2016). in tabular form: https://www.northkoreainthe-
20 Agence France-Presse, ‘Trump Slams South world.org/inter-korean/inter-korean-dialogue.
Korea’s Moon Jae-in, but Highlights Kim Jong For the present century, since 2001 this writer
Un Friendship’, Japan Times, 24 April 2021, has surveyed ROK–DPRK relations three to
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/04/24/ four times a year, with chronologies. See ‘North
asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/ Korea – South Korea’, Comparative Connections,
trump-kim-moon-korea/. https://cc.pacforum.org/relations/north-korea-
21 Hyonhee Shin, ‘N. Korea Suggests It May south-korea/.
Resume Nuclear, Missile Tests; Slams 26 The implicit model here was how China and
“Hostile” US’, Reuters, 20 January 2022, Taiwan had managed to forge pragmatic busi-
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ ness relations. Seen from 2022, however, such
nkorea-warns-it-may-rethink-moratorium-nu- ties do not necessarily soften political enmity
clear-missile-tests-2022-01-19/. or reduce the risk of conflict, as was hoped. See
22 Kate O’Keeffe, ‘China Stymies Once-united UN Aidan Foster-Carter, ‘Scrapping the Second
Panel on North Korea Sanctions’, Wall Street Summit: Lee Myung Bak’s Fateful Mis-step’,
Journal, 15 September 2021, https://www.wsj. 38North, 20 January 2011, https://www.38north.
com/articles/china-stymies-once-united-u-n- org/2011/01/lee-myung-bak-fateful-misstep/.
panel-on-north-korea-sanctions-11631714247. 27 For the text of the latter, see ‘Joint Declaration of
23 From 2010 through 2021 the PoE issued 15 South and North Korea on the Denuclearization
reports; another is expected in spring 2022. of the Korean Peninsula’, Nuclear Threat
These are all listed and accessible at UNSC, Initiative, https://www.nti.org/wp-content/
‘Reports’, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ uploads/2021/09/korea_denuclearization.pdf.
sanctions/1718/panel_experts/reports. Other 28 The Panmunjom Declaration for Peace,
efforts to track DPRK sanctions violations Prosperity and Unification of the Korean
include the Royal United Services Institute’s Peninsula (27 April 2018), the Pyongyang Joint
(RUSI) Project Sandstone. See RUSI, ‘Project Declaration (19 September 2018) and a military
Sandstone’, https://rusi.org/explore-our-re- annex (also 19 September 2018).
search/projects/project-sandstone. 29 Kim Deok-hyun, ‘Moon Pledges to Pursue
“Irreversible Path to Peace” with N. Korea Prevailed: On the Political History of North Korea
Until His Term Ends’, Yonhap News Agency, (2007–2020) (Independently published, 2021).
3 January 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/ 38 The official charge sheet against Jang paints
AEN20220103002051315. a lurid picture of power struggles and coup
30 South Korea, Ministry of Unification, ‘2022 plots, utterly unlike the DPRK’s usual blandly
Government Work Plan’, 23 December 2021, triumphalist self-presentation. See ‘Traitor
https://unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/ Jang Song Thaek Executed’, KCNA Watch,
releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&- 13 December 2013, https://kcnawatch.org/
mode=view&cntId=54269. newstream/1451900820-902618004/trai-
31 Hyonhee Shin, ‘South Korea’s Push for Tourism tor-jang-song-thaek-executed/?t=1652807895057.
in North Poses Tricky Balancing Act’, Reuters, 39 See Ruediger Frank, ‘The 2022 Session of the
24 January 2020, https://www.reuters.com/ North Korean Legislature: Strengthening
article/us-northkorea-southkorea-analy- Import Substitution and State Control
sis-idUSKBN1ZN0DH. While the Economy Stagnates’, 38North,
32 Christian Davies, ‘South Korea Forges Ahead 10 February 2022, https://www.38north.
with End-of-war Declaration Despite US org/2022/02/the-2022-session-of-the-north-ko-
Reservations’, Financial Times, 5 January 2022, rean-legislature-strengthening-import-sub-
https://www.ft.com/content/8f00d054-d66a- stitution-and-state-control-while-the-econ-
409c-9a8e-cd6b0a1012f4. omy-stagnates/; and Peter Ward, ‘Kim Jong
33 For instance Justin McCurry, ‘North and South Un’s Plenum Speech Displays Striking
Korea Agree “in Principle” on Formal End Lack of New Economic Ideas’, NK News, 1
of War’, Guardian, 13 December 2021, https:// January 2022, https://www.nknews.org/pro/
www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/13/ kim-jong-uns-plenum-speech-displays-striking-
north-south-korea-agree-in-principle-formal- lack-of-new-economic-ideas/?t=1652857305459.
end-war-us. 40 Jay Song and Benjamin Habib, ‘Typhoons
34 Jeongmin Kim, ‘Yoon Suk-yeol Doubles and Human Insecurity in North Korea’,
Down on Preemptive Strike to Stop North Diplomat, 21 October 2020, https://thediplomat.
Korean Attack’, NK News, 17 January com/2020/10/typhoons-and-human-insecurity-
2022, https://www.nknews.org/2022/01/ in-north-korea/.
yoon-suk-yeol-doubles-down-on-preemp- 41 Andrew Yeo, ‘North Korea Is Addressing
tive-strike-to-stop-north-korean-attack/. He the Pandemic in Its “Style.” That Means
later adopted more measured tones. See Leaving a Lot of People Hungry’, Washington
Yoon Suk-yeol, ‘South Korea Needs to Step Post, 17 November 2021, https://www.
Up’, Foreign Affairs, 8 February 2022, https:// washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/11/17/
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south- north-korea-is-addressing-pandemic-its-style-
korea/2022-02-08/south-korea-needs-step. that-means-leaving-lot-people-hungry/.
35 As argued in ‘South Korea’s Foreign Policy: 42 Kyodo, ‘China–North Korea Trade in 2021
Local or Global?’, in IISS, Strategic Survey 2021: Down 90% from Before Pandemic’, Nikkei
The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics (Abingdon: Asia, 18 January 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/
Routledge for the IISS, 2021), pp. 152–61. Economy/Trade/China-North-Korea-trade-in-
36 See Anna Fifield, The Great Successor: The Secret 2021-down-90-from-before-pandemic.
Rise and Rule of Kim Jong Un (London: John 43 Matt Burgess, ‘No Cases? No Chance. The Truth
Murray, 2019); and Jung H. Pak, Becoming Kim about North Korea and Covid-19’, Wired, 22
Jong Un: Understanding North Korea’s Young January 2021, https://www.wired.co.uk/article/
Dictator (London: Oneworld, 2021). Dr Pak is north-korea-covid-news.
currently US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 44 William Gallo, ‘North Korea Expands
in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. China Trade, but Wider Pandemic
37 For a different view, by a long-serving former Approach Unclear’, Voice of America, 20
German ambassador to the DPRK (first in 2007– January 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/
10, returning by his own choice for a second north-korea-expands-china-trade-but-wider-
stint in 2013–18), see Thomas Schäfer, From pandemic-approach-unclear/6404934.html.
Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un: How the Hardliners 45 Martyn Williams, ‘English Transcript of Kim
Jong Un’s Speech’, North Korea Tech, 18 News, 25 March 2022, https://www.youtube.
April 2012, https://www.northkoreatech. com/watch?v=I3cWMQUmBXQ. The video
org/2012/04/18/english-transcript-of-kim-jong- originally aired on DPRK domestic television.
uns-speech/. 55 Hyonhee Shin and Josh Smith, ‘S.Korea Says
46 Some details appear to have leaked. See ‘Docs N.Korea Staged “Largest ICBM” Fakery
Shed Light on Scope of N. Korean Development to Recover from Failed Test’, Reuters, 30
Strategy through 2020’, Mainichi, 20 April 2019, March 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/
https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190420/ asia-pacific/skorea-says-nkorea-staged-largest-
p2a/00m/0in/018000c; and Peter Ward, ‘North icbm-fakery-recover-failed-test-2022-03-30/.
Korea’s Five-year Strategy Set Outlandish 56 Ibid. These claimed official figures are broadly
Targets for Economic Growth’, NK News, confirmed by Japanese and ROK observation.
23 July 2021, https://www.nknews.org/pro/ 57 ‘On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim
north-koreas-five-year-strategy-set-outlandish- Jong Un at 8th Congress of WPK’, KCNA
targets-for-economic-growth/?t=1637635038191. Watch, 9 January 2021, https://kcnawatch.
47 ‘Kim Jong-un Says North Korea’s Economic org/newstream/1610155111-665078257/
Plan Failed’, BBC News, 6 January 2021, https:// on-report-made-by-supreme-leader-kim-jong-
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-55563598. un-at-8th-congress-of-wpk/?t=1652882194627.
48 ‘North Korea Tells Hungry Citizens to “Tighten 58 Ibid.
Belts” until 2025’, Radio Free Asia, 26 October 59 Agence France-Presse, ‘Blinken Says N.Korea
2021, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/ Launches May Be Seeking Attention’, France
shortage-10262021174250.html. 24, 13 January 2022, https://www.france24.com/
49 For a comprehensive stock-taking of North en/live-news/20220113-blinken-says-n-korea-
Korea’s WMD assets – also a rare exercise in launches-may-be-seeking-attention.
scholarly cooperation with Russia – see IISS 60 See ‘Korea Chair “The Capital Cable #34”
and Center for Energy and Security Studies with Sydney Seiler’, Center for Strategic and
(CENESS), ‘DPRK Strategic Capabilities and International Studies, 29 September 2021,
Security on the Korean Peninsula: Looking https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lWr-
Ahead’, 14 July 2021, https://www.iiss.org/ S3HSSzzE&t=3s.
blogs/research-paper/2021/07/dprk-strategic-ca- 61 Such was the view of a former US national
pabilities-security-korean-peninsula. intelligence officer for WMD and proliferation.
50 ‘Trump: I’ll Handle “Little Rocket Man” Kim See Vann H. Van Diepen, ‘North Korea’s “New
Jong-un – Video’, Guardian, 23 September Type Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile”:
2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ More Political than Military Significance’,
video/2017/sep/23/trump-little-rocket-man-kim- 38North, 22 October 2021, https://www.38north.
jong-un-video. org/2021/10/north-koreas-new-type-subma-
51 See Van Jackson, On the Brink: Trump, Kim, rine-launched-ballistic-missile-more-politi-
and the Threat of Nuclear War (Cambridge: cal-than-military-significance/.
Cambridge University Press, 2018). 62 Andrew Salmon, ‘North Korea’s Hypersonic
52 For detailed analyses, see multiple articles by Missile Is a Game-changer’, Asia Times, 11 January
Ankit Panda, https://www.nknews.org/pro/ 2022, https://asiatimes.com/2022/01/north-koreas-
content_author/ankit-panda/; Vann H. Van hypersonic-missile-is-a-game-changer/.
Diepen, https://www.38north.org/author/ 63 Ankit Panda, ‘North Korea’s Test of Rail-based
vann-h-van-diepen/; and Joseph S. Bermudez Missiles Continues Emphasis on Survivability’,
Jr, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/?s=bermu- NK News, 15 January 2022, https://www.
dez&x=16&y=16. nknews.org/pro/north-koreas-test-of-rail-based-
53 ‘Latest North Korea Projectile Launch missiles-continues-emphasis-on-survivability/.
Ends in Failure’, Al Jazeera, 16 March 2022, 64 Ankit Panda, ‘North Korea Overflies Japan
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/16/ with Another Intermediate-range Ballistic
failed-test-neighbours-say-n-korea-tried-to- Missile: Early Analysis’, Diplomat, 15 September
launch-projectile. 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/
54 See ‘North Korean TV Airs Movie-like Footage north-korea-overflies-japan-with-another-inter-
of Kim Jong Un Guiding an ICBM Test’, NK mediate-range-ballistic-missile-early-analysis.
65 Julian Borger, ‘North Korea Details Guam Strike jae-in-and-south-koreas-military-buildup/.
Plan and Calls Trump “Bereft of Reason”’, 75 ‘Moon Flies to Aerospace Defense Expo in S.
Guardian, 10 August 2017, https://www. Korean-made Fighter Jet’, Hankyoreh, 21 October
theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/10/north-ko- 2021, https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_
rea-details-guam-strike-trump-load-of-nonsense. edition/e_national/1016127.html.
66 ‘Hwasong 12 Ground-to-ground Missile Test- 76 ‘Clumsy SLBM Launch of S. Korea’, KCNA
fired for Evaluation’, KCNA Watch (Pyongyang Watch, 20 September 2021, https://kcnawatch.
Times), 31 January 2022, https://kcnawatch. org/newstream/1632119522-729672631/clumsy-
org/newstream/1643619917-868311896/ slbm-launch-of-s-korea/?t=1652890461330.
hwasong-12-ground-to-ground-missile-test- 77 Sangsoo Lee, ‘Missile Deployments on the
fired-for-evaluation/?t=1652885097674. Korean Peninsula: An Accelerating Arms Race’,
67 Gareth Jennings, ‘Seoul’s ADEX Escapes 38North, 7 May 2021, https://www.38north.
the Worst of Covid-19 Cancellations’, Janes, org/2021/05/missile-deployments-on-the-ko-
13 October 2021, https://www.janes.com/ rean-peninsula-an-accelerating-arms-race/.
defence-news/news-detail/seoul-adex-escapes- See also Ian Bowers and Henrik Hiim, ‘South
the-worst-of-covid-19-cancellations. Korea, Conventional Capabilities, and the
68 Colin Zwirko, ‘New Missiles and Kim Jong Future of the Korean Peninsula’, War on the
Un Idolatry Dominate “Self-Defense-2021” Rocks, 11 February 2021, https://warontherocks.
Expo’, NK News, 12 October 2021, https://www. com/2021/02/south-korea-conventional-capabil-
nknews.org/pro/new-missiles-and-kim-jong-un- ities-and-the-future-of-the-korean-peninsula/;
idolatry-dominate-self-defense-2021-expo/. and a reply by two ROK officers, Manseok
69 ‘Kim Jong Un Makes Commemorative Speech Lee and Hyeongpil Ham, ‘South Korea’s
at Defence Development Exhibition’, KCNA Conventional Forces Buildup: The Search for
Watch, 12 October 2021, https://kcnawatch. Strategic Stability’, War on the Rocks, 16 April
org/newstream/1634029315-868831692/ 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/
kim-jong-un-makes-commemora- south-koreas-conventional-forces-build-
tive-speech-at-defence-development-exhibi- up-the-search-for-strategic-stability/.
tion/?t=1652886589408. 78 For a critique, see Ryo Nakamura, ‘Biden’s
70 Ibid.; and ‘Defence Development Exhibition Call for Dialogue Alone Aids North Korean
Self-Defence-2021 Closes’, KCNA Watch, Ambitions’, Nikkei Asia, 14 February 2022,
23 October 2021, https://kcnawatch.org/ https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/
newstream/1634943388-218486701/defence-de- Biden-s-call-for-dialogue-alone-aids-North-
velopment-exhibition-self-defence-2021-closes/. Korean-ambitions.
71 Ibid. 79 Sandip Kumar Mishra, ‘Biden’s North Korea
72 ‘DPRK Gov’t Statement on Successful Test- Policy: Has “Strategic Patience” Returned?’, East
fire of New-type ICBM’, KCNA Watch, Asia Compass, Institute of Peace and Conflict
29 November 2017, https://kcnawatch. Studies, 30 May 2021, http://www.ipcs.org/
org/newstream/1511929851-215959348/ comm_select.php?articleNo=5769.
dprk-govt-statement-on-successful-test-fire-of- 80 ‘Kim Jong Un Makes Commemorative Speech at
new-type-icbm/. Defence Development Exhibition’, KCNA Watch.
73 For example, see Sungmin Cho and Oriana 81 US, Department of Justice, ‘Three North Korean
Skylar Mastro, ‘North Korea Is Becoming an Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-ranging
Asset for China: Pyongyang’s Missiles Could Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial
Fracture America’s Alliances’, Foreign Affairs, 3 Crimes Across the Globe’, 17 February 2021,
February 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-ko-
articles/north-korea/2022-02-03/north-korea-be- rean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-rang-
coming-asset-china. ing-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and.
74 Lami Kim, ‘A Hawkish Dove? President 82 Eric Geller, ‘North Korean Hackers Are “the
Moon Jae-in and South Korea’s World’s Leading Bank Robbers,” US Charges’,
Military Buildup’, War on the Rocks, 15 Politico, 17 February 2021, https://www.politico.
September 2021, https://warontherocks. com/news/2021/02/17/us-charges-north-kore-
com/2021/09/a-hawkish-dove-president-moon- an-hackers-wannacry-sony-469406.
83 Richard Stengel, ‘The Untold Story of the Sony Country of Intelligence Theft’, KNCA
Hack: How North Korea’s Battle with Seth Rogen Watch (DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs),
and George Clooney Foreshadowed Russian 7 February 2022, https://kcnawatch.org/
Election Meddling in 2016’, Vanity Fair, 6 October newstream/1644247870-380027553/u-s-notori-
2019, https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/10/ ous-for-tapping-empire-hacking-empire-and-
the-untold-story-of-the-sony-hack. country-of-intelligence-theft/?t=1652944246977.
84 US, Department of Justice, ‘Assistant Attorney 92 On how the nuclear issue and human rights
General John C. Demers Delivers Remarks interact, see Robert R. King and Gi-Wook Shin
on the National Security Cyber Investigation (eds), The North Korean Conundrum: Balancing
into North Korean Operatives’, 17 February Human Rights and Nuclear Security (Stanford, CA:
2021, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2021).
assistant-attorney-general-john-c-demers-deliv- 93 ‘North Korea: Missile Programme Funded
ers-remarks-national-security-cyber. through Stolen Crypto, UN Report Says’, BBC
85 ‘North Korean Hackers Target Gamers in News, 6 February 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/
$615m Crypto Heist – US’, BBC News, 15 April news/world-asia-60281129.
2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- 94 For example, see Geir Helgesen and Rachel
asia-61036733. Harrison (eds), East–West Reflections on
86 A thorough overview as of 2014 is Sheena Demonization: North Korea Now, China Next?
Chestnut Greitens, Illicit: North Korea’s Evolving (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies
Operation to Earn Hard Currency (Washington Press, 2020).
DC: Committee for Human Rights in North 95 A contrary view is Doug Bandow, ‘North Korea
Korea, 2014), https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/ Needs the Bomb to Protect Itself from America’,
pdfs/SCG-FINAL-FINAL.pdf. Foreign Policy, 7 July 2021, https://foreignpolicy.
87 On human rights, two major resources are com/2021/07/07/north-korea-nuclear-weap-
the many reports by the (US) Committee for ons-united-states-deterrence/.
Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK): https:// 96 Including Thomas Schäfer (see endnote 37) and
www.hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications. B.R. Myers, North Korea’s Juche Myth (2015, inde-
php; and the White Papers compiled annually pendently published).
since 1996 by the Korean Institute for National 97 See Terence Roehrig, ‘North Korea and
Unification (KINU), an ROK government think Reunification: The Limits of Nuclear Coercion’,
tank: https://www.kinu.or.kr/www/jsp/prg/ Asian Survey, vol. 60, no. 5, September/October
api/dlLE.jsp?menuIdx=648&category=74&this- 2020, pp. 859–81.
Page=1&searchField=&searchText=. 98 As shown by Hy-Sang Lee, North Korea: A Strange
88 Morten Soendergaard Larsen, ‘While North Socialist Fortress (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).
Korean Missiles Sit in Storage, Their Hackers 99 Desmond Ball et al., Asia’s New Geopolitics:
Go Rampant’, Foreign Policy, 15 March 2021, Military Power and Regional Order, Adelphi
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/15/north-ko- 478–480 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2019).
rea-missiles-cyberattack-hacker-armies-crime/. 100 Notably, blowing up the new inter-Korean
89 Elizabeth Shim, ‘North Korea Launched Over liaison office in Kaesong, built and funded by
1M Cyberattacks Daily, Seoul’s Spy Agency South Korea, in June 2020. This was the climax
Says’, UPI, 16 February 2021, https://www. of a frenzied campaign in which Pyongyang
upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2021/02/16/ threatened to march south. See Aidan Foster-
North-Korea-launched-over-1M-cyberattacks- Carter, ‘A Tempestuous Summer’, Comparative
daily-Seouls-spy-agency-says/7491613484246/. Connections, vol. 22, no. 2, September 2020, pp.
(The actual figure given for 2020 is higher: 1.58m.) 81–94, https://cc.pacforum.org/2020/09/a-tem-
90 See ‘N. Korean Hackers Suspected of pestuous-summer/.
Continuing Attacks amid Friendly Inter- 101 After North Korea’s hypersonic missile
Korean Relations’, Yonhap News Agency, test on 12 January, the US Federal Aviation
5 July 2018, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/ Administration briefly grounded commercial
AEN20180705004200320. flights for the first time since 9/11, among other
91 As of course it does. See ‘US Notorious precautions. See Kyle Mizokami, ‘Why a North
for Tapping Empire, Hacking Empire and Korean Missile Test Grounded Flights on the
West Coast’, Popular Mechanics, 13 January 2022, ons-8d5f00b17403495db198e993aeb1c73c.

https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/ 111 Ethan Jewell, ‘China Still Throwing Cash at
weapons/a38759535/north-korean-missile-test- an Unused Bridge to North Korea’, NK News,
grounded-flights-on-west-coast/. 13 December 2021, https://www.nknews.
102 See Jeffrey Lewis, The 2020 Commission Report org/2021/12/china-still-throwing-cash-at-an-un-
on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the used-bridge-to-north-korea/.
United States (London: W. H. Allen, 2018). 112 ‘China Built a $350 Million Bridge that Ends in
103 Robert Carlin, ‘Beyond the Billet-Doux: a Dirt Field in North Korea’, Business Insider,
Thoughts on How to Read the Trump– 27 May 2017, https://www.youtube.com/
Kim Letters’, 38North, 16 August 2021, watch?v=aU8fy3pF3js.
https://www.38north.org/2021/08/ 113 Toby Dalton and Youngjun Kim, ‘Negotiating
beyond-the-billet-doux-thoughts-on-how- Nuclear Arms Control with North Korea:
to-read-the-trump-kim-letters/. Trump has Why and How?’, Korean Journal of Defense
reportedly claimed to be still in contact with Analysis, vol. 33, no. 1, March 2021, pp.
Kim, via unspecified channels. See ‘Trump 1–21, https://www.kida.re.kr/frt/board/
Says He Is Still in Touch with North Korea’s frtNormalBoardDetail.do?sidx=2263&idx-
Kim Jong Un’, Al Jazeera, 10 February 2022, =2584&depth=3&searchCondition=&searchKey-
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/10/ word=&pageIndex=1&lang=kr&v_sidx=707.
update-1-trump-says-he-is-in-touch-with-north- 114 Josh Rogin, ‘We Can’t Neglect North Korea
koreas-kim-book. for Another Year’, Washington Post, 13 January
104 Aidan Foster-Carter, ‘South Korea Has Lost the 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
North to China’, Financial Times, 20 February opinions/2022/01/13/we-cant-neglect-north-ko-
2014, https://www.ft.com/content/f8fca490-9a23- rea-another-year/.
11e3-a407-00144feab7de. 115 Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press, ‘Should
105 ‘Russia Writes Off 90 Percent of North Korea’s South Korea Build Its Own Nuclear Bomb?’,
Debt’, Reuters, 18 September 2012, https://www. Washington Post, 7 October 2021, https://
reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-debt-idUS- www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/
BRE88H0NH20120918. should-south-korea-go-nuclear/2021/10/07/
106 Ruediger Frank, ‘North Korea as a Beneficiary a40bb400-2628-11ec-8d53-67cfb452aa60_story.
of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine’, 38North, 16 html. Controversially, they answer their
March 2022, https://www.38north.org/2022/03/ question in the affirmative. See also Mark
north-korea-as-a-beneficiary-of-the-russian-in- Fitzpatrick, Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan,
vasion-of-ukraine/. South Korea and Taiwan, Adelphi 455 (Abingdon:
107 But not very recently. See Jonathan Watts, Routledge for the IISS, 2016).
‘China Cuts Oil Supply to North Korea’, 116 Choi Song Min, ‘NK Residents React to Kim’s
Guardian, 1 April 2003, https://www. Cane’, DailyNK, 16 October 2021, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/01/north- dailynk.com/english/nk-residents-react-to-
korea.china. kims-cane/.
108 See the striking rise and fall on this graph: 117 Alleged in Ha Yoon Ah, ‘Source: Kim Jong
‘China–DPRK Merchandise Trade Volume’, Un Recently Underwent a Cardiovascular
North Korea in the World, https://www.north- Procedure’, DailyNK, 21 April 2020,
koreaintheworld.org/china-dprk/total-trade. https://www.dailynk.com/english/
109 ‘Traitor Jang Song Thaek Executed’. source-kim-jong-un-recently-cardiovascu-
110 Christopher Bodeen, ‘China’s Xi Pushes lar-operation/. The Blue House, among others,
Economic Reform at North Korea Summit’, AP denied this. Laura Bicker, ‘Kim Jong-un Illness
News, 21 June 2019, https://apnews.com/article/ Rumours Denied amid Intense Speculation’,
weapons-programs-ap-top-news-north-ko- BBC News, 21 April 2020, https://www.bbc.
rea-international-news-nuclear-weap- co.uk/news/world-asia-52364055.
118 AP, ‘Slim Kim: North Korean Leader Believed Survival in North Korea (New York: Columbia
Healthy Despite Weight Loss’, Guardian, 28 University Press, 2015). Today’s generation, by
October 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/ contrast, know more and have fewer illusions.
122 For a nuanced account of the interplay
world/2021/oct/28/slim-kim-north-korean-lead-
er-believed-healthy-despite-weight-loss. between marketisation, social groups and the
119 Timothy W. Martin and Andrew Jeong, ‘Kim regime, see Andrew Yeo, State, Society and
Yo Jong: What We Know about Kim Jong Markets in North Korea (Cambridge: Cambridge
Un’s Sister and Her Role in North Korea’, University Press, 2021).
123 ‘Maximum Punishment under the “Korean
Wall Street Journal, 4 April 2022, https://www.
wsj.com/articles/kim-jong-un-sister-kim-yo- Wave Suppression Act” Is Death … Still, K-pop
jong-11607524273. Is Popular’, Rimjingang, 19 May 2021, https://
120 See Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘5 Things to Know if www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2021/05/recom-
Kim Jong Un Dies’, Foreign Policy, 27 April 2020, mendations/kpop-2/.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/27/5-things- 124 See James Church, The Man With The Baltic Stare
to-know-if-kim-jong-un-dies/. (New York: Macmillan, 2011). Written by a
121 On North Koreans’ struggle to make sense of former US intelligence officer, this and the other
their suffering in the famine of the 1990s, see ‘Inspector O’ novels convey the feel of North
Sandra Fahy, Marching through Suffering: Loss and Korea very atmospherically.
CHAPTER 5
SINO-AMERICAN
SECURITY RELATIONS:
THE NUCLEAR DYNAMICS
DR JEFFREY G. LEWIS
Jeffrey G. Lewis is Adjunct Professor and Director of the East Asia
Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey
s)
Plu
es
ag
Im
tty
Ge
ck/
to
/iS
m
sia
eo
(N
on
riz
ho
nd
ou
China and the United States increasingly view their

gr
ck
ba
relationship as one of strategic competition. In 2021,

ar
cle
Nu
public disclosures about the construction of new missile silos

in China and the test of an orbital bombardment system focused
attention on the possibility that strategic competition between the two powers might
intensify to include a nuclear arms race.
CHINA’S GROWING NUCLEAR-WEAPON AND MISSILE CAPABILITIES

China’s changing society, economy and political structure are reshaping its nuclear forces in important
ways. Significant developments include an expansion of the number of intercontinental-range
ballistic missiles, as well as the development of new submarine- and air-launched ballistic missiles.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY AT STRATEGIC AND THEATRE LEVELS

China’s evolving nuclear forces give rise to fundamental questions about their strategic purpose:
are they intended simply to deter the US? Or are they intended to undermine Washington’s ability
to extend deterrence to its allies? China’s new nuclear forces prompt further concerns about crisis
stability and particularly control of escalation. If the US and China are to maintain a stable nuclear
dynamic, each side must do far more to understand how the other thinks about nuclear weapons.
POTENTIAL FOR ARMS CONTROL

A useful first step towards bilateral strategic-arms control would be for Washington and Beijing to
devise and issue a joint statement on strategic stability. This could provide a clear definition of the
status quo against which stability could be understood. In the longer term, real stability would require
negotiated and verifiable limitations on both countries’ offensive and defensive strategic forces.
No nuclear arsenal in the world is changing Workers celebrate China’s first nuclear-bomb test at Lop
Nor base in Xinjiang, western China, 16 October 1964
as dramatically as that of China. While
important developments have been under
way for several years, they only entered the
public consciousness in a significant way
in 2021. In June of that year, open-source
analysts discovered more than 100 missile
silos under construction in western China,
raising the possibility that Beijing was
expanding its arsenal of intercontinental-
range ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It was the
first of what would turn out to be three
such sites under construction. Weeks later,
China tested a hypersonic glider capable of
delivering a nuclear weapon. It entered orbit,
travelled around the Earth and re-entered
the atmosphere, missing its target by several
kilometres. The United States’ top defence
official compared the test to the Soviet
(History/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)
Union’s launch of a satellite for the first time
in 1957. ‘I don’t know if it’s quite a Sputnik moment’, explained Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, ‘but I think it’s very close to that. It has all of our
attention.’1 Another US defence official compared the US reaction to the days following
the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, when Americans felt surprised, vulnerable and
unsure how to respond.2
Observers have noted the deteriorating China–US relationship for several years. By
late 2020, it had become so strained that the US intelligence community observed an ‘entire
body’ of intelligence suggesting that Chinese leaders believed the US might launch an
attack on their country. There are many reasons for the tensions in the Sino-American
security relationship: trade disputes, China’s territorial claims, human-rights issues and,
most importantly, the status and security of Taiwan. In 2021, these tensions were joined by
a fast-changing nuclear dynamic that resembled the beginning of a nuclear arms race, as
both countries faced the prospect that they increasingly needed to consider and prepare for
the possibility of nuclear war.
CHINA’S GROWING NUCLEAR-WEAPON AND MISSILE CAPABILITIES

China’s nuclear forces have changed significantly since the late 1990s, although some
threads connect the present to the past. Beijing first decided to develop nuclear weapons in
the mid-1950s, expecting significant Soviet assistance. Following the suspension of aid from
Moscow in 1959, it was decided to continue the nuclear programme without foreign support.
China chose to do so despite the high costs because it believed that other nuclear powers
(primarily the US, but potentially also the Soviet Union) would continue to use nuclear supe-
riority to coerce Beijing – something Chinese leaders referred to as ‘nuclear blackmail’.
SINO-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS: THE NUCLEAR DYNAMICS 113
China’s early nuclear forces were organised around the primary goal of acquiring
ICBMs and thermonuclear weapons to retaliate against a US nuclear attack – what one
Chinese leader called ‘the minimum means of reprisal’.3 Today, most experts call this
capacity ‘assured retaliation’: the idea that ‘a small number of survivable weapons would
be enough to accomplish deterrence by threatening retaliation and, thus, unacceptable
damage on an adversary’.4
A notable feature of China’s approach was an unconditional pledge that it ‘would never
at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons’.5 This pledge
was used initially as a diplomatic stratagem to deflect pressure from the developing world:
China needed to conduct atmospheric tests and could not support proposals for a test ban
popular among non-aligned states. However, it also encapsulated some important Maoist
ideas about the role of nuclear weapons and suited the bureaucratic proponents of China’s
nuclear-weapons and missile programmes. Notable among those proponents was People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) marshal Nie Rongzhen, head of China’s National Defense Science
and Technology Commission, which had responsibility for these programmes. In this
period China had a nuclear policy – no first use – but lacked both operational concepts for
its nuclear arsenal and any nuclear strategy that might connect the policy to those concepts.
This did not change substantially until the 1980s, when China first began to deploy nucle-
ar-armed ICBMs that could threaten the US.6
Chinese leaders were at that time content to live with an almost unbelievably small
and vulnerable nuclear force. At the end of the 1980s, the arsenal comprised fewer than 100
liquid-propellant land-based ballistic missiles stored unfuelled in fixed sites. Their warheads
were stored separately some tens of kilometres away. However, these circumstances did not
mean that Chinese leaders did not think about survivability or worry about technological
developments in the US and the Soviet Union. Particularly during the 1970s, China made
significant efforts to reduce the launch time of its missile forces. It explored different
Sources: IISS, The Military Balance, 2002–08;
basing modes for its missiles and developed prototypes of advanced systems that it would IISS, Military Balance+, milbalplus.iiss.org
never deploy, including a ballistic-missile

submarine, an enhanced-radiation warhead, Figure 5.1: China’s defence budget, 2000–21
an anti-ballistic-missile interceptor and even
a fractional orbital bombardment system
200
(FOBS). Most importantly, China planned
eventually to replace its liquid-fuelled missiles
with solid-fuelled counterparts. 150
At the same time, Chinese leaders evaluated
the international environment in highly
100
politicised terms, with those supporting
‘reform and opening’ in the 1980s arguing that
the international situation was becoming less 50
tense. Therefore, while leaders may not have

wanted to fall behind in military technology,
0
they were also uninterested in turning research-
2001
2011
2021
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
and-development projects into large-scale

procurement programmes, preferring to use Map 5.1: Ranges of China’s nuclear-armed, land-based ballistic missiles
the former to jump-start the civilian economy.
Today, China faces far fewer resource
12,000+ km
constraints (Figure 5.1 highlights the growth DF-41 (CH-SS-20)
DF-5A (CH-SS-4 Mod 2)
of China’s defence budget since 2000). Its DF-5B (CH-SS-4 Mod 3)
GDP is the second largest globally and the
largest when adjusted for purchasing-power 11,000+ km
DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2)
parity. Unlike in the 1980s, China’s political
system appears to be tightening rather than
opening. While previous leaders may have
argued that a more benign international envi-
7,000+ km
ronment allowed for their preferred domestic
DF-31 (CH-SS-10 Mod 1)
reforms, contemporary Chinese leaders have
depicted the external context as increasingly
5,500+ km
hostile to justify their continued narrowing of DF-4 (CH-SS-3)
the domestic political space. China’s nuclear
forces have always been influenced more by
domestic political dynamics than by strategic
4,000 km
considerations. It remains the case today, DF-26 (CH-SS-18)
as China’s changing society, economy and
political structure reshape its nuclear forces
in important ways. Beijing
CHINA
The PLA Rocket Force 1,750+ km
Although it is no longer the exclusive oper- DF-21A/E (CH-SS-5 Mod 2/6)
ator, China’s nuclear forces are primarily

managed by the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF),
©IISS
which was known as the Second Artillery
Corps until 2016. Established in 1966, the Note: Ranges are approximate, and shown for illustrative purposes only.
Sources: US Department of Defense, www.defense.gov; IISS
Second Artillery was initially a small organ-
isation and never possessed the status of a
service like the navy or air force. In its early
years, the Second Artillery had little role in determining the missiles or nuclear weapons
in its charge and was not allowed to develop operational concepts to implement the
no-first-use policy imposed from above. Xiang Shouzhi, the first commander of the
Second Artillery, was purged twice during periods of turbulent domestic politics, on the
second occasion being placed under house arrest at a farm where he tended pigs. He was
offered a chance to return for a third stint as commander in 1980 but declined, saying he
preferred the pigs.7
Today, no military officer would prefer pigs to the PLARF. As well as the service being
autonomous, with a status equal to the other services, it is also influential. Two of the seven
members of the Central Military Commission (CMC) have Rocket Force backgrounds, a
distinction shared only by the PLA Army (traditionally China’s premier military service).
Table 5.1: China’s nuclear-capable missile systems
Chinese US Deployment mode Type No. of stages Propellant No. of Range

name designation warheads (km)
DF-21A/E CH-SS-5 Road-mobile Medium-range 2 Solid 1 1,750+

Mod 2/6 ballistic missile
DF-26 CH-SS-18 Road-mobile Intermediate-range 2 Solid 1 4,000

ballistic missile
DF-4 CH-SS-3 Transportable Intercontinental 2 Liquid 1 5,500+

ballistic missile
(ICBM)
DF-5A CH-SS-4 Silo ICBM 2 Liquid 1 12,000+

Mod 2
DF-5B CH-SS-4 Silo ICBM 2 plus post-boost Liquid 4 12,000+

Mod 3 vehicle (PBV)
DF-31 CH-SS-10 Road-mobile ICBM 3 Solid 1 7,000+

Mod 1
DF-31A CH-SS-10 Road-mobile ICBM 3 Solid 1 11,000+

Mod 2
DF-31AG Road-mobile ICBM 3 Solid unknown unknown
DF-41 CH-SS-20 Silo and road-mobile ICBM 3+PBV Solid multiple 12,000+
JL-2 CH-SS-N-14 Jin-class nuclear-powered Submarine- 3 Solid 1 7,000

ballistic-missile submarine launched ballistic
(SSBN) missile (SLBM)
JL-3 Type-096 SSBN SLBM 3 Solid multiple 10,000
CH-AS-X-13 H-6N bomber Air-launched 2 Solid 1 3,000

ballistic missile
Source: IISS
However, the rise of the PLARF has not been synonymous with a growing emphasis on
nuclear weapons, but rather the opposite. After China finished developing its first gener-
ation of liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles, attention turned to developing replacements for
those systems using solid propellant. Solid-propellant missiles offer significant operational
advantages, including simplified launch preparations and lighter logistical requirements.
Chinese leaders initially imagined solid-propellant missiles as nothing more than replace-
ments for liquid-fuelled ones, but some leaders of the Second Artillery had other ideas.8
Beginning in the 1990s, the Second Artillery acquired short-range, solid-propellant
missiles originally designed for export and transformed itself into a force organised around
conventional-missile operations, amassing hundreds of short- and medium-range missile
launchers. Conventional missiles offered the Second Artillery a much-expanded role,
allowing it to contribute to a range of military scenarios beyond the single, unlikely possi-
bility of nuclear retaliation. Missile tests in 1995, which China conducted to coerce Taiwan
before its first democratic presidential election, appear to have been an important turning
point. The growth of China’s arsenal of conventionally armed missiles coincided with the
Second Artillery’s rising status, which culminated in its redesignation as the PLARF in 2016.
Today, the Rocket Force has far more personnel dedicated to conventional-missile
operations than to nuclear ones. Moreover, there appear to be clear internal preferences
for conventional missiles. One study found not only that there is some personnel separa-
tion between nuclear and conventional forces, but also that ‘senior leaders are more likely
to have served in the Rocket Force’s premier conventionally-armed missile base’.9 With
conventional-missile operations offering the service a path towards greater autonomy and
prestige, its internal priorities appear to have adjusted accordingly.
While the PLARF’s role as the organisation responsible for conventiona-missile oper-
ations is hugely important, it retains control of the bulk of China’s nuclear deterrent,
which comprises more than 100 intercontinental-range, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.
These include:
DF-4 (CH-SS-3): A large liquid-propellant ballistic missile with a multi-megaton
warhead, originally deployed in the late 1970s. It has a range of around 5,500 kilo-
metres, making it a limited-range ICBM. China retains about a dozen of these missiles,
which are stored in ‘roll-out to launch’ sites.
DF-5 (CH-SS-4): A large liquid-propellant ballistic missile originally deployed in the
1980s with a multi-megaton warhead. It is deployed in silos due to the missile’s large
size. China deployed two modernised variants of this missile, the DF-5A (CH-SS-5 Mod
2), in the mid-2000s, armed with a single warhead, followed by the DF-5B (CH-SS-4
Mod 3), which can be armed with up to four smaller warheads (originally developed
for the DF-31). There are 18 known DF-5 silos, although the PLARF is reportedly
building additional silos.
DF-31 (CH-SS-10): A road-mobile missile capable of carrying a single warhead, first
tested in the late 1990s. In 2007 China displayed publicly a new variant, the DF-31AG,
which may be able to carry multiple warheads. Commercial satellite imagery suggests
that China is converting some of its existing DF-31A brigades to this new variant.
DF-41 (CH-SS-20): A solid-propellant ICBM able to carry multiple warheads. One
press report indicated that the US intelligence community believes the DF-41 could
carry between three and six warheads,
Chinese DF-31AG missiles on parade in Beijing, 1 October 2019
although it has only ever been tested
with two. The system was originally
developed to be road-mobile, but
some reports indicate that China has
explored rail-basing the system and, in
2021, open-source researchers observed
the construction of several hundred
new missile silos believed to be for
the DF-41.10
Map 5.2: PLA Rocket Force missile bases and brigades
1. Brigade 611 (MUCD 96711) 8. Brigade 621 (MUCD 96721)

12 launchers for DF-21A missiles 12 launchers for unknown mobile ICBM

12 launchers for DF-21A missiles 12 launchers for DF-31A missiles

~27–36 launchers for DF-15 missiles ~27–36 launchers for CJ-10 missiles

~27–36 launchers for DF-17 missiles 12 launchers for DF-21D missiles

~27–36 launchers for DF-11A missiles 18 launchers for DF-26 missiles

~27–36 launchers for DF-15 missiles 18 launchers for DF-26 missiles

~27–36 launchers for DF-16A/B missiles Unknown number of launchers for DF-17 missiles
30
Base 65 (MUCD 96605)

29
27 32
31
26
23
28 Base 64 (MUCD 96604) 38 33

22
24 34 35
25 36
37 39
1
18 2
8 Base 63 (MUCD 96603) 19 3 7
16
15 17
6 4
21
Base 62 (MUCD 96602) 20
9 10 5
13
12 14
11
6 launchers for DF-5 missiles Under construction
29. Brigade 651 (MUCD 96751)
16. Brigade 632 (MUCD 96732) 23. Brigade 642 (MUCD 96742) Under construction 34. Brigade 661 (MUCD 96761)
12 launchers for DF-31AG missiles 8 launchers for DF-31AG missiles 6 launchers for DF-5 missiles
30. Brigade 652 (MUCD 96752)
17. Brigade 633 (MUCD 96733) 24. Brigade 643 (MUCD 96743) Under construction 35. Brigade 662 (MUCD 96762)
6 launchers for DF-5 missiles 12 launchers for DF-31AG missiles 4 missile silos under construction
(New location unknown)
18. Brigade 634 (MUCD 96734) 25. Brigade 644 (MUCD 96744) Brigade 653 (MUCD 96753) 36. Brigade 663 (MUCD 96763)
1 missile silo under construction 12 launchers for DF-41 missiles 12 launchers for DF-21D missiles 12 launchers for DF-31A missiles
19. Brigade 635 (MUCD 96735) 26. Brigade 645 (MUCD 96745) 31. Brigade 654 (MUCD 96754) 37. Brigade 664 (MUCD 96764)
~27–36 launchers for CJ-10A missiles Under construction 18 launchers for DF-26 missiles 8 launchers for DF-31AG missiles
~27–36 launchers for DF-16 missiles 18 launchers for DF-26 missiles Under construction Under construction
4 missile silos under construction 18 launchers for DF-26 missiles ~27–36 launchers for CJ-100 missiles 18 launchers for DF-26 missiles
Note: MUCD = Military Unit Cover Designator

Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org
©IISS
The construction of around 260 new

Chinese DF-41 (first image) and DF-5B (second image) intercontinental
missile silos near Yumen (120 silos), Hami ballistic missiles on parade in Beijing, 1 October 2019
(110 silos) and Ordos (29) begs the question
of how many DF-41 ICBMs China will ulti-
mately deploy. (Some silos may be intended
for other missile types, such as the DF-31 and
DF-5.) A US State Department spokesperson
has said that the US intelligence commu-
nity believes China will fill every silo with a
missile. However, some non-governmental
experts believe that the unusual pattern of
roads at the Yumen and Hami sites suggests
that China might deploy a relatively small
number of missiles hidden among a consid-
erably larger number of silos, emulating the
‘shell game’ that the Carter administration in
the US originally planned for the Peacekeeper
ICBM in the late 1970s. They point to histor-
ical accounts showing that in the early 1980s
China closely studied the shell game and
admired it as a basing mode.11
Assumptions about the number of
warheads and missiles can produce radi-
cally different estimates. A small number of missiles hidden among the silos, each with
only two warheads, would result in fewer than 100 new nuclear warheads. By contrast, if
China places a missile in every silo and arms each missile with six warheads, the resulting
increase is more than 1,500 new nuclear warheads. These very different possibilities are
open to very different interpretations. As the Commander of US Strategic Command
Admiral Charles Richard has observed:
I think the point is to start with an assumption that you’re probably not going to know
for sure. Are some of them going to be filled? Are some of them not? … Are some of
them filled now and some of them are going to be filled later, and so all that adds up to
is you got to be humble in your ability to predict this.12
The silo construction raises a second question, which relates to a growing body of
evidence that China will place some of its ICBM force on alert, able to launch on warning
of an attack. China’s first generation of land-based strategic missiles were stored unfuelled
with their warheads kept separately several kilometres away, owing both to the technolog-
ical limitations of liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles and to China’s poor early-warning radar
capabilities. As early as the 1970s, however, Chinese leaders considered the possibility of
placing some missiles on alert and urged the Second Artillery to reduce launch times. Since
2016, senior military officers have spoken openly about the need to put at least some ICBMs
Map 5.3: Trajectory of China’s orbital-bombardment-system test, 27 July 2021
Target Taiyuan
©IISS
on alert, something that would reduce the vulnerability of the silo-based ICBMs now being Source: Nuclear Threat
Initiative, www.nti.org
deployed.13 China has established a new generation of ground-based early-warning radars
and operates at least one early-warning satellite in orbit, which could give President Xi
Jinping or a future Chinese leader the same option available to US and Russian leaders: to
order the launch of silo-based missiles on warning of a missile attack.
Very little is known about China’s nuclear command-and-control system. Official
statements make clear that the decision to use nuclear weapons rests with the CMC but
it is unclear how this body would communicate a launch order to missile units.14 Routine
communications are believed to run through the Joint Staff Department to the Rocket Force
headquarters and then down through the PLARF system of bases, brigades and finally
to launch units. It is possible that this structure could be contracted in a crisis. Moreover,
there are numerous questions about the command and control of submarine-launched
ballistic missiles and China’s nascent air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs).
China is also developing ‘an intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle – similar
to Russia’s Avangard – which is designed to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, compli-
cating [the United States’] ability to provide precise warning’.15 This system is reportedly
called the DF-ZF, which is likely a Chinese abbreviation for Dong Feng Re-entry Vehicle.
According to the US National Air and Space Intelligence Center, this system is ‘associated
with [China’s] nuclear deterrent forces’.16 It is likely the same gliding re-entry vehicle that
China tested in July 2021 as a FOBS capable of defeating US missile defences (see Map 5.3).17
(This system would likely be different from the glider on China’s DF-17 medium-range
ballistic missile, which is likely optimised for a less punishing gliding environment.)
In addition to ICBMs, China maintains a significant number of short- and medium-
range ballistic and cruise missiles. This force numbers some 800 launchers and more than
2,000 missiles.18 Most of these missiles are conventionally armed but a small number have
nuclear missions.19 The medium-range DF-21 (CH-SS-5) is a solid-propellant ballistic missile
that China has deployed in both nuclear and conventional variants. China maintains about
50 nuclear-armed DF-21 launchers and another 30 or so conventional variants, including
an anti-ship variant, the DF-21D (CH-SS-5 Mod 5).
The intermediate-range DF-26 (CH-SS-18) is China’s first truly dual-capable ballistic
missile. It is designed so that launch units can change the warhead type in the field, which
makes it extremely difficult to know how many nuclear weapons are assigned to the DF-26
brigades or even which units have nuclear missions. The US intelligence community also
assesses that the DF-17 hypersonic glider is dual-capable, although many experts doubt
that the system will be armed with nuclear weapons.20
Nuclear-missile submarines
Although China pursued the idea of launching a ballistic missile from a nuclear-powered
submarine from the outset of its nuclear programme, early efforts were slow and an initial
vessel was not commissioned until 1984. At that time, China was in the midst of a significant era
of ‘defence conversion’ and cancelled the construction of additional ballistic-missile subma-
rines (SSBNs). China did not develop a
true sea-based deterrent until the
mid-2010s,
(M
ar
kSc
hi
ef
elb
ein
/A
FP
Ph
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The PLA Navy’s Long March 10, a Type-094 Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic-
missile submarine, at sea near Qingdao, eastern China, 23 April 2019
deploying its first Type-094 Jin-class SSBN in 2007. Today the PLA Navy (PLAN) has six
SSBNs, the most recent commissioned in April 2021.21
Each Jin-class submarine carries 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14) submarine-launched ballistic
missiles, which are sea-based variants of the DF-31 ICBM. The JL-2 has limited range, likely
around 7,000 km, which means that the submarines would need ‘to operate in areas north
and east of Hawaii if the PRC [People’s Republic of China] seeks to target the east coast
of the United States’.22 This constraint seriously limits the credibility of China’s sea-based
deterrent, especially given that only a portion of the SSBN force is at sea at any one time
and the possibility that these submarines might be vulnerable to US anti-submarine-
warfare efforts over such a long journey. However, China is developing an estimated 10,000
km-range follow-on, the JL-3, which would allow it to target portions of the continental US
from its own territorial waters.23 This missile will probably be deployed on the new Type-
096 submarine, which China likely began constructing in the early 2020s.24
Nuclear-armed bombers
China has not historically operated nuclear-capable bombers, although it did use a small
number of specially modified aircraft for nuclear-weapons tests in the 1960s and 1970s,
leading to speculation that some Chinese aircraft might have a nuclear-delivery mission.
Since 2017, however, China has made substantial progress towards developing ALBMs that
could deliver nuclear weapons.25 It has developed a new variant of the Xian H-6 bomber,
the ‘N’ variant, which can be refuelled in flight and has ‘recessed fuselage modifications
that would allow for the external carriage of an ALBM believed to be nuclear capable’.26
According to press reports, the ALBM – designated the CH-AS-X-13 by the US – is a 3,000
km-range, two-stage, solid-fuel variant of the ground-launched DF-21 ballistic missile.27
Nuclear-weapons stockpile
In 2020, the US Department of Defense estimated that China’s stockpile of nuclear warheads
was ‘in the low-200s’.28 This number was unchanged from declassified estimates dating back
to the early 1990s29 that appear to be derived from estimates of fissile-material production,
nuclear-weapons designs and the number of delivery vehicles deployed by China. There is
no evidence that the US has direct knowledge of the size of China’s nuclear stockpile.
China produced weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) at
four sites starting from the early 1960s. Beginning in the 1980s, however, these sites were
gradually converted for use by the civilian nuclear programme. This decision was part of
a broader trend of defence conversion, which represented a change in leadership priorities
rather than a conscious decision to cap China’s stockpile. Consequently, Beijing has not
publicly declared a moratorium on fissile-material production, although Chinese officials
have occasionally – and in private – stated that China is not producing HEU or plutonium
for weapons purposes.30
In the late 1990s, the US Department of Energy estimated that China had accumulated a
stockpile of between 1.7 and 2.8 tonnes of plutonium during its period of producing fissile
material.31 This number is broadly consistent with open-source estimates, which cluster
around median estimates of about two or three tonnes. While official estimates of China’s
HEU production are not available, open-source estimates place the total amount of HEU
produced by China at 10–20 tonnes. How many nuclear weapons these estimates represent
depends on how much fissile material each nuclear weapon uses. Fissile-material usage
can vary greatly across different designs, meaning that estimating the size of China’s stock-
pile further requires making educated guesses about the types and degree of sophistication
of its nuclear weapons.
In general, such estimates are produced by examining nuclear tests and historical
sources that often describe in general terms the course of China’s nuclear-weapons devel-
opment. China has likely only deployed a small number of nuclear-warhead designs,
including a large multi-megaton thermonuclear warhead for its older liquid-fuelled ballistic
missiles and a more modern warhead for its solid-propellant ballistic missiles tested prior
to China’s signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.
Declassified estimates – such as the expressed belief of the US intelligence community in
1993 that China’s stockpile was ‘based on only a few designs’ – are derived by matching the
development of delivery systems with China’s 46 nuclear explosive tests, which were largely
conducted in the atmosphere until the early 1980s.32 Because those tests were conducted in
the atmosphere, it is possible to confirm with publicly available data the course of Chinese
nuclear-weapons development until nuclear testing went underground in the early 1980s.
In the mid-1990s, China completed the development of a warhead for its new genera-
tion of solid-propellant ballistic missiles. This design is likely the mainstay of its nuclear
forces today. It is the most modern nuclear warhead that China has been able to validate
with an explosive test and, according to one US estimate, weighs 470 kilograms.33 Based
on publicly available seismic data from the test series and US and Soviet nuclear-test expe-
rience, the warhead could have a yield of several hundred kilotons. Both estimates are
consistent with open-source information that China planned a warhead with a mass of 500
kg and a yield of 300 kt.34 The ‘yield to weight’ ratio is a common figure of merit for nuclear
warheads; achieving a ratio of 1 (500 kg and 500 kt) is plausible for a state with significant
nuclear-testing and -design experience.
How much fissile material might such a device require? A thermonuclear weapon
comprises a primary stage that might use plutonium, HEU or both, and a secondary
stage that includes thermonuclear materials such as lithium-6 and a significant amount
of HEU. Based on its atmospheric nuclear tests, China’s large, multi-megaton thermonu-
clear warhead used significant amounts of
Commander of US Strategic Command Admiral Charles Richard testifies during
plutonium in its primary. Its modern ther- a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Washington DC, 8 March 2022
monuclear weapon, tested in the early 1990s,
would be expected to make more efficient use
of plutonium than its predecessor, although
analysts are largely left to guess. Assuming
3–6 kg of plutonium per nuclear weapon
would suggest China had sufficient fissile
material for several hundred warheads.
The US has recently released a new esti-
mate that ‘Beijing has accelerated its nuclear
(Drew Angerer/Getty Images)
expansion, which may enable the PRC to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads
by 2027 and likely intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030’.35 Although this esti-
mate does not indicate a consensus of the US intelligence community, it reflects a growing
concern that China will continue to expand its nuclear stockpile. If China wished to increase
its stockpile substantially – to around 1,000 warheads – it would have two options: produce
additional fissile material, or use a new design that would make more efficient use of its
existing stock of plutonium.
US officials have highlighted the possibility that China might employ its large civilian
nuclear-energy programme to increase its stockpile size by using fast breeder reactors and
reprocessing facilities to produce and harvest weapons-grade plutonium. Testifying before
the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2021, Admiral Richard stated:
With a fast breeder reactor, you now have a very large source of weapons grade pluto-
nium available to you, that will change the upper bounds of what China could choose
to do if they wanted to, in terms of further expansion of their nuclear capabilities.36
This observation is repeated in the 2021 edition of the Department of Defense’s annual
report to Congress regarding military and security developments involving China.37 It is
important to stress that these comments are intended to underline options available to
China and are not US intelligence judgements about what Chinese leaders have chosen to
do. Relying on fast breeder reactors to provide plutonium would entail significant tech-
nical risk. Although the possibility of economical fast breeder reactors was recognised
immediately in the nuclear age, states that have invested in their development have typi-
cally found them expensive to build and difficult to operate safely. While Beijing could
choose to take this path despite the apparent difficulties, a simpler solution would be to
build dedicated plutonium-production reactors using familiar designs.
China could also attempt to develop a new generation of nuclear warheads that make
more efficient use of fissile material. Reports in the Chinese press have indicated that
China’s final nuclear test was intended to vali-
date even more advanced nuclear-weapons The Sunway TaihuLight at the National Supercomputing
designs.38 To assess their performance, China Center in Wuxi, eastern China, 29 August 2020
would rely heavily on modern computing

capabilities, data from past nuclear explosive
tests, and sub-critical tests conducted at the
nuclear-test site near Lop Nor.
In the US, there is a generational divide
among nuclear-weapons designers. Older
designers express little confidence in designs
that have not been explosively tested, while
younger designers are more comfortable
relying on computer models. This divide
reflects, in part, the enormous advances in
supercomputing that have occurred since the
(Chinatopix via APimages)
mid-1990s. China’s early nuclear-weapons Figure 5.2: United States’ and China’s maximum supercomputing
speeds, 1995–2021
designers were highly conservative in
their design choices, and it is unclear how Maximum performance (teraflops)
comfortable the current generation would
be developing new designs without addi- 100,000
tional explosive testing. When China

stopped testing in 1996 it had extremely 1,000
limited supercomputing capabilities that

fell far short of the 100-teraflops (one trillion 10
floating operations per second) benchmark
that US designers thought necessary to US
0.1 China
certify nuclear weapons without testing (see
0
Figure 5.2).39 Today China is a world leader
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2021
in supercomputing. Its Sunway TaihuLight
is the world’s fourth-fastest computer with
a rating of 93,000 teraflops. China is also developing a so-called ‘exascale’ computer Maximum performance is as measured
using the LINPACK benchmark of
capable of performing an exaflop (one million teraflops).40 computing power by which researchers
China does conduct stockpile-stewardship efforts, including so-called ‘sub-critical tests’ compile the TOP500 list of fastest super-
computers in the world. It is expressed
that do not produce a nuclear explosion. In 1999, the State Department reported that it in ‘teraflops’, or trillions of floating-point
believed China had initiated a programme at its Lop Nor test site ‘to evaluate the safety and operations (a type of mathematical
calculation) per second.
reliability of its nuclear weapons’.41 The US National Academies suggested these activities
Source: TOP500, www.top500.org
would include ‘hydrodynamic tests with flash radiography and subcritical tests’.42 The US
conducts similar tests underground at its former nuclear-test site in Nevada and maintains
the site in a state of readiness to resume explosive testing with as little as six months’ notice.
Commercial satellite images show similar activity levels consistent with sub-critical
testing and test-site-readiness activities at Lop Nor. These activities have given rise to a debate
in the US about whether China is strictly adhering to the CTBT, which has not yet entered
into force, or whether it is conducting small nuclear explosions that are not detectable using
existing means of monitoring.43 This debate is reflected in the State Department’s annual
compliance report of April 2021, which cited observable activities at Lop Nor as having ‘raised
concerns regarding its adherence to the US “zero yield” nuclear testing moratorium’.44 In
2012, a National Academy of Sciences panel said that conducting extremely low-yield nuclear
tests could allow China ‘to partially validate design codes and modernize [its] arsenal’, but
continued that the country is ‘unlikely to be able to deploy new types of strategic nuclear
weapons that fall outside of the design range of [its] nuclear-explosion test experience’.45
Additional systems
In addition to new offensive nuclear-weapons systems, China is developing other stra-
tegic systems that have raised alarm in the US and among American allies. Over the
past two decades, Beijing has invested in a range of anti-satellite capabilities, including
ground-based lasers and a direct-ascent missile capable of destroying adversary satellites.
It demonstrated a hit-to-kill direct-ascent anti-satellite missile in 2007, which destroyed a
defunct Chinese weather satellite in orbit. The development of this system was, according
to Chinese sources, driven by concerns about advanced US military capabilities – including

missile defences – that depend on space-based sensors to operate.46
The 2007 anti-satellite weapons tests were met with significant international outcry,
prompting Beijing to shift to testing the same system as an anti-ballistic missile. China
has now reportedly developed ‘kinetic-kill vehicle technology to field a mid-course inter-
ceptor, which will form the upper layer of a multi-tiered missile defense’.47 It tested this
system in February 2021.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY AT STRATEGIC AND THEATRE LEVELS

Why are China’s nuclear forces changing? One view is that Beijing has embarked on a
search for nuclear parity with the US, deploying a wide range of new capabilities in large
numbers that could be used to deter the US from coming to the aid of allies (Taiwan, for
example) and to coerce regional states that might oppose Chinese regional hegemony. This
view starts with the observation that the PLARF has married a large arsenal of conven-
tional missiles with a highly offensive doctrine for conventional missile strikes.48 It is
easy to imagine that Beijing’s nuclear policy might eventually evolve in similar ways. In
this view, China’s growing economy and increasingly authoritarian leadership under Xi
Jinping represent a sharp break with the past.
Another view is that the new capabilities do not represent a fundamental break with a
policy of assured retaliation. Although in the past China’s nuclear forces were smaller and less
capable, leaders were extremely concerned about their survivability, exploring anti-satellite
weapons, anti-ballistic missiles, orbital bombardment systems and a variety of basing modes
for their ICBMs. They chose not to pursue most of these systems for historically contingent
reasons – China had limited resources and, following Mao Zedong’s death, leaders insisted
that the international environment was becoming increasingly benign to justify a process
of reform and opening that entailed a significant amount of defence conversion. Restraint,
however, was hardly complacency: Chinese strategists simultaneously expressed alarm
about the development of advanced US military capabilities, including missile defences.
In this view, China remains committed to preserving an assured retaliatory capability
in the face of increasingly capable US strategic forces, including missile defences. However,
that commitment is mediated both through leadership perceptions that the US has become
more difficult to deter and the availability of more options since China labours under fewer
technical and financial constraints.
In 2022, China has technological options that it did not have in the past. Beijing consid-
ered shell-game-style basing desirable in the 1980s. However, its large, liquid-fuelled
ICBMs were unsuitable for a ‘race-track’-style system in which missiles were moved
among silos. Today, China is deploying solid-propellant ICBMs that could easily be shut-
tled in canisters among a much larger number of silos. Similarly, in the past China rejected
placing its large liquid-fuelled missiles on alert partly because the country lacked ground-
based radars and satellites to warn of an attack. Today, China has early-warning radars,
an early-warning satellite and a modern communications infrastructure. Beijing ended
research into its FOBS when accuracy issues became apparent, but hypersonic glide vehi-
cles are now able to glide onto target using modern guidance technologies.
Former Chinese leaders might have made different decisions about the country’s nuclear
posture had their options been different. It is impossible to separate how Mao and others
viewed nuclear weapons from the context in which they arrived at those views. What has
changed more than anything else is China’s economy. The current leaders preside over one
of the world’s largest economies and do not feel the technological constraints that bound
Mao, nor are they compelled to seek reform and opening as Deng Xiaoping did. China’s
economic dynamism has produced a leadership committed to tightening political control
of the country and fearful of external efforts to weaken that dynamism and undermine the
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) control.
It is by no means clear that the leadership has dramatically changed its views about
nuclear weapons in response to this different context. Consumed by the challenges of
maintaining economic growth and securing the CCP’s leadership, it is more likely that Xi
and other senior figures in Beijing are broadly committed to military modernisation but
do not think deeply about nuclear deterrence. However, it is also possible that leaders will
begin to think differently as these new capabilities offer them novel options.
China’s new nuclear forces raise troubling questions about crisis stability, particularly
escalation control in a crisis. Even if Beijing and Washington view their own nuclear forces
as inherently retaliatory, it will not be clear to either that the other side shares this percep-
tion. US and allied officials dismiss China’s unconditional no-first-use pledge as little more
than propaganda. They believe there are scenarios in which Beijing might initiate the use
of nuclear weapons. For example, some US officials have expressed concern that China
might engage in limited use of nuclear weapons for escalation control. During a crisis,
it is possible to imagine China putting some nuclear forces into the field or to sea as part
of a basic measure to improve their survivability. The US, however, might conclude that
these forces were being postured for a first use of nuclear weapons by China to attempt
to control escalation. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that China maintains dual-
capable missile systems. For instance, if during a conventional conflict over Taiwan China
were to prepare DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles for use against US bases in
Guam, it is not clear that Washington would be able to interpret correctly whether the
ensuing attack was conventional or nuclear.
Moreover, if the US were to attack dual- Chinese DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic
missiles on parade in Beijing, 3 September 2015
capable systems such as the DF-26 throughout
China, it cannot be guaranteed that Chinese
leaders would understand that such an
attack was limited in scope. These challenges
are difficult enough to reason through in the
comfort of an office behind a keyboard. They
would be much more ambiguous and fright-
ening in a situation room under the pressure
of events in a real crisis.
The problem is further complicated by
‘entanglement’ – the tight coupling of the
development of US and Chinese forces.
(Rolex Dela Pena/AFP via Getty Images)
As the US built missile defences, China developed anti-satellite weapons to target sensors
and a FOBS to offer avenues of attack other than over the North Pole. In turn, the US
has explored the development of long-range conventional-strike systems to target Chinese
anti-satellite systems and may seek anti-satellite weapons of its own to counter potential
Chinese FOBS. The existence of large numbers of complex military forces with interlocking
concepts of operations raises difficult questions about timing and incentives in a crisis.
A missile-defence system works most effectively if a first strike reduces the number of
missiles with which it must contend. An anti-satellite weapon works best if it can blind the
missile defences before the first strike. Each additional layer of complexity reduces the time
available to decision-makers and makes it harder to react calmly to warnings.
POTENTIAL FOR ARMS CONTROL

