Cinema for Peace Foundation Project Manager for the Court

1. Suggestion for a film to be screened at a festival dealing with the theme of "Threats to
Democracy."

Film: The Edge of Democracy 2019 - A cautionary tale for the current times of democracy in
crisis – the film explores one of the most dramatic historic periods in the South American
country of Brazil. It captures and combines the unprecedented access to leaders
democratically elected to office past and present, including President Dilma Rousseff. It also
exposes the complex past of President Lula da Silva. In this film, filmmaker Petra Costa
witnesses their rise and fall and the tragically polarised nation that remains 1. The trailer can
be found on YouTube with the link below.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xLe24M_PB5E

Why: This film portrays how people play an essential role in ensuring democracy, and although
it focuses on the events following democratic processes in the South American country of
Brazil, it depicts a worldwide paradigm of polarisation, political violence, including the
deliberate use of the law to suppress civil and political rights, naturalisation of hate speech,
and the rise of fascism to power. This film acts as a benchmark to guide investigation, research,
and documentation into the unknown unknowns of the threats to democracy in other
countries.

Below are the guest speakers for the respective topics at the film festival
a) Suppression of political oppression in Russia;
Guest Speaker: Michael McFaul - The former U.S. ambassador to Russia 2. He is a professor
of political science at Stanford University, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for
International Studies, and Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Why: He is an ideal guest speaker because in one of the books he contributed to,
"Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies", documents that the "third wave" of
democratisation around the world has seen more than 60 countries participate and
experience democratic transitions since 1974. Although these countries, on the face of it,
have succeeded in bringing down authoritarian regimes and replaced them with
seemingly freely elected governments, only a handful of them can as yet be considered
stable democracies 3.

1
The Edge of Democracy – IFC Center. https://www.ifccenter.com/films/the-edge-of-democracy/
2
McFaul, M. (n.d.). Author: Michael McFaul. Journal of Democracy. Retrieved July 22, 2022, from
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/authors/michael-mcfaul/
3
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies - Journal of Democracy.
https://www.journalofdemocracy.com/books/consolidating-the-third-wave-democracies/
 b) China and political prisoners;
Guest Speaker: Arch Puddington- He is currently a Senior Scholar Emeritus at Freedom
House and previous Senior Vice President for Research at Freedom House 4. As Senior Vice
President, he was responsible for publishing articles at Freedom House in addition to
other research publications and developing new research and advocacy programs at
Freedom house.
Why: His Article, "China: The Global Leader in Political Prisoners 5", provides succinct
documentation of how China is a global leader in political prisoners despite being a hot
spot for some of the world's most dire global challenges, including but not limited to
pollution, inequality and the systematic demolition of democratic standards, universal
human rights norms, and the principle of free expression on the internet.

c) Social media and big tech.

Guest Speaker: Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson - She is a Commercial Law, Digitisation and
Competition Law Professor at the Vienna University of Economics and Business 6.
Why: She is an ideal speaker for this topic because owing to Her Article, "Antitrust, Big
Tech, and Democracy: A Research Agenda 7", explains how the rise of big data and big
analytics has led to a paradigm shift in competition dynamics that influences the
outcomes of democratic processes and informs broader political debate yet it is only
within the reach of those that can access and channel the vast streams of user data that
are generated online.

2. Six alleged violations of International Law (taking into account International Human Rights
Law, International Criminal Law, and International Humanitarian Law) Russia has
perpetrated / is currently perpetrating during the Ukrainian War.

Russia has endangered international peace and security, and justice. This is in violation of
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which stipulates that all Members of the U.N shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat of use of force or use of force against the political
independence or territorial integrity of any State, or in any other manner not consistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, Russia annexed Crimea
in 2014, invaded Ukraine in February 2022, and a report by the BBC 8 on 4 July is continuing to
push forward in its invasion of Ukraine. This is a direct use of force against Ukraine's political
independence and territorial integrity 9.

