VIP MENA Bank Profitability
VIP MENA Bank Profitability
VIP MENA Bank Profitability
. (2)
The Greek letters refer to parameters that will be estimated using nonlinear least squares
regression on the system of equations that include the cost function plus the share equations for
s
1
and s
2
as follows:
22
3 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
ln ln ln
j j n n E
j n
s p y E o | m c
= =
= + + + +
(3)
3 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1
ln ln ln
j j n n E
j n
s p y E o | m c
= =
= + + + +
. (4)
Since the share equations sum to one, the third share equation (s
3
) for physical capital is omitted.
The share equations are included in the system of equations to improve efficiency of estimation.
The cost function can be estimated by itself, but since the share equations add no new
parameters not already included in the cost function, the additional information provided
improves the precision of parameter estimates. The terms ,
1
and
2
represent stochastic error
terms for each firm in each time period in the respective regression equations (2), (3) and (4),
while u is a nonnegative term measuring potential inefficiency. The term u in equation (2)
cannot be directly estimated from the system of three equations. Instead, the error term in
equation (2) for any firm k is actually u
k
+
k
. By estimating a stochastic efficient frontier instead
of some average cost function, one assumes that the best practice or lowest cost firm has zero
inefficiency, or that u
k
= 0. Stochastic errors average out to zero, so assume that
k
= 0 for a
typical bank and that u
k
> 0 for all but the best practice bank. A common measure of inefficiency
(IN) is the percentage difference in total cost to produce any level of output for a given bank (C
k
)
versus the minimum possible cost for the best practice bank (C
min
). Mathematically, percentage
inefficiency for any firm is expressed by
IN = 100 (C
k
/C
min
1). (5)
To obtain a determinate solution to the system of equations, some further restrictions are
23
commonly imposed on the estimation of the translog cost function. First,
3
1
1
i
i
o
=
=
ensures that
factor shares sum to one. Then, symmetry requires that
12 21
= and
ij ji
| | = for all ij. Finally,
linear homogeneity in input prices imposes the following restrictions:
3 3 3 3
1 1 1 1
0
ij ij in Ei
i j i i
| | m
= = = =
= = = =
. (6)
Note that the cost function in equation (2) is nonhomothetic, meaning that no restrictions are
imposed on the relationship between cost and outputs. This means that returns to scale can vary
with output level and that different factor proportions might be efficiently employed at different
output levels.
To measure overall returns to scale, the translog cost function can be differentiated with
respect to the outputs y
1
and y
2
. Assuming that the dollar value of loans and securities can
simply be added together, a measure of scale economies (SE) is
2 2 2 3 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
ln ln ln ln
2
n nm n m in i Ei
n n m i n n
SE y y p E o
= = = = = =
= + + +
. (7)
If SE<1, there are increasing returns to scale, which is alternatively referred to as economies of
scale. If SE>0, there exist decreasing returns to scale or diseconomies of scale. Finally, SE=1
means constant returns to scale and no economies nor diseconomies of scale. This, in a sense,
implies optimal bank size. Because the cost function is non-homothetic and the approximation is
around a point, the measured scaled economies may be different for banks much smaller or larger
than the average bank in the sample.
The translog function is said to be a flexible functional form and it is the most popular cost
24
function used to model cost and efficiency in banking. Hence, it is adopted for a first look at the
banking sector in the MENA countries. The major underlying assumption of the translog model
is that the underlying cost and production functions can be represented by a specific type of
logarithmic relationship between input prices, input quantities, output quantities and total cost of
production. The translog approximation has proven reasonable for a variety of cost, production,
and consumption data in many, but not in all studies. There is some controversy regarding
whether other functional forms significantly improve upon the translog approximation and that
issue is explored in Section 7.
The translog profit and alternative profit functions have been discussed and modeled in
Berger and Mester (1997), Maudos et al (2002), and in many other studies. Since data on output
prices are not available, the specific form adopted in most studies is to estimate the alternative
profit function. Now define = operating profit, which is net income minus provisions for loan
losses as defined in Maudos et al (2002). For the cost function of equation (2), we replace ln C
on the right-hand side of the equation with + , where is a positive number added to the profit
of the least profitable (most unprofitable) bank so that its operating profit equals zero. This
avoids the problem of trying to take a natural log of a negative number. Profit efficiency is
calculated in the similar manner to cost efficiency except that banks are compared against the
most profitable and not the minimum profit bank. Hence, equation (5) is modified as follows:
IN = 100 (1 -
k
/
max
). (8)
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the translog cost and alternative profit
functions are presented in Table 5. The log of the likelihood function for the estimated translog
25
cost function is 485.73 and 16 of the 21 estimated coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
Scale economies estimated using equation (7) are SE = 1.018 > 1, suggesting very minor
diseconomies of scale. The log of the likelihood function for the alternative profit function is
LLF = 206.29, which confirms the results of previous studies that the translog cost functions are
estimated with greater precision than the profit functions. However, the fit still appears to be
reasonable since 15 of 21 estimated coefficients are significant at the 5% level. Scale economies
as measured by the alternative profit function are SE = 0.9987 < 1, suggesting almost constant
returns to scale.
