01 Labour Law 1 - Notes - Anirudh Belle

Case Notes for Labour Law – 1 / 2018
1. Case Law on the Constitutional Framework and

Industrial Relations
I. PUDR v. Union of India (1982)
PUDR v. Union of India (1982)
• PUDR is an organisation formed for the purpose of protecting democratic rights. It

commissioned three social scientists for the purpose of investigating and inquiring into
the conditions under which the workmen engaged in the various Asiad Projects were
working.
• Based on these investigations, the petitioner addressed a letter to Justice Bhagwati

complaining of violation of various labour laws by the Respondents and seeking
interference by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court treated the letter as a Writ
Petition on the judicial side and issued notice to the Union of India, Delhi Administration
and the Delhi Development Authority.
• Inter alia, the allegations in the petition were: (i) The provisions of Equal Remuneration
Act, 1976 were violated as the women workers were being paid less and the balance of
the amount of the wage was being misappropriated by the Jamadars: (ii) There was
violation of Article 24 of the Constitution and of the provisions of the Employment of
Children Acts, 1938 and 1970 in as much as children below the age of 14 years were
employed by the contractors in the construction work of the various projects; (iii) There
was violation of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulations and Abolition) Act,
1970 which resulted in deprivation and exploitation of the workers and denial of their
right to proper living condition and medical and other facilities under the Act.
• The SC spoke in favour of the attempt to safeguard the constitutional and legal rights of
the workers through this petition. It held that Judges in the country must view violations
of labour laws with strictness and whenever any violations of labour laws are established
before them, they should punish the errant employers by imposing adequate punishment.
• The labour laws are enacted for improving the conditions of workers and the employers
cannot be allowed to buy off immunity against violations of labour laws by paying a
paltry fine which they would not mind paying, because by violating the labour laws they
would be making profit which would far exceed the amount of the fine.
• Many of the fundamental rights enacted in Part III operate as limitations on the power of
the State and impose negative obligations on the State not to encroach on individual
liberty and they are enforceable only against the State. But there are certain fundamental
Page 1 of 50
Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

rights conferred by the Constitution which are enforceable against the whole world and
they are to be found inter alia in Articles 17, 23 and 24.
• Where a person provides labour or services to another for remuneration which is less
than the minimum wage, the labour or service provided by him clearly falls within the
scope and ambit of the words “forced labour” under Article 23. Such a person would be
entitled to come to the court for enforcement of his fundamental right under Article 23
by asking the court to direct payment of the minimum wage to him so that the labour or
service provided by him ceases to be ‘forced labour’ and the breach of Article 23 is
remedied. Ordinarily no one would willingly supply labour or service to another for less
than the minimum wage, when he knows that under the law he is entitled to get minimum
wage for the labour or service provided by him. Therefore, when a person provides
labour or service to another against receipt of remuneration which is less than the
minimum wage, he is acting under the force of some compulsion which drives him to
work though he is paid less than what he is entitled under law to receive.
• It is the duty of the State to create laws that protect the fundamental rights of the workers
and enforce them. To the extent that such laws impose restrictions on the freedom to
contract, such restrictions, if reasonable, are justified under the Constitution.
• These in particular include child labourers, contract workers and migrant workers.
Page 2 of 50

2. Case Law for “industry” under Section 2(j), Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947
I. Madras Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union v. Madras Gymkhana

Club (1968) & Safdarjung Hospital v. Kuldeep Singh (1970)
The definition of the term ‘industry’ in section 2(j) is both exhaustive and inclusive. It is in two
parts. The first part lays down that industry “means any business, trade, undertaking,
manufacture or calling of employers” and the second part specifies that it “includes any calling,
service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen.” Thus, while
the first part defines it from standpoint of the employer, the second part visualises it from that
of the employees.
Discussing both these parts, the Supreme Court, in Madras Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union
v. Madras Gymkhana Club (1968), attempted to keep the two notions concerning employers
and employees apart and expressed the view that denotation of the term ‘industry’ is to be found
in the first part relating to the employers and the connotation of the term is intended to include
the second part relating to workmen.
Later on, the court in Safdarjung Hospital v. Kuldeep Singh (1970) held that the definition had
to be read as a whole and when so read it denoted a collective enterprise in which employers
and employees were associated. It did not exist by the employers or by the employees alone. It
existed only when there was a relationship between employers and employees, the former
engaged in ‘business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers’ and the latter
engaged in ‘calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation’.
II. D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherji (1953)
The earliest case on the construction of the definition of ‘industry’ decided by the Supreme Court
was D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherji (1953).
The question there raised was whether a municipality can be said to be engaged in industrial
activity while discharging its normal municipal functions and was posed by Chandrasekhara
Iyer, J., as follows: "If a public utility service is carried on by a Corporation like a Municipality,
does it cease to be an industry?"
- His conclusion was that what would amount to an industry if carried on by a private
person does not cease to be an industry when it is carried on by a local body although
Page 3 of 50

in the latter case "there is nothing like investment of any capital or the existence of
a profit earning motive as there generally is in a business." Thus, absence of capital
and absence of profit-motive are irrelevant in considering whether an undertaking falls
into the category of 'industry or not. 'Industry' will cover, according to the learned judge,
"all branches of work that can be said to be analogous to the carrying out of a trade or
business".
- Iyer, J. also observed: "Though the word "undertaking" in the definition of "industry" is
wedged in between business and trade on the one hand and manufacturing on the other,
and though therefore it might mean only a business or trade undertaking, still it must be
remembered that if that were so, there was no need to use the word separately from
business or trade. The wider import is attracted even more clearly when we look at the
latter part of the definition which refers to "calling, service, employment, or industrial
occupation or avocation of workmen." "Undertaking" in the first part of the definition
and "industrial occupation or avocation" in the second part obviously mean much more
than what is ordinarily understood by trade or business. The definition was apparently
intended to include within its scope what might not strictly be called a trade or business
venture."
In this case, the court held that though municipal activity cannot be truly regarded as ‘business’
or ‘trade’, yet the definition in the ID Act includes also disputes that might arise between
municipalities and their employees in branches of work that can be said to be analogous to
carrying out of a ‘trade’ or ‘business’, though they are carried on with the aid of taxation and no
immediate material gain by way of profits is envisaged.
The court further held that neither profit motive nor investment of capital is a sine qua non or
necessary element in the modern conception of industry. Accordingly, the court held that a
dispute espoused by the workers’ union regarding non-employment of a head-clerk and a
sanitary-inspector in the municipality was an ‘industrial dispute’. However, the court did not
elaborate as to what analogous to carrying out ‘trade’ and ‘business’ meant.
III. Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen (1957)
In Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen (1957), relying on Banerji, the court
reiterated that the branches of work that could be regarded as ‘analogous to trade or business’
would fall within the meaning of ‘industry’ in section 2(j) of the ID Act.
IV. Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Its Employees (1960)
Page 4 of 50

Yet another case pertaining to the activities of the municipal corporation was Corporation of
City of Nagpur v. Its Employees (1960), where the court had to consider whether a municipal
corporation would be an ‘industry’ within the meaning of section 2(14) of the C.P. and Berar
Industrial Disputes and Settlement Act, 1947.
Under that Act, unlike the definition of ‘industry’ in the ID Act, the word ‘undertaking’ in the
definition was qualified by the words ‘manufacturing’ or ‘mining’. Therefore, the court could
not press the expression ‘undertaking’ into service. The court in this case, however, brought
municipal activity within the ambit of the word ‘business’ or ‘trade’ and a distinction was
drawn between regal and municipal functions of the municipal bodies.
- In coming to the conclusion that municipal functions were ‘analogous to trade or

business’, the court took the view that the emphasis was more on “the nature of the
organised activity implicit in trade or business than to equate the other activities with
trade or business.”
- A workable and reasonable test to determine if a Municipal Corporation’s activity

in question is “industrial” or not, is, according to the Supreme Court in the present
case, laid down in Isaacs, J.’s dissenting opinion in Australia v. The State of Victoria,
an Australian decision, [at p. 587]:
"The material question is: What is the nature of the actual function assumed – is
it a service that the State could have left to private enterprise, and, if so fulfilled,
could such a dispute be ‘industrial’?"
- Further, the Court stated that however wide the definition of "industry" may be, it cannot
include the regal or sovereign functions of state.
The Court cited Isaacs, J., in his dissenting judgment in The Federated State School
Teachers' Association of Australia v. The State of Victoria, who defined the regal or
sovereign functions of state at [p. 585] in the following terms:
"Regal functions are inescapable and inalienable. Such are the legislative power, the
administration of laws, the exercise of the judicial power. Non-regal functions may be
assumed by means of the legislative power. But when they are assumed the State acts
simply as a huge corporation, with its legislation as the character. Its action under the
legislation, so far as it is not regal execution of the law is merely analogous to that of
a private company similarly authorised."
- The exclusion of sovereign functions of the state removes from the scope of 'industry'
the vast sector of employees in the government service. Such employees enjoy statutory
or constitutional protection and so may well be excluded from the scope of the industrial
law.
Page 5 of 50