4
Arch Puddington. Freedom House. (n.d.). Retrieved July 22, 2022, from
https://freedomhouse.org/expert/arch-puddington
5
Paddington , A. (2018, July 26). China: The global leader in political prisoners. Freedom House. Retrieved July
22, 2022, from https://freedomhouse.org/article/china-global-leader-political-prisoners
6
Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson. WU Research. (n.d.). Retrieved July 22, 2022, from
https://bach.wu.ac.at/d/research/ma/18439/
7
Robertson, V. H. S. E. (2022). Antitrust, Big Tech, and Democracy: A Research Agenda. The Antitrust Bulletin,
67(2), 259–279. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221082749
8
Brown, D., Hurrell, B., Bailey, D., Hills, M., Rodgers, L., Sargeant , P., & Trowsdale, A. (2022, July 4).
Ukraine War in maps: Tracking the Russian invasion. BBC News. Retrieved July 23, 2022, from
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682
9
Wuerth, I. (2022, February 25). International law and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Lawfare. Retrieved July
23, 2022, from https://www.lawfareblog.com/international-law-and-russian-invasion-ukraine
 Russia has violated the Geneva Convention of 1864 and its subsequent Geneva Conventions,
notably the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and two 1977 Additional Protocols, which focus
on the protection of persons no longer or not taking part in hostilities 10. As reported by
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), Russia's bombing of a children's clinic and maternity ward
in Mariupol, Ukraine, with at least 18 attacks on health care facilities in Ukraine, is in direct
violation of the Geneva Conventions 11.

By invading Ukraine, Russia also violated Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which provides for the
pacific settlement of disputes 12. Russia has boldly argued that its use of force against Ukraine
is justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This Article preserves the right of a U.N. member
state to defend itself against "an armed attack" and allows the aggrieved state to engage in
the form of self-defence. In particular, Russia has alleged that its use of force against Ukraine
is to defend states it recognises as independent, like the Donetsk People's Republic and the
Luhansk People's Republic 13. In their justification, Russia makes no mention of how it invoked
Chapter VI of the UN Charter and its failure thereof to warrant the use of force for self-
defence. This begs the question of whether there was a valid dispute in the first place, but
that's a question for another day.

Russia violated the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POW).
Adopted in 1949 by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International
Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, held in Geneva in August 1949, it seeks to
protect POW 14. As the Russia-Ukraine war continues, Russia has captured and broadcasted
programs featuring images of and interviews with captured Ukrainian soldiers that expose.
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), 15 such treatment of prisoners of war, or POWs,
violates protections under the Geneva Conventions intended to ensure dignified treatment of
captured combatants on all sides, even if the images show that the POWs captured are in
situations of relative comfort.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has violated the 159 articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
The Article provides that civilians should be protected from torture, brutality, or murder and
from discrimination on the basis of nationality, religion, political opinion or race 16. According

10
United Nations. (n.d.). United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the responsibility to protect.
United Nations. Retrieved July 23, 2022, from https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/war-crimes.shtml
11
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR). (2022, March 10). Russia's bombing of Ukrainian hospitals directly
violates Geneva Conventions: PHR - Ukraine. ReliefWeb. Retrieved July 23, 2022, from
https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/russia-s-bombing-ukrainian-hospitals-directly-violates-geneva-
conventions-phr
12
United Nations. (n.d.). Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Articles 33-38). United Nations. Retrieved
July 23, 2022, from https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-6
13
Milanovic, M. (2022, February 25). What is Russia's legal justification for using force against Ukraine? EJIL.
Retrieved July 23, 2022, from https://www.ejiltalk.org/what-is-russias-legal-justification-for-using-force-
against-ukraine/
14
Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. OHCHR. (n.d.). Retrieved July 23, 2022,
from https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-
treatment-prisoners-war
15
Russia: Respect the rights of prisoners of war. Human Rights Watch. (2022, April 28). Retrieved July 23, 2022,
from https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/28/russia-respect-rights-prisoners-war
16
Summary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols.
https://www.redcross.org/content/dam/redcross/atg/PDF_s/International_Services/International_Humanitari
an_Law/IHL_SummaryGenevaConv.pdf
 to the U.N. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine launched in June 2022, the
war on Ukraine by Russia has led to grave human rights violations in the country, with
countless civilians being killed and injured in addition to colossal demolition of civilian housing
and infrastructure, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention implemented ill-
treatment and torture, and conflict-related sexual violence 17

Russia has violated Article 57 of the UN Charter. This Article provides that various specialised
agencies established by an intergovernmental agreement having wide international
responsibilities defined in their basic instruments in social, economic, educational, cultural,
health, and related fields are to be linked with the United Nations in reference to the
provisions of Article 63 18. Russia has violated its responsibilities and obligations established
by intergovernmental agreements by invading Ukraine, significantly undermining economic,
educational, cultural, and other fields of rights.