Another use of cost and profit functions, and perhaps the main objective of many economic
studies, is to determine substitution possibilities between the various factors of production. The
most common measure of input substitution possibilities between any two factors i and j is the
Allen elasticity of substitution (AES
ij
). The Allen cross-price is defined as AES
ij
=
ij
/S
i
S
j
for i
j and the Allen own-price elasticity is AES
ii
=
ii
/S
i
Si
j
-1/S
i
for all factors. The notation is the
same as in equations (2), (3), and (4) where as
ij
and
ii
are regression parameters and S
i
and S
j
are the factor shares in either the cost or profit function, depending upon which equation is being
estimated.
Based upon the cost function parameters presented in Table 5, the average Allen elasticities
of substitution across all years are presented in Table 6. The own-price elasticities are on average
all negative as required by economic theory, showing that an increase in factor price reduces
factor usage. For the first factor (deposits), AES
11
= -0.51, while AES
22
= -1.85 for labor and
AES
33
= -2.30 for fixed assets. These results show that deposits are least elastic factor in
production, which seems logical since deposits are needed to fund the purchase of securities or
26
the granting of loans. The cross-price elasticities are AES
12
=.36, AES
13
= .71 and AES
23
= .79
showing that factors are somewhat substitutable, but nevertheless inelastic.
The own-price Allen elasticities for the profit function are AES
11
= -0.67, AES
22
= -3.40, and
AES
33
= -2.49. The cross-price elasticities are AES
12
= 0.84, AES
13
= 0.68, and AES
23
= 0.93.
These again show inelastic factor demand, but slightly greater substitution possibilities than
suggested by the cost function.
6. A comparison of the translog and minflex Laurent functional forms
The translog approximation to the true cost function is only locally flexible and Berger and
Mester (1997) note that the potentially globally flexible Fourier cost function may be preferable
when there is a wide range of bank sizes across a data sample. Another globally regular
functional form is Barnett, Geweke and Wolfes (1991) asymptotically ideal model (AIM). It has
recently been implemented by Fisher, Fleissing, and Serletis (2001) and Feng and Serletis (2008)
to model a variety of consumption and cost data. While these globally regular approximations
may hold promise for improved modeling of efficiency in the banking industry, they are beyond
the scope of this paper.
Globally regular forms may impose too rigid a structure on the cost and profit functions
particularly if some banks truly do not try to minimize costs or maximize profits. An alternative
is to examine other locally flexible functional forms such as the Generalized Leontief form
developed by Diewert (1971). As argued by Dumont (2006), the Generalized Leontief has good
regularity properties when the true elasticities of input substitution are near zero, while translog
is more appropriate when all elasticities of substitution are near one. Both the translog and
27
Generalized Leontief models are based upon Taylor series expansions. The various minflex
Laurent models developed by Barnett (1985) and Barnett, Lee, and Wolfe (1985) are based upon
the Laurent series expansion. Although a Taylor series expansion of some order can produce a
smaller remainder term than any other expansion series, this property need not hold for finite
orders of expansion, such as third order or less as would be required in empirical work in
economics and finance. Similarly, large orders of expansion, or many expansion terms may be
needed to accurately model data using a Fourier or a Muntz-Szatz expansion. For a second order
expansion series, which is most common in the literature, a Laurent expansion will generally
provide a smaller remainder term than a Taylor series expansion, at the cost of only adding a few
regression parameters. The regular region also will generally be larger than for functional forms
approximated by the taylor series expansion. The minflex Laurent functional form is a simplified
version of the complete Laurent expansion that can be used to encompass both the translog and
Generalized Leontief functional forms. The minflex Laurent-translog is estimated in logarithms
just like translog. The minflex larent-Generalized Leontief is an expansion in the square roots of
prices and other factors, just like the original Generalized Leontief functional form.