Subba Rao, J., as he then was, explained the significance of the industrial activity being
"analogous to trade or business". à The pith and substance of the similarity lies in the
"structural, organisational, engineering aspect". The analogy with trade is in the carrying
out of the venture, in the modus operandi and not in the purpose of the project or disposal of
the proceeds. Here Subba Rao, J., applied the predominant activity criterion. à It is
possible that an activity has many aspects and in such a case it is the predominant activity
that imparts its complexion to the whole of it. This test is supplemented by the severability
test. à If the specific activity is integrated with the predominant activity, it loses its identity.
But if it is severable, it can be considered in isolation. The learned; judge applying these
principles, held that health, education and tax departments of the municipality fell within the
ambit of 'industry'. The fact that for the discharge of these functions the municipality was
vested with the statutory power was regarded as "irrelevant".
V. State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (1960)
- The court noted that not only the words used in the definition were very wide in their
import, but even its latter part purported to provide an inclusive definition. It pointed out
that if all the words used were given their widest meaning, all services and all callings
would come within the purview of the definition; even services rendered by a servant
purely in a personal or domestic matter, or even in a casual way, would fall within the
definition and that could not have been the intention of the legislature. Hence, domestic,
personal and casual services were excluded from the definition.
- Although the court rejected the application of the principle noscitur a sociis in
interpreting the words of wide amplitude used in the definition of ‘industry’, in reality it
applied this principle to constitute the rationale to the exceptions carved out by it.
- The court held that activities of the government which could be properly described
as ‘regal’ or ‘sovereign’ must be excluded from the definition as these were functions
which could and must be undertaken for governance by a constitutional government and
which no private citizen could undertake. The court, however, was clear that sovereign
functions could not be confused with welfare functions of the state. The court laid down
that the true test to distinguish regal or sovereign functions from welfare functions was
whether the activity in question could be undertaken by private individuals.
- Thereafter, the court laid down working principles explaining the attributes of the phrase
‘analogous to trade or business’, the presence of which made an activity an undertaking
within section 2(j). à (i) As a working principle, it may be stated that an activity
systematically or habitually undertaken for the production or distribution of goods or
for the rendering of material services to the community at large or a part of such
community with the help of employees is an undertaking. It must be organised or
arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organised or arranged;
(ii) Such an activity generally involves the co-operation of the employer and the
Page 6 of 50

employees; (iii) and its object is the satisfaction of material human needs. It must not
be casual nor for oneself or for pleasure.
- Thus, the manner in which the activity in question is organised or arranged, the
condition of the co-operation between employer and the employee necessary for its
success, and its object to render material service to the community can be regarded
as some of the features which are distinctive of activities to which section 2(j) applies.
VI. University of Delhi v. Ram Nath (1963)
In University of Delhi v. Ram Nath (1963), the court narrowed the concept of service. It held
that educational institutions would not fall within the meaning of ‘industry’ because their aim
was education and the teachers’ profession was not to be equated with industrial workers. The
work in the university was primarily carried on with the help of teachers who were not covered
by the definition of “workman” and, therefore, educational institutions like the University of
Delhi were not ‘industry’.
In its reasoning, the court observed that it would be unreasonable to hold that educational
institutions are employers within the meaning of Section 2(g), or that the work of teaching
carried on by them is an industry, because, essentially, the creation of a well-educated, healthy,
young generation imbued with a rational, progressive outlook on life, which us the sole aim of
education, can in no case be compared or assimilated with what may be described as an
industrial process.
The court further observed that education seeks to build personality of the pupil by assisting his
physical, intellectual, emotional and moral development. To speak of this educational process
as industrial sounds so completely incongruous that one is not surprised that the Act has
deliberately so defined workmen under Section 2(s) as to exclude teachers from its scope. à
Hence, it is clear that any problems connected with teachers and their salaries are outside
the purview of the Act, and since the teachers form the sole class of employees with whose
cooperation education is imparted by educational institutions, their exclusion from the purview
of the Act necessarily corroborates the conclusion that education itself is not within its scope.
It is true that like all educational institutions, the University of Delhi employed subordinate
staff such as peons, drivers employed for driving college buses run for convenience of the
students, etc., and this subordinate staff does the work assigned to it. But, in the main scheme of
imparting education, this subordinate staff play such a minor, subordinate and insignificant
part that it would be unreasonable to allow this work to lend its industrial colour to the principal
activity of the university which is imparting education. The work of promoting education is
carried on by the university and its teachers and if the teachers are excluded from the purview
of the Act, it would be unreasonable to regard the work of imparting education as industry
only because its minor, subsidiary and incidental work may seem to partake of the
character of service which may fall under Section 2(j).
Page 7 of 50

VII. Madras Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union v. Madras Gymkhana

Club (1968)
The question for consideration was whether the Madras Gymkhana Club was an 'industry'. It
was a members' club offering facilities for golf, tennis, billiards, etc., and arranging refreshments
and entertainments for its members with the help of a large retinue of servants.
Two reasons were given by Hidayatullah, C.J., for withdrawing clubs from the scope of
'industry':
- In the first place, though the activity of a club may be falling in the second part of the
definition in as much as the work of the club is conducted with the aid of the employees
who follow a "calling" or "avocation", it cannot be described as a calling of the members
of the club or of the managing committee of the club within the first part of that
definition. à The Chief Justice had drawn a distinction between the 'denotation' and
the 'connotation' of 'industry'. The first part of section 2(j) contains the 'denotation' and
the second part is only an enlargement of 'connotation' of the term à So, unless the
activity is within the first part of the definition it does not qualify for the status of
'industry’. No doubt, the word 'undertaking' is there in the first part, but the Chief Justice
pointed out that the "undertaking" was not one analogous to trade or business, an
element missing in the members' club. The club was thus excluded from, the category
of 'industry'.
- The second reason given by him was that the club was a members' self-serving
institution. He stated: “No doubt the material needs or wants of a section of the
community is catered for but that is not enough. This must be done as part of a trade or
business or as an undertaking analogous to trade or business. This element is
completely missing in a members' club”.
VIII. Management of Safdarjung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh (1970)
Three institutions— Safdarjung Hospital, Tuberculosis Hospital and the Kurji Holy Family
Hospital—were involved in the bunch of appeals covered by the Management of Safdarjung
Hospital v. Kuldip Singh (1970) case. They were hospitals with research and training
components and the question was whether they were covered by the definition of 'industry'.
Hidayatullah, C.J., propounded the view that to fall under 'industry' two conditions should be
satisfied: (i) The end-product should be the result of cooperation between the employers and the
employees; and (ii) if the end-product is a service, it should be a material service. à In the
words of Hidayatullah, C.J., material services involve an activity providing "the community with
Page 8 of 50

the use of something such as electric power, water, transportation, mail delivery, telephones and
the like." For a material service, something shall be "brought into existence quite apart from
the benefit to particular individuals. It is the production of this something which is described
as the production of material services."
In a hospital, especially one engaged in research work, the services are those of professionally
trained expert persons. The character of individuality is stamped on these services. The end-
product, namely, services rendered to patient cannot be described as one brought into
existence by the cooperation of employers and employees. The employers might have created
necessary conditions for rendering the service, but the service is that of the doctor alone. The
service is absorbed by the patient in the form of benefit and is not something tangible that can
be seen apart from that benefit. An 'industry' is generally understood as one producing
material products. By way of extension even the production of material service is comprised
within 'industry'.
IX. Bombay Pinjrapole v. The Workmen (1971)
In Bombay Pinjrapole v. The Workmen (1971), Mitter, J., concluded that if the income for
running the pinjrapole is derived from donations and animals are treated free there would be
no 'industry'. Since this was not so and income was raised by using the cattle for producing milk
and by selling the milk products, the activity had to be considered an 'industry'.
X. National Union of Commercial Employees v. M.R. Meher, Industrial

