PATRICK R. FABIE, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEONARDO M.

REAL,
Respondents.
A.C. No. 10574 September 20, 2016
-Adizas

FACTS:
Complainant Patrick R. Fabie claimed that he is the owner of a parcel of land located in
Bo. Dela Paz, Antipolo City registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. R-
1971. His sister Jaynie May R. Fabie (Jaynie May) donated the property to him in support
of his intended application for immigration either to the United States of America or
Canada. However, his plan to immigrate did not push through hence, he engaged the
services of respondent Atty. Leonardo M. Real to facilitate the return of ownership of the
said property to Jaynie May.

Complainant gave respondent the necessary documents for the purported transfer of
ownership of the property as well as the amount of P40, 000.00 to answer for the
expenses to be incurred in connection therewith and for respondent's professional fees.
This is evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt which complainant attached to his
Petition indicating as follows:

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT RECEIPT
Received from PATRICK R. FABIE the following documents:
Deed of Absolute Sale and Deed of Donation between Patrick Fabie and Jaynie May
Fabie
Tax Declaration of Real Property
Tax Clearance
[Official] Real Property tax receipt
Xerox and Original [Transfer Certificate of] Title No. |TCT]. N-129303
Cash-P40,000.00

Received by:
Signed 9/18/10
ATTY. LEONARDO M. REAL
Date: August 24,2009
Place: Bermuda Subd.
Antipolo City
Conforme:
Signe
PATRICK R. FABIE3
However, more than a year had passed without anything being accomplished. Hence,
complainant sought for the return of the items received by respondent. While respondent
gave back to complainant TCT No. R-1971, he did not return the P40,000.00 and the
other documents. And since the demand letter for the return of the money was left
unheeded, complainant was constrained to lodge with the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (EBP) the said Verified Petition.

In his answer, respondent admitted that he received the items enumerated in the afore-
quoted acknowledgement receipt albeit on a different date and for a different purpose, ie,
on September 18, 2010, for the purpose of settling the estate of complainant's late father.
Later, however, the heirs of Esteban had a change of heart and took back from respondent
the documents and the money on November 28, 2010. Complainant allegedly
acknowledged the return of the items by respondent as follows:

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT RECEIPT
Received from Atty. Leonardo M. Real the following documents:
Deed of Absolute Sale and Deed of Donation bet. Patrick Fabie and Jaynie
May Fabie
Tax Declaration of Real Property
Tax Clearance
[Official] Real Property Tax Receipt
Xerox and original Title No. N-129303
Cash-P40,000.00
Received by: Signed
PATRICK R. FABIE
Date: August 24,2009
Place: Bermuda Subd.
Antipolo City
Conforme:
Signed 11/28/10
ATTY. LEONARDO M. REAL

Further, respondent attached to his Answer a photocopy of TCT No. N-1293038 which
he claimed to be a part of the estate of complainant’s father referred to him by the latter's
heirs for settlement proceedings. But since there was a misunderstanding among the
heirs, the settlement did not push through. Respondent claimed that he got caught in the
middle of this bitter spat of the heirs such that complainant filed this disbarment case
against him.

Complainant filed a reply and clarified that the title which was the subject of his
engagement of respondent was TCT No. R-1971 as alleged in his Petition and not TCT
No. N-129303. While, indeed, the acknowledgement receipt he appended to his Petition
indicates that the TCT number of the title received by respondent is TCT No. N-129303,
this was a mere typographical error committed by respondent's secretary who prepared
the said acknowledgement receipt. Unfortunately, respondent was using his possession of
a photocopy of TCT No. N-129303 in this case to negate his clear deviation from the
conduct expected of a lawyer.

In his Rejoinder, respondent reiterated his denial that he dealt with complainant with
respect to TCT No. R-1971 and asserted that the latter, in filing this complaint for
disbarment, was just sour graping because of the aborted settlement of his father's estate.

Mandatory Conference was set and although respondent filed a Mandatory Conference
Brief, he did not appear thereat. Hence, the mandatory conference was terminated and the
parties were required to file their respective position papers.

Report and Recommendation of the

Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation, Investigating Commissioner, held that the evidence
tended to support complainant's allegations. For one, the items received by respondent
included a Deed of Absolute Sale and a Deed of Donation executed by and between
complainant and Jaynie May - documents which are significant to the purported transfer
of ownership of property between the said siblings. For another, he found complainant as
quite sure of the details of respondent's return to him of TCT No. R-1971 only as
complainant even vividly recalled that the same took place in Starbucks, Edsa Central,
Mandaluyong City. On the other hand, Commissioner Cachapero did not find credible
respondent's claim that he was engaged by the heirs of Esteban for the settlement of
estate.

Ultimately, Commissioner Cachapero found respondent to have (1) breached his duties to
his client when he failed to exercise due diligence in his undertaking to cause the transfer
of ownership of property from complainant to Jaynie May and instead abandoned his
client's cause; (2) converted his client's fund of P40,000.00 to his personal use when he
failed to return the same to complainant; and, (3) committed dishonesty when he claimed
that he had been engaged to settle the estate of Esteban when in truth he was not. And
since the above transgressions did not only show bad faith on the part of respondent but
also caused material damage to complainant, Commissioner Cachapero recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years.

Ruling of the IBP Board of Governors

 The IBp Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the
Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended for a shorter period of six
months.2

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 insisting that there was no clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence adduced to establish that he breached his duties to
complainant as to warrant his suspension. The IBP Board of Governors, however, denied
the Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON atty. Leonardo Real is guilty for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

YES.

"The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that [he] denies the charges against him; [he] must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence against [him]. [He] must show proof that [he] still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.
Respondent failed in this regard.

It bears to stress at this point that “every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns
of his client. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the
client. His duty to safeguard the client's interests commences from his engagement as
such, and lasts until his effective release by the client. In that time, he is expected to take
every reasonable step and exercise ordinary care as his client's interests may require."

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH

COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

The Lawyer's Oath similarly mandates a lawyer to conduct himself according to the best
of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to the courts and to his clients.

Clearly here, respondent failed to competently and diligently discharge his duty when he
was unable to cause the transfer of ownership of property from complainant to Jaynie
May. Despite doing nothing, he even obstinately refused to return the P40,000.00 he
received as attorney's fees. No doubt, respondent "fell short of the demands required of
[him] as a member of the bar. [His] inability to properly discharge [his] duty to [his
client] makes [him] answerable not just to [him], but also to this Court, to the legal
profession, and to the general public."

The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two years. Suffice it to say, however, that "the appropriate
penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts."

In Pesto v. Millo, the Court, after finding therein that Atty. Marcelito M. Millo failed to
comply with his obligation to serve his clients with competence and diligence, suspended
him from the practice of law for six months and directed him to return the attorney's fees
he received on the ground that he did not render efficient service to his clients. The
surrounding facts and circumstances of this case calls for the imposition of the same
penalty and the adoption of a similar directive. Respondent should thus refund to
complainant the P40,000.00 given to him in connection with the purported transfer of
ownership of property with interest of 12% per annum reckoned from the time he
received the amount on August 24, 2009 until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from
July 1,2013 until full payment thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS respondent Atty. Leonardo M. Real guilty of violating
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath
and thus SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of six months effective
from notice, ORDERS him to return to complainant Patrick R. Fabie within 10 days from
notice the sum of P40,000.00 with legal interest of 12% per annum reckoned from the
time he received the amount on August 24,2009 until June 30,2013, and 6% per annum
from July 1, 2013 until full payment thereof.
 GRACE M. ANACTA vs. ATTY. EDUARDO D. RESURRECCION, Respondent.
A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012
-Adizas

"The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the
officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.”

FACTS:

In a Complaint for disbarment filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), complainant Grace M. Anacta (complainant) prays for the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Eduardo D. Resurreccion (respondent) for "gross misconduct, deceit and
malpractice."

On November 15, 2004, complainant engaged the services of respondent to file on her behalf a
petition for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, for
which she paid respondent ₱ 42,000.00.

In December 2004, respondent presented to the complainant a supposed copy of a Petition for
Annulment of Marriage5 which bore the stamped receipt dated December 8, 2004 of the RTC, as
well as its docket number, Civil Case No. 04-25141.

From then on, complainant did not hear from respondent or receive any notice from the trial
court relative to the said petition. This prompted her to make inquiries with the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City (OCC-RTC). To her surprise and dismay, she
discovered that no petition for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 04-25141 was ever filed
before the said court. Thus, complainant terminated the services of respondent "for loss of trust
and confidence" and requested the OCC-RTC to refuse any belated attempt on the part of
respondent to file a petition for annulment of marriage on her behalf.

Complainant, through her new counsel, wrote a letter to the respondent demanding for an
explanation as to how respondent intended to indemnify the complainant for damages she had
suffered due to respondent’s deceitful acts. Respondent has not replied thereto. Hence,
complainant filed before the IBP a verified complaint praying that respondent be disbarred.

In an Order dated August 22, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP required the
respondent to submit his answer to the complaint within 15 days from notice. However,
respondent did not heed said directive. Hence, complainant filed Motions to Declare Respondent
in Default and Hear the Case Ex-Parte. The Investigating Commissioner held in abeyance the
resolution of the above motions and instead set the complaint for Mandatory
Conference,however, only the complainant and her counsel appeared. Accordingly, the
Investigating Commissioner deemed respondent to have waived the filing of an answer; noted
complainant’s motion to declare respondent in default; and gave the complainant 10 days from
notice within which to file her verified position paper, after which the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution.

Complainant filed her verified Position Paper.

In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found clear and convincing
evidence that respondent is guilty of deceit and dishonesty when he misrepresented having filed
the petition for annulment of marriage after receipt of P42,000.00 when in fact no such petition
was filed. He thus recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two years and to reimburse/return to the complainant the amount of P42,000.00.

In a Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner but modified the recommended penalty of suspension from the
practice of law from two years to four years and ordered respondent to return to the complainant
the amount of ₱ 42,000.00, otherwise his suspension will continue until he returns the sum
involved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Eduardo Resurreccion is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty and
should be disbarred;

Whether or not he is obliged to return the P42, 000.00 for the acceptance fee?

RULING:

YES, he is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty but not necessarily disbarred.
YES, he should return the P42, 000.00 pesos for the acceptance feel

WE adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

In Narag v. Atty. Narag this Court held that "[t]he burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence."

In this case, complainant submitted the all the documents to prove her allegations, however, in
the face of such a serious charge, the respondent has chosen to remain silent.
Thus, we find the confluence of the evidence submitted by the complainant to have clearly,
convincingly and satisfactorily shown that indeed the respondent has authored this reprehensible
act. Respondent committed deceitful and dishonest acts by misrepresenting that he had already
filed a petition for annulment on behalf of the complainant and pocketing the amount of
P42,000.00. He even went to the extent of presenting to the complainant a supposed copy of the
petition duly filed with the court. After he was found out, he made himself scarce. He ignored all
communications sent to him by the complainant. After the disbarment complaint was filed, he
failed to file his answer despite due notice. He totally disregarded the proceedings before the IBP
despite receipt of summons. "The act of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the
hearings set by the Investigating Commission, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for
legal proceedings."

We thus agree with the observation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner that "such action of
the respondent is patently deceitful and dishonest, considering further that he received an amount
of money from the complainant."

As early as In Re: Sotto, this Court held that:

One of the qualifications required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession of
good moral character, and, when one who has already been admitted to the bar clearly shows, by
a series of acts, that he does not follow such moral principles as should govern the conduct of an
upright person, and that, in his dealings with his clients and with the courts, he disregards the
rule of professional ethics required to be observed by every attorney, it is the duty of the court, as
guardian of the interests of society, as well as of the preservation of the ideal standard of
professional conduct, to make use of its powers to deprive him of his professional attributes
which he so unworthily abused.

In addition, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "The Code exacts from lawyers
not only a firm respect for law, legal processes but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity
and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their
fiduciary relationship."

Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, respondent may either be disbarred or
suspended for committing deceitful and dishonest acts. Thus:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
 turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do
so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

It is thus clear from the foregoing provision that in any of the following circumstances, to wit:
(1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's oath; (7) wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; or (8) corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so; the Court is vested with the authority and discretion to
impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment or mere suspension. Certainly, the Court is not
placed in a straitjacket as regards the penalty to be imposed. There is no ironclad rule that
disbarment must immediately follow upon a finding of deceit or gross misconduct. The Court is
not mandated to automatically impose the extreme penalty of disbarment. It is allowed by law to
exercise its discretion either to disbar or just suspend the erring lawyer based on its appreciation
of the facts and circumstances of the case.

We examined the records of the case and assessed the evidence presented by the complainant.
After such examination and assessment, we are convinced beyond doubt that respondent should
only be meted the penalty of four-year suspension as properly recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors. In the exercise of our discretion, we are unquestionably certain that the four-year
suspension suffices and commensurable to the infractions he committed. As will be pointed out
later, there have been cases with more or less the same factual setting as in the instant case where
the Court also imposed the penalty of suspension and not disbarment.

The court has ruled in its many cases that the Court is not bound to impose the penalty of
disbarment in cases of gross misconduct and/or dishonesty, if in its appreciation of facts and in
the exercise of its sound discretion, the penalty of suspension would be more commensurate.
"Disbarment, jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any punishment less severe,
such as reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be
considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic life and honor of the erring person."
In this case, we believe that the penalty of suspension of four years will provide Atty.
Resurreccion "with enough time to ponder on and cleanse himself of his misconduct."

Anent the issue of whether respondent should be directed to return the amount of ₱ 42,000.00 he
received from the complainant, we note that the rulings of this Court in this matter have been
diverse. On one hand, there are cases where this Court directed respondents to return the money
they received from the complainants. On the other hand, there are also cases where this Court
refrained from venturing into this matter on the ground that the same is not within the ambit of
its disciplinary authority as the only issue in administrative cases is the fitness of the lawyer to
remain a member of the bar.

Now is the most opportune time to harmonize the Court's ruling on this matter. Thus, it is
imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the
Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter
involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court’s
disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal
liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then
the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the
purview of the Court’s disciplinary authority. Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of the
inquiry pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the
legal fraternity, the issue of whether the respondent be directed to return the amount received
from his client shall be deemed within the Court’s disciplinary authority.

In this case, respondent received the amount of P42,000.00 supposedly as payment for his legal
services and as filing fees. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.

xxx

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x

In this case, it is thus clear that respondent violated his lawyer’s oath and code of conduct when
he withheld the amount of ₱ 42,000.00 despite his failure to render the necessary legal services
and after complainant demanded its return. He must therefore be directed to return the same.

Finally, we emphasize that "the object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the
individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by proceeding the court
and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the profession of
law persons whose disregard for their oath of office has proved them unfit to continue
discharging the trust respect in them as members of the bar."
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo D. Resurreccion is ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for four years. He is also DIRECTED to return to the complainant the amount of
P42,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the promulgation of this Decision.
 Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado, and Elito P. Andres, Complainants, v. Atty.
Salimathar V. Nambi
A.C. No. 7158, 09 March 2015
-Antido

FACTS:
On 10 December 2003, Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi rendered a decision in a consolidated labor
case against M.A. Mercado Construction and spouses Maximo and Aida Mercado (spouses
Mercado). The spouses Mercado interposed an appeal which was dismissed for failure to post an
appeal bond. Thus, an alias Writ of Execution was issued to implement the decision. The
complainants in the labor case filed an ex parte motion for amendment of the alias writ of
execution claiming that they could hardly collect the judgment award from M.A. Mercado
Construction because it allegedly transferred its assets to M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. On 17
February 2006, an amended alias writ of execution was issued to enforce the monetary judgment
amounting to P19,527,623.55 against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators. An
urgent motion to quash was field by M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. but the same was denied.
Aggrieved, complainants filed an instant complaint for disbarment, which was referred to the
IBP on 04 March 2007 for investigation, report and recommendation.

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In his Report and Recommendation dated September 6, 2010, the Investigating Commissioner
found Atty. Nambi guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six months. This was adopted and approved with
modification by the IBP Board of Governors in an April 12, 2011 Resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent is guilty of of gross ignorance of the law and of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
As a rule, for one to be held administratively accountable for gross ignorance of the law, there
must be a showing that the error was gross and patent as to support a conclusion that the actor
was so moved with malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud, and dishonesty.
We perused the records of the case particularly respondent’s Order dated March 13, 2006
denying complainants’ Urgent Motion to Quash. Therein, we note that respondent’s ruling was
not arrived at arbitrarily; on the contrary, he cited grounds based on his personal assessment of
the facts at hand. Xxx
Xxx Clearly, respondent did not act whimsically or arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any
manner be characterized as imbued with malice, fraud or bad faith. Xxx His conclusion was
reached after an examination of the documents presented and evaluation and assessment of the
arguments raised by the parties. He did not capriciously rule on the issues presented; on the
contrary, he exerted efforts to weigh the positions of the contending parties. In any event, we
hold that respondent should not be held accountable for committing an honest mistake or an error
in the appreciation of the facts of the case before him. Otherwise every labor arbiter or any
judicial or quasi-judicial officer for that matter, would be continually plagued with the possibility
of being administratively sanctioned for every honest mistake or error he commits. For sure, this
would not augur well to the administration of justice as a whole. 
However, we note that respondent had consistently and obstinately disregarded the Court’s and
IBP’s orders. It is on record that respondent totally ignored the Court’s June 7, 2006 Resolution
directing him to file his Comment. He also failed to attend the mandatory conference before the
IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline despite notice. Neither did he file his Position Paper. As a
former Labor Arbiter, respondent should know that orders of the court “are not mere requests but
directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely.” “He disregarded the
oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession ‘to obey the laws and the legal orders
of the duly constituted legal authorities.’ x x x His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is
called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying
with court directives as an officer of the court.”
Considering that this appears to be respondent’s first infraction, we find it proper to impose on
him the penalty of reprimand with warning that commission of the same or similar infraction will
be dealt with more severely.
 PO2 Patrick Mejia Gabriel v. Sheriff William Jose R. Ramos, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 166, Pasig City
A.M. No. P-06-2256, 10 April 2013
-Antido
FACTS:
This is a complaint for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a court personnel filed by PO2
Patrick Mejia Gabriel against William Jose R. Ramos, Sheriff IV of the RTC. The complainant
alleged that on 22 August 2005, Ramos destroyed personal belongings inside the house of
Consolacion Dela Cruz Favillar, the mother of his common-law-wife, Jenelita Dela Cruz, and
thereafter indiscriminately fired a gun outside the said house. Ramos was charged with alarms
and scandals and violation of domicile. The complaint also alleged that Ramos’ illicit
relationship with Jenelita offends the morality and sense of decency of the people in the locality.
In his comment, Ramos asserted that he is also living in the house of Consolacion and, therefore,
could not be charged with the said offense of Violation of Domicile.
Anent the charge of immorality, Ramos admitted his common-law relationship with Jenelita but
denied living under scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock common decency. He
argued that their relationship having spanned 15 years already and the fact that they have two
children dispel any vestiges of immorality.
Ramos prayed for the dismissal of the instant administrative case.

OCA Findings and Recommendations

In a Memorandum dated November 5, 2012, the OCA found Ramos liable to the charge of
immorality considering his admission that he has been cohabiting with Jenelita for 15 years
despite his subsisting marriage with Montehermoso.

ISSUE:
Whether Ramos is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct.

RULING:
The Court sustains the finding of the OCA that Ramos is guilty of disgraceful and immoral
conduct. His barefaced admission and justification of his relationship with another woman
despite his subsisting marriage to another is proof of his immoral conduct.

Immorality has been defined to include not only sexual matters but also “conducts inconsistent
with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful,
flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of
the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.” In this
case, Ramos showed his moral indifference to the opinions of respectable members of the
community by attempting to rationalize his illicit relationship with Jenelita. Xxx The illicit
relationship between a married man and a woman not his wife will remain illicit
notwithstanding the lapse of considerable number of years they have been living together. 
Passage of time does not legitimize illicit relationship; neither does other people’s perceived
tolerance or acquiescence or indifference toward such relationship. Xxx
An officer of the court, and any employee thereof for that matter, should be above
reproach.  The very existence of the court, the institution we represent, is anchored on
upholding what is true, right and just.  That is why we require nothing less than the highest
standard of morality and decency for each and every member, from the highest official to
the lowest of the rank and file, to preserve the good name and integrity of courts of justice
lest we be deemed unworthy to represent this honorable institution.
With regard to the charge of conduct unbecoming of a court personnel, it appears that there is
ample evidence on record showing that Ramos indeed indiscriminately fired a gun. Xxx given
the confluence of events as borne out by the records, this Court finds that Ramos is
administratively liable for indiscriminately discharging a firearm even if the same does not
pertain to his official functions.  This is in consonance with the oft-repeated exhortation
that “all those involved in the administration of justice must at all times conduct
themselves with the highest degree of propriety and decorum and take [utmost] care in
avoiding incidents that x x x degrade the judiciary and diminish the respect and regard for
the courts.”
WHEREFORE, respondent WILLIAM JOSE R. RAMOS, Sheriff IV, Branch 166, Regional
Trial Court, Pasig City is found GUILTY of immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.  Accordingly, he is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION for twelve (12)
months without pay, with WARNING that commission of the same or similar act will merit a
more severe penalty.  He is ADMONISHED to terminate his common-law relationship with
Jenelita Dela Cruz Favillar or to take the necessary steps to legitimize the same.  He is
further ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in his conduct both as a court employee and as
a private individual.
 MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, LTD.
AND/OR MR. EDUARDO U. MANESE, Petitioners, v. VIRGILIO L. MAZAREDO,
Respondent
G.R. No. 201359, September 23, 2015
-Arevalo

FACTS:
Respondent Virgilio Mazaredo has been working for petitioner manning agency Magsaysay
Maritime Corporation since 1996. For his last employment contract, he was hired as Upholsterer
onboard the vessel M/V “Tahitian Princess.” He was to receive a monthly salary of US$455.00
under his 10-month POEA Standard Employment Contract dated June 25, 2008 and was
deployed on July 5, 2008.

While aboard M/V “Tahitian Princess,” respondent experienced back pain. Upon examination by
the ship’s doctor, he was diagnosed with uncontrolled hypertension and was advised to consult a
cardiologist. On March 22, 2009, respondent was medically repatriated and immediately referred
to the company-designated physician. Respondent underwent a series of examinations and was
found to be suffering from “coronary artery disease, three-vessel involvement.” He was
recommended to undergo coronary artery bypass graft surgery; however respondent could not
afford said surgery, and instead underwent angioplasty, which was a mere outpatient procedure.
Petitioners did not provide medical and financial assistance after respondent's initial diagnosis.

Respondent filed a Complaint against petitioners for recovery of permanent total disability and
sickness benefits, reimbursement of medical and other expenses, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorney's fees, claiming that petitioners acted in bad faith in refusing to provide medical and
financial assistance to address his heart condition, which he claimed was contracted during his
employment with the latter; and that he has been rendered permanently and totally disabled,
which thus entitled him to the maximum corresponding benefits.

Petitioners argued that respondent disembarked upon completion of his contract which meant
that he completed his contract prior to contracting of his illness; that respondent's illness is not
work-related as declared by the company-designated physician in a Medical Report dated March
27, 2009 which thus justified their denial of respondent's disability claim; and that the company-
designated physician's assessment should prevail in deciding respondent's case.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the respondent's Complaint for lack of merit,
which was, in turn, vacated and set aside by the NLRC upon respondent’s appeal. Petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the NLRC. Finally, petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside the NLRC dispositions and reiterating their
arguments that respondent's disability was not work-related; that he disembarked from the vessel
due to a finished and completed employment contract, and not his illness; and that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the awards.

The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the NLRC, hence the present appeal.

ISSUES:
Whether respondent disembarked from the vessel due to a finished contract or his illness; and
whether or not respondent's illness is work-related.

RULING:
YES, respondent's illness is work-related and is the reason of his disembarkation from the vessel.
Petitioners insist that respondent's employment contract expired before he contracted his illness;
however, the evidence clearly belies such claim. His 10-month POEA SEC was dated June 5,
2008; he was deployed on July 5, 2008, and repatriated on March 22, 2009 – or sometime during
the ninth or tenth month of his POEA SEC.

On the issue of compensability, there is no question that respondent's condition – “coronary

artery disease, three-vessel involvement” – is a covered illness. It has consistently been held that
cardiovascular diseases, coronary artery disease, as well as other heart ailments, are
compensable. It likewise remains undisputed that given his 12 years of employment with
petitioners and the conditions he was subjected to as a seafarer, respondent's illness can be
attributed to his work. As correctly held by the CA, there is a reasonable connection between
respondent's work and the development and exacerbation of his heart ailment. During his
employment as seafarer, respondent was consistently exposed to varying temperatures and harsh
weather conditions as the ship crossed ocean boundaries, and he may have been required to
perform overtime work. Indeed, “any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally
resulting in wear and tear of the human body.”

Furthermore, respondent's condition remains unresolved and petitioners did not renew his
contract; nor was respondent able to work for other employers on account of his condition. Thus,
applying the doctrine enunciated in Magsaysay Mitsui OSK Marine, Inc. v. Bengson and Alpha
Ship Management Corporation v. Cab – that an employee's disability becomes permanent and
total when so declared by the company-designated physician, or, in case of absence of such a
declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability, upon the lapse of the statutory 120- or
240-day treatment period, while the employee's disability continues and he is unable to engage in
gainful employment during such period, and the company-designated physician fails to arrive at
a definite assessment of the employee's fitness or disability – respondent is thus deemed totally
and permanently disabled and entitled to the corresponding benefit under the POEA SEC.

Finally, the Supreme Court served a warning that another transgression shall warrant the
initiation of proceedings for disbarment, to the petitioners’ counsels of record, Atty. Herbert Tria
and Atty. Jerome Pampolina for repeatedly attempting all throughout the proceedings of this
case, or for a period of six years, to deceive and mislead the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, the CA,
and the Supreme Court, into believing that a favorable March 27, 2009 “Medical Report” of
petitioners’ company-designated physician exists which supposedly shows that respondent’s
condition was not work-connected and not compensable, when in fact there is none.