The avenues for international accountability include the following.

It is important to note that Russia being a Permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council, has veto powers to justify its action under the guise of defending national interests
in order to uphold a tenet or tenets of its foreign policy and, in some cases, this can be used
promote a single issue of particular importance to a state." 19 The Geneva Convention of 1954
was ratified by USSR IN 1954; however, in 2019, Russia withdrew itself from Article 90 of
Protocol 1 but remains a signatory to the rest of the agreements. Furthermore, the ICC,
formed in 2002, is clearly distinct from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), a United Nations
body that hears state disputes 20.

This significantly places the power of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to hold Russia
accountable in the balance because neither Russia nor Ukraine is a member of the ICC, and
Moscow does not recognise the Tribunal. Although Ukraine is within its rights to file
proceedings against Russia before the ICJ, Russia has not accepted the ICJ's general
jurisdiction; the ICJ has the authority to rule only when provided by special conventions.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction to prosecute leaders responsible for
crimes of aggression, including but not limited to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but this
jurisdiction only applies to the ICC's member states, which do not include Russia.
In addition, although Ukraine has permitted the investigation and examination of the alleged
atrocities on its territory starting from all the way back when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014,
it is predictable that Russia may not cooperate with the ICC and any trial is susceptible to delay
tactics until a defendant is arrested provided all factors remain constant or unchanged 21.

17
New report by UN Human Rights shows the shocking toll of the war in Ukraine.
https://ukraine.un.org/en/188268-new-report-un-human-rights-shows-shocking-toll-war-ukraine
18
United Nations Charter (full text) | United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text
19
The United Nations Security Council Veto, Explained - News.
https://news.northeastern.edu/2022/04/14/united-nations-security-council-veto/
20
Explainer: How could Russia's Putin be prosecuted for war crimes in ....
https://www.aol.com/news/explainer-could-russias-putin-prosecuted-061209760-094339318.html
21
Langford, M., & Ulfstein, G. (2022, March 2). Russia has violated the fundamental rules of international
law. what are the consequences? PRIO Blogs. Retrieved July 23, 2022, from
https://blogs.prio.org/2022/03/russia-has-violated-the-fundamental-rules-of-international-law-what-are-the-
consequences/
 However, if for some reason the factors change regarding Russia, then the ICC and ICJ are the
direct avenues for international accountability, including the European Court of Human
Rights, despite having several cases between Russia and Ukraine concerning eastern Ukraine
and Crimea.

That said, if the factors do not change, below are some of the avenues for international
accountability that can be implemented independently by states; they include the following.

I. Diplomatic condemnation and sanctions, however, these require strategic patience

because it may take a long time for them to have the desired effect. Sanctions are not
a long-term fix and must be carefully calibrated. In countries like Iran, Venezuela,
Syria, and Cuba, decades of sanctions have not changed the regime or its policies but
have created an enormous human cost for the innocent civilians affected by them and
led to inflation globally; thus, they need to be designed to minimise their impact on
innocent civilians. The appropriate sanctions that can be imposed include but are not
limited to asset seizure bans on travel to the West, financial sanctions targeted at the
defence sector, and export controls on leading-edge technologies used in defence and
aerospace. These will cripple Russia's effort to continue the war and hopefully force a
cease-fire on Ukraine 22.

II. Withholding recognition of the unlawful situation and deliberate denial of aid or
assistance to Russia. Under international law, states can choose not to recognise as
lawful a situation birthed by a gross breach of an obligation resulting from a
peremptory norm of general international law. States can also choose to refuse to
render aid or assistance in maintaining such a situation. The ICJ has emphasised the
applicability of this customary international law obligation in the context of aggression
and unlawful acquisition of territory 23.