Tribunal (1962)
In this case, the question was whether a firm of solicitors constituted an ‘industry’?
Gajendragadkar, J. held that [t]he essential basis of an industrial dispute is that it is a dispute
arising between capital and labour in enterprises where capital and labour combines to produce
commodities or to render service. This essential basis would be absent in the case of liberal
professions. A person following a liberal profession does not carry on his profession in any
intelligible sense with the active co-operation of his employees and the principal, if not the
sole, capital which he brings into his profession is his special or peculiar intellectual and
educational equipment. That is why on broad and general considerations which cannot be
ignored, a liberal profession like that of an attorney must be deemed to be outside the definition
of industry under section 2(j).
---
Note: BWSS overruled the above case (the Solicitors case) and observed as follows:
“A solicitor’s firm or a lawyer’s firm becomes successful not merely by the talent of a single
lawyer but by the cooperative operations of several specialists, juniors and seniors. Likewise,
the ancillary services o f competent stenographers, para-legal supportive services are equally
Page 9 of 50

important. The same test applies to other professions. The conclusion is inevitable that
contribution to the success of the institution — every professional unit has an institutional
goodwill and reputation comes not merely from the professional or specialist but from all
those whose excellence in their respective parts makes for the total proficiency. We have,
therefore, no doubt that the claim for exclusion on the score of liberal professions is
unwarranted from a functional or definitional angle.”
“[T]he Solicitors’case is wrongly decided and must therefore, be overruled. We must hasten,
however, to repeat that a small category, perhaps large in numbers in the muffasil, may not
squarely fall within the definition of industry. A single lawyer, a rural medical practitioner
or urban doctor with a little assistant and/or menial servant may ply a ‘profession but may
not be said to run an industry. That is not because the employee does- not make a contribution
nor because the profession is too high to be classified as a trade or industry with its
commercial connotations but because there is nothing like organised labour in such
employment. The image of industry or even quasi-industry is one of a plurality of workmen,
not an isolated or single little assistant, or attendant. The latter category is more or less like
personal avocation for livelihood taking some paid or part-time from another. The whole
purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act is to focus on resolution of industrial disputes and
regulation of industrial relations and not to meddle with every little carpenter in a village or
blacksmith in a town who sits with his son or assistant to work for the customers who trek
in. The ordinary spectacle of a cobbler and his assistant or a cycle repairer with a helper, we
come across in the pavements of cities and towns, repels the idea of industry and industrial
dispute. For this reason, which applies all along the line, to small professions, petty
handicraftsmen, domestic servants and the like, the solicitor or doctor or rural engineer, even
like the butcher, the baker and the candle-stick maker, with an assistant or without, does not
fall within the definition of industry. In regular industries, of course, even a few employees
are enough to bring them within S. 2 (j) otherwise automated industries will slip through the
net.”
XI. Bangalore Water Supply and Sewage Board v. A. Rajappa (BWSS)

(1978)
On a reference, a seven-judge bench of the apex court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewage
Board v. A. Rajappa (BWSS) (1978), re-examined all the earlier cases with a view to simplify
and clarify the definition of ‘industry’.
BWSS overruled the Safdarjung, Solicitors, Gymkhana, Delhi University, Dhanrajgirji

Hospital cases, rehabilitated the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case and reaffirmed Nagpur and
Banerji.
Page 10 of 50

The holding in BWSS is summarised as follows:
(a) Triple-Test: Where the entity pursues (i) systematic activity, (ii) which is organised by
co-operation between employer and employees, (iii) for the production and/or
distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not
spiritual or religious wants or wishes), prima facie, there is an ‘industry’ in that
enterprise.
(b) Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant, be the venture in the public,
joint, private or other sector.
(c) The true focus is functional, and the decisive test is the nature of the activity with special
emphasis on the employer-employee relations.
(d) If the organisation is a trade or business, it does not cease to be one because of
philanthropy animating the undertaking.
(e) ‘Undertaking’ must suffer a contextual and associational shrinkage; so also, service,
calling and the like. Thus, all organised activity possessing the triple elements, although
not trade or business, may still be ‘industry’ provided the nature of the activity, viz. the
employer-employee basis, bears resemblance to trade or business.
(f) Dominant Nature Test: However, where a complex of activities, some of which qualify
for exemption, others not, involves employees on the total undertaking, some of whom
are not “workmen” as in Delhi University or some departments are not productive of
goods and services if isolated, even then, the predominant nature of the services and the
integrated nature of the departments as explained in Corporation of Nagpur will be the
true test. The whole undertaking will be ‘industry’ although those who are not ‘workmen’
may not benefit by the status. à Notwithstanding the previous clauses, sovereign
functions, strictly understood (alone), would qualify for exemption, and not the welfare
activities or economic adventures undertaken by Government or statutory bodies. à
Even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if these are units which are
industries, and they are substantially severable, then they can be considered to come
within Section 2(j) (Doctrine of Severability / Severability Test).
(g) Applying the aforesaid tests to the specific cases, activities such as (i) professions, (ii)
clubs, (iii) educational institutions, (iv) co-operatives, (v) research institutes, (vi)
charitable projects and (vii) other kindred adventures, if they fulfil the triple test (supra),
cannot be exempted from the scope of section 2(j).
(h) Self-Sufficiency Test: A restricted category of professions, clubs, co-operatives and

even gurukulas and little research labs may qualify for exemption if in simple ventures,
substantially, and going by the dominant nature criterion, substantively, no employees
Page 11 of 50

are employed but in minimal matters marginal employees are hired without destroying
the non-employee character of the unit.
(i) If, in a pious or altruistic mission many employ themselves, free or for small honoraria
or like return, mainly drawn by sharing in the purpose or cause, such as lawyers
volunteering to run a free legal services clinic or doctors serving in their spare hours in
a free medical centre or ashramites working at the bidding of the holiness, divinity or
like central personality, and the services are supplied free or at nominal cost and those
who serve are not engaged for remuneration or on the basis of master and servant
relationship, then the institution is not an industry even if stray servants, manual or
technical, are hired. Such eleemosynary or like undertakings alone are exempt—not
other generosity, compassion, developmental passion or project.
(j) Even in departments discharging sovereign functions, if there are units which are
industries and they are substantially severable, then they can be considered to come
within section 2(j).
- The Triple-Test, as originally enunciated in the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case, was
altered in BWSS, to the extent that the third condition removed the requirement of
“material” before “services”.
- Types of Charitable Institutions: (1) The enterprise, like any other, yields profits but
they are siphoned off for altruistic objects; (2) The institution makes no profit but hires
the services of employees as in other like businesses but the goods and services, which
are the output, are made available, at low or no cost, to the indigent needy who are priced
out of the market. (3) The establishment is oriented on a humane mission fulfilled by
man who work, not because they are paid wages, but because they share the passion for
the cause and derive job satisfaction from their contribution. à Only the 3rd type of
Charitable Institution will be exempt from the definition of “industry”.
XII. Physical Research Laboratory v. K.G. Sharma (1997)
In Physical Research Laboratory v. K.G. Sharma (1997), the question arose whether Physical
Research Laboratory (‘PRL’), a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950,
dedicated to research in space and allied sciences, was ‘industry’ within the meaning of the ID
Act. PRL was financed mainly by the Department of Space, Government of India with nominal
contribution from Government of Gujarat and two educational institutions.
Assailing the award of the labour court before the Supreme Court, PRL argued inter alia that it
was virtually an institute falling under the Department of Space, Government of India, engaged
in carrying on fundamental research regarding the origin and evolution of the universe and
atmosphere of earth which was more in the nature of governmental or sovereign function.
Page 12 of 50