For our data set the minflex Laurent-translog generalization of the translog cost function of
equation (2) is expressed by
28
3 2 2 2 3 2
0
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
2
i i n n nm n m in i n
i n n m i n
C p y y y p y o o o o
= = = = = =
= + + + +
3 2
1 1
ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
E EE Ei i Ei n
i n
E E E E p E y m
= =
+ + + +
3 3 3 2 3
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 ln ln ln ln ln ln
ij in Ei
i j i n i
i j i n i
b c d u
p p p y E p
c
= = = = =
+ +
. (9)
The share equations are represented by
3 2 3 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
ln ln ln ln ln ln
j j n n E j j n n E
j n j n
s p y E b p c y d E o | m c
= = = =
= + + + + + + +
(10)
3 2 3 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1
ln ln ln ln ln ln
j j n n E j j n n E
j n j n
s p y E b p c y d E o | m c
= = = =
= + + + + + + +
. (11)
The minflex Laurent-Generalized Leontief cost function is represented by
C =
Since share equation form for the Generalized Leontief model is highly nonlinear, both it and the
minflex Laurent-Generalized Leontief model are estimated using the three factor input quantity
equations without including the cost equation. The values for the log of the likelihood function
and the Allen elasticities for all four functional forms are presented in Table 6.
7. Comparison of Accounting and Economic-Based Profitability Measures
In order to compare the economic and accounting based results, we take the efficiency measures
from equation (5) as measured by cost and profit efficiency using the translog functional form
29
and use these values as the dependent variable in a second stage panel regression of all of the
accounting variables used in Section 4. Results are shown in Table 7 and can be compared to the
panel regression results for ROA and ROE in Table 4.
8. Summary and Conclusion
30
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33
Table 1Description of Data Sample
Number of banks in sample by country and year, and by region and type
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Country and Year
Country Year
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Totals
Bahrain 7 7 9 9 9 9 9 0 59
Egypt 2 3 5 7 7 7 4 0 35
Jordan 2 3 6 8 8 10 9 0 46
Kuwait 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 46
Lebanon 1 2 6 8 12 12 11 0 52
Morocco 0 0 0 0 6 6 5 0 17
Oman 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 30
Qatar 2 4 5 5 5 4 4 1 30
Saudi Arabia 7 8 9 10 9 9 8 7 67
Tunisia 0 0 1 2 2 4 3 0 12
United Arab Emirates 5 7 12 12 11 11 11 7 76
Totals 35 43 63 71 79 82 74 23 470
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Region and by Type of Bank
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Totals
GCC (Oil) 30 35 45 46 44 43 42 23 308
Non-GCC (Non-Oil) 5 8 18 25 35 39 32 0 162
Totals 35 45 63 71 79 82 74 23 470
Islamic 10 13 16 17 16 15 14 8 109
Conventional 25 30 47 54 63 67 60 15 361
Totals 35 45 63 71 79 82 74 23 470
34
Table 2
Definitions of Variables
Bank Profitability Ratios
1. ROA = return on assets = net income / (average?) total assets.
2. ROE = return on equity = net income / stockholders equity.
3. NIM = net interest margin = (interest income income expense)/ total assets
4. NNIM = net noninterest margin = (noninterest income noninterest expense)/ total assets
Bank Internal Characteristics
5. SIZE = natural log of total assets
6. LOANS = loan specialization ratio = total net loans / total assets
7. SECUR = security specialization ratio = other interest bearing assets (non-loans)/ total assets
8. DEPLIAB = deposit specialization ratio = total deposits/ total liabilities
Bank Efficiency Measures
9. INEFF = inefficiency ratio = operating expenses/ gross income
10. OVER = ratio of overhead (depreciation plus other expenses) to total assets
11. NIBA = ratio of non-interest bearing assets to total assets, where non-interest bearing assets
include cash, fixed assets, and amount due
12. LCI = labor cost to income = personnel expenses/gross income
Bank Risk Measures
13. RISK = default risk as measured by the debt-equity ratio = long-term debt/total assets
14. CRISK = credit risk = loan loss provisions/ net loans
15. CAPSTR = capital strength = total equity/ total assets
External Variables
16. CGDP = year to year % change in country gross domestic product (GDP) deposits
17. INFL = annual country inflation rate in %
18. CONC = concentration ratio = ratio of a banks total assets to the total assets of all banks in our
sample for that country
19. GCC = dummy variable equal to one if the bank is in a GCC country, zero otherwise
20. TYPE = dummy variable equal to one if the bank is Islamic, zero for conventional banks
____________________________________________________________________________________
???Averages for any variable are the beginning of period value plus the end of period value
divided by 2. They are defined the same way for both conventional and Islamic banks.
Net income for Islamic banks is conventional net income before taxes, plus Zakat.
Interest income and expenses are replaced by commission income and expenses for Islamic
banks. Similarly, investments in Mudaraba, Murabaha, and Musharka are equivalent to loans
and advances.
35
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for the Financial Ratios
(in %, except for SIZE which is log of total assets)
t-test for equality of means
Variable
All
banks
GCC
Non-
GCC
Islamic
Convent
ional
GCC vs.