III. Imposition of penalties from other international organisations to which Russia is a

member. This is evidenced by the action of the Council of Europe (CoE), which
immediately suspends Russia's membership from the 47-member human rights
organisation to remove significant Russian influence from a key pan-European
democratic forum and protect the rights of vulnerable members like Ukraine.

IV. Diplomatic isolation of Russia. States can also opt to take decisive individual action to
strategically isolate Russia diplomatically 24. Governments worldwide have a choice to
declare ambassadors, diplomats, and consular officials persona non grata and send
them home while maintaining a hotline for communication, including but not limited
to withdrawal of all Western (NATO, E.U., OECD) ambassadors from Moscow and at

22
Stanley, M. (2022, March 2). Why sanctions on Russia are necessary. Responsible Statecraft. Retrieved July
23, 2022, from https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/02/25/why-sanctions-on-russia-are-necessary/
23
Desierto, D. (2022, February 23). Non-recognition. EJIL. Retrieved July 23, 2022, from
https://www.ejiltalk.org/non-recognition/
24
Gienger, V., Gienger, V., Graham, T., Rosen, B., & Whatcott, E. (2022, February 25). Holding Putin and
Russia accountable: A list of legal and policy options. Just Security. Retrieved July 23, 2022, from
https://www.justsecurity.org/80360/holding-putin-and-russia-accountable-a-list-of-legal-and-policy-options/
 the same time send Russian counterparts back home. This should systematically be
followed by the closure of all Russian consulates and trade missions around the world.

Benefits a People's Tribunal could bring in the current context to address gross human rights
violations and shed light on abuses.

People's Tribunals are grassroot, independent, peaceful movements put in place by members
of civil society organisations or civil society organisations with the aim of hearing,
investigating, and devising ways to address violations like impunity that is often associated
with past, current, or ongoing atrocities against human rights. Peoples Tribunals offer society
an alternative solution to neutralise gross violations and create space for reconciliation and
healing that political agendas and legal technicalities may otherwise stifle 25. A People's
Tribunal's legal authority does not go beyond the integrity and respect generated from its
participants and processes. An example of a modern-day People's Human Rights Tribunal is
the Russell Tribunal, the International War Crimes Tribunal 26 and the Peoples' Tribunal on the
Murder of Journalists convened by the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal (PPT).

Below are the benefits of a People's Tribunal in addressing gross human rights violations.

Most People's Tribunals are organised to hold states accountable for their violations of
international law. This is achieved by ensuring the building of public awareness and by
investigating, recording, documenting, and generating legitimate evidence records owing to
the violation of human rights. People's Tribunals play a significant role in empowering victims
and recording their stories.

Peoples Tribunals provide an avenue for adjudicating questions of legal responsibility for
large-scale human rights violations like the Russia Ukraine war 27. If a Peoples Tribunal is set
up owing to the Russia-Ukraine war, it will act as a hub for continued legal, research,
deliberation, debate and public awareness building towards identifying, developing and laying
strategies for the implementation of long-term and sustainable solutions to global social,
political, and humanitarian challenges like the Russia Ukraine war which has judicial
technicalities under international.

People's Tribunals offer a specialised view and perspective that ensures adequate hearing of
technical issues that may sometimes miss the eye of law in the conventional courts like the
ICC or the ICJ. This is most especially because they constitute carefully selected judges and
prosecutors specifically assigned to the objective of the Tribunal in question, creating more
time for comprehensive work to be done towards achieving the Tribunal's objective.
The procedural simplicity and speedy justice guaranteed by a tribunal significantly reduce the
burden of the constitutional courts, and thus its importance cannot be undermined. In the

25
Podcast: People’s Tribunals – Do They Achieve Anything?. https://www.actwithus.org/hj-talks-about-abuse-
peoples-tribunals-do-they-achieve-anything-an-interview-with-regina-paulose/
26
People's Tribunal versus Judicial Tribunal - rights of Nature Tribunal. Global Alliance for the Rights of Nature
(GARN). (2021, October 8). Retrieved July 23, 2022, from https://www.garn.org/peoples-tribunal-vs-judicial-
tribunal/
27
Daly, T. (2019, November 21). Peoples' Tribunals and the rule of Law - IACL-IADC Blog. IACL. Retrieved July
23, 2022, from https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2019-posts/2019/11/21/peoples-tribunals-and-the-rule-of-law
 case of the Russia-Ukraine war, a Peoples Tribunal would close the gap between the role of
international courts and national courts in holding perpetrators accountable.