Beijing’s growing nuclear arsenal is a concern for traditional US approaches to managing
the strategic challenge that China presents. The American approach to date has been to
watch China warily. The George W. Bush administration was worried by a ‘sprint to parity’
scenario in which US nuclear reductions would prompt China to seek numerical parity. Its
solution was ‘dissuasion’, hoping that the United States’ retention of large advantages in
nuclear forces (such as a stockpile four times as large as China’s) would dissuade Beijing
from seeking numerical parity. Others argued that attempting to maintain large advan-
tages would provoke a Chinese build-up.
The Trump administration made a public show of attempting to bring China into
bilateral arms-control negotiations in the context of discussions about extending the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Marshal Billingslea, then undersecretary
of state for arms control and international security, went so far as to place small Chinese
flags in front of empty seats at a 2020 meeting between the US and Russia on extending
the agreement. Billingslea photographed the flags and then posted them on Twitter with
the caption: ‘Vienna talks about to start. China is a no-show.’49 Many observers denounced
the tweet as a stunt, including the Russian delegation attending the talks. ‘There weren’t
any Chinese flags in the negotiating room and couldn’t have been at Russian–American
consultations on strategic stability’, one
Russian official told Russian news agency Empty seats at US–Russia New START negotiations, Vienna, 22 June 2020
RIA Novosti.50 Chinese officials believed that

the Trump administration did not want to
extend New START and was using China’s
non-participation as a thin veil to obscure
Washington’s own preferences.51 Similarly,
US officials, when blaming Russia for the
demise of the 1987 Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, also made it
clear that Washington would want China to
be included in any replacement.52
It is easy to overlook the fact that China
did engage in arms control for a short period.
(Marshall Billingslea via Twitter)
In the 1990s, it signed the CTBT and participated in the early stages of preparatory efforts to
negotiate a ‘fissile material cut-off treaty’. These efforts are overlooked because they were
multilateral, although that feature was very appealing to China. The CTBT especially was
evidence that China could be enticed into negotiations that constrained its nuclear arsenal
providing they had widespread international support and similarly constrained the US.
These two agreements would have provided important constraints on the nuclear powers.
China would be hard-pressed today to complete the current expansion of its nuclear forces
if the nuclear-test ban were in force and if there were a verifiable prohibition on producing
new fissile material for nuclear weapons.
These efforts collapsed due to the same issues that are driving Sino-American nuclear
tensions today. Although the US signed the CTBT, it did not ratify it. Chinese officials
made it clear that China would not ratify the treaty until the US did so. Furthermore,
Beijing began to block negotiations on a fissile-material cut-off treaty after 1998 because
Chinese officials felt they could not commit to capping their arsenal if the US was
committed to an open-ended strategic modernisation that included missile defences.
In the 1990s China tried two different arms-control strategies. At first, it attempted to
negotiate a bilateral no-first-use pledge with the US, which the Clinton administra-
tion rejected. Subsequently, it tried to link efforts in the United Nations Conference on
Disarmament to negotiate a fissile-material cut-off treaty with a corresponding nego-
tiation on what Beijing and Moscow called ‘preventing an arms race in outer space’.
This policy was a back-door effort to negotiate limits on US missile defences, which rely
heavily on space-based sensors.
Then, as now, the key questions were simple but different for each country. For China,
the question remains whether the US accepts mutual deterrence. China developed an
assured retaliation capability to prevent what it perceived to be nuclear coercion. Beijing
sees the modernisation of US nuclear forces – and the deployment of missile defences – as
an attempt to negate the Chinese deterrent so assiduously constructed over many decades.
For Washington, the question remains whether Beijing seeks numerical parity and to
undermine US extended deterrence in the Asia-Pacific. What Beijing perceived as nuclear
‘blackmail’ in the 1950s was, from Washington’s vantage point, simply the US coming to
the aid of its allies in South Korea and Taiwan.
CONCLUSION
It is necessary to consider China’s nuclear modernisation in the broader context of the
Sino-American security relationship. The question of whether China’s nuclear forces are
intended simply to deter the US or whether they threaten Washington’s ability to extend
deterrence to its allies cannot be answered by merely counting missiles and warheads or
working out ‘exchange ratios’ for nuclear strikes and counterstrikes.
The question is fundamentally political. In order to stabilise their bilateral nuclear
dynamic, Chinese and American leaders must work out what the other side wants. The
available evidence suggests that each side struggles with this crucial task. The US intel-
ligence community can provide a careful accounting of the nuclear forces that China
is building, but the question of why is harder to parse. Chinese intelligence analysts
presumably also struggle to understand US nuclear motives. Chairman of the US Joint

Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley was sufficiently alarmed by a body of intelligence
indicating that China believed the US might launch an attack that he twice reached out to
his Chinese counterpart to de-escalate tensions in late 2020 and early 2021.53
The infrastructure the two sides have created to manage these tensions is woefully
inadequate. While the hardware exists, it is not suited to the two countries’ political rela-
tionship. US policy coordinator for the Indo-Pacific Kurt Campbell has stated that while
a hotline does exist, ‘it’s known to have, the couple of times we’ve used it, just rung in an
empty room for hours upon hours’.54 Calls take days to organise and, as General Milley
discovered from the political response to his calls, may resurrect unresolved tensions
within each country about how to deal with the other.
A deeper problem is that neither side is sure the other is committed to the status quo.
The debate over whether China is seeking to restore a credible deterrent or attempting to
develop a coercive capability replicates the broader debate about the sort of competition
that is emerging between the two countries. Is China simply becoming more powerful
within an international system that has facilitated its rise, or is Beijing seeking to over-
throw the system? Finding the answer to this question exceeds the scope of this chapter.
The two countries do, however, share an interest in avoiding nuclear war. It is firmly in
the interest of both parties to explore whether they could stabilise the nuclear dynamics
of the bilateral relationship.
One possibility is for China and the US to devise and issue a communiqué or joint
statement on strategic stability. Such an agreement would attempt, much as the Shanghai
Communiqué of 1972 did with regard to Taiwan’s status, to set out clearly the parties’
differences and, crucially, the elements of a status quo that each could accept in the interests
of peace and stability. On Taiwan, the crucial bargain was Washington’s acknowledgement
that there was ‘one China’ while reaffirming its interest that any settlement of the issue
must be peaceful. For a joint statement on strategic stability, the US might acknowledge
that it does not seek to negate China’s deterrent, while China for its part might reject an
interest in numerical parity while also making clear that it does not seek to undermine the
extended deterrence that the US provides for its regional allies.
Such an agreement would not resolve all the difficult aspects of the nuclear dynamic,
which is part of a broader troubled relationship. Yet it might stabilise the dynamic and
provide the two countries with a clear definition of the status quo against which stability
could be understood. Over time, achieving real stability would require negotiated and
verifiable limitations on both countries’ offensive and defensive strategic forces.
The alternative to initiating strategic-arms control between China and the US is
that the two powers continue with a mode of great-power competition that includes
a nuclear arms race. Yet an arms race is a strange sort of competition: it has no finish
line. Victory in such a race is usually found in stability – the simple act of being able
to run the race without it careening out of control in a crisis. Stable deterrence, in turn,
depends at least partly on a basic level of mutual understanding. If the shock produced
by China’s changing nuclear arsenal tells us anything, it is that this understanding
remains in short supply.
NOTES
1 Peter Martin, ‘US General Likens China’s washingtonpost.com/national-security/

Hypersonic Test to a “Sputnik Moment”’, china-nuclear-missile-silos/2021/06/30/0fa8debc-
Bloomberg, 27 October 2021, https://www. d9c2-11eb-bb9e-70fda8c37057_story.html. The
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-27/ second field, near Hami, was found by Matt
milley-likens-china-s-hypersonic-weapon-test- Korda at the Federation of American Scientists.
to-sputnik-moment. See Korda and Hans Kristensen, ‘China Is
2 Author’s interview, September 2021. Building a Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field’,
3 The phrase ‘minimum means of reprisal’ is Federation of American Scientists, 26 July 2021,
from the English translation of Nie Rongzhen’s https://fas.org/blogs/security/2021/07/china-is-
memoir. See Nie Rongzhen, Inside the Red Star: building-a-second-nuclear-missile-silo-field/.
The Memoirs of Marshal Nie Rongzhen (Beijing: The third silo field, near Ordos, was found by
New World Press, 1988). The phrase ‘有起码的 Rod Lee of China Aerospace Studies Institute.
还击手段’ was translated as ‘at least then, we See Lee, ‘PLA Likely Begins Construction of an
could effectively counterattack’ in the English- Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Silo Site Near
language excerpt published as ‘How China Hanggin Banner’, China Aerospace Studies
Develops Its Nuclear Weapons’ in the Beijing Institute, 12 August 2021, https://www.airuni-
Review, 29 April 1985. See also Jeffrey Lewis, versity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2729781/
The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search pla-likely-begins-construction-of-an-interconti-
for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, MA: nental-ballistic-missile-silo-si/.
MIT Press, 2007); and Jeffrey Lewis, Paper Tigers: 11 Lewis and Hua, ‘China’s Ballistic Missile
China’s Nuclear Posture, Adelphi 446 (Abingdon: Programs’.
Routledge for the IISS, 2014). 12 Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, ‘Transcript: A
4 M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘China’s Conversation with Admiral Charles Richard’,
Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Hudson Institute, 14 September 2021, https://
Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure’, www.hudson.org/research/17264-tran-
International Security, vol. 35, no. 2, Autumn script-a-conversation-with-admiral-richard.
2010, pp. 48–87: 58. 13 Gregory Kulacki, ‘China’s Military Calls
5 See Peking Review, no. 44, 30 October 1964, p. 6. for Putting Its Nuclear Forces on Alert’,
6 John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, ‘Making China’s Union of Concerned Scientists, January
Nuclear War Plan’, Bulletin of the Atomic 2016, https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/
Scientists, vol. 68, no. 5, September 2012, pp. files/attach/2016/02/China-Hair-Trigger-full-
45–65. This article is based on a longer Chinese report.pdf.
article by Lewis and Xue. 14 Jeffrey Lewis and Bruno Tertrais, ‘The Finger
7 Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture, on the Button: The Authority to Use Nuclear
pp. 107–8. Weapons in Nuclear-Armed States’, CNS
8 See John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, ‘China’s Occasional Paper no. 45, February 2019, pp. 19–21.
Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, 15 ‘Statement of General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy,
Strategies, Goals’, International Security, vol. US Air Force Commander US Northern
17, no. 2, Autumn 1992, pp. 5–40, https://doi. Command and North American Aerospace
org/10.2307/2539167. Defense Command Before the Senate Armed
9 David C. Logan, ‘Career Paths in the PLA Services Committee’, US Senate Committee on
Rocket Force: What They Tell Us’, Asian Security, Armed Services, 13 February 2020, p. 6, https://
vol. 15, no. 2, 2019, pp. 103–21. www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
10 The first silo field, near Yumen, was found by OShaughnessy_02-13-20.pdf.
Decker Eveleth working with researchers from 16 US–China Economic and Security Review
the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Commission, ‘Chapter 2 Section 2 – China’s
Studies (CNS). See Joby Warrick, ‘China Military Modernization’, in ‘2014 Annual
Is Building More Than 100 New Missile Report to Congress’, November 2014, p. 292,
Silos in Its Western Desert, Analysts Say’, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
Washington Post, 30 June 2021, https://www. Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%202%3B%20
Section%202%20China%E2%80%99s%20 of 72 launch tubes, but according to the US

Military%20Modernization.pdf. See the testi- Department of Defense, based on a recent
mony of Lee Fuell, Technical Director for Force parade at least a full complement of 12 JL-2s are
Modernization and Employment at the National ‘complete and operational’. That raises the possi-
Air and Space Intelligence Center. bility that China might rotate a smaller number
17 The possibility should be noted that China of JL-2 missiles among the boats. See Office of the
may have simply used an orbital path to make Secretary of Defense, US Department of Defense,
possible a long-range test of its hypersonic ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military and
glider that could be tracked on a trajectory into Security Developments Involving the People’s
China by ships and land-based sensors. In the Republic of China 2021’, p. 49.
1970s, US intelligence wrongly assessed that 24 Ibid.
China was developing nuclear gravity bombs 25 ‘The PLA is also upgrading its aircraft … with
because of the widespread use of aircraft two, new air-launched ballistic missiles, one
to conduct atmospheric nuclear explosions. of which may include a nuclear payload.’
Chinese historical literature, however, indicated See Statement of Lt-Gen. Vincent R. Stewart,
that the use of aircraft was intended to reduce Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, to the
fallout and that China did not, at that time, Armed Services Committee, US Senate, 23 May
intend the future deployment of nuclear gravity 2017, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
bombs except as an emergency capability. See imo/media/doc/Stewart_05-23-17.pdf.
Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture. 26 Office of the Secretary of Defense, US
18 Office of the Secretary of Defense, US Department Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report
of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military to Congress: Military and Security
and Security Developments Involving the Developments Involving the People’s
People’s Republic of China 2021’, Annual Report Republic of China 2021’, p. 92.
to Congress, November 2021, p. 163, https:// 27 Ankit Panda, ‘Revealed: China’s Nuclear-
media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/- Capable Air-Launched Ballistic Missile’,
1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF. Diplomat, 10 April 2018, https://thediplomat.
19 Office of the Secretary of Defense, US com/2018/04/revealed-chinas-nuclear-capa-
Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report ble-air-launched-ballistic-missile/.
to Congress: Military and Security 28 Office of the Secretary of Defense, US
Developments Involving the People’s Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report
Republic of China 2021’, p. 91. to Congress: Military and Security
20 Ankit Panda, ‘Questions About China’s DF-17 Developments Involving the People’s
and a Nuclear Capability: Does the DF-17 Republic of China 2021’, p. 92.
Really Have a Nuclear Role?’, Diplomat, 29 ‘China’s … nuclear weapons stockpile of 200 to
16 February 2020, https://thediplomat. 250 warheads is based on only a few designs.’
com/2020/02/questions-about-chinas-df-17- See ‘China’s Nuclear Weapons Testing: Facing
and-a-nuclear-capability/. Prospects for a Comprehensive Test Ban’,
21 Matthew P. Funaiole, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Scientific and
and Brian Hart, ‘A Glimpse of Chinese Ballistic Weapons Research, Central Intelligence Agency
Missile Submarines’, Center for Strategic and (CIA), 30 September 1993, https://www.cia.gov/
International Studies, 4 August 2021, https:// readingroom/docs/DOC_0000996367.pdf; ‘Beijing
www.csis.org/analysis/glimpse-chinese-ballis- currently has fielded a nuclear stockpile esti-
tic-missile-submarines. mated by the Intelligence Community at between
22 Office of the Secretary of Defense, US 200 and 300 weapons.’ See ‘China Seeking
Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Foreign Assistance to Address Concerns About
Congress: Military and Security Developments Nuclear Stockpile Under CTBT’, Proliferation
Involving the People’s Republic of China Digest, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, 29 March
2021’, p. 91. 1996, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/
23 It is unclear how many JL-2 SLBMs and asso- DOC_0000996348.pdf.
ciated nuclear weapons are available to the 30 For example, in 2005, John Carlson, then director
PLAN. There are six submarines, with a total general of the Australian Safeguards and
Nonproliferation Office, briefed US embassy in Sharon Weinberger and Nathan Hodge, ‘A

officials on his recent trip to Beijing to begin Nuclear Family Vacation’, Slate, 13 July 2005,
exploratory talks on Australian uranium sales to http://www.slate.com/articles/life/welltraveled/
China. He was told by Chinese officials that ‘he features/2005/a_nuclear_family_vacation/a_
should infer … that China was not producing nuclear_family_rivalry.html.
such fissile material’. William Stanton, 40 Tiffany Trader, ‘Three Chinese Exascale
then deputy chief of mission in Canberra, Systems Detailed at SC21: Two Operational
summarised Carlson’s briefing in a cable subse- and One Delayed’, HPC Wire, 24 November
quently released by WikiLeaks. See ‘Discussions 2021, https://www.hpcwire.com/2021/11/24/
Begin for China to Buy Australian Uranium’, 4 three-chinese-exascale-systems-detailed-at-sc21-
March 2005, WikiLeaks, http://www.wikileaks. two-operational-and-one-delayed/.
org/plusd/cables/05CANBERRA432_a.html. 41 ‘CTBT: Regional Issues and US Interests’, fact-
31 Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, ‘World sheet released by the Bureau of Arms Control, US
Plutonium Inventories’, Bulletin of the Atomic Department of State, 8 October 1999, https://1997-
Scientists, vol. 55, no. 5, September 1999, p. 71. 2001.state.gov/global/arms/factsheets/wmd/
32 Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture, nuclear/ctbt/fs_991008_adherence.html.
pp. 52–4. 42 National Academies of Sciences, Technical Issues
33 Untitled, National Air Intelligence Center Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
assessment, NAIC-1442-0629-97, 10 December Treaty (Washington DC: National Academies
1996. Published in the appendix of Bill Gertz, Press, 2002), p. 73.
Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration 43 Like the US, China is one of a handful of states
Undermined American Security (Washington DC: to have signed but not ratified the treaty. For the
Regnery Publishing, 1999). CTBT to enter into force, eight additional states
34 Lewis and Hua, ‘China’s Ballistic Missile must accede to it: China, Egypt, India, Iran,
Programs’, p. 30. Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the US.
35 Office of the Secretary of Defense, US 44 US Department of State, ‘2021 Adherence
Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report to to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Congress: Military and Security Developments Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Involving the People’s Republic of China Agreements and Commitments’, 15 April
2021’, p. 97. 2021, p. 40, https://www.state.gov/2021-ad-
36 Timothy Gardner, ‘China Reactors Will Yield herence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-con-
Weapons-grade Plutonium – US Commander’, trol-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agree-
Reuters, 21 April 2021, https://www.reuters. ments-and-commitments/.
com/article/usa-china-nuclear-plutoni- 45 National Research Council, The Comprehensive
um-idUSL1N2ME1M6. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Technical Issues for
37 Office of the Secretary of Defense, US the United States (Washington DC: National
Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Academies Press, 2012), p. 117.
Congress: Military and Security Developments 46 Gregory Kulacki and Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Understanding
Involving the People’s Republic of China China’s Anti-satellite Test’, Nonproliferation Review,
2021’, p. 92. vol. 15, June 2008, pp. 335–47.
38 FBIS, Document ID CHI-2001-0613, ‘PRC Chief 47 Office of the Secretary of Defense, US Department
Engineer of Neutron Bomb Interviewed on of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Congress: Military
Nuclear Weapons Development’, from Chengdu and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Sichuan Ribao, 11 June 2001. Republic of China 2021’, p. 57.
39 In 1996, the fastest Chinese supercomputer had 48 See Michael S. Chase, ‘PLA Rocket Force
an Rmax of 6.6 gigaflops. The technical rationale Modernization and China’s Military Reforms’,
of the 100-teraflops benchmark was explained RAND Corporation, 15 February 2018, https://
by Bruce Goodwin, who created the estimate, doi.org/10.7249/CT489.
49 USArmsControl (@USArmsControl), ‘Vienna 52 US Department of State, ‘US Withdrawal from

talks about to start. China is a no-show. Beijing the INF Treaty on August 2, 2019’, 2 August 2019,
still hiding behind #GreatWallofSecrecy on https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-
its crash nuclear build-up, and so many other the-inf-treaty-on-august-2-2019/index.html.
things. We will proceed with #Russia, notwith- 53 General Milley testified that he made two calls to
standing’, 22 June 2020, https://twitter.com/ his Chinese counterpart because of ‘concerning
USArmsControl/status/1274956212723802113. intelligence which caused us to believe the
50 Henry Meyer and Nick Wadhams, ‘Russia, Chinese were worried about an attack by the US’.
China Lash Out at US Over Flag Stunt at Nuke See Andrew Desiderio, ‘Milley: Beijing’s Fears
Talks’, Bloomberg, 23 June 2020, https://www. of US Attack Prompted Call to Chinese General’,
bloombergquint.com/politics/russia-china-lash- Politico, 28 September 2021, https://www.politico.
out-at-u-s-over-flag-stunt-at-nuclear-talks. com/news/2021/09/28/milley-china-congress-
51 From Beijing’s perspective, it would be hard to hearing-514488.
understand the relevance of New START given 54 David Brunnstrom and Michael Martina,
that China’s nuclear forces today are much ‘Strategic Clarity on Taiwan Policy Carries
smaller than the treaty’s central limits of 1,550 “Significant Downsides” – US’, Reuters, 4
deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed May 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/
strategic offensive arms – and still would be asia-pacific/significant-downsides-strategic-clar-
even if China were to deploy 1,000 warheads. ity-over-taiwan-us-2021-05-04/.
CHAPTER 6
AIR AND NAVAL

OPERATIONS IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC: LEGAL
AND POLITICAL
DIMENSIONS
DR PETER A. DUTTON
Peter A. Dutton is Interim Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the US
Naval War College, Adjunct Professor at New York University (NYU) School
of Law, Faculty Advisor to NYU’s US–Asia Law Institute and an Associate in
Research at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies
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China’s air, naval and constabulary

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forces are active throughout the

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region advancing its interests and

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claims. Beijing engages in air operations

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ar
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to signal its displeasure with developments

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ilit
in Taiwan. At sea, the United States’ freedom-

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of-navigation operations push back against China’s

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attempts to deny passage and freedoms of the seas.

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Enhanced dialogue at every level will be essential to

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maintaining stability in East Asia.
AIR OPERATIONS: LEGALITY AND THREAT POSED

Since Tsai Ing-wen’s re-election as president of Taiwan in 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
has engaged in an intensified campaign of military signalling to demonstrate its resolve to prevent
the island from escaping the mainland’s grasp. This campaign includes air operations in Taiwan’s Air
Defence Identification Zone and, in recent years, across the median line of the Taiwan Strait. These
operations are lawful but signal Beijing’s willingness to accept increased operational risk to deter
unfavourable political developments in Taiwan.
CHINESE MARITIME OPERATIONS

China’s three sea forces – its navy, coastguard and militia – seek to consolidate territorial claims
and strengthen control over China’s near seas through grey-zone operations. The Philippines and
Indonesia were targets of China’s maritime pressure in 2021, strengthening support for US presence
in Southeast Asia. China’s Coast Guard Law continues to provoke particular concern in the region that
Beijing’s next step will be to enforce the extensive jurisdiction it claims.
NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ENHANCED DIALOGUE

The PLA and US forces operating in maritime East Asia are the daily tactical instruments of a broader
struggle for power, leadership and rule-making in the region. China’s increased aircraft sorties and
objections to lawful assertions of maritime rights and freedoms greatly heighten tensions in the
region. Informal agreements, such as the Taiwan Strait median line and the decision to shelve disputes
for later generations to resolve, have been important to regional stability in the past. They can be a
part of maintaining stability in the future.
)
AP
via
d
ar
Gu
sta
Co
ne
pi
lip
hi
(P
A China Coast Guard ship sails near a
Philippine Coast Guard vessel in the
waters west of Zambales province,
the Philippines, 2 March 2022
China’s military and constabulary forces are active throughout East Asian waters
advancing Beijing’s power in furtherance of its claims and interests. The framework for
these actions is divided by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine into non-war military
activities as a category distinct from the conduct of war. The PLA’s concept of non-war
military activities spans the spectrum from military diplomacy and humanitarian assis-
tance to near-war or war-threatening actions. Though they do not cross the technical
threshold of war, these operations can be coercive in nature and are designed to achieve
national political interests, such as advancing sovereignty and sovereign rights over
economic resources. Coercion and threats of violence below the level of armed conflict
can blend military and law-enforcement activities to achieve important national objec-
tives.1 In recent years, China’s military operations on its periphery have prioritised two
objectives. The PLA’s primary aim is to deter moves toward independence by Taiwan
and prepare for a contingency to unify the island with the mainland by military means
if necessary, including by preventing any third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.2 A
secondary but related objective is to advance Beijing’s claims and control over the features
and waters of the East and South China seas.
AIR OPERATIONS: LEGALITY AND THREAT POSED

Since Tsai Ing-wen’s re-election as president of Taiwan in 2020, the PLA has engaged in an
intensified campaign of military signalling to demonstrate its resolve to prevent the island
from escaping the mainland’s grasp. This campaign includes regular air operations in
Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), including signalling flights in the vicinity
of the median line (also known as the centre line) between the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait – a buffer that has served as a risk-reduction measure for decades. These flights are
Figure 6.1: Maritime and airspace zones
National Airspace
airspace International Airspace
airspace
12 nm 24 nm 200 nm
Internal Waters
Territorial Sea
sea Contiguous Zone
zone
Exclusive economic
Economic zone
Zone seas
High Seas
BASELINE Continental Shelf

shelf Deep
To a maximum of 350 nm from the baseline or 100 nm seabed
beyond the 2,500 metre isobath, whichever is greatest area
Note: Not drawn to scale. nm = nautical mile. ©IISS

Source: IISS
designed to convey Beijing’s displeasure with certain actions of the Taiwanese government
and suggest an increased willingness by the former to escalate militarily if these actions
are repeated. Such flights are not illegal, nor are the intercept flights that Taiwan sends
in response. They are the lawful acts of separate governments pursuing national-security
interests in international airspace. However, the PLA flights do signal China’s increased
willingness to accept operational risk in the airspace off its coasts in order to send deter-
rence signals to Taiwan, the United States and others.
The increasing military activity in the skies over the Taiwan Strait and the South China
Sea (by China, Taiwan, the US and others) accords with international air law, which is
governed by a combination of custom and treaty. Customarily, the legal character of airspace
has reflected the legal character of the land or sea beneath it. In terms of treaty law, the
1919 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (the ‘Paris Convention’)
and the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (the ‘Chicago Convention’) each
perpetuate the long-held distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign space; both
require special authorisation for all aircraft – including military aircraft – to fly in the
airspace above the territory of another sovereign. In law, the sovereign’s territory includes
the territorial sea, a 12-nautical-mile band of ocean extending from the sovereign’s coast.
Thus, the airspace above the territorial sea is also sovereign and part of the national
airspace of the coastal state. The airspace over the oceans beyond the territorial sea is
non-sovereign – or international – in character. In international airspace, military aircraft
are simply expected to operate with due regard for the right of others to operate safely in
the same airspace and to refrain from unlawful threat or use of force.3
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) further divided
the waters beyond the territorial sea into the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), the continental shelf and the high seas (see Figure 6.1), but in each of these zones
UNCLOS explicitly retained the concept of high-seas freedoms.4 Nonetheless, for a time,
Chinese scholars and officials argued that UNCLOS also gave the coastal state security
interests beyond the territorial sea that should, on balance, be superior to international
rights to freely operate military aircraft there.5 However, over at least the last decade, as
China’s interests and military capacity have expanded, Beijing’s claims to legally protected
offshore security interests appear to have receded. Prior to about 2010, Beijing took the line
that military overflights above a coastal state’s EEZ were illegal, employing a convoluted
legal argument about a coastal state having a legally protected security interest in and
above the EEZ.6 Since about 2010, the Chinese narrative has shifted to acknowledging that
such flights ‘may be legal’ but are ‘unfriendly’ (i.e., politically provocative) and should
therefore not be undertaken in the context of an overall relationship seeking pathways
toward cooperation.7 In terms of Chinese operations and rhetoric, China’s policy, like that
of the US, may now favour broad operational rights for military aircraft in international
airspace above all non-sovereign maritime zones. If so, the major powers operating in the
airspace above East Asia appear to agree that in the airspace beyond the territorial sea,
military aircraft are, according to international law, allowed to operate freely with due
regard for others.
THE AIR DEFENCE IDENTIFICATION ZONE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Although UNCLOS did not create a new legal regime of protections for a coastal state’s
offshore security interests, the fact remains that coastal states do possess security inter-
ests that emanate to the maritime domain beyond the territorial sea. One way some states
choose to protect these security interests is to declare an ADIZ off their coasts. It is impor-
tant to note that establishing an ADIZ does not give the coastal state additional legal rights
or jurisdiction. General international law provides for a coastal state’s security whether
it possesses an ADIZ or not. These zones do, however, put other states on notice that the
coastal state has a heightened security interest in a particular area and may choose to exer-
cise its existing legal rights to ensure its security.
Conceptually, therefore, an ADIZ is a defined area of international airspace in which
a coastal state notifies other states of its security interests and publicises the procedures
it will follow – and may request others to follow – in furtherance of those interests. As
discussed above, the coastal state has no general authority to regulate the operational
activities of military aircraft in the international airspace off its coasts. However, it may
designate requested procedures for military aircraft to follow while they operate in inter-
national airspace within the ADIZ. These procedures assist the coastal state to ascertain the
character and intentions of foreign military aircraft operating off its coasts. The requested
procedures usually involve a radio request by the coastal state’s air-traffic controllers to the
military pilot to provide a positive radio identification, a statement of intentions and to set
the aircraft’s transponder to a particular frequency to allow the coastal state to readily track
and monitor the aircraft’s activities. When followed, these procedures assure the coastal
state that the foreign aircraft presents no active threat to its security. However, because
military aircraft possess the sovereign immunity of their state of origin, they cannot be
Map 6.1: Declared Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZs) in East Asia
RUSSIA
China
Japan Kuril Islands
South Korea
Taiwan
Philippines
Taiwan Strait
median line
Sea of
NORTH Japan
KOREA (East Sea)
Beijing
Pyongyang
Seoul
SOUTH
JAPAN
KOREA
Tokyo
Shanghai
East
China
Sea
CHINA
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
Taipei
Taiwan
Taiwan
Hong Kong Strait
Pratas
Islands
South
China
Sea Philippine
Sea
Paracel
Islands
Scarborough Manila
Shoal
PHILIPPINES
VIETNAM
Spratly
Islands
Sources: IISS; US Congressional Research Service, crsreports.congress.gov
Sulu
Sea ©IISS
required to follow these procedures. Accordingly, coastal states often provide notice that
unidentified or unresponsive aircraft operating in their ADIZ may be subject to intercept
and observation by their own military aircraft. Each aircraft – the foreign military aircraft
operating in the ADIZ and the coastal state’s intercepting aircraft – must always operate
with due regard for the rights and safety of each other and of others. In summary, the basic
principle of freedom of the skies governs the operation of military aircraft in international
airspace. The right of national defence and the responsibility to respect the rights of others
govern a coastal state’s reaction to them.
The international airspace of East Asia is well covered by ADIZs (see Map 6.1). China,
Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan have offshore ADIZs. Japan’s ADIZ was
drawn by the US during its occupation following the Second World War, in the context
of increasing tensions with the Soviet Union. It was eventually adopted by the Japanese
Ministry of Defense in 1969. Similarly, the South Korean ADIZ was first drawn by the US in
1951, after China entered the Korean War and as threats from Chinese aircraft increased.8
War on the Korean Peninsula also led to the creation of an ADIZ around Taiwan. North
Korea’s attack on the South led then US president Harry Truman to fear a larger commu-
nist assault in East Asia.9 In 1951, he reversed US policy and offered a mutual defence
assistance agreement to Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in Taiwan, stationed US forces on and
around the island and established the Taiwan ADIZ.10
The Philippines’ ADIZ was also established with US assistance. In 1953, a Philippine
presidential directive required the country’s civil-aeronautics administrator and air force to
establish the ADIZ ‘in consultation with representatives of the Armed Forces of the United
States’ for ‘effective air defense’ during the ongoing ‘military emergency’.11 China’s ADIZ
over the East China Sea was established much later, in November 2013, with some contro-
versy as to the degree of jurisdictional authority it appeared to claim and its apparent
threat to use force if not obeyed.12 Despite declaring these authorities, however, Beijing
has done little to act on them in the intervening years. Therefore, there are ADIZs in the
international airspace of East Asia that extend from Hokkaido to Luzon, covering much of
the Sea of Japan (East Sea), the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the
northeastern portion of the South China Sea. The latter two regions have been the focus of
tensions and attention most recently.
CHINESE AIR OPERATIONS AROUND TAIWAN

PLA naval and air-force flights around Taiwan began to increase dramatically after 2010,
especially in the airspace to its north over the East China Sea, through the Miyako Strait,
into the Philippine Sea, and even circumnavigating the island. In 2020, after nearly 70 years
of restraint and limited capacity, the increasingly capable PLA began flying up to and even
across the median line in the Taiwan Strait. The first such flights across the median line
came after then US health and human services secretary, Alex Azar, made an official visit
to the island in August 2020. Azar was the most senior US official to visit the island since
the US normalised relations with China in 1979.13 The visit was followed by an official visit
from then US under secretary of state for economic growth, energy, and the environment,
Keith Krach, in September 2020.14 The median line was established by the US in 1954 after
completing the Mutual Defense Assistance Then US secretary of health and human services Alex Azar
meets Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in Taipei, 10 August 2020
Agreement with Taiwan. Its purpose was to
discourage dangerous cross-strait military
incursions by both communist and nationalist
forces; it has served as a de facto demarcation
line since that time despite having no foun-
dation in either international law, national
legislation or formal agreement.15
Records of Chinese military incursions
into the Taiwan ADIZ – based on data made
public by the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense
– indicate that between October 2020 and
December 2021, PLA military aircraft entered
Taiwan’s ADIZ between ten and 27 days per
(Pei Chen/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)
month.16 There are conflicting statistics, but
only eight formations are known to have flown sorties across the median line in the middle
of the Taiwan Strait.17 Six of these incursions occurred in September 2020 following Azar’s
and Krach’s visits to Taiwan. Other sources report that in total there were 49 median-line
crossings in 2020.18 One possible explanation for the difference is that most median-line
crossings may have taken place at the very southern tip of the line – as aircraft flew from
the mainland to exercise or to operational stations in the South China Sea – and were not
intended to be especially provocative. In any event, the vast majority of Chinese aircraft
sorties crossing the median line flew into the southwest portion of Taiwan’s ADIZ between
Taiwan and the Taiwan-occupied Pratas Island in the South China Sea. Although these
flights cross the median line, the fact that they do so well outside the Taiwan Strait means
they are much less provocative.19 The Pratas Islands, which lie outside of Taiwan’s ADIZ,
lie in the north of the South China Sea, close to the Chinese mainland and approximately
400 kilometres southwest of Taiwan. Some observers, especially in Taiwan, see these flights
as intentionally provocative, since the PLA clearly has the military capacity to displace
the small contingent of Taiwanese forces on A member of Taiwan’s Coast Guard after a flag-
Pratas Island in a military action to demon- raising ceremony on Pratas Island, 11 April 2019
strate its power and possibly provoke a

wider conflict.20
According to Gerald C. Brown, a
Washington DC-based defence analyst, as
of 30 April 2022, there had been 1,480 PLA
aircraft sorties in Taiwan’s ADIZ in the
previous 20 months. The majority of these
incursions were reportedly by fighter aircraft
(782) and anti-submarine-warfare aircraft
(263).21 During one especially intense period
– over a four-day weekend in October 2021
during which China held its National Day
(Alberto Buzzola/LightRocket via Getty Images)
celebrations – 149 PLA aircraft of various

An H-6 bomber on display at an airshow in Zhuhai, southern China, 28 September 2021
types sortied to the airspace over the South
China Sea between Taiwan and the Pratas
Islands.22 From Friday to Sunday, PLA H-6
bombers, accompanied by J-16 and other
fighter aircraft, plus anti-submarine and early-
warning aircraft, flew from their mainland
bases into the airspace over the South China
Sea off the southern tip of Taiwan. Some
flights continued through the Luzon Strait
and then headed northeast to operate in
the Philippine Sea parallel to Taiwan’s east
coast before completing their missions.23
One especially significant development
(Chen Xiao/VCG via Getty Images)
was an incursion by a group of H-6s and
A J-16 fighter performs at a military open day in
accompanying fighter aircraft flying at night,
Changchun, northeast China, 17 October 2019
demonstrating advances in the PLA’s ability
to fly – and potentially to fight – around the
clock. This occurred as three aircraft carriers
– two from the US and one from the United
Kingdom – operated with a flotilla of navy
vessels from Canada, Japan, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, the UK and the US in the waters
off Okinawa and the Philippines. French navy
vessels had also been active in the region in
the preceding months.24
Given the level of tension, it is not
surprising that some of the PLA aircraft
operating in and around Taiwan’s ADIZ have
(STR/AFP via Getty Images)
real teeth. The H-6 is a PLA bomber, based on
the Soviet Tu-16 Badger, which forms the core
of the PLA’s strike force. As a bomber, it is operated in multiple incrementally improved
variants by both the PLA Air Force and the PLA Navy Air Force and incorporates many of
the PLA’s newest capabilities and technologies. Some H-6 variants have the capacity to carry
cruise missiles capable of threatening US bases throughout the Western Pacific and East
Asia.25 These systems make the H-6 one of the mainstays of the PLA’s ‘counter-intervention’
force structure. Similarly, the J-16 is an advanced strike fighter with an electronic-warfare
variant. These versions of the J-16 and H-6 would be useful operating together to suppress
Taiwan’s air-defence system in the early stages of a conflict.26 Accordingly, the combination
of H-6 and J-16 aircraft operating with anti-submarine and early-warning aircraft around
Taiwan signal China’s full-spectrum capacity to challenge US intervention in a conflict over
the future of the island and, in so doing, seek to deter both Taipei and Washington from
crossing any of Beijing’s red lines.
The vast majority of the PLA aerial operations in Taiwan’s ADIZ occur in the north-
eastern part of the South China Sea (as opposed to in the Taiwan Strait). What is unclear
is the degree to which these are merely overwater training flights in a convenient offshore
area as opposed to flight operations intended to intimidate Taiwan and signal China’s
displeasure with US actions. That a significant number of the incursions were made by
Y-8 anti-submarine-warfare aircraft suggests the possibility that submarine-tracking
operations may be the purpose of some of these flights of concern. The Bashi Channel
between Taiwan and the Philippines is a key submarine passage through the first island
chain. Certainly, the PLA has multiple motives for its operations. In addition to signalling,
training and operational requirements, these flights allow the PLA to gather intelligence
and to wear down Taiwan’s air force. Whatever the motives, these flights have the effect of
greatly heightening tensions in the region and are one significant driver of the rapid stra-
tegic and political changes under way.
CHINESE MARITIME OPERATIONS

China’s air operations over the waters of East Asia are matched by its long-standing
campaign on and under the waters of the East and South China seas. It is worth noting that
in this aspect of its maritime campaign China employs a much more numerous and diverse
array of tools than it does in the air. While China’s aerial operations have been undertaken
almost exclusively by the various branches of its military, on the water Beijing employs
three very different sets of tools.
China’s armed forces comprise three major organisations, each with a maritime
subcomponent that, taken together, comprise the world’s largest such sea force by number
of ships. Firstly, the PLA contains the PLAN. Secondly, since 2018 the People’s Armed
Police has formally overseen most maritime law-enforcement forces, including the China
Coast Guard (CCG). Finally, the People’s Armed Forces Militia oversees the People’s
Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). These organisations comprise China’s three sea
forces, which train, coordinate and operate together with increasing frequency and inte-
gration. Determined to change the status quo in its favour – while avoiding war if possible
but using coercion as necessary – Beijing employs its enormous second and third sea forces
in maritime grey-zone operations to further its disputed sovereignty and sovereign-rights
claims in the ‘Near Seas’ (the East and South China seas and the Yellow Sea). Typically, the
PLAN provides coordination and deterrence from over the horizon.27
East China Sea

The CCG was very active in the East China Sea in 2021. China claims sovereignty over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which are administered by Japan, and the CCG continues to patrol
the waters around the islands to advance China’s claims and undermine Japan’s exclusive
administrative control over them. Since 2020, the duration and assertiveness of patrols has
increased, with longer times spent in the territorial sea than in the past. In 2019, the CCG
was observed in the contiguous zone (a zone contiguous to the territorial sea not extending
beyond 24 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured)
around the islands for 282 days. This increased to 333 days in 2020, with two periods of
more than a day and a half each.28 In 2021, CCG incursions continued at a similar pace to
those in 2019 and 2020.29 CCG forces have also become more assertive during their patrols,
shadowing Japanese fishing vessels and ordering them to depart, causing the Japanese
Coast Guard to intervene and Tokyo to lodge protests to Beijing.30 These actions occurred
after the controversial new China Coast Guard Law came into effect on 1 February 2021,
providing the CCG with the right to take measures, including using weapons, in maritime
areas under the ‘jurisdiction’ of China, a term China interprets expansively.31
The PLAN was also active in the East China Sea in 2021. In addition to routine small-
unit training, the PLAN held a six-day surface drill that included live-fire exercises north of
Taiwan in July. The drill occurred after three US senators arrived in Taiwan aboard a US Air
Force C-17 transport aircraft in June. Another US military transport aircraft made a brief
stop in Taipei in July.32 In October, in the aftermath of the announcement of the AUKUS
agreement between Australia, the UK and the US, China and Russia held a joint naval
exercise in the East China Sea and Western Pacific. A sign of their growing military align-
ment, Beijing described the exercise as a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ to ‘jointly
maintain international and regional strategic stability’.33As part of the exercise, ten Chinese
and Russian naval vessels – five from each country – passed through Japan’s Tsugaru and
Osumi straits in a circumnavigation of Japan’s main island of Honshu. Although the ships’
passage was entirely lawful, it raised eyebrows given Beijing’s own description of foreign
warships passing through the Taiwan Strait as developments that could ‘seriously jeop-
ardize peace and stability’ and ‘stir up trouble’.34 In December 2021, the Chinese aircraft
carrier Liaoning led PLAN exercises in the East China Sea and in the Philippine Sea south-
east of Okinawa. The Liaoning conducted flight operations with J-15 carrier-based fighter
aircraft, among other flight operations.35
South China Sea

One of the most significant series of incidents in the South China Sea involved China’s mari-
time militia playing what some have called a ‘shell game’, moving from one contested spot
to another just ahead of law-enforcement vessels in the Spratly Islands (see Map 6.2 for key
features and groups of features in this area).36
Despite Chinese denials, there is ample A satellite image of Whitsun Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands, 9 March 2021
evidence that at least some of the ‘fishing

vessels’ that began gathering at Whitsun Reef
in the Union Banks of the Spratly Islands as
early as February 2020 were affiliated with
the PAFMM.37 Whitsun Reef is a shallow
coral reef with a natural harbour but little
or no land – artificial or otherwise – and no
built facilities.38 In the spring of 2020, Chinese
vessels avoided law-enforcement action by
circulating around the various unoccupied
features at Union Banks, including Whitsun
Reef, Kennan Reef, Hughes Reef and Sin
(Gallo Images/Orbital Horizon/Copernicus Sentinel Data 2021)
CHINA
Taiwan
Cowe Island.39 In late 2020 and early 2021, Map 6.2: Key features and groups of features near the Philippines
many of these vessels rode at anchor for
weeks or even months through good and
South
bad weather, suggesting that Beijing’s claim China
Sea
that they were escaping a storm was simply
cover for government-directed activities.40 Paracel
Islands
Bolstering this point of view is the fact that Scarborough
Shoal
China maintained a substantial presence
of civilian and militia fishing vessels in the
region for more than a year. In April 2021,
PHILIPPINES
CAMBODIA
there were as many as 220 Chinese fishing
vessels at Whitsun Reef, provoking concerns Reed
VIETNAM Bank
in Manila that China intended to occupy and
Spratly
fortify this feature.41 The vessels once again Islands
Second
circulated between Union Banks and Reed Thomas
Shoal
Bank, where they gathered at Iroquois Reef
in April. By September 2021 there were more
than 100 Chinese fishing vessels at Union
Banks. Their number rose to more than 150
in October.42 As of December 2021, many of
these vessels remained there, idle for at least
BRUNEI
three months.43 Natuna
Islands
Reed Bank is an especially sensitive area
for the Philippines. It is located off the island
MALAYSIA
INDONESIA
of Palawan, where Chinese vessels previ-
ously disrupted Philippine hydrocarbon ©IISS
development. In the 2016 South China Sea

arbitration case brought by the Philippines against China, the arbitral tribunal found that Source: IISS
Reed Bank is submerged at high tide and, forming part of the Philippines’ continental
shelf, is within the Philippines’ sovereign rights and control. China continues to refuse to
accept the award’s validity and contests its findings based on its claim of historic rights
related to its self-drawn ‘nine-dash line’ encapsulating much of the South China Sea.
In an incident that precipitated the Philippines bringing a legal case against China
under UNCLOS, China took over control of Scarborough Shoal in 2012. In the South
China Sea, China often employs grey-zone tactics – incremental steps to achieve control
over a maritime feature or to advance its maritime claims. Such tactics often begin with
passing domestic legislation that extends China’s jurisdictional authority and its enforce-
ment powers. China’s Coast Guard Law has caused particular concern in Manila and
elsewhere that Beijing’s next step will be to enforce the extensive jurisdiction it claims.44 In
the Philippines, China’s actions in the past two years have increased domestic frustration
with the government of President Rodrigo Duterte and elevated concerns in the fishing
EAST TIMOR
industry. (The latter fears it may face a second Scarborough Shoal-style incident at Whitsun
Reef – and another loss of access to rich fishing grounds.45)
China has also been applying pressure on

the Philippines throughout 2021 at Second Ahead of sailing into disputed waters, local fishermen prepare
their boat in Mariveles, western Luzon, Philippines, 18 May 2021
Thomas Shoal, another unoccupied reef
on the Philippines’ continental shelf not far
from Palawan but within the nine-dash line
and therefore claimed by China. Second
Thomas Shoal, like Reed Bank, was explic-
itly determined to be part of the Philippines’
continental shelf in the 2016 arbitration deci-
sion.46 On 16 November 2021, CCG vessels
aimed water cannons at and blocked two
Philippine civilian vessels delivering supplies
to the Philippine service members garrisoned
aboard the BRP Sierra Madre, a hulk used by
the Philippines’ government to establish a
(Jes Aznar/Getty Images)
military presence at the shoal. At least one
A satellite image of Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, 9 March 2020
Philippine commentator has suggested that
Beijing’s motive may have been to signal that
Manila should not undertake any actions or
decisions that undermine China’s interests
in the dispute.47 If true, Beijing’s actions are
yet another indication that it continues to
disregard the 2016 South China Sea arbitral
tribunal’s award.
China’s actions have had a significant
impact on the Philippines’ politics and
Manila’s willingness to work more closely
with the US. In July 2021, the Duterte admin-
istration reversed its previous position and
retracted its notice of termination of the
Visiting Forces Agreement with the US.48 The
agreement facilitates more than 300 bilat-
eral military engagements each year, such as (Gallo Images/Orbital Horizon/Copernicus Sentinel Data 2021)
expert exchanges, component exercises and
major training exercises with international
partners. The policy change came during US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s visit to
Manila in July, during which the two sides also discussed US support for modernising
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to deal with ‘the region’s complex security environ-
ment’.49 Furthermore, the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement already allows
the US to pre-position military assets in five locations in the Philippines to facilitate an
immediate response to any contingency in the region, such as a crisis in the South China
Sea or Taiwan Strait. Discussions are now reportedly under way to explore additional sites
– clearly not the result Beijing would have preferred.50
Indonesia also had to weather Map 6.3: Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and
China’s ‘nine-dash line’
Chinese maritime pressure in its EEZ in
2021.51 It followed the familiar pattern of China’s nine-dash line Paracel
Islands
non-militarised coercion China has employed Indonesia's EEZ
against Malaysia, the Philippines and

Vietnam. Over the summer of 2021, a joint
CAMBODIA
British and Russian venture drilled two
exploratory wells within Indonesia’s EEZ off
VIETNAM
the Natuna Islands, though the block in which
the wells were drilled falls within the farthest
Spratly
reaches of China’s nine-dash line (see Map Islands
6.3). CCG vessels trailed the rig but failed to
deter it from its work. In the following months,
Chinese officials reportedly demanded that
the drilling activities be halted. While Jakarta
prefers to maintain a low profile on the issue,
it has quite publicly worked with the US to
BRUNEI
build a joint coastguard training facility near Natuna
Islands
Natuna. It has also participated in a major
joint military exercise (Garuda Shield) to
MALAYSIA
practise island-defence tactics.52
The CCG and maritime-militia units
harass and coerce vessels in the South China
Sea; the Indonesian Navy and coastguard INDONESIA
have dealt with these Chinese tactics for many

©IISS
years. In one incident in 2013, an Indonesian
vessel from the Ministry of Maritime Affairs
and Fisheries encountered a Chinese fishing boat operating illegally in Indonesian waters Source: IISS
and arrested its crew. Yuzheng 310 – a Chinese maritime-law-enforcement vessel equipped
with guns, light cannons and electronic gear – began to threaten the Indonesian vessel,
demanding the release of the Chinese crew. The Indonesian vessels’ radios stopped
functioning (though they worked flawlessly before and after the incident) and the
Indonesian captain decided to acquiesce to the Chinese demands out of consideration
for the crew’s safety.53 In December 2019 and January 2020, more than 60 Chinese fishing
vessels went to fish in the portion of the Indonesian EEZ claimed by China. Where oil
and gas are involved, a repeated Chinese tactic involves sending research vessels: from
late August to early October 2021, Beijing sent Haiyang Dizhi to perform a seismic survey
within the area of overlap between the nine-dash line and the Indonesian EEZ.54
For decades, China and the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) have unsuccessfully sought to conclude a ‘code of conduct’ for the
South China Sea. Beijing points to its intensified rivalry with the US as a key reason for the
failure to find agreement but neglects to acknowledge that its own actions have encroached
upon its neighbours’ sovereign rights to their economic resources. China’s actions have
mostly strengthened support for US presence An Indonesian vessel patrols the South China
Sea near the Natuna Islands, 17 August 2016
in Southeast Asia. As Secretary of Defense
Austin pointedly remarked in his speech
in Manila in July: ‘We ... talked about how
we can work toward a free and open Indo-
Pacific rooted in a rules based international
order.’55 Beyond support for coastal states’
resource rights, the US and its allies and part-
ners have also sought to defend passage and
freedoms of the seas through conducting
multiple ‘freedom of navigation’ operations
(FONOPs) each year.
(Ulet Ifansasti/Getty Images)
LEGAL BASIS FOR ‘FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION’ OPERATIONS

As Secretary of Defense Austin’s remarks suggest, the US has sought to reinforce the inter-
national law of the sea as reflected in UNCLOS. It has tried to do so especially in the
South China Sea in response to China’s actions. US FONOPs in the South China Sea have
long been an irritant to Beijing – perhaps because one of their objectives is to ensure that
Beijing’s excessive maritime claims do not gain the international traction Chinese leaders
seek. A FONOP is a US operational activity to apply the rights and freedoms set out in
UNCLOS carefully and strictly in a particular water space, in order to challenge a coastal
state’s assertion of excessive jurisdictional authority over that space. Such operational
activity is often coupled with a démarche from the US specifying the United States’ legal
objections to the government with the excessive claim.
Law-of-the-sea expert Jonathan Odom has explained: ‘Since the U.S. FON Program’s
inception, a fundamental guiding principle has been to “not acquiesce in unilateral acts of
other states designed to restrict” freedom of the seas.’56 Acquiescence could suggest that
the US accepts a coastal state’s excessive maritime claims and ultimately undermine tradi-
tional freedoms of the seas. FONOPs are based in international law in two ways. Firstly,
they reflect the exercise of rights and freedoms as they are set forth in UNCLOS. Secondly,
they reflect the right of all states to exercise those freedoms. Some commentators argue that
the US, as a non-party to UNCLOS, cannot rely on its navigational provisions. This reflects
several misconceptions. Most importantly, many of UNCLOS’s provisions on navigational
rights and freedoms in the various maritime zones have been held to be customary inter-
national law and the US accepts them as such. Furthermore, in 1983 then US president
Ronald Reagan ‘declared that the United States will accept and act in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention relating to traditional (non-seabed) uses of the ocean, such as
navigation and overflight’.57 Reagan’s document sets out the policy rationale that became
the FONOP. Specifically:
the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and free-
doms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests
reflected in the convention. The United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral
acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international
community in navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses.58
The US objects to China’s restrictions of passage and freedoms of the sea in the South
China Sea. FONOPs preserve application of the global navigational regime in the waters of
East Asia – for the US and all states.
NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ENHANCED DIALOGUE

The PLA and US forces operating in maritime East Asia in proximity to each other are the
daily tactical instruments of a broader struggle for power, leadership and rule-making
in the region. Sharpening tensions even further is the increased salience of the Taiwan
issue. Recent actions and statements by Beijing suggest that Chinese leaders now believe
that many of the reasons previously seen as justifying deferring resolution of this issue
have waned. Furthermore, some in Beijing believe that in the wake of Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine in February 2022, the resulting international climate is cause for an acceler-
ated timeline to resolve the Taiwan issue, by force if necessary.59 Simultaneously, Beijing
sees increasingly overt international support for Taiwan as a clear trend against its inter-
ests. Accordingly, while Washington wants to maintain the status quo, Beijing may be less
willing to defer resolution of Taiwan’s status than in the past.
These overlapping drivers make very real the risk of a tactical crisis between US and
Chinese military forces, especially in the Taiwan Strait. Each side blames the other. US
State Department spokesperson Ned Price has condemned China’s ‘provocative military
activity near Taiwan’, stating that such activity is ‘destabilizing, risks miscalculations, and
undermines regional peace and stability’.60 Similarly, Chinese Ministry of National Defense
spokesperson Senior Colonel Tan Kefei recently stated that the ‘prolonged and intensive
reconnaissance and exercises by the US military ships and aircraft and their frequent
provocative activities are the source of Sino-US maritime and aerial security risks’.61 Given
these tactical tensions and the lack of serious introspection by either government, a crisis
could result from a mistake or human error. Some have sensibly asked, for instance, what
would happen if a PLA military aircraft or a Taiwanese intercepting aircraft experienced
mechanical failure and crashed into the sea during especially tense operations near or
across the median line. This event could easily lead to the mistaken assumption that one
side or the other had used force to send a signal or to precipitate a crisis.62 In March 2021,
Taiwan’s deputy minister of national defence announced that the Taiwanese military would
‘largely use land-based missile forces’ to track Chinese military aircraft flying in the vicinity
of Taiwan.63 While this development alleviates the strain on Taiwan’s air force, it invites a
risk that China might mistakenly believe that a provocative PLA flight has been attacked.
Allies and partners in the region will be critical to ensuring that stability is maintained
before, during and after a crisis. Any Chinese decision to use force to alter the status quo
will be influenced by its calculations of relative power, the risk involved and the like-
lihood of success. The degree to which states align policies in support of stability will
therefore have a profound impact on East Asia’s future. International cooperation is likely
to deter Beijing from adopting an aggressive stance towards Taiwan, which is why such
cooperation is rapidly coalescing across the Asia-Pacific, sometimes under US leadership

and sometimes independent of it.
Mechanisms to maintain stability do exist but they should be expanded. Both
Washington and Beijing currently pursue power-based deterrence as a form of stability
maintenance. Each side claims it formulates its military policies in reaction to provoca-
tions or changes brought about by the other. In fact, the dynamic is much more complex
and the two sides’ interests, especially in regard to the status of Taiwan, have always been
misaligned. Systems in which power is the only regulator are highly unstable. It is a good
sign, therefore, that the two sides have agreed to restart talks pursuant to the Military
Maritime Consultative Agreement.64 Dialogue should be increased at every official level, as
should semi-official and non-governmental dialogues. Such dialogues are essential in the
effort to find ways to accommodate and compartmentalise friction to avoid a destructive
breakdown of the overall relationship. Furthermore, the US and China, with the assistance,
support and participation of partners in the region and beyond it, should find ways to
extend both formal and informal rule-making. Informal agreements, such as the Taiwan
Strait median line and the decision to shelve disputes for later generations to resolve, have
been important to regional stability in the past. They can be a part of maintaining stability
in the future.
NOTES
1 See Office of the Secretary of Defense, US Commission Staff Research Backgrounder, 19

Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report to June 2013, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/
Congress: Military and Security Developments files/Research/Staff%20Backgrounder_China%20
Involving the People’s Republic of China in%20Foreign%20EEZs.pdf. The quotes are
2021’, Annual Report to Congress, November derived from the author’s conversations with
2021, p. 35, https://media.defense.gov/2021/ Chinese officials and senior military officers.
Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR- 8 Gil Yun-hyung, ‘The History of Air Defense
FINAL.PDF. Identification Zones in Northeast Asia’,
2 Ibid., p. 99. Hankyoreh, 27 November 2013, http://english.
3 See Peter A. Dutton, ‘Caelum Liberam: Air hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_interna-
Defense Identification Zones Outside Sovereign tional/612953.html; and ‘Seoul Considers
Airspace’, American Journal of International Law, Southward Expansion of Air Defense Zone’,
vol. 103, 2009, pp. 691, 693–4. Korea Herald, 1 December 2013, http://www.
4 Ibid., pp. 691–2. koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20131201000304.
5 See, for example, Peter A. Dutton (ed.), Military 9 David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon
Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.–China Dialogue on and Schuster, 1992), p. 780.
Security and International Law in the Maritime 10 Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke,
Commons, China Maritime Study No. 7 Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and
(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010). Practice (New York: Columbia University Press,
6 Ren Xiaofeng and Cheng Xizhong, ‘A Chinese 1974), pp. 268–74.
Perspective’, Marine Policy, vol. 29, no. 2, March 11 President of the Philippines, ‘Administrative
2005, pp. 139–46. No. 222: Establishing the Philippine Air
7 See, for example, Kimberly Hsu and Craig Defense Identification Zone’, 21 November
Murray, ‘China’s Expanding Military Operations 1953, https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/down-
in Foreign Exclusive Economic Zones’, loads/1953/11nov/19531121-AO-0222-EQ.pdf.
US–China Economic and Security Review 12 Peter A. Dutton, ‘Testimony before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on China’s nytimes.com/2021/10/03/world/asia/china-tai-

Maritime Disputes in the East and South China wan-flights-airspace.html.
Seas’, US House of Representatives, 14 January 24 Silva Shih et al., ‘Why the Chinese Military Has
2014, p. 7, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/ Increased Activity Near Taiwan’, Commonwealth
AS28/20140114/101612/HHRG-113-AS28-Wstate- Magazine, 2 November 2021, https://web.
DuttonP-20140114.pdf. cw.com.tw/taiwan-strait-2021-en/index.html.
13 ‘US Health Chief Arrives in Taiwan on Trip 25 Greg Waldron, ‘H-6 Evolves from Cold War
Condemned by China’, Reuters, 9 August 2020, Relic to Beijing’s Hammer’, FlightGlobal, 4
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-us- September 2020, https://www.flightglobal.com/
a/u-s-health-chief-arrives-in-taiwan-on-trip-con- fixed-wing/h-6-evolves-from-cold-war-relic-to-
demned-by-china-idUSKCN2550DI. beijings-hammer/140043.article.
14 Chris Chang, ‘US Under Secretary of State 26 Mark Episkopos, ‘China’s J-16 Stealth Fighter
Keith Krach Arrives in Taiwan’, Taiwan News, 17 Just Got Deadlier’, National Interest, 28
September 2020, https://www.taiwannews.com. September 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/
tw/en/news/4011275. blog/buzz/chinas-j-16-stealth-fighter-just-got-
15 See virtual presentation by Brendan Mulvaney, deadlier-194540.
‘Presentation for Habibie Center 30 Nov 27 Andrew S. Erickson, ‘Maritime Numbers
2021’, China Aerospace Studies Institute, 10 Game: Understanding and Responding to
December 2021, https://www.youtube.com/ China’s Three Sea Forces’, Indo-Pacific Defense
watch?v=SN-bSt7WRzI. Forum Magazine, vol. 43, no. 4, December 2018,
16 Gerald C. Brown, a Washington DC-based pp. 30–5. See also Andrew S. Erickson, ‘The
defence analyst, maintains a detailed public China Maritime Militia Bookshelf: Latest Data/
database of Chinese military incursions Analysis, SECNAV Guidance, Wikipedia &
into Taiwan’s ADIZ from September 2020 Music Video!’ China Analysis from Original
to the present based on information publi- Sources, 30 October 2021, https://www.
cised by the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign andrewerickson.com/2021/10/the-china-mari-
Affairs. See Gerald C. Brown, ‘Taiwan time-militia-bookshelf-latest-data-analysis-sec-
ADIZ Violations’, https://docs.google.com/ nav-guidance-wikipedia-music-video/.
spreadsheets/d/1qbfYF0VgDBJoFZN5elpZwN- 28 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Trends
TiKZ4nvCUcs5a7oYwm52g/edit#gid=364160716. in China Coast Guard and Other Vessels in
17 Ken Allen and Gerald Brown, ‘PLA Flight Activity the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands,
in Taiwan’s ADIZ’, presentation by Ken Allen at and Japan’s Response’, 21 April 2022, https://
the US Naval War College, 15 October 2021. www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.
18 Mulvaney, ‘Presentation for Habibie Center 30 html; and Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Nov 2021’. US Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report to
19 Allen and Brown, ‘PLA Flight Activity in Congress: Military and Security Developments
Taiwan’s ADIZ’. Involving the People’s Republic of China
20 Sarah Wu, ‘China Has Debated Attacking 2021’, pp. 99–100.
Taiwan-controlled Islands, Taiwan 29 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Trends in
Official Says’, Reuters, 4 November 2021, China Coast Guard and Other Vessels in the
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/ Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and
china-has-debated-attacking-taiwan-con- Japan’s Response’.
trolled-islands-taiwan-official-says-2021-11-04/. 30 ‘Chinese Coast Guard Ships Sail in Japanese
21 See Brown, ‘Taiwan ADIZ Violations’. Waters Near Senkakus’, Japan Times, 26
22 Associated Press, ‘French Senators Arrive in June 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
Taiwan Amid Tensions with China’, Voice of news/2021/06/26/national/china-coast-guard-
America, 6 October 2021, https://www.voanews. senkakus-2/; and ‘Chinese Government
com/a/feench-senators-arrive-taipei-amid-ten- Vessels Approach Japanese Fishing Boats Near
sions-with-China/6259180.html. Senkakus’, Japan Times, 29 March 2021.
23 Chris Buckley and Amy Qin, ‘In a Surge of 31 Yang Sheng and Leng Shumei, ‘China’s
Military Flights, China Tests and Warns Taiwan’, Coast Guard Continues Patrolling Waters
New York Times, 14 October 2021, https://www. Surrounding Diaoyu, Defying US Reaffirming
Security Commitment to Japan’, Global Times, at Whitsun Reef Identified’, Asia Maritime
25 April 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/ Transparency Initiative, 21 April 2021, https://
page/202104/1222054.shtml. amti.csis.org/caught-on-camera-two-dozen-mili-
32 Kelvin Chen, ‘China Conducts Naval Exercise tia-boats-at-whitsun-reef-identified/.
in East China Sea’, Taiwan News, 18 July 41 Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, ‘The Philippines and
2021, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/ China Spar Anew’, Asia Maritime Transparency
news/4251307. Initiative, 6 April 2021, https://amti.csis.org/
33 Chen Zhuo, ‘Chinese and Russian Navies the-philippines-and-china-spar-anew/.
Conduct Joint Cruise in the Western Pacific’, 42 ‘There and Back Again: Chinese Militia at
China Military Online, 23 October 2021, http:// Iroquois Reef and Union Banks’, Asia Maritime
english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2021-10/23/ Transparency Initiative.
content_10101912.htm; and ‘Russian, Chinese 43 Shea Donovan, ‘China Seeks Maritime
Warships Hold First Joint Patrols in the Pacific’, Dominance with Gunboat-filled “Fishing
Reuters, 24 October 2021, https://www.reuters. Fleets”’, Newsweek, 27 January 2022, https://
com/world/russian-chinese-warships-hold-first- www.newsweek.com/china-seeks-maritime-
joint-patrols-pacific-2021-10-23/. dominance-gunboat-filled-fishing-fleets-1673672.
34 Brad Lendon, ‘Why Russian and Chinese 44 Nguyen Thanh Trung, ‘How China’s Coast
Warships Teaming Up to Circle Japan Is a Big Guard Law Has Changed the Regional Security
Deal’, CNN, 25 October 2021, https://www.cnn. Structure’, Asia Maritime Transparency
com/2021/10/25/asia/china-russia-naval-flotil- Initiative, 12 April 2021, https://amti.csis.org/
la-circles-japan-intl-hnk-ml/index.html. how-chinas-coast-guard-law-has-changed-the-
35 Dzirhan Mahadzir, ‘Chinese Carrier Group regional-security-structure/.
Drills in Pacific Ocean: Carl Vinson Carrier 45 ‘China Seeks Maritime Dominance with
Strike Group Wraps Up Exercises with Gunboat-filled “Fishing Fleets”’, Newsweek.
Australia’, USNI News, 22 December, 2021, 46 Robert D. Williams, ‘Tribunal Issues Landmark
https://news.usni.org/2021/12/22/chinese-carrier- Ruling in South China Sea Arbitration’, Lawfare,
group-drills-in-pacific-ocean-carl-vinson-carrier- 12 July 2016, https://www.lawfareblog.com/
strike-group-wraps-up-exercise-with-australia. tribunal-issues-landmark-ruling-south-chi-
36 ‘There and Back Again: Chinese Militia at na-sea-arbitration.
Iroquois Reef and Union Banks’, Asia Maritime 47 Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, ‘The Second Thomas
Transparency Initiative, 22 October 2021, https:// Shoal Incident and the Reset in Philippine–U.S.
amti.csis.org/there-and-back-again-chinese-mili- Ties’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative,
tia-at-iroquois-reef-and-union-banks/. 17 December 2021, https://amti.csis.org/
37 Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, the-second-thomas-shoal-incident-and-the-reset-
‘Records Expose China’s Maritime Militia at in-philippine-u-s-ties/.
Whitsun Reef’, Foreign Policy, 29 March 2021, 48 Rene Acosta, ‘Philippines Reverses Course and
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/29/china-mili- Commits to U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement’,
tia-maritime-philippines-whitsunreef/. USNI News, 30 July 2021, https://news.usni.
38 See Alexander L. Vuving, ‘South China Sea: Who org/2021/07/30/philippines-reverses-course-and-
Occupies What in the Spratlys?’, Diplomat, 6 May commits-to-u-s-visiting-forces-agreement.
2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/south-chi- 49 Jim Garamone, ‘Philippine President Restores
na-sea-who-claims-what-in-the-spratlys/. Visiting Forces Agreement with U.S.’, US
39 Drake Long, ‘Chinese Maritime Militia Department of Defense, 30 July 2021, https://
on the Move in Disputed Spratly Islands’, www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/
Radio Free Asia, 24 March 2020, https:// Article/2713638/philippine-president-re-
www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/china- stores-visiting-forces-agreement-with-us/.
spratly-03242020164332.html. 50 Pitlo, ‘The Second Thomas Shoal Incident and
40 ‘Caught on Camera: Two Dozen Militia Boats the Reset in Philippine–U.S. Ties’.
51 ‘Threats to Indonesia’s Sovereign Rights in com/2016/02/fonops-to-preserve-the-right-of-