Non-GCC
Conventional
vs. Islamic
ROA 1.92 2.37 1.12 2.77 1.67
ROE 14.99 17.12 11.19 20.32 13.38
NIM 2.35 2.51 2.05 2.55 2.28
NNIM 2.27 2.97 1.03 4.24 1.68
SIZE 15.64 15.90 15.19 16.59 15.36
LOANS 46.57 51.19 38.34 50.58 45.35
SECUR 28.33 26.98 30.34 34.23 26.55
DEPLIAB 75.52 73.19 79.67 79.66 74.27
INEFF 22.78 21.49 25.08 22.77 22.78
OVER 1.19 1.12 1.31 1.14 1.20
NIBA 25.10 21.84 30.93 15.18 28.10
LCI 9.94 9.91 10.00 10.37 9.81
RISK 21.11 22.90 17.93 17.43 22.22
CRISK 1.48 1.13 2.10 1.13 1.59
CAPSTR 12.89 14.39 10.23 14.52 12.40
CGDP 6.02 6.76 4.72 5.44 6.20
INFL 2.75 2.61 2.99 1.77 3.04
CONC 16.71 16.90 16.36 11.59 18.25
DMS 15.40 14.91 16.29 11.40 16.61
PWR 15.41 14.91 16.30 11.37 16.63
The t-test for equality of means is based on the mean for GCC minus non-GCC banks and for the
mean of Islamic minus conventional banks for each financial ratio. The test is calculated
assuming unequal sample variances.
* denotes significance at the 10% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
36
Table 4
Panel Regressions for the Determinants of Profitability Ratios
(t-statistics are in parenthesis below each coefficient)
Independent Variable Profitability ratio
ROA ROE NIM NNIM
SIZE 0.006
(2.32)
LOANS 0.012 0.072 0.016 -0.064
(3.00) (3.27) (4.87) (-2.54)
SECUR -0.102
(-3.94)
DEPLIAB 0.014
(5.87)
INEFF -0.014 -0.167 -0.104 -0.159
(-2.15) (-4.14) (-13.86) (-6.21)
OVER 0.169 1.388 0.999
(2.93) (3.91) (18.55)
LCI 0.094
(6.41)
CRISK 0.034
(1.89)
CAPSTR 0.119 0.040 0.147
(12.29) (5.29) (3.16)
INFL 0.0001 0.004
(4.56) (3.12)
CONC -0.042
(-2.92)
GCC (1=GCC) 0.012 0.034
(3.60) (2.94)
TYPE (1=Islamic) 0.006 0.040 -0.005 0.033
(2.81) (3.56) (-2.97) (4.25)
Constant(s) Multiple .002 Multiple 0.091
(0.05) (4.61)
Hausman statistic 19.12 11.31 21.63 6.99
significance (.008) (.185) (.006) (.221)
Model selected Fixed Random Fixed Random
F statistic 8.78 6.76 16.46 2.28
Significance (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Adjusted R
2
51.88% 44.39% 68.52% 14.64%
(All variables are significant at 5%, except for the coefficient on CRISK in the NIM regression. It is
significant at 6% level. The adjusted R
2
and F statistics for the random effects model are not reported in
RATS 7.0, so approximate values are reported using the fixed effects estimator.)
37
Table 5
Maximum Likelihood estimates of the translog cost and alternative profit functions
Regressors Cost Function Profit Function
Parameter Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
0
constant
2.655 2.36 25.258 8.90
1
ln p
1
0.521 8.37 0.511 7.35
2
ln p
2
0.150 3.88 0.178 4.44
11
ln p
1
ln p
1
0.106 8.86 0.058 4.69
12
ln p
1
ln p
2
-0.069 -8.88 -0.017 4.64
22
ln p
2
ln p
2
0.078 9.18 0.020 2.22
1
ln y
1
0.551 3.20 -0.344 -0.79
2
ln y
2
0.427 2.32 0.041 0.08
11
ln y
1
ln y
1
0.202 4.10 -0.167 -1.86
12
ln y
1
ln y
2
-0.111 -3.52 -0.147 -2.54
22
ln y
2
ln y
2
0.010 6.57 0.018 0.66
11
ln p
1
ln y
1
-0.019 -1.58 -0.018 -1.57
21
ln p
2
ln y
1
-0.019 -2.54 -0.019 -2.57
12
ln p
1
ln y
2
0.055 7.30 0.060 8.36
22
ln p
2
ln y
2
-0.023 -4.96 -0.022 -5.26
E
ln E
-0.590 -1.83 -2.353 -9.43
EE
ln E ln E
0.130 1.23 -0.317 -1.84
E1
ln E ln y
1
-0.102 -1.43 0.360 2.87
E2
ln E ln y
2
0.015 0.48 0.140 2.15
E1
ln E ln p
1
-0.382 -2.81 -0.042 -2.94
E2
ln E ln p
2
0.051 5.66 0.047 5.13
LLF = 485.73 LLF = 206.29