3. A brief concept note (max 800 words) of a potential People's Tribunal aimed at holding the
Russian government to account for violations of international law.

Concept Note.
People's Tribunal for Ukraine and Peace in Europe.
Introduction and background
Armed conflict in eastern Ukraine has been brewing for some time now, and it
erupted in early 2014 following Russia's annexation of Crimea. Despite the disputed
local referendum, The conflict transitioned to an active stalemate characterised by
regular skirmishes and shelling witnessed along the front line that separated Russian
and Ukrainian-controlled border regions in the east. In February 2015, Germany,
France, Russia, and Ukraine tried to kickstart negotiations and broker a cessation of
violence through the Minsk Accords. The agreement framework included provisions
for a cease-fire, immediate withdrawal of heavy weaponry, and full Ukrainian
government control throughout the entire conflict zone 28. However, efforts toward
diplomatic settlement and satisfactory resolution have been widely unsuccessful. In
April 2016, NATO announced its deployment of four battalions to Eastern Europe, the
rotation of troops through Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and Lithuania in order to deter
possible future Russian aggression across Europe, mainly in the Baltics region. Since
then, sanctions, deployment of more military arms and continued attempts for peace
negotiations have been applied, but no success has been realised.
To make matters worse, Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022. According to the United Nations, this fighting has caused nearly three
thousand civilian deaths and internally displaced more than seven million people. The
conflict has forced another five million Ukrainians to flee to neighbouring countries—
the majority of whom have arrived in Poland, a NATO country where the United States
and other allies are helping to accommodate the influx of refugees.

The Problem
It is now almost nine years since the conflict between Ukraine and Russia began, and
the war is showing no signs of stopping despite the various sanctions put in place by
different states to force a cease-fire on Russia. The situation is fluid to the
disadvantage of Ukraine as Russia is still one of the leading distributors and producers
of gas in Europe.
By invading Ukraine, Russia also violated Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which provides
for the pacific settlement of disputes 29. Russia has boldly argued that its use of force
against Ukraine is justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter. This Article preserves
the right of a U.N. member state to defend itself against "an armed attack" and allows
the aggrieved state to engage in the form of self-defence. In particular, Russia has
alleged that its use of force against Ukraine is to defend states it recognises as

28
Ukraine Conflict - Press. https://pressmagazine.com/ukraine-conflict/
29
United Nations. (n.d.). Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Articles 33-38). United Nations. Retrieved
July 23, 2022, from https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-6
 independent, like the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic 30.
In their justification, Russia makes no mention of how it invoked Chapter VI of the UN
Charter and its failure thereof to warrant the use of force for self-defence.

As a result, Russia has endangered international peace, security, and justice. This is in
violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which stipulates that all Members of the
U.N shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force or use
of force against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State, or in
any other manner not consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. This is a
direct use of force against Ukraine's political independence and territorial integrity.

Although Ukraine is within its rights to file proceedings against Russia before the ICJ,
Russia has not accepted the ICJ's general jurisdiction; the ICJ has authority to rule only
when it is provided by special conventions, which do not exist at the moment. To add
salt to a wound, The International Criminal Court (ICC), which has jurisdiction to
prosecute leaders responsible for crimes of aggression, including but not limited to
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but its authority only applies to the ICC's member states,
which do not include Russia.
Although Ukraine has permitted the investigation and examination of the alleged
atrocities on its territory starting from all the way back when Russia annexed Crimea
in 2014, it is predictable that Russia may not cooperate with the ICC and any trial is
susceptible to delay tactics until a defendant is arrested and this is not about to
happen time soon yet violations continue.

Way forward
On this basis, this concept note proposes the establishment of a Peoples Tribunal for
Ukraine and Peace in Europe to hold Russia accountable. The People's Tribunal will
significantly contribute toward holding Russia and other states accountable for their
violations of international law. This will be achieved by ensuring the building of public
awareness and by investigating, recording, documenting, and generating legitimate
evidence records owing to the violation of human rights. The People's Tribunal will
play a significant role in empowering victims and recording their stories following
regular weekly investigative sessions focused on examining and investigating and
documenting the violations of the atrocities perpetrated by Russia in Ukraine.