The Supreme Court has taken pains to review in earnest the record, in order to locate and
determine what the March 27, 2009 medical report contained, but it could not be found. Yet in
their pleadings filed before the Court, Attys. Tria and Pampolina continued to refer to the
document. Instead, it appears that in truth and in fact, there is no such document: from the start,
the Labor Arbiter already noted its absence; in fact, the Labor Arbiter even admonished
respondents to “carefully go over the evidence they present or inadvertently fail to attach.” But
just the same, the CA was deceived to the point of declaring that respondent “was diagnosed
with hypertensive cardiovascular disease and the company-designated physician opined that his
illness is not work-related and found to be generic in origin” when no such medical opinion
exists on record. It would appear, therefore, that such “medical report” was contrived in order to
satisfy the legal requirement that the company-designated physician must make a definitive
assessment of the employee's fitness to work in order to justify a denial of disability benefits.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct” (Rule 1.01); he “shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause” (Rule 1.03); he “shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice” (Rule 10.01); and he “shall not knowingly assert as a fact that which
has not been proved” (Rule 10.02). Lawyers should not transcend the bounds of propriety and
commit a travesty before this Court by willfully, intentionally and deliberately resorting to
falsehood and deception in handling their client's case in order to misguide, obstruct and impede
the proper administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Resolution of the CA is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.

Atty. Herbert Tria and Atty. Jerome Pampolina are STERNLY WARNED for their unethical
conduct.
 RYAN S. PLAZA, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court, Argao, Cebu, Complainant, v.
ATTY. MARCELINA R. AMAMIO, Clerk of Court, GENOVEVA R. VASQUEZ, Legal
Researcher and FLORAMAY PATALINGHUG, Court Stenographer, all of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 26, Argao, Cebu, Respondents,
A.M. No. P-08-2559, March 19, 2010
-Arevalo

FACTS:
Complainant Ryan Plaza, Clerk of Court II of the MTC of Argao, alleged that sometime in the
first week of July 2007, he heard that some of the personnel of RTC Branch 26 were planning to
hold a Sara Lee party in the Argao Hall of Justice and thereafter informed the personnel of the
said court about Administrative Circular No. 3-92 prohibiting the use of the Halls of Justice for
residential or commercial purposes.

In the morning of July 14, 2007, a Saturday, the security guard on duty, Roger Jimenez,
telephoned him with the information that there were persons from Sara Lee who wanted to enter
the Argao Hall of Justice to put up the decorations, sound system and catering equipment for the
Sara Lee party. Complainant directed Jimenez not to allow the persons to enter the premises. He
then called up Atty. Marcelina Amamio, Clerk of Court of the said RTC, to inform her of the
situation and of the infraction that would be committed should the Sara Lee party push through;
however, Atty. Amamio insisted that she had authorized the Sara Lee party and raffle draw.

In the security logbook, Jimenez wrote that he received a telephone call from Genoveva
Vasquez, legal researcher of the RTC, approving the use of the entrance lobby for the raffle draw
which she claimed was authorized by Atty. Amamio. According to the entries in the logbook, the
raffle draw started at around 2:00 p.m. and ended at 5:00 p.m., with 51 participants attending the
event. The security guards on duty who recorded the Sara Lee event in the logbook were later
subjected to harassment by the respondents who questioned the guards as to why the said event
was recorded in the logbook and for also jotting down the court personnel who were not in
uniform.

Complainant stressed that holding the party and raffle draw inside the Argao Hall of Justice was
a clear violation of Administrative Circular 3-92 and had exposed the properties and records
contained within it to risk of damage and loss.

In their joint comment, respondents vehemently and strongly resisted the charges against them
for utter lack of both legal and factual bases. The respondents argued that only a raffle draw was
conducted and no commercial activity or transaction which involved the buying and selling of
goods for profit was made. They further claimed that similar activities had been held before at
the Argao Hall of Justice such as a beauty pageant and a Sinulog parade. The respondents added
that since the building which houses the Argao Hall of Justice has been declared a cultural
heritage and is the centerpiece of the said municipality, then the activity planned by Sara Lee
was appropriate in promoting the town of Argao. They also denied harassing and intimidating
the security guards who recorded the raffle draw in the logbook.

Atty. Amamio denied the complainant’s allegation that the latter informed her about violating
Administrative Circular No. 3-92, stating that she need not be informed about the issuance of
said circuler since she had practically read and studied carefully all circulars that had been issued
by the Supreme Court “not only as a dutiful Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, but as a
lawyer herself.”

The matter was indorsed to Judge Maximo Perez, RTC of Argao, Branch 26, for appropriate
action and investigation, who then recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
substantial evidence to substantiate the charge. However, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) did not agree with the findings of the Judge and held that respondents violated
Administrative Circular No. 3-92 by allowing the holding of a raffle draw in the lobby of the
Argao Hall of Justice. OCA recommended that Atty. Amamio be SUSPENDED for one month
and one day for simple misconduct and the other respondents be REPRIMANDED for violation
of office rules and regulations, both with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents violated Administrative Circular No. 3-92.

RULING:
YES, respondents violated Administrative Circular No. 3-92. The Supreme Court adopted the
findings and recommendations of the OCA.

The complainant manifested before the Court his intention to desist from pursuing the case.
However, the Supreme Court stated that the discretion whether to continue with the proceedings
rests exclusively with the Court, notwithstanding the complainant’s intention to desist. Courts
look with disfavor at affidavits of desistance filed by complainants, especially if done as an
afterthought. Contrary to what the parties might have believed, withdrawal of the complaint does
not have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from any administrative disciplinary sanction.
It does not operate to divest this Court of jurisdiction to determine the truth behind the matter
stated in the complaint. The Court’s disciplinary authority cannot be dependent on or frustrated
by private arrangements between parties.

An administrative complaint against an official or employee of the judiciary cannot simply be

withdrawn by a complainant who suddenly claims a change of mind. Otherwise, the prompt and
fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.
As correctly observed by the OCA, a careful reading of Administrative Circular No. 3-92 shows
that the Halls of Justice are to be used only for court purposes and for no other purpose, despite
the use of the word “may,” which the respondents and the investigating judge argue as
permissive and not mandatory. The mention of residential and commercial purposes are used as
concrete examples since such instances actually happened and were in fact the subject of
administrative cases, and are thus enumerated, not to exclude other acts but rather to illustrate the
general prohibition. Thus, the argument that the raffle draw event was not residential or
commercial does not deserve consideration.

This reminder was reiterated in Administrative Circular No. 1-9917 where courts are described
as “temples of justice” and as such, “their dignity and sanctity must, at all times, be preserved
and enhanced.” The Court thus exhorted its officials and employees to strive to inspire public
respect for the justice system by, among others, not using “their offices as a residence or for any
other purpose than for court or judicial functions.”

The Supreme Court also agreed with the OCA that the fact the Argao Hall of Justice had been
used for similar activities does not justify the holding of the raffle draw thereat. The Argao Hall
of Justice is not meant to be used for festivities, and in fact should remain closed to the public
during such occasions. The contention that there was no danger to the building and the records
since the raffle draw was merely held at the ground floor lobby is untenable. Time and again, the
Court has always stressed in pertinent issuances and decisions that courts are temples of justice,
the honor and dignity of which must be upheld and that their use shall not expose judicial records
to danger of loss or damage.

If the Argao Hall of Justice is such an important historical landmark, all the more reason why
activities such as the Sara Lee raffle draw, should not be held within. At most, the said Hall of
Justice could have been made part of a regular local tour, to be viewed at designated hours,
which viewing shall be confined to certain areas not intrusive to court operations and records.

ACCORDINGLY, Atty. Amamio is found GUILTY of simple misconduct and is ordered

SUSPENDED for one month and one day with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Ms. Vasquez and Ms. Patalinghug, are
found GUILTY of violation of office rules and regulations and are REPRIMANDED with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
 PATROCINIA H. SALABAO vs. ATTY. ANDRES C. VILLARUEL
A.C. No. 8084, August 24, 2015
-Briton
FACTS:
In 1995, Salabao filed a case against Elmer Lumberio for his deceitful or fraudulent
conduct of taking her precious real property situated in Taguig City. After hearing, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162, Pasig City issued its resolution in her favor in 2002.
In 2002, the RTC Branch 162, Pasig City which tried Civil Case No. 65147 issued its
resolution in her favor. In order to delay the case, Villaruel brought the case on appeal to the CA
which also decided in her favor. Respondent again filed an appeal before the Supreme Court
under GR No. 16741. Lumberio lost the case and it became final and executory.
Undeterred, Villaruel tried to defer the execution of the decision of the RTC, Branch 162,
by bringing to the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment. When rebuffed, he again appealed
to the Supreme Court sans a clear or new arguments other than what he had presented before the
Court of Appeals.
Still, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the 29 November 2007
Order of the RTC before the CA which was however dismissed. From hereon, there was not
stopping Villaruel. Once again he filed a new complaint before the RTC of Mauban, Quezon,
Branch 64. Apart from this, Respondent filed several Motion, Inhibition and Contempt that were
meant to delay the resolution of the case. He likewise filed an administrative case against Judge
Briccio Ygaña of RTC Branch 153, Taguig City. Salabao then complained that Villaruel had
done more than enough to suppress her rights as a winning litigant and filed this case for abuse
of processes pursuant to Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Investigating Commissioner found at respondent "relentlessly filed petitions and
appeals in order to exhaust all possible remedies to obtain relief for his client" which he
considered as tantamount to "abusive and a spiteful effort to delay the execution of Judgment,”
and herein to have violated Canon 12, Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the CPR for which he
should be meted with the appropriate administrative penalty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Villaruel Jr., violated Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for abuse of court processes?

RULING:
While it is true that lawyers owe "entire devotion" to the cause of their clients, 10 it cannot
be emphasized enough that their first and primary duty is "not to the client but to the
administration of justice."11 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A
lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice." Thus, in the use of Court processes, the lawyer's zeal to win must be
tempered by the paramount consideration that justice be done to all parties involved, and the
lawyer for the losing party should not stand in the way of the execution of a valid judgment. This
is a fundamental principle in legal ethics and professional responsibility that has iterations in
various forms:

The Lawyer's Oath:

x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to my clients x x x 
Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.

Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse Court processes.
Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice,
any act of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of justice constitutes
misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.
From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed, it is clear that respondent's
intention was to delay the execution of the final judgment.
It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by abusing Court
processes, employing dilatory tactics to frustrate the execution of a final judgment, and feigning
ignorance of Ms duties as an officer of the court. He has breached his sworn duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice, and violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.03 and
12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c) and (g) of the Rules
of Court. In so doing, he is administratively liable for his actions.
Atty. Andres Villaruel, Jr. is found guilty of violations of Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 10.03 and
12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is suspended for 18 months.
 DARIA O. DAGING vs. ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS,
A.C. No. 9395 November 12, 2014
-Briton
FACTS:
The owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge was complainant Daging.
She leased from Benjie Pinlac a building space located at No. 22 Otek St., Baguio City where the
bar operates. Complainant received a Retainer Proposal from Davis & Sabling Law Office
signed by respondent Atty. Davis and his partner Atty.Amos Saganib-Sabling, which eventually
resulted in a Retainer Agreement signed by both parties.
 
Pinlac terminated the lease because Daging was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals.
Pinlac and Novie Balageo inventoried all equipment and took over the operation of the bar under
the name, Amarillo Music Bar. Daging alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac
and Balageo before (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time, Davis & Sabling Law Office
was still her counsel as their Retainer Agreement remained subsisting and in force. However,
Atty. Davis appeared as counsel for Balageo in that ejectment case filed, on behalf of the latter,
an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Respondent maintained that he never obtained any knowledge or information regarding the
business of complainant who used to consult only Atty. Sabling. Respondent admitted though
having represented Balageo in the ejectment case, but denied that he took advantage of the
Retainer Agreement between complainant and Davis and Sabling Law Office.

The Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and Recommendation finding Atty.

Davis guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of information obtained from his
client to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of another person. He recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and reduced suspension to 6 months upon motion of complainant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Davis violated the Code of Professional Responsibility in appearing
as a lawyer in the ejectment case?

RULING:
Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent transgressed Rule 15.03
of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It provides:

Rule 15.03 -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person
whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client." The prohibition against
representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in
good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.”

In Quiambao v. Atty. Bamba, this Court emphasized that lawyers are expected not only
to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of Davis & Sabling Law office, her
case is actually handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling. He was not privy to any transaction
between Atty. Sabling and complainant and has no knowledge of any information or legal matter
complainant entrusted or confided to his law partner. He thus inveigles that he could not have
taken advantage of information obtained by his law firm by virtue of the Retainer Agreement.

In Hilado v. David, reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana, Jr., this Court held that a
lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has engaged the services of his
law firm brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion and undermines the
integrity of justice. Thus, respondent's argument that he never took advantage of any information
acquired by his law firm in the course of its professional dealings with the complainant, even
assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the fact that complainant is a client
of his law firm, respondent should have immediately informed both the complainant and Balageo
that he, as well as the other members of his law firm, cannot represent any of them in their legal
tussle; otherwise, they would be representing conflicting interests and violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Indeed, respondent could have simply advised both complainant and
Balageo to instead engage the services of another lawyer.

Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a stiffer
penalty.
 William G. Campos vs Atty. Alexander Estebal
AC No. 10443, Aug. 8, 2016
-Cañas
FACTS:
In the early part of 2006, complainants engaged the services of Atty. Estebal to assist each of
them in securing tourist visas to the United States. Toward this end, on January 24, 2006,
Campos and Atty. Estebal entered into a Service Contract stipulating an acceptance/service fee of
P200,000.00 exclusive of out-of-pocket expenses such as tickets, filing fees, and application
fees; and that in case no visa is issued, Campos is entitled to a refund of what has been actually
paid less 7% thereof. Campos paid Atty. Estebal the sum of P150, 000.00. For their part, Batac
and Carpio gave Atty. Estebal the amounts of P75, 000.00 and P120, 000.00, respectively.
Unlike Campos, their agreement with Atty. Estebal was not put in writing.

Complainants claimed that despite receipt of their monies, Atty. Estebal failed to apply or secure
for them the U.S. tourist visas that he promised. Thus, they demanded for the return of their
monies. Atty, Estebal, however, failed to return the amount despite repeated demands. Hence,
they filed this Complaint praying that Atty. Estebal be suspended or disbarred from the practice
of law, and that he be directed to return their monies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Estebal is guilty of professional misconduct for violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
RULING:
Yes.
Respondent clearly violated Canons 15, 16 and 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN

ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client,

CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his
fees.

Respondent violated Canon 15 for the reason that he was not candid enough to tell the
complainants their chance[s] of getting US visa. Instead, the respondent made the complainants
believe that they will have a good chance of getting the US visa if they will be joined with other
groups. It turned out to be false. Complainants waited for so long before the respondent could
find other members of the group. In the end, nothing happened .He also violated Canon 16, Rule
16.01 because he did not account the money he received from the complainants. It is not clear to
the complainants how much is trip amount due to the respondent. Lastly, it appears that the
attorney's fees that he collected from the complainants are excessive and unreasonable.
Considering the degree of work and number of hours spent, the amount he collected from the
complainants is not commensurate to the degree of services rendered. Obviously, respondent
took advantage of the weakness of the complainants in their desire to go the United States.

In view of the foregoing, the respondent Atty. Alexander C. Estebal is hereby found GUILTY of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is also ORDERED
to return the amounts of P135, 000.00 to William G. Campos, Jr., P60, 000.00 to Rita C. Batac;
and P105, 000.00 to Dorina D. Carpio. Atty. Alexander C. Estebal is WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
 SABITSANA JR. vs MUERTEGUI
GR No. 181359, Aug. 5,2013
-Cañas
FACTS:
Petitioner Clemencio Sabitsana was the counsel of the respondent, Juanito Muertegui. The
dispute involved a parcel of land bought by Juanito by virtue of an un-notarized deed of sale
from Alberto Garcia. Juanito’s father and his brother Domingo, took actual possession of the
land. Later on, Garcia sold the same land to the petitioner this time, through a notarized deed of
sale. When the respondents’ father passed away, the heirs applied for the registration and
coverage of the lot under Public Land Act or CA No. 141. Petitioner opposed the application,
claiming he was the true owner of the lot. Respondent filed for quieting of title and preliminary
injunction against petitioners Clemencio and his wife, Rosario, claiming that they bought the
land in bad faith and are exercising possession and ownership of the same, which acts thus
constitute a cloud over the title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the declaratory relief.
RULING:
YES.
The RTC has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title. On the question of jurisdiction, it is
clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless
of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides that,
an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the
appropriate RTC. Both the trial court and the CA are, however, wrong in applying Article 1544
of the Civil Code. That provision does not apply to sales involving unregistered land. Act No.
3344applies to sale of unregistered lands. What applies in this case is Act No. 3344, as amended,
which provides for the system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No.
3344 expressly declares that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party
with a better right. The question to be resolved therefore is: who between petitioners and
respondent has a better right to the disputed lot? Respondent has a better right to the lot since
Petitioner is a purchaser in bad faith.
 MALANGAS VS ZAIDE
A.C. No.10675
-Capoquian
FACTS:
Complainant Datu Ismael Malangas instituted a verified complaint for disbarment against
respondent lawyer Atty. Paul C.Zaide, before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Complainant accused respondent lawyer of committing acts of dishonesty, breach of trust, and
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, this is in connection with a Civil Case (complaint for
damages before the RTC of Iligan City) he filed against Paul Alfeche and NEMA Electrical and
Industrial Sales, Inc, where he engaged the services of respondent lawyer.
Civil Case:
Complainant figured in an accident where two vehicles (Alfeche and NEMA), hit
and pinned him in between them , he was hospitalized for more than 4 months, and spent
more than 1.5 million pesos, despite the operations, he remained crippled and bed ridden.
Complainant gave respondent lawyer P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P50,000.00 as filing
fees. He later discovered, however, that his Complaint had been dismissed by the RTC because
of "failure to prosecute," for the reason that respondent lawyer did not attend two hearings in the
case, and because respondent lawyer did not submit an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed
therein by NEMA. Respondent lawyer filed a Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel effectively
leaving him without counsel to prosecute his case. He sent a relative to the RTC, where he
further discovered that the amount of damages sought in the Complaint filed by respondent
lawyer was only P250,000.00, and not P5 million, as stated in the copy of the Complaint given to
him by respondent lawyer.
Respondent lawyer claimed that he only received appearance fees in attending to complainant's
civil case. Respondent lawyer specifically denied that he received an acceptance fee of P20,
000.00.
According to respondent lawyer, the complaint which embodied a prayer for P5 million in
damages "was clearly maneuvered to create an impression that he, (respondent lawyer)
defrauded the complainant.”
Lastly, respondent lawyer contended that although he deliberately skipped attending the hearings
set by the RTC in said Civil Case, and that although he also intentionally filed no opposition to
NEMA's Motion to Dismiss, these matters were initially agreed upon between him and
complainant.
Proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Following the investigation, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline submitted his Report and Recommendation dated January 29, 2013 finding respondent
lawyer guilty of dishonesty and breach of trust, for which he recommended a penalty of two
years suspension against respondent lawyer.   Commissioner Cachapero found complainant's
allegations more credible than respondent lawyer's explanation.
Respondent mentioned that he has never received acceptance fee from Complainant, however, he
may have contradicted his declaration in this regard when in his Answer he mentioned that he
received P7,000.00 for docket fee and the rest was paid as advance fees for his services and the
usual visitation done by him at the hospital.
Commissioner Cachapero found respondent lawyer negligent in the handling of complainant's
case.
Action of the IBP Board of Governors
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Cachapero.
Respondent committed Dishonesty, Breach of Trust and Negligence to Complainant, Atty. Paul
C. Zaide is SUSPENDED from practice of law for two (2) years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent lawyer is guilty of professional misconduct and violation of the Code
of professional responsibility.
RULING:
Respondent lawyer is found guilty of professional misconduct and of violating Canons 1, 16, and
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Complainant's version is more credible, while there are inconsistencies in respondent lawyer's
allegations.
Respondent lawyer himself admitted that he received "P7,000.00 for the docket fees and the rest
[was paid] as advance fees for his services and the usual visitation done [by] him at the
hospital."16 Because of this admission, it can be concluded that respondent lawyer received fees
"for his services" from the complainant himself.
Respondent lawyer's refusal to account for the funds given to him, especially his refusal to return
the amount paid in excess of what was required as docket fees, clearly violated Rules 16,01 and
16.03 of the CPR, to wit:

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith
in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship."
By his deliberate failure to file a Comment on or Opposition to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss in
said Civil Case No. 6380, and by his failure to appear at the hearings in connection therewith,
respondent lawyer unduly delayed the case in violation of Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR.
If respondent lawyer's claim that he and complainant had indeed agreed to drop the case against
NEMA were true, then he as an officer of the court should have saved the Court's precious time
by at least promptly manifesting his lack of objection to NEMA's Motion to Dismiss. This he did
not do.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Paul C. Zaide is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years effective immediately. Atty, Paul C. Zaide is also ORDERED to promptly return to
complainant the sums given to him as acceptance fee and docket fees in the amount of
P70,000.00, from which should be deducted the amount of P2,623.60 paid as docketing fees.
 A.C. No. 7337, September 29, 2014

ROLANDO VIRAY v. ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS

-Capoquian

FACTS:
Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor case2 he filed
against Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez).
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant. Among the order of the court is also for the
Sps. Lopez the complainant the attorney’s fees for the amount of P17,226.51.
Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was issued relative to aforesaid decision.  During the
implementation of said writ, however, complainant discovered that respondent had already
collected the total amount of P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez. Respondent received said amount
in the following manner:
Date Voucher No. Amount Purpose
02/05/2004 7802 P 20,000.00 Attorney’s fees
02/13/2004 7833 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
02/26/2004 7848 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
03/12/2004 7894 20,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
04/02/2004 7932 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
04/06/2004 7941 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
04/13/2004 7944 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
04/16/2004 7954 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
04/30/2004 7977 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
Total Amount: P 95,000.00
Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is
authorized to receive payments on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is not.  Consequently,
complainant made several verbal demands to the respondent to remit to him the amount of
P95,000.00, less his attorney’s fees of P20,000.00.  But respondent did not budge.  Thus,
complainant lodged a complaint before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Brgy. Felisa,
Bacolod City.  Respondent, however, ignored the summons to attend a conference before the
barangay to resolve the issues.
ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS (Respondent):
He admits that he received P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on installments, but denies that he
was not authorized to accept it.
He explains that complainant agreed to pay him additional attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of
the total monetary award, on top of the attorney’s fees that may be awarded by the labor tribunal,
and to refund all expenses respondent incurred relative to the case. Thus, from the total award of
P189,491.60, the sum of P17,226.57 representing respondent’s professional fees has to be
deducted, leaving a balance of P172,275.13. Then from said amount, complainant proposed that
he will get P100,000.00 and the balance of P72,275.13 shall belong to respondent as and for his
additional 25% attorney’s fees and reimbursement for all expenses he incurred while handling
the case. However, after receiving the amount of P95,000.00 and deducting therefrom the
amounts of P20,000.007 attorney’s fees, P17,000.00 earlier given to complainant, and P2,000.00
paid to the sheriff, what was left to respondent was only P56,000.00.  Respondent whines that
this amount is way below the promised 25% attorney’s fees and refund of expenses in the total
amount of P72,275.13.
INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER: Respondent be meted the penalty of two (2) years
suspension. Respondent is also ordered to return, in restitution all the amounts in his possession
which are due to complainant, less his rightful attorney’s fees
IBP Board of Governors: Approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner suspending respondent from the practice of law for two years, but with the
modification that respondent should restitute the sum of P85,500.00 to the complainant.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to promptly account
to his client the funds received in the course of his professional engagement and return the same
upon demand.
RULING: Yes. The Court finds respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas GUILTY of gross
misconduct and accordingly SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Also, Atty. Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant, within 90 days from finality of this
Resolution, the net amount of P85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality
of this Resolution until the full amount is returned. 
“The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith
in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship.” 
Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty to “account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client.”  Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other
hand, mandates that “[a] lawyer shall deliver the funds x x x of his client when due or upon
demand.”
In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions from February 5, 2004 to April 30, 2004
received payments for attorney’s fees and partial payments for monetary awards on behalf of
complainant from spouses Lopez.  But despite the number of times over close to three months he
had been receiving payment, respondent neither informed the complainant of such fact nor
rendered an accounting thereon.  It was only when an Alias Writ of Execution was issued and
being implemented when complainant discovered that spouses Lopez had already given
respondent the total amount of P95,000.00 as partial payment for the monetary awards granted to
him by the labor tribunal.
To make matters worse, respondent withheld and refused to deliver to the complainant said
amount, which he merely received on behalf of his client, even after demand. Such failure and
inordinate refusal on the part of the respondent to render an accounting and return the money
after demand raises the presumption that he converted it to his own use.
His unjustified withholding of the funds also warrants the imposition of disciplinary action
against him.
There is nothing in the records which would support respondent’s claim that he was authorized
to receive the payments.  Neither is there proof that complainant agreed to pay him additional
25% attorney’s fees and reimburse him for all expenses he allegedly incurred in connection with
the case.  Respondent did not present any document, retainer’s agreement, or itemized
breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support his claim. 
Even assuming that respondent was authorized to receive payments, the same does not exempt
him from his duty of promptly informing his client of the amounts he received in the course of
his professional employment.  “The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and
client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received
for or from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money
he has collected for his client.”  “The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney’s fees on the
money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a
prompt accounting.”
Moreover, a lawyer has no right “to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the
mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees.”
In sum, “[r]espondent’s failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and
upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral
soundness, and warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.”
 SPOUSES GEORGE WARRINER ABD AURORA WARRINER VS. ATTY. RENI M.
DUBLIN
A.C. NO 5239, NOVEMBER 18, 2013
-Cello
FACTS:
Complainant spouses alleged that they secured the services respondent Atty. Reni M. Dublin
forclaim of damages against E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. Respondent requested the RTC
for a period of 10 days within which to submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence.
However, respondent did not send anything. This prompted the RTC to dismiss the Civil Case to
the prejudice of the complainants. On 26 June 2000, respondent was directed to file his comment
to the administrative complaint. He thereafter requested an extension of 30 days which the court
eventually granted. However respondent had not yet filed his comment as of August 5, 2002 or
after a lapse of almost two years. Respondent did not show any cause why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt. On March 10, 2008, the court resolved to order
respondent's arrest and detention. In his side, respondent Atty. Dublin claimed that complainant
Warriner's cause in filing the Civil Case No. 23, 396-95 is vitiated by fraud, thus, led him to
believe that his late comment in the instant case was with the contention of protecting the legal
profession and in accordance with his oath not to do any falsehood or promote unlawful causes.
ISSUE/S:
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Reni M. Dublin should be held guilty of violating Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in representing the cause of herein complainant
spouses George A. Warriner and Aurora R. Warriner
RULING:
The Court suspended respondent Atty. Reni M. Dublin from the practice of law for six months.
The court held that respondent is guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23, 396-95. Responded,
thus, violated Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that “A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence" and "A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with shall render
him liable ".
Respondents admittedly claim that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of exhibits.
 CABUATAN V. ATTY. VENIDA
A.C. NO. 10043, NOVEMBER 20, 2013
-Cello
FACTS:

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
received a Complaint filed by Aurora H. Cabauatan (complainant) against respondent Atty.
Freddie A. Venida for serious misconduct and gross neglect of duty. x x x Complainant alleged
that she was the appellant in CA-G.R. [No.] 85024 entitled Aurora Cabauatan, PlaintiffAppellant
vs. Philippine National Bank, Defendant-Appellee. The case was originally handled by a
different lawyer but she decided to change her counsel and engaged the services of the
Respondent x x x. Complainant was then furnished by the Respondent of the pleadings he
prepared, such as "Appearance as Counsel/Dismissal of the Previous Counsel and a Motion for
Extension of time to File a Memorandum." Complainant made several followups on her case
until she lost contact with the Respondent. Complainant alleged the gross, reckless and
inexcusable negligence of the Respondent that led to the case is “x x x deemed ABANDONED
and DISMISSED on authority of Sec. 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1996 Rules of Civil Procedure. x x x”
Certified on March 31, 2006. Respondent did not submit any pleading with the Court of Appeals.
It is likewise very noticeable that the Respondent was not among those furnished with a copy of
the Entry of Judgment hence it is crystal clear that he never submitted his Entry of Appearance
with the Court of Appeals [insofar] as the case of the Complainant is concerned. Respondent
assured the Complainant that he was doing his best in dealing with the case, nevertheless, later
on Complainant lost contact with him. x x x including the fact that he was not one of the parties
furnished with a copy of the Entry of Judgment proved the inaction and negligence of the
Respondent.