EEZ’, Jakarta Post, 25 January 2022, https://www. innocent-passage/.
thejakartapost.com/adv/2022/01/25/threats-to-in- 57 See US, Department of State, ‘Law of the
donesias-sovereign-rights-in-eez.html. Sea Convention – Timeline’, https://www.
52 Koya Jibiki and Tsukasa Hadano, ‘China Tells state.gov/law-of-the-sea-convention/#:~:-
Indonesia to Stop Drilling Off South China Sea text=1983%20President%20Reagan’s%20
Islands’, Nikkei Asia, 28 December 2021, https:// Ocean%20Policy,such%20as%20navigation%20
asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ and%20overflight.
South-China-Sea/China-tells-Indonesia-to-stop- 58 ‘Statement on United States Oceans Policy’,
drilling-off-South-China-Sea-islands; and Koya 10 March 1983, Ronald Reagan Presidential
Jibiki, ‘US and Indonesia to Hold Largest Island Library and Museum, https://www.
Defense Drills’, Nikkei Asia, 30 July 2021, https:// reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-
asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ united-states-oceans-policy.
Indo-Pacific/US-and-Indonesia-to-hold-largest- 59 Tong Zhao (@zhaot2005), tweets, 19 April
island-defense-drills. 2022, https://twitter.com/zhaot2005/
53 Scott Bentley, ‘Mapping the Nine-dash Line: status/1516387259427147777.
Recent Incidents Involving Indonesia in the 60 Buckley and Qin, ‘In a Surge of Military Flights,
South China Sea’, ASPI Strategist, 29 October China Tests and Warns Taiwan’.
2013, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/ 61 Catherine Wong, ‘Chinese, US Militaries
mapping-the-nine-dash-line-recent-incidents-in- Resume Maritime Safety Talks After Last
volving-indonesia-in-the-south-china-sea/. Year’s No-show’, South China Morning Post, 30
54 Evan Laksmana, ‘Indonesia’s Response December 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/
to China’s Incursions in North Natuna china/diplomacy/article/3161614/chinese-us-mil-
Sea Unsatisfactory: Indonesian itaries-resume-maritime-safety-talks-after-last.
Academic’, Think China, 10 December 62 Allen and Brown, ‘PLA Flight Activity in
2021, https://www.thinkchina.sg/ Taiwan’s ADIZ’.
indonesias-response-chinas-incursions-north-na- 63 Ben Blanchard, ‘Military Turns to Missiles
tuna-sea-unsatisfactory-indonesian-academic. in Effort to Track Increasing Chinese
55 Garamone, ‘Philippine President Restores Incursions’, Taipei Times, 30 March 2021, https://
Visiting Forces Agreement with U.S.’. www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/arch
56 Jonathan G. Odom, ‘FONOPs to Preserve ives/2021/03/30/2003754756.
the Right of Innocent Passage?’, Diplomat, 64 Wong, ‘Chinese, US Militaries Resume Maritime
25 February 2016, https://thediplomat. Safety Talks After Last Year’s No-show’.
CHAPTER 7
SINO-AMERICAN
TECHNOLOGY
COMPETITION AND
THE ASIA-PACIFIC
PAUL TRIOLO
Paul Triolo is Senior Vice President for China and Technology Policy
Lead at Albright Stonebridge Group
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competition is likely to have profound regional security
implications, particularly for the potential for military confrontation over Taiwan but also
more generally for the long-term strategic and economic security of the Asia-Pacific.
SINO-AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY COLD WAR

In both Washington and Beijing, strategic goals have sometimes been driven by forces intent on over-
securitising the technology dimension of bilateral relations. This process has been fraught with risks
and potential collateral damage for bilateral US–China relations and the Asia-Pacific, as well as more
generally for global supply chains in key technology sectors, such as semiconductors.
SEMICONDUCTORS AND THE RISK OF A TAIWAN CONFLICT: PUSHING ON

UNKNOWN RED LINES
Taiwan is increasingly a flashpoint in the bilateral relationship, a development linked to changes in the
semiconductor industry, which has been increasingly affected by US–China competition. US efforts to
restrict Chinese companies’ ability to use Taiwanese firms as a manufacturing platform – particularly
global foundry leader Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) – and Washington’s
pressure on Taipei to support US over Chinese supply chains creates a new red line for Beijing, though
it is unclear what might trigger a Chinese response.
COMPETITION IN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

AND QUANTUM COMPUTING
US–China technology competition in emerging sectors such as artificial intelligence and quantum
computing could lead to the decoupling of supply chains and research and development, reducing
US (and US allies’) understanding of China’s progress in these areas.
SINO-AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY COLD WAR

The author first used the hashtag #USChinaTechColdWar in January 2018,1 though the
term ‘technological cold war’ was first employed by China technology watcher Paul Mozur
of the New York Times in July 2015.2 The context of the 2015 article – important for the
future direction of US–China technology competition – was the attempted acquisition of
Micron Technology, the leading US semiconductor-memory company, by China’s Tsinghua
Unigroup. The latter had support from the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment
Fund (CICF), established in 2014 as part of a series of major national technology-related
initiatives actioned under Chinese President Xi Jinping.3 Tsinghua Unigroup would later
abandon the deal as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) came under
increasing congressional pressure to review it. Over the next five years, China became
increasingly authoritarian in the eyes of Washington policymakers as Xi ramped up efforts
to support domestic technology companies. This context set the stage for a spiralling
dynamic that would culminate in 2021 and 2022 with geopolitical risks erupting around
the entire semiconductor sector and one of its epicentres (Taiwan). To understand how this
happened one must follow several interrelated threads, including the failed Micron deal,
the expansion of US regulatory purviews and powers and lastly Beijing’s reactions and
countermeasures, both current and future.
CFIUS is an inter-agency committee that reviews proposed acquisitions of US compa-
nies by foreign firms through the prism of national security. It typically employs a
mitigation strategy to address any concerns while allowing some portion of a deal to go
forward. The committee had already been reviewing semiconductor-related acquisitions
as far back as 2012. However, Xi’s focus on building China into a cyber superpower (on par
with the US4) and the establishment of the CICF under his aegis generated greater concern
in Washington regarding the potential that Micron’s acquisition could be used to assist
Chinese firms. CFIUS said it was part of ‘an effort among foreign governments or compa-
nies to acquire U.S. companies involved in research, development or production of critical
technologies’.5 Both sides abandoned discussions of the deal after receiving clear signals
from CFIUS that it would not be approved.
CFIUS then adopted a much harder line on Chinese acquisitions of semiconductor
companies. Another major milestone – in what would be an increasingly central theatre of
the US–China ‘Tech Cold War’ – was president Barack Obama’s decision in December 2016
to block Chinese investors from acquiring Aixtron US, a subsidiary of a German maker
of manufacturing equipment (such as gallium arsenide) for compound semiconductors
that have military applications. The company had been targeted by a provincial Chinese
investment fund with ties to the CICF. In this case, the very unusual route of issuing a pres-
idential executive order,6 based on a recommendation from CFIUS, indicated that the US
government would no longer hesitate to act directly and promptly on this type of deal. In
the past, firms involved in a transaction had backed down merely as a result of the threat of
a CFIUS recommendation to deny the deal in question; only in rare cases was a presidential
action recommended or needed to kill a deal.
The coupling of concerns over Beijing’s subsidies for China’s domestic semicon-
ductor industry and the potential for the CICF to fuel multiple acquisitions of US
semiconductor-technology companies became Table 7.1: Chinese semiconductor companies on the US Commerce
a hallmark of the Trump era, which also
Department Entity List and Treasury Department NS-CMIC List
saw broader US–China technology-related

tensions spread to many other technology Company Date
sectors, including artificial intelligence (AI),
quantum computing and biotechnology.  Fujian Torch Electron Technology 17 Dec 2021
This focus on the potential impact of govern-
 Hong Kong Cheung Wah Electronics Technology 17 Dec 2021
ment subsidies generated several key strands
 HSJ Electronics 17 Dec 2021
that remain part of the ongoing US–China
 Shaanxi Reactor Microelectronics 17 Dec 2021
technology-competition narrative.
 Shanghai Aisinochip Electronics Technology 17 Dec 2021
Tentative US steps to use the subsidy issue as  Dawning Information Industry (Sugon)* 16 Dec 2021
a justification for applying export controls  Corad Technology (Shenzhen) 26 Nov 2021
Concern about the potential for the CICF to  Hangzhou Zhongke Microelectronics 26 Nov 2021
distort the highly competitive and global  Hunan Goke Microelectronics 26 Nov 2021
value chains critical to the semiconductor  New H3C Semiconductor Technologies 26 Nov 2021
industry also became part of the US debate
 Xi'an Aerospace Huaxun Technology 26 Nov 2021
late in the Obama administration. The pres-
 Yunchip Microelectronics 26 Nov 2021
ident’s last commerce secretary, Penny
 Armyfly 12 Jul 2021
Pritzker, claimed in late 2016 that China was
 Beijing E-science 12 Jul 2021
using the fund to try to ‘appropriate’ the
 Beijing Hileed Solutions 12 Jul 2021
global semiconductor supply chain.7 Though
Pritzker was referring primarily to the fund’s  Hangzhou Hualan Microelectronics 12 Jul 2021
role in backing acquisitions, she was also  Tongfang R.I.A. 12 Jul 2021
addressing its fuelling of overinvestment in  Changsha Jingjia Microelectronics Company 03 Jun 2021
the sector in China and undermining of more  Semiconductor Manufacturing International 03 Jun 2021
market-driven players, such as commodity Corporation (SMIC)
semiconductor producers in the memory  Ningbo Semiconductor International Corporation (NSI) 18 Dec 2020
sector. This concern became the basis for  ROFS Microsystems 18 Dec 2020
the 2018 Commerce Department Entity  SMIC + related entities 18 Dec 2020
List action against Chinese semiconductor-  SJ Semiconductor 18 Dec 2020
manufacturing start-up Fujian Jinhua (see
 Hefei Bitland Information Technology 22 Jul 2020
Table 7.1).8 The start-up had been involved
 HiSilicon + three subsidiaries 21 Aug 2019
in a case involving intellectual-property
 Chengdu Haiguang Integrated Circuit 24 Jun 2019
theft from Micron. However, after receiving
 Chengdu Haiguang Microelectronics Technology 24 Jun 2019
significant subsidies from the CICF, it was
blacklisted for potentially undermining  Higon 24 Jun 2019
established US dynamic random-access  Fujian Jinhua 30 Oct 2018
memory producers that might be future  Added to Entity List

 Added to NS-CMIC List
suppliers to the US armed forces. One
*Better described as a supercomputing company. Note: ‘NS-CMIC List’ refers to the Treasury
Washington trade lawyer called the move a Department’s Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List, where SDN
stands for ‘Specially Designated Nationals’.
‘dramatic expansion of the use of the Entity
Sources: US, Federal Register, www.federalregister.gov; US, Commerce Department, Bureau of Industry and Security,
List for economic purposes’.9 www.bis.doc.gov; US, Department of the Treasury, home.treasury.gov.
Expansion of US concerns to allies

As Chinese firms determined that the US would be a much less fertile ground for acquisi-
tions in the semiconductor and other high-technology sectors, they turned to other countries
and regions. However, they have found that European and Asian countries have also
stepped up their efforts to monitor transactions in sensitive technology sectors, including
those involving semiconductors, AI and robotics. In addition, the US government under
both Donald Trump and Joe Biden has worked hard with so-called ‘like-minded’ allies to
share information on transactions deemed sensitive and related to national security. This
allied effort intensified following Chinese electronics-maker Midea’s late-2016 acquisition of
German robot-maker Kuka.10 The acquisition, which Kuka claims obtained CFIUS approval,
drew significant criticism in Europe after being approved by Berlin.11 In the geopolitical
climate of 2022, there is little chance that such a deal would be allowed to proceed.
EXPANSION OF EXPORT CONTROLS’ EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION

Following the Kuka sale, the tightening of mergers and acquisitions and investments
involving Chinese entities was increasingly a focus for both CFIUS and an emerging
investment-review process in the European Union. The late Obama era also saw critical
and unprecedented export-control actions targeting Chinese telecoms firm ZTE kick off
another key strand of the confrontation over semiconductors. Under Trump, the ZTE
action also spawned a spate of Commerce Department Entity List actions, including those
against China’s leading technology company Huawei (a competitor to ZTE) and Sugon
and Phytium – Chinese makers of central processing units (CPU).
Placing large multinational Chinese companies such as ZTE and Huawei on the Entity
List came with a host of unanticipated second- and third-order effects. Although the 2016
listing of ZTE12 was put on hold after the firm agreed to pay a fine and discipline execu-
tives, in April 2018 then US commerce secretary Wilbur Ross imposed a denial order on
the firm for allegedly violating the original provisions of the 2016 deal.13 Only a phone
call between Trump and Xi in July 2018 – when the firm faced an increasing threat of
bankruptcy – saved ZTE by again holding the Entity List action in abeyance (although
new fines and monitoring requirements were
imposed).14 Huawei was hit with an Entity Huawei’s headquarters in Shenzhen, China, 31 May 2021
List action in May 2019, soon after US–China

trade talks had collapsed.15 This development
sparked a months-long process during which
US subcontractors to Huawei continued to
ship some products to the Shenzhen firm
(complying with the letter of the under-
lying Export Administration Regulations)
while the Commerce Department’s Bureau of
Industry and Security (BIS) lacked clear guid-
ance on how to adjudicate incoming licensing
requests. In part responding to this cat-and-
mouse game, US political appointees at the
(STR/AFP via Getty Images)
Commerce Department developed a way to Inside the headquarters of Taiwan Semiconductor

Manufacturing Company (TSMC), Taiwan, 11 January 2022
strengthen the restrictions on suppliers to
Huawei by crafting a change to the Foreign
Direct Product Rule (FDPR), issued initially
in May 202016 and then amended to provide
further clarity in August 2020.17 With this
amendment, the rule now extended US
export controls in an unprecedented manner
to all manufacturers globally that used any
US technology to manufacture semiconduc-
tors on behalf of Huawei.
The FDPR’s extraterritoriality effectively
dragged Taiwan and its semiconductor-
manufacturing champion and global foundry
(I-Hwa Cheng/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
leader Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Company (TSMC) into the growing US–China technology competition. In May 2020,
TSMC announced that it was suspending cooperation with Huawei, which at the time
represented at least 15% of TSMC sales and was a fast-growing customer for the firm’s
foundry services. It also announced that by September 2020 Huawei would be unable to
source from TSMC advanced semiconductors for any of its product lines, undermining
Huawei’s business model.18 While Huawei continued in business, drawing on significant
stockpiles of TSMC-made semiconductors, by early 2022 it was clear that it could no longer
compete in its two major product lines and revenue sources: smartphones and critical parts
of its advanced mobile-telecommunications-equipment line.19 These developments set the
stage for the potential broader use of the FDPR.
PUSH TO PROTECT FOUNDATIONAL TECHNOLOGY: SEMICONDUCTOR

MANUFACTURING EQUIPMENT IN THE CROSS HAIRS
As concern grew within the Trump administration over China’s rise as a technological and
military power, academic studies and growing debate within Congress on these issues
culminated in the 2018 effort to revamp the US export-control system. The so-called Export
Control and Reform Act (ECRA), passed as part of the 2019 National Defense Authorization
Act,20 called (among many other new provisions) for the BIS to draft lists of foundational
and emerging technologies that should be considered for new export controls and also
monitored for transactions falling under CFIUS. The semiconductor manufacturing equip-
ment (SME) sector, where US companies are among global leaders, was an important part
of the overall debate, which centred on how and whether to control (or reassert control
over) a broader range of SME going to specific Chinese end users deemed to be providing
support for China’s military modernisation.
The debate around ECRA, SME and foundational technology helped to fuel new policy
initiatives during the Trump era that have continued into the Biden era (see Table 7.2 for
details on the United States’ options to pursue policy action against China). The most
important aims of these initiatives are discussed below.
Table 7.2: The United States’ options for pursuing policy action against China in the context of US–China
technological competition
Option Notes
Existing Placement on the The US Department of Commerce imposes export restrictions against foreign
Regulatory Commerce Department firms placed on its Entity List. Traditionally this power has been used against
Tools Entity List companies accused of violating sanctions regimes (for example, those targeting
Iran). More recently, it has been used to take action against Chinese companies
for new reasons, such as offering support for organisations involved in human-
rights violations, or receiving subsidies from the Chinese government (therefore
potentially threatening trusted US suppliers).
Placement on the The US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) bars
Treasury Department US persons from investing in Chinese companies determined to have a role
non-SDN* Chinese in supporting China's military-industrial complex or Chinese surveillance
Military-Industrial technology used to facilitate repression or human-rights abuses according to
Complex Companies US President Joe Biden's executive order of 3 June 2021 (‘Addressing the Threat
(NS-CMIC) List from Securities Investments that Finance Certain Companies of the People's
Republic of China’). Chinese companies designated by the inter-agency process
as linked to the Chinese military-industrial complex or facilitating human-rights
abuses are subject to delisting from US stock exchanges.
Expanded definition of Changes to export administrative regulations that took effect in June 2020
military end-use targeting require US suppliers of national-security technologies to conduct due diligence
Chinese firms on China-based companies to determine if they might qualify as military
end-use organisations. The changes give the Commerce Department wide
latitude to determine licensing requirements. Licence applications will come
with presumption of denial.
Reviews of landing Team Telecom, which is formally known as the Committee for the Assessment
licences for transpacific of Foreign Participation in the US Telecommunications Services Sector (or the
cables with landings in Committee), has been reviewing cable licences for fibre-optic cable landings
China or Hong Kong in China and Hong Kong. In June 2020, the Committee recommended that
the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) deny a licence for Pacific
Light Cable Network System’s Hong Kong undersea cable connection to the
US. It is likely that the Committee will not approve any such licences in future,
complicating the economics of major cable consortia and impacting broader
communications connectivity and capacity expansion in the Asia-Pacific.
Investment reviews CFIUS is an inter-agency committee empowered to evaluate the national-

by the Committee on security implications of foreign investments in the US. Under new legislation,
Foreign Investment in the the 2018 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, CFIUS has
US (CFIUS) expanded its purview, added resources and is scrutinising current and previous
deals involving Chinese investors. In addition, CFIUS has become more activist,
intervening in board decisions before acquisitions have been launched, citing
strategic considerations related to China and key technologies.
Preventing companies in China from obtaining advanced equipment related to

semiconductor manufacturing
All the technologies specific to producing advanced SME – such as extreme ultravi-
olet lithography (EUV) – are controlled under US export controls and the multilateral
Wassenaar Arrangement, which replaced the Cold War era Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls in 1996. A company wishing to buy EUV equipment from
Option Notes
Proposed Restrictions on The implementing rule released in early 2021 for a May 2019 executive order on
Regulatory equipment/services used securing US ICT supply chains will allow the Commerce Department to block
Tools in US ICT supply chains sales of equipment and services with components from ‘adversary nations’, such
as China.
Outbound investment The so-called National Critical Capabilities Defense Act (NCCDA) is currently being
review mechanism debated by Congress. It calls for the establishment of an inter-agency outbound
(sometimes called investment review committee. The NCCDA is focused on reviewing investments
an ‘outbound-CFIUS related to critical supply chains with a view to reducing US dependence on China
process’) and other adversary nations. Should the NCCDA fail, Biden administration officials
are also discussing an executive order that would seek to establish reviews of
investment in key technology sectors deemed to be of high national-security
concern, directed at US companies investing in China’s high-tech sector.
Legislation Holding Foreign The HFCAA was adopted in late 2020 and passed with unanimous bipartisan
Companies Accountable support. It requires the Treasury Department to begin the process of delisting
Act (HFCAA) Chinese firms if either auditing requirements or disclosures relating to Chinese
government control are not made within a three-year period. In late 2021, the
department finalised rulemaking on this process, which could affect the more
than 150 Chinese companies listed on US exchanges, including large technology
platforms such as Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu. Placement on the NS-CMIC List may
also result in the delisting of Chinese firms from US stock exchanges.
Creating Opportunities The bill includes a proposal – the National Critical Capabilities Review – that
for Manufacturing, would create a new legal framework to regulate outbound investment from the
Pre-Eminence in US. While there is heavy industry opposition to this type of provision, it is likely
Technology, and to continue to get support from some in Congress and the administration, even
Economic Strength if it is not included in a final bill.
(COMPETES) Act
Technology EU–US Trade and The ten working groups under the TTC are focused on a number of areas
Alliances With Technology Council (TTC) relevant to China policy, including considering new multilateral export controls
China Nexus on technology, further coordination on investment reviews and coordination
on industrial policies in the semiconductor sector.
Quadrilateral Security The Quad countries (Australia, India, Japan and the US) are discussing
Dialogue opportunities for collaboration across a range of technology issues, including
semiconductor industrial policies, 5G, secure supply chains, and standards.
Similar to the TTC, the thrust of the Quad discussions focuses on collaboration
with the goal of containing China's rise as a technology and military power in
the Asia-Pacific.
* SDN refers to ‘Specially Designated Nationals’
the sole supplier, Dutch firm ASML, must get a licence approved by the Netherlands
government. Beginning in early 2018 and reflecting growing US concern over China’s rise
as a technological power, the US government has applied pressure on the Netherlands
to deny a licence to Chinese foundry leader Semiconductor Manufacturing International
Corporation (SMIC).21 The effect of this restriction has been to freeze China’s domestic
semiconductor-manufacturing capability somewhere between the seven nanometre (nm)
)
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A laboratory at ASML, a Dutch company
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lithography equipment (an advanced
semiconductor-manufacturing equipment),
Veldhoven, the Netherlands, 17 April 2018
and 10 nm nodes (see Tables 7.3 and 7.4). (‘Nodes’ refers to the feature size of individual
elements of a semiconductor that depend on the level of advanced processing; currently
the most advanced levels in commercial operation or at the research and development
(R&D) stage are pushing down towards 5 nm, 3 nm and 2 nm). In addition to restrictions
on SMIC’s ability to obtain EUV equipment, in late 2021 US officials vetoed the installation
of EUV equipment in a manufacturing facility in Wuxi, China, operated by South Korean
semiconductor giant SK Hynix, probably citing concerns about the potential for diversion
of the technology.22
Expansion of restrictions from semiconductors to more of the equipment used to

manufacture chips
In addition to imposing restrictions on EUV equipment and making slow progress on
developing a list of foundational technologies likely to include SME capable of manufac-
turing at more mature nodes, late in the Trump administration the Commerce Department
moved to add SMIC to the Entity List. As a result, US suppliers to the firm would need to
apply to the department for a licence, often with the presumption of denial. The language
of the listing specified that equipment ‘uniquely required to produce semiconductors at
advanced technology nodes 10 nanometers or below will be subject to a presumption of
denial’.23 In early 2022, there was continued discussion within the Biden administration
about a Department of Defense proposal to change the language from ‘uniquely required’
to ‘capable of’. The reasoning was that typically no SME is designed specifically to produce
a particular node. Such a change would potentially subject a wider range of equipment to
licence denial. It was opposed by career officials at the Commerce Department and by US
semiconductor-equipment manufacturers.24
Table 7.3: Number of semiconductor-manufacturing firms at key technology nodes, early 2022
Process node (nanometre, nm)
180 130 90 65 45/40 32/28 22/20 16/14 10/7 5/4 3/2
Number of manufacturers working at each process node
US 24 18 11 8 4 4 4 4 1 1 1
South Korea 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
Taiwan 9 9 6 6 6 6 5 3 1 1 1
Japan 18 10 7 6 5 1 1 1
China 19 18 16 13 8 6 3 1 1
Other 20 13 5 1 1 1 1
Total 94 72 48 36 26 20 16 11 5 3 3
Notes: ‘Nodes’ refers to the feature size of individual elements of a semiconductor. These depend on the level of advanced processing. Some companies have fabrication
facilities outside of where they are headquartered but have been included in totals; table does not distinguish between producers of different types of semiconductors,
such as CPU/GPU, application-specific semiconductors and memory, each of which is driven by market requirements relating to future size.
Sources: SEMI, www.semi.org; Semiwiki, semiwiki.com; anandtech.com, www.anandtech.com
Table 7.4: Major industry players and the process-node levels at which they are working, early 2022
Process node (nanometre, nm)
Major industry players 90 65 45/40 32/28 22/20 16/14 10/7 5/4 3/2
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)         *
Samsung         
Intel       **  
GlobalFoundries       
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC)***        ? ?
SK Hynix      
Kioxia      
United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC)     
STMicroelectronics (STM)     
Infineon    
International Business Machines (IBM)    
Texas Instruments    
Fujitsu   
 Currently producing in commercial volumes

 Under development/planned
*Commercial production to start in late 2022. **Intel is in commericial production at 10 nm but has encountered challenges with high-volume production at 7 nm.
***SMIC’s ability to develop processes at advanced nodes will remain limited by US export controls on advanced lithography equipment.
Note: The industry labelling of advanced nodes is becoming more complicated. Essentially, it is now a marketing tool, as companies use different geometries and packaging
technologies, such as 3D FinFET, to achieve greater performance.
Sources: SEMI, www.semi.org; Semiwiki, semiwiki.com; anandtech.com, www.anandtech.com
SEMICONDUCTORS AND THE RISK OF A TAIWAN CONFLICT: PUSHING ON

UNKNOWN RED LINES
The rolling actions taken by Trump and continued under Biden in the semiconductor and
other high-tech sectors – coupled with other elements of the ‘Tech Cold War’ dynamic –
have contributed to a broad cross-party consensus in Washington among certain elements
of the foreign policy community, conservative think tanks and within the US intelli-
gence community.25 The consensus perspective holds that the US and China are locked
in a long-term struggle to dominate the ‘technologies of the future’, including both some
already in existence – such as advanced semiconductors and next-generation mobile-
telecommunications technologies – and also emerging sectors, such as AI, quantum
computing and biotechnology. There is an important subtext to this perspective that holds
that Beijing, left to its own preferences, will eventually misuse or exploit these technologies
(or its companies’ role in particular technology sectors) to damage or undermine Western
institutions and values, either by using them in ways that would contribute to human-rights
violations; by exporting them to authoritarian governments; or by seeking to exploit them for
China’s military modernisation, particularly in relation to a potential attack on Taiwan. By the
time Biden took office in January 2021, this narrative was firmly entrenched in Washington
policy circles, as well as in the Department of Defense and the US intelligence community.
Another important element of the emerging conventional wisdom regarding the US–
China Tech Cold War was that US companies – particularly those in the cutting-edge
sectors now part of the struggle for the so-called technologies of the future – should not
be assisting China’s military modernisation. Increasingly during the Trump administra-
tion, rhetoric from Washington policymakers and think tanks focused on the Chinese
leadership’s civil–military fusion and integration initiative, which is an attempt to exploit
technologies developed by the private sector for military purposes.
From late 2021, several of these strands converged in ways that are likely to affect the
Asia-Pacific by raising pressures on supply chains and innovation ecosystems and by
driving further wedges between China and Taiwan – with unknown consequences for
regional stability. Washington was angered by revelations in late 2021 that Phytium CPUs
manufactured at TSMC may have been used in high-performance computers that modelled
advanced Chinese weapons systems, such as a hypersonic glide vehicle apparently tested in
July–August 2021. Some congressional hardliners on China wrote to Commerce Secretary
Gina Raimondo in October 2021 following reports of the hypersonic-missile test. They urged
her to extend the FDPR to all ‘entities that enable the CCP’s military capabilities and human
rights abuses’.26 Then, in early 2022, the semiconductor element of US–China technology
competition saw renewed emphasis on Taiwan and TSMC, specifically the latter’s continued
viability as a platform for Chinese firms to manufacture advanced semiconductors. From
Beijing’s point of view, the US had already cut off its leading technology from TSMC, along
with a major CPU-maker, Phytium, which was added to the Entity List in April 2021.27
US officials are approaching what may be called Beijing’s unknown red lines, given
the prospect that the further extraterritorial extension of US export controls could cut off
more Chinese technology firms from using TSMC and other Taiwanese semiconductor-
manufacturing companies, such as United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC).
The importance of the semiconductor sector Chinese President Xi Jinping is shown around Huawei’s
London offices by its president, Ren Zhengfei, 21 October 2015
for China has been highlighted by Xi’s
launching of the CICF and his role in leading
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo
‘study sessions’ on semiconductors and other
high-tech sectors. Developing these sectors
and reducing China’s reliance on foreign
sources are key parts of the 14th Five-Year
Plan – published in March 2021 – and Xi’s
overall push for ‘self reliance’, which was
boosted in 2021 with Beijing’s ‘dual circula-
tion’ and ‘common prosperity’ initiatives.
So far, the Chinese government has not
even threatened to target US technology-
(Matthew Lloyd/AFP via Getty Images)
company operations in China in retaliation for
US actions that have undermined Huawei’s business model and future viability. However, it
remains unclear how Beijing will react to the prospect of having most or all of its technology
leaders cut off from Taiwan and TSMC. The prospect that SMIC will not be able to obtain EUV
equipment to enable the firm to move to production at more advanced nodes domestically
– as a hedge against Chinese firms being delinked from TSMC – creates more uncertainty.
US officials deliberating changing the Entity List language on SMIC appear to favour first
holding discussions with international allies on the issue, probably as part of semiconductor
supply-chain and export-control collaboration taking place in the ‘Quad’ format (a grouping
comprising Australia, India, Japan and the US) via its Emerging Technology Working Group
and at the EU–US Trade and Technology Council. For China, the worst-case outcome of these
discussions would be a united front among the US and its international partners on export
controls covering SME and other advanced and emerging technologies.
In early 2022, Beijing was concerned about another Washington discussion on extending
the FDPR. The talks took place in February when the Commerce Department extended
FDPR restrictions to Russia broadly and added dozens of Russian firms to the Entity List
as retaliation for the Russian invasion of Ukraine.28 The new rules apply the FDPR against
Russia in a blanket fashion and specifically require an export licence – likely to be denied
– for any information and communications technology (ICT) equipment that includes US
technology intended for transfer to specific Russian firms or organisations.29 It is the first
time that Washington has effectively weaponised the entire US technology supply chain to
target an entire country (rather than a single company), in a manner similar to the use of
the dollar in US Treasury Department sanctions. A senior official with the Semiconductor
Industry Association, Jimmy Goodrich, who is familiar with the US Entity List and FDPR
actions, noted: ‘We could be in uncharted waters with such a potentially broad export
control measure. We are still trying to assess what the ripple effect may be to global supply
chains.’30 A major issue that remained unclear in late March 2022 was whether China would
go along with such an action and, if not, whether Chinese firms shipping electronics to
Russia could be the target of secondary sanctions. The broad use of the FDPR in this
manner would set a dangerous precedent, according to industry officials, by disrupting

supply chains, driving countries to ‘design out’ US technology, and adding to concerns in
Beijing that China or a much broader set of Chinese companies could be subject to the same
treatment, particularly under a potential Republican-dominated Congress later in 2022.
The broader technology-policy environment is also increasingly hostile for Beijing.
The US-organised Summit for Democracy held in December 2021 and the associated
Alliance for the Future of the Internet, launched in early 2022, use language such as the
need to promote ‘democracy-affirming’ technologies and to control technologies that
could be used by ‘techno-authoritarian’ states, meaning principally China and Russia.31
As the debate intensified over how to handle sales to China of advanced and emerging
technologies that could contribute to its military modernisation and government surveil-
lance operations, the issue of the role of Taiwan (and particularly TSMC) generated media
speculation in late 2021 in relation to the potential that China will use military force to
achieve ‘reunification’. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has emphasised the importance
of Taiwan’s ‘silicon shield’32 – in other words, the dominance of TSMC and other Taiwan-
based companies in the semiconductor-manufacturing sector – as a potential deterrent to
Chinese military action. Some US commentators have even suggested that Taiwan should
threaten to destroy semiconductor facilities in the event of Chinese military action against
the island.33 That the discussions reached this point indicated US and Taiwanese policy
circles’ growing recognition of the centrality of Taiwan and TSMC to the technology sector
in general, to China and to the global economy.
The US and its allies in Europe and Asia are working to reduce their companies’
dependence on TSMC via new funding for domestic semiconductor manufacturing.
However, it will be at least a decade before there is significant change in the sector. The
Biden administration’s CHIPS for America Act,34 which is unlikely to receive funding
until May 2022 or later, will provide incentives for TSMC, Samsung and Intel to locate
advanced facilities in the US. The EU Chips Act will attempt to provide similar subsidies
to incentivise these firms to consider placing facilities in Europe. It is likely that over
the next five years Washington and its allies will make progress towards reducing the
centrality of Taiwan and TSMC in semicon- European Union Commissioner for Innovation, Research, Culture, Education
ductor manufacturing. However, as a result and Youth Mariya Gabriel discusses the EU Chips Act in Brussels, 8 February 2022
of the risks around US export-control and

other policies, there will likely be increased
tail risk that the semiconductor issue will
play a larger role in Beijing’s calculus around
making a military move against Taiwan
– especially if there is a substantial reduc-
tion in Chinese firms’ ability to use Taiwan
as a manufacturing platform. Therefore,
the consequences of US–China technology
competition blowing up over Taiwan are
real and growing, with major implications
for the wider Asia-Pacific.
(Thierry Monasse/Getty Images)
COMPETITION IN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND

QUANTUM COMPUTING
In addition to semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing, US–China tech-
nology competition has intensified under both the Trump and Biden administrations in
two other important sectors that Washington identifies as ‘technologies of the future’: AI
and quantum computing. AI-related competition intensified following the publication
of China’s ‘National AI Development Plan’ (AIDP) in 2017, which highlighted Beijing’s
efforts to develop key technologies. Subsequent plans and strategies, such as the 14th Five-
Year Plan and 14th Five-Year Plan for Informatization, have continued to focus on AI and
other key technology areas, such as quantum computing.
Following the AIDP’s release, Chinese government support for the AI sector grew with
the establishment of industry alliances, an AI Strategic Advisory Committee and prefer-
ential policies.35 In addition, many AI start-ups and established companies found ready
funding for application development from government security organisations. This was
particularly true in relation to facial-recognition and natural-language processing, the
latter being the core of ‘perception AI’. A large number of companies have emerged in this
field, which have provided an impetus for advances in the sector. These companies include
Hikvision, iFlytek, Megvii, SenseTime and Yitu. Other key areas of commercial AI devel-
opment in China include healthcare, autonomous vehicles, retail applications, education
and data science as a service (‘DaaS’).
An important part of the 14th Five-Year Plan was concerned with so-called ‘hard tech-
nologies’.36 This included AI and quantum computing as well as semiconductors and
advanced manufacturing. In a major speech in October 2021, which was later published as
an essay in the CCP journal Qiushi, Xi emphasised the importance of AI, cloud computing,
big data and blockchain for China’s future economic growth.37
AI is clearly a priority for Beijing and increasingly the sector is being pulled into the
US–China technology competition. Most Western analyses of the AIDP highlight the
Chinese government’s role in promoting AI development, including applications relevant
to surveillance and internal security, and its potential applications for military command
and control. This emphasis has given rise to the narrative that Beijing is intent on using
AI as a critical part of its military modernisation, with significant potential security conse-
quences for the Asia-Pacific. However, in reality, it is the Chinese private sector that is
responsible for much of the R&D related to AI, driven by foreign and domestic venture
capital. Meanwhile, the Chinese government is primarily ‘playing catchup’, supporting
rather than leading China’s AI charge.38
The narrative that US–China technological competition includes an ‘AI arms race’39
obscures the reality that US companies currently lead their Chinese counterparts in
almost every category of AI development and sectoral application, including what former
Microsoft Research Asia chief and venture-capital investor Kai-fu Lee has called ‘internet
AI’, ‘business AI’, ‘perception AI’ and ‘autonomous AI’.40 Nevertheless, spurred by its
innovative private-sector companies, China is rapidly closing the gap. Yet companies
in both China and the US have benefited from the current high levels of collaboration:
China is able to leverage open-source and openly published research and is increasingly
Table 7.5: Chinese emerging-technology companies on the US Commerce Department Entity List and
Treasury Department NS-CMIC List
Company Sector Date
 CloudWalk Technology AI 16 Dec 2021

 Leon Technology Group Cloud services 16 Dec 2021
 Megvii Technology AI 16 Dec 2021
 NetPosa Technologies AI 16 Dec 2021
 Xiamen Meiya Pico Information AI 16 Dec 2021
 Yitu AI 16 Dec 2021
 SenseTime Group AI 10 Dec 2021
 Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at the Microscale Supercomputing 26 Nov 2021
 QuantumCTek Supercomputing 26 Nov 2021
 Beijing Geling Shentong Information Technology (DeepGlint) AI / facial recognition 12 Jul 2021
 China Academy of Electronics and Information Technology Supercomputing 12 Jul 2021
 Shenzhen Cobber Information Technology AI / facial recognition 12 Jul 2021
 Urumqi Tianyao Weiye Information Technology Service AI 12 Jul 2021
 Xinjiang Lianhai Chuangzhi Information Technology AI / surveillance 12 Jul 2021
 Xinjiang Tangli Technology AI / surveillance 12 Jul 2021
 Hikvision AI 03 Jun 2021
 Inspur Group Cloud services 03 Jun 2021
 Beijing Cloudmind Technology AI 05 Jun 2020
 CloudWalk Technology AI 05 Jun 2020
 Intellifusion AI 05 Jun 2020
 IS'Vision AI / facial recognition 05 Jun 2020
 NetPosa AI 05 Jun 2020
 SenseNets AI / facial recognition 05 Jun 2020
 Dahua Technology AI 09 Oct 2019
 Hikvision AI 09 Oct 2019
 iFlytek AI 09 Oct 2019
 Megvii AI 09 Oct 2019
 Xiamen Meiya Pico Information AI 09 Oct 2019
 SenseTime AI 09 Oct 2019
 Yitu AI 09 Oct 2019
 Yixin Technology (Ecguard) AI 09 Oct 2019
 Sugon + nine aliases Supercomputing 24 Jun 2019
 Wuxi Jiangnan Institute of Computing Technology + two affiliates Supercomputing 24 Jun 2019
 Added to Entity List
 Added to NS-CMIC List
Note: ‘NS-CMIC List’ refers to the Treasury Department’s Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List, where SDN stands for ‘Specially
Designated Nationals’
Sources: US, Federal Register, www.federalregister.gov; US, Commerce Department, Bureau of Industry and Security, www.bis.doc.gov; US, Department of the Treasury, home.treasury.gov.
contributing to cutting-edge R&D, while US companies benefit from being able to recruit
large numbers of qualified software engineers in China and from collaboration with
Chinese companies to gain exposure to Chinese datasets.
Advanced technologies increasingly pulled into competition

During the Trump administration, large Chinese AI companies came under increasing
pressure from export controls and later from financial sanctions, having been targeted for
selling hardware and software to support public security organs involved in monitoring
the Uighur population in China’s Xinjiang province. In October 2019, iFlytek, Hikvision,
Megvii, SenseTime and Yitu were added to the Entity List,41 followed in June 2020 by other
AI companies including Cloudwalk, Intellifusion and SenseNets (see Table 7.5).42 Under
Trump and in December 2021 under the Biden administration, these companies were
also added to the Treasury Department’s so-called non-SDN43 Chinese Military-Industrial
Complex Companies (NS-CMIC) list,44 barring US investors from holding the securities of
the firms and precluding them from stock listings on US markets.
The measures have restricted these companies’ access to US technology, such as semi-
conductors, but also affected their ability to raise money on capital markets. For example,
Megvii postponed a planned listing in Hong Kong following the October 2019 Entity List
action but by early 2022 was planning to list on the Shanghai STAR market.45 SenseTime
briefly postponed its initial public offering (IPO) in Hong Kong in early January 2021
as a result of the NS-CMIC listing. All the companies on these US lists face reputational
challenges and are unlikely to be able to operate globally as a result. Megvii appears to
have appealed to the Commerce Department regarding its Entity List action in 2019. It
claimed that even before the October 2019 Entity List action it did very little business in
Xinjiang and was phasing out remaining support for public security organs there, and
had installed an internal AI ethics committee, which reported to the board, that included
several external members.46 Megvii’s reported inability to secure a clear answer from US
officials about what it would take to be removed from the list, despite apparently taking
action to address the underlying reasons it was placed there, suggests a continuing lack of
a clear US strategy for listing firms.47 Another result of the growing restrictions on Chinese
technology companies’ ability to tap overseas capital markets (and the intensified efforts
of US financial regulators to require Chinese firms listed on US markets to undergo third-
party audits48) is that the Chinese government is boosting its support for domestic stock
markets, notably Shanghai’s STAR and a new bourse in Beijing.
Chinese AI sector under increasing pressure

While China’s big push into AI has encouraged Western observers to think in terms of a
bilateral US–China ‘AI arms race’, the reality is that China’s AI companies face major chal-
lenges to further development on several fronts:
Investment in the sector has slowed considerably, and much touted Chinese govern-
ment funding is squandered in dubious investments. Foreign investors remain
concerned about further US pressure on the sector as well as the inability of large
players like iFlytek, Megvii and SenseTime to list on US capital markets. Government
funding in the form of large pools of capital, such as that announced by the city of
Tianjin with much fanfare in 2018, appear to be largely real-estate schemes.49 A close
watcher of Chinese AI developments, Jeffery Ding, noted in early 2022 that much
state-backed AI investment has been ‘reckless and redundant’,50 with private-sector
companies devoting a significant amount of revenue to AI R&D focused on optimising
their business operations, but often then experiencing difficulties when trying to inte-
grate AI applications due to lack of sufficient qualified personnel or management
understanding of the potential benefit.
Talent recruitment is becoming more difficult and increasing numbers of Chinese AI
engineers, particularly the top 10%, are choosing to work outside China. Top-level
Chinese AI researchers are on par with their peers in the US, Europe and elsewhere and
are able to find work with top-tier AI companies internationally. Many are choosing to
leave China, particularly in the wake of increased US sanctions targeting Chinese AI
companies, which makes it likely these firms will be shut out of major markets in the
US and EU.51 In addition, a 2020 study by MacroPolo, the US-based Paulson Institute’s
think tank, found that while about one-third of ‘top-tier’ AI personnel globally has been
trained in China, only one-tenth is currently working there.52
IPOs are under pressure as US restrictions remove potential for US listings. The pres-
sure on Chinese AI companies from US restrictions will continue to mean that they
will be both unlikely to penetrate markets in the US and other developed countries
and unable to contemplate future overseas listing to raise capital. After briefly post-
poning an IPO in Hong Kong in December 2021 following its NS-CMIC listing, AI giant
SenseTime was able to go public in late December, raising some US$740 million.53 It is
not clear whether other Chinese AI ‘unicorns’, of which there are many in the pipeline,
will be as successful as SenseTime in tapping capital markets to continue their growth.
Access to cutting-edge, AI-optimised hardware may prove more difficult. The Biden
administration’s continued use of export-control laws to restrict access to US tech-
nology has made it difficult for blacklisted Chinese AI firms to obtain cutting-edge CPU
and graphics processing unit (GPU) hardware from US firms. In addition, Washington
could increase the use of extraterritorial controls to prevent Chinese companies from
developing their own AI-optimised semiconductors (many Chinese AI semiconductor
start-ups are using foundry services from TSMC in Taiwan, Samsung in South Korea or
US-based Global Foundries).54
Due to these challenges, the future of China’s AI development is uncertain and the
AIDP’s ambitious targets for 2025 and 2030 are unlikely to be met. Moreover, the decoupling
pressure on the sector is likely to continue apace. The coronavirus pandemic has compli-
cated international travel from China, making it difficult, if not impossible, for Chinese AI
researchers to travel to the US or other international destinations for conferences. Due to the
US China Initiative at the Department of Justice and anti-Asian sentiment in the US stoked
by the pandemic (and right-wing media portrayals that blamed China for the coronavirus
outbreak), the US has become a more hostile environment for Chinese STEM researchers
and professionals. The result has been fewer Chinese AI researchers willing to travel to the
US, fewer Chinese students at US universities and more Chinese AI researchers and soft-
ware engineers returning to work for Chinese companies. The once tightly coupled US and
Chinese AI sectors are becoming increasingly decoupled, with unknown consequences.
The United States’ National Security Committee on AI (NSCAI), a blue-ribbon committee
that included former US government officials and industry leaders, concluded in March
2021: ‘It would be counterproductive to sever the technology ties to China that benefit
basic research and U.S. companies.’55 As the decoupling process continues, the risks for
Asian security are likely to increase: US and other foreign researchers’ lack of visibility into
China’s AI sector will reduce US (and its allies’) understanding of how the sector is devel-
oping, how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may be benefiting from AI, and how and
when major breakthroughs with economic and national-security implications might occur.
A similar dynamic can be seen in other emerging-technology sectors, notably quantum
computing. In December 2021, the US Commerce Department put Chinese quantum-
computing and quantum-communications firms on the Entity List.56 The companies were
not designated because they were involved in developing quantum technology in general
terms but rather because they had acquired quantum-related technology that could be used
for military purposes. According to the Commerce Department, the listing was intended
to prevent ‘U.S. emerging technologies from being used for China’s quantum computing
efforts that support military applications, such as counter-stealth and counter-submarine
applications, and the ability to break encryption or develop unbreakable encryption’.57
Some of the companies have ties to China’s defence industry and PLA-funded academic
organisations. One sanctioned firm, QuantumCTek, supplies equipment and devices for
quantum computing, as well as quantum key distribution (QKD) systems used in telecom-
munications systems to establish encrypted links. The Chinese Academy of Sciences and
the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC), plus leading Chinese QKD
researcher Pan Jianwei, hold stakes in the company. A USTC-based institution, the Hefei
National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale, was also listed. In late 2021, USTC
announced that it was launching China’s first doctoral-degree programme in quantum
science and technology,58 while Hefei is also home to the National Laboratory for Quantum
Information Science. Quantum information sciences (QIS) are a priority for Beijing, which
has a national strategy for quantum and has provided significant funding for projects such
as the Hefei facility. Most of the Chinese breakthroughs announced in QIS, such as those
relating to QKD and quantum computing, have come from state-backed national projects.59
The Commerce Department listed quantum computing among the technology sectors
under consideration for further controls as part of the requirement mandated in the
2018 ECRA.60 However, the US export-control system has been slow to bring quantum-
computing technologies under its aegis. In part, this is a result of the industry’s nascent
state but also uncertainty about how to bring clarity to concerns specific to national secu-
rity – especially those related to the dual-use technologies used in quantum computing and
QKD systems. In November 2018, the BIS announced an advanced notice for proposed rule-
making (ANPRM), which cited 14 broad areas of emerging technology under consideration
for expanded controls, including quantum computing, quantum encryption and quantum
sensing. Since then, under the Biden administration the BIS has attempted to narrow the
controls to focus on specific enabling equip- US President Joe Biden hosts a meeting with the prime ministers of Australia,
India and Japan in the ‘Quad’ format, Washington DC, 24 September 2021
ment, such as quantum-refrigeration units
and post-quantum cryptography, software
used for nucleic-acid assembly and synthesis,
and some specific AI-related software.61
As well as QIS (including quantum
computing), biotechnology is another sector
under focus – particularly in terms of its mili-
tary applications and access to healthcare
data. The broader risks related to further
decoupling in these sectors are similar to
those for developments related to AI, as
Beijing continues to support advanced tech-
nologies and restrict information about
(Sarahbeth Many/New York Times/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
domestic R&D in key sectors – such as
high-performance computing – while the US government increases its controls and US
researchers retract their collaboration. Loss of access and visibility into how these technol-
ogies are developed and used in China will make it more challenging for the US and its
allies to keep abreast of significant breakthroughs there.
In addition, semiconductors, quantum-related technologies and AI have featured in
discussions initiated by the Biden administration in 2021 about expanding multilateral or
plurilateral export controls among the US, the EU and the Quad. The formats for these
discussions include the EU–US Trade and Technology Council, which has working groups
on export controls and supply-chain resilience,62 and the Quad Emerging Technology
Working Group,63 which is likely to investigate opportunities for expanding export controls
targeting China and coordinating semiconductor-related industrial policies.
RISKS FOR ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

If left unchecked, growing pressures driven by the effects of US–China technology
competition on semiconductor supply chains and by decoupling in emerging-technology
sectors will pose an increasing risk to Asia-Pacific security over the next five years. If the
Republican Party sweeps the US mid-term elections in November 2022, hardline political
views on tightening export controls and using the FDPR more expansively are likely to
gain traction in Washington. If large numbers of Chinese firms are affected by an FDP-style
rule – and thereby cut off from using Taiwan as a manufacturing base – the result may
be that Beijing feels pushed into a corner on the issue of Taiwan and advanced semicon-
ductor manufacturing. The US would then risk running up against Beijing’s unknown red
lines on technology-related issues. Semiconductors are now part of Beijing’s calculus when
it considers the timetable for ‘reunification’ with Taiwan. It is unclear what the regional
consequences would be if the US attempted to cut off Taiwan’s role as a semiconductor-man-
ufacturing base for Chinese firms. Such a development could reduce the utility of the silicon
shield around Taiwan, increasing Beijing’s willingness to discount the impact of a significant
disconnection from Taiwan’s semiconductor industry resulting from military action.
In addition, the lack of clear US policy with respect to dual-use-technology controls

and restrictions will further complicate the development of robust, resilient semiconductor
supply chains in the Asia-Pacific. It could also lead to further economic-security challenges
of the kind caused by the global semiconductor shortage since 2020. For example, some
industry observers believe that the US Entity List action against Huawei in May 2019
and the FDPR action in May 2020 are responsible for 15–20% of the global semiconductor
shortage. These actions were starting to take effect at the same time that the coronavirus
pandemic was impacting auto-industry procurement decisions (which were the prime
cause of the shortage). These developments led Huawei and then other Chinese compa-
nies to stockpile, the impact of which ripped through supply chains and semiconductor
brokers, worsening the shortage.64
Without a clear regulatory framework governing civilian-use technologies not tradi-
tionally covered by the US export-control regime – including in AI, quantum computing
and biotechnology – the US risks taking action with unknown second- and third-order
collateral impacts. These impacts could affect global and regional supply chains, as with
the Huawei Entity List and FDPR actions. Highlighting the risks relating to future regula-
tory decisions affecting advanced technologies, in March 2021 the NSCAI made a number
of recommendations on export controls, including:
The U.S. Government must clearly state the principles that will guide future U.S. deci-
sions regarding policies to protect critical technologies. This will enable more consistent
and cohesive technology protection policies and provide clarity to industry regarding
how the government intends to utilize these regulatory tools in the current competitive
environment, thereby reducing uncertainty for U.S. businesses. No such framework
currently exists.65
US officials could consider tightening controls in the semiconductor sector, pursuing

very narrow export controls and seeking to reduce tensions over the issue. They should
aim to sharpen the focus on specific national-security implications for the semiconductor
industry; often, these implications are not clearly articulated by government officials.66
Similar considerations could be applied to other technology sectors in order to reduce the
unforeseen or low-probability (but high-risk) implications for the Asia-Pacific. If current
trends continue unchecked, the regional security implications will only grow larger.
NOTES
1 Paul Triolo (@pstAsiatech), tweet, 12 January business/international/micron-technology-is-

2018, https://twitter.com/pstAsiatech/status/9518 said-to-be-takeover-target-of-chinese-company.
77233202868225?s=20. html?ref=technology&_r=0.
2 See Paul Mozur and Quentin Hardy, ‘Micron 3 See China, State Council, ‘Guojia jicheng dianlu
Technology Is Said to Be Takeover Target of chanye touzi jijin zhengshi sheli’ 国家集成电路产
Chinese Company’, New York Times, 14 July 业投资基金正式设立 [The National IC Industry
2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/ Investment Fund is officially launched], 14
October 2014, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014- investor-agreement-with-midea-and-recom-

10/14/content_2764849.htm; and China, State mends-acceptance-of-the-offer.pdf.
Council, ‘Guowuyuan yinfa “Guojia jicheng 11 ‘US Government Authorities Grant Clearances
dianlu chanye fazhan tuijin gangyao’ 国务 for Take-over of KUKA by Midea’, Kuka, 30
院印发《国家集成电路产业发展推进纲要》 December 2016, https://www.kuka.com/en-de/
[National integrated circuit industry develop- company/press/news/2016/12/clearances-for-
ment guidelines], 24 June 2014, http://www.gov. take-over-of-kuka-by-midea.
cn/xinwen/2014-06/24/content_2707281.htm. 12 US, Federal Register, ‘Additions to the Entity
4 This is a key concept in understanding the List’, 8 March 2016, https://www.federalregister.
wellsprings of the US–China technology compe- gov/documents/2016/03/08/2016-05104/addi-
tition. For a detailed discussion of this concept, tions-to-the-entity-list.
‘wăngluò qiángguó’, see Rogier Creemers et al., 13 US, Federal Register, ‘In the Matter of:
‘Lexicon: Wăngluò Qiángguó: Understanding Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment
and Translating a Crucial Slogan and “Cyber Corporation ZTE Plaza, et al.’, 23 April
Superpower” Ambition’, New America, 31 2018, https://www.federalregister.gov/
May 2018, https://www.newamerica.org/ documents/2018/04/23/2018-08354/in-the-mat-
cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/lexi- ter-of-zhongxing-telecommunications-equip-
con-wangluo-qiangguo/. ment-corporation-zte-plaza-keji-road-south.
5 US, Committee on Foreign Investment in the 14 US, Federal Register, ‘Order Terminating
US, ‘Annual Report to Congress’, 2014, p. 29, Denial Order Issued on April 15, 2018,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ Against Zhongxing Telecommunications
international/foreign-investment/Documents/ Equipment Corporation and ZTE
Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress%20 Kangxun Telecommunications Ltd’, 23
for%20CY2014.pdf. July 2018, https://www.federalregister.gov/
6 White House, ‘Presidential Order – documents/2018/07/23/2018-15633/order-termi-
Regarding the Proposed Acquisition nating-denial-order-issued-on-april-15-2018-aga
of a Controlling Interest in Aixtron SE inst-zhongxing-telecommunications.
by Grand Chip Investment GMBH’, 2 15 US, Federal Register, ‘Addition of Entities to the
December 2016, https://obamawhitehouse. Entity List’, 21 May 2019, https://www.federal-
archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/02/ register.gov/documents/2019/05/21/2019-10616/
presidential-order-regarding-proposed-acquisi- addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list.
tion-controlling-interest. 16 US, Federal Register, ‘Export Administration
7 David Lawder, ’US Commerce Chief Warns Regulations: Amendments to General
Against China Semiconductor Investment Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct
Binge’, Reuters, 3 November 2016, https://www. Product Rule) and the Entity List’, 19 May
reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trade-semicon- 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/
ductors-idUSKBN12Y0EG. documents/2020/05/19/2020-10856/export-ad-
8 US, Federal Register, ‘Addition of an ministration-regulations-amendments-to-gener-
Entity to the Entity List’, 30 October al-prohibition-three-foreign-produced-direct.
2018, https://www.federalregister.gov/ 17 US, Federal Register, ‘Addition of Huawei
documents/2018/10/30/2018-23693/addition-of- Non–US Affiliates to the Entity List, the
an-entity-to-the-entity-list. Removal of Temporary General License, and
9 David Lawder, ‘US Restricts Exports to Chinese Amendments to General Prohibition Three
Semiconductor Firm Fujian Jinhua’, Reuters, 29 (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule)’, 20
October 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/ August 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/
us-usa-trade-china-semiconductors-idUSK- documents/2020/08/20/2020-18213/addition-of-
CN1N328E. huawei-non-us-affiliates-to-the-entity-list-the-
10 ‘KUKA Signs Investor Agreement with Midea removal-of-temporary-general-license-and.
and Recommends Acceptance of the Offer’, 18 See, for example, Qu Hui and Han Wei, ‘TSMC
Kuka, press release, 28 June 2016, https://www. Cuts Off Computer Chip Sales to Huawei
kuka.com/-/media/kuka-corporate/documents/ Under US Sanctions’, Caixin Global, 17 July
press/news/2016/06/press-release-kuka-signs- 2020, https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-07-17/
tsmc-cuts-off-computer-chip-sales-to-huawei-un- Secretary Gina Raimondo, 22 October 2021,

der-us-sanctions-101580989.html. https://gop-foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/
19 See, for example, Joe McDonald, ‘Huawei Sales uploads/2021/10/CTF-Letter-to-Sec.-Raimondo-
Off 32% After US Sanctions, Smartphone Sale’, on-Export-Control-Actions.pdf.
ABC News, 29 October 2021, https://abcnews. 27 US, Federal Register, ‘Addition of Entities to the
go.com/Technology/wireStory/huawei-sales-off- Entity List’, 9 April 2021, https://www.federal-
32-us-sanctions-smartphone-sale-80850979. register.gov/documents/2021/04/09/2021-07400/
20 See ‘Principal Statutory Authority for addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list.
the Export Administration Regulations’, 28 US, Department of Commerce, ‘US Department
Bureau of Industry and Security, https:// of Commerce & Bureau of Industry and
www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/ Security Russia and Belarus Rule Fact
regulations-docs/2263-legal-authority-for-the-ex- Sheet’, 24 February 2022, https://www.
port-administration-regulations-1/file. commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2022/02/
21 See, for example, Paul Triolo, ‘A Holistic us-department-commerce-bureau-indus-
Approach to the Semiconductor Challenge try-and-security-russia-and-belarus.
with China’, RUSI Transatlantic Dialogue on 29 Ibid.
China Blog, 15 June 2021, https://www.trans- 30 Ibid.
atlantic-dialogue-on-china.rusi.org/article/ 31 White House, ‘Summit for Democracy
addressing-the-challenge-of-chinas-semicon- Summary of Proceedings’, 23 December
ductor-industry-calling-for-a-holistic-approach- 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/brief-
that-preserves-the-long-term-health-of-global-in- ing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/23/
dustry-supply-and-value-chains; and Alexandra summit-for-democracy-summary-of-proceed-
Alper, Toby Sterling and Stephen Nellis, ‘Trump ings/#:~:text=Calling%20the%20defense%20
Administration Pressed Dutch Hard to Cancel of%20democracy,action%20toward%20
China Chip-equipment Sale: Sources’, Reuters, global%20democratic%20renewal.
6 January 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ 32 Tsai Ing-wen, ‘Taiwan and the Fight for
us-asml-holding-usa-china-insight/trump-ad- Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, November/December
ministration-pressed-dutch-hard-to-cancel-china- 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
chip-equipment-sale-sources-idUSKBN1Z50HN. taiwan/2021-10-05/taiwan-and-fight-democracy.
22 See, for example, Stephen Nellis, Joyce Lee 33 Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris, ‘Broken
and Toby Sterling, ‘Exclusive: US–China Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan’,
Tech War Clouds SK Hynix’s Plans for a Parameters, vol. 51, no. 4, November 2021, pp.
Key Chip Factory’, Reuters, 17 November 23–36, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/param-
2021, https://www.reuters.com/technology/ eters/vol51/iss4/4.
exclusive-us-china-tech-war-clouds-sk-hynixs- 34 White House, ‘FACT SHEET: Biden–Harris
plans-key-chip-factory-2021-11-18/. Administration Bringing Semiconductor
23 US, Federal Register, ‘Addition of Entities to Manufacturing Back to America’, 21 January
the Entity List, Revision of Entry on the Entity 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/brief-
List, and Removal of Entities from the Entity ing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/21/
List’, 22 December 2020, https://www.federal- fact-sheet-biden-harris-administra-
register.gov/documents/2020/12/22/2020-28031/ tion-bringing-semiconductor-manufactur-
addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-revision-of- ing-back-to-america-2/.
entry-on-the-entity-list-and-removal-of-entities. 35 For more on this, see Paul Triolo and Jimmy
24 See, for example, Alex Leary and Ian Talley, Goodrich, ‘From Riding a Wave to Full Steam
‘US Blacklists Dozens of Chinese Entities Over Ahead: As China’s Government Mobilizes
Surveillance, Military Work’, Wall Street Journal, for AI Leadership, Some Challenges Will
16 December 2021, https://www.wsj.com/ Be Tougher than Others’, New America, 28
articles/u-s-to-blacklist-more-chinese-tech-com- February 2018, https://www.newamerica.org/
panies-over-surveillance-11639663210. cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/riding-
25 This was particularly the case during the Trump wave-full-steam-ahead/.
administration. 36 ‘Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th
26 Michael T. McCaul et al., letter to Commerce Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social
Development and Long-Range Objectives for documents/2019/10/09/2019-22210/addition-of-