Constitution of the Tribunal

The Tribunal will constitute international and local NGOs, international and national
retired judges, academics, and activists focused on events resulting from the Russia
Ukraine war to build public awareness, research investigation and a case against the
perpetrators of the gross violation of human rights happening in Ukraine.
The Tribunal will constitute ten judges with each sitting, not exceeding an odd number
less than five during its sessions with an equivalent number of prosecutors.

Sitting of the Tribunal

30
Milanovic, M. (2022, February 25). What is Russia's legal justification for using force against Ukraine? EJIL.
Retrieved July 23, 2022, from https://www.ejiltalk.org/what-is-russias-legal-justification-for-using-force-
against-ukraine/
 The Tribunal will hold open and closed hearings depending on the specific matters
before it for consideration bi-weekly to examine evidence and arguments to
adjudicate questions of legal responsibility on human rights violations in Ukraine. The
tribunal headquarters will be stationed at the Cinema for Peace Head Quarters in
Berlin, Germany.

Term of the Tribunal

The Tribunal will come into force as soon as the selected judges and prosecutors
accept the letters of appointment to services, and their term in office will run for a
duration of two years when their term expires and is open to renewal.

4. Suggested 10 prosecutors

Almudena Bernabeu
Almudena Bernabeu is a renowned international lawyer with a long career in Transitional
Justice and International Criminal and Human Rights Law.

Sir Howard Morrison QC

Sir Howard is a British lawyer with extensive experience in the field of international law and,
particularly, international criminal and humanitarian law, having served as a judge at the
International Criminal Court

The current Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Karim Khan QC from the United Kingdom

Nazhat Shameem Khan (Fiji). Of the ICC

Nazhat Shameem is a Fijian diplomat and former judge serving as the Permanent
Representative of Fiji to the United Nations since 2014. She was also the President of the
United Nations Human Rights Council in 2021

Dr Busingye Kabumba, He is a Qualified Advocate of the High Court of Uganda with experience
in International Law, International Human Rights Law, Rule of Law, Electoral Law &
Comparative Constitutional Law. He is a member of Uganda Law Society (ULS), East African
Law Society (EALS), Society of International Economic Law (SIEL), International Bar Association
(IBA), International Law Association and African Network of Constitutional Lawyers.

Daniëlle Goudriaan, a Dutch prosecutor with more than 20 years of experience. Prior to joining
the EPPO, she was the national coordinating prosecutor on corruption in the Netherlands at
the Special Prosecutor's Office for Serious Fraud, Environmental Crime and Asset Confiscation.
She was responsible for establishing the specialised corruption team within the Dutch
Prosecutor's Office (DPO) and supervised and provided guidance to members of this team on
individual cases. This team handles complex bribery cases (foreign and commercial) and
supports other prosecutors dealing with these corruption cases. The team exercises the
authority on behalf of the prosecutor's office on the criminal investigations conducted by the
Anti-Corruption Center from the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigations Service (FIOD).
 Harri Tapio Tiesmaa started as a district prosecutor at the Helsinki Prosecutor's Office in 1991
and has worked as a specialist prosecutor of financial crime since 1999. He worked as a
seconded national expert at Eurojust in 2009–2010. He was appointed as National Member
for Finland at Eurojust in July 2011, before returning to his own post in August 2015. Tiesmaa
is a member of the European Judicial Cybercrime Network (EJCN). He also chaired Eurojust's
Cybercrime Task Force in 2014 and 2015.

Dimitrios Zimianitis formerly worked as a prosecutor at the Athens Court of Appeals. In recent
years (2015–2020), he was in charge of the Court's Department of International Cooperation
in Criminal Matters and Extradition. He has also been a member of the OLAF Supervisory
Committee (2014–2017) and was previously attached (2002–2008) as a Justice and Home
Affairs Counsellor at the Permanent Representation of Greece to the E.U. His academic activity
comprises degrees in Criminal Law, Sociology and Criminology as well as a number of articles,
editions, and lectures on judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the EU

Frédéric Baab is the former French National Member and President of the counterterrorism
team at Eurojust, a position he held from 2014 to 2019. Prior to this, he worked for four years
as liaison magistrate in Germany, and for three years as President of the Court of Dunkirk. He
was then diplomatic adviser to the French Minister for Justice, Christiane Taubira, who
published a common statement with the German Minister for Justice, Sabine Leutheussser-
Schnarrenberger, calling for the creation of the European Public Prosecutor's Office.