ISSUE/S:
Is respondent can be held liable for his gross negligence and inaction
against his clients’ case?

RULING:

Yes, It is beyond dispute that complainant engaged the services of respondent to handle her case
which was then on appeal before the Court of Appeals. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client's
cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter's rights.
Complainant also established that she made several follow-ups with the respondent but the latter
merely ignored her or made her believe that he was diligently handling her case. Thus,
complainant was surprised when she received a notice from the Court of Appeals informing her
that her appeal had been abandoned and her case dismissed. The dismissal had become final and
executory. This is a clear violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to keep their clients informed of the status of their case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients' request for information. The Code of
Professional Responsibility pertinently provides: Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause
of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. Canon 18 – A
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. x x x x Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida is SUSPENDED from the practice o law for
one year effective immediately, with WARNING that a similar violation will be dealt with more
severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to
enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect. Let a copy of this
Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.
 FAJ CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SUSAN M.
SAULOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 200759 March 25, 2015
-Corot
FACTS:
On June 15, 1999, petitioner FAJ Construction and Development Corporation and respondent
Susan M. Saulog entered into a construction agreement of a residential building for a contract
price of P12,500,000.00. Payment to petitioner contractor shall be on a progress billing basis,
after inspection of the work by respondent.
Construction of the building commenced, and respondent made a corresponding total payment to
petitioner. However, progress billing statements sent by petitioner, respondent refused to pay.
After performing additional work, petitioner made another request for payment, but respondent
again refused to pay, prompting petitioner to terminate the construction contract.
Petitioner then sent demand letters to. In reply, respondent claimed that petitioner’s work was
defective, and that it should instead be made liable thereon.
Petitioner thus filed with the RTC of Quezon City a civil case for collection of a sum of money
with damages against respondent alleging that despite faithful compliance with the construction
agreement, respondent refused to pay, which prompted it to stop construction of the building.
Petitioner thus prayed that respondent be ordered to pay the unpaid billings, the retention
amount, for litigation expenses, attorney’s fees and appearance fees, and costs of suit.
In Civil Case, respondent was allowed to present her evidence on the counterclaim. Plaintiff FAJ
Construction & Development Corporation is hereby ordered to pay defendant Susan Saulog.
RTC, however, dismisses the claim of Susan Saulog for additional consequential damages,
which has not been proven.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA which essentially argued that the trial court erred in
holding petitioner liable to the respondent for the amounts stated in the decretal portion of the
trial court’s decision. In addition, petitioner contended that it was erroneous for the trial court to
have dismissed its complaint for failure to prosecute, as it should not be penalized for the
negligence of its counsel, which is the sole reason for the dismissal thereof.
On November 29, 2011, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming with modification
deleting the award of lost rentals, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees,
including appearance fee.
Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration, but in a February 24, 2012 Resolution, the
CA denied the same. Hence, the present Petition.

ISSUES:
In a January 28, 2013 Resolution,38 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition, which
raises the following assignment of errors:
 I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED
THAT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED
THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES, AND IN IMPOSING THE
PENALTY FOR DELAY AND AWARDING INTEREST ON ALL AMOUNTS DUE.

RULING:
The Court denies the Petition.
Petitioner’s claim that res judicata cannot apply has no merit. The Court has repeatedly said that
minute resolutions dismissing the actions filed before it constitute actual adjudications on the
merits. They are the result of thorough deliberation among the members of the Court. When the
Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies the petition, there is
no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already means that it agrees with and
adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. The decision sought to be reviewed and set aside
is correct. It would be an exercise in redundancy for the Court to reproduce or restate in the
minute resolution denying the petition the conclusions that the CA reached.
Next, petitioner’s argument that it should not be punished for the negligence of its counsel
deserves the same treatment. Suffice it to state that we have not seen any reason to reverse the
CA’s ruling on this matter; on the other hand, the record will disclose that petitioner was itself
neglectful of its duties relative to its case, and it continued to retain the services of its counsel
which it now conveniently claims to be negligent, even after repeatedly suffering from the
latter’s claimed lack of care. It appears that despite witnessing firsthand the caliber of its lawyer
during the initial presentation of its evidence in 2003, petitioner changed counsel only after the
trial court’s January 30, 2006 Decision on respondent’s counterclaim. The general rule still
applies that the mistakes of counsel bind his client.
On the issue of liability, we find — relying on the identical findings of the trial and appellate
courts — that petitioner is guilty of violating the construction agreement, for its defective and
incomplete work, delay, and for unjustified abandonment of the project. Indeed, we find no
reason to disturb the identical pronouncements of the trial court and the CA. The same holds true
with respect to the issue of damages raised by petitioner; it requires an inquiry into the facts,
which is no longer this Court’s realm. In a case previously decided by this ponente concerning a
construction contract and where similar allegations of abandonment, delay and defective
workmanship were advanced, it was held that —
Petitioner endeavors to convince us to determine, yet again, the weight, credence, and probative
value of the evidence presented. This cannot be done in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where only questions of law may be raised by the parties
and passed upon by us. In Fong v. Velayo, we defined a question of law as distinguished from a
question of fact, viz.:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must
rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the
issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the [question] posed is one of fact. Thus, the test
of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the
party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it
is a question of fact.
Since respondent suffered damages as a result of petitioner’s defective and delayed work and
unjustified abandonment of the project, the principle of damnum absque injuria cannot apply.
The principle cannot apply when there is an abuse of a person’s right.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The November 29, 2011 Decision and February 24,
2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 WILSON CHUA vs. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ
A.C. No. 9880. November 28, 2016.
-Corot
FACTS
The complainant is in a retainership agreement with the respondent for the latter to handle all his
legal problems. For these, he gave respondent money for necessary filing fees and entrusted to
the respondent all the pertinent documents thereto.
The complainant likewise alleged that, for the last seven years prior, he had never attended a
single hearing on any case assigned to respondent. Respondent allegedly would advise him of
upcoming hearings only to cancel them last minute due purportedly to cancellations,
postponements, or resettings of the hearings.
Complainant had written respondent several times for the return of the documents he had
entrusted to respondent as well as the amount she gave for filing fees. On September 24, 2003,
he terminated respondent’s legal services for failure to file the necessary cases, the very object of
the retainership agreement, and to return the fees he gave.
Respondent denied complainant’s charges that he had violated his oath of office as a lawyer and
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He further alleged that he had been pressuring the
complainant and his mother for the payment of professional services rendered by his law firm
and because of this nonpayment or failure to arrive at a mutually acceptable arrangement for the
payment of his professional fees, he has withheld the filing of cases on behalf of the complainant
and his companies. He also denied receiving the money for filing fees from complainant.
By way of Reply, complainant insisted that respondent had received the amount intended for
payment of filing fees. As proof, he submitted photocopies of checks payable to respondent as
well as cash vouchers showing details of said payment.
Mandatory conference was thereafter conducted during which both parties appeared and entered
into stipulations. After the termination of the mandatory conference, both parties were directed to
submit their verified position papers. Only complainant complied. Respondent failed to submit
his position paper.
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and should therefore be disciplined.
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) months and that he be ordered to return the pertinent files and
documents to complainant. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner but modified the recommended penalty to suspension of one (1)
year from the practice of law and to return the files and documents of the complainant, and the
amounts duly supported by receipts.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. In Resolution No. XX-2012-591 dated December
29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors granted the same and reinstated the penalty recommended
by the Investigating Commissioner of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) months and to return the records and documents to complainant.
The records of the case was thereafter transmitted by the IBP to this Court. In a Complainant
sought that respondent be also ordered to return the subject filing fees to complainant.

ISSUES
Does a lawyer have the right to hold on to a client’s documents, even after the relationship of
lawyer-client has been terminated, due to nonpayment of his or her professional legal fees? Or is
this a ground for disciplinary action? Did respondent violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he failed to file the cases indorsed by complainant despite receipt of filing
fees?

RULING
Relying on the exhaustive fact-finding deliberations of the IBP, we find the complainant’s
allegations to be believable and supported by evidence.
“A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in
probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are
likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.”
“A lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional
capacity. Consequently, when a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer is bound to render an accounting to his client, showing that he spent the money for the
purpose intended.”
The respondent’s issue on the supposed nonpayment of his fees should have prompted him to
seek communication with complainant and resolve such matter. He should not have used the
same as a ground for his inaction insofar as the cases referred to him were concerned. “A
lawyer’s negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel
and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant,
particularly his client.
In the recent En Banc case of Fabie v. Atty. Real, the Court suspended the errant lawyer from the
practice of law for six (6) months for failing to return the documents and money entrusted to him
by his client. At the same time, he was ordered to return the money with legal interest from the
time he received the same until full payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found GUILTY of violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months and ORDERED to return to complainant within ten (10)
days from notice all the pertinent records and documents, and the amounts of P165,127.00, with
interest of according to Fabie v. Atty. Real. Respondent is WARNED that commission of the
same or similar infraction in the future will merit a more severe penalty. Respondent is also
directed to submit proof of his compliance within 30 days from receipt of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered in the
personal records of respondent and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
 WILLIAM G. CAMPOS, JR., REPRESENTED BY ROSARIO B. CAMPOS, RITA C.
BATAC AND DORINA D. CARPIO, Complainants, v. ATTY. ALEXANDER C.
ESTEBAL, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10443, August 08, 2016
-Dado

FACTS:

In the early part of 2006, complainants engaged the services of Atty. Estebal to assist
each of them in securing tourist visas to the United States (U.S.). Toward this end, on January
24, 2006, Campos and Atty. Estebal entered into a Service Contract stipulating an
acceptance/service fee of Php200, 000.00 exclusive of out-of-pocket expenses such as tickets,
filing fees, and application fees; and that in case no visa is issued, Campos is entitled to a refund
of what has been actually paid less 7% thereof Campos paid Atty. Estebal the sum of Php150,
000.00. For their part, Batac and Carpio gave Atty. Estebal the amounts of Php75, 000.00 and
Phpl20, 000.00, respectively. Complainants claimed that despite receipt of their monies, Atty.
Estebal failed to apply or secure for them the U.S. tourist visas that he promised. Thus, they
demanded for the return of their monies. Atty. Estebal, however, failed to return the amount
despite repeated demands. Hence, they filed this Complaint praying that Atty. Estebal be
suspended or disbarred from the practice of law, and that he be directed to return their moniesIn
the early part of 2006, complainants engaged the services of Atty. Estebal to assist each of them
in securing tourist visas to the United States (U.S.). Toward this end, on January 24, 2006,
Campos and Atty. Estebal entered into a Service Contract stipulating an acceptance/service fee
of Php200, 000.00 exclusive of out-of-pocket expenses such as tickets, filing fees, and
application fees; and that in case no visa is issued, Campos is entitled to a refund of what has
been actually paid less 7% thereof Campos paid Atty. Estebal the sum of Php150, 000.00. For
their part, Batac and Carpio gave Atty. Estebal the amounts of Php75, 000.00 and Phpl20,
000.00, respectively. Complainants claimed that despite receipt of their monies, Atty. Estebal
failed to apply or secure for them the U.S. tourist visas that he promised. Thus, they demanded
for the return of their monies. Atty. Estebal, however, failed to return the amount despite
repeated demands. Hence, they filed this Complaint praying that Atty. Estebal be suspended or
disbarred from the practice of law, and that he be directed to return their monies.

Atty. Estebal posited that complainants’ demand for the return or refund of their money
has no factual or legal basis at all, especially because he had invested considerable time, talent
and energy in the processing of complainants’ tourist visa applications with the U.S. Embassy.
Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. recommended that Atty. Estebal be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for violating Canons 15, 16 and 20 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; moreover, it was recommended that Atty. Estebal be
directed to refund the amount of Php330, 000.00 and to retain the amount of Php 15, 000.00 as
his attorney’s fees. On December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution
affirming with modification the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation. In fine, the IBP
Board of Governors resolved to delete the recommended penalty of suspension and reduce the
amount refunded from Php330, 000.00 to Php300, 000.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Estebal is guilty of professional misconduct for violating the
pertinent provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

RULING::
Respondent clearly violated Canons 15, 16 and 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: CANON 15
–
A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS. CANON 16
–
A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01
–
A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client. CANON 20
–
A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES. Rule 20.01
–
A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees. Respondent
violated Canon 15 for the reason that he was not candid enough to tell the complainants their
chance[s] of getting [a] US visa. Instead, the respondent made the complainants believe that they
will have a good chance of getting the US visa if they will be joined with other groups. It turned
out to be false. Complainants waited for so long before the respondent could find other members
of the group. In the end, nothing happened. He also violated Canon 16, Rule 16.01 because he
did not account [for] the money he received from the complainants. It is not clear to the
complainants how much is the amount due to the respondent.

Lastly, it appears that the attorney’s fees that he collected from the complainants are
excessive and unreasonable. Considering the degree of work and number of hours spent, the
amount he collected from the complainants is not commensurate to the degree of services
rendered. Obviously, respondent took advantage of the weakness of the complainants in their
desire to go the United States. Respondent Atty. Alexander C. Estebal is found GUILTY of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year, effective upon receipt of the Decision. He is also ORDERED to return
the amounts of Php,000.00 to William G. Campos, Jr., Php60,000.00 to Rita C. Batac; and
Php105,000.00 to Dorina D. Carpio. Atty. Alexander C. Estebal is WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
 JUDGE PELAGIA DALMACIO-JOAQUIN, Complainant, vs. NICOMEDES DELA
CRUZ, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan, Respondent.

A.M. No. P-06-2241, July 10, 2012

-Dado

FACTS:
Complainant, Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin, alleged that Dela Cruz submitted belated ad false
returns of services of notice. In particular, she claimed that Dela Cruz received and Order
relative to a Criminal Case on December 9, 2005 but served the same to the parties only on
March 23, 2006. She also alleged that Dela Cruz submitted false returns relative to another
Criminal Cases. According to Complainant, Dela Cruz stated in his return of service in some
Criminal Case that the accused therein was no longer residing at the given address. However,
during pre-trial, this was denied by the accused who declared in open court that they have not
transferred residence. Anent in another case, Dela Cruz likewise indicated in his return of service
that therein accused is no longer residing at his given address and that the houses thereat have
already been demolished. However, during the scheduled pre-trial, the complainant manifested
that the accused who is her neighbor still resides at his given address and that his house is still
standing thereon. According to Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin, the aforesaid acts of Dela Cruz were
unbecoming, undesirable, dishonest and even more reprehensible, undermined the integrity of
the court processes and tarnished the trustworthiness of the court employees and of the judiciary,
Dela Cruz denied the allegations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dela Cruz submitted false returns which resulted to his dishonesty.
RULING:
The Court does not agree with the ruling of the OCA that the above infractions amount to
dishonesty. "This Court has defined dishonesty as the 'disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle;
lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.'"
"[D]ishonesty x x x is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of
intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be
taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the
respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might
have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the
degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment.
Dela Cruz guilty not of dishonesty but only of simple neglect of duty which is defined as "the
failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to
carelessness or indifference." A process server’s primary duty is to serve court notices which
precisely require utmost care on his part by ensuring that all notices assigned to him are duly
served on the parties.
 AGADAN v. KILAAN
A.C. No. 9385 | 11 November 2013
-De Luna
DOCTRINE:
Failure to make the proper entries in the notarial register is a ground for revocation of the
notarial commission. A notary public cannot escape his dereliction of duty by putting the blame
on his secretary.
FACTS:
Mariano Agadan (Agadan) filed a complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
against Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan (Atty. Kilaan) for falsification of documents, dishonest,
and deceit. They allege that Atty. Kilaan intercalated certain entries in the application for
issuance of Certificate of Public Entry by substituting the name of Gary Adasing (Adasing) to
Joseph Batingwed (Batingwed). Atty. Kilaan submitted false documentary requirements in
support of Batingwed’s application. Atty. Kilaan prepared a Decision granting the application of
Batingwed. A mandatory conference was conducted wherein it was found that the Verification in
Batingwed’s application was notarized by Atty Kilaan but the Notarial Registry indicated that it
refers to a Deed of Sale and not the Verification. Adasing was not abroad as shown by the
Affidavit of Adasing in contradiction to the statement of Atty. Kilaan. Atty. Kilaan is now
arguing that the he delegated the job of recording the documents to his secretary and the mistake
was due to the fault of the secretary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Kilaan violated the Notarial Law?
HELD:
Yes, the notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register.
Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility for violation of the Notarial Law by passing the
buck to their secretaries. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, or routinary act but one
invested with substantive public interest such that only those who are qualified or authorized to
do so may act as notary public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not
qualified or authorized to act must be prevented form inflicting themselves upon the public the
courts and the administrative offices in general.
The inaccuracies in his Notarial register and his failure to enter the documents he
admittedly notarized constitute dereliction of duty as a notary public. He cannot escape liability
by putting the blame on his secretary. The lawyer himself, not merely his secretary, should be
held accountable for these misdeeds.
Aside from violating the Notarial Law, respondent also violated his Lawyer’s Oath and
the Code of Professional responsibility by committing falsehood in the pleadings he submitted
before the IBP. His claim that Adasing was abroad hence could not corroborate the explanation
made by Batingwed was proved to be untruthful when complainants submitted the Affidavit of
Adasing insisting that he never left the country.
 SPS. ANAYA vs ATTY. JOSE B. ALVAREZ
A.C. No. 9435. 11 November 2013
-De Luna

FACTS:
The spouses Anaya sold three properties, with Atty. Alvarez preparing and notarizing
their deeds of sale. Atty. Alvarez asked them for cash in exchange for four checks with the
assurance that they will be funded. They agreed to the suggestion, relying on Atty. Alvarez’s
assurance and professional stature. When they presented the checks, all except one which
appeared stale, were dishonored due to the account being closed. They repeatedly made demands
but these remain unheeded. After receipt of the second demand letter, Atty. Alvarez offered to
pay the partial amount but the spouses rejected the offer and demanded the return of the full
amount. However, Atty. Alvarez claimed that his obligation to the spouses was a simple loan
from the spouses and that they knew that the checks were issued mainly as collateral for the loan
and were not funded. He also claimed that he had no intention to defraud them as shown by his
act of going to their residence and offering to pay the partial amount.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Alvarez’s conduct warrants disciplinary action.
HELD:
Yes. The Court held that Atty. Alvarez was guilty of gross misconduct when he issued
the worthless checks and failed to settle his debts, thus violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility for which he was suspended from the practice of law for a year. The Court added
that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does
not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude.
 NESTOR V. FELIPE, ET AL., VS. ATTY. CIRIACO A. MACAPAGAL
A.C. No. 4549, December 02, 2013
-Dela Cruz

FACTS: On March 5, 1996, Complainants filed a Petition for Disbarment against Respondent
Macapagal. In their Petition, complainants alleged that they are co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
A-95-22906 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City while respondent is the
counsel for the defendants therein. Complainants charged respondent with dishonesty (1) when
he stated in the defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are
strangers to each other;  (2)  when he introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his
evidence in  the said case; and (3) when he knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned
as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the same
case.
Complainants also alleged that they filed another Perjury case before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City against the respondent in relation to the above cited case.
Complainants insisted that by the foregoing actuations, respondent violated his duty as a
lawyer and prayed that he be disbarred and ordered to pay complainants the amount of P500,000
representing the damages that they suffered.
In a Resolution dated June 19, 1996, the court required respondent to comment. Instead
of filing his Comment, on August 15, 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Extension of Time to File Comment. The extended deadline passed sans respondent’s comment. 
Thus, on January 29, 1997, complainants filed an Urgent Motion to Submit the Administrative
Case for Resolution without Comment of Respondent.
On February 24, 1997, the court referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Investigating Commissioner, Delos Reyes directed the parties to submit their
respective position paper. Respondent still did not submit his position paper. On February 26,
2010, before the IBP, thru Investigating Commissioner Gonzaga, submitted its Report and
Recommendation. In the Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and whether respondent is liable for his
unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of the court and IBP.

RULING:
1. The Petition filed by complainants must be dismissed without prejudice.
The SC held that in order to determine whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty, we
will have to delve into the issue of whether the complainants are indeed related to the defendants
in Civil Case being half-brothers and half-sisters.  The court would also be tasked to make an
assessment on the authenticity of the Certificate of Marriage which respondent submitted in the
proceedings in Civil Case.  Similarly, the court will have to make a ruling on whether the Urgent
Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction which respondent filed
was indeed baseless and irrelevant to the proceedings in Civil Case.  Clearly, these prerequisites
cannot be accomplished in this administrative case. In fine, these issues are proper subjects of
and must be threshed out in a judicial action.

The SC held in Virgo v. Amorin, that:

While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a
respondent to remain as a member of the bar, and need not delve into the
merits of a related case, the Court, in this instance, however, cannot ascertain
whether Atty. Amorin indeed committed acts in violation of his oath as a
lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of the Virgo Mansion without
going through the factual matters that are subject of the aforementioned civil
cases, x x x.  As a matter of prudence and so as not to preempt the conclusions
that will be drawn by the court where the case is pending, the Court deems it
wise to dismiss the present case without prejudice to the filing of another one,
depending on the final outcome of the civil case.

2. Yes, the SC held that it has not escaped our notice that despite receipt of our directive,
respondent did not file his comment.  Neither did he file his Position Paper as ordered by the
IBP.  And for this, he must be sanctioned.

Respondent's unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not
only irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. 
His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court
orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being
themselves officers of the court. As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know that a
resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with
promptly and completely.  This is also true of the orders of the IBP as the investigating arm of
the Court in administrative cases against lawyers.
Under the circumstances, we deem a reprimand with warning commensurate to the
infraction committed by the respondent.
 JASPER JUNNO F. RODICA VS. ATTY. MANUEL "LOLONG" M. LAZARO, ATTY.
EDWIN M. ESPEJO, ATTY. ABEL M. ALMARIO, ATTY. MICHELLE B. LAZARO,
ATTY. JOSEPH C. TAN, AND JOHN DOES.
A.C. No. 9259, August 23, 2012
-Dela Cruz
FACTS: This is a disbarment complaint filed by Rodica against the respondent Atty. Lazaro on
grounds of gross and serious misconduct, deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On May 5, 2011, William Strong was arrested and detained by the Bureau of Immigration
for allegedly being involved in an international gang and conspiracy in Brazil on fraud involving
the creation of hundreds of dollars in illegal securities. Strong requested his friend Philip Apostol
to look for a lawyer. Apostol recommended the Lazaro Law Office represented by Atty. Manuel
Lazaro and his associates who initially declined but later accepted to handle the deportation
case. 
Strong initiated giving the information that his deportation case may be due to the
complaint filed by his live-in partner Jasper Rodica before the RTC against the Hillview
Marketing Corporation for recovery and possession and damages involving a property they have
in Boracay which is represented by Atty. Tan. Rodica was represented by Atty. Ibutnande in this
case. Apparently, Rodica claimed that Atty. Manuel met with Atty. Tan to discuss the settlement
package on the deportation case they filed against Strong on the condition that Rodica withdraws
her complaint from the RTC of Cebu. 
On May 25, 2011 the Bureau of Immigration rendered a judgment deporting Strong to
leave the country. On June 6, 2011 Rodica filed before the RTC a motion to withdraw her
complaint against Hillview. Rodica now alleges that after Strong was deported and withdrawing
the case before the RTC, she was deceived by Atty Manuel et al for over settlement of 7 million
which was allegedly extorted from her after misrepresenting that the withdrawal of the case
before the RTC is only a part of the settlement package.
It appears on the record that Atty. Espejo, an associate of the Lazaro Law office helped in
drafting the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration after Rodica
pleaded him to prepare the motion and was requested further to indicate the name of the Lazaro
Law Office including the name of Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle to give more weight on the
pleading. Rodica promised Atty. Espejo to talk to Atty. Manuel about it. The case before the
RTC was actually dismissed on March 29, 2011 for failure to show cause of action but a motion
for reconsideration was filed by Rodica. 

ISSUE: Whether the allegations in Rodica’s Complaint merit the disbarment or suspension of
respondents.