The court held that, although PRL was carrying on the activity of research in a systematic manner
with the help of its employees, yet its object was not to render services to others, nor, in fact,
did it do so except in an indirect manner.
Holding that PRL was not an ‘industry’, the court ruled that it was more an institution
discharging government function and a domestic enterprise than a commercial enterprise.
XIII. Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Ashok Harikuni (2000)
In Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Ashok Harikuni (2000), the core question before
a two-judge bench judge of the court was whether the appellant, a market committee, established
under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulations Act, 1966 was exercising
sovereign functions, the answer to which question depended upon the nature of the power
conferred on the committee and the manner of its exercise.
To arrive at the correct decision, it became necessary for the court to examine the whole of the
statute. The court observed that even if a statute conferred on a statutory body any function
which could be construed to be sovereign in nature, it did not mean that every other function
under the same statute was also to be sovereign. à In interpreting any statute to find if the body
created under it was ‘industry’ or not, the courts must find the pith and substance of the statute.
à Since the ID Act was enacted to maintain harmony and industrial peace between the parties,
the endeavour of the court should not in all circumstances be to exclude any enterprise from the
ambit of the Act.
The court observed that merely because an enterprise was a statutory corporation, a creature of
a statute, it did not fall outside the ambit of ‘industry’ under the ID Act. It was, therefore, held
that the present case did not fall under any of the exceptions laid down under the BWSS.
XIV. All India Radio v. Santosh Kumar (1998) & General Manager,
Telecom v. A. Srinivas (1997)
In All India Radio v. Santosh Kumar (1998), it was held that functions carried on by All India
Radio and Doordarshan cannot be said to be confined to sovereign functions as they carry on
commercial activities for profit by broadcasting or telecasting commercial advertisements
through their various stations and kendras by charging fee.
For arriving at this conclusion, the court drew support from the judgment in General Manager,
Telecom v. A. Srinivas (1997) wherein the court had held that the Telecommunication
Department of Government of India was an ‘industry,’ as it answered the ‘dominant nature test’.
Page 13 of 50

XV. Coir Board, Ernakulam, Cochin v. Indira Devi P.S. (1998)
In Coir Board, Ernakulam, Cochin v. Indira Devi P.S. (1998), a division bench of two judges
of the court felt that the case-law on the question of ‘industry’ had left uncertainty and it was
necessary that the decision in BWSS be re-examined by a larger bench, as it had the effect of
bringing in various organisations in the fold of ‘industry’ which, in their opinion, were quite
possibly not intended to be covered by the machinery set up under the Act. The division bench
felt that BWSS might have done more damage than good not merely to the organisations but
also to the employees by curtailing of employment opportunities. à [It is submitted that the
sweeping observations of the division bench of the court that the decision in BWSS might have
done more damage than good are not based on any study or research.]
Subsequently, a three-judge bench headed by the Chief Justice of India in Coir Board,
Ernakulam v. Indira Devi observed that the judgment delivered by the seven-judge bench of
the court in BWSS did not require any reconsideration on the reference being made by the two
judge bench which was bound by the judgment of the larger bench. The court, therefore, directed
that the appeal of the Coir Board, Ernakulam be listed before the appropriate bench for further
proceedings.
XVI. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh (2005)
The Constitution Bench of five judges in State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh (2005) after considering
rival contentions, and on a closer examination of the decision in BWSS, held that a reference to
a larger bench for reconsideration of the decision was required for the following, amongst other,
reasons:
(a) The judges delivered different opinions in the case of BWSS at different times and in
some cases without going through, or having had an opportunity of going through, the
opinion of some of the judges on the Bench. They have themselves recognized that the
definition clause in the Act is so wide and vague that it is not susceptible to a very definite
and precise meaning.
(b) In the opinion of all of them it would be better that the legislature intervenes and clarifies
the legal position by simply amending the definition of ‘industry’. The legislature did
respond by amending the definition of ‘industry’, but unfortunately 23 years were not
enough for the legislature to provide Alternative Dispute Resolution Forums to the
employees of specified categories of industries excluded from the amended definition.
(c) The legal position thus continues to be unclear and to a large extent uncovered by the
decision of the BWSS case.
In its opinion the larger bench will have to necessarily go into legal questions in all
dimensions and depth, keeping in view all these aspects.
Page 14 of 50

Page 15 of 50

3. Case Law for “industrial dispute” under Section 2(k),

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
I. Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate (1958)
In Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate (1958), the court was called
upon to construe the term ‘any person’ used in the wide definition of ‘industrial dispute’ and to
decide whether the dispute relating to non-employment of the medical officer fell within the
definition of ‘industrial dispute’.
The court by a majority held that a liberal construction of the expression ‘any person’, used in
the definition of industrial dispute, was impermissible despite the wide amplitude of those
words. The court observed that ‘any person’ could not be everybody in this wide-world and if
the words were given their ordinary meaning, then the definition would become inconsistent
with the objects and other provisions of the Act, as well as the definition itself.
Earlier, the Bombay High Court in N. K. Sen v. L.A.T had illustrated the absurdity of construing
the words without any limitation or qualifications whatsoever and expounded the crucial test of
‘direct and substantial interest.’ This test of ‘direct and substantial interest’ was approved by
a majority decision of the court in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate.
From the context of the definition of ‘industrial dispute’ and its setting in the Act, the court
applied limitations on the construction of the expression ‘any person’ and held that a dispute
relating to a person in respect of whom the employer-employee relationship never existed, or
can never possibly exist, could not be the subject-matter of a dispute between the employer and
the workmen. à The court, therefore, held that ‘any person’ in the definition clause meant a
person in whose employment or non-employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour,
the employer was in a position to give relief and the workmen as a class, have a direct and
substantial interest – with whom they have, under the scheme of the Act, a community of
interest. à It is the community of interest of the class as a whole – the class of employers or the
class of workmen – which furnishes the clear nexus between the dispute and the parties to the
dispute. In cases where a party to the dispute is composed of aggrieved workmen themselves
and the subject-matter of the dispute relates to them or any of them, they clearly have a direct
interest in the dispute. In the same manner, where a dispute of a person whose employment, or
non-employment, or terms of employment, or conditions of labour may have the effect of
prejudicing the interest of other workmen espousing his cause, the workers have a substantial
interest in the subject matter of the dispute. In both such cases the dispute is an ‘industrial
dispute’. The majority judgment of the court stressed that the crucial test is one of ‘community
of interest’ with the concerned person, and subjected the interpretation of the expression ‘any
person’ to the following two limitations:
Page 16 of 50

(a) The dispute must be a real dispute between the parties to the dispute (as given in the
definition of ‘industrial dispute’) so as to be capable of settlement between them, or
through adjudication giving the necessary relief; and
(b) the person regarding whom the dispute is raised, must be one in whose employment,
non-employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour, (as the case may be) the
parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest though he may not be strictly
speaking a ‘workman’ within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Act.
In Dimakuchi Tea Estate, the majority of the court, applying the aforesaid tests, held that the
workers espousing the case of the medical officer had failed to build up a case of ‘direct and
substantial interest’ with the dispute of non-employment of the medical officer and therefore the
dispute was not an ‘industrial dispute.’
II. Workmen v. Dharampal Premchand (1968)
In Workmen v. Dharampal Premchand (1968), the court held that notwithstanding the width of
the words used in section 2(k), a dispute raised by a single workman cannot become an industrial
dispute unless it is supported either by his union or in the absence of a union, by a substantial
number of workmen. This decision of the court has acquired the status of locus classicus.
The respondent is a firm which carries on business as perfumers and tobacconists in Chandni
Chowk, Delhi. Out of 45 employees of the respondent, 18 had become members of a general
registered Trade Union. Later, these 18 employees were dismissed by an order passed on the
same day. The Union took up the cause and ultimately the dispute was referred to the Tribunal,
where the respondent raised the preliminary objection that the reference was invalid inasmuch
is the dispute referred to the Tribunal was not an industrial dispute but was merely an individual
dispute.
The basis was this argument was that besides these dismissed employees, no other employees of
the respondent was a member of the Union, and so the Union could not raise the dispute. Only
the Union of the majority of the workers of the employer could raise this dispute.
The Tribunal agreed with this argument and held that this was not an industrial dispute it could
take up.
The court held that a union of workmen may validly raise a dispute as to dismissal even
though it may be a union of minority of the workmen employed in any establishment.
Similarly, if there is no union of workmen in any establishment, a group of employees can
raise the dispute and the dispute then becomes an industrial dispute, though it may relate
to the dismissal of an individual employee.
Page 17 of 50