2035’, 13 May 2021, Center for Security and certain-entities-to-the-entity-list.
Emerging Technology (CSET), https://cset. 42 US, Federal Register, ‘Addition of Certain
georgetown.edu/publication/china-14th-five- Entities to the Entity List; Revision of
year-plan/. Existing Entries on the Entity List’, 5
37 Xi Jinping, ‘Buduan zuo qiang zuo you zuoda June 2020, https://www.federalregister.
woguo shuzi jingji’ 不断做强做优做大我国数字 gov/documents/2020/06/05/2020-10868/
经济※ [Continue to strengthen and optimise addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list-re-
China’s digital economy], Qiushi, 15 January vision-of-existing-entries-on-the-entity-list.
2022, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2022- 43 SDN refers to specially designated nationals.
01/15/c_1128261632.htm. 44 US, Department of the Treasury, Office of
38 For more on this, see Paul Triolo, ‘China’s Foreign Asset Control, ‘Non-SDN Chinese
AI Trajectory Is Set by Entrepreneurs and Military-Industrial Complex Companies
International Collaboration, Not By Government (NS-CMIC) List Updates; Administrative
Edict’, SupChina, 19 April 2019, https://supchina. Updatesto the SDN, Consolidated, NS-CMIC,
com/2019/04/19/chinas-ai-trajectory-is-set-by-en- and SSI Lists’, 18 December 2021, https://home.
trepreneurs-and-international-collabora- treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/
tion-not-by-government-edict/. recent-actions/20211216.
39 See, for example, Uri Friedman, ‘The Trump 45 Megvii’s initial IPO prospectus can be found
Administration Debates a Cold War with China’, at Megvii Technology Limited, ‘Application
Atlantic, 30 November 2018, https://www. Proof of Megvii Technology Limited’, 29 July
theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/11/ 2019, https://ipvm-uploads.s3.amazonaws.com/
trump-xi-meet-g20-new-cold-war/577045/; uploads/f19d/2a89/megvii-ipo-doc.pdf. It is a
Michael Auslin, ‘Can the Pentagon Win the rare English-language look at a large Chinese AI
AI Arms Race?’, Foreign Affairs, 19 October company’s business plans and models.
2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 46 Ibid., p. 3.
united-states/2018-10-19/can-pentagon-win-ai- 47 The basis for including Megvii on the Entity List
arms-race; Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘The in October has not been explained clearly by US
Trouble with China’s Edge in the AI Arms Race’, officials but appears to rely primarily on media
Diplomat, 10 August 2018, https://thediplomat. reports about the company. Speaking to the
com/2018/08/the-trouble-with-chinas-edge- author, one industry observer said it appeared
in-the-ai-arms-race/; Julian E. Barnes and Josh that Commerce officials were clipping outdated
Chin, ‘The New Arms Race in AI’, Wall Street media stories, which the firm deemed to be
Journal, 2 March 2018, https://www.wsj.com/ inaccurate, and using them as the basis for inclu-
articles/the-new-arms-race-in-ai-1520009261; sion. The official did not believe the Commerce
Joe Pappalardo, ‘“Fake News” Is Sparking an Department had read the 600-page English-
AI Arms Race’, Popular Mechanics, 18 September language prospectus Megvii had submitted to
2018, https://www.popularmechanics.com/ the Hong Kong Stock Exchange months before
technology/a23286956/fake-news-ai-arms-race/; the Commerce action.
and Clay Chandler, ‘Why China Has an Edge 48 The auditing issue is a long-standing problem
in the A.I. Arms Race’, Fortune, 25 June 2018, that has resulted in ‘on-again, off-again’ negoti-
https://fortune.com/2018/06/25/artificial-intelli- ations between the China Securities Regulatory
gence-in-china/. Commission and the US Securities Exchange
40 See Dr Kai-Fu Lee and Paul Triolo, Commission (SEC), eventually leading to US
‘China’s Artificial Intelligence Revolution: legislation that sets a deadline for delisting
Understanding Beijing’s Structural Chinese companies if the two sides cannot
Advantages’, Eurasia Group, 6 December 2017, agree on a solution. The SEC announced on 3
https://www.eurasiagroup.net/files/upload/ December 2021 that it had adopted the final rule
China_Embraces_AI.pdf. that fully implements the requirements of the
41 US, Federal Register, ‘Addition of Certain Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act,
Entities to the Entity List’, 9 October enacted by Congress in 2020 and signed into
2019, https://www.federalregister.gov/ law by former president Trump in December
2020. See US, SEC, ‘SEC Adopts Amendments to Commission on Artificial Intelligence, ‘Final
Finalize Rules Relating to the Holding Foreign Report’, March 2021, p. 6, https://www.nscai.
Companies Accountable Act’, 2 December gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-
2021, https://www.sec.gov/news/press-re- Digital-1.pdf.
lease/2021-250. 56 US, Federal Register, ‘Addition of Entities
49 ‘China’s City of Tianjin to Set Up and Revision of Entries on the Entity List;
$16-billion Artificial Intelligence Fund’, and Addition of Entity to the Military
Reuters, 17 May 2018, https://www. End-User (MEU) List’, 26 November
reuters.com/article/us-china-ai-tianjin/ 2021, https://www.federalregister.gov/
chinas-city-of-tianjin-to-set-up-16-billion-artifi- documents/2021/11/26/2021-25808/
cial-intelligence-fund-idUSKCN1II0DD. addition-of-entities-and-revision-of-entries-on-
50 ‘Can China Create a World-beating AI Industry? the-entity-list-and-addition-of-entity-to-the.
Don’t Hold Your Breath’, The Economist, 22 57 See US, Department of Commerce,
January 2022, https://www.economist.com/ ‘Commerce Lists Entities Involved in
business/2022/01/22/can-china-create-a-world- the Support of PRC Military Quantum
beating-ai-industry. Computing Applications, Pakistani Nuclear
51 Author’s discussions with Chinese AI industry and Missile Proliferation, and Russia’s
leaders and insiders, 2020–21. Military’, 24 November 2021, https://www.
52 Ishan Banerjee and Matt Sheehan, ‘America’s commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2021/11/
Got AI Talent: US’ Big Lead in AI Research Is commerce-lists-entities-involved-sup-
Built on Importing Researchers’, MacroPolo, port-prc-military-quantum-computing.
9 June 2020, https://macropolo.org/ 58 Coco Feng, ‘US–China Tech War: School in
americas-got-ai-talent-us-big-lead-in-ai-re- Eastern Anhui Province Offers Country’s First
search-is-built-on-importing-researchers/?rp=e. PhD Programme in Quantum Technology as
For the best available work on tracking China’s Global Race to Lead This Field Heats Up’, South
AI talent, see also ‘The Global AI Talent China Morning Post, 29 November 2021, https://
Tracker’, MacroPolo, https://macropolo.org/digi- www.scmp.com/tech/policy/article/3157756/
tal-projects/the-global-ai-talent-tracker/. us-china-tech-war-school-eastern-anhui-prov-
53 Zhang Shidong, ‘SenseTime Rises 7 Per Cent ince-offers-countrys-first.
in Hong Kong Debut After Surprise Surge 59 See, for example, Daniel Garisto, ‘China Is
as Traders Defied US Sanctions’, South China Pulling Ahead in Global Quantum Race, New
Morning Post, 30 December 2021, https://www. Studies Suggest’, Scientific American, 15 July
scmp.com/business/companies/article/3161461/ 2021, https://www.scientificamerican.com/
sensetime-set-underwhelming-hong-kong-de- article/china-is-pulling-ahead-in-global-quan-
but-us851-million-ipo. tum-race-new-studies-suggest/.
54 For an excellent and in-depth look at 60 See, for example, US, Federal Register, ‘Review of
China’s AI-specific semiconductor space, Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies’, 19
see Dieter Ernst, ‘Competing in Artificial November 2018, https://www.federalregister.gov/
Intelligence Chips: China’s Challenge Amid documents/2018/11/19/2018-25221/review-of-con-
Technology War’, Center for International trols-for-certain-emerging-technologies.
Governance Innovation, 26 March 2020, 61 See, for example, US, Federal Register,
https://www.cigionline.org/publications/ ‘Implementation of Certain New Controls on
competing-artificial-intelligence-chips-chi- Emerging Technologies Agreed at Wassenaar
nas-challenge-amid-technology-war. For a Arrangement 2018 Plenary’, 23 May 2019,
broader look at the Chinese semiconductor https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/
industry’s development, see Paul Triolo, ‘The regulations-docs/federal-register-notices/feder-
Future of China’s Semiconductor Industry’, al-register-2019/2398-84-fr-23886/file.
American Affairs, vol. 5, no. 1, Spring 2021, https:// 62 See, for example, ‘EU–US Trade and Technology
americanaffairsjournal.org/2021/02/the-fu- Council Inaugural Joint Statement’, European
ture-of-chinas-semiconductor-industry/#notes. Commission, 29 September 2021, https://ec.eu-
55 During discussions with the NSCAI, the author ropa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/e%20n/
emphasised this point. See National Security statement_21_4951.
63 White House, ‘Fact Sheet: Quad Summit’, 12 www.transatlantic-dialogue-on-china.rusi.org/

March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ article/what-can-brussels-and-washington-
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/ really-do-about-the-semiconductor-problem;
fact-sheet-quad-summit/. and Paul Triolo, ‘A Holistic Approach to
64 Author’s discussions with various industry offi- the Semiconductor Challenge with China’,
cials, 2020–21. RUSI, Transatlantic Dialogue on China
65 National Security Commission on Artificial Blog, 15 June 2021, https://www.transat-
Intelligence, ‘Final Report’. lantic-dialogue-on-china.rusi.org/article/
66 See, for example, Paul Triolo, ‘What Can addressing-the-challenge-of-chinas-semicon-
Brussels and Washington Really Do About the ductor-industry-calling-for-a-holistic-approach-
Semiconductor Problem?’, RUSI, Transatlantic that-preserves-the-long-term-health-of-global-
Dialogue on China Blog, 28 June 2021, https:// industry-supply-and-value-chains.
CHAPTER 8
JAPAN–CHINA
RELATIONS:
STABILISING
INTENSE STRATEGIC
COMPETITION
DR MICHAEL GREEN NICHOLAS SZECHENYI

Michael Green is Director of Asian Studies and Nicholas Szechenyi is Senior
Chair in Modern and Contemporary Japanese Fellow and Deputy Director
Politics and Foreign Policy at the School of Foreign of the Japan Chair at the
Service at Georgetown University and incoming Center for Strategic and
CEO of the United States Studies Centre in Sydney International Studies
,
an
ap
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Japan’s rivalry with China is deep and enduring.

rt/ se
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ar D
A decade ago, Tokyo began quietly pushing

(C elf-
22 S
20 und
Washington and other like-minded capitals to embrace

ch o
ar Gr
M se
a counterbalancing strategy centred on Japan’s vision for

15 ane
p
Ja
a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), the protection of sensitive

technologies and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).
Today, Japan is proving that it is possible to adopt a nuanced approach towards China that
combines competition and cooperation.
SHAPING THE INDO-PACIFIC

At first, the likes of Canberra, London and Washington viewed Japan’s counterbalancing strategy with
a deep scepticism. However, a decade of coercive Chinese strategies under President Xi Jinping’s
leadership has prompted a change of perspective. The Trump and Biden administrations in the United
States embraced Tokyo’s framework, while other states in Europe and maritime Asia are following
suit. Japan is beginning to explore how to ‘compete with China without catastrophe’. A key question
for Japan is how to maintain beneficial economic and diplomatic ties with China while defending
the rules-based order. Since the US approach to China is still focused on competition – with little
emphasis on cooperation or the future of bilateral economic relations – Japan’s search for balance in
its relations with Beijing could once again be an important shaper of future American strategy.
TAPERING JAPAN–CHINA ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

An emerging debate over economic security in Japan – premised on the need to secure sensitive
technologies – is leading to a tapering of investments in certain industries in China, introducing a new
dimension of economic competition to the bilateral relationship.
TRAJECTORY FOR JAPAN–CHINA RELATIONS

Continuity should be expected in Japan’s China strategy given the domestic consensus on China
and the reality that Tokyo needs to deter Chinese aggression while recognising a degree of
economic interdependence, tempered by elements of competition with Beijing in areas such as
emerging technologies.
FIRST MOVER JAPAN

For all the chaos it sowed on the world stage, the Trump administration opened an
enduring new chapter in US diplomatic history by declaring China a strategic competitor
in its 2017 National Security Strategy.1 Though different in tone, the Biden administration
has followed suit. In turn, Australia, the European Union, the United Kingdom and other
stakeholders have adopted tougher stances on Beijing and demonstrated a willingness to
defend the liberal international order against systemic competition from Beijing. Yet of the
major powers it was Japan that moved first to adopt policies that reflected the increasing
challenge posed by China. In Japan’s 2013 National Security Strategy, then-prime minister
Abe Shinzo premised his policies on the observation that Chinese coercion was creating a
challenging security environment for Japan.2 Abe promised lines of effort to preserve what
he would call later the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). The Trump and Biden admin-
istrations picked up the key elements of Abe’s approach, including the FOIP framework;
an emphasis on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’, comprising Australia,
India, Japan and the US); the banning of Chinese telecoms firm Huawei from domestic 5G
markets; deeper engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN);
and provision of ‘quality infrastructure’ to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
It is unsurprising that Japan – which has been competing strategically with China since at
least the eighth century – was the first to adapt to China’s rise. More surprising has been
the degree to which other major powers have followed in Japan’s footsteps, often without
fully appreciating Tokyo’s foresight.
When Abe’s government published its 2013 National Security Strategy, its position on
China contrasted with that of the rest of the world. At that time, the Obama administration
was debating whether to operationalise Chinese President Xi Jinping’s proposal for a US–
China ‘New Model of Great Power Relations’, which foresaw a bipolar condominium that
would have relegated Japan and other US allies to second-tier status in Asia.3 Polls showed
that 40% of Americans supported such an approach at the time.4 Meanwhile, then UK chan- Source: Genron NPO, genron-npo.net
cellor of the exchequer George Osborne was

promising to make London the renminbi hub
Figure 8.1: Public opinion on Japan–China relations, 2013–20
in Europe, while Australian scholar Hugh
White’s popular new book, China Choice: Why %
50
America Should Share Power, was prompting Chinese public: favourable or relatively
favourable impressions of Japan
former Australian prime ministers to urge
Japanese public: favourable or relatively
40
their fellow citizens to follow China rather favourable impressions of China
than the US.5 Rather than viewing Abe’s

Japan as a responsible manager of compe- 30
tition with China, many Western observers

agreed with the Financial Times’ observation 20
in 2014 that – on the centenary of the outbreak

of the First World War – there were echoes of 10
August 1914 emanating from East Asia.6

Yet Abe’s Japan did in fact show the way 0
forward. Today, more than three-quarters 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
of Americans (and over 80% of US elites) Then Japanese prime minister Abe Shinzo addresses the
press during a visit to Washington DC, 22 February 2013
agree that it would be better to work with
Japan to counter China’s rise rather than to
seek compromise with Beijing.7 The Lowy
Institute’s 2019 survey of power in Asia
declared Japan the ‘leader of the liberal
order’ in the Asia-Pacific, particularly after
the vacuum left by the Trump administra-
tion’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership in 2017.8 Lowy polls also found
that in Australia, Abe was the second-most
trusted leader on the world stage.9 Polls by
the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and
others consistently list Japan as the most
(Brendan Hoffman/Getty Images)
trusted power in Southeast Asia.10 Bipartisan
support for the US–Japan alliance in the US Congress has never been higher. Perhaps most
notably, Chinese polls showed that over the course of Abe’s second term as prime minister,
the proportion of respondents that held a positive view of Japan increased (from 5.2% in
2013 to 45.2% in 2020, see Figure 8.1), although the Japanese public maintained its largely
negative assessment of China’s intentions.11
The Chinese public might be on to something. For just as Japan led the way to ramp
up strategic competition with China a decade ago, today Tokyo is quietly defining how
to sustain that competition without spiralling into catastrophe. In other words, Tokyo is
showing how to deter Chinese aggression, protect advanced technology and defend a
rules-based order without inviting complete decoupling, regime change or conflict. Japan’s
strategy continues to evolve and there are clearly shortcomings. However, of all the coun-
tries in the region, Japan’s approach to China will have the most influence on the United
States’ China strategy – because no country is more important to US strategy in Asia than
Japan. In this sense, Japan’s relationship with China going forward may be a harbinger of
other regional states’ strategic approaches towards Beijing, rather than the outlier many
thought was the case a decade ago.
JAPAN’S DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSENSUS ON CHINA

There is more political consensus in Japan on the China challenge than in any other
major power. It was evident in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) leadership
race of September 2021, in which all four candidates were critical of China. Indeed,
their views on security policy, including whether Japan should acquire a counterstrike
capability to deter missile attacks, were as central to the policy debate as their prescrip-
tions for economic growth or combatting the coronavirus pandemic.12 Kishida Fumio,
who emerged victorious in that race and succeeded Suga Yoshihide as prime minister,
was generally considered a moderate on China as he headed a faction led previously
by Kato Koichi, who favoured close diplomatic and economic ties with Beijing to stabi-
lise the Japan–China relationship. However, Kishida adopted a harsher stance on
China, leading the LDP to victory in the Kishida Fumio in Tokyo after winning the race for leadership of the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party, replacing Suga Yoshihide, 29 September 2021
October 2021 elections for the National
Diet’s (Japanese parliament’s) lower house.
His party’s policy manifesto empha-
sised the need to protect universal values,
such as freedom and human rights (and
referenced the Uighurs, Tibet and Hong
Kong in that context); welcomed Taiwan’s
interest in joining the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP); supported Taiwan’s
desire for observer status in the World
Health Organization; and noted the need
to strengthen Japan’s defence capabilities
in response to China’s rapidly advancing (Du Xiaoyi/Pool/Getty Images)
military modernisation and to produce a
new national-security strategy to reflect changes in the regional security environment.13
Kishida’s policy prescriptions do not presage a hardline approach towards China
weighed heavily in favour of competition. Rather, like his predecessors, Kishida will
strive to balance competition and cooperation. The prime minister indicated as much
in a January 2022 speech to the National Diet in which he vowed to ‘say to China the
things that need to be said and strongly urge China to act responsibly’ but also explore
opportunities for dialogue and cooperation, given that 2022 marks the 50th anniversary
of the normalisation of diplomatic relations between the two countries.14
Recent public-opinion surveys suggest that the Japanese public also appreciates the
balance between competition and cooperation at the heart of Japan’s China strategy. Such
polls have highlighted the public’s recognition that Japan–China relations are poor but
also a recognition that stable ties with China are important for regional stability. A poll
conducted by Genron NPO in October 2021 found that 90% of Japanese respondents had
a poor impression of China but 56% agreed that Japan and China should cooperate to
resolve bilateral and regional issues.15 Similarly, a survey of the Japanese public conducted
by Japan’s Cabinet Office during the same period indicated that 85% of the public did not
consider the current state of Japan–China relations to be good but 78% believed that the
future development of the relationship was important for the Asia-Pacific.16 Meanwhile,
thought leaders in Japan appear more inclined to counterbalance China on national-security
issues. In a 2020 survey of thought leaders in Asia and Europe conducted by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 80% of Japanese respondents supported an approach to
national-security issues in which Japan prioritised cooperation with the US and other allies
or partners to balance China, even at the risk of harming Tokyo’s relations with Beijing.17
Those same respondents expressed a readiness to accept economic decoupling from China
in technology but much less readiness to accept a broader economic decoupling, including
in trade in goods and services and tourism, exemplifying the perceived importance of
sustaining stable economic ties with Beijing.
There are several explanations for Japan’s strategic consensus on China. As Mireya Solís of
the Brookings Institution notes, Japan had adjusted to the realities of globalisation earlier than
other states – and without the displacement and reaction against globalisation that divided US
and UK society and politics – enabling Japan to accept a degree of economic integration with
China while rivalling China in terms of investment and infrastructure development abroad.18
Japan also has a millennia-old tradition of measuring and responding to Chinese power and
was the first major power to be subjected to China’s latest coercive practices (in relation to the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2010 and 2012). Finally, alternate strategies that sought to down-
play the competitive dynamics in Japan’s China strategy and associate cooperation with
equidistance between the US and China, such as former prime minister Hatoyama Yukio’s
attempt to distance Japan somewhat from its US alliance by proposing to move all US Marine
Corps air units off of Okinawa, failed miserably, weakening the credibility of the Democratic
Party of Japan and the plausibility of his idea for an ‘East Asia Community’ that would play
the US and China against each other. Taken together, these factors led to a domestic consensus
on a strategy that incorporated elements of cooperation and competition with China. At
present, the key question is not whether Japan should be tough on China but rather how
tough it should become. The outcomes of debates on issues such as defence spending and the
degree of economic interdependence that is acceptable will indicate the extent to which Japan
will push back more forcefully against increased Chinese assertiveness.
COUNTERING CHINESE GREY-ZONE COERCION

Japan’s 2021 defence white paper, ‘Defense of Japan 2021’, accentuated Japanese concerns
about the rapid advances in China’s military capabilities and grey-zone coercion in the
East China Sea (see Figure 8.2 for Japan Air Self-Defense Force scrambles over the East
China Sea in response to Chinese military aircraft).19 Japan’s increasing concern about
China’s behaviour was evident in its denunciation of China’s Coast Guard Law, which
was passed in January 2021 and authorised the use of weapons in ‘maritime areas under
Chinese jurisdiction’ – a term China interprets expansively.20 Tokyo’s concerns were also
made clear in a statement that emphasised that ‘stabilizing the situation surrounding
Taiwan is important not only for Japan’s security but also for the stability of the interna-
tional community’ and that Japan should ‘pay close attention to the situation with a sense
of crisis more than ever before’.21 Moreover, a US–Japan joint leaders’ statement – issued
following a summit meeting between Suga and US President Joe Biden in April 2021 – also
referred to the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged
the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, clearly reflecting heightened concerns about
Chinese coercion.22 Japan’s willingness to speak more openly about Taiwan reflects its own
experience of Chinese coercion around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea
and Tokyo’s concern that if China were to attempt to seize Taiwan by force, similar action
against the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could follow. Ensuring maritime and air superiority
and enhancing manoeuvre and deployment capabilities across the Nansei (southwest)
island chain therefore feature prominently in Japan’s defence strategy, while China’s grey-
zone coercion tactics inform the policy debate on increasing defence spending to manage
an increasingly complex security environment around Japan.23
Figure 8.2: Japan Air Self-Defense Force scrambles over the East China Sea, 2012–20
Number of scrambles
1,000
g
in
in
8 ra
01 t
) r2 ta
es be ft a
ag to ra
Im Oc airc
tty 14 ter
800
Ge yo, gh
via Tok 5 fi
FP er -3
/A at e F
gi re rc
No a, G e Fo
iro sak ns
uh A efe
(K nd elf-D
600
ou r S
az i n
gr Ai
p an
Ja
400
200
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Source: Japan, Ministry of Defense, mod.go.jp
Kishida’s cabinet approved a record-high defence budget of approximately US$50

billion for the fiscal year beginning April 2022, with an emphasis on enhancing capabilities
in traditional domains, such as air and missile defence, as well as new domains, including
space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum (Japan’s defence budget saw only small
increases in the previous decade, see Figure 8.3).24 Procurement and construction priorities
included patrol aircraft (to strengthen intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
capabilities); destroyers and submarines (to increase maritime-domain awareness); the
F-35A/B stealth fighter and funds to upgrade the F-15 multi-role fighter and design a
replacement for the F-2 multi-role fighter (to support air superiority); missiles and radars
(for missile defence); and transport vessels (to be used in rapid-deployment training and
joint exercises for amphibious operations, to improve Japan’s ability to defend remote
islands).25 Kishida also pledged to develop a new national-security strategy – the first to
follow the inaugural strategy unveiled by Abe in 2013 – and attendant national-defence
and procurement strategies by the end of 2022 to meet an array of security challenges.
Kishida suggested that deliberations on the new strategy will examine all options to
enhance national security, including strike capability to deter missile strikes against
Japan.26 The debate on strike capability signifies the beginning of a new chapter in a
decades-long process of pursuing incremental changes to defence policy in response to
the deteriorating regional security environment. In addition to strengthening its own
capabilities, Japan will also seek opportunities to enhance defence cooperation with the
US and other partners in the region.
There are clearly shortcomings in Japan’s defence strategy. Per capita defence spending
still ranks closer to Barbados or Bermuda than neighbouring US allies Australia and South
Korea (see Figure 8.4). Tokyo’s emphasis on maintaining the aerospace-industrial base has
Figure 8.3: Japan’s defence Figure 8.4: Per capita defence budgets of
budget, 2012–21 Japan, the US and selected US allies, 2020
US$ billions (constant 2015) US$
50 2,500
40 2,000
30 1,500
20 1,000
10 500
0 0
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Japan US Australia France Germany South Korea
Source: IISS, Military Balance+, milbalplus.iiss.org Source: IISS, Military Balance+, milbalplus.iiss.org
led to expensive indigenous programmes with long lead times before deployment. Training
has improved but Japan still engages in far fewer large-scale combined-arms exercises than
Australia, South Korea and the US. Despite the unprecedented alignment of Japanese and
US defence strategies, the bilateral command-and-control relationship remains outdated
compared with the joint - and combined - command relationships of NATO countries and
the US–South Korea alliance. However, there is no doubt that Abe’s decision to double
down on defence cooperation with the US is here to stay following his government’s activa-
tion of Japan’s right of collective self-defence in 2015 (the right to defend the US and allies
and engage in joint operations outside of Japan). Beijing will have to assume it will face both
the US and Japan in regional contingencies; although this fact complicates Japan–China
relations, it also reduces Beijing’s confidence that it will prevail in such contingencies.
SHAPING THE INDO-PACIFIC

Japan’s strategy also involves networking with like-minded states across the Indo-Pacific
to manage strategic competition with China and support regional stability and pros-
perity within a rules-based order. Abe unveiled the FOIP concept in 2016 and promoted
a vision for the region based on the rule of law, open economies and freedom from coer-
cion.27 This framework has shaped not only Japan’s regional strategy but also that of
countries such as Australia, France, Germany, India, the Netherlands, the UK and the US,
as well as organisations including ASEAN and the EU. Japan’s FOIP vision has encour-
aged the cultivation of a shared interest in shaping an open, inclusive and rules-based
Asia-Pacific security environment.
The US–Japan alliance constitutes the core of Japan’s networking strategy. The two
countries are increasingly aligned on the importance of defence cooperation and of
partnering in areas such as public health, Australian and Japanese prime ministers Scott Morrison and Kishida
Fumio sign a bilateral reciprocal-access agreement, 6 January 2022
emerging technologies and infrastructure
development under a shared vision for a
free and open Indo-Pacific.28 Japan has also
partnered closely with Australia; the two
governments signed a Reciprocal Access
Agreement in January 2022 that stands
to further bilateral defence cooperation
and trilateral coordination with the US.29
Australia, Japan and the US have cooperated
on infrastructure development to counter
China’s regional economic influence,
evidenced most recently by their December
2021 announcement of a project to strengthen
(Issei Kato/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)
internet connectivity in Pacific Island
countries.30 The three countries have engaged India via the Quad grouping, which in 2021
unveiled a range of initiatives related to coronavirus-vaccine diplomacy, climate change,
critical and emerging technologies, cyberspace and infrastructure development. The Quad
reiterated a commitment to provide public goods consistent with its establishment as a
vehicle for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief following the 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami.31 The four countries have also participated in the Malabar naval exercise to enhance
inter-operability and maritime-security cooperation.32 Japan is committed to engaging
ASEAN countries in areas such as defence capacity-building to support its FOIP vision.33
The missing link in Japan’s shaping strategy is South Korea. Bilateral tensions over
historical sensitivities, a territorial dispute and export controls have impacted efforts to
advance security cooperation bilaterally and trilaterally (with the US) and prevented coor-
dination on broader regional imperatives consistent with the FOIP vision. Seoul unveiled
its New Southern Policy in 2017, which aims to develop ties with ASEAN and India, but
is conducting this diplomatic initiative largely in isolation. It represents a missed oppor-
tunity to coordinate official development assistance and other strategies with like-minded
countries aimed at promoting future prosperity.34 Integrating South Korea into the broader
network of nations focused on the Indo-Pacific will prove critical to efforts to shape rules
and norms foundational to future stability and prosperity. Seoul’s adherence to ‘strategic
ambiguity’ with regard to competition with China is viewed in Tokyo as undermining
US and Japanese strategy. However, Japan’s passive-aggressive stance towards Seoul
(including downgrading expressions of shared values with South Korea in the ‘Diplomatic
Bluebook’, an annual report on Japan’s foreign policy and diplomatic activities published
by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs) does not help either.35 Although Japan and South Korea
share a common commitment to democratic norms and a strong alliance with the US, it
may take a shock from North Korea to remind them of their common purpose in Northeast
Asia. The election of Yoon Suk-yeol, who expressed interest in diplomacy with Japan, as
South Korean president in March 2022 could present an opportunity to enhance trilateral
coordination on North Korea.36
TAPERING JAPAN–CHINA ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

Throughout Japan’s history of economic interdependence with China, Japanese leaders
favoured economic cooperation with Beijing to balance Japan’s emphasis on deterrence in the
security realm – often called seikei bunri (separating political and economic issues). However,
an emerging debate over economic security in Japan – premised on the need to secure sensi-
tive technologies – is already leading to a tapering of investments in certain industries in
China, introducing a new dimension of economic competition to the bilateral relationship.
Following the normalisation of diplomatic relations with China in 1972, Japan invested
heavily in China due to a strategic impetus to bolster its economic competitiveness vis-à-vis
the Soviet Union. Bilateral economic ties flourished, with foreign direct investment, bilat-
eral trade and the emergence of a middle class in China that boosted tourism to Japan.
However, by the late 2000s, China’s emergence as an economic power was accompanied by
an assertive foreign policy that generated tensions, exemplified by Chinese coercion in the
East China Sea, which prompted Japanese industry to divert some manufacturing oper-
ations from China to other countries in the region, such as Vietnam, under the so-called
‘plus one’ strategy. More recently, Chinese attempts to enhance its regional economic influ-
ence through establishing the BRI in 2013 and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
in 2016 have led to competition in regional economic diplomacy, as Japanese businesses
continue to invest heavily in the Chinese market, creating a dynamic of economic interde-
pendence and competition that is likely to continue into the future.
A recent survey of Japanese business sentiment indicates that China is considered
the most promising country for overseas manufacturing investment over the next three
years, followed closely by India (see
Map 8.1).37
(T
ak
as
hi
Ao
ya
m
a/
Ge
tt y
Im
ag
es
)
Kobayashi Takayuki, Japan’s first-

ever Minister for Economic Security,
pictured in Tokyo, 4 October 2021
Map 8.1: Top five most promising destinations for mid-term business development as seen by Japanese
businesses, 2018–21
CHINA
2018 2019
INDIA 2020
2021
2019 2018 VIETNAM

2020
2021
2019 2018
2020 2021
THAILAND
2018 2019 2021

2020
INDONESIA
2018
2019
US
2021 2020
Source: Japan Bank for International Cooperation, jbic.go.jp

©IISS
70% of 118 Japanese firms with operations in China surveyed at the end of 2021 indicated
plans to either maintain or expand business operations in China.38 Yet one of the centre-
pieces of Kishida’s 2022 economic agenda is legislation on economic security designed to
strengthen the supply chain for key industries; prevent the outflow of sensitive technolo-
gies by introducing a classified patent system; secure rare earth minerals; and encourage
the domestic production of sensitive products, including semiconductors, which could limit
new market entrants to the Chinese market.39 This appetite for partial decoupling is also
evident in the business community. A 2020 survey by the business-oriented Japan Center for
Economic Research found that 46% of respondents favoured reducing high-tech tie-ups in
China and 48% favoured stronger export controls modelled on those of the Trump adminis-
tration.40 When Japan offered funds for reshoring from China in 2020, the subscriptions from
companies were 11 times the available funds.41 The juxtaposition of these two trends suggests
the potential for targeted decoupling in critical and emerging technologies, capturing the
delicate balancing act between cooperation and competition that could become a perma-
nent fixture of Japan–China economic relations. Where the Biden administration has no clear
policy position on US investments in China, Tokyo is seeking multilateral trade agreements
such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to protect continuing
investments while offering incentives to Japanese companies to shift supply chains out of
China when necessary to safeguard the most advanced technologies. As Japanese CEOs put
it to the authors, this is a matter of ‘tapering’ rather than ‘decoupling’.42
WHAT’S NEW? TAIWAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS

While Japan has sought a careful balance between economics and security, there is no
doubt that the Japanese public – and especially the ruling LDP – have developed a greater
appetite for risk in relations with China. China’s growing military and mercantile pressure
on Taiwan prompted Japanese leaders to make unprecedented statements of support for
Taiwan in 2021. In June, former state minister of defense Nakayama Yasuhide referred
to Taiwan as Japan’s ‘brother’ and stressed the importance of supporting Taiwan in the
face of Chinese coercion.43 Shortly thereafter, then-deputy prime minister Aso Taro report-
edly told a gathering of LDP lawmakers that Japan and the US would have to defend
Taiwan if the island was attacked by China.44 Former prime minister Abe echoed those
sentiments in December when he declared that a Taiwan contingency would be a contin-
gency for Japan and the US–Japan alliance.45 Nakatani Gen, Kishida’s special adviser on human rights,
Abe stated subsequently that if a US vessel addresses the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, 2 March 2022
were attacked in a Taiwan contingency, it

could constitute a threat to Japan’s survival
and allow Japan to exercise the right of
collective self-defence.46 Japan’s role in such
a contingency would presumably centre on
providing rear-area support for US forces.
However, these statements nonetheless sent
strong signals about alliance solidarity amid
a steady tempo of Chinese coercion aimed at
(Denis Balibouse/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)
Taiwan and Japan in the East China Sea. The Japanese public is also increasingly attuned to
the threat against Taiwan; 74% of respondents to a survey in April 2021 supported Japan’s
engagement towards stability in the Taiwan Strait.47
There is also growing bipartisan support for Japan to voice more forcefully concerns
about China’s human-rights record. In 2021, a group led by former minister of defense
Nakatani Gen sought to pass legislation comparable to the American Global Magnitsky
Act that would allow Japan to impose sanctions against individuals and entities involved
in human-rights abuses.48 While this legislation is yet to pass, Kishida appointed Nakatani
as his special adviser on international human-rights issues, a new cabinet post, to empha-
sise the administration’s commitment to this issue.49 Human rights have also featured
in Kishida’s diplomatic agenda; a readout of his virtual summit meeting with Biden in
January 2022 included a reference to shared concerns about Chinese practices in Xinjiang
and Hong Kong,50 consistent with Kishida’s emphasis on human rights in the LDP policy
platform for the October 2021 lower-house elections. There are also elements of subtlety
in Kishida’s approach, as evidenced by his cabinet’s decision to stop short of declaring a
diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics in February 2022 but quietly refrain
from sending cabinet members to the games.51 Meanwhile, before the start of the Olympics,
the National Diet’s lower house passed a resolution expressing concerns about human
rights in the country without directly referencing ‘China’.52
It would be a mistake to assume that this new appetite for standing up to Beijing on
Taiwan and human rights is driven solely by ideologically motivated conservatives in
Japan, though that is one factor to consider. The ideological battles within the LDP over
China policy go back to the 1950s. However, for perspective, it is worth noting that the
Japan Communist Party was among the most critical of China in the 2020 election cycle
(and the only communist party in the world not to join the Chinese Communist Party in
celebrating its centennial).53 The increased emphasis on deterrence, support for Taiwan
and human rights is taking place under Kishida, a moderate keen on managing a delicate
balancing act between cooperation and coercion. The main driver for this new readiness to
confront China on Taiwan and human rights is China’s repression of Hong Kong (captured
for average Japanese by the sympathetic social-media account of fluent Japanese-language
speaker and democracy activist Agnes Chow) and the conspicuous increase in Chinese
military pressure on Taiwan, which sits only 225 kilometres from Japanese islands.
TRAJECTORY FOR JAPAN–CHINA RELATIONS

As Japan develops its new national-security strategy in 2022, the balance of competi-
tion and cooperation that animates Japan’s China strategy will come into clearer view.
Continuity should be expected in this trajectory given the domestic consensus on China
and the reality that Japan needs to deter Chinese aggression while recognising a degree of
economic interdependence, tempered by elements of competition with China in areas such
as emerging technologies. Five variables in particular are likely to influence the effective-
ness of Japan’s strategy in 2022:
Defence spending: Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo has called for Japan to use the NATO
methodology for calculating the ratio of defence spending to GDP and demonstrate
that Japan is surpassing the unofficial

The signing ceremony for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
threshold of 1% of GDP.54 Takaichi Sanae,
for Trans-Pacific Partnership in Santiago, Chile, 8 March 2018
Chair of the LDP’s Policy Research
Council, openly advocated for an increase
in defence spending to 2% of GDP while a
candidate for LDP president in 2021, but
it is not clear whether Japan can resource
that degree of defence spending.55
This debate speaks to the importance
of economic power to support Japan’s
desire to enhance its defence capabilities.
(Claudio Reyes/AFP via Getty Images)
Political stability: This factor does not
affect the trajectory of Japan’s China The virtual signing ceremony for the Regional Comprehensive
strategy as much as its velocity. Should Economic Partnership hosted by Vietnam, 15 November 2020
Kishida’s LDP falter in the upper-house

elections scheduled for mid-2022 and
cede some power to the political oppo-
sition, the policymaking process could
become bogged down and slow the pace
of implementation, though the funda-
mentals of the strategy would likely
remain unchanged.
China’s assertiveness: If Xi Jinping
continues to consolidate his power by
(Nhac Nguyen/AFP via Getty Images)
securing a third term, expectations of a
more belligerent China will accelerate
the elements of competition in Japan’s China strategy. This could manifest as even
more expressions of support for Taiwan, both unilaterally and under the rubric of the
US–Japan alliance, to counter Chinese coercion.
Japan–South Korea relations: China will seek to exploit ongoing tension between
Japan and South Korea by leveraging the latter’s economic dependence on China and
historical grievances with Japan to pull Seoul closer to Beijing, thereby driving a wedge
between two of the United States’ closest allies. A renewed effort in Tokyo and Seoul to
turn the tide and facilitate trilateral cooperation with the US would signal that the US
alliance network in Northeast Asia cannot be divided, while also potentially opening
avenues for coordination under the FOIP framework.
Regional trade: China is a party to the RCEP and has expressed interest in joining the
CPTPP. China’s accession to the CPTPP may not be a near-term prospect but Japan will
have to engage China on this question and play a leading role in determining whether
China has a seat at the table where standards for trade liberalisation and the future of
regional economic integration will take shape. The CPTPP could become an arena for
either competition or cooperation, and the absence of US leadership places pressure on
Japan to lead the navigation of this complex challenge.
CONCLUSION
Japan is proving that it is possible to adopt a nuanced approach towards China that combines
competition and cooperation. The trend line favours increased investments in defence
amid concerns about China’s advancing capabilities and military ambitions; continued
emphasis on the US–Japan alliance and networking with other like-minded states to shape
regional dynamics; more vocal criticism of Chinese behaviour; and sustained economic
ties with China, albeit with some tapering of economic interdependence in sensitive areas
related to national security. A commitment to deterrence need not preclude the pursuit
of diplomatic interaction, which can play an important role in encouraging stability and
preventing conflict. The 50th anniversary of the normalisation of Japan–China diplomatic
ties in 2022 presents such an opportunity. However, there should be no doubt that Japan is
prepared to manage strategic competition with China by strengthening its own capabilities
and the network of like-minded states committed to shaping a regional environment free
from coercion and favouring a rules-based order.
NOTES
1 White House, ‘National Security Strategy Share Power (Melbourne, Australia: Black Inc.,
of the United States of America’, December 2013); and ‘Former PM, Paul Keating Speaks
2017, p. 2, https://trumpwhitehouse. on Hugh White’s “The China Choice: Why
archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ America Should Share Power”’, Lowy Institute,
NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 20 March 2014, https://www.bing.com/videos/
2 Japan, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, search?q=hugh+white+china+choice&do-
‘National Security Strategy’, 17 December 2013, cid=608013244425842201&mid=7B5F-
https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenho- 6D7E5D99616964157B5F6D-
shou/nss-e.pdf. 7E5D9961696415&view=detail&FORM=VIRE.
3 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 6 ‘End Drift to War in the East China Sea’,
‘Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Financial Times, 23 January 2014, https://www.
National Security Advisor Susan E. ft.com/content/7d713b60-8425-11e3-b72e-
Rice: “America’s Future in Asia”’, 20 00144feab7de.
November 2013, https://obamawhitehouse. 7 Dina Smeltz et al., ‘Divided We Stand:
archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/21/ Democrats and Republicans Diverge on Foreign
remarks-prepared-delivery-national-securi- Policy; Results of the 2020 Chicago Council
ty-advisor-susan-e-rice. Survey of American Public Opinion and US
4 Dina Smeltz et al., ‘Foreign Policy in the New Foreign Policy’, Chicago Council on Global
Millennium: Results of the Chicago Council Affairs, 17 September 2020, p. 11, https://
Survey of American Public Opinion and US www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/
Foreign Policy’, Chicago Council Surveys, Chicago files/2020-12/report_2020ccs_americadivided_0.
Council on Global Affairs, 10 September 2012, pdf; and ‘Analysis: an overwhelming majority
pp. 34–8, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/ of US thought leaders want to work with allies
sites/default/files/2020-11/2012_CCS_Report.pdf. and partners to respond to the challenge from
5 See, for example, Philip Aldrick, ‘Osborne China even if it hurts relations with Beijing’,
Aims to Make London Renminbi Hub’, Mapping the Future of US China Policy, Center
Daily Telegraph, 15 October 2013, https:// for Strategic and International Studies, October
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/ 2020, https://chinasurvey.csis.org/analysis/
banksandfinance/10381311/Osborne-aims- thought-leaders-support-working-with-allies/.
to-make-London-renminbi-hub.html; Hugh 8 Lowy Institute, ‘Lowy Institute Asia Power
White, The China Choice: Why America Should Index 2019’, May 2019, p. 8, https://power.
lowyinstitute.org/downloads/Lowy-Institute- go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2021/DOJ2021_EN_
Asia-Power-Index-2019-Pocket-Book.pdf. Full.pdf.
9 Alex Oliver, ‘2018 Lowy Institute Poll’, Lowy 20 See Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘The Coast
Institute, 20 June 2018, https://www.lowyinsti- Guard Law of the People’s Republic of China’,
tute.org/publications/2018-lowy-institute-poll. https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/
10 Sharon Seah et al., ‘The State of Southeast Asia: ch_ocn/index.html; and Japan, Ministry of
2021 Survey Report’, ASEAN Studies Centre, Foreign Affairs, ‘Press Conference by Foreign
ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 10 February 2021, Minister Motegi Toshimitsu’, 26 February
p. 48, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/ 2021, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/
uploads/2021/01/The-State-of-SEA-2021-v2.pdf. kaiken22e_000019.html.
11 ‘Japan–China Public Opinion Survey 2020’, 21 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘Defense of Japan
Genron NPO, November 2020, p. 10, https:// 2021’, p. 92.
genron-npo.net/en/201117_en.pdf. 22 White House, ‘US–Japan Joint Leaders’
12 ‘Ran 2021 Jimintō Sōsaisen [Bōeiryoku Kyōka] Statement: “US–Japan Global Partnership
4shi Icchi Chūgoku no Taitō, Kitachōsen for a New Era”’, 16 April 2021, https://
Misairu, Nentō’ [2021 LDP Presidential www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
Race: Four Agree on ‘Strengthening Defense statements-releases/2021/04/16/u-s-japan-joint-
Capabilities’, Heeding China’s Rise, North leaders-statement-u-s-japan-global-partnership-
Korean Missiles], Asahi Shimbun, 25 September for-a-new-era/.
2021, https://www.asahi.com/articles/ 23 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘National Defense
DA3S15054820.html. Program Guidelines for FY 19 and Beyond’,
13 ‘Atarashii Jidai wo Minasan totomoni’ [Create 18 December 2018, pp. 11, 21–2, https://warp.
a New Era Together With You], Liberal da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.
Democratic Party of Japan, October 2021, pp. mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/
32–6, https://jimin.jp-east-2.storage.api.nifcloud. pdf/20181218_e.pdf.
com/pdf/manifest/20211018_manifest.pdf. 24 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘Defense Programs
14 Japan, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, ‘Policy and Budget of Japan: Overview of JFY2022
Speech by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to Budget Request’, p. 13, https://www.mod.go.jp/
the 208th Session of the Diet’, 17 January 2022, en/d_act/d_budget/pdf/220330a.pdf.
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/state- 25 Ibid.
ment/202201/_00009.html. 26 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘Policy Speech by
15 ‘Public Opinion of Japan Drastically Falls among Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to the 208th
Chinese People in the Previous Year’, Genron Session of the Diet’.
NPO, 28 October 2021, https://www.genron-npo. 27 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Address
net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5587.html. by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening
16 Japan, Cabinet Office, ‘Gaikō ni kan suru yoron Session of the Sixth Tokyo International
chōsa’ [Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy], Conference on African Development’, 27
21 January 2022, https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/ August 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/
r03/r03-gaiko/2-1.html. page4e_000496.html.
17 ‘Analysis: Allies and partners want more coopera- 28 See, for example, White House, ‘Readout
tion with the united states on china’, Mapping the of President Biden’s Meeting with Prime
Future of US China Policy, Center for Strategic Minister Kishida of Japan’, 21 January
and International Studies, October 2020, https:// 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/brief-
chinasurvey.csis.org/analysis/allies-and-part- ing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/21/
ners-want-us-china-cooperation/. readout-of-president-bidens-meeting-with-
18 Mireya Solís, ‘The Underappreciated Power: prime-minister-kishida-of-japan/.
Japan after Abe’, Foreign Affairs, November/ 29 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan–
December 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs. Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement’, 6
com/articles/japan/2020-10-13/underappreciat- January 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/ocn/
ed-power. au/page4e_001195.html.
19 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘Defense of Japan 30 US, Department of State, ‘Joint Statement on
2021’, July 2021, pp. 58–82, https://www.mod. Improving East Micronesia Telecommunications
Connectivity’, 11 December 2021, https://www. Companies: 70% to Continue China Activities],

state.gov/joint-statement-on-improving-east-mi- Sankei Shimbun, 5 January 2022.
cronesia-telecommunications-connectivity/. 39 For context, see ‘Japan’s Economic Statecraft in
31 White House, ‘Joint Statement from Quad 2022: A Dialogue with Tadashi Maeda’, CSIS,
Leaders’, 24 September 2021, https:// 19 January 2022, https://www.csis.org/events/
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ japans-economic-statecraft-2022-dialogue-ta-
statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-statement- dashi-maeda.
from-quad-leaders/. 40 ‘Japanese Business Rethinks High-tech
32 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, ‘The Quad Deals with China’, Nikkei Asia, 3 September
Conducts Malabar Naval Exercise’, Diplomat, 27 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/
August 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/ International-relations/US-China-tensions/
the-quad-conducts-malabar-naval-exercise/. Japanese-business-rethinks-high-tech-deals-
33 Mitsuko Hayashi, ‘How Japan Can Forge with-China.
Resiliency and Defense Capacity Building in 41 ‘Korona de Seisan Kaiki Hojokin Kyōsōritsu
the Indo-Pacific in the Era of Covid-19’, CSIS, 11bai Masuku ya Iyakuhin’ [As the Coronavirus
17 July 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ Promotes Reshoring of Production, Applications
how-japan-can-forge-resiliency-and-defense-ca- for the Government Subsidy Swell to 11
pacity-building-indo-pacific-era-covid-19. Times the Budget, Many in Mask and Medical
34 For context, see South Korea, Presidential Equipment Producers], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 8
Committee on New Southern Policy, ‘New September 2020.
Southern Policy’, http://www.nsp.go.kr/eng/ 42 Author’s interviews, December 2021 and
main.do. January 2022.
35 In 2020, the Japanese government referred 43 Kenneth R. Weinstein, ‘Transcript: The
to South Korea as an ‘important neighboring Transformation of Japan’s Security Strategy’,
country for Japan’ (it was previously referred Hudson Institute, 30 June 2021, https://www.
to as ‘most important neighboring country’). hudson.org/research/17059-transcript-the-trans-
Beginning in 2015, in its ‘Diplomatic Bluebook’ formation-of-japan-s-security-strategy.
Japan no longer referred to South Korea as 44 ‘Deputy PM Aso Says Japan Would Defend
a country with which it shared common Taiwan with US, Irking China’, Kyodo News,
values. See Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 July 2021, https://english.kyodonews.net/
‘Diplomatic Bluebook 2020’, 21 October 2020, p. news/2021/07/4303060a680b-deputy-pm-aso-
37, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/blue- says-japan-would-defend-taiwan-with-us-irk-
book/2020/pdf/2-1.pdf. ing-china.html.
36 Victor Cha and Dana Kim, ‘Yoon Seok-youl: 45 ‘Taiwan Contingency Also One for Japan, Japan–
What to Expect from South Korea’s Next US Alliance; Ex-Japan PM Abe’, Kyodo News, 1
President’, Critical Questions, CSIS, 9 March December 2021, https://english.kyodonews.net/
2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/yoon-seok- news/2021/12/b38433927c1e-taiwan-contingency-
youl-what-expect-south-koreas-next-president. also-one-for-japan-japan-us-alliance-abe.html.
37 Kasuga Takeshi and Fujii Risa, ‘Survey Report 46 ‘Abe Hints at Japan’s Possible Military Role
on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese in Taiwan Contingency’, Kyodo News, 14
Manufacturing Companies – Results of the December 2021, https://english.kyodonews.net/
JBIC FY2020 Survey: Outlook for Japanese news/2021/12/134b0c5b6ed0-abe-hints-at-japans-
Foreign Direct Investment’, Japan Institute for possible-military-role-in-taiwan-contingency.html.
Overseas Investment, 25 May 2021, p. 46, https:// 47 Ryo Nemoto and Natsumi Iwata, ‘74%
www.jbic.go.jp/en/information/reference/refer- in Japan Support Engagement in Taiwan
ence-2021/contents/202105_spot.pdf. Strait: Nikkei Poll’, Nikkei Asia, 26 April
38 ‘Shuyō 118 sha Ankēto Chūgoku Jigyō 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/
“Keizoku” 7 wari’ [Survey of 118 Major International-relations/74-in-Japan-support-
engagement-in-Taiwan-Strait-Nikkei-poll. world/asia-pacific/japan-parliament-adopts-res-
48 ‘Japan Eyes Legislation to Enable Sanctions olution-human-rights-china-2022-02-01/.
over Human Rights Abuses’, Kyodo News, 6 53 Julian Ryall, ‘Japanese Communist Party
April 2021, https://english.kyodonews.net/ Snubs China’s Communist Party on Centenary,
news/2021/04/8cdbb6c4fad1-japan-eyes-legis- Saying It Is “Not Worthy” of Name’, South
lation-to-enable-sanctions-over-human-rights- China Morning Post, 5 July 2021, https://www.
abuses.html. scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3139887/
49 Jiji Press, ‘Kishida to Name Nakatani Adviser for japanese-communist-party-snubs-chinas-com-
Human Rights Issues’, 8 November 2021, https:// munist-party-centenary.
www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2021110800209/. 54 ‘“NATO Kijun nara 1.24%” Bōeishō, Bōeihi
50 White House, ‘Readout of President Biden’s GDP hi de’ [‘If NATO Standard 1.24%’,
Meeting with Prime Minister Kishida of Japan’. Minister of Defense, Comparing Defense
51 Rintaro Tobita, ‘Japan to Quietly Snub Beijing Spending as Ratio of GDP], Nikkei Shimbun, 14
Olympics, But Won’t Call It a Boycott’, January 2022, https://www.nikkei.com/article/
Nikkei Asia, 17 December 2021, https://asia. DGXZQOUA142XM0U2A110C2000000/.
nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ 55 Ryuto Imao, ‘Japan PM Candidate Takaichi
Japan-to-quietly-snub-Beijing-Olympics-but- Backs Doubling Defense Budget to 2% GDP’,
won-t-call-it-a-boycott. Nikkei Asia, 11 September 2021, https://
52 Kiyoshi Takenaka, ‘Japan Parliament Adopts asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-election/
Resolution on Human Rights in China’, Reuters, Japan-PM-candidate-Takaichi-backs-doubling-
1 February 2022, https://www.reuters.com/ defense-budget-to-2-GDP.
CHAPTER 9
INDIA AND THE QUAD
DR TANVI MADAN
Tanvi Madan is Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy programme
and Director of The India Project at the Brookings Institution
in Washington DC
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India’s choices have been crucial to the Quadrilateral

Na rd
ar bo
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Security Dialogue’s (Quad’s) revitalisation since 2017.

( Y id t
Am
For now, New Delhi remains committed to deepening its

engagement in the grouping. The longer the trends that facilitated
this deeper engagement continue – especially regarding a greater threat perception of
China – the more likely it is that these choices will get locked in.
THE CHINA FACTOR

China’s actions in recent years have fundamentally changed India’s cost–benefit calculus about the
Quad. Beijing’s challenge to the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific has prompted Quad countries
to explore opportunities for collaboration with like-minded states that share concerns about Chinese
behaviour. Moreover, China’s assertiveness helped them overcome their reluctance to revive the Quad
and to elevate its status.
INDIA: THE QUAD’S PACING PARTNER

As the only Quad country outside the US hub-and-spoke alliance system in Asia, India’s buy-in is
critical to the format’s sustainability and trajectory. Since 2020, Indian engagement with the Quad has
intensified, helping to speed up the grouping’s development. India has also been active in shaping
the Quad’s agenda and adjusting its framing, particularly towards the portrayal of the group as a
regional-solutions provider.
POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS
If New Delhi perceives that Canberra’s, Tokyo’s or Washington’s enthusiasm for the Quad is waning –
for example, as a result of domestic political changes in those countries, their competing global or
regional priorities or even their differences with India – then India could recalibrate its involvement.
Or, if India believes that further deepening of its involvement would be detrimental to stability along
its border with China, or if China successfully pursues a wedge strategy via outreach to India or other
Quad members, some in New Delhi might advocate for slowing the pace of the Quad.
In March 2016, then-head of United States Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi participates in the first in-person
summit of the Quad leaders, Washington DC, 24 September 2021
Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Harry Harris
spoke at a conference co-hosted by the Indian
Ministry of External Affairs. In a speech titled
‘Let’s Be Ambitious Together’, he proposed
reviving the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
(Quad), an informal grouping of Australia,
India, Japan and the US that had enjoyed
a brief existence in 2007. Harris stated: ‘We
are all united in supporting the international
rules-based order that has kept the peace and
is essential to all of us.’1
In 2016 India was not ready to match the
admiral’s ambition. However, the following
(Kyodo News via Getty Images)
year, in November 2017, New Delhi agreed
to revive the Quad at the working level. Two years after that, it supported its elevation to
the ministerial level while still trying to maintain the grouping’s limited visibility. India
went even further in 2021, agreeing to a virtual leaders’ summit in March followed by an
in-person summit in September.2 Despite the Indian approach to Russia’s February 2022
invasion of Ukraine differing from that of the other Quad countries (and despite Moscow’s
objections to the Quad), New Delhi also joined the other Quad leaders in March 2022 for a
call in which they discussed the implications of the conflict in Ukraine for the Indo-Pacific.3
It is important to understand the evolution and drivers of India’s approach to the Quad.
The Biden administration has identified both ‘a leading India’ and ‘a strong and reliable
Quad’ as key elements of its Indo-Pacific strategy.4 However, as former US deputy secre-
tary of state Stephen Biegun suggested in August 2020, the Quad is a consensus-driven
grouping.5 As the only country outside the US hub-and-spoke alliance system in Asia,
India’s buy-in is critical to the format’s sustainability and trajectory. One can even think
about India as the pacing partner in the Quad.
This chapter examines India’s evolving perspectives and policies vis-à-vis the Quad. It
first considers New Delhi’s role in the rise and fall of the grouping’s first iteration in 2007–
08. It then examines India’s decision to agree to the Quad’s revival and the government’s
step-by-step approach to achieve this. Particular attention is paid to how the China factor
has shaped India’s approach. The chapter then explores New Delhi’s current assessment
of the Quad and India’s role within it, with a concluding review of potential impediments
to India’s engagement and the grouping’s future development.
THE ORIGIN STORY

In some sense, the Quad originated organically in India’s neighbourhood. It was launched
in 2007, inspired by the four countries’ cooperative response to the December 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami. New Delhi was actively involved in the Tsunami Core Group (TCG) that
was formed at the time.6 In 2005, then joint secretary (Americas) in India’s external-affairs
ministry S. Jaishankar – today the external-affairs minister – described the TCG as an ‘urgent
and ad-hoc response to an unprecedented Senior Australian, Japanese, Indian, US and Singaporean naval officers aboard USS
Kitty Hawk in the Bay of Bengal during the Malabar naval exercise, 7 September 2007
situation that required close and continuous
coordination between those contributing
actively and expeditiously to rescue and
relief’.7 It was a vehicle for the four countries
to share information, avoid duplication and
fill gaps. It later came to involve Canada, the
Netherlands and the United Nations before
disbanding in early 2005 once the UN was
able to lead the coordination effort.8
Subsequently, in 2006, Indian prime
minister Manmohan Singh and Japanese
prime minister Abe Shinzo met in Tokyo,
concurring on ‘the usefulness of having
(Deshakalyan Chowdhury/AFP via Getty Images)
dialogue among India, Japan and other like-
minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region on themes of mutual interest’.9 Less than six
months later, in May 2007, working-level officials from the four countries met in Manila
on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum.
Later that year, the navies of the four countries and Singapore conducted an exercise in
the Bay of Bengal. However, following these developments, the Quad faded away – in
practice, although not as an idea – for a decade. All the member countries had reservations
about the grouping and it was clear that the Quad’s time had yet to come.10
It is important to understand New Delhi’s reservations about the Quad’s first iteration
(or Quad 1.0) as India played a role in its demise and was reluctant to revive the grouping
for several years. Moreover, the Quad’s rebirth (Quad 2.0) only became possible when
India revised its cost–benefit assessment of the grouping and overcame its reservations.
Finally, some of India’s concerns about Quad 1.0 continue to shape its approach to Quad
2.0, particularly regarding the pace of its development.
One reason for India’s reluctance about Quad 1.0 was its assessment of the utility and
necessity of the grouping. In 2007, there was no sense of urgency, no challenge or purpose
for which India assessed the Quad necessary. Or rather, there was no challenge sufficient
to override a second factor: Indian concerns about the Quad’s potential impact on its rela-
tionships with other countries, particularly China. There was concern in New Delhi that
Beijing would see India’s participation in the Quad as provocative – evidence of ‘ganging
up’ against China. Indeed, Beijing had issued démarches to all four countries about their
involvement.11 In addition to India’s broad strategic concern that China would interpret
its involvement as hostile and find ways to retaliate, there was also a more immediate
consideration: at that time, India needed Beijing’s buy-in – or at least its acquiescence – as
New Delhi and Washington sought a waiver for India from the Nuclear Suppliers Group
following the India–US civil nuclear agreement.12
A third reservation was India’s uncertainty about other members’ enthusiasm for
the Quad. Tokyo seemed lukewarm after Abe left office in September 2007. Washington
seemed more interested in the Australia–Japan–US trilateral strategic dialogue, which
had been upgraded to the ministerial level in Left-wing members of India’s parliament protest
against the Malabar exercise, 6 September 2007
2005. Furthermore, a new government took
office in Canberra whose leadership had
objected to the Quad when in opposition.13
New Delhi’s uncertainty about the other
countries was magnified by other factors,
such as India’s doubts about their relia-
bility on China. Indian officials believed that
their partners’ diplomatic and economic ties
with China would make them unwilling to
commit fully to the Quad and even lead them
to renege at some point, leaving India to face
Beijing’s ire alone. And when in 2008 the
Australian foreign minister stated at a joint
(Raveendran/AFP via Getty Images)
press conference with his Chinese counter-
part that Australia would not propose another Quad meeting – administering what then
Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran later called the ‘coup de grâce’ for Quad 1.0 – New
Delhi interpreted the development as Canberra currying favour with Beijing at the expense
of the other countries.14
New Delhi’s doubts about other Quad members’ reliability were exacerbated by another
factor: its lack of familiarity – and lack of experience cooperating – with the other members.
In 2007–08, India’s bilateral relationships with those countries were not particularly well
developed, especially in the strategic realm. New Delhi and Washington had only recently
begun to build a strategic relationship with the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership initi-
ative (January 2004), a ten-year defence framework agreement (June 2005) and a nuclear
deal (July 2005).15 At that time, India was yet to acquire US military equipment. Moreover,
there were no regular US–India discussions on Asia and no US–India–Japan trilateral
dialogues (these developments would follow Quad 1.0’s demise). There was even less
Indian strategic collaboration with Canberra and Tokyo.
A final factor informing India’s reservations about Quad 1.0 was domestic politics. At
the time, the Singh government depended on the support of communist parties. These
parties, which have a long history of anti-Americanism, objected to deepening ties with
the US and were particularly opposed to the 2007 Quad–plus–Singapore Malabar exer-
cise. There were also some within the ruling Indian National Congress party who looked
askance at the initiative – because of either scepticism of the US or a broader concern that
the Quad signalled a departure from non-alignment and would impinge on India’s stra-
tegic autonomy. These groups were also concerned about the proposed US–India civil
nuclear deal, which was going through the legislative process and facing opposition from
the communist parties and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Singh prioritised passing legis-
lation to enable the deal over the Quad, eventually putting his government at stake for the
nuclear agreement in a no-confidence vote in 2008.16
The combination of these factors – and a belief that the Quad would not provide suffi-
cient benefit to balance or overcome them – resulted in New Delhi’s focus shifting elsewhere.
INDIA’S APPROACH TO THE QUAD’S REVIVAL

When Admiral Harris proposed reviving the Quad in 2016, some of India’s reservations
persisted even as others had faded. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP had come to
power with a majority in 2014 and, on balance, his government was not as sceptical of
the US as its predecessor. In its first two years it had deepened bilateral ties, elevated the
US–India–Japan dialogue and welcomed Japanese participation in the annual US–India
Malabar military exercise.17
However, whatever the admiral’s views, the administration of president Barack Obama
was not pushing to revive the Quad in 2016. Moreover, New Delhi had only recently started
to deepen defence and security ties with Tokyo and Canberra. Relations with Australia
were especially underdeveloped and New Delhi remained sceptical of Canberra’s China
policies, partly as a result of the legacy of Quad 1.0. Complicating matters, the Modi
government itself sought to engage China, particularly on economic issues. Furthermore,
although there were signs of Sino-Indian friction, New Delhi did not want to see relations
worsen in ways that would require a diversion of Indian attention and resources.18
By August 2017, there was renewed official interest in reviving the Quad, with Tokyo
putting forth a proposal at the Australia–Japan–US trilateral.19 However, there could be
no Quad without India and securing New Delhi’s buy-in became crucial. By that time,
India and the US had joined Australia and Japan in embracing the concept of an integrated
Indo-Pacific region. In October, then US secretary of state Rex Tillerson made a case for
building on US–India–Japan cooperation by including Australia.20 By November, India
was on board for Quad 2.0.
The Quad met on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Manila at the senior offi-
cials’ level (India sent a joint secretary, the equivalent of an assistant secretary in the US).
Those working-level meetings were subsequently held twice a year (see Figure 9.1). The
countries’ cyber-security officials met on the sidelines of a summit, while Quad diplo-
mats also held meetings in various Indo-Pacific capitals and beyond. For instance, India’s
ambassador in Brussels met with his Quad counterparts. In addition, India hosted a Quad
table-top counter-terrorism exercise in November 2019, while its foreign ministry’s flag-
ship conference, the Raisina Dialogue, featured Quad+ panels that included senior military
leaders from member states (in 2018, they were joined by the former Indonesian deputy
foreign minister; in 2019, by the French navy chief).21
India was slower to take other steps. Its readout of the first senior officials’ meeting in
November 2017, unlike those of Australia and the US, did not refer to the grouping as a
‘quadrilateral’. It continued to demur from using the term ‘Quad’ in official documents,
or issuing joint statements, instead preferring individual readouts. Furthermore, despite
Canberra’s request, it did not invite Australia to join the India–Japan–US Malabar exercise
in 2018 or 2019. It also took two years to heed calls, particularly from the US, to agree to an
elevation of the Quad to the ministerial level, which eventually took place on the sidelines
of a UN General Assembly meeting in September 2019.22 Even then, it did not provide a
readout of the ministerial.
New Delhi preferred to take a step-by-step approach to Quad 2.0 for several reasons.
Firstly, it enabled India to assess the sustainability of other countries’ enthusiasm for Quad
2.0 and whether their more competitive attitudes towards China would continue. (In the
period 2017–21, India was particularly uncertain about US president Donald Trump’s view
of China and the United States’ role in the world hosts.23)
A second reason was the China factor. A summer 2017 China–India military stand-off
contributed significantly to New Delhi’s decision to revive the Quad. Concurrently,
however, New Delhi also sought to stabilise ties with Beijing. The period between autumn
2017 and autumn 2019 witnessed Sino-Indian reengagement in various dialogues and
two summits between Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping.24 New Delhi would not
let Beijing veto the Quad; the inaugural ministerial a month before Modi was due to meet
with Xi made that clear. However, it did not want higher-profile Quad activity to lead
Beijing to pause the Sino-Indian stabilisation effort, or to provoke Beijing into pressuring
India or trying to weaken the Quad.
An additional reason for India’s step-by-step approach was
non-Quad partners’ concerns. ASEAN’s anxieties about the grouping
prompted Indian efforts to assuage
those concerns, including by
inviting Southeast Asian
leaders to India’s
Republic Day in
January 2018.
Figure 9.1: Quad 2.0
meetings, 2017–22
US
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Senior officials’ meeting in Manila

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12.11.2017
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Senior officials’ meeting in Singapore

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Senior officials’ meeting in Singapore

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15.11.2018
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Senior officials’ meeting in Bangkok

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31.5.2019
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Leaders’ summit (virtual)

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Foreign ministerial in New York City

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Senior officials’ meeting in Bangkok

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Senior officials’ meeting (virtual) Leaders’ summit in Washington DC

07 13 24.9.2021
25.9.2020
Foreign ministerial in Tokyo Foreign ministerial in Melbourne

08 14 11.2.2022
6.10.2020
Senior officials’ meeting (virtual) Leaders’ summit (virtual)

09 15 3.3.2022
18.12.2020
Foreign ministerial (virtual) Senior officials’ meeting (virtual)