RULING: The court ruled that Rodica failed to overcome the presumption of innocence of the
respondents.
 In Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr.,this Court reiterated its oft repeated ruling that in
suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove her allegations by
preponderant evidence. Elaborating on the required quantum of proof, this Court declared
thus:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance
of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the
case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity
of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or
want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately
appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater number. (Citations omitted.)
In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the
lawyer continues and the complaint against him must be dismissed. In the present case, the
totality of evidence presented by Rodica failed to overcome the said presumption of
innocence.
On Rodica's claim with regards to the settlement package, the court find it without merit
because she withdrew her complaint only after the deportation of Strong. It was also evident on
record that the said case was already dismissed even before the deportation case was filed only
she filed a motion for reconsideration. Therefore, it cannot be said that her withdrawal of the
complaint is a settlement consideration regarding the deportation case of Strong. Moreover,
Strong is not a party to the case she filed before the RTC therefore there is no connection
between these 2 cases. 
There was sufficient preponderance of evidence that was presented that the cause of her
withdrawal of the complaint is to facilitate the sale of her property in Boracay. According to
Atty. Espejo who helped Rodica draft the motion for withdrawal of the complaint, the said
withdrawal is for the purpose of selling her property to Apostol. Apostol further corroborated
that he told Rodica he is willing to purchase the property once it is free from any pending case.
Rodica promised him to work on the termination of the pending case attached to the property to
make the sale. 
On her claim to have paid 7 million to Atty. Manuel et al, she failed to substantiate such
claim despite showing off withdrawals from her bank account certain amount of money after
failing to prove that the said amount was paid to the respondents. Moreover, the court held that
Rodica is not a client of Lazaro Law Office. They merely handled the deportation case of Strong.
As for Atty. Espejo, the court found him to have aided Rodica for misrepresenting before
the court that she was aided by the Lazaro Law Office when in fact she is not. Atty. Espejo
explained that Rodica assured him to talk to Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle about including
their name on the pleading but she did not do so. Atty. Espejo should have known better that
Atty. Ibutnande was the counsel on record on the case before the RTC and therefore it is not his
duty to prepare said pleading. He also should have known that all pleadings before the court are
acted based on merit or the lack of it and not by the name of the law firm. However, the court
give due recognition on the fact that Atty. Espejo expressed remorse on his conduct and made a
sincere apology to the RTC for wrongly employing the name of the Lazaro Law Office and that
he was newly admitted to the Bar in 2010, the court find it proper to give him a warning to
become more prudent on his actuation in the practice of his profession.
The complaint for disbarment was dismissed.
 ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, vs. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA

A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014

-Enage

FACTS:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose

Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for
Gross Immoral Conduct.

In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. 2 Bansig is the sister of
Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.

However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another

marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San
Juan, Manila.3

Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full
legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had
never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

ISSUE:

WON the act of atty. Celera constitutes grossly immoral conduct that renders him unfit to be a
member of the Bar.
RULING:

Yes. The act of atty. Celera Constitute Grossly immoral conduct

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A.

CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering
him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.
 THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS vs. ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT
AC L-1117, March 20, 1944
-Enage

FACTS:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service 

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105 
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement;
but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in
the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further
mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that
he never had any case at law by reason thereof.

ISSUE:

WON advertisement of a lawyers services a violation of the code of professional conduct

RULING:

YES.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to
the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as
the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for
the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by
writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the
solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of
the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
 LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009
-Espedilla
Facts:
A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan, Linsangan &
Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients &
encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentino with the help of
paralegal Labiano convinced his clients to transfer legal representation by promising financial
assistance and expeditious collection of their claims. To induce them, Tolentino allegedly texted
and called them persistently. To support his allegation, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit
of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty
relationship with Linsangan. Also, he attached “respondent’s calling card”:

Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City
Cel.: (0926) 2701719
10 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulating of
said calling card.
Issue:

Whether Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services?

Ruling:

Yes. Atty. Tolentino is guilty for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Thus,
lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow lawyers to
advertise their talents/skill is a commercialization of the practice of law (degrading the
profession in the public’s estimation).

With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for purpose of
gain, either personally or through an agent. In relation to Rule 1.03, which proscribes
“ambulance chasing” (involving solicitation personally or through an agent/broker) as a measure
to protect community from barratry and champertry.

As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by Linsangan, a lawyer’s
best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust
based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their
services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.

Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase “with financial assistance.” The phrase was
clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise
of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their
original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability.
This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserves no place in the legal
profession.
 SPOUSES DAVID and MARISA WILLIAMS v. ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ
A.C. No. 6353, February 27, 2006
-Espedilla

Facts:

Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with "unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful acts in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, and
with conduct unbecoming an attorney.

According to the complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the
controversy. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was then issued in her favor, stating that she is
"Filipino, married to David W. Williams, an American citizen."

The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:

21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the practice of law, Attorney Rudy
T. Enriquez cited outdated material in his complaint-affidavit (Annex A-1) and in his
comments to counter-affidavit (Annex A-2). He then knowingly applied this stale law in
a perverse fashion to argue that Marisa Batacan Williams automatically lost her Filipino
citizenship when she married an American, and was thus prohibited to own land in the
Philippines, thereby making her guilty of falsification in the Deed she executed to buy
property in Negros Oriental.
22. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex A-2) Marisa cites Article IV,
Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that she would not lose her citizenship
when she married an American unless she renounced it in a specific act.
23. That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more outdated law, declaring that her "act
of marrying" her husband was equivalent to renouncing her citizenship. He also doggedly
attempts to show that the 1987 Constitution supports his position, not Marisa’s (Annex
A-4).

Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who knows that the false charge
(that Marisa Williams is an American) "will not prevail in the end."

On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. Forthwith, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
scheduled the case for mandatory conference/hearing.

In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-
Maala ruled that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and should be suspended
for six (6) months. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted the foregoing
recommendation in its Resolution No. XVII-2005-114 dated October 22, 2005, with the
modification that respondent be "reprimanded, with a warning and advice to study each and
every opinion he may give to his clients."

Issue:

Whether Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez was guilty for violation of the the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

Ruling:

Yes, in particular CANON 5 – (A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in
continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as
well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating the law and
jurisprudence.)

The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following objectives: (a) elevate the
standards of the legal profession, (b) improve the administration of justice, and (c) to enable the
bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively (In re: Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, 49 SCRA 22). In line with these objectives of the Integrated Bar, lawyers must keep
themselves abreast of legal developments. To do this, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic
movements of the law and jurisprudence. He must acquaint himself at least with the newly
promulgated laws, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and of the significant decisions of
the Court of Appeals. There are other executive orders, administrative circulars, regulations and
other rules promulgated by other competent authorities engaged in the administration of justice.
The lawyer’s life is one of continuous and laborious study, otherwise, his skill and knowledge of
the law and related disciplines will lag behind and become obscure due to obsoleteness (Canon 5,
Code of Professional Responsibility.)

As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence.10 Indeed,
when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.11As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his duty
to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Court on the issues and legal problems
confronting a client. In this case, the law he apparently misconstrued is no less than the
Constitution, the most basic law of the land. Implicit in a lawyer’s mandate to protect a client’s
interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost diligence is the duty to keep abreast of the
law and legal developments, and participate in continuing legal education programs. Thus, in
championing the interest of clients and defending cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the
strict standards imposed by the lawyer’s oath, but should likewise espouse legally sound
arguments for clients, lest the latter’s cause be dismissed on a technical ground. Ignorance
encompasses both substantive and procedural laws.
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A
STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011
-Gabor

FACTS:

On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo)
in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010,
the counsel for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Vinuya decision.

On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque)
and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
in G.R. the same case (No. 162230), where they posited for the first time their charge of
plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other
arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:

IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE

COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE
SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE
CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND MAKE
IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS
FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE
PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S
CLAIMS.

They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of
extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the
ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition.

Many different articles condemning the alleged plagiarism of the Supreme Court or (Justice Del
Castillo specifically) circulated the internet and through the newspapers/columns. Through some
of these articles, some relevant persons also expressed disappointment towards the Supreme
Court’s position in the Vinuya case.
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A
Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was
posted in Newsbreak’s website and on Atty. Roque’s blog. A report regarding the statement also
appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV 4 and the Sun Star sites, on
the same date. The statement was likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of
Law’s bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 2010 and at said college’s website.

On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the
Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:

RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas
who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with
their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost
two decades for any meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the
government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case
of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had
these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation
by the Highest Court of the land.

xxx

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon
them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the
University of the Philippine College of Law that:

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is

unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;
xxx

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the  Vinuya case does violence
to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of
justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as
the petitioners therein;
 ETC.

The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement, having
been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under consideration
by the Court.33

In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations
regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the
allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not
only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction
over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted
portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles
supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the
Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay
ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
Xxx
(and other similar statements)

In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free
and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only
goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to
become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and
unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on
being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner,
free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass
the administration of justice."

Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A.
Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, and etc. (so-called “signatories” to the letter)
to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should
not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02
and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common
compliance which was signed by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In the
"Preface" of said Common Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring
Integrity Statement in the discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as
teachers in the profession of law,’ and as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of
public concern and one that is of vital interest to them." 39 They likewise alleged that "they
acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed out that "none of them was involved either as
party or counsel"40 in the Vinuya case.

On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, through the Common
Compliance, it was prayed that the court reverse its findings in the Show Cause Resolution
including its conclusions that respondents have (a) breached their obligation as law professors
and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of the Court, or (b)
committed violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13, and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and that in the event that the Court declines to grant the
foregoing prayer, the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing.

ISSUES:

Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the
material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

a.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?

b.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic freedom as law
professors?

c.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be
disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

d.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in
relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or presentation
of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case
(G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the witnesses and evidence
presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).

RULING:
 1. The Show Cause Resolution did not deny respondents their freedom of expression.

A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members
of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in
the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case
for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The
Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered
excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and
later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.
2. The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic freedom.

It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic
freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how
they will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that
dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction.
Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject
lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled
with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper
procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.

The constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed
by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the
public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that
freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to
the academic freedom of law professors.

3. The submissions of respondents do not satisfactorily explain why they should not be
disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid
basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These
are two separate matters to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers
it highly inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the
compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance,
respondents even go so far as to attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism
charges against Justice Del Castillo in the present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del
Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending
at the time of the filing of respondents’ submissions in this administrative case. As respondents
themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not proper
procedure for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no
bearing on their own administrative case.

As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive
action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement
was primarily meant for this Court’s consideration, why was the same published and reported
in the media first before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the
Statement was prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to capture media
attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most controversial ground in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is
respondents’ colleague on the UP Law faculty.

In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due
respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of
plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of
the Statement’s issuance, were still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the
Court. These facts have been widely publicized.

With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this
appears to be the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of
this sort, the Court is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most
part well-intentioned in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in
jurisprudence that where the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and
undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating.

Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim
of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect
to the courts and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the
Court on pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice; and warned
that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

4. The Court finds this contention unmeritorious. Respondents’ requests for a hearing
and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.
It should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which
requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause
Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter.

The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary
proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:

SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the

Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the
Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any
officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation
shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review
of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
(Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral
to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it
is only if the Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11
of Rule 139-A will be followed.

As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial
type hearing. We have held that:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits
is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of
due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or
trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the
requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal
investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its
disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be
heard.

Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their
reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they
shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance.
They have not specifically stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they
intend to present in their defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.

Some of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as
follows:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
 PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN vs. GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR.

Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984

-Gabor

This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband Generoso B.
Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct. He was admitted to the bar in
1968.

FACTS:

In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who represented to him that she
was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot with her a son who was born on November 27,
1972. He was named John Obusan (Jun-Jun). Generoso came to know that Natividad's
marriage to Tony Garcia was subsisting or undissolved.

Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33, married
Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a religious ceremony held on
December 30,1972.

The couple lived with the wife's mother at Tondo, Manila for more than one year. In the
evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out of the house, lawyer Obusan asked permission
from his mother-in-law to leave the house and take a vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines
Norte. Since then, he has never returned to the conjugal abode.

Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient investigation
and surveillance, she discovered that he was living and cohabiting with Natividad in an
apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. He had brought his car to
that place.

The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated by Linda
Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and Ernesto Bernal, a
plumber, their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street. The three executed affidavits,
which were confirmed by their testimonies.

Romegil Magana, a pook  leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as the head of
the family. His name is at the head of the barangay list. Nieves Cacino, the owner of the
apartment, came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo.
 Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated when he
married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he went to Felix Manalo Street but only for
the purpose of giving financial assistance to his son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes,
the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated respondent's testimony.

He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He claims that
they were paid witnesses. He declared that he did not live with Natividad. He resided with his
sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.

On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal home
because he could not endure the nagging of his wife, their violent quarrels, her absences from the
conjugal home (she allegedly went to Baguio, Luneta and San Andres Street) and her
interference with his professional obligations.

The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a complaint
for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did not answer the complaint. He waived the
presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not file any memorandum.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Generoso Obusan is guilty of grossly immoral conduct and must be disbarred.

RULING:

After an examination of the record, the court found that the complainant has sustained the burden
of proof. She has proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous relations with a married
woman separated from her own husband.

Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was guilty of grossly
immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour,
a married woman, fails within "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community" (7 C.J.S. 959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106
SCRA 591).

Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another
woman who had borne him a child. He failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of the bar (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).

Respondent Obusan was disbarred. His name was stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
 PAZ ARELLANO TOLEDO VS. ATTY., JESUS B. TOLEDO
Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963
-Gacho
FACTS: The complainant, Paz Arellano Toledo is a dentist by profession, and the
respondent, then a second year law student, were married civilly in Camiling, Tarlac, by the
Justice of the Peace. After their wedding, the respondent went to Manila to resume his studies at'
the Far Eastern University, and she remained in Camiling to practice her profession. While the
respondent was still studying, he either returned to Camilmg once a week or she came to Manila
twice a week to visit with each other. Sometimes the respondent stayed with her in Camiling for
a week, and when she came to Manila to buy dental materials she slept with him at his boarding
house or at the house on Economia street where he later on lived with his brothers Cleto' and
Aniceto and cousin Felisa Bacera. They were in good terms until about three or four months
before his graduation.
On the day of his graduation he showed her indifference and humiliated and embarrassed
her by calling her a "provinciana" and telling her that she was a nuisance whenever she came to
see him. A week after the bar examination, she again came to see him. Since then they became
actually separated and she never saw him again until the hearing of the case. She learned that the
respondent was employed in the Bureau of Lands and stationed at Cagayan de Oro City and is
cohabiting with another woman who had borne him a child. The respondent never wrote to her
and asked her to follow him at his place of work and she did not care to either.
This Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. After finding that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent,
the Solicitor General filed a complaint in this Court charging the respondent with abandonment;
of his wife and immorality for cohabiting with another woman by whom he has a child, and
praying that he be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the charges contained therein are
not based on and supported by the facts and evidence adduced at the investigation, conducted by
the Office of the Solicitor General.

ISSUE: Whether respondent waived his right to present evidence when he filed a motion
to dismiss and whether respondent should be disbarred for abandonment of his wife
RULING: Yes, the Supreme Court held:
Section 6, Rule 128, provides:
The evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation may be
considered, by the Supreme Court in the final decision of the case, if the respondent had an
opportunity to object and cross-examine. If in the respondent's answer no statement is made as
to any intention of introducing additional evidence, the case shall he set down for hearing, upon
the filing of such answer  or upon the expiration of the time to file the same.
 The above-quoted rule in no uncertain terms requires the respondent in disbarment or
suspension proceedings from the practice of law to file an answer to the complaint filed by the
Solicitor General after investigation and, should he desire to present, evidence in his, behalf, to
expressly say so in the answer.  Instead of doing what the rule requires, the respondent filed a
motion to dismiss without stating that he intended to present evidence in his behalf, thereby
waiving his right. The fact that at the close of the hearing conducted by the Solicitor General, he
made of record his desire to present evidence in his behalf, is not sufficient. The correct manner
and proper time for him to make known his intention is by and in the answer seasonably filed in
this Court.

2. Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the testimonies of the witnesses and the documents
presented by the OSG are worthy of credence. However, the annexes attached to the respondent's
memorandum cannot be taken into consideration for they were not properly introduced in
evidence during the investigation.
The respondent, by abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with another woman who
had borne him a child, has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar.6 Therefore, the respondent is disbarred from the practice of
law.
 In Re Charges of LILIAN F. VILLASANTA for Immorality, vs. HILARION M.
PERALTA
Administrative Case. April 30, 1957.
-Gacho
FACTS: G. R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present complaint. Said case originated
from a criminal action filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan by the complainant against
the respondent for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code of which the respondent
was found guilty. The verdict, when appealed to the Court of Appeals, was affirmed. The appeal
by certiorari taken to this Court by the respondent was dismissed for lack of merit.
The complaint seeks to disqualify the respondent, a 1954 successful bar candidate, from
being admitted to the bar.
The basic facts are the same as those found by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
On April 16, 1939, the respondent was married to Rizalina E. Valdez in Rizal,
Nueva Ecija. On or before March 8, 1951, he courted the complainant who fell in love
with him. To have carnal knowledge of her, the respondent procured the preparation of a
fake marriage contract which was then a blank document. He made her sign it on March
8, 1951. A week after, the document was brought back by the respondent to the
complainant, signed by the Justice of the Peace and the Civil Registrar of San Manuel,
Tarlac, and by two witnesses. Since then the complainant and the respondent lived
together as husband and wife. Sometime later, the complainant insisted on a religious
ratification of their marriage and on July 7, 1951, the corresponding ceremony was
performed in Aparri by the parish priest of said municipality. The priest no longer
required the production of a marriage license because of the civil marriage contract
shown to him. After the ceremony in Aparri, the couple returned to Manila as husband
and wife and lived with some friends. The complainant then discovered that the
respondent was previously married to someone else; whereupon, she filed the criminal
action for a violation of Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan and the present complaint for immorality in this court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Haliron M. Peralta made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity and his conviction of violation of Art. 350 of the
Revised Penal Code involves moral turpitude.
RULING: Yes, Upon consideration of the records of G. R. No. L-9513 and the complaint, this
Court is of the opinion that the respondent is immoral. He made a mockery of marriage which is
a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His conviction in the criminal case involves
moral turpitude. The act of respondent in contracting ting the second marriage (even his act in
making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and
existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the respondent is
hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
 Quingwa vs. Puno
A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967
-Gervacio
FACTS:
That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno
were engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on
their way the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before going to the
Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at
the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to
complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting
married; that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of respondent and the
respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel
room respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after
registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the room; that as soon as they
were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside and respondent proceeded to the
bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to molest her but respondent
insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the
reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better
give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant
to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep
her flat on the bed; that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no
other recourse but to submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place
from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to
a birthday party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent
repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait
until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she
was already on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his
promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant
gave birth to a child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred.
HELD:
YES. Respondent’s name was ordered to be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
RATIO:
[T]he respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the
fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and
learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of
morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
… The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to
improve not only the law but the administration of justice.
[A] “grossly immoral conduct” is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section
27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
 ROYONG VS. OBLENA
AC No. 376 April 30, 1963
-Gervacio
FACTS:
Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the
bar and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and
found out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent
seems to be consensual sex.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not
commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General
made another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his
application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living
adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year
old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render
judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the
adulterous cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.
HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.
RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who
has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not
specify that as ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his
profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have
proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action
by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to
show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for
admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people
who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good
moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is
clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
 Antonio M. Lorenzana vs. Ma. Cecilia I. Austria
AM No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014.
-Golgota
Doctrine: The New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or
maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to
freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference
and import information and ideas through any media regardless of frontier" Joining a social
networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge's act of
joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative
restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct,
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.
FACTS: A supplemental complaint was filed against Judge Ma. Cecilia I, Austria, : who was
alleged, to have committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social
networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge for the
purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a
shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.
Judge Austria submitted that the photos she posted in the social networking website
"Friendster"could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an "on shouldered" attire
is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further
stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo
for having been aesthetically made.
The Court of Appeals recommended that the respondent be admonished for failing to observe
strict propriety and judicial decorum required by the office. The Office of the Court
Administration agreed with the CA recommendation that the respondent's act of posting
seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the
Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Austria's act of allegedly posting seductive photos in her
Friendster account contravened the standard oF propriety and judicial decorum required by the
office. (YES)
RULING: The Supreme Court said that while judges are not prohibited from becoming
members of and from taking part in social networking activities, they should be reminded that
they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same
ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday
activities. It is in this light that the Supreme Court ruled the respondent in the charge of
impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.

The New Code oF Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining an
account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression. This right"includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart
information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers."Joining a social networking site
is an exercise of one's freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is,
therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative
restriction on judges; in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a mannef that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Bases on this provision, the SC held that the respondent disregarded the propriety and
appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an
“off-shouldered” suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing. While the
respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive had this act been
done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible personification of law and justice,
however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport
themselves.
 P/SR. Insp. Teddy M. Rosqueta vs. Judge Jonathan A. Asuncion
A.M No. MTJ-13-1823, March 19, 2014.
-Golgota
Doctrine: A Judge who allowed his bodyguard to take possession of firearm that is the subject of
a criminal case pending before the court where he is presiding is administratively liable for
gross misconduct for violating Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 2 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct. He is guilty of misusing evidence entrusted to the court. After having
accepted their exulted positions in the Judiciary, the Judges owe to the public to uphold the
exacting standards of conduct demanded of them. The conduct required of court personnel, from
the Presiding Judge to the lowliest clerk must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that could taint
the judiciary.
FACTS: Two men were arrested for illegally possessing firearms. One of the arrestees was
identified as Fidel Refuerzo. In an investigation conducted, it was found that Refuerzo worked as
a bodyguard of Judge Asuncion and upon verification at the Office of the Firearms and
Explosives, Security Agencies and Guards Supervision (FESAGS), he was found to be not listed
as a registered or licensed holder of any kind and calibre of firearm. The investigation further
revealed that the firearm in question had been previously seized from the possession of one
Joseph Cantas who, after a buy-bust operation, was charged with illegal possession of dangerous
drugs and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The case for illegal possession of
firearms filed against Cantas was assigned to Branch 2 where Judge Asuncion presided.
Subsequently, Police Sr. Insp-Rosqueta filed an affidavit-complaint charging respondent Judge
Asuncion with grave misconduct and violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Rosqueta
contended that the judge committed serious misconduct because he had shown malicious interest
in the firearm by allowing his bodyguard to take possession of them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge committed grave misconduct for violating the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
RULING: Judge Asuncion is Administratively Liable for Gross Misconduct. Under SC Circular
47-98, Judge Asuncion and his clerk of court in Branch 2 had the ministerial duty and the
primary responsibility to turn over the firearm to the proper office of the PNP (i.e., FESAGS)
because it would no longer be needed as evidence upon the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
34412. A ministerial duty or function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of
a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act to be done.
The actuations of Judge Asuncion in relation to the firearm conceded that the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 34412 did not invest the rightful custody of the firearm either in him or his
court. Yet, the established facts and circumstances show that he still appropriated the firearm and
given it to Refuerzo, his bodyguard.

Although SC Circular 47-98 did not so specify, the prompt and immediate compliance with its
directive of turning the firearm over by either Judge Asuncion or the clerk of court was
reasonably expected. The unexplained long delay could only mean that he had already taken
personal interest in the firearm.
The foregoing incongruities contained in Judge Asuncion’s explanation inevitably lead us to
conclude that he took a personal interest in the firearm and appropriated it. Accountability for his
actuations is inescapable for him. He was guilty of misusing evidence entrusted to his court. He
thereby did not live up to the exacting standards prescribed by the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, specifically its Canon 2 and Canon 4.
WHEREFORE, the Court pronounces Judge JONATHAN A. ASUNCION,
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating Section 1 and
Section 2 of Canon 2, and Section 1 of Canon 4, of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
 Mortel vs Aspiras
AC No. 145 (100 Phil. 58), December 28, 1956
-Ilao

Facts:
In 1952, Atty. Anacleto Aspiras, a married man introduced himself as a single man to
Josefina Mortel, the petitioner. The latter believed it and he let Anacleto court her. Anacleto,
wooed her personally and by correspondence until he finally conquered her trusting heart, and
promised to marry Mortel. With this promise, Mortel agreed to have carnal knowledge with him.
Later, Anacleto persuaded Mortel to go to Manila so that they could marry there. The petitioner
complied. However, Anacleto did not secure the marriage license with Mortel, instead he let
Cesar Aspiras, whom he introduced to Mortel as his nephew, secure it with Mortel. Further, in
the marriage ceremony, Anacleto made Mortel believe that Cesar will be his proxy in the
wedding. So it happened that Mortel married Cesar, who turned out to be Anacleto’s son, and
was a minor. During the petitioner and marriage, Anacleto continued to cohabit and have carnal
knowledge with the petitioner as a result the latter gave birth to a baby boy. The petitioner later
found out that the respondent was married and worse she found out that Cesar was the
respondent’s son. On March 17, 1954, the petitioner filed a complaint with the Supreme Court
for the disbarment of herein respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ordered herein respondent’s disbarment. Though it may be said that
Anacleto’s moral transgression did not amount to crime nor is it one of those enumerated by
statute still his moral delinquency as proved by the facts as aggravated by his mockery of
marriage which is an inviolable social institution and his corruption of his minor son to marry
Mortel just so he could redeem his promise of marriage to Mortel, all these concur to Anacleto
being unfit to continue being a member of the legal profession.
 Cabrera vs Agustin
AC No. 225 (106 Phil. 256), September 30, 1959
-Ilao
Facts:
Sometime in April 1953 the respondent courted the petitioner and proposed marriage. In
July 1954 she accepted his proposal. On 27 November 1954 the couple proceeded to Pasay City
Hall of Manila to apply for a marriage license and in the room of Mr. Leoncio V. Aglubat both
signed two sheets of paper. From the room of Mr. Aglubat they entered into another room, where
a lady doctor took blood samples from them. After these events the respondent then told the
petitioner that they are already married and being as such they would go to Grace Park to
introduce herein petitioner to the respondent’s uncle. After arriving at Grace Park they went to a
house which the petitioner later learned was the Venus Hotel. The respondent asked the
complainant to have sexual intercourse with him for they were already married. Because of his
insistence and assurance that they were already married, she gave in to his desire. From then on
they continued to have sexual intercourse in the same place once a month for three consecutive
months. The petitioner then asked the respondent why despite their marriage they had not yet
lived as husband and wife. The respondent excused himself by saying that he was still waiting
for the release of the result of the bar examinations. After he passed the bar examination, the
respondent gave her his diploma issued by the Clerk of the Supreme Court to show his affection
to her. The petitioner then told him to settle down and he spoke to her father and the latter told
him that as they were Catholic Church. He agreed. On 26 April 1955 both went to the office of
the Local Civil Registrar at the City Hall in Manila to get the marriage license which they had
applied for previously. However, before the date set, the complainant received a letter from the
respondent withdrawing from their agreement to marry. She showed to her father the documents
in her possession and he found out that they had not been married civilly. She confessed to him
that she was on the family way. On 4 August 1955 she delivered at the Saint Mary's Hospital a
baby girl whom she named Delia Agustin. On 9 June 1955 the respondent married another
woman. As a consequence, the petitioner filed a complaint before the Supreme Court charging
herein respondent with immorality and asking for his disbarment. In his defense in breaching his
promise to marry the complainant was that her family insisted on a pompous wedding, the
expenses of which he had to defray; and that he noticed she was mentally deranged because she
often smiled for no cause at all. He denied that he deceived her into believing that they had been
married civilly to satisfy his carnal desire and insist that she submitted to his desire voluntarily.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ordered herein respondent’s disbarment. The Court held that the
respondent’s defense cannot be believed. The truth is that all along he never intended to redeem
the petitioner’s honor. He had inveigled her into believing that they had been married civilly to
satisfy his carnal desire. He himself admits that what prompted him to offer and propose
marriage to her was to satisfy such desire. On the other hand, the petitioner has not gone far in
educational attainment, having reached first year high school only, and does not have the
slightest idea of a legal and valid marriage. Thus she fell an easy prey to a man like the
respondent, a lawyer who knows the intricacies of the law and the way to extricate himself from
the mess he has brought about. The respondent has not maintained the highest degree of morality
and integrity which at all times is expected of, and must be possessed by, members of the Bar.
He is therefore disbarred from the practice of law and his name in the roll of attorneys stricken
out.
 ROSARIO DELOS REYES, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, Respondent.