Gabriel Seixas was previously Deputy Director of the Financial Intelligence Unit of
Luxembourg. In that capacity, he was also a member of the Luxembourgish delegation to the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as well as the Committee for the Prevention of Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing. Prior to this, Seixas was a district attorney for nearly 7
years at the District Prosecutor's Office in Luxembourg, and a member of the section
specialised in financial and economic crime. In that function, he was additionally in charge of
the Asset Recovery Office and was the national contact point for the Camden Asset Recovery
Inter-Agency Network.

5. Suggested 10 judges
Professor Eduardo Bertoni (PhD, Buenos Aires University), currently the Representative of the
Regional Office for South America of the InterAmerican Institute of Human Rights. He was the
first director of the Access to Public Information Agency (AAIP) which is the Argentine Data
Protection and Access to Information Authority. He was the founder and the first director of
the Center for Studies on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (CELE) at Palermo
University School of Law, Argentina. He was the Executive Director of the Due Process of Law
Foundation (DPLF) until May 2006. Previously, he was the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights at the Organization of
American States (2002-2005). Bertoni currently teaches at Buenos Aires University School of
Law and New York University School of Law (Global Clinical Professor).

Mariarosaria Guglielmi, European Prosecutor from Italy, serving in Rome. Previously, she
served as Public Prosecutor in Terni and, since October 2015, as Prosecutor in the Court of
Rome, assigned to the working group on economic and financial crimes. Since October 2018,
she was assigned as well to the working group on International Judicial Assistance (dealing
with European Investigation Orders and requests for international judicial assistance).
Between July 2007 and October 2015, she was seconded as magistrate to the secretariat of
the Superior Council of the Judiciary. Between 2016 and 2021, she was for two consecutive
mandates Secretary General of Magistratura Democratica. Since 2017, she is Vice President
of MEDEL (Magistrats Européens pour la démocratie et les libertés).

Marcela Turati Muñoz, a freelance Mexican journalist dedicated to the investigation of human
rights violations and coverage of issues related to victims of the "drug war" violence in Mexico.
She also leads efforts to empower journalists and against the silence of the press, by creating
and co-founding the network Periodistas de a Pie, the organisations Quinto Element Lab and
the investigative website "A dónde van los desaparecidos." She is member of the International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), Cronistas de Indias group, and counselor for the
Centro Latinoamericano de Investigación Periodística (CLIP). She is the author of the book
Crossfire: the victims trapped in the drug war (2008) and editor and coordinator of some
collective books. She has led some projects on the memory of journalists killed and on the
investigations of the killings. She has received many awards, such as the Louis M. Lyon Award
for conscience and integrity in journalism, awarded by the Nieman Foundation of Harvard
University, the Lasa (Latin American Studies Association) Media Award and the WOLA
(Washington Office on Latin America) Human Rights Award, the Gabriel García Márquez
Journalism Award for Excellence and the Javier Valdez Cardenas Award, on behalf of the
Mexican journalist murdered.

Philippe Texier, the President of the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal. He is an honorary judge at
the Cassation Court of France. He was also a member of the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights from 1987 to
2008 and its chairperson from 2008 to 2009. In addition, he was director of the Human Rights
Division of ONUSAL (U.N. Mission in El Salvador) from 1991 to 1992, and an independent
expert of the Human Rights Commission in Haiti from 1988 to 1990.

Nello Rossi, currently the editorial director of the legal journal "Questione Giustizia" under the
auspices of Magistratura Democratica. He was Solicitor General at the Supreme Court of
Cassation, Italy, from 2015 to 2017. Since 2000 until 2015 he was the Chief Public Prosecutor's
Deputy in Rome, coordinator of the departments specialised in economic crimes and
computer crimes. From 2002 to 2007 he was a Justice at the Court of Cassation, in the criminal
division of the Court. Until 2016 he was also the Ministry of Justice delegate to the Financial
Action Task Force on money laundering (FATF) set up by the OECD.