10 16 30.3.2022
18.2.2021
Source: India, Ministry of External Affairs, mea.gov.in
Subsequently, Modi’s Shangri-La Dialogue A submarine, aircraft carriers and other warships from Australia, India, Japan and
the US participate in the Malabar exercise in the Arabian Sea, 17 November 2020
speech in June 2018 emphasised the inclu-
sivity of India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific
and Southeast Asia’s key role in New Delhi’s
regional strategy.25 Russian concerns might
also have played a role in India’s gradual
approach: in this period, New Delhi was
seeking to keep Moscow onside and prevent
a further deepening of Sino-Russian ties.26
Finally, India generally prefers to take
a gradual approach to new initiatives. For
instance, it took four years for the India–
Japan–US trilateral to be elevated from the
joint-secretary (December 2011) to the minis-
(Indian Navy via AP)
terial level (September 2015), and three more
for it to meet at the leader level (November 2018).27 Such an approach gives advocates
within government an opportunity to socialise the system and assess an initiative’s utility.
It can also ensure initiatives are more sustainable because of opportunities for internal
consultations and consensus-building.
Once India agreed to a Quad ministerial in September 2019 the pace intensified, with
New Delhi agreeing to a high-profile in-person ministerial in Tokyo in October 2020 and
Australia’s inclusion in the Malabar exercise in November 2020.28 In 2021, a virtual minis-
terial took place within a month of US President Joe Biden taking office, followed by three
leaders’ meetings in a year (two virtual, one in person).
India’s warmer embrace of the Quad was evident in its agreement to a joint statement,
a joint op-ed and a joint vaccine initiative in March 2021.29 Starting with the ministerial
in February 2021, it has also officially adopted the label ‘Quad’. In addition, New Delhi
has helped shape the Quad’s framing, its growing institutionalisation (without formalisa-
tion) and the broadening of its agenda. Institutionalisation has taken the form of an annual
leaders’ summit and regular ministers’ and senior officials’ meetings, coordinating sherpas
and sous-sherpas within each government, and several issue-based working groups.30
Recent Indian choices vis-à-vis the Quad have been particularly striking given that they
evolved in 2020 during the worst Sino-Indian boundary crisis in nearly six decades and
then in 2021, when India and China were engaged in sensitive talks to resolve the crisis.31
Traditionally, during such sensitive moments, New Delhi would have avoided taking
actions that might further unsettle its relationship with Beijing. However, it was that very
crisis with China that spurred – and arguably locked in – India’s embrace of the Quad.
THE CHINA FACTOR

The recent evolution of India’s view of the Quad cannot be explained without under-
standing New Delhi’s changing perception of China. While Indian officials often point to
the TCG as the origin of the Quad, to explain its revival one must look to China’s growing
assertiveness towards India and the latter’s recognition that it could not alone tackle
)
es
ag
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es
im
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/H
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Ja
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An anti-China protest in Kolkata after the killing
of 20 Indian soldiers in a border face-off with the
People’s Liberation Army, 18 June 2020
the intensifying bilateral and regional challenges Beijing poses. These were not the only
reasons for India’s agreement to resurrect the Quad. However, without them, it is unlikely
that New Delhi would have considered the revival necessary.
The China factor contributed directly and indirectly to the Quad’s rebirth, with
Beijing’s actions in recent years making the Quad both desirable and feasible for all
members. China’s challenge to the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific prompted Quad
countries to explore opportunities for collaboration with like-minded states that shared
concerns about Beijing’s behaviour. Moreover, China’s assertiveness helped them over-
come their reluctance to revive the grouping and to elevate its status. China’s actions also
prompted the four countries to strengthen their bilateral and trilateral ties (on which the
Quad is built).
New Delhi’s concerns about growing Chinese assertiveness can be traced to the after-
math of the 2008 global financial crisis. Indian officials believed that a more confident
Beijing was seeking to press its advantage vis-à-vis India, as well as regionally. This anxiety
intensified when – after two and a half decades of relative stability – there were a series
of Sino-Indian military stand-offs after Xi took office, particularly in 2013, 2014 and 2017,
and then in 2020–22. In each case, India accused the People’s Liberation Army of trying
to unilaterally change the status quo. The most recent border stand-off, which resulted in
the first fatalities and shots fired in decades, was a game-changer. The episode hardened
Indian views of China as New Delhi accused China of violating the bilateral agreements to
manage the boundary dispute, which had enabled progress in other parts of the relation-
ship. The deteriorating situation at the border came in the context of other frictions: lack of
reciprocity and imbalance in economic ties; deepening China–Pakistan relations; China’s
growing influence in India’s territorial and maritime neighbourhood; what India sees as
Figure 9.2: Young Indians’ views of key partners, 2021
% of young Indians Indian strategic community’s view of India’s

most important partner on global issues, 2018
100
US
Trust Likely partner Distrust Unlikely partner 75%
90
Russia
80 12%
70 Japan
6%
60
Other
50 4%
China
40
2%
30
France
20 2%
10
US Australia Russia Japan France UK EU China UK 0% EU 0%

Adds to 101% due to rounding
Note: ‘Trust’ is made up of those responding either that they ‘Trust somewhat’ or ‘Trust completely’. ‘Distrust’ is made up of those responding that they ‘Distrust somewhat’ or ‘Distrust completely’. A ‘Likely partner’ is one that is ‘Somewhat
likely’ or ‘Very likely’ to become one of India’s leading partners in the next ten years. An ‘Unlikely partner’ is one that is ‘Somewhat unlikely’ or ‘Very unlikely’ to become such a partner.
Sources: Observer Research Foundation, www.orfonline.org; Brookings India, www.brookings.edu/center/brookings-india
China’s aims for a unipolar Asia with China as the dominant power; and Beijing’s impeding
of Indian interests on the global stage. The latter concern included China being the only P5
member not to endorse the idea of a permanent seat for India in a reformed UN Security
Council, and Beijing’s blocking of Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.32
India’s China challenge has been exacerbated by the widening China–India capabili-
ties gap. Three decades ago the two countries’ economies were roughly the same size. In
2021, China’s GDP (US$16.8 trillion) was more than five times that of India (US$2.9trn).
Moreover, Beijing’s defence budget (US$207.3 billion) was more than three times that of
India (US$65.1bn) (see Figure 9.3).33 Such disparities made clear that New Delhi could not
deal with the China challenge alone. It needed partners to enhance its own capabilities and
resilience, provide alternatives in the region, and shape a favourable balance of power that
could deter China and maintain a rules-based order in the region. Therefore, it sought to
broaden and deepen partnerships – both bilaterally and plurilaterally. Canberra, Tokyo
and Washington seemed to be the most like-minded on China and the Indo-Pacific, and
thus particularly attractive options (see Figure 9.2).
Due to Beijing’s assertiveness, there was indeed supply to meet India’s demand. Like
the Bush and Obama administrations before it, the Trump administration in the US envis-
aged a crucial role for India in its Indo-Pacific strategy. So too did Japan and, much to
some in the Indian government’s surprise, Australia. While the Australia–India relation-
ship had been the weakest and least developed bilateral in the Quad, Canberra’s growing
concerns about China’s foreign interference and economic coercion became a key driver of
a transformed Australia–India diplomatic, defence and security relationship after 2017.34
The improved habits of cooperation developed between these countries facilitated India’s
willingness and ability to revive and deepen the Quad.
China’s assertiveness also influenced Figure 9.3: China’s and India’s defence budgets and GDP, 2008–21
India’s embrace of plurilaterals (including Current US$ (billions)
trilaterals and the quadrilateral) more gener- 20,000
China’s GDP
ally (see Figure 9.4). New Delhi saw bilaterals India’s GDP
(as well as existing multilateral and regional

15,000
organisations) as insufficient to deal with
the challenges China posed in the region.35
Alliance membership was neither an option 10,000
for India nor on offer. Plurilaterals, or what
others have called minilaterals or coalitions,
were part of the answer. They offered India a 5,000
way to deepen cooperation and align – even

if not ally – with like-minded partners based
0
on shared concerns or interests. Coalitions
250
are ‘plug and play’, allowing New Delhi to China’s defence budget
200 India’s defence budget
join or create groupings fit for its purposes.
150
The Quad fit that bill.
Moreover, as the China challenge has inten- 100
sified, so too has India’s willingness to make 50
choices that have enabled the Quad’s strength- 0

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
ening. Some of these decisions have been
difficult to make because they have required Source: IISS, Military Balance+, milbalplus.iiss.org
trade-offs at home and abroad, including

with regard to Russia, a partner of India’s that
Royal Australian Navy submarine HMAS Rankin, Indian Navy ships Shivalik
has embraced China’s critique of the Quad and Kadmaat, and Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Warramunga
as a destabilising clique.36 However, China’s participate in the Ausindex exercise near Darwin, Australia, 5 September 2021
actions have fundamentally changed India’s

cost–benefit calculus about the grouping.
INDIA: THE QUAD’S PACING PARTNER

Since 2020, Indian engagement with the
Quad has intensified, helping to speed up
the grouping’s development. In April 2021,
the Australian ambassador to the US noted:
‘India has really … driven a lot of the eleva-
tion of the Quad in recent times.’37 New Delhi’s
buy-in has been important to Quad progress
as Australia and Japan are already American
allies that enjoy significantly deeper defence
and security cooperation with the US. Thus,
Kurt Campbell, Indo-Pacific Coordinator in the
US National Security Council, has called India
‘the critical, crucial member in the Quad’.38
(POIS Yuri Ramsey/Australian Defence Force via Getty Images)
Figure 9.4: Trilaterals involving Quad members and minilaterals involving India
TRILATERALS WITH TWO QUAD MEMBERS
TRILATERALS AMONG QUAD MEMBERS UK
Japan
Australia US Japan Australia Indonesia
South Korea
France
India
US India
SELECTED OTHER MINILATERALS INVOLVING INDIA
Maldives Sri Lanka Italy
Brazil China
South Africa India Russia
Israel
Australia US
Japan
UAE
Sources: Government of India, pib.gov.in; US Department of State, www.state.gov

The Quad serves multiple purposes for US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Marise
Payne, Indian Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar and Japanese Minister for
India. Its participation (both the nature and
Foreign Affairs Hayashi Yoshimasa meet in Melbourne, Australia, 11 February 2022
extent) is a signal to China. The grouping
can also contribute to several Indian objec-
tives in the region: shaping a favourable
balance of power; improving deterrence;
building India’s and other regional countries’
capabilities and resilience; and providing
alternative solutions in various sectors,
including regional infrastructure, so that
China is not the only option for regional
countries. New Delhi also sees the Quad as
a platform for consultation, coordination
and cooperation with three democratic part-
ners that broadly share India’s vision for the (William West/AFP via Getty Images)
region (that is, one not dominated by China
and where a rules-based order prevails) and its concerns about the challenge posed by
Beijing’s behaviour. Moreover, the grouping gives India the opportunity to share perspec-
tives about China with the other members. This helps New Delhi to assess its partners’
evolving views of China – and the extent of their willingness to balance against it.
In addition, India sees the Quad as a platform to keep the US engaged in the region, to
encourage Japan’s recent more proactive stance on strategic issues and to deepen its part-
nership with Australia. Furthermore, the grouping provides India with an opportunity to
participate in and shape conversations about the region. Finally, Quad membership has
facilitated India’s inclusion in other cooperative initiatives and platforms, for instance, the
G7+3 group, New Delhi’s (and Tokyo’s) signing on to a Five Eyes statement on encryption,
and like-minded partners’ coordination in regional and international forums.
India has been active in shaping the group’s agenda. As the Indian foreign minister
outlined in September 2021, this agenda has broadened over time: it now includes maritime
security, cyber security, critical and emerging technologies, disaster response, connectivity
and infrastructure, climate change and clean energy, counter-terrorism, vaccine produc-
tion, student mobility, resilient supply chains and combating disinformation.39
India also plays an indispensable role in the Quad’s vaccine initiative, which pools
the countries’ resources and deploys their comparative advantages. From India’s perspec-
tive, if the initiative succeeds, it can help demonstrate that democracies can deliver
high-quality solutions to their own publics and to the region, provide an alternative to
China’s approach (since the Quad is coordinating with existing institutions such as the
World Health Organization), improve healthcare infrastructure in the region (including
enhancing India’s vaccine production capacity) and convey the Quad’s utility to people
living in the Indo-Pacific. It would also highlight and reinforce a softer framing of the Quad
– that it has, as Modi put it, a ‘positive vision’.40
India has been involved in adjusting the Quad’s framing, particularly towards the
portrayal of the group as a regional-solutions provider. From India’s perspective, this helps
to alleviate the concerns of smaller Indo-Pacific coun- An Indian Navy P-8I, Australian Royal Navy MH-60 Sea Hawk,
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ship JS Akebono, and Indian
tries, to undercut Beijing’s framing of the grouping as an
Navy Shivalik-class frigate INS Satpura participate in the French-
exclusive, destabilising anti-China military alliance, and led La Pérouse 2021 exercise in the Bay of Bengal, 7 April 2021
to address criticisms at home and from partners such as

Russia. If the Quad achieves these sub-objectives, it will
ultimately bolster the sustainability of the grouping.
Simultaneously, the Modi government – like the Biden
administration – has often rhetorically downplayed the
group’s security dimension. For instance, Quad state-
ments do not mention China explicitly (neither do Indian
official documents more generally). However, this does
not mean that the Quad avoids discussions about secu-
rity. Moreover, China is very much on the agenda, as
Quad statements and readouts make clear. After the
March 2021 summit, official Indian sources confirmed
that the Quad leaders had discussed the Sino-Indian
border situation and that ‘Indian concerns found sympa-
thetic response from leaders’.41 Foreign Secretary Harsh
Shringla demurred when asked to speak on the record
but acknowledged that ‘contemporary’ regional issues of
importance to the countries were discussed.42
India also participates in discussions and activities
related to Quad defence and security ties. It does so in
two ways: within the grouping and with Quad partners
bilaterally, trilaterally and in other settings. Many areas
(Operation 2021/Alamy Stock Photo)
of consultation and cooperation between Quad countries
involve critical security components, particularly in the technology, cyber-security, coun-
ter-terrorism, maritime and space domains. The Quad also provides a platform for the
countries to discuss and coordinate their security-assistance and capacity-building efforts
in the region. In addition, it is likely that discussions on regional infrastructure either
already have or will include assessments of which Chinese projects are strategically sensi-
tive. Moreover, regional security is a regular agenda item in Quad meetings (for instance,
regarding Afghanistan or the Indo-Pacific); these interactions provide an opportunity for
high-level consultation on China as well.
Finally, there is joint activity in the defence and security domain. The Malabar exercise
now involves all four countries. Even though officials sometimes say this is not a ‘Quad’
exercise, to some extent that is a distinction without a difference. As previously mentioned,
New Delhi also hosted a table-top counter-terrorism exercise. Moreover, interactions
between the countries’ intelligence communities have increased, including via a leader-
ship-level meeting of what’s been dubbed the Quadrilateral Strategic Intelligence Forum.43
The four countries have also participated in what have been informally labelled Quad-plus
exercises: France’s La Pérouse in 2021, and the US-hosted anti-submarine-warfare exercise
Sea Dragon in 2021 (with Canada) and 2022 (with Canada and South Korea).44
)
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Indian Army soldiers and US Army paratroopers
conduct joint field training as part of exercise
Yudh Abhyas 21 at Joint Base Elmendorf–
Richardson, Alaska, 28 October 2021
Today, India has bilateral mechanisms, agreements and liaison arrangements in place
with each of its Quad partners that have allowed it to deepen defence and security coop-
eration. These arrangements (alongside Indian defence acquisitions from the US, see Table
9.1) have facilitated inter-operability, intelligence sharing and habits of cooperation. So too
have a range of regular and increasingly sophisticated military exercises. With Australia,
India has the biennial Ausindex maritime exercise and the Austra Hind special-forces exer-
cise. With Japan, it has navy (Jimex), air-force (Shinyuu Maitri), army (Dharma Guardian) and
coastguard (Sahyog-Kaijin) exercises. With the US, it has army (Yudh Abhyas), special-forces
(Vajra Prahar) and air-force (Cope India) exercises and a new tri-services exercise (Tiger
TRIUMPH). In addition, its navy now regularly conducts passage exercises (PASSEX) with
each of these countries between their bilateral exercises.
India has also been a participant or observer in its Quad partners’ bilateral or multilat-
eral exercises (Australia’s Pitch Black, Kakadu, Black Carillon and Talisman Sabre; the United
States’ Rimpac, Red Flag and Cutlass Express). In addition, India invites them to its own
bilateral or multilateral exercises. There were Japanese observers at the India–US air-force
exercise in 2018, US observers at the 2019 Ausindex and US participants in the India–UK
tri-services exercise Konkan Shakti. All three of India’s Quad partners participated in India’s
Milan 2022 exercise and indeed coordinated beforehand.45 Moreover, maritime security has
been a key focus of the India–Australia trilaterals with France and Indonesia.
This Indian security engagement beyond the Quad that often includes its Quad partners
reflects two Indian beliefs: firstly, in the Quad’s role as one – but not the only – platform for
cooperation, and secondly, in the need for Quad members – collectively or separately – to
cooperate with other like-minded countries. Within this ambit, India has sought to deepen
bilateral partnerships with countries like France, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, the
Table 9.1: Indian defence procurement from the United States, 2002–21
Designation Quantity Value Classification Domain Prime contractor(s) Order Delivery

(US$) date date
AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder 12 200m Radar Land ThalesRaytheonSystems 2002 2006–07
Jalashwa (ex-US Austin) 1 48.2m Landing platform dock Maritime US government surplus 2006 2007
UH-3H Sea King 6 39m Medium transport Air US government surplus 2006 2007
helicopter
C-130J-30 Hercules 6 962.5m Medium transport aircraft Air Lockheed Martin 2008 2011
P-8I Neptune 12 3.1bn Anti-submarine-warfare Air Boeing 2009 2013–22

aircraft
C-17A Globemaster III 10 4.1bn Heavy transport aircraft Air Boeing 2011 2013–14
C-130J-30 Hercules 7 1.1bn Medium transport aircraft Air Lockheed Martin 2014 2017–19
AH-64E Apache Guardian 22 2.1bn Attack helicopter Air Boeing 2015 2019–20
CH-47F Chinook 15 1.2bn Heavy transport Air Boeing 2015 2019–20

helicopter
M777A2 145 542.1m 155mm towed artillery Land BAE Systems Land & 2017 2017–
Armaments ongoing
C-17A Globemaster III 1 262m Heavy transport aircraft Air Boeing 2018 2019
MH-60R Seahawk 24 2.6bn Anti-submarine warfare Air Lockheed Martin 2020 2021–
helicopter ongoing
Source: IISS, Military Balance+, milbalplus.iiss.org
United Kingdom and Vietnam, and to maintain ties with Russia. It participates in a range of
trilaterals and there are additional proposals for Australia–India–UK and India–Japan–France
dialogues.46 India has joined both military (mentioned above) and diplomatic ‘Quad-plus’
activities – with regular discussions on coronavirus response among the Quad, New Zealand,
South Korea and Vietnam (at the foreign-secretary level for India) and between the Quad,
Brazil, Israel and South Korea at the foreign-ministerial level.47 It has also participated in one-off
initiatives, including a US–India–Japan–Philippines group sail through the South China Sea.48
New Delhi has shown little interest in expanding the membership of the Quad. The
current members bring not only capabilities to the table, but also willingness, shaped by
shared concerns about challenges in the region, especially those posed by China. At this
stage, it is not clear that other countries share the same assessment of or risk tolerance
vis-à-vis Beijing. For example, in the past, Seoul has been reluctant to engage with the
Quad – whether because of concern about China’s reaction, its desire to remain auton-
omous, its differences with Japan, or lack of clarity on the Quad countries’ Indo-Pacific
visions or the grouping’s goals. A less enthusiastic Quad member could serve as a drag
on the chemistry and the pace of the grouping. Also, India might not want its role or voice
diluted – a particular concern because, unlike India, the potential members that have been
discussed (France, South Korea and the UK) are US allies.
POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS
While India has embraced the Quad in recent years, there remain potential headwinds
that could shape and impede its involvement in the group. The current momentum has
been driven by a confluence of circumstances and high-level leadership that considers the
Quad a crucial part of the solution to India’s current problems. A different set of polit-
ical and bureaucratic decision-makers could be less enthusiastic about the Quad, or have
different views on the pace of its development or its focus areas. The Quad is not a partisan
issue as such. Its first iteration stemmed from the previous Indian National Congress-led
coalition government and officials who served then have spoken out in support of the
current Quad.49 However, there are different views both within and outside the current
government (and ruling party) about the nature and extent of India’s involvement with
the Quad, as well as the US. Sometimes those views are shaped by ideology. For instance,
the left and some parts of the right remain sceptical or distrustful of the US. Others do not
want to see a departure from India’s strategic culture (strategic autonomy) and are wary of
dependence on any external actors, which might impede India’s freedom of action. Some
are concerned about the reaction from India’s friends (Russia) and foes (China). Even with
the current configuration of the government, these views could shape India’s involvement
in the Quad. For instance, a preference for strategic autonomy – or its legacy, in the form
of dependence on Russia as a defence-trade and technology partner – could prove to be
an obstacle in deepening military cooperation. So too could a need to keep Russia onside.
China’s choices could also directly or indirectly affect India’s decisions vis-à-vis the
Quad. One way would be if New Delhi sought stability – and no further deterioration – at
the border for economic and political reasons. If India believes that further deepening of
its Quad involvement would be detrimental to that objective, then there is a possibility
it might hold back or slow the pace of the Quad. In the past, India did see the Quad as
leverage to deploy against Beijing, using the level of its participation to convince China
of India’s desire for engagement or to dissuade it from taking actions contrary to Indian
interests. China could also shape India’s decisions if it is successful in pursuing a wedge
strategy via outreach to India or other Quad members.
The last point relates to another potential obstacle – India’s assessment of other
members’ commitment to the Quad. If it perceives that Canberra’s, Tokyo’s or Washington’s
enthusiasm for the group is waning, then New Delhi could recalibrate its involvement.
Their enthusiasm could be affected by political changes (there has only been one change
in government in the capitals – that is, from one party or coalition to another – since the
Quad’s revival), or by a desire for better relations with China, or because those members
find other mechanisms (for example, AUKUS) more useful.
Their enthusiasm could also be affected by contingencies in Europe, which could draw
away US attention in particular and serve to highlight India’s divergences with the other
members on Russia. Indeed, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has raised
questions about its implications for the Quad, particularly given New Delhi’s lack of
explicit condemnation of Moscow’s military actions. It is too soon to tell what the impact
on the Quad will be, and the effect could be complex. On the one hand, the existence of the
Quad itself is evidence of India’s willingness to make choices that do not fit with Russia’s
preferences or demands. Moreover, defence capabilities provided by Russia enable New

Delhi to play a role vis-à-vis China that is desired by Australia, Japan and the US, in terms
of holding the line both at the border and in the Indian Ocean. In addition, the Quad has
served as a platform for the leaders to discuss the implications of the conflict in Ukraine
for the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the crisis has driven home the idea that Indo-Pacific
contingencies that seemed distant or unlikely may actually require greater attention and
urgency. These factors potentially increase rather than decrease the utility and necessity
of the Quad.
On the other hand, India’s response to the Russian invasion has raised questions in the
other Quad countries about how India would react, if at all, to an Indo-Pacific contingency.
This development could lead to the perception that the Quad and India will have limited
utility, and potentially result in greater investment in other platforms that are viewed
as likely to be more effective in responding to Indo-Pacific crises. Much will depend on
whether and how Australia, Japan and the US see and manage their differences with India,
if it diminishes their enthusiasm for India, and how they see the relative weight and link-
ages between the European and Indo-Pacific theatres. The level of interest and investment
in the Quad could also depend on the outcome of Chinese and Russian efforts to fuel fric-
tion between India and its Quad partners.
In turn, New Delhi is concerned with the extent to which the conflict in Ukraine will
shift other Quad countries’ focus from the Indo-Pacific. Simultaneously, it is wary of
expanding the Quad’s remit beyond the Indo-Pacific.50 However, it will have to recon-
cile some realities. Even if India seeks to align with countries to balance China but not to
isolate Russia, deepening Sino-Russian alignment is increasingly connecting the two thea-
tres. Moreover, Russia’s actions will adversely affect Moscow’s ability to provide India the
very military supplies and technology that make Moscow a crucial partner for New Delhi.
Finally, the joint Sino-Russian statement of 4 February 2022 and remarks made by Chinese
officials since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have made clear that Beijing does perceive link-
ages between Europe and the Indo-Pacific and draws comparisons between NATO and the
Quad.51 China is also learning lessons about how countries will respond or not respond to
violations of international law.
Other broader impediments to the Quad’s development – from New Delhi’s perspec-
tive – could involve a change in India’s assessment of the comparative utility of the Quad.
Some Indian commentators already argue that the grouping is too focused on the maritime
domain. This critique might not factor in how capabilities and information acquired from
Quad partners have been beneficial to India as it seeks to address the continental challenge
posed by China (and Pakistan), but it resonates as China looms large. Relatedly, other
Quad members could come to see India as too focused on the continental domain, or less
aligned (or at least less forward leaning) in the case of a Taiwan contingency, and thus
less useful or important. Another argument that could undermine the Quad is that India
is not completely aligned with other members on values, at home or abroad. This imped-
iment could stem either from within India or among the Quad members, particularly the
US. Such divergences have already been evident in concerns expressed in the US about
democratic backsliding in India and its impact on the country’s attractiveness and abilities
as a partner – and India’s objections to such comments, which it sees as interference in its
internal affairs. It can also be seen in differences between India and the other Quad coun-
tries on principles such as freedom of navigation and economic openness.
Beyond principles, India’s power and performance could be impediments if they do
not meet expectations. Resource and capabilities constraints could affect India’s ability
(and willingness) to play the role envisaged for it by other members (indeed, there are
already bandwidth impediments). In turn, this could adversely affect their assessment of
the utility of India in their Indo-Pacific or global strategies.
CONCLUSION
India’s choices have been crucial to the Quad’s revitalisation. For now, it remains committed
to deepening its engagement in the grouping. The longer the trends that facilitated this
deeper engagement continue – especially regarding a greater threat perception of China –
the more likely it is that these choices will be locked in. If the other members’ enthusiasm
for the grouping remains high, the Quad’s durability will be strengthened. Nonetheless,
although the Quad’s importance has been elevated in New Delhi’s view, it will remain one
of several mechanisms that India uses to achieve its objectives in the region. The trends that
drove India towards the Quad will also facilitate the deepening of its bilateral, trilateral
and plurilateral ties with other partners that share its interests and concerns.
NOTES
1 Harry B. Harris, Jr, ‘Raisina Dialogue Remarks 4 White House, ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy of
– “Let’s Be Ambitious Together”’, US Indo- the United States’, February 2022, p. 10,
Pacific Command, 2 March 2016, https:// https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/ uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
Article/683842/raisina-dialogue-re- 5 US, Department of State, ‘Deputy
marks-lets-be-ambitious-together/. Secretary Biegun Remarks at the US–
2 India, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India Strategic Partnership Forum’, 31
‘India–Australia–Japan–US Consultations August 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/
on Indo-Pacific’, 12 November 2017, https:// deputy-secretary-biegun-remarks-at-the-u-s-in-
bit.ly/3u4kLjA; Indian External Affairs dia-strategic-partnership-forum//index.html.
Minister Dr S. Jaishankar (@DrSJaishankar), 6 Marc Grossman, ‘The Tsunami Core Group: A
tweet, 26 September 2019, https://twitter. Step toward a Transformed Diplomacy in Asia
com/DrSJaishankar/status/117728385301 and Beyond’, Security Challenges, vol. 1, no. 1,
6272902?s=20; India, Ministry of External 2005, pp. 11–14; and Nilanthi Samaranayake,
Affairs, ‘First Quad Leaders’ Virtual Summit’, Catherine Lea and Dmitry Gorenburg, Improving
9 March 2021, https://bit.ly/3fVXFDy; and US–India HA/DR Coordination in the Indian Ocean
White House, ‘Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: (Washington DC: Center for Naval Analyses,
“The Spirit of the Quad”’, 12 March 2021, 2014), https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ drm-2013-u-004941-final2.pdf.
statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders- 7 S. Jaishankar, ‘2004 Tsunami Disaster –
joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/. Consequences for Regional Cooperation’,
3 White House, ‘Joint Readout of Quad Leaders Remarks at 26th Annual Pacific Symposium,
Call’, 3 March 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 8–10 June 2005.
briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/03/ 8 Ibid.; and India, Ministry of External Affairs,
joint-readout-of-quad-leaders-call/. ‘Joint Media Briefing by Foreign Secretary Shri
Shyam Saran and Vice Admiral Shri Raman com/other/article30192939.ece; and ‘A Look
Puri, Chief of Integrated Service Command’, 5 Back at the 2008 Floor Test When UPA
January 2005, https://bit.ly/3rOwHn6. Faced No-confidence’, Hindustan Times, 22
9 India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Joint July 2018, https://www.hindustantimes.
Statement towards India–Japan Strategic and com/india-news/a-look-back-at-the-2008-
Global Partnership’, 15 December 2006, https:// floor-test-when-upa-faced-no-confidence/
bit.ly/3qVi95U. story-zEf4TMGoSOK89oYiTrbMnN.html.
10 For a more detailed look at Quad 1.0, see Tanvi 17 White House, ‘US–India Joint Strategic Vision
Madan, ‘The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region’,
“Quad”’, War on the Rocks, 16 November 2017, 25 January 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.
https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-re- archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/
birth-quad/. us-india-joint-strategic-vision-asia-pacif-
11 Siddharth Varadarajan, ‘Chinese Demarches ic-and-indian-ocean-region; India, Ministry
to 4 Nations’, Hindu, 14 June 2007, https:// of External Affairs, ‘Inaugural US–India–
www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-inter- Japan Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue in
national/Chinese-demarches-to-4-nations/ New York’, 30 September 2015, https://
article14777267.ece. mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/25868/
12 For more detail on their quest for a waiver and inaugural+usindiajapan+trilateral+minis-
the negotiations around it, see Shivshankar terial+dialogue+in+new+york; and Vivek
Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Raghuvanshi, ‘Japan to Join Malabar as
Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Brookings Permanent Participant’, Defense News, 13
Institution Press, 2016), pp. 34–59. October 2015, https://www.defensenews.com/
13 Peter Hartcher, ‘Rudd Looks to Alliance naval/2015/10/13/japan-to-join-malabar-as-per-
in Asia-Pacific’, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 manent-participant/.
August 2007, https://www.smh.com.au/ 18 Tanvi Madan, ‘Managing China: Competitive
national/rudd-looks-to-alliance-in-asia-pacific- Engagement, with Indian Characteristics’,
20070824-gdqxs0.html. Global China, Brookings Institution, February
14 Shyam Saran, ‘The Quadrilateral: Is It an 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/
Alliance or an Alignment?’, Hindustan managing-china-competitive-engage-
Times, 25 November 2017, https://www. ment-with-indian-characteristics/.
hindustantimes.com/analysis/the-quadri- 19 Saki Hayashi and Yosuke Onchi, ‘Japan to
lateral-is-it-an-alliance-or-an-alignment/ Propose Dialogue with US, India and Australia’,
story-16CvgQjKHWaayoQjaOl2kM.html; Nikkei Asia, 26 October 2017, https://asia.nikkei.
and Stephen Smith, ‘Joint Press Conference com/Politics/Japan-to-propose-dialogue-with-
with Chinese Foreign Minister’, 5 February US-India-and-Australia2.
2008, https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/ 20 US, Department of State, ‘Remarks on “Defining
wayback/20190808194813/https://foreignmin- Our Relationship with India for the Next
ister.gov.au/transcripts/2008/080205_jpc.html. Century”’, 18 October 2017, https://2017-2021.
15 India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘India state.gov/remarks-on-defining-our-relationship-
and United States Successfully Complete with-india-for-the-next-century/index.html.
Next Steps in Strategic Partnership’, 18 July 21 ‘Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of
2005, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-doc- President Eisenhower’s Historic Visit to
uments.htm?dtl/6789/India+and+United+ India’, Atlantic Council, 11 December 2019,
States+Successfully+Complete+Next+Steps+ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/
in+Strategic+Partnershizp; and K. Alan commemorating-the-60th-anniversary-of-pres-
Kronstadt, ‘US–India Bilateral Agreements in ident-eisenhowers-historic-visit-to-india/; US
2005’, CRS Report for Congress, 8 September Ambassador to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison
2005, https://www.everycrsreport.com/ (@USAmbNATO), tweet, 21 September
files/20050908_RL33072_bd0df1a29a3c0bf- 2020, https://twitter.com/USAmbNATO/
5945c84086bf1603b7b111ba1.pdf. status/1308016963529191425; ‘India to Host 1st
16 John Cherian, ‘The Battle Is On’, Frontline, 21 Counter-terror Exercise for Quad Countries’,
September 2007, https://frontline.thehindu. Tribune India, 19 November 2019, https://www.
tribuneindia.com/news/nation/india-to-host-1st- India Trilateral Meeting’, Foreign Policy,

counter-terror-exercise-for-quad-countries-2445; 23 December 2011, https://foreignpolicy.
see also panel titled ‘Unchartered Waters: In com/2011/12/23/inside-the-first-ever-u-s-ja-
Search for Order in the Indo-Pacific’ at the pan-india-trilateral-meeting/; India, Ministry
Raisina Dialogue, 23 January 2018, organised of External Affairs, ‘Inaugural US–India–
by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs Japan Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue in
and Observer Research Foundation, https:// New York’, 30 September 2015, https://
youtu.be/pXMH1sLrsKU; see also panel titled mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/25868/
‘Indo-Pacific: Ancient Waters and Emerging inaugural+usindiajapan+trilateral+ministe-
Geometries’, 9 January 2019, Raisina Dialogue, rial+dialogue+in+new+york; and Shubhajit
https://youtu.be/C5oWaK-HdYA. Roy, ‘“Jai” Trilateral: In First Such Meet,
22 Shubhajit Roy, ‘China Watching, India PM Modi, Abe, Trump Align over Indo-
Cautious to US Move on Talks with Japan Pacific’, Indian Express, 2 December 2018,
and Australia’, Indian Express, 11 September https://indianexpress.com/article/india/
2018, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/ jai-trilateral-in-first-such-meet-pm-modi-abe-
china-watching-india-cautious-to-us-move- trump-align-over-indo-pacific-5474586/.
on-talks-with-japan-and-australia-5349653/; 28 Ankit Panda, ‘Australia Returns to the Malabar
and Suhasini Haidar and Josy Joseph, ‘No Exercise’, Diplomat, 19 October 2020, https://
Australian Presence in Naval Drill’, Hindu, 29 thediplomat.com/2020/10/australia-re-
April 2018, https://www.thehindu.com/news/ turns-to-the-malabar-exercise/; and India,
national/no-australian-presence-in-naval-drills/ Ministry of External Affairs, ‘2nd India–
article23714285.ece. Australia–Japan–USA Ministerial Meeting’, 6
23 Tanvi Madan, ‘Riding the Rollercoaster: India October 2020, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.
and the Trump Years’, America and the World— htm?dtl/33098/2nd_IndiaAustraliaJapan_USA_
The Effects of the Trump Presidency, H-Diplo ISSF Ministerial_Meeting.
Policy Series, 4 November 2021, https://issforum. 29 White House, ‘Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement:
org/roundtables/policy/ps2021-57. “The Spirit of the Quad”’; and Joe Biden,
24 Madan, ‘Managing China: Competitive Narendra Modi, Scott Morrison and Yoshihide
Engagement, with Indian Characteristics’. Suga, ‘Our Four Nations Are Committed to a
25 Elizabeth Roche, ‘India Marks 69th Republic Free, Open, Secure and Prosperous Indo-Pacific
Day with All ASEAN Leaders in Attendance’, Region’, Washington Post, 13 March 2021, https://
Mint, 26 January 2018, https://www.livemint. wapo.st/3qmoF4I.
com/Politics/xMNAVdFy3lX9WgDh7SD7uJ/ 30 India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘3rd India–
India-marks-69th-Republic-Day-with-grand- Australia–Japan–USA Ministerial Meeting’, 18
parade-Asean-leade.html; and India, Ministry February 2021, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.
of External Affairs, ‘Prime Minister’s Keynote htm?dtl/33534/3rd_IndiaAustraliaJapanUSA_
Address at Shangri La Dialogue’, 1 June 2018, Ministerial_Meeting; White House, ‘Joint
https://bit.ly/35kWSu1. Statement from Quad Leaders’, 24 September
26 Vivek Raghuvanshi, ‘India Approves 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/brief-
S-400 Buy from Russia, Amid Expectations ing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/
for More Bilateral Deals’, Defense News, joint-statement-from-quad-leaders/; and White
28 September 2018, https://www. House, ‘Fact Sheet: Quad Leaders’ Summit’, 24
defensenews.com/land/2018/09/28/ September 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
india-approves-s-400-buy-from-russia-amid-ex- briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/
pectations-for-more-bilateral-deals/; and India, fact-sheet-quad-leaders-summit/.
Ministry of External Affairs, ‘India–Russia Joint 31 Vijay Gokhale, ‘The Road from Galwan: The
Statement During Visit of President of Russia Future of India–China Relations’, Carnegie
to India’, 5 October 2018, https://www.mea. India, 10 March 2021, https://carnegieindia.
gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/30469/ org/2021/03/10/road-from-galwan-future-of-in-
IndiaRussia_Joint_Statement_during_visit_of_ dia-china-relations-pub-84019; and Abhishek
President_of_Russia_to_India_October_05_2018. Bhalla, ‘India, China Complete Disengagement
27 Josh Rogin, ‘Inside the First Ever US–Japan– in Pangong Tso, Next Round of Military Talks
on Saturday’, India Today, 19 February 2021, the First Quadrilateral Leaders’ Virtual
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-chi- Summit’, 12 March 2021, https://mea.gov.
na-disengagement-pangong-tso-military-talks-la in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/33618/
dakh-1770870-2021-02-19. Prime_Ministers_opening_remarks_at_the_first_
32 For further context, see Tanvi Madan, ‘Major Quadrilateral_Leaders_Virtual_Summit.
Power Rivalry in South Asia’, Council on 41 Geeta Mohan, ‘Quad Leaders Discuss India–
Foreign Relations, Discussion Paper Series on China Border Issue, PM Modi Takes Lead
Managing Global Disorder, no. 6, October 2021, on Vaccine Talks’, India Today, 13 March
https://www.cfr.org/report/major-power-rivalry- 2021, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/
south-asia. quad-leaders-discuss-india-china-border-vac-
33 IISS, Military Balance+, milbalplus.iiss.org, cine-1778792-2021-03-13.
accessed 21 February 2022. 42 India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Transcript of
34 Dhruva Jaishankar, ‘The Australia–India Special Briefing on First Quadrilateral Leaders
Strategic Partnership: Accelerating Security Virtual Summit by Foreign Secretary’, 12 March
Cooperation in the Indo–Pacific’, Lowy Institute, 2021, https://mea.gov.in/media-briefings.
17 September 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute. htm?dtl/33656/Transcript_of_Special_Briefing_
org/publications/australia-india-strategic-part- on_First_Quadrilateral_Leaders_Virtual_
nership-security-cooperation-indo-pacific. Summit_by_Foreign_Secretary_March_12_2021.
35 India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘External 43 Matthew Cranston and Chris Uhlmann,
Affairs Minister Participates in a Panel ‘Australian Spy Chiefs in “Full Court Press”
Discussion at the Raisina Dialogue 2021 to Sell AUKUS’, Australian Financial Review, 24
– Crimson Tide, Blue Geometries: New September 2021, https://www.afr.com/policy/
Partnerships for the Indo-Pacific’, 14 April foreign-affairs/australian-spy-chiefs-in-full-
2021, https://www.mea.gov.in/interviews. court-press-to-sell-aukus-20210923-p58u98;
htm?dtl/33806/External_Affairs_Minister_ and Greg Sheridan, ‘The Man Bringing
participates_in_a_panel_discussion_at_the_ National Security Out of the Shadows’,
Raisina_Dialogue_2021_Crimson_Tide_Blue_ Australian, 23 December 2021, https://www.
Geometries_New_Partnerships_for_the_IndoPa. theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/the-man-bring-
36 Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign ing-national-security-outof-the-shadows/
Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers news-story/3a21deec885d891562c4e6fb54810888.
to Media Questions at a Joint News Conference 44 ‘Quad Navies Participating in France-led
with Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Exercise in Eastern Indian Ocean Region’, Indian
Pakistan Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi’, Express, 5 April 2021, https://indianexpress.
7 April 2021, https://archive.mid.ru/en/foreign_ com/article/india/quad-navies-participating-
policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/ in-france-led-exercise-in-eastern-indian-ocean-
content/id/4666612. region-from-april-5-7260225/; US 7th Fleet, ‘Sea
37 See ‘Indian Ocean Initiative Launch’, Carnegie Dragon 2021 Kicks Off Between US and Partner
Endowment for International Peace, 14 Nations’, 11 January 2021, https://www.c7f.
September 2021, https://www.youtube.com/ navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/2468589/
watch?v=L6kJJPE8SuE&t=2606s. guam-hosts-partner-nations-in-exercise-sea-
38 Ken Moriyasu, ‘India and Vietnam Will Define dragon-2021/; and US Navy, ‘Six Indo-Pacific
the Future of Asia: Kurt Campbell’, Nikkei Asia, Nations Begin Exercise Sea Dragon’, 5 January
20 November 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/ 2022, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/
Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/ News-Stories/Article/2889948/six-indo-pacif-
India-and-Vietnam-will-define-the-future-of- ic-nations-begin-exercise-sea-dragon/.
Asia-Kurt-Campbell. 45 Press Trust of India, ‘Air Forces of the US and
39 India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘External India to Hold Joint Exercise “Cope India 2019”’,
Affairs Minister’s Remarks at JG Crawford Economic Times, 29 November 2018, https://
Oration 2021’, 6 September 2021, https://www. economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/
mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/34222. air-forces-of-the-us-and-india-to-hold-joint-exer-
40 India, Ministry of External Affairs, cise-cope-india-2019/articleshow/66868769.cms;
‘Prime Minister’s Opening Remarks at SpokespersonNavy (@Indian navy), tweet, 14
April 2019, https://twitter.com/indiannavy/status secretary-michael-r-pompeos-videoconfer-

/1117389903203934208?s=20&t=D_tV-RFQX9Ykl- ence-with-partners-on-covid-19/index.html.
B1WVIB0Hw; British High Commission, New 48 Caitlin Doornbos, ‘US Joins India, Japan and
Delhi, ‘UK–India Tri-service Exercise Konkan Philippines for South China Sea Sail’, Stars and
Shakti’, Gov.uk, 25 October 2021, https://www. Stripes, 9 May 2019, https://www.stripes.com/
gov.uk/government/news/uk-india-tri-ser- theaters/asia_pacific/us-joins-india-japan-and-
vice-exercise-konkan-shakti; Indian Navy, philippines-for-south-china-sea-sail-1.580241.
‘MILAN 2022: Invited Countries’, https://www. 49 See, for example, Shivshankar Menon,
in-milan.in/CountryMap.aspx; and US Pacific ‘Asia’s Regional Threats’, Project Syndicate, 4
Fleet, ‘Readout: Australia, Japan, US Trilateral December 2021, https://www.project-syndicate.
Engagement’, 23 February 2022, https://www. org/onpoint/asia-security-risks-2022-by-
cpf.navy.mil/News/Article/2944011/readout-aus- shivshankar-menon-2021-12.
tralia-japan-us-trilateral-engagement/. 50 See India, Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Prime
46 Rory Medcalf, ‘We Must Make More of Minister Participates in Virtual Summit
Renewed UK Alliance’, Australian, 13 January of Quad Leaders’, 3 March 2022, https://
2022, https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/ mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/34927/
department-news/19822/we-must-make-more- Prime_Minister_participates_in_virtual_
renewed-uk-alliance; and ‘Event Report: The summit_of_Quad_leaders.
India–Japan–France Trilateral Cooperation 51 Russia, Kremlin, ‘Joint Statement of the Russian
to Tackle the Rising Chinese Hegemony’, Federation and the People’s Republic of China
Observer Research Foundation, 12 February on the International Relations Entering a New
2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/ Era and the Global Sustainable Development’,
the-india-japan-france-trilateral-coopera- 4 February 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/supple-
tion-to-tackle-the-rising-chinese-hegemony/. ment/5770; and China, Ministry of Foreign
47 US, Department of State, ‘Deputy Secretary Affairs, ‘Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng
Biegun Remarks at the US–India Strategic Attends and Addresses the Fourth International
Partnership Forum’; and US, Department Forum on Security and Strategy’, 19 March
of State, ‘Secretary Michael R. Pompeo’s 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
Videoconference with Partners on COVID- wjb_663304/zygy_663314/gyhd_663338/202203/
19’, 11 May 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/ t20220320_10653531.html.
CHAPTER 10
EUROPE AND THE

INDO-PACIFIC:
EVOLVING SECURITY
ENGAGEMENT
DR SHERYN LEE DR BEN SCHREER

Sheryn Lee is Senior Lecturer at the
Swedish Defence University and an Ben Schreer is Executive
Adjunct Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute Director, IISS–Europe
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A growing number of European nations, as well as

as
us
io
the European Union, have formulated ambitions to

ib
ph
am
enhance their security engagements in the Indo-Pacific.

ch
n
Fre
NATO is producing a new Strategic Concept expected to

announce a similar aim. In 2021, the European military presence
in the region increased. A major force behind these activities is China’s increasing power
and its drive to shape the international system in ways that conflict with European interests.
However, the war in Ukraine raises doubts about Europe’s capacity to significantly increase
its defence engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
EUROPE’S BROAD INDO-PACIFIC INTERESTS

Beijing’s challenge to European economic security, global supply chains and the rule of law has led
to greater strategic convergence between European nations, the EU, NATO and their Indo-Pacific
partners. All these parties share a desire to check China’s influence.
EVOLVING EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

Yet Europe’s engagement in Indo-Pacific security lacks a long-term agenda and remains incoherent
and opportunistic. The military-power-projection capabilities of even major European powers
remain limited and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may further reduce their willingness to engage in
the region strategically.
TOWARDS A GEOPOLITICAL APPROACH?

If Europe’s resources can match its growing interest in Indo-Pacific security – and if it can develop
a strategy informed by geopolitics rather than mostly narrow economic interests – then its future
security role in the region might not be insignificant.
In September 2021, European Commission High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy Josep Borrell Fontelles presents the EU Strategy for
President Ursula von der Leyen vowed that the
Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, Brussels, 16 September 2021
European Union would take a robust approach
towards China.1 The statement was made after
Beijing banned ten European citizens (including
five members of the European Parliament) from
entering China in March 2021 in response to
EU sanctions levied against Beijing for reported
human-rights abuses committed against the
Uighur population in Xinjiang province. In
April 2021, a European Council report commis-
sioned by the leaders of the 27 EU member
states warned that China had
(Thierry Monasse/Getty Images)
continued its authoritarian shift with further closure of the domestic political space,
increased social controls and repression in Xinjiang and Tibet. China has also cracked
down on fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong [which] … can only have a negative
impact on EU–China relations … . The EU has clear interests at stake when it comes to
peace and stability in the South China Sea. The recent rise in tensions across the Taiwan
Strait should be closely followed.2
In September 2021, the EU’s new ‘Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ outlined
its objective to play a greater role in the region, including in the security and defence
domains. Specific aims included promoting ‘an open and rules-based regional security
architecture, including secure sea lines of communication, capacity-building and enhanced
naval presence in the Indo-Pacific’; exploring ‘ways to ensure enhanced naval deployments
by [EU] Member States in the region’; supporting ‘Indo-Pacific partners’ capacity to ensure
maritime security’; and facilitating ‘capacity-building for partners to tackle cybercrime’.3
Individual European nations have also intensified their strategic engagement with the
Indo-Pacific. Alongside the two traditional players with long-standing regional security
interests – France and the United Kingdom – Germany and the Netherlands sent warships
to the region in 2021. Combining declaratory policy to signal long-term political support
with bureaucratic planning for Indo-Pacific activities, the EU, NATO and policymakers
from major European powers are working to establish a more coherent framework for
engaging the region. Europe now accepts that China has changed the regional balance
of power. In response, the EU, NATO and European democracies seek to partner with
major Indo-Pacific powers and regional forums, such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), to address this challenge. That said, some increasingly autocratic
European countries, such as Hungary and Serbia, have closer relations with China (and
with Russia), although those aligning with Moscow had to adjust their positions following
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The focus here is on those European coun-
tries whose strategic interests broadly align with those of the United States, are often
termed ‘like-minded’ and seek to uphold the ‘rules-based order’.
EUROPE AND THE INDO-PACIFIC: EVOLVING SECURITY ENGAGEMENT 225
EUROPE’S BROAD INDO-PACIFIC INTERESTS Figure 10.1: The EU’s total trade with its top-ten partners in the
Asia-Pacific, 2020
Many European countries’ interests in
Indo-Pacific stability are tied to consider- US$ billions
ations of strategy, economics and values. 700

In 2020, the EU's top-ten Asia-Pacific
Firstly, Beijing’s growing military aspirations trading partners accounted for 29%
600
of total extra-EU trade
have resulted in several strategic concerns.
500
Intensifying US–China strategic competi-
tion in the military, political, economic and 400
technological domains has prompted the
300
EU, NATO and major European powers to
reassess their respective roles in the region. 200
A regional conflict involving China, Japan,

100
the US and other Indo-Pacific countries
would have severe ramifications, including 0
for the European continent. Apart from

Australia
China
Hong
Kong
India
Japan
Malaysia
Singapore
South
Korea
Taiwan
Vietnam
global market and supply-chain disruptions,
a military conflict might not remain local
and limited. Australia, Japan and the US – and likely also India and maritime Southeast Source: European Commission,
Directorate General for Trade,
Asian states – would look to their European partners for political, financial and even mili- trade.ec.europa.eu
tary support.4 Tellingly, US President Joe Biden’s new Indo-Pacific strategy, published in
February 2022, welcomed enhanced European and EU engagement in the Indo-Pacific and
declared Europe an important partner in collective efforts to uphold the regional order.5
In the long term, Europe will also face China’s global power-projection capabilities and a
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) more able to deploy forces in and around the European
theatre of operations.
Secondly, the Indo-Pacific is of critical economic and technological importance to
European countries (see Figure 10.1), notably in terms of ensuring the uninterrupted flow
of goods through Asia’s maritime and land trade routes. Europe’s economic security is
already adversely affected by Chinese activities, such as cyber attacks and the theft or
acquisition of critical technologies. European governments and companies have also
needed to adjust to Beijing’s illiberal trade practices and use of economic sanctions for
political gain. For example, after Lithuania invited Taiwan to open a representative office
in Vilnius in November 2021, Beijing downgraded its diplomatic and economic relations
with the Baltic nation. The following month,
Beijing also pressured major European Eric Huang, the Taiwan representative to Lithuania, poses outside
the Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius, 18 November 2021
companies, including German car-parts
company Continental, to stop using parts
made in Lithuania.6 In response, EU
lawmakers called for rapid implementation
of a new ‘anti-coercion’ instrument, though it
is unclear when and how such measures will
be adopted.7 Furthermore, to the detriment
of European innovation and critical
(Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs via AP)
infrastructure,8 China is intensifying efforts Figure 10.2: Selected European countries’ sentiment towards China, 2020
to take leadership positions in international
Very negative Negative Neutral Positive Very positive
organisations and set international standards
– based on China’s domestic laws – in relation Sweden
to emerging and enabling technologies. France
Thirdly, China’s efforts to reshape the Germany
international order to reflect its authori- UK

tarian values conflict with Europe’s stance as Czech Republic
a promoter of the liberal rules-based inter-
Hungary
national order.9 As one EU parliamentarian
Spain
said in September 2021, Europe ‘must not
Slovakia
be naive when dealing with China. Whilst
Italy
China is an important trading partner, it is
Poland
also a systemic rival that poses a challenge
Latvia
to our way of life and the liberal world
Serbia
order.’10 Beijing’s alleged systematic viola-
tion of human rights in Xinjiang province, Russia
its continued suppression of civil rights

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
in Hong Kong and its militarisation of the
%
South China Sea have prompted Europe to
make a fundamental reassessment of China’s intentions. Specifically, the fate of Taiwan Source: Turcsányi, Richard Q. et al.:
‘European public opinion on China in
has received increased attention in Europe as it could be ‘next’ on China’s list of illib- the age of COVID-19. Differences and
eral expansion. Consequently, several European countries have signalled to Beijing their common ground across the conti-
nent’ (Palacky University Olomouc,
strong interest in cross-strait stability. For instance, the December 2021 treaty estab- 2020), sinofon.cz/wp-content/
lishing the new German coalition government stated that any change in the status quo uploads/2020/11/COMP-poll-final.pdf
between China and Taiwan could only happen peacefully and with mutual consent. It
also termed China a systemic rival.11
China’s mandate under President Xi Jinping and its unwillingness to cooperate with
international efforts to uncover the origins of the coronavirus pandemic have contrib-
uted to a negative shift in European public opinion regarding China, including in the
three largest European powers – France, Germany and the UK (see Figure 10.2). To be
sure, public-opinion data in 2021 indicated that many Europeans do not perceive China
as a direct geopolitical threat and remain unwilling to incur significant costs to stand up
to Beijing’s behaviour. However, at the same time, China’s threats to democratic norms
and electoral systems have led to increased public support for European governments
pushing back against China’s interference in their domestic politics. Such measures as
establishing the European Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference aim
to address China’s suborning and co-optation of elites in Southeastern, Central and
Eastern Europe.12 The European Commission also seeks to establish a system of quick-
fire sanctions – which can be applied without the endorsement of all EU member states
– in response to foreign powers’ attempts to coerce the EU or individual members.
Individually, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Germany have also implemented
foreign-investment screening.
EVOLVING EUROPEAN STRATEGIES

The EU, NATO and European countries are seeking to increase their respective security roles
in the Indo-Pacific. The EU, the three major European powers (France, Germany and the UK)
and the Netherlands have all declared Indo-Pacific policies, demonstrating a growing view
among Europeans that their continent’s geopolitical future is increasingly tied to the region.
However, forging consensus in the EU and NATO regarding how to achieve Europe’s ambi-
tions for an upgraded Indo-Pacific presence is likely to remain a long-term challenge.
The EU’s 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy

The EU seeks a degree of autonomy from the US regarding the terms and scope of its engage-
ment with Indo-Pacific security and defence. Many EU members remain reluctant to join
what they regard as a ‘hawkish’ US approach towards China. They have objected to American
suggestions to partially ‘decouple’ from China’s economy,13 which remains a key market for
almost all European countries. Moreover, the EU seeks independence from Washington when
deepening its own strategic and economic ties with Indo-Pacific partners such as ASEAN,
Australia, India and Japan. Tellingly, EU leaders remained reluctant in early 2021 to embrace
the Biden administration’s call for Europe and the US to ‘push back’ together against China.14
French President Emmanuel Macron expressed similar concerns in February that year,
arguing that joining together against China would create ‘a scenario of the highest possible
conflictuality’.15 However, should the EU’s ‘autonomous’ approach remain unclarified with
regards to resources and outcomes – as EU High Representative for Foreign and Security
Affairs Josep Borrell Fontelles has warned – the EU will be at risk of ‘strategic shrinkage’.16
In this context, the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy reflects its ambition to have influence
in the region. Recognising that the ‘world’s centre of gravity is moving towards the
Indo-Pacific’,17 the document pledged to build ‘partnerships that reinforce the rules-
based international order, address global challenges, and lay the foundations for
a rapid, just and sustainable economic recovery that creates long-term prosperity’.18
Yet the document failed to directly address China’s assertiveness as the main cause of
regional instability, instead insisting on an ‘inclusive’ and ‘cooperation based’ approach
to the Indo-Pacific. It only hinted at Beijing’s
Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi greets EU foreign affairs
attempts to alter the regional status quo, chief Josep Borrell Fontelles ahead of a meeting in Jakarta, Indonesia, 2 June 2021
mentioning ‘tensions around contested

territories and maritime zones’ and a ‘signif-
icant military build-up, including by China’.
It also stated that regional flashpoints, such
as the South and East China seas and the
Taiwan Strait, may have ‘a direct impact on
European security and prosperity’.19 The
decision to avoid criticising China’s behav-
iour differed from recent approaches of the
US and its regional allies (notably Australia
and Japan), which are taking assertive steps
to counter Beijing’s actions.20
(Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs via AP)
Nonetheless, EU objectives include establishing a ‘meaningful’ European naval

presence and intra-European coordination through mechanisms such as the Coordinated
Maritime Presences, which aims to develop the EU into a maritime-security provider
and establish a permanent presence in areas of interest.21 The strategy called for more
joint naval exercises between EU members, more port calls and increased participation
in multilateral exercises. Brussels further seeks strengthened regional maritime-domain
awareness and information-sharing through working with information fusion centres
(such as Singapore’s) and with Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) member states.
It has also expanded the EU Critical Maritime Route Wider Indian Ocean (CRIMARIO)
programme to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Moreover, the EU promised to step up
its defence diplomacy, deploy military advisers with EU delegations and establish security
and defence dialogues with more partners, including discussions on challenges such as
counter-terrorism, cyber security, maritime security and non-proliferation. Recognising
the trend towards flexible, outcomes-based minilateralism, the EU intends to cooperate
with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad, comprising Australia, India, Japan
and the US) on issues such as vaccines and emerging technologies.22 Therefore, despite
some shortfalls, the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy has involved a step up from the previous
declaratory interest in the region. The strategy attempts to define a cohesive EU security
approach towards Indo-Pacific partners as opposed to relying on individual member
states’ contributions. Crucially, it sets out a more active role while simultaneously trying to
steer clear – to the extent possible – of US–China competition.
Whether that delicate balancing act will succeed remains to be seen. Some European
critics have argued that an EU approach that pursues a ‘third way’ between the US and
China does not adequately reflect Europe’s values and interests. Instead, they say Europe
should support the US and other like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific to reinforce
liberal norms and rules in the interest of maintaining a regional order favourable to
Western (and hence European) interests.23
The EU’s strategy faces other challenges. It states that the EU will not only continue
to protect its essential interests but also ‘promote its values’ and push back against China
‘where fundamental disagreements exist … such as on human rights’.24 It is uncertain the
extent to which Europe will indeed be willing to defend civil liberties, democratisation and
human rights in the Indo-Pacific (for example, Hong Kong’s subjugation by the Chinese
Communist Party and the ethnic genocide of the Rohingya minority in Myanmar were met
with largely ineffective EU responses).
The objective of establishing a regular and ‘meaningful’ regional maritime presence
may also face challenges. The EU’s ability to project significant military power remains
severely limited. Since the UK left the EU, France is the only power within the EU with
significant naval power-projection capacity. All of Europe’s Indo-Pacific deployments,
apart from Operation Atalanta in the western Indian Ocean, have been conducted under
national flags and many states will remain reluctant to reallocate military resources from
pressing problems closer to home, such as Russia’s threat to Eastern and Northern Europe.
The EU’s March 2022 ‘Strategic Compass’ announced the conduct of ´live maritime exer-
cises with partners in the Indo-Pacific in addition to more frequent port calls and patrols´
by 2023.25 In this context, in late January, it was reported that a concept note by the EU’s
European External Action Service proposed the establishment of a new European ‘mari-
time area of interest’ (MAI), which would cover the area from the Red Sea to Madagascar,
the Maldives and the Strait of Hormuz. It stated that European ‘member states deploying
assets [warships] in the new NWIO [northwest Indian Ocean] MAI … would be a good
opportunity’ to ‘enhance the EU’s diplomatic influence’ there.26 Indo-Pacific governments
will watch closely as Paris tries to persuade European countries to commit resources to the
region, in support of France’s declared objective to strengthen Indo-Pacific security during
its EU presidency in 2022.27
NATO’s next Strategic Concept and the China question

Ever since the Trump administration put the rise of China on NATO’s agenda in 2017, the
Alliance has been searching for its own Indo-Pacific strategy. An expert report commis-
sioned by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg concluded in November 2020 that
NATO had to ‘devote much more time, political resources, and action to the security chal-
lenges posed by China – based on an assessment of its national capabilities, economic heft,
and the stated ideological goals of its leaders’.28 It further stated that the ‘growing power
and assertiveness of China is the other major geopolitical development that is changing
the strategic calculus of the Alliance’.29 Stoltenberg himself declared in November 2021
that NATO’s next Strategic Concept, due in 2022, had to address the new reality of an age
of ‘systemic competition’ that saw ‘Russia and China undermining the rules based interna-
tional order’, a shifting balance of power
and pressure on democracy and
freedom.30
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)
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese

President Xi Jinping meet in Beijing, 4 February 2022
Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether the Alliance will be able to agree

on an enhanced role in Indo-Pacific security – and whether this might include a regular
NATO presence in the region.31 While it is plausible that the new Strategic Concept
will pave the way for greater defence cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners, such as
Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, any developments are likely to reflect
more a continuation of its current approach than a major departure. An intensified
engagement in the Indo-Pacific seems unlikely given that key European allies, such as
France and Germany, remain wary of an enhanced NATO role due to concerns about
China’s response. More importantly, most European allies understandably prefer
that NATO’s priority remain Russia. The latter’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022
will only sharpen NATO’s focus on its eastern, northern and southeastern flanks. For
these reasons, Alliance members will likely struggle to organise a communal response
to China’s activities in the Indo-Pacific region.32 That said, the ‘China question’ is now
firmly on NATO’s agenda as a pressing security challenge.
France pivots
Of all the European powers, France has published the clearest expression of its security
interests in the Indo-Pacific. A few months after the 2017 presidential election, the Ministry
for the Armed Forces’ ‘Defence and National Security Strategic Review’ pointed to growing
Sino-American rivalry and the risks Chinese power posed to regional stability.33 In 2019, the
ministry published two further documents outlining France’s security and defence strate-
gies vis-à-vis the Indo-Pacific. The first, ‘France and Security in the Indo-Pacific’, reasserted
France’s long-standing argument that it is a ‘resident power’ in the Indo-Pacific owing to
its overseas departments and territories in the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific and its
permanent military presence in both sub-regions. It added that Indo-Pacific security was a
‘strategic challenge’ for Paris and vowed to make a ‘real commitment’ to regional stability,
including through a significant military presence.34
Also in 2019, the Ministry for the Armed Forces released ‘France’s Defence Strategy in
the Indo-Pacific’. Noting that France was a ‘sovereign nation of the Indo-Pacific’, it iden-
tified four key tasks for the French armed forces in the region: to ‘defend and ensure the
integrity of our sovereignty, the protection of our nationals, territories and EEZ [exclusive
economic zone]’; to ‘contribute to the security of regional environments through military
and security cooperation’; to ‘maintain a free and open access to the commons, in coop-
eration with our partners, in a context of global strategic competition and challenging
military environments’; and to ‘assist in maintaining strategic stability and balances’.35
The document also stated that China’s actions had generated ‘deep-seated concerns’.36 In
speeches in China and India in 2018, Macron had already warned Beijing against pursuing
hegemonic ambitions.37
In its attempt to promote greater ‘strategic autonomy’, France has avoided close align-
ment with the US approach to China. In a May 2018 speech in Sydney, Macron stated
that France views itself as a ‘mediating, inclusive and stabilising’ Indo-Pacific power.38
Consequently, Paris has actively participated in security minilateralism in the region,
specifically with Australia, India, Indonesia and Japan.39 Measures have included a
trilateral ministerial dialogue with India and Australia, a defence-equipment deal with
Indonesia and a ‘2+2’ meeting with Japan. Along with the French foreign ministry label-
ling its 2021 guidelines ‘France’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific’, such moves highlight
France’s recognition of the limitations of multilateralism and of the EU as a global secu-
rity actor.40 Moreover, France’s 2020 defence strategy for the region included not just
the US as a ‘primary partner’ but also Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam.41 However, in February 2022 the French foreign ministry
published an updated version of ‘France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy’ that stated it had under-
taken a ‘re-evaluation’ and downgraded France’s strategic relationship with Australia.
This measure followed the dispute over Canberra’s September 2021 decision to terminate
cooperation with France on Australia’s future submarine programme. The update also
added the anticipation of ‘security risks brought about by climate change’ to the list of key
security and defence objectives in the Indo-Pacific.42
Germany engages
In September 2020, Germany’s Federal Foreign Office published the country’s ‘Policy
Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific’. They stated that, as part of the EU, Germany had a ‘great
interest in participating in Asia’s growth dynamics and in being involved in shaping the
Indo-Pacific region, as well as in upholding global norms in regional structures’. They
further stressed that Germany’s primary interests were regional ‘peace and security’,
which were threatened by ‘geopolitical tensions’.43 To enhance Germany’s contribution to
Indo-Pacific stability, the guidelines aimed to expand regional security and defence coop-
eration, including at the bilateral level. Concrete measures ‘may include attending security
policy forums, taking part in exercises in the region, elaborating joint evacuation plans,
seconding liaison officers and various forms of maritime presence’.44
The guidelines reflected a step forward in terms of Germany’s willingness to engage
more systematically with the region. That said, they fell short in other respects. China’s
assertiveness was not listed as the cause for growing regional tensions. It was also note-
worthy that the guidelines distanced Berlin from the US (Trump) administration of the
time, for instance by labelling ‘containment and decoupling strategies’ as adverse to
Berlin’s inclusive approaches to regional order.45 The US, rather than China, appeared to
be the main contributor to regional instability – a position out of touch with the views
of key Indo-Pacific partners, notably Japan and India. In addition, the guidelines framed
Germany’s approach to the Indo-Pacific within multilateral and European solutions.
Indeed, the foreign minister’s foreword stressed arms control and support for an ‘Alliance
for Multilateralism’ as part of Germany’s ‘tangible contribution’ to the region.46 Not only
did this approach disregard the limitations of the region’s multilateral organisations, it
also neglected a perception in the region that the EU is not a serious strategic actor in Asia
because it is not willing to wield hard power.47
Against this backdrop, Germany’s Indo-Pacific partners will be looking for signs of
Berlin’s future strategy towards the region under the country’s new coalition government.
There have been tentative signs that Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s administration will adjust
the China-friendly course of his predecessor, Angela Merkel. The coalition agreement
acknowledged that Germany was now in Then German navy chief Vice Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach
delivers the 42nd IISS Fullerton Lecture, Singapore, 21 December 2021
a ‘systemic rivalry’ with China such that
a ‘comprehensive China strategy’ was
required.48 It also called for cooperation with
regional partners that have shared strategic
interests, such as Australia, India and Japan,
to reduce ‘strategic dependencies’ and
emphasised the need for close cooperation
with the US on China. The agreement further
called on Beijing to play a ‘responsible’
role in the interests of peace and stability,
including in the Taiwan Strait.49 Moreover,
new Minister of Foreign Affairs Annalena
Baerbock has been outspoken regarding
(IISS)
China’s challenge to the existing international
order. As Minister of State in the Federal Foreign Office Tobias Lindner said in January
2022, ‘disagreements with China touch the core of European values and interests – not
addressing this now will cost us dearly in the long run’.50
It remains to be seen whether in practice the Scholz government will actively diversify
Germany’s Indo-Pacific relations away from their current China-centric focus. It is possible
that Berlin will remain focused on economic, trade and technology links to the region and
view strategic issues vis-à-vis China as separate.51 If so, Germany’s Indo-Pacific engage-
ment might intensify but lack substance when it comes to security and defence affairs.
For instance, it is unclear whether Scholz’s administration will support continued German
military deployments in the Indo-Pacific, notwithstanding remarks by then German
chief of navy Vice Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach during his IISS Fullerton Lecture in
Singapore in December 2021.52 That said, one should not underestimate the importance of
Germany’s role in organising a more coherent European contribution in support of critical
but non-military areas of regional security, such as digital standards and dual-use infra-
structure development.
Increased engagement by the Netherlands