A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989

-Juarez

FACTS:          

Complainant is a second year medical student of the Southwestern University in which

respondent Atty. Aznar is the then Chairman of the College of Medicine. Complainant was
compelled to go to Manila with respondent for three days where he repeatedly had carnal
knowledge of her upon the threat of respondent that if she would not give in to his lustful desires,
she would flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern. She consented
to the sexual desires of respondent because for her, she would sacrifice her personal honor rather
than fail in her subjects. Then sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she
was suspecting pregnancy because she missed her menstruation. Later, she was informed by Dr.
Monsanto, an instructor in the college of medicine, that respondent wanted that an abortion be
performed upon her. Thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato
fetched her at her boarding house on the pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas,
but upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and an inhalation mask was
placed on her mouth and nose. And as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an
abortion had already been performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over
her body.

After due investigation, the Solicitor General found the respondent guilty of gross immoral
conduct and recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with
respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man, with children, a rich
man and is not practicing his profession before the court, he should merely be suspended from
the practice of law for not less than three years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposition of the penalty is proper.

RULING:

No. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not
render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes
admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with
upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle
one to continue in the practice of law.
           
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for disbarment or
suspension from his office as attorney, among others, by grossly immoral conduct. Immoral
conduct has been defined as that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. In the
present case, it was highly immoral of respondent to have taken advantage of his position in
asking complainant to go with him under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in
case she refused.

Respondent Jose B. Aznar is disbarred.

 PERLA Y. LAGUITAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR F. TINIO, Respondent.
A.M. No. 3049 December 4, 1989
-Juarez
FACTS:

Sometime in June 1974, complainant and respondent Tinio met each other and in time became
lovers. Beginning in 1976, the parties lived together as husband and wife. As a result,
complainant bore respondent two children. In the course of this relationship, complainant
discovered that respondent Tinio, before meeting her, had contracted marriage with someone else
and that the prior marriage was subsisting. Nonetheless, complainant continued living in with
respondent until eventually, ten years later, she and her children by respondent Tinio were
abandoned by the latter in November 1986. Feeling helpless and aggrieved, she sought the help
of respondent's parents in supporting her children who were then already in school. Respondent's
parents gave her P400.00 and advised her not to see them again.

After examination of the record of this case and noting that respondent Tinio appeared before the
IBP Investigating Commissioner and candidly admitted his illicit relationship with complainant
and his having begotten two children by her, and promised the Commissioner that he would
support his illegitimate children but had not lived to his promise, the IBP Board recommended
that respondent Tinio be suspended from the practice of law "not for having cohabited with the
complainant, but for refusal to support his illegitimate children," the suspension to remain in
effect until respondent Tinio complies with his obligation of support.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the recommendation of IBP is correct.

RULING:

The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be suspended from the practice of law but not
merely because he has failed in his obligation to support the children complainant bore him but
also because for a prolonged period of time, he lived in concubinage with complainant, a course
of conduct inconsistent with the requirement of good moral character that is required for the
continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar,  concubinage imports moral
turpitude and entails a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage.ch

The Court resolved to suspend respondent Salvador F. Tinio from the practice of law. The Court
considered lifting the suspension upon evidence satisfactory to the Commission that respondent
is supporting or has made provision for the support of his illegitimate children and that he has
given up his immoral course of conduct.
 Salvacion Delizo Cordova vs. Atty. Laurence D. Cordova
Adm. Case No. 3249. November 29, 1989
-Maat
FACTS: Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this
marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province.
In that year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del
Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband
and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in
Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife,
and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds
with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time
failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent
reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought his
legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come home
from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his legitimate family.
In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by
hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her
(complainant’s) children in their conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with
another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger daughter Melanie along
with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complainant, compelling
complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial
Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent’s promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita
Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family.
Finally, the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant,
stating that complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other.
ISSUE: Whether or not the most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent,
assuming the same to be real would excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior
of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a
member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself.

RULING: No, the Supreme Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board. The most recent
reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not
excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in
public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the
Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to show
that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed
with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a
continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
 The Honorable cited two (2) cases in deciding the instant case, namely:
Mortel v. Aspiras, where the respondent being already married, wooed and won
the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited with him and bore
him a son. Because respondent’s conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive,
involving the marrying of his mistress to his own son and thereafter cohabiting with the
wife of his own son after the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was
disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena, the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member
of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to
have engaged in sexual relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a son;
and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous relationship with another
woman.
The Court further ruled in Mortel that the continued possession x x x of a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of the
law x x x and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not
specify that as a ground for disbarment.” It is important to note that the lack of moral
character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral character relating
to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct
for instance, which makes “a mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage.”
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous
relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the
humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or
refused to support. After a brief period of “reform” respondent took up again with another
woman not his wife, cohabiting with her, and bringing along his young daughter to live with
them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage and
its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the community at large.
The Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and
until further orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when
respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and
continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral
course of conduct that he has clung to.
 In re Atty. Roque Santiago
Adm. Case No. 923. June 21, 1940
-Maat
FACTS: It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife
Soledad Colares for some nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second
marriage, sought the legal advice of the respondent, who was at the time a practicing attorney
and notary public in the Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent, after hearing Baniquit's
side of the case, assured the latter that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry
again, and asked him to bring his wife on the afternoon of that same day, May 29, 1939. This
was done and the respondent right then and there prepared the document Exhibit A in which it
was stipulated, among other things, that the contracting parties, who are husband and wife
authorized each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of
action one might have against the party so marrying. After the execution and acknowledgment of
Exhibit A by the parties, the respondent asked the spouses to shake hands and assured them that
they were again single and as such could contract another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit
then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it the respondent stood up and,
pointing to his diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document turns
out not to be valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11, 1939,
contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. There is also evidence to show that the
respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of P50, but as the evidence on this point is not
clear and the same is not material in the resolution of the present case, we do not find it
necessary to make any express finding as to whether the full amount or any portion thereof was
paid or, as contended by the respondent, the services were rendered free of charge.
The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, but put up the defense that he
had the idea that seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to
contract a second marriage and for that reason prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after the
execution of said document he realized that he had made a mistake and for that reason
immediately sent for the contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and signed
the deed of cancellation Exhibit C.
ISSUE: Whether or not the advice made by Atty. Santiago and the preparation of the said
contract would tantamount to malpractice and ignorance of the law and eventually a valid ground
for disciplinary action.
RULING: Yes, there is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the
spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared
by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law, morals
and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent, the
preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies
disbarment from the practice of law. The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the
implied condition that his continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his
remaining a fit and safe person to society. When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer
ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of
a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this professional privilege should be declared
terminated. In the present case, respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the
law or carelessly negligent in giving the complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to
his disbarment and this is the opinion of some members of the court. The majority, however,
have inclined to follow the recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero Rodas, in
view of the circumstances stated in the report of said investigator and the fact that immediately
after discovering his mistakes, respondent endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign
another document cancelling the previous one.
The Court found that Atty. Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
 Dimagiba v. Montalvo
A.M. No. 1424, October 15, 1991
-Marquez
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed by Ismaela Dimagiba against Atty. Jose Montalvo for Malpractice,
for stretching to almost a half a century a litigation arising from the probate of a will of the late
Benedicta de Los Reyes which instituted Ismaela Dimagiba as the sole heir of all the properties.
In summary, the following are the litigations that ensue from the probate of the Will of De
Los Reyes as found by the Solicitor General involving the same parties and the same cause of
action:
1. On January 19, 1955, 1 filed a case for Probate of Will with the CFI Bulacan, regarding
the same property subject of the annulment of sale. Luckily, the said case was terminated
on June 20, 1958, probating the said will.
2. The oppositors (The clients of Atty. Montalvo, namely: Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio
Reyes, Luisa Reyes, Mariano Reyes, Cesar Reyes, Leonor Reyes) appealed this case to
the SC on October 12, 1967, affirming the decision of the Lower Court;
3. G.R. Nos. L23638 and L23662. This decision dated October 12, 1967, in the Supreme
Court, upheld the decision CA G.R. No. 31221R, in effect, affirming the due execution
the Will and the capacity of the Testator as well as the institution of the complainant.
4. Oppositors thru counsel, Atty. Montalvo filed in the CFI of Bulacan on June 4, 1968, a
petition for the nullification of the Will. This was dismissed.
5. A complaint again was filed dated November 3, 1970 and was again dismissed.
6. Civil Case No. 4151M. This case, filed on February l6, 1972, for the partition of the
property left by the deceased Benedicta De los Reyes on the ground of the nullity of the
Will, was again dismissed for failure to prosecute.
7. Civil Case No. 4188M. Filed on May 25, 1972, the respondent Atty. Montalvo, Jr., joined
the descendants of the collateral relatives of the deceased De Los Reyes against herein
complainant Dimagiba. This case was dismissed.
8. Civil Case No. 4458M. Civil Case No. 4188M was appealed. But without waiting for the
outcome, Atty. Montalvo, Jr., filed Civil Case No. 4458M on April 5, 1974 which was a
complaint for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title in the name of Ismaela
Dimagiba and the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the late Benedicta de
los Reyes.
Dimagiba was constrained to report to that [sic] Honorable Court of the actuation of said
lawyer who is a member of the Philippine Bar attending to cases of non-suit, which cause
harassment on her part.
The parties in this case are the ones in possession of the property Subject of Sp. Proc. No.
831 of the CFI, Bulacan. They cannot be ejected from the land holdings because they claim that
the case filed by Atty. Montalvo is still pending in Court.
Atty. Montalvo’s Answer: (1) He has always been of the honest and sincere belief that its
filing is for the interest of justice — certainly never for harassment; (2) that the reason why the
parties tenant could not be ejected from their land as stated by complainant in her complaint is
because of the passage of PD 27 which emancipated the farmers from their bondage and declared
them as owners of the rice and corn land they tilled upon the passage of the decree coupled with
the very acts of the complainant herself; and that (3) the complainant by filing this instant
complaint for disbarment wants to cow and intimidate the undersigned in order to withdraw as
counsel of his clients because she has been thwarted in her erroneous belief that she owns
exclusively all the properties comprising the estate of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes and could
not accept and take into account the reality that by virtue of the final decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 5618 and 5620 she is not the sole owner of the present estate of the deceased
but only a co-owner with the clients of the undersigned.
ISSUE/S:
Whether Atty. Montalvo is guilty of malpractice.
HELD:
YES. WHEREFORE on the basis of the foregoing, and consisted with the urgent need to
maintain the high traditions an standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished
public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR the respondent Atty. Jose
Montalvo, Jr. from the practice law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
RATIO:
Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various
forms involving the same parties and the same subject matter, persistently raising issues long laid
to rest by final judgment.
This misbehavior in facie curia consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's
pronouncements is in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Suction 1 of the Rules of
Court.
Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the
entire history of a case, especially if any litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even Atty.
Montalvo does not deny the fact that the probate of the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes
has been an overextended and contentious litigation between the heirs.
A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly endless channels left dangling by
our legal system in order wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may have thought that
lie could get away with his indiscriminate filing o suits that were clearly intended to harass
Ismaela Dimagiba When court dockets get clogged and the administration of justice is delayed,
our judicial system may not be entirely blame less, yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who
had taken their privilege so lightly, and in such mindless fashion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states that:
Rule 1.01 — a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.03 — On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged.
He has violated his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name
of an honorable profession, and has proven himself unworthy of the trust repose in him
by law as an officer of the Court. We have not countenanced other less significant
infractions among the ranks of our lawyers. He deserves the severest punishment of
DISBARMENT.
 Fernando T. Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron
A.C. No. 3065, August 16, 1991
-Muñoz

FACTS:
Disbarment against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City.
Atty. Collantes, counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), filed an
administrative case against Atty. Renomeron, for the latter’s irregular actuations with regard to
the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.
V&G complied with the desired requirements, however, Renomeron suspended the
registration of the documents pending the compliance of the former with their “special
conditions”, which was that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from
Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of
respondent’s Quezon City house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.
Renomeron formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself elevated the
question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio (of the National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved
in favor of the registrability of the documents.
Despite the resolution of the Administrator, Renomeron still refused the registration
thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submission of additional requirements not
adverted in his previous denial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by
the Court for his malfeasance as a public official?

HELD:
The Court ruled that Renomeron may be disciplined by the Court as public official for his
misconduct constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil.
968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's
oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or
other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). As the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers
expeditiously and prohibits them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material
interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office, and likewise bars them from
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which may be
affected by the functions of their office, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer
to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code of
Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may
practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue
"only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150
SCRA 269, 278).
The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public
official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law
(Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso, 150
SCRA 269).
Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron was disbarred from the practice of law and his name
was stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
 PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR ROBERT M. VISBAL, complainant, vs. JUDGE
MARINO S. BUBAN, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Tacloban
City, respondent

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1432, September 3, 2004

-Muñoz

FACTS:

In a sworn complaint, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Robert M. Visbal charged Judge Marino S.
Buban, MTCC, Branch 1, Tacloban City with Violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and/or Failure to Decide a Case Within the Reglementary Period, Gross
Inefficiency, Misconduct, Bias and Partiality relative to Criminal Cases Nos. 98-07-19 and 98-
07-20.

Complainant avers that respondent Judge failed to decide Criminal Cases Nos. 98-07-19 and 98-
07-20 within the 90-day period from submission of the parties’s memoranda. Hence,
complainant prays that respondent Judge be held administratively liable as well as criminally
liable for Violation of Article 174 of the Revised Penal Code for his failure to disclose in his
Certificates of Service from June 1999 that the subject cases were pending decision.

Complainant further alleges that respondent Judge displayed bias in favor of the accused in the
above-mentioned criminal cases by his tolerance of the defense’s late filing of pleadings and
failure to appear in court despite due notice. He claims that respondent Judge harbored a grudge
against him because his wife filed an administrative complaint against the latter.

In his Comment respondent Judge denied the allegations in the complaint. He alleged that the
subject cases were originally pending before the sala of Judge Paulino A. Cabello but were
subsequently transferred to him after Judge Cabello inhibited himself from hearing the cases. He
explains that his inability to dispose of the cases within the prescribed period was due to the
failure of his staff to bring the cases to him for proper action. It was only on December 1, 1999
that his attention was called regarding these two cases which had been submitted for decision.
However, after going over the memoranda of the parties and other pleadings, he found that the
only way to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused is through a full-blown trial. Thus,
he scheduled the cases for trial. He admits that he was unable to report the pendency of these two
cases in his Certificate of Service because he was unaware that the period to decide them had
already lapsed.

Respondent further averred that the administrative case filed by complainant’s wife against him
was already dismissed by this Court in a Resolution dated August 11, 1997. He notes that
complainant has the propensity of filing administrative cases against judges and fellow
prosecutors, and he even filed an administrative complaint against Judge Cabello for inhibiting
himself from hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 98-07-19 and 98-07-20.

On May 8, 2002, the complaint was docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City for investigation, report and
recommendation.

Executive Judge Leonardo B. Apita inhibited himself in a letter dated June 13, 2002 stating that
he was related to respondent Judge within the 6th degree of affinity. Thus, the case was referred
to Vice Executive Judge Salvador Y. Apurillo.

In his Report dated March 24, 2003 Judge Apurillo concluded that respondent Judge indeed
failed to resolve the cases within the reglementary period, but found that part of the blame was
attributable to his staff. Since respondent has a caseload of more than 1,000 cases, it could really
happen that some important matters may be overlooked. While many lawyers try to help out
judges by filing motions for early resolution, this did not happen in the subject cases. If
respondent Judge was to be faulted at all, it would be for his failure to devise a system to keep
track of the cases pending before him and to efficiently manage his personnel. For his
transgression, Judge Apurillo recommended that respondent Judge be "sternly reprimanded."

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with the factual findings of Judge Apurillo
but recommended that respondent Judge be fined in the amount of Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00).

As per Resolution of the Court dated February 11, 2004 both complainant and
respondent manifested their willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings filed.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the OCA erred in imposing a fine against Respondent

2. Whether Respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:

If respondent Judge could not decide the case within the reglementary period, all he had
to do was to ask from this Court a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the case, which may
have been granted.

Rules 1.02 of Canon 1 and 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct state:
 Rule 1.02. – A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

Rule 3.05. – A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In this connection, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 states, inter alia, that:

3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of
the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in
their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months
from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are
given a period of three months to do so. . . (Emphasis and italics supplied)

We find the penalty recommended by the OCA not commensurate to the misconduct committed
by respondent.

Furthermore, the court finds the complainant's explanation unsatisfactory. His propensity to
litigate raises doubts as to how he could find the time to perform his duties at all. Such an
excessive tendency to complain even the slightest of administrative infractions in some of the
cases constitutes an oppressive and gross abuse of legal processes. This imposes on the precious
time of the Court and impedes the speedy and efficient dispensation of justice. Complainant
should be reminded that it is the duty of a lawyer as an officer of the court not to foment suits
among individuals.

A lawyer owes to society and to the court the duty not to stir up litigation. The Code of
Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest
encourage any suit or proceeding." Thus, a lawyer is ordered "not to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator of concord and a conciliator for
compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of
the primacy of truth and justice." In fact, lawyers are called upon to resist the whims and caprices
of their clients and to temper the latter's propensity to litigate because the Lawyer's Oath to
uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his clients

The foregoing dictum which is embodied in the Canons of Professional Responsibility applies
with equal vigor to lawyers in the government service like complainant. Indeed, Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly states that '

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
Government lawyers who are public servants owe utmost fidelity to the public service because
public service is a public trust.A lawyer does not shed his professional obligations upon
assuming public office. In fact, his professional obligations should make him more sensitive to
his official obligations because a lawyer's disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in
the public eye.

It is worthy to note that complainant has already been cited by this Court in Visbal v. Ramos for
wantonly making baseless charges for malfeasance thus:

We must stress that gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation. It therefore behooves
complainant to be more circumspect in hurling this charge. Indeed, a person who accuses a judge
of this very serious offense must be sure of the grounds for the accusation, or else be found
ignorant of the law, as in this case. Judges, while expected to be a cut above the rest in the legal
profession, are not inured to the strain concomitant with baseless and unfair aspersions on their
competence. They certainly deserve a better treatment, especially from a prosecutor who should
know, at the very least, the basic provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Emphasis and
italics supplied).

Complainant is therefore guilty of misconduct, defined as the transgression of some established

and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.

Given the prevailing facts of this case, a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) should
suffice.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Ordering respondent Judge Marino S. Buban to PAY a FINE of Eleven Thousand Pesos
(P11,000.00); andcralawlibrary

2) Ordering Prosecutor Robert M. Visbal to PAY a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).

Both complainant and respondent are likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the

same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
 GENEROSO TRIESTE, SR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND
DIVISION), respondent.

G.R. No. 70332-43 November 13, 1986

-Palamos

Facts:

Sandiganbayan convicted herein petitioner, Generoso Trieste, Sr., of twelve (12) separate
violations of Section 3 paragraph (h) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices - Act, which petitioner were accused of in Criminal Cases Nos. 6856-6867
of said Court. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration and or new trial was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan under its Resolution of March 11, 1985.

The twelve (12) separate Informations filed by the Tanodbayan against the herein petitioner for
violation of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law are all similarly worded as the information
presented in Criminal Case No. 6856 except only as to the dates of the commission of the
offense, voucher numbers, and amounts involved. In the information in was alleged that being
then the Municipal Mayor and member of the Committee on Award of the Municipality of
Numancia, Aklan and as such, had administrative control of the funds of the municipality and
whose approval is required in the disbursements of municipal funds, he wilfully and unlawfully
had financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction in connection with which
said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law
from having any interest, to wit the purchases of construction materials by the Municipality of
Numancia, Aklan from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, of which the accused
is the president, incorporator, director and major stockholder paid under Municipal Voucher No.
211-90-10-174 in the amount of P558.80 by then and there awarding the supply and delivery of
said materials to Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation and approving payment
thereof to said corporation in violation of the Anti-Graft and corrupt Practices Act.

A supplemental petition, dated October 10, 1985, was later filed by petitioner. In this
supplemental pleading, it was vigorously stressed that the petitioner did not, in any way,
intervene in making the awards and payment of the purchases in question as he signed the
voucher only after all the purchases had already been made, delivered and paid for by the
Municipal Treasurer. It was further pointed out that there was no bidding at all as erroneously
adverted to in the twelve information filed against herein petitioner because the transactions
involved were emergency direct purchases by personal canvass.
The Solicitor General upon re-assessment of the facts and evidence recommended acquittal of
the accused.

Issue: WON the Solicitor General is correct in recommending acquittal of the accused.

Ruling: YES.

The recommendation of the Solicitor General was for acquittal after finding of the following
facts:

Inasmuch as Treasurer Vega signed and paid the vouchers after the materials were
delivered, petitioner's signature on the vouchers after payment is not, we submit the kind
of intervention contemplated under Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.

What is contemplated in Section 3(h) of the anti-graft law is the actual intervention in the
transaction in which one has financial or pecuniary interest in order that liability may
attach. (Opinion No. 306, Series 1961 and Opinion No. 94, Series 1972 of the Secretary
of Justice). The official need not dispose his shares in the corporation as long as he does
not do anything for the firm in its contract with the office. For the law aims to prevent the
don-tenant use of influence, authority and power (Deliberation on Senate Bill 293, May
6, 1959, Congressional Record, Vol. 11, page 603).

Upholding the evidence of petitioner's divestment of his interest with Trigen would
necessarily allow him to act freely in his official capacity in the municipality's dealings or
transactions with Trigen. That in itself is sufficient to acquit him of the crimes charged. 

No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment for before he signed the vouchers,
payment was already paid by the treasurer.

Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of this Court by the Solicitor General
and in view of the reassessment made by that Office of the issues and the evidence and the law
involved, the Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot
be rightfully sustained. The conscientious study and thorough analysis made by the Office of the
Solicitor General in this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the People's Advocate
in the administration of justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just
as it has the task of having the guilty punished. This Court will do no less and, therefore, accepts
the submitted recommendation that the decision and resolution in question of the respondent
Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice, the herein petitioner be entitled to a
judgment of acquittal.
 Query of Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
on the conflicting views of Regional Trial Court-Judges Masadao and Elizaga Re: Criminal
Case No. 4954-M
A.M. No. 87-9-3981-RTC Oct 26, 1987
-Palamos
Facts:

Judge Masadao rendered a decision in Cirminal Case No. 4954-M of the RTC of Bulacan,
Branch 9, Malolos entited “People of the Philippines v Jaime Tadeo”. The accused was found
guilty. Upon motion for reconsideration of the accused, retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes entered his
appearance for the accused. Judge Masadao inhibited from further sitting in the case on the
ground that retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes has been among those who had recommended him to
the bench. Consequently, the case was raffled to Judge Luciano Elizaga. Judge Elizaga returned
the records of the case refusing to act on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and assailing
the re-raffling of the case impractical and uncalled for.

Issue: WON Judge Masadao’s act of inhibiting from resolving the motion for reconsideration is
proper.

Ruling:
The rule on disqualification under Sec 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been an executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without written consent of the parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
On the other hand, where no grounds for disqualification as above enumerated exist, Par. 2, Sec
1, Rule 137 applies. The rule provides:
A judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just
or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Indeed, a judge was appointed should not be influenced by the recommendations of the sponsor
or patron. However, where the relationship between the judge and an attorney for a party is such
that there would be a natural inclination to prejudice the case, the judge should be disqualified in
order to guarantee a fair trial. Men of the Bench are not without imperfections. A judge too,
experiences the “tug and oull of purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with
the rest of his fellow mortals”.
Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend, classmate, associate or patron of a
presiding judge appears before him as counsel for one of the parties to a case. “Utang na loob”
per se, should not be a hindrance to the administration of justice. However, where, as in this case,
the judge admits that he may be suspected of surrendering to the persuasions of utang na loob or
he may succumb to it considering that he “and the members of his family, no less, shall ever
remain obliged in eternal gratitude to Justice J. B.L. Reyes. The circumstance in this case is not
ordinary ones. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, one of the most distinguished legal scholars of our country
and towering paragon, highly respected during his stints in the Office of the Sol Gen, CA, and
Supreme Court and through his post-retirement life is no ordinary sponsor. Hence, Judge
Masadao is justified in inhibiting from acting on the motion for reconsideration. The second
paragraph of Sec 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court applies in this case.
 NELSON P. VALDEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON DABON
JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 7353, November 16, 2015

-Pelingon
Facts:

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Nelson P. Valdez against Atty.
Antolin Allyson M. Dabon, Jr. anchored on the ground of grossly immoral and indecent conduct,
which transgressed the high moral standards required for membership in the Bar.

Petitioner, Nelson Valdez, is married to Sonia Romero Valdez, who was a CA Stenographer
from 1992 to 2006. Petitioner came to know of the adulterous and immoral relationship Sonia
has with Atty. Dabon, a CA Division Clerk of Court, only on April 18, 2006 after receiving an
anonymous text message hinting/stating about the existence of an illicit affair between the two.
Initially, Sonia denied the affair but eventually broke down and admitted her sexual liaison with
Atty. Dabon from 2000 to 2006 when confronted with a text message he received from Atty.
Jocelyn Dabon, the wife of the respondent, on May 4, 2006 at about 9:47 o'clock in the morning,
which asked for the complainant’s forgiveness for her husband’s infidelity and that the Dabon
spouses will be separating soon through an annulment.