Judge Kimberly Prost

Prior to her election as judge of the ICC, Judge Prost served as Chef de Cabinet for the
President of the International Criminal Court for a two-year term. Before joining the Court,
she was appointed in 2010 as the first Ombudsperson for the Security Council Al Qaida
Sanctions Committee.

Judge Miatta Maria Samba

Prior to joining the ICC, Judge Miatta Maria Samba has served as a senior judge in the judiciary
of Sierra Leone, most recently as Justice of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone (2021) and
before that as Judge of the Court of Appeals (2019-) and Judge of the High Court (2015-2019),
adjudicating complex criminal cases, particularly having to do with corruption, theft and
sexual violence. She has earlier led the prosecution of high-profile cases in the Anti-Corruption
Commission of Sierra Leone, as well as represented, on a pro-bono basis, victims of sexual
offences, particularly cases involving minors. Judge Samba is Chair of the Legal Aid Board in
Sierra Leone, which regulates the provision of legal representation for indigent persons. She
lectured Criminal Law at Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone.

Judge Piotr Hofmański - Judge Hofmański (1956) – after graduation from the Nicolaus
Copernicus University in Toruń in 1978 started his academic career as an assistant in the Chair
of the Criminal Procedure Law at this University. After completing PhD studies in Toruń (1981),
he was offered the position of adjunct at the Chair of Criminal Procedure Law at the University
of Silesia in Katowice. He completed the second scientific degree (habilitation) in 1989 and
was appointed Professor at the Chair of Criminal Law of the University of Białystok. Since 2000
he has been Professor of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, where he runs the Chair of
Criminal Procedure Law. He started his judicial career in 1994 as a judge of the Appellate Court
in Białystok and then was appointed a judge of the Criminal Chamber of the Polish Supreme
Court in 1996.

Vice-President of the ICJ =, Kirill GEVORGIAN (Member of the Court since 6 February 2015;
Vice-President since 8 February 2021) Born in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on
8 April 1953. Post-graduate studies: Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
USSR (1975-1978). Studies in the Moscow Institute of International Relations, majoring in
international law (1970-1975). Brief career résumé: Member of the Collegium, Director of the
Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (since 2009). Member,
International Law Commission (since 2012). Member, Permanent Court of Arbitration (since
2011). Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands; Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (2003-2009). Deputy Director,
Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (1997-2003).
Counsellor, Embassy of the Russian Federation to the French Republic (19931997). Deputy
Director, Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (1992-1993).
Head of Division (Legal aspects of multilateral relations), International Law Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (1987-1992). Attaché, Third, Second, First Secretary,
Head of Sector (Human rights), Treaties and Law Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
USSR (1975-1987).

Judge XUE Hanqin (Member of the Court since 29 June 2010; re-elected as from 6 February
2012 and as from 6 February 2021; Vice-President of the Court from 6 February 2018 to 8
February 2021) Born in Shanghai, China, on 15 September 1955. B.A., Beijing Foreign Language
Studies University (1980); Diploma of International law, Beijing University, Department of Law
(1982); LL.M., Columbia University School of Law (1983); J.S.D., Columbia University School of
Law (1995). Professor at Wuhan University School of Law. Vice-President and Board member,
Chinese Society of International Law. Vice-President, Chinese Society of Private International
Law. Associate, Institut de droit international (2005). Member, Institut de droit international
(since 2009). President, Asian Society of International Law (2009-2011). Member of the
Curatorium of the Hague Academy of International Law (2010-2016). Honorary Doctor of Law,
Macau University (2013). Member of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (since
2014).
6. How I would structure a trial lasting only one week
The trial would apply four phases like the special Tribunal for Lebanon, as shown below.

I. Investigations and indictment – Monday and Tuesday

II. Pre-trial phase – Wednesday
III. Trial – Thursday - Friday
IV. Appeal – Saturday
For more details on the structure of the Special Tribunal of Lebanon, go to https://www.stl-
tsl.org/en/about-the-stl