The Netherlands is the only smaller European country that has published an official Indo-
Pacific strategy document. Its 2020 publication ‘Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening
Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia’ noted that the ‘geopolitical and
geo-economic balance of power is shifting rapidly’ and that the Netherlands (and the EU)
needed to ‘step up’ their efforts in the Indo-Pacific.53 Designed to inform the EU drafting
process of an Indo-Pacific strategy at the time, the guidelines stated that the EU should
not be afraid of realpolitik and that great-power competition in the region called ‘for a
strategic approach that goes beyond trade and investment’.54 It added that the Netherlands
should actively pursue its strategic interests – an endeavour in which ‘power politics and
principles can go hand in hand’ – and that it would try to shift the EU towards adopting a
more geopolitically driven Indo-Pacific strategy.55
In pursuit of its geopolitical interests, the Netherlands aimed for close collaboration
with like-minded EU and NATO member states, NATO’s regional partners (including
Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea), India and selected ASEAN member
states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam). To this end, the Netherlands vowed
to underpin the EU’s role in helping to preserve the balance of power and potentially
‘providing a counterweight to the strategic economic and military influence of one or more
great powers’, a thinly veiled reference to China’s growing power in the region.56 More
specifically, it suggested promoting maritime security in terms of ensuring safe passage,
preserving the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and capacity-building.
This element was a response to Beijing’s use of ‘the full range of its governmental instru-
ments in a hybrid manner to pursue its strategic aims’ and aimed to remind China of its
responsibilities with regards to nuclear-arms modernisation.57 The Netherlands’ guide-
lines also stressed an intention to participate in ‘relevant gatherings on strategic issues in
the Indo-Pacific region’, such as the annual IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, and
plans to advance cooperation with regional partners on cyber security.58
The guidelines reflect the Netherlands’ concerns over the potential impact on the
Netherlands of China’s rising power and influence. The use of assertive language and
references to realpolitik pointed to a significant departure from previous language. While
the guidelines also used the term ‘inclusive’ as a framework for its approach towards the
Indo-Pacific, it made clear that such inclusivity meant cooperation with like-minded part-
ners to push back against China’s hegemonic ambitions.59 Therefore, the Netherlands may
be more willing in future to become involved in efforts to maintain maritime security and
freedom of navigation in the region.
The UK as an Indo-Pacific power

Unlike France, Germany and the Netherlands, the UK does not have an overarching
strategy document guiding its Indo-Pacific engagement. Following Brexit, the UK’s foreign
policy operates independently of EU frameworks. The government’s ‘Integrated Review of
Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’, published in March 2021, highlighted
the UK’s ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific, which it identified as a framework guiding the govern-
ment’s ‘Global Britain’ approach. The review stated that the UK would ‘be the European
partner with the broadest and most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific’.60 Because of the
‘growing importance of the Indo-Pacific’, the review pledged to reinforce the UK’s commit-
ment to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA; the other members are Australia,
Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore) and increase its regional maritime presence. In
this context, it announced that its new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, would lead a
multinational task group on a global deployment in 2021, including to the Indo-Pacific, to
demonstrate ‘interoperability with allies and partners – in particular the United States’.61
The review and its accompanying document ‘Defence in a Competitive Age’ both
highlighted concerns about Beijing’s challenge to the regional order, noting that ‘China’s
increasing international assertiveness’ was a key geopolitical challenge.62 The UK’s ‘tilt’
thus needed to show a willingness to ‘push back to protect [its] values and global inter-
ests’.63 To achieve this, the British armed services would evolve from a force ‘primarily
designed for the contingency of a major conflict and warfighting, to one that is also
designed for permanent and persistent global engagement’.64 The documents anticipated
an increased British defence role in the Indo-Pacific, including pledges to make larger and
more permanent British contributions to the FPDA; to ensure freedom of navigation and
access to UK bases in the region; to establish a ‘Littoral Response Group’ in the region in
2023; and to deploy frigates in the ensuing decade.65
EUROPEAN NAVAL AND BROADER MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

In 2021, the combined Indo-Pacific naval presence of European states increased substan-
tially in terms of units deployed to the region. It was evident that the European countries
sending ships primarily intended to signal their willingness to be more engaged in main-
taining the region’s security in the face of Chinese assertiveness. However, there are
grounds for questioning European governments’ determination to sustain such deploy-
ments in the medium and long term, particularly in light of their constrained defence
resources. In any case, aside from the two European powers long established in the Indo-
Pacific – France and the UK – it was only Germany and the Netherlands that sent ships: a
single frigate in each case (see Map 10.1).
Increased naval presence

A long-planned Royal Navy-led carrier strike group centred on aircraft carrier HMS
Queen Elizabeth deployed to the region in 2021 for over seven months to showcase ‘Global
Britain’s’ tilt to the region. It followed a series of single-ship British naval deployments to
the Indo-Pacific during 2018–20 after a break of some years in such missions. The carrier
strike group – known as CSG21 – included a Royal Netherlands Navy frigate, HNLMS
Evertsen, US Navy destroyer USS The
Sullivans and a US Marine Corps squadron HMS Queen Elizabeth off the coast of Singapore, 12 October 2021
of F-35B Lightning II combat aircraft along-

side a similarly equipped British squadron
aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth. Elements of
the group sailed through the South China
Sea, while CSG21 conducted exercises in the
region with local states’ navies, including
(Roslan Rahman/AFP via Getty Images)
Singapore’s. It also took part in drills in the
Philippine Sea southwest of Okinawa with The Netherlands’ ambassador to Japan, Peter van der Vliet, and Japanese Defense Minister
two US aircraft carriers and a Japanese heli- Kishi Nobuo inspect HNLMS Evertsen at Yokosuka naval base, Japan, 6 September 2021
copter carrier.66 Separately, one CSG21 ship,

the frigate HMS Richmond, transited the
Taiwan Strait, the first time a British front-
line warship had done so for over a decade.67
In September 2021, the UK followed CSG21
by sending two patrol vessels to the region
with the intention that they would remain
there for five years.68
(Kiyoshi Ota/Pool Photo via AP)
Map 10.1: Selected European naval deployments to the Asia-Pacific, 2021–22
UK, Oct 21: France, 2021: France, 2022: France: France, Oct 2020–Mar 2021:
Two Batch 2 River-class MN CSG Clemenceau mission, Jeanne d'Arc 22 Naval assets permanently Marianne mission, SSN
ocean patrol vessels begin Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean; mission, Indian deployed to French Émeraude and support ship
ongoing five-year deployment Jeanne d'Arc 21 mission, Ocean/South territories in south Indian Seine (including to South
to Asia-Pacific Indian Ocean/Western Pacific Atlantic/Mediterranean Ocean and Pacific China Sea)
May 21: Jun 21: Sep 21: Sep 21: May/Jul 21:
Ex Atlantic Trident/ HMS Defender, HMNLS Evertsen* HMS Richmond UKCSG visits Ex ARC-21, MN,
Steadfast Defender detached to Black Sea transits through Yokosuka/Sasebo JMSDF, RAN, USN
Taiwan Strait
(indicated by arrow), Busan Tokyo
Oct 21: Aug 21:
Jun 21: visits Camh Ranh
HMS Richmond detached Ex Noble Union
Operation Shader / port, Vietnam
to visit Goa and Karachi JMSDF, RN, USN
Jun 21: CSG visits Cyprus
Ex Gallic Strike Karachi Oct 21: Ex Maritime
Aug/Sep 21:
Partnership JMSDF,
UKCSG visits Guam
Duqm RAN, RN, USN
Mumbai
Ho Chi Sep 21:
Minh City Ex Pacific Crown
21-3 with JMSDF
Jul 21: Colombo Guam
Djibouti
IN, RN Ex
Oct 21:
Palau
Ex with USN
Salalah Oct 21:
and JMSDF
Ex Konkan Shakti IN, RN Singapore
Diego Garcia Oct 21:

UK CSG21 route and port calls UKCSG visits
Singapore, Darwin
Selected UK CSG21 activities conducts ex with
German frigate Bayern, route and SAF, participates Oct 21:
port calls, 2021/22 deployment in ex Bersama Astute-class submarine
Gold (FPDA) detached to visit Perth
Key: Ex: exercise; FPDA: Five Power Defence Arrangements; IN: Indian Navy; Perth
JMSDF: Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force; MN: Marine Nationale; RAN: Royal
Australian Navy; SAF: Singapore Armed Forces; USN: United States Navy; CSG:
Carrier strike group; SSN: Nuclear-powered attack submarine
©IISS
The presence of the German frigate Bayern in the Indo-Pacific from August 2021 to *Dutch destroyer attached to CSG21.
February 2022 was the first German deployment of its kind in nearly 20 years and received Sources: UK MoD, Royal Navy,
Bundeswehr, French MoD.
considerable publicity. Controversially, the ship’s original itinerary included a request for Displayed routes are generalised.
a port visit to Shanghai. In the end, Beijing rejected the planned stopover on the grounds
that the ship’s deployment to the South China Sea was intended to ‘flex muscles and stir up
trouble, deliberately creating disputes on maritime issues’.69 Instead the ship conducted an
additional port call in Australia, the first such visit in 30 years. Germany’s then naval chief
stated that the deployment was ‘about showing the flag and demonstrating on the ground
that Germany stands by its international partners when it comes to securing the freedom of
the sea routes and upholding international law in the region’.70 During its deployment, the
Bayern joined exercises with regional states’ navies, including Japan’s multinational exer-
cise AnnualEx in the Philippine Sea in November 2021.71 That said, the German ship was
not integrated into CSG21 or any other multinational naval task groups and – presumably
to avoid provoking Beijing72 – did not sail through the Taiwan Strait.
Meanwhile, France continued its annual regional naval deployments. In 2021, these
included two groups, one centred around the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and the
other – as is normally the case for such training missions into the region – led by one of its
Table 10.1: Selected Asia-Pacific military exercises involving European countries, 2018–21
Name Date Exercises Participants Locations
Japan–Germany 13 Dec Maritime Germany, Japan Pacific Ocean

Bilateral Exercise 2021
ANNUALEX 2021 20–30 Nov Interoperability, maritime, anti- Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, US Philippine Sea
2021 submarine warfare (ASW), surface
warfare, information warfare
Konkan Shakti 2021 21–27 Oct Maritime, air, land India, Netherlands, UK India (Mumbai),
2021 Arabian Sea
Maritime Partnership 15–18 Oct Air defence, amphibious, ASW, Australia, Japan, UK, US Pacific Ocean
Exercise 2021 2021 combat support, field training,
gunnery, interoperability, maritime
Ajeya Warrior 2021 7–20 Oct Field training, interoperability India, UK India (Uttarakhand)
2021
Bersama Gold 2021 4–18 Oct Air combat, air defence, ASW, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Malaysia (Butterworth),
2021 gunnery, interoperability, maritime Singapore, UK South China Sea
Multilateral Maritime 4–9 Oct Maritime Canada, Netherlands, Japan, South China Sea
Exercise 2021 New Zealand, UK, US
Multilateral Exercise 2–3 Oct Maritime Canada, Netherlands, Japan, Japan (Okinawa),
2021 New Zealand, UK, US Philippine Sea
Noble Union 17–23 Aug Interoperability, maritime, air, Japan, Netherlands, UK, US Japan (Okinawa),
2021 amphibious, force experimentation Philippine Sea
India–UK Maritime 21–23 Jul Maritime India, UK Bay of Bengal
Exercise 2021
Talisman Sabre 2021 14–31 Jul Interoperability, amphibious, field Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia (Queensland)
2021 training, maritime, air combat South Korea, UK, US
Suman Warrior 2021 5–14 Jul Synthetic, interoperability, command Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore (hosted
2021 post (CPX) Singapore, UK virtually)
Jeanne D’Arc 2021 11–17 May Air defence, amphibious, ASW, Australia, France, Japan, US Japan (airspace over
(ARC 21) 2021 combat support, command and staff, Kyushu, Camp Ainoura,
field training, gunnery, interoperability, Kirishima Manoeuvre
synthetic, urban operations Area), East China Sea
Varuna 2021 25–27 Apr Air defence, ASW, anti-surface France, India Indian Ocean
2021 warfare, maritime
Bersama Shield 2021 5–28 Apr CPX, interoperability Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Malaysia (Butterworth),
2021 Singapore, UK (hosted virtually)
La Pérouse 2021 5–7 Apr Air defence, anti-surface Australia, France, India, Japan, US Bay of Bengal
2021 warfare, interoperability,
maritime, surface warfare
Desert Knight 2021 20–24 Jan Air combat France, India India (Jodhpur)
2021
France, Japan, US 15–17 Dec Maritime, ASW France, Japan, US Japan (waters around
Trilateral Exercise 2020 Okinotorishima Island)
RIMPAC 2020 17–31 Aug Maritime, naval/navigation Australia, Brunei, France, Japan, New Zealand, Pacific Ocean
2020 Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, US
Indradhanush 24–29 Feb Air, air combat, airborne, India, UK India (Hindan airbase)
2020 force protection
Shakti 2019 31 Oct–13 Field training India, France India (Mahajan
Nov 2019 Range, Rajasthan)
Bersama Lima 2019 6–16 Oct Air combat, CPX, humanitarian Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Malaysia (RMAF base
2019 assistance and disaster response Singapore, UK Butterworth; land training
(HADR), interoperability, maritime, at Kuantan), Singapore
naval/navigation
Thor’s Hammer 1 Oct–1 Counter-IED Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Australia (Woomera)
Nov 2019 Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Sweden, UK, US
Equateur 2019 21 Sep–5 HADR France, Japan France (New Caledonia)
Oct 2019
Name Date Exercises Participants Locations
Suman Warrior 2019 8–20 Sep Interoperability, CPX, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Australia (Brisbane,
2019 land forces Singapore, UK Queensland)
Talisman Sabre 2019 7–27 Jul Interoperability, amphibious, field Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia (Queensland)
2019 training, maritime, air combat UK, US
La Pérouse 2019 17–25 May Maritime Australia, France, Japan, US Bay of Bengal
2019
Varuna 2019-1 1–10 May Air defence, ASW, maritime, surface France, India India (offshore Goa),
2019 warfare Indian Ocean
Japan–UK Maritime 14–15 Mar Maritime, ASW Japan, UK, US Western Pacific
Exercise 2019
US–UK Joint 11–16 Jan Interoperability, maritime security, UK, US South China Sea
Maritime Exercise 2019 naval/navigation
Japan–UK–US 21–22 Dec Maritime, ASW Japan, UK, US Philippine Sea
Maritime Exercise 2018
Bersama Lima 2018 1–19 Oct Air combat, ASW, anti-surface Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore
2018 warfare, field training, flying, Singapore, UK
gunnery, interoperability, maritime
Vigilant Isles 1–14 Oct Field training Japan, UK Japan (Camp Fuji)
2018
Koolendong 2018 15–29 Aug Field training Australia, France, US Australia
2018
Pitch Black 2018 27 Jul–18 Interoperability, air combat Australia, Canada, France, India, Australia
Aug 2018 Singapore, Thailand, US
RIMPAC 2018 11–24 Jul Air defence, amphibious, ASW, anti- Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Denmark, US (Hawaii)
2018 surface warfare, maritime security France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Thailand, UK, US
Gobi Wolf 2018 4–8 Jun HADR Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Mongolia
2018 Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, South Korea,
Thailand, UK, US
Suman Warrior 2018 28 May–8 Interoperability, CPX Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, UK (Wiltshire)
Jun 2018 Singapore, UK
Komodo 2018 4–9 May CPX, field training, naval/navigation, Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia
2018 table top China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Myanmar, New
Zealand, Oman, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russia, Spain,
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Timor-Leste,
Turkey, UK, US, Vietnam
Varuna 2018-3 1–7 May Air defence, interoperability, France, India Indian Ocean
2018 live fire, maritime security
Bersama Shield 2018 27 Apr–15 Interoperability, maritime, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Mayalsia, Singapore
May 2018 flying, gunnery Singapore, UK
Japan–UK Maritime 27–28 Apr Maritime Japan, UK Japan (waters south
Exercise 2018 of Honshu)
Varuna 2018-2 3–8 Apr Amphibious, maritime security France, India Bay of Bengal
2018
Varuna 2018-1 15–24 Mar ASW, maritime France, India Arabian Sea, Bay of
2018 Bengal, Indian Ocean
Note: Passing exercises (PASSEX) excluded; listed exercise participants may have taken part in the entire exercise, or only aspect(s) of it, with some deploying more equipment and
personnel than others; these exercises are of varying size and complexity; some exercises may be annual, but may alternate exercise location
Source: IISS Military Balance+, milbalplus.iiss.org
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The German frigate Bayern arrives
in Japan, 5 November 2021
amphibious helicopter carriers, Tonnerre.73 In April 2021, the latter group took part in the
French-led La Pérouse exercise in the Bay of Bengal, which for the first time included all four
Quad members. The French group also joined Australian ships for a joint patrol in the South
China Sea.74 A month later, the multinational exercise ARC21 around Japan’s southwestern
islands involved Australian, French, Japanese and US warships (see Table 10.1). During the
year, France also sent a nuclear-powered attack submarine to the region, while its signals-
intelligence vessel, Dupuy de Lôme, made a rare transit through the Taiwan Strait.75
As European governments’ security and defence concerns came to focus increasingly
on Russia’s war against Ukraine in early 2022, it remained to be seen if Europe’s defence
engagement in Indo-Pacific security would significantly expand. While the German Navy
indicated prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that it may send two ships to the region in
2023,76 it is no longer certain that this will happen. Moreover, smaller European countries
have not yet announced any deployments for 2022. In addition, even France and the UK
may struggle to maintain a persistent regional naval presence unless their governments
take deliberate choices to either increase their fleets or limit their operational contributions
in their European theatres.77 That said, the UK’s planned expansion of its surface-combatant
strength during the current decade and its potential long-term regional deployment of a
frigate in the medium term remain positive signals.
Growing bilateral defence relations

Several European powers have intensified their bilateral defence cooperation with Indo-
Pacific countries, with the supply of military technology and equipment sometimes
constituting a significant part of these relationships (see Table 10.2). In December 2021,
Japan and the UK signed a memorandum of cooperation on the joint development of an
Table 10.2: European defence companies: selected ongoing and pending sales to Asia-Pacific countries
Recipient Quantity and type of equipment Prime contractor flag Contractor Value (US$ Order date
billions)
Australia 211 x Boxer armoured fighting vehicles Germany Rheinmetall 2.58 Aug 2018
Australia 12 x Arafura-class (OPV 80) patrol ships Germany Lürssen Werft 2.55 Jan 2018
Australia 9 x Hunter-class frigates UK BAE Systems 26.18 Pending
India 56 x C295MW light transport aircraft Spain Airbus 2.54 Sep 2021
India 36 x Rafale fighter ground-attack aircraft France Dassault Aviation 8.71 Sep 2016
India 6 x Kalvari-class (Scorpène) submarines France Naval Group 3.75 Oct 2005
Indonesia 6 x European multi-purpose frigate (FREMM), Italy Fincantieri n.k. Jun 2021
2 x Maestrale-class frigates
Indonesia 2 x Arrowhead 140 frigates UK Babcock Interntional 0.72 May 2021
Indonesia 6 x Rafale fighter ground-attack aircraft France Dassault Aviation 1.10 Pending
Indonesia 2 x A400M heavy transport aircraft France, Germany, Spain Airbus n.k. Pending
Malaysia 6 x Maharaja Lela-class (Gowind 2500) frigates France Naval Group 2.94 Dec 2011
Philippines 6 x T129B attack helicopters Turkey Turkish Aerospace 0.27 Jul 2020
Industries
Philippines 32 x S-70i Black Hawk medium transport Poland PZL Mielec 0.65 Pending
helicopters
Singapore H225M heavy transport helicopters France Airbus 1.58 Nov 2016
Singapore 4 x Type-218SG attack submarines Germany ThyssenKrupp 3.44 Dec 2013

Marine System
Source: IISS, Military Balance+, www.milbalplus.iiss.org
engine demonstrator for their respective sixth-generation fighter aircraft.78 The devel-
opment followed their agreement in September 2021 to commence formal negotiations
on a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) to deepen their defence relations.79 If these
talks succeed, the UK will be only the third country (after the US and Australia) to have
concluded a visiting-forces agreement with Japan.
In November 2021, France reached an agreement with India on strengthening their
bilateral defence and security relationship through greater intelligence- and information-
sharing, operational cooperation and improving capabilities for joint operations, including
those in the maritime, space and cyber domains.80 France also offered Rafale combat aircraft
to both India (which already operated the type) and Indonesia, indicating its desire to
increase its arms sales to these attractive markets.81 In February 2022, Indonesian Defence
Minister Prabowo Subianto announced the country’s intention to purchase 42 Rafales.82
Germany signed an Enhanced Strategic Partnership with Australia in June 2021 that
included a commitment to hold regular ‘2+2’ meetings between the foreign and defence
ministers and to increase defence cooperation.83 In September 2021, the two countries signed
a letter of intent for a ‘military space partnership’.84 Germany’s air force is scheduled to
participate in Australia’s annual multinational air combat exercise Pitch Black in September
2022, sending six Eurofighter combat aircraft, three A330 MRTT tankers (presumably from
NATO’s Multinational Multi-Role Tanker and Transport Fleet – MMF) and three A400M
transport aircraft.85 Following the exercise, several aircraft are scheduled to visit Japan,
Singapore and South Korea. In November 2021, in the context of the frigate Bayern’s visit,
Japanese defence minister Kishi Nobuo announced that Japan and Germany would seek to
increase their defence cooperation.86
AUKUS fallout
European engagement in Indo-Pacific security was temporarily complicated by the
unexpected September 2021 announcement of AUKUS, an Australia–UK–US deal that
will see the UK and US assisting Australia to develop a nuclear-powered submarine
capability. The three allies also agreed to joint capability-building in cyber, artificial-
intelligence, quantum-computing and undersea technologies.87 Caught unprepared, the
French government responded furiously to the surprise termination of its US$65 billion
submarine deal with Australia by recalling its ambassador and cancelling the next iteration
of the India–France–Australia Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue. Minister of the Armed
Forces Florence Parly and Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Yves Le Drian also
issued a statement that called for greater European ‘strategic autonomy’ in response.88 As
already mentioned, France’s updated Indo-Pacific strategy of February 2022 also dropped
Australia as a strategic partner in the region.
While France’s immediate reaction was to seek closer ties with India and Japan, and
to advocate a distinct ‘European’ approach to Indo-Pacific security, the long-term fallout
from AUKUS may be limited. France depends on continued military cooperation with
Australia and the US to protect its enduring strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. Paris is
also cognisant of the limits of European power projection.89 Since the non-nuclear domains
of AUKUS are reportedly open to other partners, there is potential for future European
participation in cooperation under the
US President Joe Biden participates in an address with Australian
auspices of AUKUS – a multi-decade project Prime Minister Scott Morrison and UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson
– including with France. to announce the AUKUS deal, Washington DC, 15 September 2021
Asian countries’ responses to AUKUS

indicated that many were not averse in prin-
ciple to increased European (in this case,
British) military engagement in the region.
Aside from China and Malaysia, which both
responded negatively, Indo-Pacific powers
were either silent or expressed support
for the AUKUS agreement. For instance,
while Malaysia attempted to organise
unified ASEAN opposition to AUKUS, the
Philippines publicly declared its support
while Singapore and Vietnam indicated
(Kent Nishimura / Los Angeles Times via Getty Images)
implicit support.90 And while the Indonesian government voiced concerns, at the 2021 IISS
Manama Dialogue Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto expressed an understanding of the
thinking behind the agreement.91 India and Japan also stated their support.
TOWARDS A GEOPOLITICAL APPROACH?

In light of China’s geopolitical challenge to the regional and global order, individual
European countries, the EU and NATO can no longer avoid the question of how to engage
with Indo-Pacific security. Several European states have declared their aim to play a more
active role in Indo-Pacific security. These include Germany, Europe’s largest single national
economy, which also played a leading role in developing the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
Greater European interest is welcome news for many Indo-Pacific countries, which see it as
additional weight to balance China’s assertiveness while simultaneously providing addi-
tional mechanisms aside from US-focused security pacts.
Protecting European interests and promoting European values are increasingly tied to
Indo-Pacific geopolitical dynamics. Foremost for Europe is the need to avoid major-power
conflict so as to maintain the Indo-Pacific as an open market to meet European economic
and trade objectives. Secondly, effectively countering China’s growing assertiveness in Asia
and elsewhere will require substantive coordination by the EU and individual European
states with Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asian states and the US. In the
first case, this should involve information-sharing regarding foreign-interference attempts,
coordinating approaches to global-governance challenges such as technical-standards
issues, and the aligning of the EU’s new ‘Global Gateway’ sustainable-infrastructure-
development initiative (designed to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative) with
like-minded Indo-Pacific connectivity programmes.92
Moreover, because closer Sino-Russian alignment will have repercussions for both
regions, European powers and institutions may find that they need to engage with Indo-
Pacific partners about potential collective responses. Debates about what might constitute
effective responses to growing cooperation between Beijing and Moscow has the potential
to promote EU disunity and constrain NATO actions. A Sino-Russian strategic commu-
niqué of February 2022 stated for the first time that both sides ‘oppose further enlargement
of NATO’.93 This document indicated both Chinese President Xi’s support for Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s concerns about NATO expansion in Europe and Putin’s concur-
rence with Xi’s worries about possible NATO involvement in Asia. Increased China–Russia
alignment and, in particular, their closer coordination in Africa, the northern Indian Ocean
and Central Asia could complicate future US and European military deployments to the
Indo-Pacific via land and maritime routes.
European leaders have been openly critical of the evolving Sino-Russian relationship
and its impact on Europe’s security order. For instance, EU Commission President von der
Leyen stated in February 2022 that both countries were now seeking a ‘new era’ and were
trying to replace ‘the existing international order’.94 Moreover, her foreign-policy chief,
Josep Borrell Fontelles, stated that the joint communiqué was the ‘culmination of a long-
standing campaign. It is an act of defiance. It is clear: revisionist manifesto. A manifesto to
review the world order.’ He added that Russia and China were ‘becoming more and more
assertive, willing to restore the old empires that they have been in the past’.95 A senior
European diplomat also declared that ‘China endorsing Russia’s historical revisionism and
aggression on our continent’ was ‘certainly not going down well in EU’.96 Beijing’s unwill-
ingness to lean on Moscow to stop its war of aggression against Ukraine, with President Xi
reportedly even asking Putin to delay the invasion until after the Olympics,97 has further
hardened the mood in European capitals.
However, to deal effectively with this issue and China’s broader challenge, the EU
and European states would need to fully embrace geopolitics as the lens through which
to approach the Indo-Pacific. At present, they are far from fulfilling their objectives
to influence the region’s security equation. The three most powerful European coun-
tries – France, Germany and the UK – manifest significant differences in their strategic
approaches, while the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy lacks a framework sufficiently informed
by geopolitics that accepts that hard power is an important currency in the Indo-Pacific.
Shortfalls in the military capability needed to enable a more persistent presence are
unlikely to be addressed in the short term. Moreover, the EU’s insistence on a middle
path between the US and China will continue to reduce its effectiveness as a security
actor in the region. Europe’s influence on Indo-Pacific stability will remain limited
unless its constituent parts work together with the US and significant regional players,
including Australia, India, Japan, Singapore and South Korea, to shore up the region’s
open markets and supply chains, provide alternatives to China’s financing and invest-
ments and ensure fair access to critical and emerging technologies.
NOTES
1 European Commission, ‘2021 State of the Union U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.

Address by President Ursula von der Leyen’, 15 6 Andrius Sytas and John O’Donnell, ‘China
September 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commis- Pressures Germany’s Continental to Cut
sion/presscorner/detail/ov/SPEECH_21_4701. Out Lithuania’, Reuters, 17 December 2021,
2 Stuart Lau, ‘EU Slams China’s “Authoritarian https://www.reuters.com/world/china/
Shift” and Broken Economic Promises’, Politico, exclusive-china-asks-germanys-continen-
25 April 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/ tal-cut-out-lithuania-sources-2021-12-17/.
eu-china-biden-economy-climate-europe/. 7 ‘EU Plan for Anti-coercion Trade Measure
3 European Commission, High Representative Faces Scepticism’, Reuters, 7 December
of the Union for Foreign and Security Affairs, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/
‘The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the eu-plan-anti-coercion-trade-measure-faces-scep-
Indo-Pacific’, 16 September 2021, https://eeas. ticism-2021-12-07/.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunica- 8 Cissy Zhou, ‘Standard-bearer: China Races
tion_2021_24_1_en.pdf. US and Europe to Set Tech Rules’, Nikkei Asia,
4 Antoine Bondaz and Bruno Tertrais, ‘Europe 21 December 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/
Can Play a Role in a Conflict Over Taiwan. Will Spotlight/Asia-Insight/Standard-bearer-China-
It?’, World Politics Review, 23 March 2021, https:// races-U.S.-and-Europe-to-set-tech-rules.
www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29515/ 9 See Article 2 in ‘Consolidated Version of the
europe-can-help-prevent-a-taiwan-war. Treaty on the European Union’, Official Journal
5 White House, ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy of the of the European Union, C 326/1, 26 October 2012,
United States’, February 2022, https://www. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2012/
whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ art_2/oj.
10 European Parliament, ‘Parliament Sets Out Its ‘The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the
Vision for a New EU Strategy on China’, 16 Indo-Pacific’, 16 September 2021, p. 1, https://
September 2021, https://www.europarl.europa. eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/

eu/news/en/press-room/20210910IPR11917/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0024&from=EN.
parliament-sets-out-its-vision-for-a-new-eu- 19 Ibid., p. 2.
strategy-on-china. 20 See Tim Huxley and Ben Schreer, ‘What
11 ‘Mehr Fortschritt Wagen: Bündnis für Freiheit, Does AUKUS Mean for Europe’s Indo-Pacific
Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit‘ [Dare Strategies?’, IISS Analysis, 27 September 2021,
more progress: Alliance for freedom, justice https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/09/
and sustainability], 2021–25 coalition agree- aukus-and-european-strategies.
ment between the Social Democratic Party of 21 European Commission, High Representative
Germany (SPD), Alliance 90/The Greens and of the Union for Foreign and Security Affairs,
the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Association ‘The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-
of German Educational Organizations (AdB), Pacific’, p. 13.
6 December 2021, p. 157, https://www.adb.de/ 22 Ibid., p. 4.
content/mehr-fortschritt-wagen-b%C3%BCnd- 23 See, for example, François Heisbourg, ‘Euro-
nis-f%C3%BCr-freiheit-gerechtigkeit-und-na- Atlantic Security and the China Nexus’,
chhaltigkeit. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 63, no.
12 ‘Draft Report on Foreign Interference in All 6, December 2021–January 2022, p. 51.
Democratic Processes in the European Union, 24 European Commission, High Representative
Including Disinformation’, Special Committee of the Union for Foreign and Security Affairs,
on Foreign Interference in all Democratic ‘The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-
Processes in the European Union, including Pacific’, p. 4.
Disinformation, European Parliament, 25 European Union, ‘A Strategic Compass for
2020/2268 (INI), 18 October 2021, https://www. Security and Defence’, March 2022, p. 60,
europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/INGE-PR- https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
695147_EN.pdf. documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf
13 See Demetri Sevastopulo and Sam Fleming, 26 Andrew Rettman, ‘EU Eyes Indian Ocean Naval
‘Will Europe Sign Up to Joe Biden’s Plan to Adventure’, EU Observer, 25 January 2022,
Counter China?’, Financial Times, 7 June 2021, https://euobserver.com/world/154186.
https://www.ft.com/content/e4c7df1a-5048-4cf1- 27 On this goal, see ‘Minister Sets Out Defence
8a2d-c9a2d721ba92. Priorities for French EU Presidency in
14 Robin Emmott et al., ‘Despite Transatlantic 2022’, French Embassy in London, 14
“Love Fest”, EU Charts Third Way in Ties with December 2021, https://uk.ambafrance.org/
US and China’, Reuters, 12 March 2021, https:// Minister-sets-out-defence-priorities-for-French-
www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-usa-china- EU-presidency-in-2022.
idUSKBN2B401R. 28 ‘NATO 2030: United for a New Era’, NATO,
15 Rym Momtaz, ‘Macron: EU Shouldn’t Gang Up 25 November 2020, p. 12, https://www.nato.
on China with US’, Politico, 4 February 2021, int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/
https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-eu- pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Re-
shouldnt-gang-up-on-china-with-u-s/. port-Uni.pdf/.
16 ‘Why European Strategic Autonomy Matters’, 29 Ibid., p. 17.
EU External Action Service, 3 December 30 ‘Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens
2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/ Stoltenberg at the Event: NATO’s Outlook
headquarters-homepage/89865/why-europe- Towards 2030 and Beyond’, NATO, 30
an-strategic-autonomy-matters_en. November 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
17 European Commission, ‘EU and Indo-Pacific: natohq/opinions_189089.htm.
Natural Partners’, 16 September 2021, https:// 31 For such a suggestion, see Ian Brzezinski,
ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ ‘NATO’s Role in a Transatlantic Strategy on
IP_21_4704. China’, Atlantic Council, 1 June 2020, https://
18 European Commission, High Representative www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/
of the Union for Foreign and Security Affairs, natos-role-in-a-transatlantic-strategy-on-china/.
32 See Jonathan Holslag, ‘China, NATO, and the fique_16p_2021_v4_cle4b8b46.pdf.
Pitfalls of Empty Engagement’, Washington 41 France, Ministry for the Armed Forces, ‘France’s
Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 3, 2019, pp. 137–50; and Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific’, 2019.
François Heisbourg, ‘NATO 4.0: The Atlantic 42 France, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs,
Alliance and the Rise of China’, Survival: Global ‘France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy’, February 2022,
Politics and Strategy, vol. 62, no. 2, April–May pp. 41, 54, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/
2020, pp. 83–102. IMG/pdf/en_dcp_a4_indopacifique_022022_
33 France, Ministry for the Armed Forces, ‘Defence v1-4_web_cle878143.pdf.
and National Security Strategic Review 2017’, 13 43 Germany, Federal Foreign Office, ‘Policy
October 2017, pp. 26–7. Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, Germany–
34 France, Ministry for the Armed Forces, ‘France Europe–Asia: Shaping the 21st Century
and Security in the Indo-Pacific’, June 2019, Together’, September 2020, pp. 8, 9, https://
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/layout/set/print/ www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2380514/
content/download/532754/9176250/version/3/ f9784f7e3b3fa1bd7c5446d274a4169e/200901-in-
file/France+and+Security+in+the+Indo- do-pazifik-leitlinien--1--data.pdf.
Pacific+-+2019.pdf. 44 Ibid., p. 15.
35 France, Ministry for the Armed Forces, ‘France’s 45 Ibid., p. 11.
Defence Strategy in the Indo-Pacific’, 2019, pp. 5, 46 Ibid., p. 2.
7, https://apcss.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ 47 Marie Jourdain, ‘The EU as a Global Actor in
France-Defence_Strategy_in_the_Indo- the Indo-Pacific’, Issue Brief, Atlantic Council
Pacific_2019.pdf. Europe Center, December 2021, https://www.
36 Ibid., p. 8. atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/
37 See President of France, ‘Transcription du The_EU_as_a_Global_Actor_in_the_Indo-
Discours du President de la République au Pacific.pdf.
Palais de Daminggong’ [Transcript of the 48 ‘Mehr Fortschritt wagen: Bündnis für Freiheit,
speech of the President of the Republic at Gerechtigkeit und Nachhaltigkeit‘ [Dare more
Daminggong Palace], 9 January 2018, https:// progress: Alliance for freedom, justice and
www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/01/09/ sustainability], p. 157.
transcription-du-discours-du-president-de- 49 Ibid.
la-republique-au-palais-de-daminggong; 50 Germany, Federal Foreign Office, ‘Keynote
and President of France, ‘Discours du Speech by Minister of State Tobias Lindner at
President de la République Emmanuel the MERICS China Forecast 2022’, 26 January
Macron à la Communauté Française d’Inde’ 2022, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/
[Speech of the President of the Republic newsroom/news/lindner-merics-china/2508286.
Emmanuel Macron to the French commu- 51 Noah Barkin, ‘Watching China in Europe –
nity in India], 11 March 2018, https://www. January 2022’, German Marshall Fund of the US,
elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/03/11/ 5 January 2022, https://www.gmfus.org/news/
discours-du-president-de-la-republique-emma- watching-china-europe-january-2022.
nuel-macron-a-la-communaute-francaise-dinde. 52 ‘42nd IISS Fullerton Lecture: The Future of Indo-
38 President of France, ‘Discours à Garden Island, Pacific Maritime Security’, International Institute
base navale de Sydney’ [Speech at Garden Island, for Strategic Studies, 21 December 2021, https://
Naval Base Sydney], 3 May 2018, https://www. www.iiss.org/events/2021/12/42nd-iiss-fuller-
elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/05/03/discours- ton-lecture.
a-garden-island-base-navale-de-sydney. 53 Government of the Netherlands, ‘Indo-Pacific:
39 Frédéric Grare, ‘Exploring Indo-Pacific Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and
Convergences: The Australia–France–India EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia’, 13
Trilateral Dialogue’, Washington Quarterly, vol. November 2020, p. 1, https://www.government.
43, no. 4, 2020, p. 160. nl/documents/publications/2020/11/13/indo-pa-
40 France, Ministry for Europe and Foreign cific-guidelines.
Affairs, ‘France’s Partnerships in the 54 Ibid.
Indo-Pacific’, April 2021, https://www. 55 Ibid., p. 3.
diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/en_a4_indopaci- 56 Ibid., p. 5.
57 Ibid., pp. 4, 5. xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202109/

58 Ibid., p. 9. t20210916_9721334.html.
59 Maaike Okano-Heijmans, ‘Netherlands 70 Australia, Department of Defence, and Germany,
and Indo-Pacific: Inclusive but Not Value Federal Ministry of Defence, ‘German Navy
Neutral’, Clingendael Institute, 31 August Visits Australia as Part of Indo-Pacific Voyage’,
2021, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/ 28 September 2021, https://news.defence.gov.au/
netherlands-and-indo-pacific-inclusive-not-val- media/media-releases/german-navy-visits-aus-
ue-neutral. tralia-part-indo-pacific-voyage.
60 Government of the UK, ‘Global Britain in 71 Dzirhan Mahadzir, ‘US Begins Exercise
a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review Off Japan with Canadian, German
of Security, Defence, Development and and Australian Navies’, USNI News,
Foreign Policy’, 16 March 2021, p. 66, https:// 23 November 2021, https://news.usni.
www.gov.uk/government/publications/ org/2021/11/23/u-s-begins-exercise-off-japan-
global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-inte- with-canadian-german-and-australian-navies.
grated-review-of-security-defence-develop- 72 Blake Herzinger, ‘Germany Nervously Tests the
ment-and-foreign-policy. Indo-Pacific Waters’, Foreign Policy, 3 January
61 Ibid., p. 5. 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/03/
62 Ibid., p. 17. german-navy-indo-pacific-frigate-china-policy/.
63 UK, Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence in a 73 The Charles de Gaulle only got as far as the north
Competitive Age’, 30 March 2021, pp. 5, 27, Arabian Sea and northern Indian Ocean, while
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ the Tonnerre-led deployment ranged further into
defence-in-a-competitive-age#:~:text=De- the Pacific.
fence%20in%20a%20Competitive%20Age%20 74 See Gidget Fuentes, ‘French Navy Exercise
outlines%20defence’s%20contribution%20to%20 Combines Ships from 5 Navies on Short Notice’,
the,the%20threats%20of%20the%20future. USNI News, 12 April 2021, https://news.usni.
64 Ibid., p. 12. org/2021/04/12/french-navy-exercise-com-
65 Alessio Patalano, ‘The United Kingdom and bines-ships-from-5-navies-on-short-notice; and
Indo-Pacific Security’, in International Institute Xavier Vavasseur, ‘French Navy and Royal
for Strategic Studies, Asia-Pacific Regional Australian Navy Ships Patrol the South China
Security Assessment 2021: Key Developments and Sea Together’, Naval News, 22 April 2021, https://
Trends (London: Routledge for the IISS, 2021), www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/04/
pp. 156–57, 164. french-navy-and-royal-australian-navy-ships-
66 Keoni Everington, ‘4 US, UK, Japanese Carriers patrol-the-south-china-sea-together/.
Patrolled North of Taiwan Over Weekend’, 75 See Ken Moriyasu, ‘French Nuclear Sub
Taiwan News, 5 October 2021, https://www. Prowls South China Sea’, Nikkei Asia, 10
taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4306367. February 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/
67 Agence France-Presse, ‘UK Sends Warships International-relations/Indo-Pacific/French-
Through Taiwan Strait for the First Time in More nuclear-sub-prowls-South-China-Sea; and
Than a Decade’, Guardian, 28 September 2021, Xavier Vavasseur, ‘French SIGINT Ship Dupuy
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/ De Lôme Makes Rare Taiwan Strait Transit’,
sep/28/uk-sends-warship-through-taiwan- Naval News, 13 October 2021, https://www.
straight-for-first-time-in-more-than-a-decade. navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/10/french-
68 UK, House of Commons Defence Committee, sigint-ship-dupuy-de-lome-taiwan/.
‘We’re Going to Need a Bigger Navy’, Third 76 ‘42nd IISS Fullerton Lecture: The Future of Indo-
Report of Session 2021–22, 14 December 2021, Pacific Maritime Security’.
https://committees.parliament.uk/publica- 77 On the limits of the UK defence ‘tilt’ to the Indo-
tions/8205/documents/85026/default/. See Task Pacific, see Albin Aronsson, ‘Global Britain:
10, Deployment 3. Navigating Between Europe and the Indo-
69 China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Pacific?’, Swedish Defence Research Agency
Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press (FOI), Memo 7710, 6 December 2021, https://
Conference on September 16, 2021’, 16 September www.foi.se/en/foi/reports/report-summary.
2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ html?reportNo=FOI+Memo+7710.
78 Andrew Chutter, ‘Britain and Japan Join 5 November 2021, https://www.defensenews.

Forces on Next-generation Fighter Engine’, com/digital-show-dailies/feindef/2021/11/05/
Defense News, 22 December 2021, https://www. as-europe-looks-to-the-indo-pacific-so-does-the-
defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/12/22/ luftwaffe/.
britain-and-japan-join-forces-on-next-genera- 86 Associated Press, ‘Japan, Germany Expand
tion-fighter-engine/. Military Ties as German Warship Visits’, Asahi
79 UK, Ministry of Defence, ‘UK and Japan Shimbun, 6 November 2021, https://www.asahi.
Begin Talks on Deeper Defence Relationship’, com/ajw/articles/14476161.
28 September 2021, https://www.gov. 87 White House, ‘Joint Leaders Statement
uk/government/news/uk-and-japan-be- on AUKUS’, 15 September 2021, https://
gin-talks-on-deeper-defence-relationship. www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
80 ‘India, France to Expand Defence, Maritime statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-
Security Partnership’, Tribune, 6 November 2021, statement-on-aukus/.
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/ 88 France, Ministry for Europe and Foreign
india-france-to-expand-defence-maritime-secu- Affairs, ‘Joint Communiqué Issued by
rity-partnership-334813. Jean-Yves Le Drian and Florence Parly’, 16
81 See Pratap Chakravarty, ‘France, India Step September 2021, https://www.diplomatie.
Up Military Allegiance with Offer of More gouv.fr/en/country-files/australia/news/article/
Rafale Jets’, RFI, 26 December 2021, https:// joint-communique-issued-by-jean-yves-le-drian-
www.rfi.fr/en/international/20211226-france- and-florence-parly-16-sept-2021.
india-step-up-military-allegiance-with-offer- 89 Bruno Tertrais and Michel Duclos, ‘After
of-more-rafale-jets; and Mike Yeo, ‘Indonesia AUKUS: How Could France Reboot Its Indo-
Gives Up on Russian Aircraft Purchase, Pacific Strategy?’, Institut Montaigne, 4 October
Instead Turning to US and French Options’, 2021, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/
Defense News, 22 December 2021, https:// blog/after-aukus-how-could-france-reboot-its-
www.defensenews.com/air/2021/12/22/ indo-pacific-strategy.
indonesia-gives-up-on-russian-aircraft-pur- 90 William Choong and Ian Storey, ‘Southeast
chase-instead-turning-to-us-and-french-options/. Asian Responses to AUKUS: Arms Racing,
82 Tassilo Hummel and Stanley Widianto, ‘France Non-Proliferation and Regional Stability’, ISEAS
Seals $8.1 Billion Deal with Indonesia to Sell 42 Perspectives, no. 134, 14 October 2021, https://
Rafale Jets’, Reuters, 10 February 2022, https:// www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/
www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ iseas-perspective/2021-134-southeast-asian-re-
indonesia-orders-42-rafale-jets-french-defence- sponses-to-aukus-arms-racing-non-prolifera-
minister-says-2022-02-10/. tion-and-regional-stability-by-william-choong-
83 Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and and-ian-storey/.
Trade, ‘Enhanced Strategic Partnership Between 91 IISS, ‘17th Regional Security Summit, The
Australia and the Federal Republic of Germany’, IISS Manama Dialogue, Opening Address:
10 June 2021, https://www.dfat.gov.au/ Q&A’, 19 November 2021, https://www.iiss.
about-us/publications/international-relations/ org/-/media/files/manama-dialogue/2021/
enhanced-strategic-partnership-between-aus- plenary-transcripts/opening-address/opening-
tralia-and-federal-republic-germany. address-qa---as-delivered.pdf.
84 Naomi O’Leary, ‘Australia’s Treatment of 92 See European Commission, ‘Global Gateway:
France “Unacceptable”, EU Says’, Irish Times, 20 Up to €300 Billion for the European Union’s
September 2021, https://www.irishtimes.com/ Strategy to Boost Sustainable Links Around the
news/world/europe/australia-s-treatment-of- World’, 1 December 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/
france-unacceptable-eu-says-1.4679131. commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6433.
85 Vivienne Machi, ‘As Europe Looks to the Indo- 93 ‘Joint Statement of the Russian Federation
Pacific, So Does the Luftwaffe’, Defense News, and the People’s Republic of China on
the International Relations Entering a European External Action Service, 2 February

New Era and the Global Sustainable 2022, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/
Development’, China Aerospace Studies headquarters-homepage/111167/munich-securi-
Institute, 4 February 2022, https://www. ty-conference-20-february-2022-opening-state-
airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/ ment-hrvp-josep-borrell_en.
documents/Translations/2022-02-04%20 96 Stuart Lau, ‘China Direct: When Your Best Pal
China%20Russia%20joint%20statement%20 Picks War — EU Dismay — Taiwan’s Watching’,
International%20Relations%20Entering%20 Politico, 24 February 2022, https://www.politico.
a%20New%20Era.pdf. eu/newsletter/china-direct/when-your-best-pal-
94 ‘Speech by President von der Leyen at the picks-war-eu-dismay-taiwans-watching.
Munich Security Conference 2022’, European 97 Edward Wong and Julian E. Barnes, ‘China
Commission, 19 February 2022, https://ec.eu- Asked Russia to Delay Ukraine War Until
ropa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ After the Olympics, US Officials Say’, New York
SPEECH_22_1221. Times, 2 March 2022, https://www.nytimes.
95 ‘Munich Security Conference, 20 February 2022 com/2022/03/02/us/politics/russia-ukraine-
– Opening Statement by HR/VP Josep Borrell’, china.html.
CHAPTER 11
CHINA AS AN
UPSTREAM
RIPARIAN STATE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR
SOUTHEAST ASIA
BRIAN EYLER
Brian Eyler is Senior Fellow and Director of the Southeast Asia
Program and the Energy, Water, and Sustainability Program at the
Stimson Center
)
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at
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17
20
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7O
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nd
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ha
,T
ce
in
ov
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As well as being deeply involved in

m
ra
kh
ng
lower Mekong countries’ infrastructure

So
ut
m
development, China is the most upstream

Sa
r in
state in the Mekong basin. China has completed

ve
Ri
ng
11 mega-dams on its portion of the Mekong

lo
ek
eM
mainstream that have changed the hydrology of the

th
ils
sa
river system and exacerbated droughts, causing ecological

at
bo
A
crises and water- and food-security challenges for downstream

countries. In the worst case, environmental damage to the lower
Mekong could lead to a major refugee crisis in Southeast Asia. Likely, only an ‘all hands on deck’
approach involving China, development partners and downstream states will be sufficient to
mitigate such outcomes. However, attempts to make downstream countries take sides in a
broader geopolitical competition could undermine efforts to avoid worst-case scenarios.
CHINA’S MOTIVATION FOR DAMMING THE MEKONG

Economic incentives related to Beijing’s clean-energy discourse and emissions-reduction goals
provide important reasons for China to continue damming its southwestern rivers. More dams are
likely to be built on China’s portion of the upstream Mekong over the coming decade.
SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONCERNS AND CHINESE POLICY

Processes set in motion through the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation Mechanism and recognition of
the environmental crisis in the Mekong by the Mekong River Commission have led to some changes
in Chinese activities since 2018. Beijing’s attitude towards data transparency in relation to the Mekong
is also evolving. However, these developments have not been sufficient to reduce the threat damming
poses for downstream countries.
NON-SOUTHEAST-ASIAN RESPONSES AND THE REGIONAL BALANCE

Geopolitical concerns over the deepening impact of China’s upstream activities have driven greater
external resources towards downstream governments, civil-society groups and research bodies. The
United States and other development partners of downstream Southeast Asian countries now have
multilateral development frameworks focused on the sub-region.
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CHINA’S UPSTREAM DAMMING

The water and food security – and by extension, economic security – of tens of millions
of people rely on the natural-resource provisions of the Mekong, a transboundary river
system running more than 4,000 kilometres from China into Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar,
Thailand and Vietnam (see Map 11.1). While half of the river’s length is upstream in China,
the country’s portion of the Mekong basin accounts for only 20% of the total basin size and
less than 5% of China’s national territory. As the river flows out of China, its basin fans out
to form significant portions of downstream countries (with the exception of Myanmar).
More than 80% of the territories of Laos and Cambodia are located within the Mekong
basin. All of Thailand’s northeastern region and several provinces in northern Thailand
KAZAKHSTAN
(35% of the country’s territory) are also within the basin. In Vietnam, 23% of national terri-
MONGOLIA
tory lies inside, almost equally split between parts of Vietnam’s central highlands and the
delta region at the Mekong’s mouth.
The Mekong delta in Vietnam, one of the world’s largest rice-, fruit- and aquacul-
ture-production zones, is responsible for roughly 20% of Vietnam’s GDP.1 The delta relies
KYRGYZSTAN
on the Mekong’s annual wet-season floods – delivering freshwater and sediment across
UZBEKISTAN
the floodplain – to maintain its agricultural productivity. The Mekong is also the world’s
TAJIKISTAN
largest inland fishery, containing 20% of the
URKMENISTAN
global freshwater fish catch (an annual haul Map 11.1: The Mekong basin
of 2.6 million tonnes).2
It is second only to the
SIACHEN GLACIER
Amazon in terms of fish biodiversity and all
AFGHANISTAN CHINA
lower Mekong countries rely on the annual
fish catch for livelihood and diets. Cambodia
alone consumes some 500,000 tn of fish per Lancang
PAKISTAN
year, providing its population with approx-
imately 70% of its animal-protein intake.
NEPAL
3
N BHUTAN
Much of Cambodia’s catch is provided by
INDIA
Tonle Sap Lake, Southeast Asia’s largest fresh-
Kunming
BANGLADESH
water body. Each summer wet season, a pulse
of floodwaters from the Mekong mainstream
Jinghong HONG KON
reverses the direction of the Tonle Sap River VIETNAM
MYANMAR Hanoi
Ou
and causes the lake to increase its dry-season LAOS
Naypyidaw
Chiang Rai
volume 50 times.4 This natural pulse of Ngum
wet-season floods brings fish, sediment and Vientiane
nutrients that combine to set the scene for the THAILAND Mekong
Chi
world’s largest migration of biomass, which Mun
occurs underwater later in the year when Bangkok Stung Treng
Srepok
the floods recede, sending fish upstream and Tonle Sap
CAMBODIA
downstream throughout the basin. Phnom Penh
The Mekong delta’s agricultural produc- Mekong basin

Mekong delta
Country borders
tivity, the river system’s impressive fishery,
Capital cities
the livelihoods and identities of countless
SRI LANKA Rivers/tributaries
indicated by white lines
riparian communities and the basin’s wide
Source: IISS
©IISS
MALDIVES
SINGAPORE
Map 11.2: Dams along the Mekong mainstream, 2022
Megawatt-capacity scale
Yuelong
100
250
500
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
Rumei
Guxue
Gushui
Wunonglong, 2018
CHINA
Lidi, 2019
Tuoba
Huangdeng, 2019
Dahuaqiao, 2018
INDIA Miaowei, 2017
Gongguoqiao, 2011
Xiaowan, 2010
Manwan, 1995
Dachaoshan, 2003
Nuozhadu, 2012
Jinghong, 2008
Ganlanba
MYANMAR
LAOS
Luang Prabang
Pak Beng
Xayaburi, 2019
Pak Lay
Pak Chom
Sanakham
THAILAND Ban Koum

Phu Ngoy
Don Sahong, 2019

Operational (year of Stung Treng
completion indicated)
Under construction Sambor
CAMBODIA
Planned
Postponed
Megawatt capacity
VIETNAM
Country borders
Rivers/tributaries
indicated by white lines
©IISS
)
es
ag
Im
tt y
Ge
via
P
AF
y/
th
So
n
hi
Ch
g
an
(T
Workers clean fish to be made into prahok
(fermented fish paste) along the Tonle Sap
River in the Chrang Chamreh area of Phnom
Penh, Cambodia, 15 December 2021
range of land- and water-based biodiversity rely on the annual wet-season pulse.5 Over the
last two decades and particularly since 2016, the impacts of upstream dams and reductions
in wet-season precipitation have severely reduced the positive benefits of the wet season’s
flood pulse. Mega-dams on China’s mainstream are assessed to have a major impact by
reducing the wet-season pulse all the way to the river’s mouth.
More than 400 completed dams now populate the Mekong basin (see Table 11.1). They
have been built and used for many purposes, notably for hydropower, irrigation and flood
control. Each contributes in varying degrees to reducing the Mekong’s annual flood pulse
by storing and releasing water. Chinese companies, many of them state-owned, have built
more than 130 dams on China’s portion of the Mekong, including 11 on the Mekong main-
stream (see Map 11.2). Two of those dams – Xiaowan (4,200 megawatts) and Nuozhadu
(5,850 MW) – are within the top 25 dams globally for hydropower production. When these
and China’s nine other Mekong dams release water for hydropower production during
the Mekong’s dry season, they generate and transmit up to 23,000 MW in hydropower
capacity to benefit energy users from southwest China to the industrial coast.6 To prepare
for the next dry season, these dams must recharge their reservoirs during the wet season to
the detriment of downstream countries, which rely on the wet season’s natural flood pulse.
Following the commissioning of China’s first Mekong dam at Manwan in the 1990s,
communities in the closest downstream zone began feeling the effects. A community organ-
isation in Thailand’s Chiang Rai province, the Rak Chiang Khong Conservation Group,
noted slight seasonal change – slightly lower floodwaters during the wet season and slightly
higher dry-season river levels – just after the dam was finished in 1995. As larger upstream
dams were completed over the next 15 years, these seasonal effects became more noticeable
in Chiang Rai, with local community fisheries beginning to decline. When the Jinghong Dam
Figure 11.1: Predicted and actual flow of Mekong River, Jan 2002–Nov 2021
River flow (cubic metres per second)
10,000 Actual flow*

Predicted flow** Xiaowan Dam comes online Nuozhadu Dam comes online
Difference between Major flood event in Chiang Rai, Thailand Mekong pulse is not
actual and predicted flow observed at gauge
7,500 for first time
5,000
2,500
-2,500
-5,000
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
*As measured by the Mekong River Commission’s gauge at Chiang Saen, northern Thailand. **As determined by Eyes on Earth’s natural-flow model.
was completed in 2008 some 300 km to the north, making it the closest dam to Chiang Rai,
the conservation group noted daily changes in river levels, sometimes of one metre or more.
Local communities assumed these unnatural daily fluctuations were the result of ‘hydrope-
aking’ operations coming from the Jinghong Dam.7 Hydropeaking is a method of operating
a hydropower dam to maximise energy production over short periods of high demand and
involves sudden releases and restrictions of water. It is widely documented as delivering
severe ecological shocks to fish populations, forests and wetlands along a river’s course.8
Yet because Chinese water authorities in Yunnan or Beijing (as well as Jinghong Dam’s
operators) provided no information about the dam’s operations, downstream communi-
ties along the Thailand–Laos border could only speculate as to the cause of the sudden
changes in the river’s regular hydrological cycle. Then, during a rainless week in December
2013, without any notification from Chinese authorities, a massive release of water from
China’s upstream zone caused a 10 m-deep flood along the Thailand–Laos border. It took
several days to subside and resulted in an uncalculated quantity of losses in agricultural
assets and livestock.9 Subsequent studies based on satellite data suggested that the massive
release of water was part of the commissioning process for Nuozhadu Dam, more than
1,500 km upstream from the flooded areas.10 More specifically, in recent years the Mekong’s
hydrological cycle along this part of the river’s course has flipped: high levels are reached
during the dry season from upstream dam releases, while low levels bottom out in the wet
season from upstream dam restrictions (see Figure 11.1). While China releases no informa-
tion concerning seasonal dam operations or even the construction status or completion of
new dams, the downstream impact has been severe. For example, fishing settlements along
the Thailand–Laos border in stretches of the river closest to China have been depopulated,
effectively turning some into ghost villages.11
Table 11.1: Dams in the Mekong basin by country, 2021
Status China Laos Thailand Cambodia Vietnam Total
Completed 129 68 152 9 78 436
Under construction 1 37 1 0 0 39
Planned 7 232 2 49 1 291
Total 137 337 155 58 79 766

Source: Stimson Mekong Infrastructure Tracker, www.stimson.org/2020/mekong-infrastructure-tracker-tool
Much of what is now known about the exact drivers of change along the Thailand–
Laos border is derived from the work of United States-based climate consultancy Eyes
on Earth, which released a report in April 2020 that used remote-sensing data to show
for the first time when, for how long and to what degree China’s upstream dams were
changing the river’s hydrology in Chiang Rai.12 Before this report, which was funded by
the US Department of State’s Mekong Water Data Initiative, researchers and downstream
authorities widely agreed that China’s upstream dams were changing the Mekong’s
natural flow pattern but their conclusions lacked supporting evidence.13 The Eyes on
Earth study showed that after 2007 China’s dams could significantly reduce wet-season
flow in Chiang Rai and significantly increase dry-season flow. Another key finding
was that during the severe wet-season drought in 2019, flow restrictions from China’s
upstream completely erased any wet-season pulse effect in the province.14 While China’s
water authorities dismissed the report15 and the Mekong River Commission (MRC, repre-
senting Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam) questioned the use of remote-sensing
data as a basis for such conclusions,16 the Trump administration in the US capitalised
on the study to open a new chapter of American engagement in the Mekong region,
thereby intensifying great-power competition there. The Eyes on Earth study also led to
the establishment of the Mekong Dam Monitor (MDM),17 an online platform co-managed
by US-based think tank the Stimson Center and Eyes on Earth. The monitor provides
accurate, near-real-time reporting on the operations of all of China’s mainstream dams
and 34 large dams in downstream countries.
Determining the specific impacts of China’s upstream dams on stretches of the river
downstream from Chiang Rai province is difficult owing to the complexity of the river
system. Hundreds of tributaries drain into the lower basin. However, peer-reviewed
studies have built a consensus around evidence suggesting that China’s dams trap about
60% of the Mekong’s traditional total sediment load of some 163m tn per year.18 China’s
portion of the Mekong traditionally provides a majority of the sediment to the Mekong
basin due to long mountainous slopes in Tibet and Yunnan province. That sediment, now
trapped behind China’s 11-dam cascade, no longer flows into Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake
Map 11.3: Operational and under-construction dams in the lower Mekong, 2021
Of the 346 dams shown,

166 are for hydroelectric power generation and
180 for water supply.
Not shown are 289 further hydropower dams
that are planned in the lower Mekong, mostly
in Cambodia and Laos but also in Myanmar and
Thailand, though not yet under construction.
LAOS
THAILAND
VIETNAM
CAMBODIA
Operational
Under construction
Source: Stimson Mekong Infrastructure Tracker,

www.stimson.org/2020/mekong-infrastructure-tracker-tool
©IISS
and across the Mekong delta floodplain. Yet downstream more than 300 dams of various
sizes and uses (hydropower, irrigation, flood control, etc.) are operational in Cambodia,
Laos, Thailand and Vietnam (see Table 11.1 and Map 11.3). These dams also contribute to
downstream problems.
Over the last two decades, downstream countries have experienced some of the driest
wet seasons on record and have often blamed this on China’s manipulation of wet-season
flow. In 2015–16, the Mekong delta experienced a major drought by historical standards,
leading Hanoi to highlight the effects of China’s upstream dams and appeal to Beijing to
release water. That appeal was met with six weeks of water release during March–April
2016. It was the first time that Beijing had responded to a call for drought relief.19 However,
China’s dams are not solely responsible for low river levels downstream. MRC data shows
that wet-season droughts are increasing in both frequency and intensity, mostly because
of low precipitation. Table 11.2 shows that over a 112-year period, the ten years with the
lowest flow at Stung Treng in northeastern Cambodia have occurred since 1977, with five
of these since 2010. The year with the lowest flow on record was 2020 – 150 km3 lower than
the pre-2008 average. Upstream dams cannot be responsible for such an effect as their
operational patterns are seasonally determined. In other words, by and large, whatever
water is restricted in the wet season is released during the next dry season. Some water is
indeed held permanently behind reservoirs when dams are commissioned, but this likely
totals less than 10 km3 per year over the last two decades.20
MDM data suggest that China’s dams are
operating the same way during abnormally Table 11.2: Ten years with the lowest Mekong River flow to
low-flow wet seasons as they do during
Stung Treng, northeastern Cambodia, 1910–2021
normal wet seasons, taking the same amount

Rank Year Annual flow Difference % difference
of water out of the Mekong system.21 When (km3) in flow from in flow from
this happens, dams in China and down- baseline* baseline
(km3)
stream have an even greater effect in terms
of reducing Tonle Sap’s flood pulse and
reducing the dispersal of nutrient-rich flood- 1 2020 270.98 -150.31** -35.7
water across the Mekong delta. 2 1998 272.29 -149.01 -35.4