The dismissed 18 workers themselves would form a group that is sufficient to raise such a
dispute as an industrial dispute.
The dispute should relate to employment or non-employment or terms of employment or

conditions of labour of any person.
The “employment or non-employment” is concerned with the employer’s failure or refusal to

employ a workman.
The expression “terms of employment” refers to all terms and conditions stated in the contract
of employment. It would also include those terms which are understood and applied by parties
in practice without ever being incorporated in the contract.
“Condition of labour” is much wider in its scope and usually refers to the amenities to be
provided to the workmen and the conditions under which they will be required to work. It will
include safety, health and welfare of workers.
Page 18 of 50

4. Case Law for “workmen” under Section 2(s),

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
The question whether an employee is a ‘workman’ under section 2(s) of the Act is required to
be answered with reference to principal nature of the duties and functions performed by him.
I. S.K. Maini v. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. (1994)
In S.K. Maini v. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. (1994), a division bench, ruled that the determinative
factor is the main duties of the employee concerned and not some work incidentally done. If
the employee is mainly doing supervisory work but incidentally also does some manual or
clerical work, he shall be held to be doing supervisory work. Conversely, if the main work is
manual, clerical or technical, the mere fact that he does some supervisory work is immaterial
and the employee will come within the purview of the definition of ‘workman’.
II. S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra (1983)
In S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra (1983), the court examined whether a development officer
employed by the Life Insurance Corporation is a workman within the meaning of the expression
in the Act.
After referring to the multifarious duties assigned to a development officer the court concluded
that the principal duty of the appellant appeared to be to organise and develop the business of
the corporation in the area allotted to him and for that purpose to recruit active and reliable
agents and to train them to canvas new business and to render best service to policyholders. Even
though the development officer had the power to recruit agents and to supervise their work, yet
his duties were held to be primarily clerical. The contention that his duties were mainly
supervisory or administrative or managerial was rejected by the court. The court held that he
was a workman within the meaning of section 2(s). Chinnappa Reddy J, speaking for the court,
propounded the test that if a person does not fall within the four exceptions to the said
definition, he is a ‘workman’ within the meaning of the Act.
III. H.R. Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. (1994)
In H.R. Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd.(1994), a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court
referred to a five-judge bench of the court the question of laying down true test for determining
Page 19 of 50

whether an employee employed under a contract of service is a ‘workman’ under section 2(s)
and the question of the status of medical/sales representatives under the said definition.
(1) The constitution bench agreed that on surveying the whole body of case law on the
definition of ‘workman’ there was conflict between two sets of the three judge bench
decisions on the interpretation of section 2(s) of the Act. It reaffirmed the tests laid down
by the court in May & Baker, Western India Match Co. and Burmah Shell, to the effect
that a person to be a workman he must be employed to do any of the categories of
work envisaged in section 2(s) and that he should not be excluded by the excluding
part of the definition. Further, and consequently, departing from the ruling in S. K.
Verma, the court held that it is not enough that he is not covered by either of the four
exceptions to the definition; the reason for this view followed the observations on the
same matter in Burmah Shell:
It was argued by the Staff Association of Burmah Shell that the amendment to the
definition of ‘workman’ introduced the words ‘supervisory’ and ‘technical’ with the
object of making the definition all-comprehensive and contemplates that all persons
employed in an industry must necessarily fall in one or other category namely, skilled or
unskilled manual, or clerical, or technical or supervisory and, consequently, the court
should proceed on the assumption that every person is a ‘workman’, unless he is taken
out of the definition of ‘workman’ under any of the four exceptions contained in the
definition. Rejecting this contention of the staff association, the court held:
“If every employee of an industry was to be a workman except those mentioned

in the four exceptions, these four classifications need not have been mentioned
in the definition and a workman could have been defined as a person employed
in an industry except in cases where he was covered by one of the exceptions.
The specification of the four types of work obviously is intended to lay down that
an employee is to become a workman only if he is employed to do work of one
of those types, while there may be employees who, not doing any such work,
would be out of the scope of the word “workman” without having to resort to the
exceptions. An example, which appears to be very clear, will be that of a person
employed in canvassing sales for an industry. He may not be required to do any
paper work, nor may he be required to have any technical knowledge. He may
not be supervising the work of any other employees, nor would he be doing any
skilled or unskilled manual work. He would still be an employee of the industry
and, obviously, such an employee would not be a workman, because the work,
for which he is employed, is not covered by the four types mentioned in the
definition and not because he would be taken out of the definition under one of
the exceptions.”
(2) On the second issue whether medical representatives are ‘workman’, the court held that
they did not perform duties of a ‘skilled’ and ‘technical’ nature. The context in which
the word ‘skilled’ is used, would not include the work of a sales promotion employee
Page 20 of 50

such as a medical representative. à The court expressed the opinion that the word
‘skilled’ has to be construed ejusdem generis and thus construed, would mean skilled
work whether ‘manual’ or ‘non-manual’, which is of a genre of other types of work
mentioned in the definition.
The court held that the work of promotion of sales of the product or services of the
establishment was distinct from and independent of the types of work covered by the
said definition and hence the contention that the medical representatives were employed
to do ‘skilled’ work within the meaning of the said definition had to be rejected. As
regards the ‘technical’ nature of their work, the court noted that it had been expressly
rejected by it in the Burmah Shell.
In Burmah Shell, the court referred to the nature of the duties of sales engineering
representatives and the district sales representatives with whom, among others, the court
was concerned. It found that the amount of technical work that the sales engineering
representative did was of ancillary nature to his chief duty of promoting sales and
giving advice. The mere fact that he was required to have technical knowledge for
such a purpose did not make his work technical. According to the court, the work of
advising and removing complaints so as to promote sales remains outside the scope of
technical work. The court held that the chief duty of promoting sales or giving advice
was not work of technical nature. Hence the sales engineering representative was not a
‘workman.’ Referring to the district sales representatives, the court held that they were
not doing clerical work and that they were principally employed for the purposes of
promoting sales of the company. Their main work was canvassing and obtaining orders
with incidental work of doing clerical work. On these facts the work that they were
mainly doing was neither manual, nor clerical, nor technical, nor supervisory and,
therefore, could not be included in any of the said four classifications.
IV. Hussain Bhai v. Alath Factory Employees Union (1978)
Facts: There is a factory owner manufacturing ropes. A number of workmen were engaged to
make ropes from within the factory, but those workmen were hired by contractors who had
executed agreements with the owner to get such work done. Therefore, the owner contended that
the workmen were not his workmen but the contractors’ workmen.
Issue: Whether the workmen were employees of the contractor or the principal?
Holding: The workmen were employees of the principal.
Reasoning: The work done by these workmen was an integral part of the industry concerned.
The raw material was supplied by the Management. The factory premises belonged to the
Management. The equipment used also belonged to the Management and that the finished
product was taken by the Management for its own trade. The workmen were broadly under the
Page 21 of 50

control of the Management and defective articles were directed to be rectified by the
Management. Even cases where this impressive array of factors were not present, would have
persuaded an industrial court to the conclusion that the economic reality was employer-employee
relationship and, therefore, the industrial law was compulsively applicable.
Where workers labour to produce goods or services and these goods or services are for the
business of another, that other is in fact the employer. He has economic control over the
workers’ subsistence, skill, and continued employment. He is in a position to lay-off the worker.
If the livelihood of the workmen substantially depends on labour rendered to produce goods and
services for the benefit and satisfaction of an enterprise, the absence of direct relationship or the
presence of contractors or the make-believe trappings of detachment from the Management
cannot snap the bond. The liability cannot be shaken off.
V. Workmen of the Canteen of Coates of India Ltd. v. Coates of India Ltd.