Sonia narrated that her illicit relationship with Atty. Dabon started sometime in November 2000
and ended in March 2006 when she, bothered by her conscience, decided to break it off. She
mentioned that Atty. Dabon relentlessly pursued her for years and even admitted that he fell in
love with her the first time he laid eyes on her and that on November 13, 2000, Atty. Dabon
lured her to what appeared to be a mere friendly lunch date, managed to put sleep-inducing drug
into her food or drink causing her to feel drowsy and weak and, thereafter, brought her to
Victoria Court Motel where he sexually molested her while she was asleep. She opted to keep
silent about the incident for fear of its adverse repercussions of shame and embarrassment to her
and her family. She pleaded with Atty. Dabon to leave her and forget what had happened, but the
respondent instead taunted her by laughing at her misery. Since then, Atty. Dabon succeeded in
having repeated carnal knowledge of her once or twice a week through intimidation and threats.

Respondent, Atty. Dabon, strongly refuted the accusation against him claiming that the same was
baseless and unfounded and that the complaint for disbarment was merely calculated to harass,
annoy and besmirch his reputation.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, through Investigating Commissioner, Manuel T. Chan,
reported that the charge against respondent, Atty. Dabon, had been sufficiently proven and
recommended for the latter’s disbarment.
On December 11, 2008, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the
recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Chan.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of grossly immoral conduct warranting his disbarment.

Held:

In the case at bench, the Court subscribes to the IBP's opinion that there was substantial evidence
showing that Atty. Dabon did have an illicit relationship with Nelson's legal wife.

The Court notes from the respondent's comment that he appeared to be perplexed as to whether
or not he would admit his extramarital liaisons with Sonia. As Investigating Commissioner Chan
stated in his report, Atty. Dabon interposed a blanket denial of the romantic involvement but at
the same time, he seemed to have tacitly admitted the illicit affair only that it was not attended by
sexual assaults, threats and intimidations. The Court also observed that he devoted considerable
effort to demonstrate that the affair did not amount to gross immoral conduct and that no sexual
abuse, threat or intimidation was exerted upon the person of Sonia, but not once did he squarely
deny the affair itself.

In other words, the respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the
admission of substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstance alone is denied
while the fact itself is admitted. It is clear from Atty. Dabon's comment that his denial only
pertained as to the existence of a forced illicit relationship. Without a categorical denial thereof,
he is deemed to have admitted his consensual affair with Sonia.

Atty. Dabon's intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife showed his moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. It manifested
his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and for his own marital vow of fidelity. It
showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession.
Indeed, he has fallen below the moral bar. Such detestable behavior warrants a disciplinary
sanction. Even if not all forms of extramarital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside of marriage are considered disgraceful and immoral as they manifest deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.
A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. It is willful, flagrant, or shameless as to
show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.

The respondent’s misconduct and unrepentant demeanor clearly showed a serious flaw in his
character, his moral indifference to the sanctity of marriage and marital vows, and his outright
defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and
place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril. Accordingly, the Court finds the need
for the imposition of the extreme administrative penalty of disbarment.
 MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON,
Respondent
A.C. No. 9608, November 27, 2012
-Pelingon
Facts:

Complainant, Maria Victoria B. Ventura, filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint  for Disbarment or
Suspension before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline
against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for "grossly immoral conduct."

In her complaint, complainant alleged that sometime in December 2001, when she was merely
13 years of age, at around midnight, she was sleeping in the maid’s room at respondent’s house
when respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked her breast,
and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found blood stain in her
panty. She stated that another incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondent’s poultry farm
in Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He
brought her to an old shanty where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five
hundred pesos and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill her and her
mother.

In her Supplemental-Complaint, complainant averred that respondent allowed her to sleep in his

house after her mother agreed to let her stay there while she studied at the Agusan National High
School. She further stated that on the night she was sexually abused, she was awakened when
respondent went on top of her. She struggled to free herself and shouted, but respondent covered
her mouth and nobody could hear as nobody was in the house. Complainant also claimed that on
March 19, 2002, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 pm, respondent forced her to ride a multi-cab. When
they arrived at his poultry farm in Alegria, respondent dragged her to a dilapidated shack. She
resisted his advances but her efforts proved futile.

After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan
Del Sur, Philippines issued a Resolution dated 10 June 2002 dismissing the charge of Rape and
finding the existence of probable cause for the crime of Qualified Seduction.

Respondent, Atty. Samson, admitted that sexual intercourse indeed transpired between the herein
complainant and himself. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations to the effect
that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant constitute grossly immoral conduct.
The truth is that the act of respondent in having sex with complainant was done with mutual
agreement after respondent gave money to complainant. According to him, there is no human
law that punishes a person who has sex with a woman with mutual agreement and complainant
accepts compensation therefore. Having sex with complainant once with just compensation does
not amount to immoral conduct.
In addition, the respondent alleges also that the complainant, Maria Victoria, is a person of loose
morals and that the complainant usually stayed late at night with her male friends when her
mother was out of the house. He claimed that he heard rumors that complainant had sexual
affairs with different boys.

Further, the respondent mentioned that the case was instigated by his former employee, Corazon
Ventura, the mother of the complainant. He alleged that the latter holds a grudge against him for
terminating her. The latter tried to settle the case outside of court for Php 2,000,000.00.
However, when the case for rape was dismissed and substituted for qualified seduction, Mrs.
Ventura again tried to settle for Php 400,000.00.

On December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor and
executed their respective Affidavits of Desistance. Complainant stated that what happened
between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on mutual understanding. Thus, she was
withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent before the RTC as well as the one she
filed before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against
respondent was dismissed.

Despite the desistance, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline continued its investigation and
recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of 1 year from the practice of law for
immorality.

On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-
237 to adopt and approve with modification the recommendation of the IBP Commission. The
Board recommended for the respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for 5 years.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of grossly immoral conduct that will warrant disbarment.

Held:

From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself,
the Court find that respondent’s act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his
former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only
admitted he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever
when he asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her
money. Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover,
the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost
moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his
profession. Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant,
then a 13-year-old minor, who for a time was under respondent’s care. Whether the sexual
encounter between the respondent and complainant was or was not with the latter’s consent is of
no moment. Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly
reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality required of the
legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court,
membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer’s lack
of the essential qualifications required of lawyers.

In this case, respondent’s gross misbehavior and unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious
flaw in his character, his moral indifference to sexual exploitation of a minor, and his outright
defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and
place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but
appropriate disciplinary action. The seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its
power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
The Court disbarred respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for Gross Immoral Conduct, Violation
of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
 JOSELANO GUEVARRA vs ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA
A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007
-Polidario
FACTS:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancée Irene
Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne
(sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.
Joselano Guevarra filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment before the IBP-
Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala for grossly immoral
conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath. He alleged that after his marriage with
Irene, he noticed that his wife and the respondent had special relationship, which was confirmed
when she abandoned their conjugal home and lived with the respondent. Complainant later
found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face,
which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his
wedding to Irene. Also, it was revealed that Irene gave birth to a girl in 2002 and Irene named
respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father, which was not denied by the Eala.
He further alleged that respondent’s grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and
the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. He even mocked the institution of marriage
when he regarded it as “just a piece of paper”.
In his answer, respondent denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with
Irene, for their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their
respective families. He also said that his special relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct that would be a ground
for disbarment. After investigation, IBP-CBD found the charge against respondent sufficiently
proven recommending that he be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. However, the IBP Board of Governors,
annulled and set aside the Recommendation without giving any reason. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not concubinage or adulterous relationship a ground for disbarment from the
practice of Law.

RULING:
Yes. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the
surrounding circumstances. The case involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.
Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations
outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws. Respondent’s statements, in fact, constitute an admission of the illicit relationship. The
adulterous relationship has been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence.
It was found that he violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law.
Furthermore, he violated Rule 1.01 of Canon1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, and
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any
"conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. "As a lawyer, respondent should be
aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless
proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an extra-
marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was
null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an
institution held sacred by the law. Hence, respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala,
is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 Office of the Court Administrator vs Judge Eliza B. Yu
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, June 14, 2013
-Polidario
FACTS:
On June 4, 2013, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813 was consolidated with A.M. No. MTJ-12-1-09-
MeTC. Other closely-related administrative complaints involving the respondent, specifically:
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1863, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815, OCA IPI No. 11-2398-MTJ, OCA IPI No. 11-
2399-MTJ, OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ, and OCA IPI No. 12-2456-MTJ, were similarly
consolidated.
On January 27, 2011, the Court, through Chief Justice Renata C. Corona, issued
Administrative Order No. 19-2011 in response to the specific request of Secretary Alberto A.
Lim of the Department of Tourism (DOT) to establish night courts in Pasay City and Makati
City. A.O. No. 19-2011 designated the branches of the MeTC in Pasay City and Makati City as
night courts to expeditiously hear and try cases involving nighttime apprehensions, special cases
under the Rule on Summary Procedure, and criminal cases involving tourists.
27 January 2011, to comply with A.O. No. 19-2011, then Pasay City MeTC Executive
Judge Bibiano G. Colasito issued a Memorandum dated February 9, 2011 prescribing the
schedules for night court service of all Pasay City MeTC Judges and employees effective
February 14, 2011. Under the Memorandum, MeTC Branch 47, presided by respondent Judge
Yu, was assigned night court duties every Friday. But Judge Yu did not desire to comply.
Judge Yu communicated her reservations about the night court by letter directly to DOT
Secretary Lim, pointing out that the DOT's request for the establishment of the night courts was
supported neither by statistical data nor by any study. Judge Yu addressed some of her concerns.
First is that some of the rights of the accused who were charged with cases covered by the
Summary Procedure are impaired by the operation of night courts. Second, night courts in
Manila City and Quezon City are criticized for being ineffective and non-functional. Third, there
is a grave violation of the right of government employees against long and extended period of
work with no additional pay at night. Fourth, it is very burdensome to attend the court at night.
Fifth, it is risky to work at night because of lack of security. Lastly, the establishment of night
courts in Pasay City will not unclog a court's criminal docket.
On May 5, 2011, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Assistant Court
Administrator (ACA) Thelma C. Bahia, responded to the concerns raised by the Judge Yu.
Ostensibly not satisfied with the response, Judge Yu replied that the letter did not address the
issues raised in her letter dated February 11, 2011. Back at the Pasay City MeTC, the continued
refusal by Judge Yu to render night court service prompted Executive Judge Colasito to assign
additional night court duties to the other MeTC Judges and their personnel. In view of Judge
Yu's refusal to follow A.O. No. 19-2011, the OCA submitted a memorandum to the Court,
recommending that her insubordination, gross misconduct and violation of The New Code of
Judicial Conduct be docketed as an administrative complaint against her. In her comment, Judge
Yu denied the charges, and asserted that she did not commit insubordination; that her protest
against night courts was a mere expression of her opinion; that she would render night duty upon
receiving a resolution on her protest from the Court; that the OCAD should have submitted a
complete study and report about the effectiveness of night courts in the National Capital Judicial
Region, particularly in Pasay City; and that her protest was covered by her constitutional right to
freedom of speech and other legal principles.
The administrative matters referring to the appointments of Ms. Leilani A. Tejero-Lopez
as the Branch Clerk of Court of MeTC Branch 47, and Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman as Clerk III of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 108, in Pasay City was challenged by Judge Yu due to
lack of required training. The OCA filed a memorandum denouncing the misconduct and
insubordination of Judge Yu relative to the appointments of Ms. Tejero Lopez and Ms. Lagman.
On January 30, 2012, the Court required Judge Yu to show cause and explain why she should not
be disciplined for her actions.
A.M. No. 11-2399-MTJ refers to the complaint filed by the court staff of MeTC Branch
47 charging Judge Yu with grave misconduct, oppression, gross ignorance of the law and
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. In OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ, four MeTC Judges and
70 MeTC court personnel assigned in Pasay City filed two affidavit-complaints against Judge
Yu. A.M. No. 12-109-METC relates to the Letter dated July 21, 2011 sent by her fellow Pasay
City MeTC Judges, namely: Executive Judge Bibiano G. Colasito (Branch 45), Vice-Executive
Judge Bonifacio S. Pascua (Branch 44), Judge Restituto V. Mangalindan (Branch 46), and Judge
Catherine P. Manodon (Branch 48), requesting Judge Yu's immediate suspension or detail to
another station pending investigation of all the administrative cases filed against her. The
common issue in the three complaints concerned the conduct of Judge Yu in relation to her staff,
fellow Judges and other officers of the Supreme Court, her disobedience of the Court's issuances,
and her manner of disposing cases.
OCA IPI No. 12-2456-MTJ concerned the letter dated January 12, 2012[118] signed by
MeTC Executive Judge Colasito, Vice-Executive Judge Bonifacio S. Pascua, Judge Restituto V.
Mangalindan, Jr., and Clerk of Court Miguel C. Infante charging Judge Yu with oppression in
issuing the order dated December 1, 2011 in Criminal Case No. M-PSY-09-08592-CR entitled
People v. Ramil Fuentes. OCA IPI No. 11-2398-MTJ stemmed from the complaint filed by Mrs.
Josefina G. Labid charging Judge Yu with oppression, gross ignorance of the law, and conduct
unbecoming of a judge in connection with the fate of her son, Noel, who had served as Utility
Worker I at the MeTC Branch 47. A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821 emanated from the Letter-Complaint
of Judge Emily L. San Gaspar-Gito of MeTC Branch 20, whereby the latter imputed to Judge Yu
conduct unbecoming of a judge for constantly sending alarming messages with sexual
undertones via Facebook and electronic mail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Yu be disbarred for being guilty of the charges filed against her?
RULING:
The Court held that Judge Yu is guilty of noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary is clear and
forthright, viz.:
 Sec. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in
such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.
For sure, Judge Yu's expression of her dissent against A.O. No. 19-2011 was misplaced.
We may as well declare that she did not enjoy the privilege to dissent. Regardless of her reasons
for dissenting, she was absolutely bound to follow A.O. No. 19-2011. Indeed, she did not have
the unbridled freedom to publicly speak against A.O. No. 19-2011 and its implementation, for
her being the Judge that she was differentiated her from the ordinary citizen exercising her
freedom of speech and expression who did not swear obedience to the orders and processes of
the Court without delay. Her resistance to the implementation of A.O. No. 19-2011 constituted
gross insubordination and gross misconduct, and put in serious question her fitness and
worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to her judicial office. Judge Yu's unwillingness to
comply with A.O. No. 19-2011 was also a betrayal of her sworn duty to maintain fealty to the
law, and brought dishonor to the Judiciary. In that regard, her conduct amounted to gross
misconduct.
With regards to her refusal to honor the appointments of court personnel, the Court held
that Judge Yu's rejection of the appointment of Ms. Lagman was just as unwarranted.
Accordingly, Judge Yu's administrative complaint had no bearing on Ms. Lagman's appointment,
more so because Ms. Lagman was held liable only for simple misconduct, a less grave offense
that did not merit termination from public service for the first offense. We also take Judge Yu to
task for disrespectful language uttered against the Court, no less. The making of the verbal
threats by Judge Yu to compel a subordinate to withdraw her application constituted grave abuse
of authority.
Furthermore, as to the issuance of a show-cause order against fellow Judges and court
personnel, Judge Yu gravely abused her authority. The issuance of the show-cause order by
Judge Yu represented clear abuse of court processes, and revealed her arrogance in the exercise
of her authority as a judicial officer. She thereby knowingly assumed the role of a tyrant
wielding power with unbridled breadth. Based on its supervisory authority over the courts and
their personnel, the Court must chastise her as an abusive member of the Judiciary who tended to
forget that the law and judicial ethics circumscribed the powers and discretion vested in her
judicial office. Moreover, the Court notes that Judge Yu's issuance of the show-cause order
emanated from her desire to retaliate against her fellow Judges and the concerned court
employees considering that the allegedly contumacious conduct was the copying of court records
to be used as evidence in the administrative complaint against her. She thereby breached her duty
to disqualify herself from acting at all on the matter. Such self-disqualification was required
under Section 5, Canon 3, and Section 8 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.
As to her refusal to sign the application for leave of absence and other allegations of
oppression, the Court held that she was guilty of oppression, which is any act of cruelty, severity,
unlawful exaction, domination or excessive use of authority constituting oppression. Her
oppression did not befit an administrator of justice.
With regards to charges of gross ignorance of the law filed against her, the Court held
that Judge Yu disregarded Section 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court when she allowed the
change of plea by the accused in People v. Manduriao without the assistance of counsel. Judge
Yu justified herself by claiming that she had apprised the accused of the penalty for the offense
charged, which had then convinced the accused to change his plea. The Court cannot accept her
justification. As such, Judge Yu was guilty of gross ignorance of the law, which is ignorance of
the law when the law is so elementary, and when one professes not to know it, or when one acts
as if she does not know it. Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prescribes that
competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of the judicial office. In Judge Yu's case, her
competence was indispensable to her fair and proper administration of justice in her office. By
failing to adhere to and implement existing laws, policies, and the basic rules of procedure, she
seriously compromised her ability to be an effective magistrate.
Lastly, as to her sending of inappropriate messages was conduct unbecoming of a judicial
officer, the Court held that in the letter in question, Judge Yu used the phrase "our court" in
issuing the invitation to Atty. San Gaspar. She was obviously intending to use her authority as an
incumbent Judge to advance her personal interest. Such conduct was reprehensible because she
thereby breached Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.
In fine, the administrative offenses Judge Yu committed were the following, to wit:
1. In A.M. No. MTJ-12-1823, insubordination and gross misconduct for her non-
compliance with A.O. No. 19-2011;
2. In A.M. No. MTJ-13-1836 and A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815, gross insubordination for her
unwarranted refusal to honor the appointments of court personnel and rejection of the
appointment of Ms. Lagman; disrespect toward the Court for her intemperate and
disrespectful language in characterizing Ms. Tejero-Lopez's valid appointment as void ab
initio and a big joke; and grave abuse of authority and oppression for issuing verbal
threats of filing administrative, civil and criminal charges against Ms. Tejero-Lopez
unless the latter withdrew her application;
3. In OCA IPI No. 11-2378-MTJ and OCA IPI No. 12-2456-MTJ, grave abuse of authority
and abuse of court processes for issuing the show-cause order against her fellow Judges
and court personnel; and gross misconduct amounting to violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct for not disqualifying herself in acting on the supposedly contumacious conduct
of her fellow Judges and concerned court personnel in copying the records of her court;
4. In OCA IPI No. 12-2398-MTJ, refusal to perform official functions and oppression for
refusing to sign the application for leave of absence despite the employee having
complied with the requirements, and for doing so in retaliation for the employee's having
joined as signatory of administrative complaint filed against her;
5. Gross ignorance of the law for: (a) allowing on-the-job trainees and designating an OIC
who did not possess the minimum qualifications for the position and without approval
 from the Court (OCA IPI No. 11-2399-MTJ; (b) ordering the presentation of ex parte
evidence before the OIC despite his not being a member of the Bar (OCA IPI No. 11-
2378-MTJ); (c) allowing criminal proceedings to be conducted without the actual
participation of the public prosecutor (A.M. No. MTJ-12-1815); and (d) authorizing the
change of plea by the accused without the assistance of counsel; and
6. In A.M. No. MTJ-13-1821, conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer for sending
inappropriate messages with sexual undertones to a fellow female Judge, and for using
the official letterhead of her judicial office in summoning a lawyer to a conference.
The grossness and severity of her offenses taken together demonstrated Judge Yu's unfitness
and incompetence to further discharge the office and duties of a Judge. Her arrogance and
insubordination in challenging A.O. No. 19-2011, and her unyielding rejection of the
appointments of court personnel constituted gross insubordination and gross misconduct, and
warranted her immediate dismissal from the Judiciary. Her requiring her fellow Judges to submit
to her authority by virtue of her showcause order, whereby she revealed her utter disrespect
towards and disdain for them, as well as her conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer aggravated
her liability. The administration of justice cannot be entrusted to one like her who would readily
ignore and disregard the laws and policies enacted by the Court to guarantee justice and fairness
for all.
The Court will not hesitate to impose the extreme penalty on any judicial officer who has
fallen short of the responsibilities of her worthy office. Any conduct that violates the norms of
public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system must be
condemned. No act or omission by a Judge or Justice that falls short of the exacting norms of
holding the public office of dispensing justice can be condoned, for the most important thing for
every Judge or Justice is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the Judiciary as well as
in the individuals who dispense justice. The image of the Judiciary must remain unsullied by the
misconduct of its officials. The Court will not shirk from its duty of removing from the Bench
any Judge or Justice who has stained the integrity and dignity of the Judiciary. This is what must
be done now in these consolidated cases.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU
GUILTY of GROSS INSUBORDINATION; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; GROSS
MISCONDUCT; GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY; OPPRESSION; and CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDICIAL OFFICIAL; and, ACCORDINGLY, DISMISSES her from
the service EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, with FORFEITURE OF ALL HER BENEFITS,
except accrued leave credits, and further DISQUALIFIES her from.reinstatement or appointment
to any public office or employment, including to one in any government-owned or government-
controlled corporations.
 WYNA MARIE P. GARINGAN-FERRERAS vs. EDUARDO T. UMBLAS
A.M. No. P-11-2989
-Pomida
FACTS:
Complainant claimed that she received in June 2009 an e-mail with an attachment
purportedly a Certificate of Finality dated March 24, 2006 of Civil Case No. 33-398C-2006
entitled "Reynaldo Z. Ferreras v. Wyna Marie G. Ferreras" for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage issued by RTC, Branch 33, Ballesteros, Cagayan. The Certificate of Finality which
bore the signature of respondent as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Clerk of Court stated that the
Decision, declaring void ab initio the marriage contracted by complainant with Reynaldo z.
Ferreras (Reynaldo) on the ground of psychological capacity, granting complainant custody to
their child, and dissolving their conjugal property regime, had already become final and
executory.
Fearing foul play since she had absolutely no knowledge about said case nor received any
summons/notices regarding the same, complainant asked for a Certification from the National
Statistics Office which was confirmed.
She then asked for copy of all documents relative to the annulment case . There was one issued ,
stating that the declaration of nullity case is not on file..
Respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint, stating, among others, that the
Decision and Certification of Finality were fraudulent and that his purported signatures thereto
were spurious and not his own handwriting and accord. Furthermore, he countered that he was
no longer acting as the OIC Clerk of Court and responsible for such issuances as he had been
replaced prior to the date of issuance.
The matter was then to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Tuguegarao City for Investigation,
Report and Recommendation. According to the Investigating Judge, no actual confrontation was
had between the parties. Notably, complainant, who hails from Nueva Vizcaya, would travel all
the way to Tuguegarao City to attend all the scheduled hearings, except in one instance when she
moved for its postponement as she had to accompany her son to Manila. On the other hand,
respondent did not honor any of the scheduled hearings with his presence despite receipt of
summons. So, the case revolved substantially on the documents submitted by the parties,
particularly on the signature of the respondent. Other than the respondent's claim that he did not
participate in the annulment of petitioner's marriage and that the signature in the Certificate of
Finality was a simulation, he did not present any evidence or witnesses to prove that his
signature in the Certificate of Finality was forged. Since it was the respondent who alleged
forgery, it falls upon him to produce clear, positive and convincing evidence to prove the same.
However, he failed to do so.
Investigating Judge -recommended that respondent be dismissed from service for committing the
grave offense of falsification. The Court resolved to refer this matter to the OCA for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
The Office of the Court Administrator- same
ISSUE: Whether the respondent fraudulently, maliciously, and willfully caused the preparation
of, and signed, a Certificate of Finality of a non-existent case that led to the declaration of nullity
of the marriage between Ferreras and complainant and its subsequent annotation in the marriage
certificate on file with the National Statistics Office.
RULING: Yes.The Court adopted the findings of the Judge and the OCA.
Having affirmatively raised the defense of forgery the burden rests upon respondent to prove the
same. Aside from his bare denial, respondent did not even make any attempt to show that the
signature appearing in the Certificate of Finality was not his signature or that it was dissimilar to
his real signature. The Court then held that the signature in the Certificate of Finality was affixed
by respondent himself. Section 22, Rule 132, Rules of Court instructs that genuineness of
handwriting may be proved "by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by a party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the Judge."
Also as pointed out by the OCA, respondent was never present during any of the seven hearings
set by the Investigating Judge. For four times, he moved for postponement for ambiguous and
lame grounds. During all this time, complainant would travel all the way from Nueva Vizcaya
only to find out that the hearing was again cancelled or postponed. To be sure, respondent was
fully aware of the gravity of the offense of which he was charged. If it was established that he
committed the falsification, he could be dismissed from service or even criminally prosecuted.
Yet, he did not give the complaint the requisite attention it needed thereby impressing upon this
Court that he did not have any viable defense to offer and that he is guilty as charged.
Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), falsification
of an official document is considered a grave offense warranting the penalty of dismissal from
the service.
"Falsification of an official document such as court records is considered a grave offense. It also
amounts to dishonesty. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987,
dishonesty (par. a) and falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty
of dismissal from service" even if committed for the first time.
Respondent's infraction would have merited the penalty of dismissal from service. However, the
court held that in the recent case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Umblas, the Supreme
Court found respondent guilty of grave misconduct and violation of Republic Act No. 6713 or
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. In said case,
respondent was accordingly meted the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all
benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Thus, considering his earlier dismissal from service and its accessory penalties, the penalty
applicable in this case, which is also dismissal, is no longer relevant or feasible. In lieu thereof, it
is proper to impose a fine of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from his accrued leave credits.
 SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON vs. ATTY. REY FERDINAND
GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.
G.R. No. 179914, June 16, 2014

ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY vs. JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR.,

Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
-Pomida

FACTS: Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon (spouses Sombilon) were the previous
owners of a 601-square meter property with two buildings constructed on it. The said property,
which they mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank as security for their loan, was foreclosed
and sold at public auction. PNB emerged as the winning bidder in the amount of ₱2,355,000.00.
A Certificate of Sale was issued and duly registered with the Registry of Deeds.The one-year
redemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed to redeem the property.
Spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Garay, as they wanted to reacquire the property from
PNB, but had no money to repurchase it. Thus, they were hoping that he would agree to advance
the money and, in exchange, they promised to sell him the 331-square meter portion of the
property, where one of the buildings is located, for ₱5 million.
The following day, Atty. Garay went to the bank alone and offered to buy the property by
making a down payment of ₱587,600.0016 or 20% of the purchase price. Upon learning that
Atty. Garay intended to purchase the entire property for himself, spouses Sombilon offered to
buy back the property from PNB.The bank advised them to make a 10% down payment of the
bank’s total claim.. PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Garay since spouses
Sombilon failed to make the required down payment.
G.R. No. 179914
PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession. Judge Venadas, Sr. granted
the petition and issued a Writ of Possession in favor of PNB. Spouses Sombilon moved for the
reconsideration of the the writ as Atty Garay was barred from purchsing said property under
Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Ruling of the RTC- ordered the holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession, Although, ordinarily a writ of possession is issued by the court because it is a
mandatory and ministerial duty, there is an exception to this rule that if the implementation and
enforcement of the writ of possession would work injustice to the registered owner because PNB
or in this case Atty. Garay is not entitled thereto.
Aggrieved, Atty. Garay and PNB elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
CA- granted the application for TRO. It also ruled that granted the Petition for Certiorari. The
CA found grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession.
Hence, spouses Sombilon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari contending that that
the CA should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari due to the failure of PNB and Atty.
Garay to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order. They also contended that Judge
Venadas, Sr. did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession because PNB no longer has the legal personality to do
so considering that the subject property had already been sold to Atty. Garay, who they claim is
also not entitled to the Writ of Possession as he is disqualified from purchasing the subject
property pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code
Atty. Garay, on the other hand, argues that the CA did not err in granting the Petition for
Certiorari as Judge Venadas, Sr. acted with grave abuse of discretion when he recalled the Writ
of Possession without notice to him and PNB. He also emphasizes that it is a ministerial duty of
the court to issue a writ of possession after the redemption period has lapsed.
PNB, asserts that as registered owner of the subject property, it is entitled to the Writ of
Possession. PNB further avers that it is not privy to the arrangement or relationship between
Atty. Garay and spouses Sombilon. In any case, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of
the Civil Code does not apply to the instant case as Atty. Garay purchased the subject property
from PNB and not from spouses Sombilon.
Anent its failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition for Certiorari, PNB
explains that in this case the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration may be dispensed with as the
issue involved is purely one of law, which is an exception under prevailing jurisprudence.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance
the implementation of the Writ of Possession
RULING: Yes. The issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the court.
A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with the Register of
Deeds within which to redeem his property. During the one-year redemption period, the
purchaser may possess the property by filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
before the court, upon the posting of a bond. And once title is consolidated under the name of the
purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the court;
thus, no discretion is left to the court. In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when
PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of Possession. In fact, the title over the subject property
had already been consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr.
to issue the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of the subject property.
Although Spouses Sombilon claimed that the sale between PNB and Atty. Garay was invalid as
it was done in violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code, the alleged invalidity of
the sale is not a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of Possession as this does not
affect PNB’s right to possess the subject property. Thus, there was no reason for Judge Venadas,
Sr. to hold in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he committed
grave abuse of discretion as being the registered owner, PNB is entitled to the possession of the
subject property as a matter of right.
As to the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to move for a reconsideration prior to the availment of
a special civil action for certiorari, the Court held that the filing of a motion for reconsideration
may be dispensed with where the decision is a patent nullity or where there is violation of due
process, such as in the instant case. There is no error on the part of the CA in granting the
Petition for Certiorari.