A recent study suggests that during years 3 1988 281.40 -139.90 -33.2
with anomalously low flows, upper-basin 4 2015 291.08 -130.22 -30.9
dam restrictions in China have reduced by 5 1977 295.71 -125.59 -29.8
9–11% over six months of wet-season flow
6 2010 301.28 -120.02 -28.5
to Stung Treng, Cambodia, which is nearly
7 2019 302.06 -119.24 -28.3
2,000 km from China’s most downstream
8 1987 314.00 -107.30 -25.5
dam.22 These wet-season restrictions are
9 2021 316.30 -105.00 -24.9
probably significant enough to alter substan-
tially the duration and intensity of the annual 10 1992 320.01 -101.29 -24.0
wet-season natural flooding processes at *The baseline (421.3 km3) is the average annual flow from 1910 to 2007 (the latter being the
year when large dams began to be constructed throughout the Mekong basin) as measured
Tonle Sap and in the Mekong delta, therefore by the Mekong River Commission’s gauge in Stung Treng, Cambodia.
**‘Annual flow’ plus ‘Difference in flow from baseline’ for 2020 only adds to 421.29 rather than
having a major impact on downstream fish- 421.3 km3 due to rounding.
Source: Mekong River Commission, portal.mrcmekong.org/home
eries and agricultural production during wet
seasons, which are anomalously dry. Further research has supported these findings23 but
ultimately more research is needed to pin down how upstream dams impact natural flood
processes in the Tonle Sap and Mekong delta. Moreover, recent reporting from Tonle Sap24
and the Mekong delta25 suggests that fish and agricultural harvests have declined signifi-
cantly since 2018 as the environmental crisis in the Mekong basin has worsened. The last
three years were among the top nine low annual flow years for the Mekong. If the succes-
sion of low-flow years persists in the 2020s, dam operations in China and throughout the
basin will need to change if a modicum of natural wet-season flood pulse is to be preserved
to support downstream fisheries and agriculture.
CHINA’S MOTIVATION FOR DAMMING THE MEKONG

Some policy analysts suggest that China’s upstream control of the Mekong – and of the
upstream reaches of more than a dozen international rivers that flow out of China – is part
of a geopolitical plot to bring downstream countries into China’s sphere of influence.26
This message often prevails in international media coverage. Yet this perspective misinter-
prets the complexity of China’s political economy and the internal motivations that drive
China’s hydropower and dam sector. The control of rivers for irrigation purposes and flood
control has long been part of China’s state-building narrative and political discourse. The
harnessing of the Min River at Dujiangyan in 256 bce paved the way for a strong state
supported by robust agricultural production. China’s communist government has sought to
harness the power of all of China’s rivers for various purposes and has designated all major
rivers in Southwest China, the Mekong
included, as ideal investment
zones for
(Ily
La
y/
AF
P
via
Ge
tt y
Im
ag
es
)
The Lower Sesan 2 dam in Stung Treng

province, Cambodia, 17 December 2018
hydropower production, regardless of the environmental and social impacts of the dams
both inside and outside China.27 This has led to the construction of more than 200 large
hydropower dams in Yunnan, Guanxi, Sichuan and Tibet over the last two decades.28 The
environmental geographer Darrin Magee calls these exploited river basins ‘powersheds’ as
they are viewed by Beijing as geographical areas zoned for a single purpose: the produc-
tion of massive amounts of hydroelectric power to drive industrial growth and further the
development of the Chinese state (and by extension the legitimacy of the ruling Chinese
Communist Party).29 Specifically in the context of the Mekong, in the 1990s the Yunnan
provincial government negotiated – under Beijing’s oversight – a deal with its counterpart
in Guangzhou to exploit Yunnan’s rivers (the Mekong included) for hydropower, which
would be transmitted to Guangzhou to support export-oriented manufacturing there.
The intent was to provide income to Yunnan through the sale of hydropower and allow
that province to forgo large-scale industrialisation that might undermine tourism, a major
driver of its economy. In other words, damming the Mekong and other rivers in Yunnan
was a way to keep the province ‘green’.30
Today, economic incentives related to Beijing’s clean-energy discourse and emis-
sions-reduction goals provide important reasons for the Chinese state to continue investing
in damming the country’s southwestern rivers. Indeed, Beijing’s latest (14th) five-year plan,
covering the years 2021–25, pledges to finish pipelines of hydropower projects, construction
of which had lagged under the previous plan.31 It can be expected that many more dams
will be built in China over the next decade, including the planned eight dams on China’s
portion of the Mekong mainstream, despite the protests of downstream countries. China’s
powerful dam-building sector is largely impervious to such objections. Most information
concerning Chinese dams’ construction schedules, design specifications and operations is
classified, which has resulted in downstream authorities and interested parties in the lower
Mekong often calling for China to be more transparent regarding its dam operations and
river data.32 This lack of transparency has contributed to speculation regarding the role of
Chinese dams in exacerbating wet-season droughts.
China agreed to become an MRC
A fisherman anchors his boats amid drought along the
dialogue partner in 1996 just one year after
Mekong River – an increasingly common phenomenon over
its formal establishment but has not joined the last decade – near Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 22 March 2016
as a full member. That would require full

transparency on mainstream dam opera-
tions and adherence to MRC protocols for
notification and consultation on mainstream
dam construction. Importantly, full MRC
membership would also require upstream
dams to operate at minimal flow levels
during the wet season in order to guarantee
floodplain contributions to Tonle Sap and
the Mekong delta.33 During the wet seasons,
China’s major upstream dams at Xiaowan
and Nuozhadu recharge their empty reser-
(Heng Siniths/AP Photo)
voirs. To do this, they effectively turn off their taps: they are likely not engineered to
provide guaranteed flow during the wet season even under dire circumstances.34 In other
words, if China were a full member, it would not have been able to build the major seasonal
storage dams at Xiaowan and Nuozhadu. Nevertheless, over the last decade China has
increased its transparency (though minimally compared to the practices of downstream
countries) and improved its cooperative engagement with downstream countries via the
Lancang–Mekong Cooperation Mechanism (LMC), a multilateral development framework
Beijing established in 2016 that downstream countries have welcomed.
EFFECTS ON CHINA–SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS

Since the 1990s, downstream countries have viewed China’s upstream behaviour with
ambivalence. China is a growing global economic power as well as an upstream riparian
state. While prioritising its national interests, Beijing also tries to avoid destabilising rela-
tions with its Southeast Asian neighbours. With the exception of Myanmar (which has
been inward-looking for most of its post-colonial existence), mainland Southeast Asian
governments have often displayed a preference for alliances and deep economic relations
with far-flung powers over fostering relations in their immediate region. Examples include
Thailand’s long-standing security alliance with the US, Vietnam’s relationship with the
Soviet Union after its ‘American War’ and the Khmer Rouge regime’s alliance with China
from 1975–79. Like most other Southeast Asian states, Vietnam warily but skilfully balances
its relations with the US and China, pursuing hedging strategies that accrue economic
and security benefits. However, mainland Southeast Asian states have sometimes lent too
far towards particular major powers, resulting in state failure or forced regime change.
Examples include the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), the Khmer Rouge regime and
Myanmar’s military regime before 2015. Asia policy experts now often cite Cambodia’s and
Laos’ contemporary over-reliance on Chinese investment and commercial ties as examples
that might ultimately lead to similar results.35
Mainland Southeast Asia is often referred to as a coherent sub-regional geograph-
ical and economic bloc. However, it has never been sufficiently internally connected via
road, rail or water transport infrastructure. While outward-looking and maritime-focused
foreign policies have traditionally impeded connections, so has the geography of the
Mekong basin, one of the world’s wettest and most mountainous regions. Only in the last
two decades are century-old visions for sub-regional infrastructural connectivity coming
to fruition. Chinese state-sponsored investment via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is
playing an important part in improving sub-regional connectivity: most of China’s infra-
structure pathways originate in Yunnan’s provincial capital, Kunming, and branch out to
promote economic and physical links with mainland Southeast Asia.
Early plans for sub-regional connectivity, such as those for dams on the Mekong, were
originally developed by the French and British colonial powers and later by the US and
global institutions such as the United Nations and Asian Development Bank. When, after a
half-century of intermittent conflict, mainland Southeast Asia stabilised following the land-
mark 1991 Paris Peace Agreement ending the conflict in Cambodia, the Asian Development
Bank established its Greater Mekong Subregion Program. The initiative supported both
Thailand’s goal of ‘turning battlefields into marketplaces’36 and China’s ‘good neighbour’
policy of promoting trade with mainland Southeast Asia.37 When China’s first upstream
Mekong dam, at Manwan, was completed in the mid-1990s, energy planners in Cambodia,
Laos and Thailand dusted off decades-old blueprints for Mekong mainstream dams first
suggested by the US government in the 1960s.38 At that time, some downstream hydro-
power planners welcomed China’s damming of the upstream Mekong. They believed this
was a necessary first step towards building dams downstream as China’s upstream dams
could help manage the river’s unwieldy wet-season flow.
These developments led to the 1995 Mekong Agreement, which established the MRC
and protocols to govern damming of the Mekong mainstream in mainland Southeast Asia.
From that time to the advent of the Xi Jinping era in 2012, China’s economic relationship
with downstream Southeast Asian countries was generally positive. However, down-
stream states’ attitudes towards China’s upstream dams hardened as more dams were
built without notification, consultation and data-sharing on dam operations. The Mekong
Agreement had created protocols for notification, consultation and data-sharing; Southeast
Asian countries had hoped that China would adhere to these rules. Its unwillingness to
do so drew the ire of some government and non-government stakeholders in the sub-
region. The MRC and a broad network of scientists and civil-society actors also produced
numerous peer-reviewed studies speculating on the impacts of China’s upstream. Those
studies also highlighted the severe economic and social costs of damming the Mekong
mainstream and tributaries in downstream countries, focusing on the Xayaburi, Nam
Theun 2 and Don-Sahong dams in Laos and China’s Lower Sesan 2 dam in Cambodia,
a flagship project of the BRI. Because of Laos’ ambition to become a major hydropower
producer and its policy of exploiting all of its mainstream and tributaries to that end, Lao
government stakeholders, including the Prime Minister’s Office and line agencies, have
never criticised any dam projects, including China’s.
Since 2013, an era of closer Chinese engagement in mainland Southeast Asia (a result of
the BRI) has brought large-scale investment in dams and physical-infrastructure projects.
While downstream states have benefited from China’s largesse, stakeholders inside and
outside the region are increasingly nervous about China’s intentions. The annual ‘State
of Southeast Asia’ report produced by Singapore’s ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute shows
that these worries have increased over the last five years.39 China’s hydropower invest-
ment projects in mainland Southeast Asia, notably the failed Myitsone Dam in Myanmar
and the Lower Sesan 2 Dam in Cambodia, are often cited as negative examples of poorly
designed projects resulting in social and environmental costs that far outweigh their bene-
fits. One study predicts that the 400 MW Lower Sesan 2 Dam will reduce the total Mekong
fish population by 9.3%.40 Thailand and Vietnam have developed their own hydropower
investment plans in Laos, possibly in part to balance China’s dam construction there. While
Chinese entities are involved in 41 of Laos’ dams, Thailand is Laos’ largest investor and
dam builder, with involvement in 120 projects.41 The Thai and Vietnamese power markets
favour purchasing power from Thai- and Vietnamese-built dams respectively, in Laos.
Numerous dams in Laos financed largely through Beijing’s state-sponsored vehicles42 sell
power directly to Laos’ state electricity corporation, Électricité du Laos, which has struggled
to find foreign markets for its hydropower Nam Ou 6 hydropower dam in the early stages of construction by Chinese state-
owned company Sinohydro in Phongsaly province, northern Laos, 29 March 2014
because of Thai and Vietnamese preferences.
An excessive number of Chinese-financed
dams with no viable markets left Laos’ equity
share of those dams overburdened with
onerous debt-financing requirements; in
September 2020, China Southern Power Grid,
one of China’s two major utility companies,
took majority control of the transmission
arm of Électricité du Laos.43 Beijing’s support
for dam construction and other projects in
Laos, such as a high-speed rail project, have
substantially increased China’s influence in
the country.
(In Pictures Ltd./Corbis via Getty Images)
Under Xi’s leadership, China has
developed its foreign-policy architecture in mainland Southeast Asia. Previous Chinese
leaders preferred bilateral and often transactional relationships with lower Mekong
countries. Xi instigated a period of sub-regional multilateralism with the establishment
of the LMC in 2016. Some analysts suggest that China established the LMC in reaction
to the US-led Lower Mekong Initiative created by the Obama administration in 2009.44
However, Beijing’s global pivot towards multilateralism and participation in multilateral
institutions has been pronounced during Xi’s tenure, and China may not have needed
the stimulus supposedly provided by the US to establish the LMC.45 The organisation
counts as members all six Mekong basin countries (Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar,
Thailand and Vietnam); holds regular high-level meetings, including an annual leaders’
summit; and features working groups and cooperative frameworks on sectors ranging
from energy and infrastructural development to water-resource cooperation, health and
education.46 Since 2016, the LMC’s Special Fund is estimated to have contributed tens of
millions of dollars to numerous projects and programmes throughout the lower Mekong.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called for the LMC to ‘not be a superb talking shop,
but a grounded bulldozer’ for regional cooperation – an oblique criticism of Western-led
regional cooperation mechanisms, which the Chinese government sometimes portrays
as forums for diplomatic discourse with scant tangible outcomes in terms of practical
cooperation.47 Another contrast is drawn by Fudan University’s Zhang Li, who claims that
while the LMC promotes regionalisation through a common identity and shared experience,
Western-led mechanisms promote internationalisation that reinforces overdependence
on foreign aid and global institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank.48 Yet in contrast to mechanisms such as the MRC and the Thai-led Ayeyawady-Chao
Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS, established in 2003), to which
member states contribute resources to support various projects, the LMC Special Fund
is funded only by Beijing. Furthermore, the LMC’s Sino-centric orientation is apparent:
its headquarters and key research centres are located in Beijing, while the organisation’s
name contains ‘Lancang’ – the name given to China’s portion of the Mekong – rather
than adopting the regionally and globally Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi attends a joint press conference
in Bangkok (with his Thai counterpart, not pictured) where he urges that the
accepted name of the river. Within the
Lancang–Mekong Cooperation Mechanism ‘should not be a superb talking
wide community of stakeholders involved shop, but a grounded bulldozer’, 24 July 2017
in Mekong transboundary water research
and policymaking (including academic
institutions, think tanks, civil-society groups
and government agencies), the LMC is
often portrayed as a rival to the MRC. It is
described in academic studies and mainland
Southeast Asian media as a threat to the
viability of the MRC and as an institution
that might eventually replace the MRC.49
In reality, the MRC and LMC are not
mirror images of each other. The MRC was
established by the 1995 Mekong Agreement,
(Lillian Suwanrumpha/AFP via Getty Images)
an international treaty ratified by the four
member countries. It is bound by strict legal protocols and practices that focus on water-
related issues and is financially supported by member countries and external development
partners. The LMC is a regional development mechanism initiated, led and entirely
financed by Beijing, with a loosely defined and amorphous set of objectives in various
sectors. The MRC also curates more than a century’s worth of publicly available data on the
lower Mekong. In contrast, whatever data generation and curation is conducted by China’s
Lancang–Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Center (LMWRCC, established in 2016) is
not widely shared. For these reasons, the MRC is a regional centre of excellence from which
the LMWRCC seeks to learn. However, the MRC will need continued robust funding from
member states and external development partners to maintain this position.
The LMC promotes a consistent discourse about upstream dams. In its view, upstream
dams (which it often calls ‘water conservancy projects’) promote downstream flood control
and drought relief.50 However, this is a contentious perspective. Firstly, China’s upstream
dams were singularly built for hydropower production.51 Secondly, unlike the 1995 Mekong
Agreement, no agreements exist between China and downstream countries detailing how
these dams should contribute to flood-control or drought-relief efforts. Thirdly, the LMC
has not provided authoritative evidence or data to show how the upstream dams contribute
to flood control or drought relief. Finally, despite growing calls for river regulation in the
interests of wet-season flood control from a growing cohort of downstream stakeholders,
the MRC continues to promote an evidence-based position that wet-season floods provide
benefits for fisheries, agriculture and freshwater availability that far outweigh the damage
caused by extreme flood events.52 On the issue of river regulation, China and downstream
countries continue to be diametrically opposed.
These opposing viewpoints could widen, even in the near term. The April 2020 Eyes
on Earth study showed how China’s dam operations entirely obviated the 2019 wet-season
pulse at Chiang Saen, Thailand, and exacerbated wet-season drought downstream. It was
the beginning of a series of wet-season droughts that continued in 2020 and 2021.
SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONCERNS AND CHINESE POLICY

Despite an increasing body of evidence to the contrary, the LMC’s repeated assertions that
upstream dams are useful for wet-season flood control and relieving dry-season drought show
no signs of changing.53 Yet processes set in motion by the LMC combined with the ongoing
environmental crisis in the Mekong have led to changes in China’s behaviour since 2018.
For instance, community-based conservation groups in Chiang Rai, Thailand, had protested
Chinese plans to blast rapids along the Thailand–Laos border in order to open a major cargo
trade route from Yunnan to Laos’ southern border. The groups claimed that the rapids were
important breeding grounds for the Mekong giant catfish and other fish species. From 2017–
19, relevant Chinese and Thai authorities and engineering firms involved with the project
met the conservation groups for several rounds of consultations. In February 2019, Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced the cancellation of the project after Thailand’s cabinet
made a formal request that Beijing halt it.54 It was a rare example of civil society achieving
success in altering the behaviour of Chinese stakeholders through persistent campaigning.
Beijing’s attitude towards data transparency is also changing. The April 2020 Eyes on
Earth report and the subsequent launch of the MDM have acted as catalysts to quicken
implementation of China’s pledges for increased transparency over upstream dam
operations and river-flow conditions. Before the downstream environmental crisis that
began in 2019, China had made slow progress towards data transparency. In 1996, it began
sharing wet-season data on water levels at two gauges along the river’s course, one on the
mainstream below the Jinghong Dam and another tributary that flows into the Mekong
below Jinghong. China occasionally shared dry-season data at times ‘of emergency’:
according to the academic expert Sebastian Biba, this was an ad hoc measure intended to
de-escalate criticism.55 Mekong transboundary water governance expert Carl Middleton
has suggested that ‘released data was not complete enough to conclusively determine the
role that upstream dams had played in low river flows’.56 Since its inception, the MRC
has repeatedly called on China to release more data; following the publication of the Eyes
on Earth report it messaged Beijing publicly on five occasions regarding the need for
greater data transparency.57 It also signalled to external development partners its interest
in using satellite-observation techniques to Community representatives protest in Bangkok against the construction of the
better understand river and dam conditions then-planned and subsequently completed Xayaburi Dam in Laos, 24 April 2012
throughout the basin.

In September 2020, the LMWRCC
launched a publicly available online data
portal that provides hourly river-level data at
the Jinghong and Man’an gauges. For the first
time, Mekong watchers could observe phys-
ical river conditions in China.58 However, the
portal shares no information on upstream
dam operations or reservoir conditions,
and its data should be understood as repre-
senting only a marginal improvement on the
broad historical datasets curated and made
(Apichart Weerawong/AP Photo)
publicly available by the MRC. The LMWRCC also describes its portal as a platform for
unspecified ‘early warning’, but the organisation lacks protocols defining early warning
and the website has yet to issue such a warning. In the meantime, by November 2021 the
MDM had issued more than 20 early warnings based on parameters of upstream dam
releases and restrictions in China changing the river level in Chiang Rai province by 50
centimetres or more.59 The monitor’s first identification of such change occurred in early
January 2021 when it detected a sudden 1m drop in the river level at Jinghong caused by
upstream dams. Some 48 hours after an alert was issued on social media, China’s water
authorities notified the MRC of a prolonged, 20-day flow restriction.60
Occurring only three weeks after the MDM’s launch, the January 2021 alert was the
first example of the monitor encouraging behavioural change on the part of China’s water
authorities. Other indications of behavioural change include the LMC’s adoption of MRC
methodology to calculate flow at Jinghong after a mathematical discrepancy was discovered
between their data.61 Furthermore, using Eyes on Earth’s natural-flow modelling, the MDM
has identified major impacts on upstream flow caused by dams since 2007. In September
2021, the MRC and LMC agreed to a three-year joint study that uses the pre-2008 period as
a baseline for normal river conditions.62 If the study is to be conducted effectively, the LMC
will have to share information on upstream dam operations with the MRC for the first time,
although it is unclear how much of this information will then be shared publicly. Until a full
spectrum of data on dam and river conditions is shared with downstream countries, sources
of information on upstream reservoir conditions will continue to rely on remote-sensing
data and satellite imagery, the quality of
which is improving rapidly.
(C
h
es
s ad
ap
or
n
Bu
as
ai/
AP
Ph
o
to
)
The ’Blue Mekong’ phenomenon: the Mekong River turned blue due to
sediment being trapped behind dams and lower-than-normal river levels,
in Nakhon Phanom province, northeast Thailand, 4 December 2019
There is an increasing demand for data on China’s upstream dam operations.

Thailand’s Office of National Water Resources has repeatedly called for information on
sediment-trapping behind China’s dams and downstream dams,63 citing the ‘Blue Mekong’
phenomenon that is thought to occur when the Mekong is robbed of its sediment load.64
Downstream dam companies have contacted the MDM team regarding speculation that
China’s upstream dams are altering flow so much that downstream dams are unable to
meet power-generation targets. Unnatural flow patterns were affecting their business,
but like many other stakeholders in the basin they could not point to specific drivers of
these patterns. Meanwhile, the deepening environmental crisis (resulting in decreased fish
catches and agricultural yields) has amplified calls from government agencies, research
institutions and civil-society groups throughout the basin for greater data transparency,
which is necessary for effective economic planning. For example, the success of Vietnam’s
Resolution 120 – a Mekong delta planning programme initiated in 2018 that assumes
natural flow in the flood plain will persist to promote a transition to high-value agriculture
– relies on continued upstream natural flow conditions.
Current data on both upstream and downstream reservoir operations, provided by the
MDM and authorities in Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, suggests the cumulative amount of
downstream water storage in reservoirs is roughly equal to the amount of water storage
in China.65 However, a major difference is that downstream storage is spread across many
more dams than in China. From an engineering and dam-operations perspective, it is theo-
retically possible to operate downstream dams with releases in a way that counters China’s
upstream wet-season restriction and helps restore some natural flooding to Tonle Sap and
the Mekong delta. However, such coordination would require participatory authorities in
Laos, Thailand and Vietnam to manage reservoirs using protocols not provided for in the
1995 Mekong Agreement and operating rules outside the MRC’s current purview. Laos
contains most of the dams that could provide a counterbalance in flow to China’s upstream
restrictions. However, the Lao government has limited capacity to communicate with dam
operators to coordinate such an effort, let alone convince or even pay those dam operators
to forgo hydropower production for wet-season reservoir releases.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) apparently struggles to maintain
a strong focus on Mekong River environmental issues despite the importance of primary
production in the Mekong basin for Southeast Asia’s food security. While serving as ASEAN
chair in 2020, Vietnam attempted unsuccessfully to make the Mekong crisis an ASEAN
priority. However, the coronavirus pandemic reduced Hanoi’s ability to develop a robust
agenda. Moreover, some ASEAN members may have objected to prioritising the issue
due to concerns about being drawn into growing US–China tensions in the sub-region.
Instead of promoting Mekong River governance as a specific point on ASEAN’s agenda,
stakeholders could allocate Mekong-related concerns to thematic areas already prioritised
by the organisation, such as climate, food security, trade and disaster-risk reduction. The
Mekong is a major food export zone for consumers throughout ASEAN; the organisation’s
trade and commerce initiatives could provide resources to support rice and aquaculture
supply chains via smart planning initiatives addressing both climate adaptation and
upstream water-resource management. An ASEAN-wide focus on climate adaptation
for at-risk coastal river deltas like the Mekong could generate solutions to mitigate
environmental damage there but also encourage the sharing of best practices in delta
protection across Southeast Asia.66
NON-SOUTHEAST-ASIAN RESPONSES AND THE REGIONAL BALANCE

Before the BRI and the establishment of the LMC, external funding for the MRC and
government and non-government initiatives addressing transboundary water governance
was waning.67 In 2016, some external funders, particularly those from Europe, were plan-
ning to cease supporting the MRC entirely because of the absence of evidence that the
organisation could produce the desired result of no dams on the lower Mekong main-
stream.68 Denmark and Finland ended their formerly robust support for Mekong initiatives
in 2016 and 2018, respectively. At the same time, Myanmar’s democratic opening following
its 2015 election led donors to reallocate resources away from Mekong-focused efforts to
programmes supporting democratisation, resource governance and market development
there. However, the deepening impact of China’s upstream activities on the region has
actually driven greater external resources back into the hands of downstream govern-
ments, civil-society groups and research institutions, leading some in the Mekong policy
community to ironically call China the Mekong’s ‘best friend’ due to this unintended
consequence of Beijing’s dam operations.
Australia, India, Japan, South Korea and the US each now has a multilateral develop-
ment framework focused on the Mekong region. All except the United States’ framework
include leaders’ summits. In 2020, the US rebranded its Lower Mekong Initiative as the
Mekong–US Partnership (MUSP) to emphasise inclusivity, multilateralism and the
building of partnerships on issues related to ‘economic connectivity, human capital devel-
opment, transboundary water and natural resources management and non-traditional
security’, including collaboration on threats such as health security and pandemic
responses, transnational crime, cyber-security challenges, and trafficking in people, drugs
and wildlife.69 The MUSP was launched towards the end of the Trump administration
alongside US rhetoric critical of China’s Mekong dams, which was amplified in speeches
by then-secretary of state Mike Pompeo and other senior officials.70 While the MUSP was
well received throughout the region, Washington’s parallel diplomatic discourse was
misinterpreted by some in the region as suggesting that the US wanted Southeast Asian
countries to ‘choose sides’ between China and the US. Subsequently, the Biden adminis-
tration has reduced US criticism of China’s upstream dams. It has also moved the focus of
US Mekong policy towards increasing the region’s capacity for adapting to the impact of
climate change and concerns about the impact of dams in general throughout the Mekong
region.71 US programmes that use satellite imagery and remote-sensing approaches to
provide evidence, improve transparency and inform local decision-making processes,
such as the Mekong Water Data Initiative, the MDM and the US Agency for International
Development’s SERVIR–Mekong programme, continue to receive robust funding support
from Washington. Furthermore, the MUSP has issued an important message to all actors
involved in regional policymaking on the Mekong regarding the continued need for the
US and other external development partners to support the MRC with annual funding
and other support.72 In aid of this objective, Then US secretary of state Mike Pompeo criticises Chinese dams while attending
the Lower Mekong Initiative Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, 1 August 2019
in August 2021 the MRC joined ‘The Friends
of the Mekong’, a cooperation mechanism
within the MUSP that comprises the lower
Mekong countries, Australia, the European
Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the
Asian Development Bank, the World Bank
and the US. It is tasked with coordinating and
calibrating development partners’ resources
and efforts focused on the Mekong.73
Other Mekong-focused initiatives include
the Mekong–Australia Partnership (MAP)
established by the Australian Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade in November
(Jonathan Ernst/AFP via Getty Images)
2020. A major augmentation of Canberra’s
existing work in the sub-region, the MAP focuses on coronavirus-pandemic recovery,
trade and investment, cyber issues, infrastructure development, environmental resilience,
gender and regional governance.74 Elsewhere, India has reinvigorated the Mekong–Ganga
Cooperation (originally launched in 2000) with the aim of enhancing economic and
people-to-people ties between India and downstream Mekong countries.75 Japan and the
US continue to develop the Japan–US–Mekong Power Partnership (JUMPP), which seeks
to promote regional electricity trade through the financing of power-generation projects
and transmission infrastructure with an emphasis on connectivity between Vietnam and
Laos.76 The Korea–Mekong Cooperation Fund (established in 2013) has received increased
resources as part of South Korea’s broader New Southern Policy focused on supporting
diplomatic relations and economic development with ASEAN and India.77
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Environmental conditions and the state of the Mekong River are likely to worsen over
the coming decades as the effects of dams and climate change take hold. The result
will be reduced production of primary foods, including the fish and rice that currently
form the basis of the diets of tens of millions of people living in the Mekong basin. If the
Mekong’s resource base is significantly depleted, intra-regional migration and possibly
out-migration could increase. In the worst case, these conditions could lead to a refugee
crisis in Southeast Asia.
These effects could be mitigated by proper planning based on improved provision of
data and monitoring of the river’s resources. An ‘all hands on deck’ approach is needed to
reduce the most disastrous effects of the potential environmental crisis. Such an approach
would require the active participation of China, development partners (including
Australia, Japan, South Korea and the US) and government and non-government
stakeholders from downstream states. A significant step in the right direction would
be for China to modify its position on upstream river regulation to recognise firstly the
resources that the river provides naturally to downstream countries and secondly that
China’s upstream dams are part of the problem. However, effecting this change would
require greater effort by downstream countries to influence China’s perspective and
policy. Development partners, acting in cooperation and on a sustained basis, could
assist by continuing to identify and highlight factors contributing to environmental
change, strengthening the provision of data needed to inform downstream countries’
decision-making. Adopting such approaches could enable China and the sub-region’s
development partners to help downstream countries avoid the worst effects of water,
climate and food-security crises. However, efforts to avoid worst-case scenarios in the
lower Mekong will be undermined if non-Southeast Asian powers encourage downstream
countries to take sides in a broader geopolitical competition.
NOTES
1 Dung Duc Tran et al., ‘Long-term Sustainability China’s Dams on the Mekong’, Stimson Center,
of the Vietnamese Mekong Delta in Question: 16 June 2021, https://www.stimson.org/2020/
An Economic Assessment of Water Management discussing-chinas-dams-on-the-mekong/.
Alternatives’, Agricultural Water Management, 7 Brian Eyler, Last Days of the Mighty Mekong
vol. 223, 20 August 2019, https://doi. (London: Zed Books, 2019), chapter 1.
org/10.1016/j.agwat.2019.105703. 8 Atle Harby et al., ‘Ecological Impacts of Hydro
2 Yuichiro Yoshida et al., ‘Impacts of Peaking in Rivers’, in Bjørn Honningsvåg et al.
Mainstream Hydropower Dams on Fisheries (eds), Hydropower in the New Millenium (London:
and Agriculture in Lower Mekong Basin’, CRC Press, 2001), pp. 249–56.
Sustainability, 19 March 2020, https://www. 9 Areeya Tivasuradej, ‘Unexpected Waters: How
google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&- Sudden Water Changes in the Mekong Affect
source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwigg- Local Thai Livelihoods’, Prospect, 29 May
vWd6K70AhVCmHIEHVCiDNYQFnoECAU- 2014, https://prospect-journal.org/2014/05/29/
QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mdpi.com% unexpected-waters-how-sudden-water-changes-
2F2071-1050%2F12%2F6%2F2408%2Fpdf&us- in-the-mekong-affect-local-thai-livelihoods/.
g=AOvVaw2uHxcGHN-mOu2mVbENOChB. 10 Brian Eyler et al., ‘New Evidence: How China
3 Marta Kasztelan, ‘Resilient Rivers: Helping Turned Off the Tap on the Mekong River’,
Protect the Mekong, and Rivers Around the Stimson Center, 13 April 2020, https://www.
World’, World Wildlife Magazine, Summer 2021, stimson.org/2020/new-evidence-how-china-
https://www.worldwildlife.org/magazine/ turned-off-the-mekong-tap.
issues/summer-2021/articles/resilient-rivers. 11 Eyler, Last Days of the Mighty Mekong, chapter 5.
4 Stefan Lovgren, ‘Cambodia’s Largest Lake Is 12 Alan Basist and Claude Williams, ‘Monitoring
Running Dry, Taking Forests and Fisheries With the Quantity of Water Flowing Through
It’, National Geographic, 17 April 2020, https:// the Upper Mekong Basin Under Natural
www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/ (Unimpeded) Conditions’, Sustainable
cambodia-tonle-sap-lake-running-dry-taking- Infrastructure Partnership, Bangkok, 10 April
flooded-forest-fish. 2020, https://www.eyesonearth.org/reports.
5 Matti Kummu and Juha Sarkkula, ‘Impact of the 13 Timo A. Räsänen et al., ‘Observed River
Mekong River Flow Alteration on the Tonle Sap Discharge Changes Due to Hydropower
Flood Pulse’, Ambio, vol. 37, no. 3, May 2008, pp. Operations in the Upper Mekong Basin’, Journal
185–92, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25547881. of Hydrology, vol. 545, February 2017, pp. 28–41.
6 See ‘Mekong Infrastructure Tracker Dashboard’, 14 Hannah Beech, ‘China Limited Mekong Flow.
supported by the Stimson Center, USAID and the Other Countries Suffered a Drought’, New York
Asia Foundation, 25 May 2020, https://stimson. Times, 13 April 2020, https://www.nytimes.
org/2020/mekong-infrastructure-tracker-tool/; com/2020/04/13/world/asia/china-mekong-
and Brian Eyler and Yun Sun, ‘Discussing drought.html.
15 Huileng Tan, ‘China Could Have Choked Off the 15 November 2021, https://e.vnexpress.net/
Mekong and Aggravated a Drought, Threatening news/news/absence-of-seasonal-flooding-wash-
the Lifeline of Millions in Asia’, CNBC, 27 es-away-mekong-delta-livelihood-4385931.html.
April 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/28/ 26 Philip Citowicki, ‘China’s Control of the
china-choked-off-the-mekong-which-worsened- Mekong’, Diplomat, 8 May 2020, https://
southeast-asia-drought-study.html. thediplomat.com/2020/05/chinas-control-of-
16 ‘Understanding the Mekong River’s the-mekong/.
Hydrological Conditions’, Mekong River 27 For context, see Philip Ball, ‘The Chinese Are
Commission, April 2020, https://www. Obsessed with Building Giant Dams’, BBC, 15
mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/ October 2015, https://www.bbc.com/future/
Understanding-Mekong-River-hydrological- article/20151014-the-chinese-are-obsessed-with-
conditions_2020.pdf. building-giant-dams.
17 See Mekong Dam Monitor, http://monitor. 28 Eyler, Last Days of the Mighty Mekong, chapter 3.
mekongwater.org. 29 Darrin Magee, ‘Powershed Politics:
18 G.M Kondolf et al., ‘Changing Sediment Yunnan Hydropower Under Great Western
Budget of the Mekong: Cumulative Threats Development’, China Quarterly, vol. 185, March
and Management Strategies for a Large River 2006, pp. 23–41.
Basin’, Science of The Total Environment, vol. 30 Eyler, Last Days of the Mighty Mekong, chapter 3.
625, pp. 114–34, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scito- 31 ‘Renewable Energy in China’s 14th Five-Year
tenv.2017.11.361. Plan: Five Changes’, Energy Iceberg, 24 March
19 Nam Nguyen, ‘China’s Water Unlikely to Slake 2021, https://energyiceberg.com/14th-fyp-renew-
Vietnam’s Thirst’, RFA Vietnam, 23 March 2016, able-changes/.
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/ 32 See, for example, Vantha Phuong, ‘Mekong
chinas-water-unlikely-to-slake-vietnams- River Commission Calls for More Transparency
thirst-03232016154743.html. Among Members and China’, Thmey Themy, 22
20 See ‘Operating Curves/Time Series’ under April 2020, https://cambodianess.com/article/
‘Virtual Gauges’ at Mekong Dam Monitor, mekong-river-commission-calls-for-more-
https://monitor.mekongwater.org/virtu- transparency-among-members-and-chinal;
al-gauges/. Kay Johnson and Panu Wongcha-um, ‘Mekong
21 Mekong Dam Monitor, https://monitor.mekong- River at “Worrying” Low Level Amid Calls for
water.org/virtual-gauges/. See operating curves More Chinese Dam Data’, Reuters, 12 February
for major season dams in the Mekong to see 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-me-
consistent patterns of dry-season releases and kong-river-idUSKBN2AC0K0; Mekong River
wet-season restrictions from 2016 to the present. Commission, ‘Understanding the Mekong
22 Brian Eyler et al., “Mekong Dam Monitor at One River’s Hydrological Conditions’; Eugene
Year: What Have We Learned?” Stimson Center, Whong, ‘Mekong River Commission Urges
5 March 2022, https://www.stimson.org/2022/ More Data Sharing Amid Low Water Levels in
mdm-one-year-findings/. Lower Mekong’, Radio Free Asia, 7 August 2020,
23 Marko Kallio and Matti Kummu, ‘Comment https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/
on “Changes of Inundation Area and Water mrc-08072020175825.html; and ‘Mekong
Turbidity of Tonle Sap Lake: Responses River Group Urges More Data Sharing on
to Climate Changes or Upstream Dam Hydropower Operations’, Reuters, 30 June 2021,
Construction?”’, Environmental Research Letters, https://www.reuters.com/article/mekong-river/
vol. 16, no. 5, May 2021. mekong-river-group-urges-more-data-shar-
24 Luke Hunt, ‘Amid Drought and Flooding, ing-on-hydropower-operations-idUSL-
Cambodia Fish Catches, Exports Fall 3N2OC1XP.
Precipitously’, Diplomat, 21 October 33 Richard Cronin, ‘There’s Still Hope for the
2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/ Mekong’, Bangkok Post, 11 January 2021, https://
amid-drought-and-flooding-cambodi- www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2048887/
an-fish-catches-exports-fall-precipitously/. theres-still-hope-for-the-mekong.
25 Ngoc Tai, ‘Absence of Seasonal Flooding Washes 34 This analysis can be determined by use of the
Away Mekong Delta Livelihoods’, VNExpress, Mekong Dam Monitor and access to dam spec-
ifications there. See Mekong Dam Monitor, Vietnam. In 2020, the LMI was rebranded as the
https://monitor.mekongwater.org/virtu- Mekong–US Partnership (MUSP).
al-gauges/. 45 See G. John Ikenberry and Darren Lim,
35 For example, see Keith Zhai and Kay Johnson, ‘China’s Emerging Institutional Statecraft: The
‘Exclusive: Taking Power: Chinese Firm to Run Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the
Laos Electric Grid Amid Default Warnings’, Prospects for Counter-hegemony’, Brookings
Reuters, 4 September 2020, https://www. Institution, April 2017, https://www.brookings.
reuters.com/article/us-china-laos-exclusive/ edu/research/chinas-emerging-institution-
exclusive-taking-power-chinese-firm-to- al-statecraft/.
run-laos-electric-grid-amid-default-warn- 46 Lancang–Mekong Cooperation, http://www.
ings-idUSKBN25V14C?edition-redirect=uk; lmcchina.org/eng/.
Murray Hiebert, ‘Rappler Talk: Murray 47 ‘Wang Yi: LMC Should Not Be a Superb Talking
Hiebert on China’s Relationship with Shop But a Grounded Bulldozer’, Ministry of
Southeast Asia’, Rappler, 20 October 2020, Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3s5N- (PRC), 24 July 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
NXv0Uc; and ‘China Defends Cambodia mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1480129.shtml.
Relations after US Expresses Concern’, AP 48 Zhang Li, ‘Regionalization or
News, 3 June 2021, https://apnews.com/article/ Internationalization? Different Types of Water
cambodia-china-government-and-politics-f381f- Multilateralism by China and the United States
6c7d63556ca52ce3c5fbdb5765d. in the Mekong Subregion’ Asia Policy, vol. 17,
36 Jim Glassman, ‘Turning Battlefields into no. 2, (April 2022), pp. 14–20.
Marketplace-Battlefields’, in Glassman, Bounding 49 Bertil Lintner, ‘US, China Dueling for Power
the Mekong: The Asian Development Bank, China, on the Mekong’, Asia Times, 5 September 2021,
and Thailand (Honolulu: University of Hawaii https://asiatimes.com/2021/09/us-china-dueling-
Press, 2010), pp. 64–98. for-power-on-the-mekong/.
37 For a comprehensive overview of China’s 50 ‘Lancang-Mekong River Cooperation: Why
regional rise from 1990–2006, see Joshua Has China Built Hydropower Plants Along the
Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive (New Haven, CT: Lancang River’, CGTN, 16 July 2020, https://
Yale University Press, 2008). news.cgtn.com/news/3351544f30514464776c-
38 Eyler, Last Days of the Mighty Mekong, chapter 7. 6d636a4e6e62684a4856/index.html.
39 See ‘State of Southeast Asia Survey’, ISEAS 51 See dam engineering specifications and blue-
Yusof-Isak Institute, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/ prints on the Mekong Dam Monitor, http://
category/articles-commentaries/state-of-south- monitor.mekongwater.org.
east-asia-survey/. 52 ‘Flood and Drought’, Mekong River
40 Guy Ziv et al., ‘Trading-off Fish Biodiversity, Commission, https://www.mrcmekong.org/
Food Security, and Hydropower in the Mekong our-work/topics/flood-and-drought/.
River Basin’, Proceedings of the National Academy 53 For context, see ‘2nd Lancang–Mekong
of Sciences, vol. 109, no. 15, 10 April 2012, p. 5609, Water Resources Cooperation Forum’,
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1201423109. December 2021, http://www.lmcwater.org.cn/
41 ‘Mekong Infrastructure Tracker Dashboard’. cooperative_achievements/major_events/forum_
42 Such as China’s EXIM Bank or the China lmwrc_2021/.
Development Bank. 54 Pai Deetes, ‘Victory on the Upper Mekong:
43 Keith Zhai and Kay Johnson, ‘Exclusive: Taking Thai Cabinet Terminates Rapids Blasting
Power - Chinese Firm to Run Laos Electric Grid Project’, International Rivers, 6 February 2020,
Amid Default Warnings’, Reuters, 4 September https://www.internationalrivers.org/news/
2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chi- blog-victory-on-the-upper-mekong-thai-cab-
na-laos-exclusive-idUSKBN25V14C. inet-terminates-rapids-blasting-project/;
44 The Lower Mekong Initiative was established in and ‘The Visit of H.E. Mr. Wang Yi, State
2009 by the US Department of State. It was the Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of
United States’ flagship regional policy frame- the People’s Republic of China, to Thailand’,
work in mainland Southeast Asia, involving Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and February 2019, https://www.mfa.go.th/en/
content/5d5bd21715e39c3060027d92?cate=5d5b- 65 Comparing the upstream in China to the down-

cb4e15e39c306000683c. stream, each has about 24 km3 of cumulative
55 Sebastian Biba, ‘Desecuritization in China’s active storage. See Mekong Dam Monitor, https://
Behavior Towards Its Transboundary Rivers: monitor.mekongwater.org/virtual-gauges/.
The Mekong River, the Brahmaputra River, and 66 For context, see Hoang Thi Ha and Farah
the Irtysh and Ili Rivers’, Journal of Contemporary Nadine, ‘The Mekong River Ecosystem in
China, vol. 23, no. 85, 2014, pp. 21–43. Crisis: ASEAN Cannot Be a Bystander’,
56 Carl Middleton, ‘Beyond Water Data Sharing, ISEAS Yusof-Ishak Institute, Perspective,
Mekong-Lancang River Needs Accountable no. 69, May 2021, https://www.google.com/
Water Governance’, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&-
27 November 2020, https://th.boell.org/ cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiax-
en/2020/11/27/mekong-lancang-river-needs-ac- KaS-rH0AhWBpXIEHeW-BrwQFnoE-
countable-water-governance. CAkQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.
57 Phuong, ‘Mekong River Commission Calls iseas.edu.sg%2Fwp-content%-
for More Transparency Among Members and 2Fuploads%2F2021%2F04%2FI-
China’; Johnson and Wongcha-um, ‘Mekong SEAS_Perspective_2021_69.
River at “Worrying” Low Level Amid Calls pdf&usg=AOvVaw2h1JMF622Mam-
for More Chinese Dam Data’; Mekong River 61m5wOYc5G.
Commission, ‘Understanding the Mekong 67 Examples include the waning resource allo-
River’s Hydrological Conditions’; Whong, cations for the United States’ Lower Mekong
‘Mekong River Commission Urges More Data Initiative, Australia’s Water Partnership and
Sharing Amid Low Water Levels in Lower formerly robust support from the government
Mekong’; and ‘Mekong River Group Urges of Finland. Mekong programming by major
More Data Sharing on Hydropower Operations’. NGOs or IOs, such as the International Union for
58 http://www.lmcwater.org.cn/. Conservation of Nature, World Wide Fund for
59 See ‘Alerts and Advisories’, Mekong Dam Nature and Oxfam, also declined. Major funding
Monitor, 8 June 2021, https://www.stimson. support from foundations such as the MacArthur
org/2021/mekong-dam-monitor-alerts-and-ad- Foundation and the McKnight Foundation also
visories/. concluded within the last six years.
60 Sebastian Strangio, ‘China Belatedly Notifies 68 For example, see Stephen Wright, ‘Mekong
Mekong Nations of River Disruption’, Effort Fails after Years of Lavish Foreign
Diplomat, 8 January 2020, https://thediplomat. Funding’, AP News, 19 October 2016,
com/2021/01/china-belatedly-notifies-me- https://apnews.com/article/31978ed-
kong-nations-of-river-disruption/. 8726449dca8ba47c62816137a.
61 Confirmed through author’s internal discussions 69 See ‘About’, MUSP, https://mekonguspartner-
with MRC staff. ship.org/about/.
62 Peter Zsombor, ‘China Joins Lower Mekong 70 ‘Pompeo Again Slams Chinese “Aggression,”
River Countries to Study Impacts of Climate Says US Is Committed to SE Asia’, Radio
Change and Dams’, VOA News, 24 September Free Asia, 11 September 2020, https://
2021, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-joins- www.rfa.org/english/news/china/asean-
lower-mekong-river-countries-to-study-impacts- pompeo-09112020195514.html.
of-climate-change-dams-/6244149.html. 71 ‘Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink’s Keynote
63 Apinya Wipatayotin, ‘Thai Government Address for the Mekong–U.S. Partnership
Threatens to Veto New Lao Dam’, Bangkok Post, Track 1.5 Policy Dialogue on Infrastructure
12 December 2020, https://www.bangkokpost. and Energy’, Stimson Center, 27 October
com/thailand/general/2034151/thai-govt-threat- 2021, https://www.stimson.org/2021/
ens-to-veto-new-lao-dam. assistant-secretary-kritenbrinks-keynote-ad-
64 ‘Mekong River’s Blue Hue Blamed on Upstream dress-for-the-partnership-policy-dialogue-on-in-
Outflow Restrictions, Decreased Rainfall’, frastructure-and-energy/.
Benar News, 12 February 2021, https://www. 72 See ‘Mekong–U.S. Partnership Plan of Action
benarnews.org/english/news/thai/mekong-up- 2021–2023’, MUSP, https://mekonguspartner-
date-02122021165834.html. ship.org/about/plan-of-action/.
73 ‘MRC Secretariat CEO Urges Deeper 75 Press Trust India, ‘Mekong Region Is of Great
Engagement During Friends of the Mekong Importance to India: EAM Jaishankar’, Hindu,
Ministerial Meeting’, Mekong River 22 July 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/news/
Commission, 9 August 2021, https://www. national/mekong-region-is-of-great-importance-
mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/ to-india-eam-jaishankar/article35457770.ece.
pr-20210809/. 76 ‘Japan–U.S.–Mekong Power
74 ‘Mekong–Australia Partnership’, Australian Partnership (JUMPP)’, MUSP, https://
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, mekonguspartnership.org/projects/
https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/southeast-asia/ japan-us-mekong-power-partnership/.
investing-our-southeast-asian-partnerships/ 77 ‘Republic of Korea’, MUSP, https://mekongus-
mekong-australia-partnership. partnership.org/partners/republic-of-korea/.
CHINA AS AN UPSTREAM RIPARIAN STATE: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA 273
CHAPTER 12
THE CLIMATE
CRISIS AND ASIA-
PACIFIC SECURITY
DR JEFFREY MAZO
Dr Jeffrey Mazo is Associate Fellow, Conflict, Security and

Development at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
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The world is on track to warm by 2.1–2.7°C over pre-

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industrial levels by the end of the century. The Asia-Pacific

is both highly exposed and vulnerable to the resulting climate
changes, which are expected to slow down economic growth and contribute to food, water
and energy insecurity, affect military activities and infrastructure, and lead to a systemic
breakdown of critical services in some countries.
HUMAN SECURITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK

The impacts of climate change will not generally be distributed equally: they will disproportionally
affect poorer or marginalised states and communities. Increased inequality may create instability
within states or change the power balance between them.
REGIONAL SECURITY AND TRANSBOUNDARY ISSUES

Climate change in the Asia-Pacific may delay anticipated shifts in the balance of military and economic
power and exacerbate existing inequalities between developed and developing economies. Regional
flashpoints and transboundary issues at particular risk include the Korean Peninsula, India–Pakistan
water disputes, the Mekong basin, the South China Sea and changing patterns of trade.
MITIGATION, ADAPTATION AND SECURITY

The degree to which regional powers commit to emissions reductions and international
adaptation efforts, and meet those commitments, will also have implications for soft power and
regional leadership.
In August 2021, the United Nations’ A bushfire near Bumbalong, 64 km south of Canberra, Australia, 1 February 2020
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC) released the first volume
of its long-awaited Sixth Assessment
Report on the science of past and projected
warming, announcing that climate change
was now ‘widespread, rapid, and inten-
sifying’. Even with strong and sustained
reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions, it
could take 20–30 years for temperatures to
stabilise.1 UN Secretary-General António
Guterres, who in 2020 called on all national
governments to declare a state of climate
emergency, called the report a ‘code red for
humanity’.2 The world has already warmed
(Rick Rycroft/AP Photo)
by 1.2°C since the pre-industrial period and
is on track to warm by 2.1–2.7°C by the end of the century, even with the agreements
reached at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) summit
in Glasgow in November 2021 (COP26).3 In scenarios where emissions continue to
rise until 2050 – resulting from failure to meet or deliberate backsliding on national
commitments to greenhouse-gas reductions – warming could reach a near-catastrophic
4°C or more by 2100.4
Regardless of current global efforts to curb greenhouse-gas emissions, global mean
temperature will definitely continue to increase over the next few decades and the degree
of climate risk will increase in direct proportion.5 Increasing climate hazards can, sepa-
rately and together, drive systemic breakdown of infrastructure and critical services; food
and water insecurity; loss of livelihoods and income, particularly for poorer populations;
severe ill health; loss of biodiversity; and reduction in the economic benefits provided by
healthy ecosystems.6 Climate change is expected to slow down economic growth, making
poverty reduction more difficult and further eroding food security.7
The Asia-Pacific is both highly exposed and vulnerable to particular climate hazards,
especially droughts and floods (including sea-level rise), heat extremes and tropical
cyclones.8 In the Climate Risk Index 2000–2019, a measure of the human and economic
impact of extreme weather-related events over that period, six of the top ten and 11 of the
top 20 most affected countries are in the Asia-Pacific.9 Over 330 million people (including
120m in China alone) live in places subject to long-term sea-level rise that is already ‘locked
in’ due to past emissions, and population and emissions growth will only increase the
risk. More than one-quarter of the populations of Bangladesh, Thailand and Vietnam
is currently exposed. Small island states in the Pacific and Indian oceans and coastal
megacities in China, South and Southeast Asia are at particular risk.10 At the same time,
Notre Dame University’s Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) Country Index has
identified Singapore as the second-most prepared to adapt to climate change worldwide,
followed closely by South Korea (in seventh place), Japan (ninth), New Zealand (tenth) and
THE CLIMATE CRISIS AND ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY 277
Table 12.1: Projected climate changes in the Asia-Pacific by 2050
Southeast
Southern
Northern
Australia
Australia
Australia
Australia
East Asia
Zealand
Far East
Russian
Tibetan
Plateau
Eastern
Central
Islands
Pacific
South
New
Asia
Asia
Mean temperature ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Extreme heat ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Cold spells ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Sea-level rise ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Coastal flooding, erosion
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
and marine heatwaves
River flooding ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Frost ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓
↔
↔
Mean precipitation
Fire weather ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Snow cover, glaciers,
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
sea and river ice
Landslides ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
↔
Aridity
Heavy precipitation
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
and flooding
Sand and dust storms ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
↓
↔
↔
Tropical cyclones
Mean wind speed ↓ ↓ ↓
Drought ↑ ↑ ↑
Heavy snowfall and
↑ ↑
ice storms
↑ = increase = increase in some parts, decrease in others Already occurring Medium- and high-emissions scenarios
↓ = decrease = increased intensity but decreased frequency High-emissions scenarios only Empty cells = no significant change
Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, www.ipcc.ch
Australia (11th). Overall, measuring both vulnerability and readiness to adapt, 22 out of 33
Asia-Pacific countries rank in the bottom 50% globally.11
The security implications of climate change, especially its role as a multiplier of existing
stresses, threats and risks, have been widely recognised for at least a decade and a half.12
A 2021 survey of 57 global climate-security experts revealed a consensus that the risk
from climate-change-exacerbated events that affect global security will become severe
within the next 20 years.13 Moreover, mitigating climate change carries risks of its own.
Limiting global warming to 1.5°C – the aspiration of the 2015 Paris Agreement – by
achieving net-zero emissions by mid-century will require large investments and rapid and
drastic changes to lifestyles, which could increase inequality within and among nations
and at the very least be highly socially disruptive.
The precise impacts of climate change in the next few decades remain uncertain. But
evidence that recent changes are real and caused by human activity is increasingly strong.
Moreover, statistical confidence in climate-change projections has been steadily improving,
especially at the regional level.14 Since the 1950s, heatwaves and temperature extremes
have unambiguously increased in the Asia-Pacific due to greenhouse-gas emissions, but
there is less certainty that other observed trends, such as increased extreme precipita-
tion and fewer but more intense cyclones and typhoons (and a general northward shift,
towards northern China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula, in their occurrence), are due to
human activity. Over a timescale of up to three decades, normal year-to-year variation in
weather and climate can mask all but the strongest and most robust underlying trends.
Nevertheless, events such as Typhoon Haiyan (one of the largest and strongest tropical
cyclones on record, which struck the Philippines in November 2013) and the 2019–20
Australian bushfires (which destroyed millions of hectares and nearly 6,000 buildings) are
widely considered to be harbingers of climate change.15
The IPCC report released in August 2021 contained fine-grained assessments of regional
and sub-regional climate changes (see Table 12.1).16 The changes projected for the region are
likely to strongly affect food, water and energy security, economic development, military
activities and infrastructure, which will in turn influence all aspects of regional security.
HUMAN SECURITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK

Food, water and energy security are inextricably linked, and both the short- and long-term
climate changes projected for the Asia-Pacific are risk multipliers for all three compo-
nents of this nexus.17 After a half-century of rapid economic growth, the Asia-Pacific now
accounts for more than half of global energy consumption and an even greater proportion
of resources, although it still lags behind most of the world in per capita use.18 These growth
and resource-use trends are expected to Women and children wait for drought relief outside a state-run
continue for several decades.19 Water insecu- distribution centre in Sindh province, southern Pakistan, 12 March 2014
rity in the Asia-Pacific is generally due to lack

of storage and transport infrastructure rather
than absolute unavailability, but improving
access to water requires greater energy
consumption, while large volumes of water
are needed not just for oil production but
especially for hydraulic fracturing (fracking),
nuclear power and biofuel production.20 This
reality constrains the potential for domestic
renewable and carbon-neutral energy produc-
tion other than solar or wind power.21 And
water in turn is essential for agriculture; as
(Rizwan Tabassum/AFP via Getty Images)
the demand for food rises due to population Figure 12.1: Asia-Pacific countries’ climate-change resilience, and the
growth (at least to mid-century) and rising
extent to which this differs from resilience expected based on GDP
per capita, 2019
incomes, so too will water stress.
Climate change will be a mixed blessing
High
for the region in terms of water security: resilience
overall, freshwater availability may increase,

but changes in precipitation patterns could New Zealand
Singapore
reduce the productive capacity of rain-fed Australia
South Korea
agriculture and heat stress could reduce Japan
agricultural productivity, both requiring

increased water withdrawals. Salinisation
of partially depleted coastal aquifers
ND-GAIN
may reduce water availability for coastal SCORES
Brunei
megacities. All these factors, coupled with Malaysia China
uncertainty about geography and timing,

Mongolia
will make the already pressing need for Thailand
increased and improved storage and irri- Fiji
gation infrastructure even more urgent and Bhutan Samoa

Maldives Indonesia
Vietnam
more difficult to meet. Integrated water, food Sri Lanka
Nepal
and energy management planning is key to Philippines Timor-Leste
India Solomon Islands
meeting the climate-security challenge. Tonga Pakistan
New Zealand
Laos Vanuatu
National rankings in the ND-GAIN
Cambodia Federated States of Micronesia
Country Index – which measures countries’ Myanmar
Papua New Guinea
Bangladesh
exposure, sensitivity and ability to adapt to
Afghanistan Low
climate change in the areas of food, water, resilience
health, ecosystem services, human habitat
Less resilience DIFFERENCE FROM SCORE EXPECTED More resilience
and infrastructure, as well as their economic, than expected BASED ON PER-CAPITA GDP than expected
governmental and social readiness to adapt
– strongly correlate globally to per capita
GDP, suggesting that a country’s relative wealth is one of the most important indications Example: Singapore and New Zealand
are both equally highly resilient but
of its ability to adapt to climate change. Among the Asia-Pacific countries included in Singapore’s per capita GDP is much higher.
the ranking, Singapore and Brunei stand out: both are much more vulnerable to climate Therefore, Singapore’s high resilience is
lower than expected given its GDP, while
change than their wealth would suggest (see Figure 12.1). This is primarily due to low New Zealand’s high resilience is higher
energy security, both in terms of self-sufficiency (for Singapore) and diversity of supply than expected given its lower GDP.
Note: No data available for Kiribati,
(for both).22 Some countries, such as Australia and Japan, may be particularly exposed to
Marshall Islands, Nauru, North Korea,
certain climate hazards, but are well positioned to deal with their consequences. The cost Palau and Tuvalu.
of adaptation, however, rises with increased temperature, and not necessarily in a linear Source: Notre Dame Global Adaptation
Initiative Country Index, gain.nd.edu/
way, so such countries face increasing and accelerating costs. Moreover, if warming does
our-work/country-index/rankings
eventually exceed their capacity to cope, they have much more to lose.
In general, the impacts of climate change will not be distributed equally across or within
countries: they will disproportionally affect poorer or marginalised states and communi-
ties. Increased inequality may in turn create instability within states, or change the power
balance between them. For the most part, given the complex nexus between water, food
and energy and the unpredictable nature of Figure 12.2: Relative contribution of vulnerability to climate change
climate change, the risk is best perceived as a
and readiness to improve resilience to Asia-Pacific countries’ overall
climate-change resilience, 2019
general systemic weakening, especially in the
shorter term, and Asia-Pacific states will all
Higher readiness to
READINESS
face broadly similar challenges. Beyond the improve resilience
common threats faced by many or most coun-

Singapore
tries in the region, there are some particularly
salient climate risks for individual countries
South Korea New
or sets of countries (see Map 12.1): Japan Zealand
Australia
Particular water-security ‘hotspots’ iden-
tified by the UN Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific in
2011 include Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,
Papua New Guinea and Philippines,
China
and secondarily India, Myanmar and Brunei
VULNERABILITY Malaysia
Thailand.23 It is notable that, with the Bhutan Thailand
Mongolia
exception of India and Papua New Fiji
Maldives Samoa
Guinea, these are all in Southeast Asia, Solomon Islands Vietnam
Tonga Sri Lanka
which is water-rich in absolute terms. But Timor-Leste Indonesia
Federated States Vanuatu India
of Micronesia
most countries in the sub-region are also Nepal North Korea
Laos Philippines
particularly exposed to climate hazards
Cambodia Pakistan
and lacking in infrastructure for access to Bangladesh Papua New Guinea
Myanmar
clean water and sanitation.24 Afghanistan
Lower readiness to
improve resilience
Increased precipitation and glacial and
More vulnerable Less vulnerable
permafrost melting but declining snow- to climate change to climate change
fall and overall glacial volume on the
Tibetan Plateau will alter the geograph-
ical and seasonal patterns of drought.25 Over two billion people rely on water from the Example: Singapore has higher economic,
governance and social readiness to improve
ten major river systems fed by the plateau. While the total amount of this water may not resilience than New Zealand does, but it
decline, major investments in dams and other infrastructure will be needed to ensure it is more vulnerable to climate change in
terms of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive
is available when and where needed. capacity. Therefore, readiness contributes
By 2050, prices for irrigated crops in the region could rise in real terms by up to 37% for more than vulnerability to Singapore’s
overall resilience score (see y-axis of Figure
rice, 49% for soybeans, 97% for wheat and 102% for maize due to lower yields.26 South 12.1), and vice versa for New Zealand.
Asia and much of Southeast Asia are particular food-security hotspots.27 Note: No data available for Kiribati,
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu.
China’s megacities face major threats to human health, economic productivity and
Source: Notre Dame Global Adaptation
energy demand due to increased heat stress, compounded by the ‘urban heat island’ Initiative Country Index, gain.nd.edu/
effect.28 Other urban ‘hotspot areas of risk’ include Dhaka, Karachi, Quezon City and our-work/country-index/rankings
Bangkok.29 Most Asian megacities, including Manila and Ho Chi Minh City, also face
the compound risk from sea-level rise.30
Of the world’s population currently living in areas that by 2050 are expected to be
subject to annual coastal flooding due to sea-level rise, roughly three-quarters is in
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam. Bangladesh, Thailand and
Vietnam are at particular risk in terms of the percentage of their populations exposed.31
Map 12.1: Climate-security hotspots in the Asia-Pacific
RUSSIA
MONGOLIA
NORTH KOREA
SOUTH
KOREA JAPAN
AFGHANISTAN
CHINA
PAKISTAN
NEPAL
BHUTAN
BANGLADESH
INDIA
MYANMAR
LAOS
VIETNAM
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
PHILIPPINES
Philippines
SRI LANKA BRUNEI

MALAYSIA
SINGAPORE
INDONESIA
PAPUA
NEW
GUINEA
TIMOR-LESTE
Water insecurity
AUSTRALIA
Food insecurity
Energy insecurity
Coastal flooding
Urban heat stress
Wildfires
Source: IISS
©IISS
NEW ZEALAND
)
to
o
Ph
AP
s/
ith
Sin
g
en
(H
Workers place geotextile bags to
prevent erosion on the banks of the
Padma River in Manikganj District near
Dhaka, Bangladesh, 20 September 2021
Two other categories of risk stand out as separate from the water–food–energy–climate
nexus. Firstly, in terms of traditional security, increasing disaster risks, including the risk
of complex, overlapping crises, will put considerable strain on regional armed forces’
capacities for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). Militaries are integral to
HADR across South and Southeast Asia and their role is increasing in Australia, China and
Japan.32 Secondly, geophysical changes outside the region, in particular the opening of new
maritime routes in the Arctic, could have considerable economic impacts on Asia-Pacific
countries and affect patterns of trade within and between them.33
The aggregate effect of all these trends and vulnerabilities can be seen in the projected
economic impact of climate change as a percentage of GDP in a world that is on the way
to a warming of 3°C – slightly higher than the current trajectory (see Figure 12.3). These
impacts include not just the direct costs (in terms of damage from extreme weather, lost
workdays, etc.) but also the cost of adaptation. The OECD countries are thus projected to
suffer less damage in percentage terms, since they are more resilient. (Of course, since they
are wealthier, they may lose more in absolute terms.) This reaffirms that Southeast Asia
and India are at particular risk, comparable only to sub-Saharan Africa at the global level.34
REGIONAL SECURITY AND TRANSBOUNDARY ISSUES

The varying impacts of climate change in different Asia-Pacific states could affect
the geopolitics of the region. The comparatively high economic impact on India, for
example, could slow or reverse a widening economic gap with Pakistan that has weak-
ened Islamabad diplomatically and militarily vis-à-vis New Delhi.35 It could similarly
reduce India’s burgeoning role in regional security as part of the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue (‘Quad’) with Australia, Japan and the United States and leave it at a consider-
able disadvantage compared to China. The comparatively high impact on Taiwan could
Figure 12.3: Selected Asia-Pacific countries’ projected GDP losses, for scenarios leading to 3°C warming by 2100
Philippines
Indonesia
Malaysia
Cambodia
Sri Lanka
Singapore
Laos
India
Thailand
Vietnam
Bangladesh
Pakistan GDP lost in 2100 for scenarios
Nepal leading to only 2°C (rather
Brunei than 3°C) warming
China 2027
Mongolia 2037
South Korea 2047
Japan 2067
Australia 2100
New Zealand
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
% of GDP lost (compared to projected annual GDP in the years indicated in a hypothetical world with no climate change)
Source: Tom Kompas, Pham Van Ha and Tuong Nhu Che, ‘The Effects of Climate Change on GDP by Country and the Global Economic Gains from Complying with the Paris Climate Accord’, Earth’s Future, vol. 6, no. 8, August 2018, Tables 1 and 2
weaken its capacity to resist Chinese pressure for reunification. The particularly dispro-
portionate impact of climate change on Southeast Asia could weaken the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN’s) efforts towards building greater sub-regional cohe-
sion and more robust institutions. The relatively modest impact on China is still significant
in comparison to the OECD states and could slow China’s rise in relation to many of its
regional and global rivals (see Table 12.2). Other things being equal, the net effect of climate
change in the Asia-Pacific in the short, medium and long term will be to delay anticipated
shifts in the balance of military and economic power and exacerbate existing inequalities
between developed and developing economies.
Beyond these broad trends, regional flashpoints and transboundary issues that could
be affected by climate change include the Korean Peninsula, India–Pakistan water disputes,
the Mekong basin, the South China Sea and changing patterns of trade. The latter will be
affected not just by geophysical changes but also by global efforts to mitigate climate change,
particularly the movement to achieve net-zero carbon by mid-century, as trade in hydro-
carbons gradually declines.36 The degree to which regional powers commit themselves to
emissions reductions and international adaptation efforts, and meet those commitments,
will also have implications for their soft power and regional leadership prospects.
The Korean Peninsula