(2004)
The issue arose whether the workmen employed in a canteen, which was run in the premises of
Coates of India Ltd., could be regarded as the workmen of the respondent-company.
It was urged that it was the statutory obligation on the part of the company to provide a canteen
in the premises and, therefore, the employees of the canteen must be presumed to be the
workmen employed by the respondent-company and no one else.
The SC agreed with the view expressed by the High Court which had opined that the canteen
employees were neither directly appointed by the company nor the company had any
supervisory control over them and hence, they could not be treated as workmen employed by
the respondent-company.
VI. Workmen of Nilgiri Cooperative Marketing Society v. State of Tamil

Nadu (2004)
The villagers of the villages surrounding Nilgiris, for their livelihood, depend on growing of
vegetables and tea. To ensure that the small vegetable growers are not exploited by the vegetable
merchants, a society known as ‘Nilgiris Cooperative Marketing Society Limited’ was formed in
1935 with only 116 members, and now has grown to 22000 members. There are two classes of
members – voting and non-voting members. Any disputes between sellers and purchasers of
goods are settled through arbitration.
Page 22 of 50

All members are entitled to participate in auction mela to sell their goods. During this time, third
parties are hired to pack, load, unload vegetables in the auction organized by the society. These
workers are made available for use by the members and payments are made by the members
usually and the society maintains no wage registers, attendance records etc.
These workers have asked to be regularized as employees of the society and be given the same
benefits.
The tribunal held that they are not workers and the High Court agreed.
The SC held that this case presents a peculiar situation. The society is a service society which
has been formed with the object of protecting the growers from being exploited at the hands of
the traders. It has been found that the employment of the workmen for doing a particular
piece of work is at the instance of the producer or the merchants on an ad hoc basis or job
to job basis and, thus, the same may not lead to the conclusion that relationship of employer
and employee has come into being.
Furthermore, whether an employee has a right to work or not when an offer is made to him
in this behalf by the producer or by the merchants will also assume significance.
The workmen are engaged both by the growers as also the traders. On some occasions, payment
is made to the workmen through third parties in case the grower is not in a position to pay the
same immediately. The totality of the circumstances clearly go to show that although certain
activities are carried out in the market yards, the Society in general does not have the necessity
of employing any workman either for the purpose of loading, unloading or grading. Ultimately,
the remuneration to the concerned workmen are borne either by the farmers or by the merchants.
The workers are therefore not workmen in our view.
VII. Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra (1956)
In Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra (1956), the court held that the
professional labourers known as agarias, engaged in a salt manufacturing company and working
under the supervision and control of the officers of the company, though free to engage others
to assist them in manufacturing salt from rain water that got mixed up with saline matter in the
soil, who were paid by the company on the basis of per mound of salt if the same was of a desired
standard, were workmen under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and not independent
contractors.
The court held that the prima facie test to determine whether there was relationship of employer
and employee was the existence of the right in the master to supervise and control the work
done by the servant, not only in the matter of directing what work the employee was to do
but the manner in which he had to do the work.
Page 23 of 50

The nature and extent of control might vary from business to business and was by its nature
incapable of precise definition.
The court suggested that the correct method of approach would be to consider whether having
regard to the nature of work there was due control and supervision by the employer and “the
greater the amount of direct control exercised over the person rendering the services by the
person contracting for them the stronger the ground for holding it to be a contract of service,
and similarly the greater the degree of independence of such control the greater the probability
that the services rendered are of the nature of professional services and that the contract is not
one of service [but a contract for service]”.
Although it is often easy to recognize a contract of service when one sees it, yet it is difficult to
say wherein the difference lies.
The court also emphasized the difficulties in applying this test in different concrete factual
situations. It referred to another test applied by the English courts, namely, whereas under
contract of service a man is employed as part of the business and his work is done as are integral
part of the business, under contract for service, his work, although done for the business, is not
integrated with it but is only an accessory to it.
The court also cited with approval the relevance of four indices of contract of service
recapitulated by Lord Thankarton in Short v. J & W. Henderson Ltd. which are (a) master’s
power of selection of his servant; (b) the payment of wages and other remuneration; (c) the
master’s right to control the method of doing the work; and (d) the master’s right of suspension
and dismissal.
- Contract for Service: (i) Master can order or require what is to be done; (ii) although
the work is done for the business, it is not integrated into it, but is only accessory to it;
(iii) The greater the degree of independence of such control, the greater the probability
that services rendered are of the nature of professional services and the contract is one
for service; (iv) Eg: Ships pilot, taxi man.
- Contract of Service: (i) Master can not only order or require what is to be done but how
itself should be done; (ii) a man is employed as part of the business and his work is done
as an integral part of that business; (iii) the greater the amount of direct control exercised
over the person rendering services, by the person contracting them, the stronger the
ground that it is a contract of service; (iv) Eg: Chauffer, reporter.
VIII. R.C. Dewan Mohideen Sahib & Sons v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras
(1966)
Page 24 of 50

The beedi industry employs large number of men and women. The difficulty faced by the court
in determining the relationship in such cases was because of the various devices adopted by the
industry to escape social and economic responsibility under the Factories Act making it difficult
for the court to apply the due control and supervision test. Three systems are adopted in the
manufacture of beedis. First, is the factory system which poses no problem. There the
manufacturer is the owner of the factory. Workers gather and work under his supervision as his
employees. Second is the contract system of employment. This has been the most prevalent
form. Under this system, the proprietor gives to middlemen quantities of beedi leaves and
tobacco. The contractor receiving the materials manufactures beedis either by employing
labourers directly for this purpose, or by distributing the materials amongst home-workers, as
they are called, mostly women who manufacture beedis in their homes with the assistance of
other members of their family including children. The third system is that of outworkers. They
roll beedis out of the tobacco and beedi leaves supplied by the proprietor himself without the
agency of middlemen. The beedis thus supplied whether by the outworkers or contractor are
roasted, labelled and packed by the proprietor and sold to the public.
In R.C. Dewan Mohideen Sahib & Sons v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras (1966), the court held
that the contractors in question who employed workmen for manufacturing beedis were merely
branch managers appointed by the management and that the relationship of employers and
employees subsisted between them [the management] and the beedi-rollers. The court
followed the test laid down in Birdhichand Sharma that since the work was of such a simple
nature, supervision all the time was not required, and that supervision was made through a
system of rejecting defective beedis at the end of the day.
IX. Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour

Court (1996)
Issue: Can a doctor be said to be a workman if he does not work in a supervisory capacity?
Holding: According to the facts of the case, the doctor was supervising many staffs (the male
nurses, nursing attendant, sweeper and ambulance driver) working under him. When a doctor,
discharges his duties attending to the patients and in addition thereto supervises the work of
the persons subordinate to him, the only possible conclusion which can be arrived at is that he
cannot be held to be a workman under Section 2 (s) of IDA.
Page 25 of 50

5. Case Law for “lay off” & “lockout” under Sections

2(kkk) & 2(l), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
I. Management of Kairbetta Estate v. Rajamanickam (1960)
In Management of Kairbetta Estate v. Rajamanickam (1960), the Supreme Court has discussed
the differences between lay-offs and lock-outs (read this with the commentary in P. K. Padhi):
• lay-offs: in continuing business; lock-outs: temporary closure.
• lay-offs: relates to inability to employ due to certain reasons; lock-outs: concept doesn’t
relate to any specific reason.
• lay-offs: compensation is payable; lock-outs: consequences flow from legality or

illegality, no compensation.
• lay-offs can also result in imprisonment if the compensation / approval provisions are
not followed for identified ‘industrial establishments’
Facts: The company manager was violently attacked by the company’s workmen as a result of
which he sustained serious injuries. The workers in the lower division also threatened the
company staff working in that division that they would murder them if they worked there. The
company was therefore compelled to notify that the division would be closed until further notice.
Subsequently, the division was opened again as a result of conciliation. The workers made a
claim for lay-off compensation for the period during which the lower division was closed on the
footing that the management for their own reasons did not choose to run the division during that
period.
The company’s answer was that the closure of the division amounted to a lock-out which under
the circumstances was perfectly justified and the workers were not entitled to claim any lay-off
compensation.
Holding: It was held that the concept of a lock-out is essentially different from that of a lay-off
and where the closure of business amounts to a lock-out, it would be impossible to bring it
within the scope of a lay-off. The lock-out which was justified on the facts of the case, was not
a lay-off and therefore the workmen were not entitled to claim any lay-off compensation.
The difference between retrenchment and closure is similar. Retrenchment relates to dismissal
from a continuing establishment. Discontinuance of service on account of closure of an
undertaking on the other hand is not included within the meaning of retrenchment.
Page 26 of 50

II. Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v The Firestone Tyre and
Rubber Co. (1976)
The workers in the respondent-company manufacturing tyres in Bombay went on strike between
the period 3rd March 1967 and 16th May 1967 and again from 4th October 1967. Due to the
consequent short supply of tyres, the company had to lay-off 17 out of its 30 workmen in the
distribution offices in Delhi and Madras. The workmen were called back to duty on 22nd April
1968 but were not given their wages or compensation for the period of lay-off. An industrial
dispute was raised in Delhi and Madras. The Delhi tribunal held that the workmen were not
entitled to any layoff compensation. The Madras tribunal also held that the lay-off was justified.
The matter came before the Supreme Court on special leave.
• The first issue was whether the management had the power to lay off its workmen? Where
did this power, if any, originate from? à Explanation (i) to S. 25B(2) indicates that the
management could lay off its workmen under (i) the IDA, or (ii) Standing Orders (“SOs”), or (iii)
contract/terms of employment. à The Court found no provision in the IDA that specifically conferred
power on the management to lay off its workmen. S. 2(kkk) only defined lay off but did not provide
any substantive right to lay off. The power to lay off cannot be said to be inherent in the definition.
à Only establishments having 100+ workmen are mandated to have SOs, which contain statutorily
approved terms and conditions of employment. Since this establishment employed only 30 and 33
workmen, respectively, there were no SOs and consequently no provision within that laid down the
conditions in which the management could lay off its workmen. à There was also no stipulation in
the workmen’s contracts of employment that gave the management the right to lay off its workmen.
à Therefore, it was held as follows: In the absence of any statute, SOs or contract giving the
management power to lay off its workmen, the Court found that the lay-off was without the authority
of law and the workmen were entitled to compensation.
• The second issue was whether the workmen were entitled to compensation during the period of lay
off? à S. 25C read with S. 25A contemplates that in industrial establishments having 50-100
workmen, compensation worth 50% of wages is payable during the lay off period. à Where the
number of workmen is less than 50, compensation (or no compensation) is payable as per SOs or terms
of employment. à Where, however, the number of workmen is less than 50 and there are no SOs or
terms of employment governing lay off, the Court or Tribunal would have discretion to award up
to full wages as compensation during the lay off period. à Therefore, it was held as follows: Since
lay-off was justified in the present case due to shortage of supply, the Court awarded 75% wages as
compensation.
Quantum of compensation?
Power to lay off given in
No power to lay off given in
SOs or contract/terms of
SOs or contract of employment
employment
Compensation payable
according to S. 25C at
Compensation payable
50% of wages or
50-100 according to S. 25C at 50% of
according to SOs or terms
workmen wages.
of employment,
whichever is higher (S.
25J).
Compensation may or Compensation payable – either
may not be payable full wages or lesser. Court may
<50 workmen
depending on SOs or exercise discretion depending
terms of employment. on justifiability of lay off.
Page 27 of 50

The IDA does not confer any power on an employer to lay off his workmen. Such power must be laid
down in SOs or in the contract/terms of employment.
If any workman is laid off in the absence of a provision in SOs or terms of employment, then such lay
off is without the authority of law and compensation must be paid.
III. Workmen of Dewan Tea Estate v. Management (1964)
In Workment of Dewan Tea Estate v. Management, the Supreme Court refused to accept the
contention that S. 25-C of the Act recognises a common law right of the employer to lay-off his
workman and observed that it would be legitimate to hold that lay-off, which primarily gives
rise to a claim for compensation under S. 25-C, must be a lay-off as defined in S. 2(kkk). If the
relevant clauses in the Standing Orders of industrial employers make provisions for lay-off and
also prescribe the manner in which compensation should be paid to them for such lay-off,
perhaps the matter may be covered by the said relevant clauses; but if the relevant clauses merely
provides for circumstances under which lay-off may be declared by the employer and a question
arises as to how compensation has to be paid to the workmen thus laid-off and laid-off for
reasons contemplated by S. 2(kkk); that is all that S. 25-C means. If any case is not covered by
the Standing Orders, it will necessarily be governed by the provisions of the Act, and lay-off
would be permissible only where one or the other of the factors mentioned in S. 2(kkk) is present,
and for such lay-off compensation would be awarded under S. 25-C. Therefore, it is not correct
to say that S. 25-C recognises the inherent right of the employer to declare lay-off for reasons
while he may regard as sufficient or satisfactory in that behalf. No such common law right can
be spelt out from the provisions of S. 25-C.
Page 28 of 50

6. Case Law for “strike” & “lockout”

Provisions of the IDA relevant to this theme are S. 2(q), S. 10(3), S. 10A(4A), S. 22, S. 23, S.
24, S. 25, S. 26, S. 27 and S. 28.
Sections 10(3) and 10A(4A) empower the appropriate government to prohibit the continuance
of any strike, if it deems fit, once such dispute has been transferred to the Board, Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal under Section 10, or to an arbitrator under Section 10A,
respectively.
Sections 22 and 23 prohibit strike in public utility services and also refer to industrial
establishments other than public utility services.
Section 24 addresses illegal strikes, and Section 25 prohibits financial aid for illegal strikes.
Sections 26, 27 and 28 prescribe the punishment for illegal strikes, the penalty for instigation to
take part in a strike and the penalty for giving financial aid to a strike.
I. All India Bank Employees’ Association v. National Industrial Tribunal

(1962)
The question that came before the Supreme Court in All India Bank Employees’ Association v.
National Industrial Tribunal for consideration was whether the right guaranteed to form a union
under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution embodies the concomitant right to achieve the object
for which a union may be formed. In other words, it was submitted that when Article 19(1)(c)
guarantees the right to form associations, a guarantee is also implied that the fulfilment of every
object of an association so formed is also a protected right, with the result being that there is a
constitutional guarantee that every association shall effectively achieve the purpose for which it
was formed, without interference by law except on grounds relevant to the preservation of public
order or morality set out in Article 19(4) of the Constitution.
The Court, while rejecting this contention, held that the right to form unions guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(c) does not carry with it the fundamental right in the union so formed to achieve
every object for which it was formed. Even a very liberal interpretation of Article 19(1)(c) cannot
lead to the conclusion that trade unions have a guaranteed right to an effective collective
bargaining or to strike, either as part of collective bargaining or otherwise. The right to strike or
the right to declare a lock-out may be controlled or restricted by appropriate industrial
legislation, and the validity of such legislation would have to be tested not with reference to the
criteria laid down in Clause (4) of Article 19, but by totally different considerations.
Page 29 of 50

II. Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar (1962)
The facts of this case are that by a notification dated August 16, 1957, the Government of Bihar
introduced a provision into the Bihar Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, 1956 (Rule 4A),
which provided that “No Government servant shall participate in any demonstration or resort to
any form of strike in connection with any matter pertaining to his conditions of service.”
The appellants filed a petition before the High Court of Patna challenging the validity of the rule
on the grounds, inter alia, that it violated Article 19(1) (a) and Article 19 (1) (b). The High Court
took the view that the freedom guaranteed under Article 19 did not include a right to demonstrate
or to strike so far as servants of Government were concerned, and the impugned rule was saved
as imposing reasonable restrictions.
The Supreme Court, upon appeal, held that the new provision in so far as it prohibited any form
of demonstration, was violative of Article 19 and therefore the entire rule that put a blanket
restriction without any exceptions, should be struck down in its entirety.
On account of nature of the duties which government servants discharge, certain restrictions on
their freedoms might have to be imposed. In that regard, to the extent the rule prohibited strikes
was valid, because there was no fundamental right to resort to a strike.
III. B.R. Singh v. Union of India (1990)
“The right to strike has been recognized in almost all democratic countries. Though not raised
to the high pedestal of a fundamental right, it is recognized as a mode of redress for resolving
the grievances of workers. But the right to strike is not absolute under our industrial
jurisprudence and restrictions have been placed on it”.
IV. T. K. Rangarajan v Govt. of Tamil Nadu (2003)
In T.K.Rangarajan it was held that right to resort to strike is not a fundamental right. The court
further held that there is no legal and statutory right to go on strike and there is no moral or
equitable justification to go on strike. Government employees cannot claim that they can take
the society at ransom by going on strike. Even if there is injustice to some extent, as presumed
by some employees, in a domestic welfare state, they have to resort to the machinery provided
under different statutory provisions for redressal of their grievances. Strike as a weapon is mostly
misused which may result to chaos and total misadministration. Strike affects the society as a
entire administration comes to a grinding halt.
Page 30 of 50