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000

(Note: What was asked to be digested was GR 179914. I just included this for purposes of
academic discussion since this pertained to the liability of the Judge and also dealt with the Rules
of Procedure.).

Atty. Garay filed a complaint Judge Venadas, Sr., charging him with Grave Abuse of Authority
and Grave Misconduct when he proceeded with the hearing of spouses Sombilon’s motion for
reconsideration of the Order granting the issuance of the Writ of Possession despite lack of
notice to PNB and for holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he issued in Special Civil Case
No. 375-05. According to him, Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for
holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he earlier issued and for ignoring Sections 4, 5, and 6
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as he proceeded to hear the motion despite lack of notice to
PNB.

Judge Venadas denied the charges against him arguing that he did not annul the Writ of
Possession but merely stayed its execution and implementation to prevent any injustice. He
insists there was no violation of due process because he immediately scheduled a hearing for
PNB to present its evidence.

OCA- found Judge Venadas, Sr. administratively liable for grave abuse of authority bordering on
gross ignorance of procedure. Although the OCA did not touch on the issue of whether Judge
Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation
of the Writ of Possession as it was still pending with the CA at that time, it nevertheless found
Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court when he acted on the defective motion filed by spouses Sombilon. It also pointed out
that PNB and Atty. Garay were deprived of their rights to due process as no proper notice was
sent to them.
Issue: whether Judge Vernadas Sr should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance
the implementation of the Writ of Possession and for disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15
of the Rules of Court.

Ruling: Yes; Supreme Court agreed with the recommendations of the OCA.

Spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day notice rule and the required proof of
service embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, thereby rendering the
motion fatally defective. Despite this, Judge Venadas, Sr. still took cognizance of the motion
filed by spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and Atty. Garay of their right to due process.

To exculpate himself from the charges against him, Judge Venadas, Sr. claims that the motion
was personally served on PNB and its counsel on July 12, 2005 but they refused to receive the
same. However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, no affidavit was submitted to substantiate such
allegation. Thus, Judge Venadas, Sr. is guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross
ignorance of procedure for blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court.

Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and law is gross
ignorance of the law, which is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, punishable by either dismissal from
service, suspension for more than three months but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more
than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

Penalty - fine in the amount of ₱20,000.00. Incidentally, in the April 18, 2007 Resolution in
A.M. No. 12600-Ret.,85 the Court approved the application of Judge Venadas, Sr. for disability
retirement but withheld the amount of ₱100,000.00 pending the final resolution of this case. In
view thereof, the fine of ₱20,000.00 herein imposed on Judge Venadas, Sr. is to be deducted
from the withheld amount of ₱100,000.00.
LYDIA A. BENANCILLO, Complainant, vs. Judge VENANCIO J. AMILA, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 3, Tagbilaran City, Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2149, March 9, 2011 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2787-RTJ)

-Saavedra

FACTS:
The complainant, avers that Branch 1 of RTC Tagbilaran City, acting as then Family
Court in Tagbilaran City, issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her live-in partner,
Paul John Belot (Belot). The TPO included a directive to Belot to turn over to her personal
effects, including properties in their diving business called the Underworld Diver’s Panglao, Inc.
(Underworld). Belot sought the reconsideration of the issuance of the TPO. Meanwhile, their
business partners, Paz Mandin Trotin and Christopher Mandin, filed a motion for intervention
with respect to the properties of Underworld. The complainant filed an opposition to the motion
for intervention with prayer for preliminary injunction. Acting on the pending incidents, the
respondent judge denied both Belot’s motion for reconsideration and the intervenors’ motion for
intervention in an Order dated July 16, 2007. The respondent judge incorporated in the resolution
a cease-and-desist order prohibiting the intervenors from taking possession of the properties of
Underworld. The complainant states that the respondent judge constantly ruled in her favor as he
consistently held that the intervenors had no legal personality in the case. However, the
respondent judge refused to enforce the TPO.
The complainant claims that on October 8, 2007, the respondent judge called her and her
counsel to a meeting in his chambers on October 9, 2007. They agreed to the meeting but they
did not proceed when they learned that the intervenors were joining them. Subsequent to the
respondent judge’s meeting with the intervenors, he issued an Order dated October 18, 2007
which rescinded his Order dated October 2, 2007, of denying the intervenors’ motion for
reconsideration.

According to the complainant, the respondent judge’s conduct smacks of impropriety and
partiality. She further charges the respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion, gross
ignorance of the law and procedure and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment/order for
issuing the questioned Orders of October 18, 2007. Then, in an Order dated October 25, 2007, he
denied the complainant’s motion for reconsideration.

The complainant further observed that the respondent judge revoked his Order of October
2, 2007, without any motion being filed by any of the parties. The complainant alleged that the
respondent judge’s Order of October 25, 2007 ruling on the complainant’s motion for
reconsideration of the Order of October 18, 2007 introduced a new issue on the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of Belot. The respondent judge also ruled on maintaining the status
quo, a position inconsistent with the preliminary injunction he had previously issued.

The respondent judge claimed that the complainant was motivated by her "insatiable
greed to have exclusive control and possession pending trial of the case of all the properties of
the Underworld Divers Panglao, Inc. of respondent Paul John Belot." She added that the
"complainant . . . is only a live-in partner of respondent with no specific address who was
branded repeatedly by Belot as a ‘prostitute’ and one ‘only after his money’.

The complainant claimed that she suffered psychological and emotional violence as the
respondent judge echoed Belot’s verbal and psychological abuse against her. The complainant
averred that the respondent judge refused to enforce the TPO under the Anti-VAWC law because
of his prejudiced view that she would abscond with the contested properties due to the
"illegitimate status" of their "relationship." His personal bias against the complainant reflects his
utter lack of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The complainant asserted that while the
respondent judge can change his mind, he could no longer do so when the Order already became
final and executory and was not questioned anymore by the parties. Moreover, there was no
reason for the respondent judge to call for a meeting with the intervenors because he already
ruled that intervention was not allowed in the case.

The complainant alleged that as the respondent judge still refused to implement the TPO
despite the dismissal of Belot’s petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, she filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court for the annulment of the Orders dated October
18, 2007 and October 25, 2007. The complainant manifested that the Court of Appeals of Cebu
City already dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Belot which petition the respondent
Judge cited as reason for rescinding his Order dated [October] 2, 2007, the petition being a
prohibited pleading under Section 22 of RA 9262 (Anti-VAWC).

ISSUE:

1. WON there is an Unjust Judgment or Order relative to the issuance of the Order[s] dated
October 18, 2007 and October 25, 2007.
2. WON the respondent judge is guilty of Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of
the Law and Procedure.
3. WON the respondent judge is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. In particular,
violating Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary.

RULING:
 The OCA found that Judge Amila acted inappropriately in calling the intervenors to a
meeting in his chambers. It was also noted that he used derogatory and irreverent language in
presenting complainant in his Comment as an opportunist, a mistress in an illegitimate
relationship and that she was motivated by insatiable greed. As regards the charge for gross
ignorance of the law, the OCA noted that the same is premature considering that complainant
filed before this Court a petition assailing the October 18 and 25, 2007 Orders of respondent
Judge.

The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of OCA. Furthermore, The Supreme
Court ruled that the respondent judge acted inappropriately in calling the complainant and the
intervenors to a meeting inside his chambers. His explanation that he called the said meeting to
advice the parties that he will rescind his October 2, 2007 Order is not acceptable. This act of
respondent judge would logically create an impression to complainant that the meeting of the
judge with the intervenors had turned his views around towards issuing a revocation of the
October 2, 2007 Order. It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness.
The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be
temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and
sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech
increases his persuasiveness.

Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent Judge Venancio J. Amila is found guilty
of conduct unbecoming of a judge. In particular, he violated Sections 1 and 6, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, and and FINE him ₱21,000.00.
 ALICIA Y. LAUREL, SUBSTITUTED BY HER SOLE HEIR AND LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVE JUAN MIGUEL Y. LAUREL, Petitioner, v. FERDINAND M.
VARDELEON, Respondent.

G.R. No. 202967, August 05, 2015

-Saavedra

FACTS:

Petitioner Alicia Y. Laurel filed a Complaint for recovery of possession and ownership
and/or quieting of title against respondent Ferdinand M. Vardeleon concerning a 20,306-square
meter island in Caticlan, Malay, Aklan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7249 and
assigned to Branch 6 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.

Respondent denied the material allegations in the complaint, claiming that he bought the island
on April 9, 1973 from Avelina Casimero, and that petitioner was guilty of laches in filing her
claim.

In a July 6, 2005 Pre-Trial Order, petitioner was scheduled to present her evidence on
three separate dates: September 7, 2005; October 12, 2005; and November 23, 2005.

Previously, on August 1, 2005, respondent moved to correct the Pre-Trial Order, in order
to reflect therein petitioner's supposed admission made during pre-trial that she knew of
respondent's possession of the subject property since 1975. Petitioner opposed the same.

In an August 19, 2005 Order, the trial court denied respondent's motion to correct the
Pre-Trial Order. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court did not act on
the motion.

On September 2, 2005, petitioner's counsel moved to reset the scheduled September 7,

2005 hearing to October 12, 2005 or any available date. The trial court, in a September 7, 2005
Order, granted the motion provided that petitioner defrays the transportation expenses as well as
the appearance fee of respondent's counsel. Petitioner moved to reconsider, but the court failed to
act on the same.

During the scheduled October 12, 2005 hearing, petitioner was present, together with
substitute counsel Atty. Roy Villa and her first witness. Petitioner moved in open court to
postpone trial on the ground that there are pending motions that have to be resolved, and that the
substitute lawyer had yet to confer with the witness, since her true counsel, Atty. De la Vega -
who originally interviewed the witness - was not present. This time, the trial court, in an Order of
even date, denied: 1) petitioner's oral motion to postpone trial; 2) her motion for reconsideration
of the trial court's September 7, 2005 Order directing her to defray respondent's counsel's
transportation expenses and appearance fees; and 3) respondent's motion for reconsideration of
the trial court's August 19, 2005 Order denying his motion to correct the Pre-Trial Order. It
likewise dismissed Civil Case No. 7249 on the ground of failure to prosecute on petitioner's part,
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

On November 9, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's
October 12, 2005 Order, but in a January 31, 2006 Order, the trial court denied the same

Hence, the dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute as mentioned at the outset.

Issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED

SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT FOR SUPPOSED FAILURE TO PROSECUTE DESPITE THE
FACT THAT PETITIONER THROUGH HER COUNSEL HAD ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED
IN

THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT A QUO AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE
WAS A PENDING UNRESOLVED MOTION INVOLVING THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER.

Ruling:

The Petition must be granted.

This Court has said that "[t]he fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the
circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with
reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to... prosecute."

To constitute failure to prosecute, his non-appearance must be equated with

unwillingness to proceed with the trial as when both plaintiff and counsel made: no appearance
at all, or with the assumption that plaintiff has already lost interest in prosecuting his action, in
the same way that should the ground for dismissal be delay, this delay or failure to proceed must
be for an unreasonable length of time beyond the reasonable allowance which by judicial
leniency litigant is normally entitled

Likewise, while a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test
of such power is whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due
diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a... pattern or a
scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory
requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, courts should decide to dispense rather than
wield their authority to dismiss.

The Court declares that the trial court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 7249, and the
appellate court should not have affirmed such dismissal. Petitioner's actuations indicate that she
was not at all unwilling to prosecute her case; nor can it be said that - as the trial court puts it -
she "refused" to present her evidence. Far from these, she was indeed more than eager to see her
case through. When she instituted Civil Case No. 7249 in 2004, petitioner was already eighty-
one (81) years of age. Yet, despite her advanced age, the record indicates that petitioner attended
the scheduled hearing of October 12, 2005, together with her counsel and the first witness - only
that the lawyer who attended was a mere proxy, and not petitioner's true... counsel who
previously conferred with the witness. Moreover, in coming to court that day, petitioner and the
substitute counsel were acting in the honest belief that trial cannot proceed on account of
pending incidents which the trial court has failed to resolve, that is: 1) her motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's September 7, 2005 Order directing her to defray respondent's
counsel's transportation expenses and appearance fees; and 2) respondent's motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's August 19, 2005 Order denying his motion to correct the Pre-
Trial Order. Given the circumstances petitioner was confronted with at the time, it is
understandable that she should seek another continuance. Given her advanced age,
determination, the surrounding circumstances of the case, and the fact that no prejudice is caused
to respondent by further postponement of trial since petitioner - by prior agreement during pre-
trial - is expected to conclude her case within the agreed three settings, the trial court should have
extended to petitioner the courtesy she deserved by granting a continuance.

Postponements should not be allowed except on meritorious grounds, in light of the attendant
circumstances. Deferment of the proceedings may be allowed or tolerated especially where the
deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any party. 'The desideratum of a speedy
disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to
present evidence and either in the plaintiffs being non-suited or of the defendant's being
pronounced liable under an ex-parte judgment' While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of
non-prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the circumstances,
plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude.
 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JOEBERT C. GUIAN
A.M. No. P-07-2293, July 15, 2015. (Formerly A.M No. 06-12-411-MTC)
-Salentes

FACTS:

Joebert C. Guan, former Clerk of Court of MTC, Bulan, Sorsogon was found to be accountable
after a financial audit of the books of accounts has been made covering the period July 28, 1993
to August 31, 2004. It was disclosed that: (1) some collections were not properly and accurately
recorded in the cashbooks; (2) there were shortages in the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)
and Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund in the amounts of ₱48,207.10 and ₱5,l 16.00,
respectively; p~ (3) the financial reports on the JDF, General/Special Allowance for the Judiciary
Fund (SAJF) and Fiduciary Fund (FF) were not regularly submitted to the Accounting Division
of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA); (4) the records control is not systematic; (5) no
legal fees forms were attached to the case records; (6) daily transactions in the FF account were
not duly recorded in the cashbooks; and, (7) documents needed to validate withdrawals of cash
bonds from the Municipal Treasurer’s Office (MTO) of Bulan were missing.

The audit team recommended that Guan must IMMEDIATELY RESTITUTE his incurred
shortages in the Judiciary Development Fund and Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund,
EXPLAIN within ten (10) days from notice why he incurred such shortages and why he should
not be administratively dealt, SECURE an itemized list of Unwithdrawn Fiduciary Fund or cash
bonds he deposited thereat, and TRANSMIT to the OCA all the documents regarding the
deposits and withdrawals of cash bonds from May 1998 to July 31, 2005. The Court issued
a Resolution adopting the recommendation of the OCA as well as holding in abeyance any claim
of Guan for separation benefits pending resolution of the administrative matter against him.

Guan wrote the Court a letter requesting that the monetary value of his leave credits be applied
as payment for his accountability. He explained that he could no longer account for the shortages
because some of the records could no longer be found. He further explained that while he was
able to secure from the MTO a list of cash bond deposits made by him, the Fiscal Monitoring
Division (FMD) of the OCA did not accept the same for being incomplete and despite presenting
to the FMD a certification from the MTO that its records were damaged by typhoon "Melenyo"
in July 2007. He requested that a financial audit be conducted again on the itemized list of
unwithdrawn fiduciary fund or cash bonds deposited by Guan but several pertinent records were
nowhere to be found. In view of this, the Court issued a Resolution directing the OCA to
conduct again a financial audit.

Upon the conclusion of the audit, it was revealed that both the former Officer-In-Charge, Joseph
C. Guim and the incumbent Clerk of Court, Emerose F. Denso, have no accountability. With
respect to Guan, however, the audit team found him guilty of violation of office rules and
regulations and simple neglect of duty with a fine of P10, 000. The OCA is to provide
the Financial Management Office documents relating to Guan and for Guan to restitute
the shortages in case his earned leave credits or other benefits would not be sufficient.

ISSUE: Whether or not Guan is guilty of simple neglect of duty.

RULING:

He is guilty of gross neglect of duty. The Court disagrees with the OCA’s finding that Guan’s
transgressions constitute simple neglect of duty only. In the OCA v. Acampado, the Court
declared that any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual remittance
thereof constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall be held administratively
liable. Also in the cases of OCA vs. Mrs. Aurora T. Zuniga and OCA vs. Melchor, Jr., the Court
held that delayed remittance of cash collections constitutes gross neglect of duty because this
omission deprives the court of interest that could have been earned if the amounts were deposited
in the authorized depository bank.

Here, Guan’s shortages with respect to the JDF to the SAJF were both due to unreported and
undeposited collections. In other words, Guan’s transgressions did not merely consist of delay in
the remittance of his collections but to his total failure to deposit the same as well. This is a clear
case of gross neglect of duty. As held, "gross neglect is such neglect which, from the gravity of
the case or the frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or
threaten the public welfare." Anent Guan’s accountability of 238,000.00 in FF, the audit team
noted that the same was not due to unreported or undeposited collections but to incomplete
documentation to support cash bond withdrawals therefrom. Evidently, respondent failed to
comply with the same and this likewise constitutes gross neglect of duty.

Finally, "Clerks of Court are the custodians of the courts’ ‘funds and revenues, records,
properties, and premises.’ They are ‘liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment’ of
those entrusted to them. Any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual
remittance ‘constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall beheld
administratively liable.’"

The Court finds Joebert C. Guan GUILTY of gross neglect of duty.

 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ANA MARIE ABARENTOS
A.M. No. CA-12-26-P, August 17, 2015
-Salentes
FACTS:

Anna Marie Abarentos, former Records Officer IV at the Judicial Records Division of the Court
of Appeals, Cebu station, was charged for tampering the date of receipt of the Petition for
Review filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 05464. She allegedly made it appear that said pleading was
timely filed on November 4, 2010 to favor her husband's kumpadre who filed it. In the same
letter, she was likewise accused of taking the ATM card of her officemate, Elizabeth Gilos, and
withdrawing therefrom P10,000.00 without the latter's knowledge and consent. In her
Comment, she denied the accusations. She averred that the issue of tampering had already been
clarified and that it did not prejudice the rights and interest of any of the parties. With regard to
the alleged unauthorized withdrawal, she argued that the same is a personal issue between two
friends arising from a simple misunderstanding. Eventually, Abarentos resigned from office.

Upon recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), this case was re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to the Court of Appeals, Cebu station for
investigation, report and recommendation. Administrative hearings ensued. However, this Court
modified its Resolution by referring the case to the CA, Manila for investigation, report and
recommendation. Thus, the new Investigating Justice in Manila set this case for hearing for the
reception of respondent's evidence. But respondent instead filed a Manifestation under
Oath stating that after consulting her family, she decided not to present any controverting
evidence other than those mentioned in her Comment. The Investigating Justice found the charge
of tampering unsupported by substantial evidence. With respect to the charge of unauthorized
withdrawal from the account of Gilos, however, the Investigating Justice found sufficient
evidence to hold respondent liable therefor and categorized the unauthorized withdrawal as a
grave misconduct and recommended the penalty of disqualification from holding public office
for one year. Thereafter, this case was referred to OCA for evaluation, recommendation and
report. The OCA opined that respondent is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service for having received a pleading beyond office hours and without authority to do so.
Anent the unauthorized withdrawal, it agreed with the Investigating Justice that respondent is
guilty of grave misconduct, with the modification that the same also constitutes dishonesty.
Since respondent had already resigned, the OCA recommended the penalty of P20,000.00 fine
with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and perpetual
disqualification from holding public office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abarentos is guilty of grave misconduct.

RULING:

The Court partially adopts the recommendation of the OCA. The charge of tampering is not
supported by sufficient evidence. In finding respondent liable for tampering the date of receipt of
the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 05464, the OCA essentially relied on the following
circumstances: it is not part of respondent's duty to receive pleadings as there are four (4) court
personnel in the Receiving Section tasked to do the same; and, she received said pleading after
office hours or at 5:10 in the afternoon of November 4, 2010. At first blush, the circumstances
enumerated by OCA are enough to raise a quizzical eyebrow. But administrative liability cannot
rest on mere suspicion or speculation. There must be substantial evidence to support a finding
that respondent is responsible for the reprehensible act imputed against her. “Substantial
evidence in an administrative case consists of that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.” The circumstances relied
upon by the OCA do not, however, prove that respondent altered or intercalated the actual date
of receipt of the said Petition as appearing on the face thereof. Since it has not been established
that respondent is forbidden to receive pleadings, she should not be administratively held liable
for doing so.

The acts of respondent in taking the ATM card of Gilos and making an unauthorized
withdrawal constitute grave misconduct and dishonesty. The Court adopts the
recommendation of the OCA that the acts of respondent in taking the ATM card of her
officemate and making an unauthorized withdrawal therefrom do not only constitute grave
misconduct, but amount to dishonesty as well. Misconduct has been defined "as 'a transgression
of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer.' The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which
must be established by substantial evidence." Dishonesty, on the other hand, "has been defined as
a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud. It implies untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack
of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part of the individual who failed to exercise
fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings." In this case, the fact that respondent took
the ATM card of Gilos and the manner by which respondent was able to withdraw P10,000.00
from her account on November 12, 2010 have been duly proven by substantial evidence through
Gilos’ testimony and supporting CCTV Files. As head of the Judicial Records Division, and
involved in the administration of justice, respondent "ought to live up to the strictest standards of
honesty and integrity in public service." Court employees should be models of uprightness,
fairness and honesty to maintain the people's respect and faith in the judiciary." Resignation from
the service will not extricate court employees from the consequences of their acts. It is settled
that the cessation from office neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed
against the respondents while they were still in the service nor does it render the case moot and
academic.
Under Section 52(A) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
dishonesty and grave misconduct are classified as grave offenses meriting the supreme penalty of
dismissal from service even for the first offense, with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from re-
employment in the government service. In view of respondent's resignation, however, the penalty
that can be imposed against her is a fine with the same accessory penalties of forfeiture and
disqualification. Although the OCA recommended a fine of P20,000.00, circumstances in this
case warrant a lesser amount. While the Court does not condone the lamentable act of respondent
in making an unauthorized withdrawal, it does not escape that respondent is a first-time offender.
She eventually admitted to Gilos that she took the money which she returned, albeit partially.
After consulting her family, respondent did not present controverting evidence in this case and
effectively submitted her fate to the judicious resolution of this case. Finally, to save her family
from embarrassment and unnecessary emotional stress, respondent resigned. These
circumstances evince her sincere remorse and wholehearted repentance for committing a
regrettable misstep in her life. In Apiag v. Judge Cantero, this Court treated the indiscretion
committed by a repentant respondent as follows: Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he
may commit a mistake. But we should not look only at his sin. We should also consider the
man's sincerity in his repentance, his genuine effort at restitution and his eventual triumph in
the reformation of his life.