North Korea suffers from high food insecurity due to mismanagement, deliberate govern-
ment policies, international sanctions, a shortage of domestic resources and, most recently,
self-imposed COVID-19-related border restrictions. The government declared food emer-
gencies in 2017 and 2018 due to low production, and in April 2021 leader Kim Jong-un
warned that the country could be facing a repeat of the Arduous March – a major famine
that may have caused over 2m deaths in the period 1994–98 – beginning in 2022.37
Table 12.2: Potential economic damage from climate change to the Chinese, Indian
and selected advanced economies, assuming 3°C warming by 2100
2019 GDP 2027 2047 2100

growth rate (%)
China 5.95 -0.21 -0.69 -2.92
India 4.04 -1.02 -3.22 -10.35
US 2.28 -0.02 -0.07 -0.62
Japan 0.01 -0.04 -0.17 -0.36
South Korea 2.24 -0.03 -0.14 -1.50
Australia 1.91 -0.05 -0.17 -1.34
New Zealand 2.42 +0.04 +0.09 -0.80

Figures for 2027, 2047 and 2100 are the projected percentage losses (or gains) in annual GDP for those years compared to a world with no climate change.
Sources: IISS, Military Balance+, milbalplus.iiss.org; and Tom Kompas, Pham Van Ha and Tuong Nhu Che ‘The Effects of Climate Change on GDP by Country and the Global Economic Gains from Complying
with the Paris Climate Accord’, Earth’s Future, vol. 6, no. 8, August 2018, Table 1
Climate change threatens to make such crises more frequent and more severe, posing
risks to the Pyongyang regime’s stability, or even survival.38 Heatwaves, extreme precipi-
tation events and intense storms are likely to increase in the medium term, damaging food
production and transport infrastructure, and flooding densely inhabited areas.39 Increasing
flood risk could negatively affect inter-Korean relations as Pyongyang ramps up unan-
nounced dam releases, causing flooding in South Korea, and a spike in climate refugees
into China could strain Pyongyang’s vital relations with Beijing.40
North Korea stands out in the region as the most likely location for an acute climate-
change-related event (rather than an increase in systemic stress) that could spark a major
crisis or outbreak of armed conflict. With the risk already relatively high, it would not take
much to tip the balance. The contribution of drought and climate change to the outbreak of
the Syrian civil war a decade ago offers a good analogy.41
The Indus basin

Pakistan gets about 90% of its agricultural water from the Indus River, most of which flows
first through India and is subject to the 1960 bilateral Indus Waters Treaty (IWT).42 The
IWT reserves about 80% of the total flow for Pakistan and 20% for India; the water from the
western tributaries is reserved for Pakistan, with some exceptions, while India is allocated
the eastern tributaries. Since the treaty was signed, flow in the river system has declined
by at least 5%.43 The future of the basin is highly uncertain, with projections ranging from
moderate increases to significant decreases in flow by the end of the century.
Transboundary water-sharing agreements are generally stabilising factors: the IWT –
with the World Bank acting as facilitator with limited enforcement powers – has survived
three wars between its parties and, on balance, has contributed to reducing tensions in the
fraught Kashmir region. Over the last decade, however, there have been increasing calls on
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ag
y Im
ett
ia G
sv
e
ag
Im
tty
/G e
be
lo
alG
git
(D i
Before-and-after satellite images showing

Chinese construction on Fiery Cross Reef in the
South China Sea, 31 May 2014 and 3 June 2016
both sides for renegotiation as the demand for water increases due to population growth
and development, and as the prospect of climate change on the Tibetan Plateau threatens
to change the timing and volume of flow in the Indus basin.
New Delhi considered, at least rhetorically, unilaterally withdrawing from the IWT in
2016 and again in 2019 after attacks by the Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaysh-e-Mohammad
against Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir. Islamabad responded that any such move
would be ‘an act of war’.44 Before the Taliban takeover in August 2021, India was also funding
dam projects in Afghanistan which would affect downstream supplies for Pakistan without
contravening the IWT. But the potential for India to use water as a weapon has never substan-
tially materialised despite having always been there. A more likely scenario is one in which
India decides it needs more than its agreed share of Indus waters for its own use in response
to declines in other sources, rather than as a weapon. As with the Korean Peninsula, the risk
of crisis is already high, but here it is longer-term systemic stresses from climate change
rather than specific events that may increase the risk further.45
The Mekong basin

Like the Indus, the Mekong River arises on the Tibetan Plateau. In the previous chapter
in this volume, Brian Eyler documents the effect of China’s programme of building dams
on the upper Mekong in Yunnan Province on the food, water and economic security of
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, all of which rely to a great extent on the Mekong’s
natural resources. This effect is mainly due to how China’s water-management practices
interfere with the seasonal flow patterns of the river by reducing the annual wet-season
flood pulse. This is particularly important in years of lower-than-average annual flows,
which have been occurring more and more frequently and becoming more severe over the
past few decades due to declining precipitation.
Other things being equal, climate change is expected to bring increased annual precip-
itation to the Mekong basin. The volume and duration of flooding in the lower Mekong
are expected to rise on average, but increased variability from year to year may mean the
existing trend towards more frequent and severe droughts will continue. Water insecurity
will be further worsened by saltwater intrusion into the Mekong delta due to sea-level rise
and subsidence from groundwater extraction. On balance, the impacts of climate change
on water security will be similar to, but less severe than, those caused by China’s hydro-
power dams.46 Climate change will thus increase the salience, but not change the nature, of
the political and diplomatic issues surrounding water availability and management in the
Mekong basin outlined by Eyler in his chapter.
The South China Sea

China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam maintain more than 90 outposts on
nearly 70 low-lying islands and features in the South China Sea.47 Many of these features
are on reclaimed land: China in particular has converted submerged or partially submerged
features, or uninhabitable rocks, into artificial islands. The other four occupants have had
small airstrips in the Spratly Islands for at least ten years, and in some cases for three or
four decades. Beginning in 2014, however, China established airstrips, missile emplace-
ments, significant radar and communications infrastructure and storage facilities on its
‘big three’ – Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef – which together now comprise
more than 1,200 hectares of reclaimed land. Smaller features house fortifications, helipads
and other facilities established by several
of the rival claimants.
(P
et
er
Sw
ar
ze
n sk
i/U
.S.
Ge
ol
og
ica
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ur
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)y
Flooding on Roi-Namur island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, March 2014

These features and facilities have strategic significance in terms of asserting territorial
claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) over the disputed oil-
and gas-rich seabed, and in terms of power projection. But the smaller features are highly
vulnerable to sea-level rise, and even the largest will be increasingly at risk from storm
surges and coastal erosion due to climate change. In 2015, for example, a typhoon washed
away the land that had been recently reclaimed by Vietnam on Cornwallis South Reef.48
The cost of maintaining the artificial islands and their facilities and of extracting any hydro-
carbon resources will rise considerably, while the importance of those resources could
decline rapidly if the world moves towards the UN target of net-zero carbon emissions by
mid-century. Sea-level rise could also slow or reverse the establishment and expansion of
freshwater reservoirs on the artificial islands, such as the one discovered on Fiery Cross
Reef in 2020, which could affect the status of the islands under UNCLOS.
Such climate considerations are unlikely to affect the likelihood of acute crises or
military confrontation in the South China Sea noticeably, but they will affect strategic
risk–benefit calculations, especially by China, in the medium term. If countries decide
that assertion of their maritime claims remains critical for other than economic reasons,
acceleration or expansion of land reclamation in response to climate change could
increase tensions. Rival claimants could, however, calculate that declining demand for
oil and gas over the next few decades and the increasing cost of asserting their claims
argue for a reduced presence and reduced tensions.
Pacific Island states and US bases

The Pacific Island states view climate change as their most significant security challenge.
Countries such as Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu, which almost entirely
comprise low-lying atolls and features, could see much of their territory become uninhab-
itable by mid-century, and face the loss of much of the extensive exclusive economic zones
on which they rely.49 Greater vulnerability to extreme weather events such as typhoons
will also increase the likelihood of acute humanitarian crises. Sources of potable ground-
water on the majority of atolls could disappear by 2060 on current emissions trajectories,
or by 2030 in worst-case scenarios.50
Sea-level rise will also affect critical military bases and installations in the Pacific
and Indian oceans. The Pentagon has identified US Marine Corps facilities on Okinawa,
Andersen Air Force Base and Naval Base Guam, the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile
Defense Test Site and Space Fence radar on eight islands of the Kwajalein Atoll in Marshall
Islands, as well as two bases in Hawaii, as among the US military facilities most vulnerable
to climate change. The twin island of Roi-Namur at Kwajalein, for example, comprising
two former islands joined by an artificial isthmus, houses four key radar systems for space
surveillance and detection of launches from East Asia.51 A 2017 US Geological Survey
report for the US Department of Defense concluded that Roi-Namur’s water supply could
be destroyed by 2030–40 (under a high-emissions scenario) or 2055–65 (under the current
emissions trajectory), and over half the island could be subject to annual flooding by
2060–70 or the end of the century, depending on emissions pathway.52 The timeline for
other islands with facilities currently or potentially used by the US military, such as Diego
Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and the Northern Mariana Islands and Palau in the Pacific, is
expected to be broadly similar, although detailed modelling has not been done.53
As with facilities in the South China Sea, projected climate change affects the cost–benefit
calculations with respect to US bases, including political as well as military considerations.
Climate change will diminish the suitability of, for example, potential alternatives to US
bases on Okinawa, while also providing an additional incentive to relocate. It will also be
a factor in any US decision to establish new bases in Palau (which requested them in 2020)
or Federated States of Micronesia (agreed in principle in July 2021). These two states, as
well as Marshall Islands, are in Compacts of Free Association with the US and have been
described as ‘tantamount to a power-projection superhighway running through the heart
of the North Pacific into Asia’.54 Climate change thus has significant implications for US
defence posture in the Asia-Pacific, and hence for regional security more broadly.
MITIGATION, ADAPTATION AND SECURITY

Many potential climate risks in the Asia-Pacific may not emerge if the world as a whole
can make the necessary emissions reductions quickly enough to keep global warming to
reasonable levels. The impact of those that do emerge, too, could be significantly reduced
by adaptation measures, including aid from wealthier nations to the more vulnerable ones.
But these measures could themselves have security implications.
The most significant development in climate-change policy over the last few years is the
trend of nations committing to achieve net-zero carbon by mid-century, which the IPCC
has concluded is necessary to keep warming below 1.5°C.55 If this is successful, demand
for oil and gas will fall by more than 70% by 2050.56 Besides diminishing the strategic
relevance of potential hydrocarbon resources such as those in the South China Sea, this
will reduce (but by no means eliminate) or alter the relative importance of sea lines of
communication in the region. A quarter of the vessels over 100,000 gross tonnage passing
through the Malacca Strait are oil tankers; most of this oil also passes through the South
China Sea, either as crude or after refining in Singapore and Malaysia.57 And as Arctic sea
lanes become increasingly and consistently open to large vessels, it could become cheaper
to ship from ports north of Hong Kong to Europe through the High North, rather than via
the Indian Ocean and Suez Canal.58 Both factors could significantly challenge Singapore’s
position as an entrepôt. On the other hand, increased demand for renewable energy to
replace hydrocarbons will only strengthen China’s motivation to harness the Mekong for
hydropower, further aggravating the situation there.
There is also the question of soft power and moral leadership. Public opinion in the
Asia-Pacific is strongly in favour of climate action and critical of governments that are seen
as not playing their part.59 Until 2008, the US was, if not actually a hindrance, at least a
mere bystander to international efforts to avoid dangerous global warming. But the crisis
(in the eyes of most governments, at least) had not yet come, and China too paid only lip
service to the need to reduce emissions. During Barack Obama’s presidency, the US took
on more of a leadership role despite domestic opposition, while China continued to drag
its feet. During Donald Trump’s, Washington abrogated its role entirely, even becoming
an active impediment, but Beijing failed to seize the opportunity to fill the vacuum.
China’s commitment to ‘carbon neutrality’ Activists at a Global Day of Action for Climate Justice protest in
Quezon City, Manila metropolitan area, Philippines, 6 November 2021
only came in September 2020 and aimed
for 2060 rather than the almost-universal
target date of 2050, while carbon neutrality
is a much less robust goal than the ‘net zero
carbon’ to which most countries aspire.60
Climate-change policies offer the larger
powers opportunities to assert (or damage)
their soft power in more specific ways.
China, for example, was heavily criticised
for subsidising new hydrocarbon infrastruc-
ture, and especially hundreds of new coal
plants, through its Belt and Road Initiative.
In September 2021, however, Xi Jinping
announced that Beijing would no longer
finance new coal plants abroad, and would (Ezra Acayan/Getty Images)
‘step up support for other developing coun-

tries in developing green and low-carbon energy’.61 At the same time, Beijing’s record
on cooperation and transparency along the Mekong, for example, is poor, and unilateral
implementation of China’s ‘Sky River’ cloud-seeding project, designed to generate precipi-
tation amounting to up to 7% of its annual water use, could provoke a similar reaction not
just from Southeast Asian states but from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, which might
perceive it as diverting rainfall they would otherwise receive.62 For its part, the United
States’ failure (along with other industrialised states, including Australia, Japan and New
Zealand) to meet the commitment made at the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009 to
collectively provide US$100bn per year by 2020 in climate finance for developing coun-
tries has not endeared it to poorer Asia-Pacific states. For example, even as it became clear
that the collective commitments would not be met before COP26, ASEAN called for them
not just to be honoured but stepped up.63 Japan is the only Asia-Pacific country that has
provided its full individual share of finance, and most of this has been in the form of loans
rather than grants.64
China has stepped up its regional HADR activities over the last decade, responding
to 16 disasters in 13 countries from 2002 to 2019 – most recently Typhoon Haiyan, the
search for the missing MH370 passenger aircraft, water shortages in Maldives in 2014,
and the Nepalese earthquake in 2015 – at least partly in an effort to enhance its soft
power.65 As climate change increases the need for such support, its opportunities will
increase. India, too, has been increasing its activities in this area, hosting joint regional
exercises and conducting 29 international humanitarian-relief operations, most notably
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.66 But Beijing’s efforts are sometimes perceived
as primarily politically motivated, poorly integrated with those of other nations and
relief organisations, and even counterproductive.67 Meanwhile, since 2004 the US Navy
has led an annual Pacific Partnership HADR preparedness exercise in conjunction with
regional governments and armed forces and humanitarian organisations, and the
Pentagon contributes to HADR operations Malaysian and US military personnel conduct a medical evacuation as part
of exercise Pacific Partnership in Kuching, Sarawak state, Malaysia, 4 April 2019
somewhere in the region every year. This
is also politically motivated to some extent,
but its practical effect is a continual rein-
forcement and enhancement of the United
States’ image, at least where that image is
already positive; where it is not, the effect
is short-lived.68 Most such HADR missions
are not climate-related, but the proportion
and numbers of these are likely to increase
significantly over the coming decades.
Asia-Pacific countries do appear
strongly divided in their attitudes to
emissions reduction and climate-change
mitigation. Except for Australia, the region’s
(APFootage/Alamy Stock Photo)
OECD countries – Japan, New Zealand and
South Korea – are strong advocates of action, even as they will be the least affected in
the region. China makes the right noises, but does not always follow through. The other
G20 members in the region – Australia, India and Indonesia – did not adopt net-zero
targets until the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow in October/November 2021, and
even then, India adopted a 2070 time frame while Australia’s and Indonesia’s goals are
purely aspirational, without concrete plans to achieve them. At COP26, late objections
from China and India over the wording of an agreement on coal nearly derailed the
summit; they agreed a revised version calling for ‘phasing down’ rather than ‘phasing
out’ coal, a day after the conference had been scheduled to end.69 Even the smaller states
are behind the curve; at the end of 2021, only Sri Lanka and some Indian Ocean and
Pacific Island states (Fiji, Maldives and Marshall Islands) had formal policy goals of net
zero by 2050. It is thus unclear how important climate leadership is in the region, but as
and when the impact of climate change on economic growth and security becomes more
obvious, this will surely change.
CONCLUSION
There are two aspects to the climate crisis in the Asia-Pacific: a long-term, potentially cata-
strophic threat that may not materialise but which requires immediate action to avoid, and
a medium-term, gradual but unavoidable increase in systemic stress that calls for equally
gradual and nuanced responses. The first is a question of mitigation, the second of adap-
tation. When the UN Security Council first acknowledged climate change as a security
issue in 2007, China and Pakistan (the latter on behalf of the G77 coalition of developing
countries) formally objected to the debate on the grounds that it was an economic and
social issue best dealt with in other forums. In retrospect, they were right, in the sense
that although climate change may be a security issue, the solutions are (with the narrow
exception of military preparedness and HADR) outside the scope of security institutions,
whether national, regional or global.
Mitigation is necessarily a global issue, A bulldozer pushes coal onto a conveyer belt at Jiangyou
Power Station in Sichuan province, China, 28 January 2022
governed by the UNFCCC and the Paris
Agreement. Regional institutions such
as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum
(PIF) can and do present united negotiating
positions in the UNFCCC process, but just
six Asia-Pacific countries account for more
than 1% of global greenhouse-gas emissions
each: China (26.8%), India (7.1%), Japan
(2.5%), Indonesia (2.1%), South Korea (1.5%)
and Australia (1.1%). The remainder of the
region collectively contributes only 6%.70
Even if these other nations could present
a united front, as the PIF does, they would
(Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)
have little negotiating leverage. At COP26,
for example, the pan-regional G77 and Small Island Developing States groups failed to
get new commitments from the major emitters on climate finance or ‘loss and damage’
funding for helping the most vulnerable countries respond to climate-related disasters.
Only China and India (and to a lesser extent Indonesia and the Asia-Pacific OECD states)
have real influence on the success or failure of global mitigation efforts. The hesitation
of major regional emitters to commit to early and rapid decarbonisation stems from
calculations that the damage to their own security and development would be greater, or
more immediate, than the risks they face from climate change under the current emissions
trajectory, even if the gap between advanced and emerging economies widens.
In the medium term, climate change threatens security in the Asia-Pacific indirectly,
through its impacts on water, food, energy, ecosystem services, health and general economic
development. Besides increased international development aid from outside the region or from
the regional OECD countries and China (which has been a net donor since 2010),71 whether or
not it is formally counted as climate finance, the main opportunity for Asia-Pacific countries
to improve their climate resilience is through existing domestic and international institutions
and mechanisms intended to improve resilience in general. The key is to ensure that such
institutions and mechanisms take climate hazards into account in their decision-making, so
all investment is green or at least neutral, rather than brown (that is, counterproductive in
climate terms). This is particularly salient as the region recovers from the COVID-19 shock.
With the exceptions of Japan and South Korea, less than 10% of recovery spending by Asia-
Pacific countries in 2020 was green and the leader, South Korea, managed less than 30%.72
The Asia-Pacific faces a myriad of security issues. In some respects, climate change is sui
generis: no security issue is entirely isolated from the others, but global warming alters the
geopolitical landscape both figuratively and literally in ways that will have repercussions
across the board. By aggravating existing stresses, it is likely at the very least to increase
uncertainty and volatility, and at worst to give rise to new and unpredictable threats. Its
effects are subtle and difficult to untangle but need to be considered by policymakers and
planners contemplating any but the nearest time horizon.
NOTES
1 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 11 Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative,

(IPCC), ‘Climate Change Widespread, Rapid, Country Index, https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/
and Intensifying – IPCC’, 9 August 2021, https:// country-index.
www.ipcc.ch/2021/08/09/ar6-wg1-20210809-pr. 12 For a discussion of the origins and development
2 António Guterres, remarks to the 2020 of the concept of climate security, see Jeffrey
Climate Ambition Summit, 12 December Mazo, Climate Conflict: How Global Warming
2020, video (09:08), https://www.climateam- Threatens Security and What to Do About It,
bitionsummit2020.org/; and United Nations, Adelphi 409 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS,
‘Secretary-General Calls Latest IPCC Climate 2010), pp. 31–41; and Jeffrey Mazo, ‘Climate
Report “Code Red for Humanity”, Stressing Conflict: How Will Global Warming Threaten
“Irrefutable” Evidence of Human Influence’, 9 Our World?’, in Douglas Alexander and Ian
August 2021, https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/ Kearns (eds), Influencing Tomorrow: Future
sgsm20847.doc.htm. Challenges for British Foreign Policy (London:
3 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2021: The Physical Guardian Books, 2013), pp. 186–201.
Science Basis: Summary for Policymakers’, p. 4, 13 Steve Brock et al., ‘The World Climate and
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/ Security Report 2021’, Expert Group of the
report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM_final.pdf; Climate International Military Council on Climate and
Action Tracker, ‘Glasgow’s 2030 Credibility Security, June 2021, pp. 12–13, https://imccs.org/
Gap: Net Zero’s Lip Service to Climate wp-content/uploads/2021/06/World-Climate-
Action’, Warming Projections Global Update, and-Security-Report-2021.pdf.
November 2021, https://climateactiontracker. 14 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2021: The Physical
org/documents/997/CAT_2021-11-09_Briefing_ Science Basis: Summary for Policymakers’, p. 4.
Global-Update_Glasgow2030CredibilityGap. 15 See, for example, Roz Pidcock, ‘Speculation
pdf; and ‘The Glasgow Climate Conference’, Over Typhoon Haiyan Link to Climate
IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 27, no. 33, Change: A Media Roundup’, CarbonBrief, 13
December 2021, https://www.iiss.org/ November 2013, https://www.carbonbrief.
publications/strategic-comments/2021/the-un- org/speculation-over-typhoon-haiyan-link-to-
climate-conference-in-glasgow. climate-change-a-media-roundup; and Geert
4 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2021: The Physical Jan van Oldenborgh et al., ‘Attribution of the
Science Basis: Summary for Policymakers’, p. 14. Australian Bushfire Risk to Anthropogenic
5 Ibid., pp. 14–15. Climate Change’, Natural Hazards and Earth
6 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2014: Synthesis System Sciences, vol. 21, 11 March 2021, pp.
Report’, p. 65, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/ 941–60, https://nhess.copernicus.org/arti-
uploads/2018/02/SYR_AR5_FINAL_full.pdf. cles/21/941/2021/nhess-21-941-2021.html.
7 Ibid., p. 73. 16 The report assesses regional climate change
8 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2021: The Physical through a set of Reference Regions, which do not
Science Basis’, pp. 12–39, https://www.ipcc.ch/ necessarily correspond to national boundaries.
report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_ The regions discussed in this chapter include
WGI_Chapter_12.pdf. South Asia; the Tibetan Plateau; the Russian
9 Germanwatch, ‘Global Climate Risk Index 2021’, Far East; East Asia; Southeast Asia; Northern,
p. 15, https://www.germanwatch.org/sites/ Central, Eastern and Southern Australia; and
default/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20 New Zealand, as well as three reference regions
Index%202021_2.pdf. each for the Indian and Pacific oceans.
10 Benjamin H. Strauss et al., ‘Unprecedented 17 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2022: Impacts,
Threats to Cities from Multi-century Sea Level Adaptation and Vulnerability’, pp. 10-102–3,
Rise’, Environmental Research Letters, vol. 16, no. https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg2/pdf/IPCC_AR6_
11, 22 October 2021, p. 3, https://iopscience.iop. WGII_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf.
org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ac2e6b. For popu- 18 International Renewable Energy Agency,
lation figures used for the previous sentences’ ‘Asia and Pacific’, https://www.irena.org/
calculations, see https://www.worldometers. asiapacific. For per capita energy figures,
info/world-population/population-by-country/. see BP, ‘Statistical Review of World Energy
2021’, p. 13, https://www.bp.com/en/global/ ness-functions/sustainability/our-insights/

corporate/energy-economics/statistical-re- climate-risk-and-response-in-asia.
view-of-world-energy/primary-energy.html. 28 Asian Development Bank, ‘Climate Risk Country
19 International Energy Agency, ‘World Energy Profile: China’, May 2021, https://www.adb.org/
Outlook 2020’, pp. 168–9, https://iea.blob.core. publications/climate-risk-country-profile-china.
windows.net/assets/a72d8abf-de08-4385-8711- 29 Shiloh Fetzek et al., ‘Climate and Security in
b8a062d6124a/WEO2020.pdf. the Indo-Asia Pacific’, Expert Group of the
20 For water security in the Asia-Pacific, see ‘Water International Military Council on Climate and
Security and Climate Change’, in IISS, Regional Security, July 2020, pp. 31–5, https://imccs.org/
Security Assessment 2014: Key Developments wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Climate-Security-
and Trends in Asia-Pacific Security (London: Indo-Asia-Pacific_2020_7.pdf.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 30 Kazi Ahmed et al., ‘Climate Risks and
2014), pp. 121–36; and Asian Development Adaptation in Asian Coastal Megacities’, World
Bank, ‘Asian Water Development Outlook 2020’, Bank, 2009, p. xi.
December 2020, https://www.adb.org/publica- 31 Climate Central, ‘Flooded Future: Global
tions/asian-water-development-outlook-2020. Vulnerability to Sea Level Rise Worse Than
For the water–energy nexus, see United Nations Previously Understood’, 29 October 2019,
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and https://www.climatecentral.org/news/
the Pacific (ESCAP), ‘Water, Food and Energy report-flooded-future-global-vulnerabili-
Nexus in Asia and the Pacific’, 2013, pp. 27–8, ty-to-sea-level-rise-worse-than-previously-un-
https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/ derstood; and Scott A. Culp and Benjamin H.
Water-Food-Nexus%20Report.pdf; and Yi Jin Strauss, ‘New Elevation Data Triple Estimates
et al., ‘Water Use of Electricity Technologies: A of Global Vulnerability to Sea-level Rise and
Global Meta-analysis’, Renewable and Sustainable Coastal Flooding’, Nature Communications,
Energy Reviews, vol. 115, November 2019, https:// vol. 10, no. 4844, 29 October 2019, https://doi.
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ org/10.1038/s41467-019-12808-z.
S1364032119305994?via%3Dihub. 32 Fetzek et al., ‘Climate and Security in the
21 UN ESCAP, ‘Water, Food and Energy Nexus in Indo-Asia Pacific’, pp. 40–6; for Australia, see
Asia and the Pacific’, pp. 27–8. Riley Bradford, ‘Climate Security in the South
22 Makoto Taniguchi, Naoki Masuhara and Pacific: Australia’s Perspective’, Australian
Kimberly Burnett, ‘Water, Energy, and Food Army Research Centre, 16 September 2021,
Security in the Asia Pacific Region’, Journal of https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/
Hydrology: Regional Studies, vol. 11, June 2017, p. land-power-forum/climate-security-south-pacif-
18; and World Energy Council, ‘Energy Trilemma ic-australias-perspective.
Index’, https://trilemma.worldenergy.org/. 33 Christian Le Mière and Jeffrey Mazo, Arctic
23 UN ESCAP, ‘Water, Food and Energy Nexus in Opening: Insecurity and Opportunity, Adelphi
Asia and the Pacific’, p. 23. 440 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2013),
24 Ibid.; and UN ESCAP, Statistical Yearbook for Asia pp. 64–70.
and the Pacific 2011 (Bangkok: United Nations, 34 Tom Kompas, Pham Van Ha and Tuong Nhu
2011), p. 89. Che, ‘The Effects of Climate Change on GDP by
25 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2021: The Physical Country and the Global Economic Gains from
Science Basis’, pp. 12–43. Complying with the Paris Climate Accord’,
26 Asian Development Bank, ‘Building Climate Earth’s Future, vol. 6, no. 8, August 2018, Table 1,
Resilience in the Agriculture Sector of Asia and https://doi.org/10.1029/2018EF000922.
the Pacific’, 2009, p. 200, https://www.ifpri.org/ 35 Desmond Ball et al., Asia’s New Geopolitics:
cdmref/p15738coll2/id/17728/filename/17729.pdf. Military Power and Regional Order, Adelphi
27 UN ESCAP, Sustainable Agriculture and Food 478–480 (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS,
Security in Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok: United 2021), pp. 134–5, 162.
Nations, 2009), p. 29; and Jonathan Woetzel 36 For the trend towards net-zero carbon, see ‘The
et al., ‘Climate Risk and Response in Asia’, Rise of Carbon Neutrality: Is the New Optimism
McKinsey Global Institute, 24 November 2020, Justified?’ in IISS, Strategic Survey 2021 (Abingdon:
pp. 56–7, https://www.mckinsey.com/busi- Routledge for the IISS, 2021), pp. 71–80.
37 Hazel Smith, ‘Explaining Food Insecurity in Pacific Islands’, in IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional
North Korea: The Self-sufficiency Fallacy’, Security Assessment 2021 (Singapore: IISS,
GlobalAsia, vol. 26, no. 3, September 2021, 2021), p. 116.
https://www.globalasia.org/v16no3/cover/ 50 Curt D. Storlazzi et al., ‘The Impact of Sea-level
explaining-food-insecurity-in-north-ko- Rise and Climate Change on Department of
rea-the-self-sufficiency-fallacy_hazel-smith. Defense Installations on Atolls in the Pacific
38 Catherine Dill et al., ‘Converging Crises in Ocean (RC-2334)’, US Geological Survey, 31
North Korea: Security, Stability and Climate August 2017, p. 105, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/
Change’, Centre for Climate and Security, pdfs/AD1053105.pdf.
July 2021, https://climateandsecurity.org/ 51 US Army Space and Missile Defense Command,
wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Converging- ‘Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense
Crises-in-North-Korea_Security-Stability-and- Test Site at Kwajalein Atoll (RTS)’, https://
Climate-Change_CSR_Woodwell.pdf. www.smdc.army.mil/Portals/38/Documents/
39 Eun-Soon Im et al., ‘Potential Increase of Flood Publications/Fact_Sheets/RTS.pdf.
Hazards in Korea Due to Global Warming from 52 Storlazzi et al., ‘The Impact of Sea-level Rise
a High-resolution Regional Climate Simulation’, and Climate Change on Department of Defense
Asia-Pacific Journal of Atmospheric Sciences, vol. Installations on Atolls in the Pacific Ocean
48, no. 1, February 2012, pp. 107–13. (RC-2334)’, pp. 101–4.
40 Dill et al., ‘Converging Crises in North Korea: 53 Ibid., p. 105.
Security, Stability and Climate Change’, p. 8. 54 Derek Grossman et al., America’s Pacific Island
41 Shiloh Fetzek and Jeffrey Mazo, Conflict Allies: The Freely Associated States and Chinese
Multipliers, Climate Change and Resource Scarcity Influence, Research Report 2973-OSD (Santa
(London: Prince’s Charities International Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), p. ix,
Sustainability Unit, 2014), pp. 8–10. https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2973.
42 Karen Frenken (ed.), ‘Irrigation in Southern and 55 IPCC, ‘Special Report: Global Warming of
Eastern Asia in Figures: AQUASTAT Survey 1.5°C: Summary for Policymakers’, 2018, p. 6,
– 2011’, Food and Agriculture Organization of https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/spm/; and
the UN, 2012, pp. 379–80, http://www.fao.org/ ‘The Rise of Carbon Neutrality: Is the New
docrep/016/i2809e/i2809e.pdf. Optimism Justified?’
43 Jane Qiu, ‘Indus River Waters Shrinking’, 56 International Energy Agency, ‘Net Zero by
Nature, vol. 534, 30 June 2016, pp. 600–1. 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector’,
44 Joanna Slater, ‘India Wants to Use Water as a 2021, p. 196, https:://iea.blob.core.windows.net/
Weapon Against Pakistan. A 59-year-old Treaty assets /4719e321-6d3d-41a2-bd6b-461ad2f850a8/
Stands in the Way’, Washington Post, 22 February NetZeroby2050-ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergy
2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ Sector.pdf.
world/2019/02/22/indias-threats-pakistan-offer- 57 US Energy Information Administration, ‘South
hint-future-water-wars/. China Sea Analysis Brief’, 7 February 2013
45 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2022: Impacts, (updated 15 October 2019), https://www.eia.
Adaptation and Vulnerability’, p. 10-3. gov/international/analysis/regions-of-interest/
46 Ibid., pp. 10-41, 10-42 and 10-44. South_China_Sea.
47 ‘Occupation and Island Building’, Island 58 Le Mière and Mazo, Arctic Opening: Insecurity
Tracker database, Asia Maritime Transparency and Opportunity, pp. 64–70.
Initiative, Center for Strategic and International 59 UN Development Programme, ‘World’s
Studies, https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/. Largest Survey of Public Opinion on Climate
48 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, ‘Washed Change: A Majority of People Call for Wide-
Away’, 17 February 2016, https://amti.csis.org/ ranging Action’, 27 January 2021, https://
typhoon-spotlights-island-building/. www.asia-pacific.undp.org/content/rbap/
49 Joanne Wallis, ‘Strategic Competition and the en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2021/
world_s-largest-survey-of-public-opinion-on-cli- 66 Deon Canyon, ‘India Leading International

mate-change--a-ma.html. HADR Cooperation in South Asia’, Daniel K.
60 ‘The Rise of Carbon Neutrality: Is the New Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,
Optimism Justified?’ May 2021, https://apcss.org/nexus_articles/
61 Robin Brant, ‘China Pledges to Stop Building india-leading-international-hadr-coopera-
New Coal Energy Plants Abroad’, BBC News, 22 tion-in-south-asia/.
September 2021, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 67 Lina Gong, ‘Humanitarian Diplomacy as an
world-asia-china-58647481. Instrument for China’s Image-building’, Asian
62 Fetzek et al., ‘Climate and Security in Journal of Comparative Politics, vol. 6, no. 3, 8
the Indo-Asia Pacific’, p. 13; and China, June 2021, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
State Council, ‘China to Forge Ahead full/10.1177/20578911211019257.
with Weather Modification Service’, 2 68 Richard White, ‘Does Humanitarian Aid
December 2020, http://english.www.gov.cn/ Improve America’s Image?’, Pew Research
policies/latestreleases/202012/02/content_ Center, 6 March 2012, https://www.pewresearch.
WS5fc76218c6d0f7257694125e.html. org/global/2012/03/06/does-humanitari-
63 ASEAN, ‘Joint Statement on Climate Change to an-aid-improve-americas-image/.
the 26th Session of the Conference of the Parties 69 ‘The Glasgow Climate Conference’.
to the United Nations Framework Convention 70 Monica Crippa et al., ‘GHG Emissions of
on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP26)’, 26 All World Countries – 2021 Report’, Joint
October 2021, p. 5, https://asean.org/wp-content/ Research Centre, European Commission,
uploads/2021/10/10.-ASEAN-Joint-Statement- 2021, Annex 6, https://op.europa.eu/en/
to-COP26.pdf. publication-detail/-/publication/45c88a84-2d65-
64 Josh Gabbatiss, ‘Analysis: Why Climate-finance 11ec-bd8e-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.
“Flows” Are Falling Short of $100bn Pledge’, 71 World Bank, ‘Net Official Development
Carbon Brief, 25 October 2021, https://www. Assistance and Official Aid Received (Current
carbonbrief.org/analysis-why-climate-finance- US$) – China’, https://data.worldbank.org/indi-
flows-are-falling-short-of-100bn-pledge. cator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=CN.
65 Chris Zimmer, ‘Perspectives on Chinese 72 Brian J. O’Callaghan and Em Murdock, ‘Are
and American HADR in the Indo-Pacific We Building Back Better? Evidence from 2020
Region’, University of Texas Climate Security and Pathways to Inclusive Green Recovery
in Oceania Project, 8 March 2020, http:// Spending’, UN Environment Programme,
sites.utexas.edu/climatesecurity/2020/03/08/ 2021, hsttps://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/
perspectives-on-chinese-and-american-hadr-in- handle/20.500.11822/35281/AWBBB.pdf.
the-indo-pacific-region/.
INDEX
A Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic

Abe Shinzo 53, 182, 183, 186, 187, 191, 201 Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) 261
Afghanistan 7, 13–15, 18, 19, 31, 71, 211, 285 Azar, Alex 140, 141
air-launched ballistic missiles 119, 121

Aixtron US 156 B
Alliance for the Future of the Internet 166 Bali (Indonesia) 60
Amazon (river basin) 250 ballistic-missile submarines 115, 120, 121
Aquilino, John 25, 60 Bangkok (Thailand) 280
Arctic 282, 288 Bangladesh 276, 280, 282, 289
artificial intelligence 9, 155, 157, 158, 164, Barbados 186

167–169, 170–173 Bashi Channel 51, 143
Asian Development Bank 259, 261, 267 Bay of Bengal 201, 211, 238
Greater Mekong Subregion Program 259 Beijing Winter Olympics 90, 192, 242
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 60 Berlin (Germany) 158
Aso Taro 191 Bermuda 186
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 147, Biden, Joe 13, 14, 17– 20, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31,
182, 187, 188, 201, 204, 224, 227, 233, 240, 40, 47, 49, 50, 53, 60, 61, 64, 65, 69, 81, 93, 97,
265, 267, 283, 289, 291 155, 158–162, 164, 166, 167, 169–172, 181,
Regional Forum 201 182, 185, 191, 192, 200, 204, 205, 211, 225,
227, 240, 266
AUKUS 7, 15, 26, 28, 31, 39, 47, 48, 49, 144, 214, 240
Biegun, Stephen 200
Ausindex (exercise) 208, 212
Billingslea, Marshal 127
Austin, Lloyd 18, 22, 24, 26, 146, 148
Black Carillon (exercise) 212
Austra Hind (exercise) 212
Blinken, Antony 64, 91
Australia 9, 14–16, 19–22, 25–28, 48, 49, 60, 71,
74, 144, 161, 165, 172, 182, 183, 186–188, ‘Blue Mekong’ phenomenon 264, 265
200–205, 207, 208, 210, 212, 215, 225, 227, Brazil 213
228, 230–233, 235, 236–242, 266, 267, 276, Brookings Institution 43, 47, 185
277, 279, 282, 284, 289–291
Brown, Gerald C. 141
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 267
Brunei 279
Australian bushfires 278
Brussels (Belgium) 203
Australian Defence Force 28
Bush, George W. 16, 84, 85, 127, 207
Australia–US Ministerial Consultations 21, 22,
26, 30
INDEX 297
C Joint Staff Department 119

Cambodia 44, 250, 252, 254, 256, 258–261, 280, 285 Navy 121, 143, 144
Paris Peace Agreement 259 Navy Air Force 142
Campbell, Kurt 18, 129, 208 Rocket Force 114–117, 119, 125
Canada 51, 142, 201, 211 Second Artillery Corps 114–116, 118
Canberra (Australia) 15, 17, 21, 25, 28, 30, 49, Yellow River 53
181, 199, 202, 203, 207, 214 China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment
Carter, Jimmy 84, 118 Fund 156, 157, 165
Center for Strategic and International China Southern Power Grid 261
Studies 184 Chinese Academy of Sciences 171
Chiang Kai-shek 140 Chiu Kuo-cheng 65, 73
Chicago Council on Global Affairs 71 climate change 10, 275, 276, 279, 284, 286, 288
China Clinton, Bill 84, 85
14th Five-Year Plan 165, 167 Colby, Elbridge 71, 72
Anti-Secession Law 52, 61 Cold War 40, 48, 155, 156, 160
Belt and Road Initiative 40, 44, 182, 189, 241, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
259, 260, 266, 289 Trans-Pacific Partnership 184, 193
Central Military Commission 114, 119 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 122,
Chinese Communist Party 43, 44, 52, 64, 66, 124, 128
126, 164, 165, 167, 192, 228, 258 Convention on International Civil Aviation
Party Congress 52 (1944) 137
Coast Guard Law 135, 144, 145, 185 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial
Navigation (1919) 137
National AI Development Plan 167, 170
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
National Defense Science and Technology
Controls 160
Commission 113
COP26 276, 289–291
People’s Armed Forces Militia 143
Copenhagen climate summit 289
People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia
143, 144 coronavirus 39, 44, 45, 47, 50, 61, 89, 170, 173,
People’s Armed Police 143 183, 213, 226, 265, 267, 283, 289, 291
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 11, 15, 41, 44, Countering America’s Adversaries Through
51, 52, 62, 65, 68, 113, 114, 117, 120, 135–137, Sanctions Act 26, 30
140–143, 149, 171, 206, 225 Cutlass Express (exercise) 212
Air Force 142 Czech Republic 226
D Five Power Defence Arrangements 233–235

Dandong (China) 89, 99 Fontelles, Josep Borrell 224, 227, 241
Davidson, Philip 65 fractional orbital bombardment system 67, 113,
119, 125, 127
Demers, John 95
France 10, 187, 211–213, 223, 224, 226–231,
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 8, 10, 30,
233–240, 242
40, 44, 45, 54, 81–101, 140, 188, 279, 283, 284
navy 135, 142
Eighth Party Congress 90
free and open Indo-Pacific 9, 181, 182, 187, 188,
Workers’ Party of Korea 88
193
Defense Development Exhibition Self-Defense
freedom-of-navigation operations 148, 149
2021 91
Friends of the Mekong 267
Deng Xiaoping 60, 89, 99, 126
Fujian Jinhua 157
Denmark 226, 236, 237, 266
Dhaka (Bangladesh) 280, 282
Diego Garcia (UK) 287 G
Duterte, Rodrigo 22, 24, 46, 145, 146 G7+3 group 210
G20 290
G77 290, 291
E
Germany 10, 187, 224, 226, 227, 230–237,
East Asia Summit 203
239–242
East China Sea 8, 40, 54, 60, 136, 139, 140, 143,
coalition government 226, 231
144, 185, 186, 189, 192, 227
Federal Foreign Office 231, 232
Emerging Technology Working Group
(Quad) 165 Navy 238
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement 22, Global Foundries 170
24, 146 Goodrich, Jimmy 165
Eric Chu 52, 53 Guam 13, 21–24, 70, 287
Eritrea 89 Andersen Air Force Base 13, 21, 24
European Union 10, 158, 161, 165, 166, 170, 172, Guam Defense System 24
182, 187, 223–229, 231–233, 241, 242, 267
Guangzhou (China) 258
Coordinated Maritime Presences 228
Guardian 83
Chips Act 166
Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance
Critical Maritime Route Wider Indian Ocean Enterprise 28
228
Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation 29
European Commission 224, 225, 226
Guterres, António 276
European Council 224
European External Action Service 229
H
European Parliament 224
Hagel, Chuck 16
Special Committee on Foreign Interference
226 Hainan Island (China) 46
EU–US Trade and Technology Council 161, 165, Hami (China) 67, 118
172 Hanoi (Vietnam) 87, 98, 256, 265
exclusive economic zone 138, 147, 230 Harris, Harry 200, 203
extreme ultraviolet lithography 160, 162, 165 Hatoyama Yukio 185
Eyes on Earth 253, 254, 262, 263, 264 Hawaii (US) 24, 121, 287
Hefei National Laboratory for Physical Sciences
at Microscale 157, 168, 171
F
highly enriched uranium 121, 122
Federated States of Micronesia 288
Hikvision 167, 168, 169
Fiery Cross Reef 285–287
Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam) 280
Fiji 290
Hong Kong (China) 44, 155, 157, 160, 169, 170,
Finland 266
184, 192, 224, 226, 228, 288
First World War 182
Honshu (Japan) 144
5G 161, 182
Huawei 158, 159, 165, 173, 182
INDEX 299
Hughes Reef 144 J

Hu Jintao 61 Jaishankar, S. 200, 210
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 282, Jakarta (Indonesia) 147
289, 290
Jakobson, Linda 66
Hungary 224
Jammu and Kashmir 285
Jang Song-thaek 88, 98
I Japan 6, 9, 16, 19, 20, 22, 25–27, 29, 30, 42, 49, 51,
iFlytek 167, 168, 169 54, 71, 74, 82–85, 88, 91, 97–101, 140, 142–144,
India 6, 9, 16, 19, 25, 26, 29, 30, 40, 49, 60, 71, 161, 163, 165, 172, 180–194, 200, 201, 203–205,
82, 99, 161, 165, 172, 182, 187, 188, 189, 198, 207, 208, 210–213, 215, 225, 227, 228, 230–242,
199–216, 223, 225, 227, 228, 230, 231–233, 266, 267, 276, 278, 279, 282, 284, 289, 290, 291
236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 266, 267, 275, Cabinet Office 184
280, 282–285, 289, 290, 291 Diplomatic Bluebook 188
Bharatiya Janata Party 202, 203 Japan Center for Economic Research 191
Indian National Congress 202, 214 Japan Communist Party 192
Ministry of External Affairs 200, 204 Liberal Democratic Party 183, 184, 185,
Republic Day 204 191–193
India–France–Australia Trilateral Ministerial Ministry of Foreign Affairs 188
Dialogue 240 National Diet 184, 192
Indian Ocean 42, 49, 188, 200, 215, 228, 230, 236, National Security Strategy 29, 31
237, 241, 288, 290
Self Defense Forces 29
Indian Ocean Rim Association 228
Japanese Coast Guard 144
Indian Ocean tsunami 200
Japan–US–Mekong Power Partnership 267
Indigenous Defense Submarine (Taiwan) 72
Jaysh-e-Mohammad 285
Indonesia 71, 135, 147, 212, 227, 230, 231, 233,
Jimex (exercise) 212
237, 239, 280, 290, 291
Jinghong Dam 252, 253, 263, 264
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 147
Joseon dynasty 101
Navy 147
Indus River 284, 285
Indus Waters Treaty 284, 285 K
information and communications technology Kabul (Afghanistan) 15, 18
161, 165 Kakadu (exercise) 212
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 183 Karachi (Pakistan) 280
Intellifusion 168, 169 Kennan Reef 144
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance Khmer Rouge regime 259
68, 73 Kim Jong-il 88, 96, 98
intercontinental ballistic missile 8, 81, 85, 89–93, Kim Jong-nam 88
97, 98, 112, 113, 115, 116, 118, 120, 121, 125
Kim Jong-un 81, 83–93, 95–101, 283
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 127
Kiribati 279, 280, 287
International Atomic Energy Agency 49, 84, 86
Kishida Fumio 183, 184, 186, 188, 191–193
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Kishi Nobuo 192, 234, 240
Fullerton Lecture 232
Konkan Shakti (exercise) 212
Shangri-La Dialogue 6, 11, 16, 205, 233
Korea–Mekong Cooperation Fund 267
Manama Dialogue 241
Korean Peninsula 8, 40, 54, 84, 86, 87, 93, 96, 97,
Iran 14, 19 99–101, 140, 275, 278, 283, 285
Iraq 14, 19 Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Iroquois Reef 145 Organization 84
ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute 260 Korean War 140
Islamabad (Pakistan) 282, 285 Krach, Keith 140, 141
Islamic State 14 Kunming (China) 259
Israel 99, 213 Kwajalein Atoll (Marshall Islands) 286, 287
Itu Aba 68
L Mekong Water Data Initiative 254, 266

Ladakh (India) 49 Micron Technology 156, 157
Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism 249, Midea 158
259, 261–264, 266 Milan (exercise) 212
Special Fund 261 Military Maritime Consultative Agreement 150
Lancang–Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Milley, Mark 67, 112, 129
Center 262–264 Min River 257
Laos 250, 254, 256, 259, 260, 261, 263, 265, 267, Mischief Reef 286
280, 285
Miyako Strait 140
Le Drian, Jean-Yves 240
Modi, Narendra 47, 200, 203–205, 210, 211
Lee Jae-myung 87
Moon Jae-in 81, 85–88, 93, 97, 98
Lee Myung-bak 86
Morrison, Scott 47
Li Keqiang 61
Moscow 30, 83, 85, 98, 112, 128, 200, 205, 214,
Lindner, Tobias 232 215, 224, 241, 242
Lithuania 225 Mozur, Paul 156
London (UK) 181, 182 multiple independently targetable re-entry
long-range anti-ship missiles 28 vehicles 67
Lop Nor nuclear-test site (China) 112, 123, 124 Murray, William 72
Lower Mekong Initiative 261, 266, 267 Myanmar 42, 44, 228, 250, 259–261, 266, 280
Luzon Strait 142
N
M Nakatani Gen 191, 192
Macao 84 Nakayama Yasuhide 191
Banco Delta Asia 84 Nansei Island 185
Macron, Emmanuel 227, 230 NATO 10, 19, 187, 192, 215, 223–225, 227, 229,
MacroPolo 170 230, 233, 240, 241
Madagascar 229 Multinational Multi-Role Tanker and
Transport Fleet 240
Malabar (exercise) 202, 203, 205, 211
Strategic Concept 223, 229, 230
Malacca Strait 288
Natuna Islands 147, 148
Malaysia 71, 147, 231, 233, 236, 237, 239, 240,
286, 288, 290 Netherlands 10, 51, 161, 162, 187, 201, 224, 227,
232–234, 236, 237
Maldives 229, 289, 290
Nevada (US) 124
Manila (Philippines) 46, 145, 146, 148, 201, 203,
204, 280, 289 New Delhi (India) 9, 17, 25, 29, 30, 199–208, 210,
211, 213–216, 282, 285
Manmohan Singh 201, 202
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 127
Manwan Dam 252, 260
New York Times 156, 172
Mao Zedong 125
New Zealand 51, 142, 213, 230, 231, 233, 236,
Marshall Islands 279, 280, 286–288, 290
237, 267, 276, 277, 279, 280, 284, 289, 290
Ma Ying-jeou 61
Northern Mariana Islands 288
Megvii 167, 168, 169
North Pole 127
Mekong Agreement 260, 262, 265
Norway 82, 83
Mekong–Australia Partnership 267
Notre Dame University’s Global Adaptation
Mekong basin 249, 250, 252, 254, 256, 257, 259, Initiative 276, 279
261, 265, 267, 275, 283, 285, 286
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 49, 84, 99
Mekong Dam Monitor 254, 256, 263–266
nuclear-powered attack submarines 15, 21, 28
Mekong delta 250, 256–258, 265
nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines
Mekong–Ganga Cooperation 267 66, 67
Mekong River 6, 10, 249–268, 285 Nuclear Suppliers Group 201, 207
Mekong River Commission 249, 253, 254, 256, Nuozhadu Dam 252, 253, 258, 259
258, 260–266, 267
Mekong-US Partnership 266, 267
INDEX 301
O Quadrilateral Strategic Intelligence Forum 211

Obama, Barack 14, 16, 22, 93, 156–158, 182, 203, QuantumCTek 168, 171
207, 261, 288
Odom, Jonathan 148 R
Okinawa (Japan) 22, 23, 70, 142, 144, 185, 234, Raimondo, Gina 164
236 , 287, 288
Raisina Dialogue 203
Ordos (China) 67, 118
Rak Chiang Khong Conservation Group 252
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
RAND Corporation 68, 70
Development 282, 283, 290, 291
Ratner, Ely 64
Osborne, George 182
Reagan, Ronald 148
Osumi Strait 144
Red Flag (exercise) 212
Red Sea 229
P
Reed Bank 145, 146
Pacific Deterrence Initiative 24
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Pacific Islands Forum 291
191, 193
Pakistan 99, 206, 215, 275, 278, 282–285, 289, 290
Republic of Korea 21, 25, 27, 29, 30, 42, 45, 46,
Pak Jong-chon 92 47, 54, 71, 81, 84, 85–88, 91, 93, 95–101, 140,
Pak, Jung H. 47 163, 170, 186,–188, 193, 211–213, 266, 267,
276, 284, 290, 291
Palau 279, 280, 288
Democratic Party of Korea 87
Palawan (Philippines) 145, 146
International Aerospace and Defence
Panmunjom 98, 100
Exhibition 92, 93
Papua New Guinea 280
National Assembly 87
Paraguay 61, 62
Navy 97
Paris 229, 230, 240
New Southern Policy 188
Paris Agreement (2015) 278, 291
People Power Party 87
Paris Convention 137
RIA Novosti 127
Park Geun-hye 45
Roh Moo-hyun 86
Parly, Florence 240
Roh Tae-woo 86
Pence, Mike 64
Rongzhen, Nie 113
La Pérouse (exercise) 211
Ross, Wilbur 158
Philippines 18, 22, 24, 42, 46, 51, 71, 135, 136, 140,
Russia 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18–20, 26, 30, 48, 53, 54,
142–147, 236, 237, 239, 240, 275, 278, 280, 286
60, 64, 71, 74, 81–84, 93, 98, 99, 101, 119, 127,
Philippine Sea 51, 140, 142, 144, 234–237 144, 149, 165, 166, 200, 208, 211, 213, 214,
Phytium 158, 164 215, 223, 224, 228, 229, 230, 237, 238, 241, 242
Pitch Black (exercise) 212
Pompeo, Mike 64, 266, 267 S
Powell, Colin 84 Samsung 163, 166, 170
Price, Ned 149 Saran, Shyam 202
Pritzker, Penny 157 Scarborough Shoal 145
Putin, Vladimir 229, 241, 242 Schelling, Thomas 69
Pyongyang (DPRK) 44, 81–88, 90, 91, 93, 95–101, Scholz, Olaf 231, 232
284
Schönbach, Kay-Achim 232
Sea Dragon (exercise) 211
Q Sea of Japan (East Sea) 140
Qing Dynasty 52 Second Thomas Shoal 146
Quad Emerging Technology Working Group Second World War 6, 53, 140
39, 47–49, 161, 165, 172, 228, 238
Seiler, Sydney 91
Leaders’ Summit 47
semiconductor manufacturing equipment 159,
Quad-plus 211, 213 160, 162, 165
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) 6, 9, 17, Semiconductor Manufacturing International
30, 181, 182, 188, 198–216, 282 Corporation 157, 161–163, 165
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 143, 185 Democratic Progressive Party 51, 63

SenseNets 168, 169 Kuomintang 53
SenseTime 155, 167–170 Ministry of Defense 140, 141
Seoul 25, 27, 29, 30, 45, 47, 81, 83–88, 90, 93, 95, National Chengchi University 63
97–99, 101, 188, 193, 213 National Defense Report 73
Serbia 224 Overall Defense Concept 72, 73
Shanghai (China) 45, 157, 169 Quadrennial Defense Review 73
Shanghai Communiqué 129 Taiwan Relations Act 64
Shenzhen (China) 157, 158, 168 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Shinyuu Maitri (exercise) 212 Company 155, 159, 163–166, 170
Shringla, Harsh 211 Taiwan Strait 11, 13, 25, 30, 40, 44, 49, 50, 53,
Sichuan Dam 258 62, 64, 68, 70, 96, 135–137, 140, 141, 143, 144,
146, 149, 150, 224, 227, 232, 234, 235, 238
Siew, Vincent C. 60
Taiwan Strait Crisis 70
Sin Cowe Island 144
Taliban 18, 285
Singapore 71, 201, 204, 212, 228, 231–234, 236,
237, 239, 240, 242, 276, 279, 280, 288 Talisman Sabre (exercise) 212
Six-Party Talks 84, 85 Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system

45, 46
SK Hynix 162, 163
Thailand 250, 252–254, 256, 259–265, 276, 280,
Solís, Mireya 185
285
Sony Pictures 93, 95
Chiang Rai 252–254, 263, 264
South China Sea 8, 10, 23, 28, 39, 40, 42, 44, 46,
Chiang Saen 253, 262
49, 54, 59, 63, 65, 68, 60, 136, 137, 140–149,
213, 224, 226, 227, 230, 233–238, 240–242, Office of National Water Resources 265
275, 283, 285–288 Thailand–Laos border 253, 254, 263
Soviet Union 48, 86, 112, 113, 140, 189, 259 Three Joint Communiqués 64
Spratly Islands 144, 146, 286 Tianjin (China) 170
Sri Lanka 290 Tibet 184, 224, 254, 258
Stoltenberg, Jens 229 Tibetan Plateau 277, 280, 285
Strait of Hormuz 229 Tiger TRIUMPH (exercise) 212
Strait of Malacca 42 Tillerson, Rex 203
Stung Treng (Cambodia) 256 Tokelau 287
Subi Reef 286 Tokyo (Japan) 9, 17, 22, 25, 27, 29, 30, 83, 90,
submarine-launched ballistic missile 67, 90, 98, 144, 181–186, 188, 189, 191, 193, 199,
92, 93 201–205, 207, 210, 214
Suez Canal 288 Tonle Sap 250, 252, 254, 256–258, 265
Suga Yoshihide 47, 183–185 Tonle Sap Lake 250, 254
Sugon 157, 158, 168 Tonle Sap River 250, 252
Sullivan, Jake 19, 30 Trans-Pacific Partnership 183, 193
Summit for Democracy 166 Truman, Harry 140
Sunway TaihuLight 123, 124 Trump, Donald 14, 16, 17, 20, 22, 25, 27, 40, 43,
46, 47, 49, 64, 85, 87, 90, 93, 97, 98, 127, 155,
Sydney (Australia) 9, 230
157–159, 162, 164, 167, 169, 181–183, 191,
204, 207, 229, 231, 254, 266, 288
T Tsai Ing-wen 51, 52, 61–63, 64, 72, 135, 136, 141,
Taipei (Taiwan) 39, 60–63, 66, 68, 72–74, 141, 166
142, 144, 155 Tsinghua Unigroup 156
Taiwan 6–9, 19, 20, 25, 30, 39, 40, 42, 44, 48–54, Tsugaru Strait 144
59–74, 112, 116, 125, 126, 128, 129, 135–137, Tsunami Core Group 200, 205
140–144, 146, 149, 150, 155, 156, 159, 163–
Tuvalu 279, 280, 287
166, 170, 172, 184, 185, 191–193, 224–227,
232, 235, 238, 282, 286 Typhoon Haiyan 275, 278, 289
Air Defence Identification Zone 51, 52, 135,
136, 138–143
INDEX 303
U National Academies 124

Uighurs 169, 184, 224 National Air and Space Intelligence Center 119
Ukraine 6–11, 13, 14, 18–20, 30, 31, 45, 48, 53, 54, National Defense Authorization Act 159
59, 60, 64, 68, 71, 74, 83, 93, 99, 149, 165, 200, National Defense Strategy 16, 18, 19, 31
214, 215, 223, 224, 230, 238, 242 National Security Committee on AI 171, 173
United Kingdom 10, 15, 26, 28, 142, 144, 182, National Security Council 18
185, 187, 212, 213, 224, 226–228, 233–240, 242
National Security Strategy 182
Brexit 233
National Technological and Industrial Base 28
Royal Navy 234, 235
Navy 22, 23, 26, 28, 46, 48, 64, 73, 289
United Nations 49, 50, 81–83, 85, 86, 99, 201,
Republican Party 172
259, 276, 280, 287, 290
Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test
Conference on Disarmament 128
Site 287
Convention on the Law of the Sea 137, 138,
Senate Armed Services Committee 25, 123
145, 148, 233, 287
Six Assurances 64
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific 280 US–DPRK Agreed Framework 84, 85
Framework Convention on Climate Change US Geological Survey report 287
10, 276, 291 US-India civil nuclear deal 202
General Assembly 203 US-India-Japan trilateral dialogues 202, 241
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
276, 278, 288
V
Panel of Experts 83, 85, 86
Vajra Prahar (exercise) 212
Security Council 82–85, 92, 93, 207, 208
Vietnam 87, 88, 189, 193, 213, 231, 233, 237, 240,
United States 250, 254, 256, 259, 260, 261, 265, 267, 276,
Agency for International Development 266 280, 285, 286, 287
Armed Forces 140, 146 Vilnius (Lithuania) 225
Bureau of Industry and Security 157–162, 165, Visiting Forces Agreement 22, 24, 46, 146
168, 169, 171 von der Leyen, Ursula 224
China Initiative 170
Commerce Department Entity List 157, 158,
W
160, 162, 164, 165, 168, 169, 171, 173
Wang Yi 261, 262, 263
Committee on Foreign Investment in the US
156, 158–161 WannaCry 93, 94
Congress 16, 20, 23, 24, 84, 97, 123, 159, 161, Wassenaar Arrangement 160
166, 183 weapons of mass destruction 81, 83, 84, 85, 88,
Department of Defense 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 27, 89, 93, 95, 96, 98–101
64, 67, 70, 114, 121, 123, 162, 164, 287, 290 Wei Fenghe 61
Quadrennial Defense Review 16 Western Pacific 15, 40, 46, 54
Department of Energy 121 White, Hugh 182
Department of Justice 93, 170 Whitsun Reef 144, 145
Department of State 118, 124, 149 Wikileaks 83
Department of the Treasury 84, 94, 157, 160, Work Plan of the Ministry of Unification 87
161, 165, 168, 169 World Bank 261, 267, 284
Export Administration Regulations 158 World Health Assembly 61
Export Control and Reform Act 159, 171 World Health Organization 184, 210
Foreign Direct Product Rule 9, 159, 164, 165, Wu, Joseph 63, 64
172, 173
Wuxi (China) 162, 168
Global Magnitsky Act 192
Indo-Pacific Command 23–25, 31, 60, 65
X
Indo-Pacific Strategy 12–14, 17
Xayaburi Dam 260, 263
Marine Corps 49, 185, 234, 287
Xiang Shouzhi 114
Maritime Sealift Command 30
Xiaowan Dam 252, 257–259
Xi Jinping 39, 42, 44, 45, 52, 53, 60, 61, 65, 66, Yoon Suk-yeol 87, 88, 97, 188
69, 74, 96, 98, 99, 119, 125, 126, 156–158, 165, Yudh Abhyas 212
167, 181, 182, 193, 204, 206, 226, 229, 241,
Yumen (China) 67, 118
242, 260, 261, 289
Yunnan (China) 253, 254, 257–259, 263
Xinhai Revolution 52
Yunnan Dam 285
Xinjiang (China) 168, 169, 192, 224, 226
Z
Y
Zhang Li 261
Yalu River 89, 99
ZTE 158
Yellow Sea 140, 143
Yitu 167–169
IISS
an strategic dossier THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES an strategic dossier
ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT 2022 Key developments and trends

SECURITY ASSESSMENT
The Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment examines key regional security issues relevant
to the policy-focused discussions of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s premier defence
summit convened by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. It is published each
year in association with the Dialogue and the issues analysed within its covers are central to
discussions at the event. Key developments and trends
This ninth edition of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment focuses particularly on
developments in US−China relations, including heightened tensions over Taiwan, increased
2022
air and naval operations in maritime East Asia, and nuclear-weapons and technological
competition. It also examines the regional security roles of middle powers (India, Japan and
Europe). As this volume goes to press, the war in Ukraine overshadows the international
security landscape and many chapters in this volume touch on the conflict’s ramifications for
security in the Asia-Pacific.
This edition contains 12 detailed empirically based chapters that investigate important
dimensions of the regional security environment, supported by maps, graphs, charts and
tables. Topics include:
US Indo-Pacific strategy, alliances and security partnerships;
Chinese perspectives on regional security;
Taiwan’s security and the possibility of conflict;
the continuing challenges posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes;
the nuclear dynamics of Sino-American security relations;
air and naval operations in the Asia-Pacific;
Sino-American technology competition;
Japan’s competition and cooperation with China;
India’s role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad);
the evolving regional security engagement of European states and the
European Union;
China’s role as an upstream state in the Mekong sub-region; and
the climate crisis and Asia-Pacific security.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

The IISS, founded in 1958, is an independent centre for research, information and debate
on the problems of conflict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important
military content.

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ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT 2022 Key developments and trends

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE Dr John Chipman

© 2022 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Printed and bound in Singapore by KHL Printing Co Pte Ltd.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

About The International Institute for Strategic Studies

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASW anti-submarine warfare

BRI Belt and Road Initiative

CCG China Coast Guard

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the US

CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

EAS East Asia Summit

EEZ exclusive economic zone

FOIP Free and Open Indo-Pacific

FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangements

HGV hypersonic glide vehicle

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile

JSDF Japan Self-Defense Forces

MRBM medium-range ballistic missile

MRC Mekong River Commission

PAFMM People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia

PLA (Chinese) People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF PLA Air Force

PLAN PLA Navy

Quad Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)

SMIC Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation

SRBM short-range ballistic missile

THAAD Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense

TSMC Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

THE US, CHINA AND REGIONAL SECURITY

ROLES OF JAPAN, INDIA AND EUROPE

WAR IN UKRAINE AND ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

DR TIM HUXLEY DR LYNN KUOK

ASHLEY TOWNSHEND JAMES CRABTREE

For more than a decade,

the United States have struggled

to prioritise the Indo-Pacific. Although

President Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy

has placed the region at the top of Washington’s

global priorities, US rhetoric has been matched

only partially with the actions and resources required

to transform its regional strategic position following years

of underinvestment. Washington must intensify its efforts on

TOWARDS A STRATEGY OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

THE INDO-PACIFIC AND COMPETING PRIORITIES

EMPOWERING AND INTEGRATING ALLIES AND PARTNERS

TOWARDS A STRATEGY OF COLLECTIVE DEFENCE