The Court finds Anna Marie Abarentos guilty of Dishonesty and Gross Misconduct and orders
her to pay a fine of P5,000.00 with forfeiture of whatever benefits still due her from the
government, except accrued leave credits. Respondent is likewise declared disqualified from
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
 ARMANDO M. BALANAY vs. JUDGE JULIANA ADALIM WHITE
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2443
-Tan
FACTS:
On September 20, 2010, complainant filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a
verified Affidavit- Complaint1 charging respondent with gross ignorance of the law for allowing
Isidoro N. Adamas, Jr. (Adamas) six furloughs despite being charged with murder in Criminal
Case No. 10-07, a non-bailable offense. Worse, respondent granted Adama's motions without
requiring the prosecution to comment or giving it opportunity to be heard thereon.
Complainant likewise charged respondent with serious misconduct in falsifying the July 22,
2010 transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) in Criminal Case No. 10-07. He averred that during
the hearing held on said date, the prosecution made a reservation to present additional witnesses.
Respondent, however, instructed her court stenographer, Prescila V. Mosende to delete from said
TSN such reservation and insert therein other statements which were not made during the said
hearing. In support of his allegations, complainant submitted a piece of paper containing
respondent’s handwritten notes that were incorporated in the July 22, 2010 TSN.
Complainant sought the dismissal of respondent from the service with forfeiture of her
retirement benefits.
In her Comment,3respondent admitted that she instructed Mosende to correct the July 22, 2010
TSN to make it more coherent and accurate. She claimed that the changes were based on her own
notes which Mosende adopted after verifying them from the taped recordings of the proceedings.
Respondent maintained that the prosecution never made any reservation to present additional
witnesses.
Respondent explained that she granted Adamas six furloughs based on the affidavits of
desistance subscribed before Prosecutor Raquel G. Kho which were already attached to the
records of Criminal Case No. 10-07. She also insisted that Adamas is not a flight risk because he
voluntarily surrendered himself to the police.
In its Memorandum dated May 21, 2014, the OCA held that respondent patently and inexcusably
transgressed the rules on motions and for which misfeasance she is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law. With regard the charge of serious misconduct, the OCA found substantial evidence to
support the same. For the OCA - the copy of the altered TSN and the scratch paper containing
the statements to be inserted in the TSN that were handwritten by respondent Judge herself
attached to the complaint-affidavit, the testimony of Mosende that it was the respondent Judge
who ordered the insertion of the statements, the admission of the respondent Judge that she
ordered the insertion of the said statements, and the transcription of the stenographers of the
Court of Appeals of the hearing covered by the altered TSN sufficiently established that
respondent caused the unauthorized alteration of the TSN which amounts to serious misconduct.
The OCA, thus, recommended that respondent be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
gross misconduct, and that she be suspended from office without salary and other benefits for six
months.
ISSUE:
Is the respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and serious misconduct?
RULING:
1. Respondent is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for granting ex parte
motions to allow Adama’s temporary liberty without setting the same for hearing. If hearing is
indispensable in motions for bail, more so in this case where the motions for the temporary
liberty of Adamas were filed without offering any bail or without any prayer that he be released
on recognizance. Besides, the reasons relied upon in said motions – to allow Adamas to attend
the Sangguniang Bayan sessions – had already been rebuked by this Court. In People v. Hon.
Maceda reiterated in Trillanes IV v. Judge Pimentel Sr., the Court held that "all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention."
That the prosecution has already filed affidavits of desistance and that, to the opinion of
respondent, the accused is not a flight risk, do not justify non-compliance with procedural rules.
It is basic that bail cannot be allowed without prior hearing. It is also basic that litigious motions
that do not contain a notice of hearing are nothing but a useless piece of paper which the court
should not act upon. These rules are so elementary that not to know them constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
2. Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct. The court also agree with the OCA that there is
substantial proof to hold respondent liable for gross misconduct even if the altered TSN was not
formally offered in evidence. Respondent admitted in her Comment dated November 24, 2010
and Memorandum dated May 1, 2013 that she instructed Mosende to make some changes in the
July 22, 2010 TSN, viz.:
When the draft [TSN] of the July 22, 2010 proceedings was submitted for correction to
respondent by the court stenographer, Ms. Prescila Mosende, the missing or omitted
statements were brought to her attention. To rectify the errors in the draft, respondent showed
her notes to Ms. Mosende and later transcribed it for the latter on another sheet of paper. Ms.
Mosende verified the corrections by referring it to her tape recordings.
To determine the accuracy and correctness of said TSN, the investigating justice directed two
stenographic reporters of Court of Appeals, Cebu Station to make their own transcription of the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 10-07 held on July 22, 2010 based on audio records. From
their transcriptions, the above-quoted exchanges between respondent and Prosecutor Kho do not
exist. Indubitably, respondent tried to make it appear that she and Prosecutor Kho made the
above-quoted statements during the proceedings held on July 22, 2010 when in truth no such
statements were actually made.
A TSN "is supposed to be a faithful and exact recording of all matters that transpired during a
court proceeding." Respondent’s act of directing her subordinate to alter the TSN by
incorporating therein statements pertaining to substantial matters that were not actually made
during the hearing constitutes gross misconduct which warrants administrative sanction.
 CONCEPCION DIA-AÑONUEVO vs. MUN. JUDGE BONIFACIO B. BERCACIO OF
TABACO
A.M. No. 177-MJ November 27, 1975
-Tan
FACTS:
Mrs. Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo, claims to be a co-owner of an undivided interest of a certain
parcel of irrigated riceland situated in Cabilogan, Sto. Niño, Sto. Domingo, Albay. This property
was the object of a deed of sale executed by Maximo Balibado, Justo Balibado and Petrona
Balibado de Barrios in favor of Alfredo Ong and acknowledged before Municipal Judge
Bonifacio Bercacio, respondent herein, as ex-officio notary public, on January 25, 1972.
Complainant informed respondent judge that the vendors owned only one-third undivided
portion of the property and that she and other cousins of hers owned two-thirds thereof. Judge
Bercacio advised the complainant to redeem or repurchase the property from the vendee, Alfredo
Ong. Complainant then requested the judge to intercede in their behalf with the vendee to allow
them to redeem the property and for that purpose she gave respondent the amount of P3,500.00
to be used to pay Alfredo Ong. Respondent agreed and received the amount of P3,500.00.
Respondent sent the corresponding letter to Alfredo Ong but the latter did not answer. Forthwith
a complaint was filed on March 8, 1972 with the Court of First Instance of Albay. During the
pendency of the civil case, complainant asked respondent judge to allow her to withdraw
P3,500.00 she had deposited with him as she was then in need of money, but no action was taken
by respondent.
Due to the non-remittance of the aforementioned amount, Atty. Madrid filed with the Court of
First Instance an urgent motion dated August 20, 1973, praying that Judge Bercacio be directed
to consign in court the amount deposited with him by the plaintiff, Mrs. Añonuevo.
Upon receipt of the foregoing motion, respondent manifested to the trial judge that he would be
ready to deliver the money as soon as the plaintiffs won the case. On September 13, 1973, the
trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and on the same date, issued an order
directing Judge Bercacio to deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount of P3,500.00 within five
(5) days from receipt of the order. On September 17, Judge Bercacio received a copy of the order
and on September 26, 1973, he turned over the amount to Atty. Rodolfo Madrid.
ISSUE:
WON respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge on two counts:
1. by engaging in the practice of law violating Judiciary Act of 1948, and
2. failure to return promptly to complainant, the money deposited with him.
RULING:
1. Yes. Respondent violated Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, which
provides in part: All provisions relative to the observance of office hours and the holding of
sessions applicable to courts of first instance shall likewise apply to municipal judges, but the
latter may, after office hours and with the permission of the district judge concerned, engage in
teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law ...
Respondent submits that it was Atty. Berango and not he who assisted the complainant, Mrs.
Añonuevo, and her co-plaintiffs as counsel in the civil case. Respondent's claim is belied,
however, by the active interest he took in the case of Mrs. Añonuevo manifested as follows: (a)
He gave Mrs. Añonuevo legal advice on the remedy available to her and her co-owners with
regards to the property sold to Alfredo Ong. (b) He accepted from Mrs. Añonuevo the sum of
P3,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the property from the vendee, plus P100.00 for incidental
expenses. (c) He wrote to Alfredo Ong for and in behalf of Mrs. Añonuevo and her co-owners
offering to redeem the land in question. (d) When his attempts at an out-of-court settlement
failed, he caused the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 4591 for which he was issued a
receipt for docket and legal research fees. (e) He was present together with Atty. Berango at the
pre-trial of July 5, 1972, and although, as he claims, it was Atty. Berango who made an
appearance for that pre-trial, the trial Judge nonetheless took note of respondent's presence so
that the Order dictated on that occasion reads: "Attys. Berango and Bercacio are notified of the
date of the trial.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court
proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation,
giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, etc. The rule disqualifying a
municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law seeks to avoid the evil of possible use of
the power and influence of his office to affect the outcome of a litigation where he is retained as
counsel. Compelling reasons of public policy lie behind this prohibition, and judges are expected
to conduct themselves in such a manner as to preclude any suspicion that they are representing
the interests of a party litigant.
3. Respondent's failure to return the amount of P3,500.00 to herein complainant upon her
demand is highly reproachable, to say the least.
Respondent's obstinate refusal or failure to accede to complainant's request for almost a year led
the latter to secure the services of another counsel who was compelled to ask from no less than a
member of the Judiciary the return of the P3,500.00 deposited with the latter otherwise he would
have to take the necessary steps to protect the interest of his client. That demand of Atty. Madrid
was made in March of 1973, but instead of delivering the amount, respondent still held it putting
up the excuse in a letter to Atty. Madrid that the money did not belong entirely to Mrs.
Añonuevo and that the latter had agreed to his keeping the money during the pendency of the
case. That of course was untrue, because, first, there was nothing in the record to show that the
P3,500.00 belonged to persons other than Mrs. Añonuevo from whom respondent received it,
and secondly, it was Mrs. Añonuevo who had personally been asking all along for the return of
said amount. It is to the discredit of respondent that it took a court order issued on September 13,
1973, for him to return complainant's money to Atty. Madrid.
While the Court does not make a categorical finding that respondent made use of the money
deposited with him, nonetheless, it held that by his actuations, respondent placed his honesty and
integrity under serious doubt. Although every office in the government service is a public trust,
no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than
a seat in the Judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a
manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public
that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. To a certain degree, respondent
herein failed to meet these exacting standards of judicial conduct.
 FREDDIE A. GUILLEN v. ATTY. AUDIE ARNADO,
A.C. No. 10547, November 08, 2017
-Templado
FACTS:
Complainant Freddie Guillen is the registered owner of the City Grill Restaurant. He then
invited respondent Atty. Audie Arnado and a certain Cedric Ebo to join the restaurant business.
Each of them had to shell out P200,000.00 to make up a total capital of P600,000.00. A
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was therefore executed and the business was formally
launched in May 2003. At first, everything went smoothly, until Arnado's sister-in-law and Ebo's
son participated in the management, causing complications in the business operations, which
later forced Guillen and his wife to step down as general manager and operations manager,
respectively.
Because of the disagreements among the parties, Guillen offered that he would waive his
claims for profits, provided that Arnado would return the P200,000.00 that he paid as capital.
Arnado allegedly claimed that said refund would still be subject to the billings of the Arnado and
Associate Law Firm. Thereafter, Guillen was surprised to find out that Arnado had already
caused the incorporation of the restaurant with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
which was approved on February 16, 2004. Guillen was likewise excluded from the business
without the aforementioned refund of his capital. He was further charged with Estafa before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu. Thus, Guillen initiated the present administrative case
For his part, Arnado admitted the existence and the contents of the MOA. He also
admitted that he caused the incorporation of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation. However, he
insisted that the same was done in accordance with the requirements under the law. Guillen could
not validly claim for a refund, and if he was really entitled, he should simply file an action to that
effect. Arnado likewise contended that Guillen's refund would still be subject to the legal
compensation claim of his law firm.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
recommended the censure of Arnado. The IBP Board of Governors affirmed the
recommendation. Upon reconsideration, IBP modified the penalty and increased it to 3 months
suspension. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Arnado violated Rule 1.01 of CPR

RULING:
Yes. At the onset, it must be pointed out that the business name City Grill Restaurant
registered under Guillen's name was never dissolved in accordance with the law. Even Arnado
failed to prove that the City Grill Restaurant business had already been terminated. Although
said business name was only used for a short period of time, the same had already acquired
goodwill among the residents and customers in the locality.
 On February 26, 2004, City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation was registered with the SEC.
Although Arnado and Ebo were not included as incorporators, those persons reflected in the
articles of incorporation as the company's incorporators were their relatives. It is clear that when
Arnado caused the incorporation of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation, he was fully aware that
City Grill Restaurant was still registered in Guillen's name. Obviously, he did the same to take
advantage of the goodwill earned by the name of City Grill Restaurant. Arnado was likewise the
one who actually notarized some of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation's legal documents such
as the Treasurer's Affidavit and a letter addressed to the SEC
The IBP Board thus aptly concluded that Arnado is guilty of taking advantage of his
knowledge of the law and of surreptitiously easing out Guillen from their restaurant business
partnership by registering a corporation under a different but similar name and style, in the same
line of business, and using the same trade secrets. Arnado, although not reflected as one of the
incorporators of City Grill-Sutukil Food Corporation, has deceived the public into believing that
City Grill Restaurant and City GrillSutukil Food Corporation are one and the same, clearly
violating Rule 1.01 of the CPR, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public
interest and that a lawyer owes substantial duties, not only to his client, but also to his brethren in
the profession, to the courts, and to the public, and takes part in the administration of justice, one
of the most important functions of the State, as an officer of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are
bound to maintain, not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing.
Here, Arnado has certainly fallen short of the high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing required of him. On the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill
of the law as well as took advantage of Guillen to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict
serious damage on others.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court SUSPENDS Atty. Audie
Arnado from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year and WARNS him that a repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely
 Soriano v. Dizon
A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006.
-Templado
FACTS:
Atty. Manuel Dizon was driving under the influence of alcohol along Abanao st. in
Baguio city when a taxi overtook him. Enraged, Dizon tailed the taxi, pulled it over and berated
and threatened Roberto Soriano, the taxi driver. To stop the aggression, Soriano opened his door
which caused Dizon to fall to the pavement. Soriano tried to help Dizon up but had to punch
Dizon because he was going to punch him. Soriano prevented another attempt by Dizon to hit
him. Dizon went back to his car to get his gun, the handle wrapped in handkerchief. Dizon shot
Soriano who was then picking up Dizon’s eyeglasses to return it to him. After shooting Soriano,
Dizon sped off with his car and left him to die on the street. The bullet hit Soriano in the neck
and lacerated his carotid artery. According to the doctors who treated Soriano, he would have
easily died if not for the timely medical assistance. Nevertheless, the left side of Soriano’s body
was paralyzed, leaving him unable to drive anymore.
A complaint for Frustrated Homicide was filed against Dizon by Soriano. Dizon was
eventually found guilty but was allowed probation. One of the conditions of the probation is the
payment of the civil liabilities. Four years after the judgment was rendered, Dizon has not yet
fulfilled his civil obligation to Soriano.
A Complain-Affidavit for disbarment was filed by Soriano before the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Dizon was declared in
default and an ex-parte hearing was held. The Commissioner of the CBD recommended to the
IBP the disbarment of Dizon for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The IBP
adopted the recommendation of the Commissioner and sent its resolution to the Supreme Court

ISSUES:
1. Whether the crime committed by Atty Dizon involved moral turpitude.
2. Whether Atty Dizon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, warranting his
disbarment

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Commissioner that the frustrated
homicide committed by Atty. Dizon was attended by moral turpitude. The Court defined moral
turpitude as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen,
or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Atty. Dizon exhibited moral turpitude when he shot a taxi driver for no valid reason. His
act did not constitute self-defense. In fact, he was the aggressor. It was him who first tried to
punch the other. Soriano was merely defending himself and fending off the aggression when he
counterpunched Dizon. Furthermore, the trial court also ruled that the crime was committed with
treachery. Dizon shot Soriano when he was not in a position to defend himself. Soriano was
picking up Dizon’s eyeglasses which fell on the road when Dizon fell to return it to him when he
was shot. Furthermore, Dizon tried to escape punishment by wrapping the handle of his gun in
handkerchief. He intended not to leave fingerprints on the gun he used.

The Supreme Court also ruled that there was indeed a violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 provides that lawyers must obey the laws of the land and
promote respect or law and legal processes. Atty. Dizon was in violation of the law because he
was in illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm. He also failed to obey the lawful orders of the
trial court when he failed to settle his civil liabilities, a condition for the grant of the probation.
Atty. Dizon also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Dizon
tried to reach an out-of-court settlement with the family of Soriano but when the negotiations
failed, he instead made it look like it was the family who approached him to get a referral to a
neurosurgeon. In addition, Dizon fabricated a story saying that it was Soriano and two other
persons who mauled him. According to three doctors, there was no proof of assault on Soriano.
 WILFREDO F. TUVILLO vs. JUDGE HENRY E. LARON
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1755, October 18, 2016
-Teodosio
FACTS:

On May 2, 2008, Wilfredo wrote a letter-complaint against Judge Laron to the Court
Administrator for immorality and unacceptable wrongdoing. He submitted a Complaint-
Affidavit where he alleged, among others, that his wife Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron
for the resolution of the cases filed against her; that, in turn, Judge Laron asked money from
Melissa and forced her to produce it whenever he needed it; that they lost all their savings and
their two houses and lots because of Judge Laron's constant requests for money from Melissa;
that Judge Laron would physically hurt Melissa when she could not produce the money he
needed; and that Judge Laron "transgressed, intruded and besmirched the tranquility and
sacredness of our marital union and family unity". To support his complaint, Wilfredo attached
Melissa's complaint-letter and her affidavit where she admitted having illicit relations with Judge
Laron.

Wilfredo also submitted the Joint Affidavit of his two sons wherein they alleged that they were
surprised that certain Tito Henry Laron used to go to their house in Antipolo, slept in their house
twice or thrice a week specially during weekends; “Nagtaka kami mga magkakapatid bakit
natutulog si Tito Henry Laron sa bahay namin at sinusundo na kami at ang mama namin tuwing
umaga minsan gamit ang kanyang sasakyan minsan aming sasakyan ang ginagamit niya at
sunduin kami sa school tuwing hapon.”

This allegation was confirmed by their caretaker in her Affidavit stating that Judge Laron slept in
the Antipolo house during weekends, picked up Melissa and her children in the morning, and
fetched them from school in the afternoon using either his own or Melissa's car.

Judge Laron averred that he had already confessed his affair with Melissa to his wife. He also
claimed that Melissa told him that she was a widow and explained that his relationship with her
was an intimate emotional and personal attachment that did not involve any sexual liaison.

After its evaluation, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Judge Laron be
found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge and be fined P10,000.00, and that the case for
unexplained wealth be dismissed for being unsubstantiated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Laron must be dismissed from service on the ground of immorality.

HELD:
The charge of immorality is a serious one covered by Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
The penalty therefor includes dismissal from the service.
Moreover, members of the judiciary are essentially guided by Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Canons of Judicial Ethics in their acts. Canon 4, Section 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities. Judge Laron's conduct of carrying on an affair with a married woman is highly
improper. Pertinently, Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:

3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety.

A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of official duties, but also in his
everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

As the judicial front-liners, judges must behave with propriety at all times as they are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the people's sense of
justice. No position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any
individual than a seat on the Bench. As the epitome of integrity and justice, a judge's personal
behavior, both in the performance of his official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion. For moral integrity is not only a virtue but a necessity in the judiciary.

In these cases at bench, the conduct of Judge Laron fell short of this exacting standard. By
carrying an affair with a married woman, Judge Laron violated the trust reposed on his office and
utterly failed to live up to noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of the members
of the judiciary.

The Court also finds Judge Laron guilty of gross misconduct for violating the Code of Judicial
Conduct. This is another serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. The
illicit relationship started because Melissa sought the help of Judge Laron with respect to her
pending B.P. Blg. 22 cases and, apparently, he entertained the request for assistance. Canon 2 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Rule 2.04.—A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.

Another situation of impropriety was when Judge Laron asked money from Melissa who was a
litigant in a case pending before his court.

Judge Laron's immorality and serious misconduct have repercussions not only on the judiciary
but also on the millions of overseas Filipino workers (OFW) like Wilfredo. While Wilfredo was
working hard abroad to earn for his family, Judge Laron was sleeping with his wife in his bed in
his house and spending his hard-earned dollars. What was even worse was the flaunting of the
illicit relationship before his young boys (aged 13 and 14) who related it to him upon his return
from abroad. This is the nightmare scenario of every OFW - to be confronted upon their return
with stories from their own children about the "other man or woman" sleeping in their house
while they were away enduring the bitter cold or searing heat, homesickness, culture shock, and
occasional inhumane treatment just to earn the dollars for the food, shelter, clothing, and
education of their family back home.
 MANUEL L. VALIN AND HONORIO L. VALIN vs. ATTY. ROLANDO T. RUIZ
A.C. No. 10564, November 7, 2017
-Teodosio
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Manuel and Honorio Valin against Atty. Ruiz with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines- Comission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) committing
forgery and falsification of a deed of absolute sale, in breach of his lawyer's oath and in violation
of the laws.
The complainants averred that they are two of the surviving children of their deceased parents,
spouses Pedro F. Valin (Pedro) and Cecilia Lagadon (Cecilia). Pedro owns a parcel of land.
Pedro died on 1992 while he was in Oahu, Honolulu, Hawaii.
Several years later, Honorio discovered that the subject land has been transferred to respondent,
the godson of Pedro, resulting in the cancellation of original title and the issuance of a new
title in the name of respondent. It was conveyed to him through a Deed of Absolute Sale and
executed purportedly by Pedro with the alleged consent of his spouse, Cecilia.
The complainants alleged that the subject deed was obviously falsified and the signatures therein
of Pedro and Cecilia were forged by the respondent.
Respondent avers that he initially declined to buy the subject property from Rogelio because he
could not produce his authority to sell the land; that he sympathized with Rogelio, thus, he was
convinced to buy the subject property with the understanding that the latter would take the
necessary steps to transfer the title in respondent's name.
In its Report and Recommendation, the IBP-CBD recommended the suspension of respondent
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP-CBD committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending Atty. Ruiz from
the practice of law for 2 years.
HELD:
The Court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP-CBD and the recommendation of
the IBP Board.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) states that "[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Lawyers must conduct themselves
beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large,
and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.
Further, the lawyer's oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients.
In this case, the complainants allege that respondent breached his lawyer's oath and violated the
law because he falsified the subject deed of sale in 1996 to acquire the land of Pedro even though
the latter died in 1992. On the other hand, respondent claims that he had nothing to do with the
sale in 1996; rather, he imputes the execution of the subject deed and its registration to Rogelio,
brother of the complainants.
In addition, that the transaction is private in nature, not in relation to the practice of law, is not an
excuse.
A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend
to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public.
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in
his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time
and a mere citizen at another.
 RE: SUSPENSION OF MTC JUDGE OF PANGASINAN Judge Gerely Rico-Cruz
-Vivero
Facts:
On May 11, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the Solicitor General's petition for quo warranto
against then Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno. This decision ousted her as Chief Justice of the
Philippines. When the SC decided to grant the quo warranto petition of the solicitor general and
ordered the ouster of Sereno, Judge Gerely Rico-Cruz immediately posted strong criticisms
against the Court on her Facebook page on the same day saying:
“Yaman rin lang wala ng Rule of Law at pinatay na ang Judicial Independence, isara na
rin natin ang mga korte! Wala na kaming silbi nyan! (Since there is no more rule of law
and judicial independence is now dead, let’s just shut down the courts! We are useless
already!) How can people trust us now? We’ve lost all credibility!”

“Paano ba magpa-refund ng tuition saka mga nagastos ko sa libro nung nag-aaral ako ng
law? T*** ina! Nasayang lahat ng panahon at pera ko sa pag-aaral ng law eh eto lang
pala ang mapapala natin!”
Issue: Whether or not a preventive suspension against Judge Gerely Rico-Cruz is imposable?
Ruling:
Yes, the SC has preventively suspended Cruz for three months starting Oct. 12 until Jan. 10
pending administrative investigation against her for possible violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and Code of Professional Responsibility.
As decided in one case by the Supreme Court, courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should
and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative
branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor
is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which
would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen."

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
 SONIA C. DECENA and REY C. DECENA vs. JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 32, IN PILI, CAMARINES SUR,
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217 April 8, 2013
-Vivero
FACTS:
The complainants have lodged an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a judge
against Hon. Nilo A. Malanyaon.
They averred that complainant Rey C. Decena had brought an administrative case at CSC Albay
against Judge Malanyaon’s wife, Dr. Amelita, then the Assistant Provincial Health Officer of the
Province of Camarines Sur; that during the hearing of the administrative case, Judge Malanyaon
sat beside his daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina C. Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the case.
Judge Malanyaon coached her daughter in making manifestations/motions before the hearing
officer. He loudly retorted that he be shown any particular rule that prohibits him from sitting
with his daughter at the lawyers’ bench. He insisted that he was merely "assisting" her daughter,
who "just passed the bar", defend the respondent, and was likewise helping the latter defend
herself.
Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock required Judge Malanyaon to comment on the
complaint. Judge Malanyaon filed his comment, refuting the allegations of the complaint. He
said there is a bad blood between the complainants and his wife. Moreover, he said: “as her
consultant, I did not speak, nor enter my appearance for my wife–to lend a helping hand to a
neophyte lawyer, defending her mother in an administrative case, is not unethical, nor does it
constitute the proscribed practice of law”
Judge Malanyaon’s counsel informed the Court that Judge Malanyaon had meanwhile suffered a
massive stroke that had affected his mental faculties and made him unfit to defend himself here;
and prayed for the suspension of the proceedings. Then, Dr. Amelita submitted a manifestation
and urgent motion to dismiss, seeking the dismissal of the administrative case against Judge
Malanyaon on the ground that her husband permanently lost the capacity to understand the
nature and object of the administrative proceedings against him.
ISSUES
whether the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of constituted conduct unbecoming of a
judge
RULING
Yes.
First was Judge Malanyaon’s occupying a seat beside his daughter that was reserved for the
lawyers during the hearing. Such act displayed his presumptuousness, and probably even his
clear intention to thereby exert his influence as a judge of the Regional Trial Court on the
hearing officer in order for the latter to favor his wife’s cause.
Second was Judge Malanyaon’s admission that his presence in that hearing was to advise his
daughter on what to do and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching his daughter. In the
process, he unabashedly introduced himself as the "counsel of the respondent’s counsel" stating
that his daughter was still inexperienced for having just passed her Bar Examinations. Such
excuse did not furnish enough reason for him to forsake the ethical conduct expected of him as a
sitting judge.
Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge
Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients.
Section 11, Canon reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law or giving
professional advice to clients.
Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice
law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so
suspended for the entire period of his incumbency as a judge.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge’s official life cannot simply
be detached or separated from his personal existence.
Judge Malanyaon had been previously sanctioned by the Court on three occasions: gross
ignorance of the law and unreasonable delay in resolving motions and failure to resolve motions.
Imposing on Judge Malanyaon a fine of 40K.