V. Bharat Kumar v. State of Kerala (1997)
The High Court agreed with the contentions of the petitioners and held that no political party or
organization can claim that it is entitled to paralyze industry and commerce in an entire State or
Nation and is entitled to prevent ‘citizens not in sympathy with its view point, from exercising
their fundamental rights or from performing their duties.
Such a claim is unreasonable and could not he accepted as a legitimate exercise of a fundamental
right by a political party.
Calling of bandhs therefore is unconstitutional.
This order was appealed in the Supreme Court and the SC fully agreed with the HC ruling and
upheld it.
VI. Punjab National Bank v. All Indian Punjab National Bank Employees’
Association (1960)
The Supreme Court in this case held that on a plain reading and grammatical construction of the
definition in S. 2(q), it would be difficult to exclude a strike where workmen enter the premises
of their employment and refuse to take their tools in hand and start their usual work. Refusal,
under common understanding, to continue to work is a strike, and if in pursuance of such
common understanding the employees entered the premises of the employer and refused to take
their pens in their hands, that would no doubt be a strike under S. 2(q). So, per se a pen down
strike cannot be treated as illegal, but if it is found to be illegal because it was commenced in
contravention of S. 23(b), mere participation in such an illegal cannot necessarily involve the
rejection of the striker’s claim for reinstatement. The general hypothetical consideration that pen
down strikes may in some cases lead to rowdy demonstrations, or result in disturbances or
violence, or shake the credit of the employer would not justify the conclusion that even if the
strikers are peaceful and non-violent and have done nothing more than occupying their seats
during office hours, their participation in the strike would itself disqualify them from claiming
reinstatement.
VII. Crompton Greaves vs. the Workmen (1978) and Churakulam Tea
Estates (P) Ltd. vs. Its Workman (1969)
In this case the Supreme Court held that it is well settled that in order to entitle the workmen to
wages for the period of strike, the strike should be legal as well as justified. A strike is legal if
Page 31 of 50

it does not violate any provision of the statutes. A strike cannot be said to be unjustified unless
the reasons for it are entirely perverse or unreasonable. Whether a particular strike was
justified or not is a question of fact which has to be judged in the light of the facts and
circumstances of each case.
The Court also observed that it is well settled that the use of force or violence or acts of sabotage
resorted to by the workmen during a strike disentitles them to wages for the strike period.
The question of deduction of wages during the period of strike was also dealt with by the three-
judge bench of the Supreme Court in Management of Churakulam Tea Estates (P) Ltd. vs. Its
Workman. In that case, the Court held that the factory workers are entitled to wages for the day
on which they were on strike since the strike was neither illegal nor unjustified.
VIII. Bank of India v. T. S. Kelawala (1990)
In Bank of India vs. T.S. Kelawala, the Supreme Court endorsed a different view (i.e. different
from Crompton Greaves and Churakulam) by observing that "where the contract, Standing
Orders or the service rules/regulations are silent on the subject, the management has the power
to deduct wages for absence from duty when the absence is a concerted action on the part of the
employees and the absence is not disputed."
The Court further held that "...whether the strike is legal or illegal, the workers are liable to lose
wages for the period of strike. The liability to lose wages does not either make the strike illegal
as a weapon or deprive the workers of it. When workers resort to it, they do so knowing full well
its consequences."
Therefore, the Court in the aforesaid judgment while reserving the right of the workman to go
on strike was of the view that workers are not entitled to wages during the strike period
irrespective of the fact that the strike is legal or illegal.
IX. Syndicate Bank v. K. Umesh Nayak (1995)
In Syndicate Bank v. K. Umesh Nayak, the question which came up for consideration before
the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court was whether the workman who proceeded on
strike, whether legal or illegal, are entitled to wages for the period of strike. The necessity to
refer this issue to a constitution bench arose due to the apparent conflict in the views expressed
by the Supreme Court in Churakulam and Crompton Greaves on the one hand and T.S.
Kelawala on the other.
In the first two cases, viz., Churakulam and Crompton Greaves, the view taken up by Court
was that the strike must be both legal and justified to entitle the workmen to wages for the period
Page 32 of 50

of strike whereas in T.S. Kelawala the Court had taken the view that the employees are not
entitled to wages for the period of strike irrespective of whether the strike is legal or illegal.
The Court, in the present case, held that the question whether the strike was justified or not was
not raised in T.S. Kelawala's case and therefore, the further question whether the employees
were entitled to wages if the strike is justified was neither discussed nor answered. The first two
decisions were not cited while deciding the other case and hence there was no occasion to
consider the said decisions there. The essence of the first two decision is that if the strike is legal
but unjustified or it is illegal but justified, the employees would not be entitled for wages for the
period of strike. The view is that for such entitlement the strike must be both legal and justified.
Since the question whether the employees are entitled to wages, if the strike is justified did not
fall for consideration in T.S. Kelawala's case, there is only an apparent conflict in the decisions.
Thus, the Supreme Court in the present case held that "to be entitled to wages for the strike
period, the strike has to be both legal and justified. Whether the strike is legal or justified are
questions of fact to be decided on evidence by the industrial adjudicator. The Hon'ble Court
further observed that "while the legality of the strike is based on examining whether there is
breach of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, the question of justifiability of strike has
to be examined by taking into consideration factors such as service conditions, nature of
demands, the cause which led to the strike, urgency of the cause or the demands of the workmen,
reason for not resorting to the dispute resolving machinery under the Act, etc."
X. Indian General Navigation and Rly. Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1960)
In the case of Indian General Navigation and Rly. Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, the Supreme
Court held that the law has made a distinction between a strike which is illegal and one which is
not, but it has not made distinction between an illegal strike which may be said to be justifiable
and one which is not justifiable. This distinction is not warranted by the Act and is wholly
misconceived, especially in the case of employees in a public utility service. Therefore, an
illegal strike is always unjustified.
The only practical question with regard to illegal strike is the quantum of punishment. Quantum
of punishment must be based on the facts and circumstances of each case:
“Mere participation in an illegal strike, without anything further, would not necessarily
justify the dismissal of all the workmen taking part in the strike and it is necessary to hold
a regular inquiry, after furnishing the charge-sheet to each of the workmen sought to be
dealt with for his participation in the strike, because ‘not reporting to work’ does not lead
to the irrefutable presumption of an active participation in the strike”
---
With regard to an inquiry as mentioned above, the burden of proving “mens rea” is on the
management. The Management has to show that the charge sheeted workmen instigated or
Page 33 of 50

incited the strike or committed acts of sabotage, vandalism or violence. The inquiry should delve
into the personal turpitudes of particular workmen in propelling an illegal and unjustified strike
and the proof of their separate part therein, meriting a dismissal.
On whether an omission to conduct an enquiry will nullify a termination order: If allegations of

misconduct have been made against striking employees, those allegations have to be inquired
into by charging them with specific acts of misconduct and giving them opportunity to defend
themselves at the inquiry. Even where the strike is illegal, it does not justify the management in
terminating the services on that ground.
---
XI. Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (1968)
In the decision of the Calcutta High Court on the case of Jay Engineering Works Ltd. v. State
of West Bengal, it was held that the protection under Sections 17 and 18 of the Trade Unions
Act, 1906 extended only to acts that were peaceful and did not amount to molestation or
intimidation. In that case, the facts pertained to the “gherao” (siege or blockade) of industrial
premises leading to the confinement of several persons. The High Court held that such acts
would amount to wrongful confinement and would not be protected under the Act (Section 17
immunity does not extend to an agreement to commit an offence).
XII. Rohtas Industries v. Union (1976)
During the year 1948, workmen went on illegal strike on account of trade union rivalry. The
workmen were not paid wages for the strike period and the appellants lost their profit during the
period. The employers and the workmen entered into an agreement during the pendency of the
conciliation proceedings and referred the claims of workmen for salaries during the strike period
and the claims of the employers for compensation for loss due to the strike to the arbitration.
The arbitrators delivered their award and held that the workmen participating in the strike were
not entitled to wages for the strike period, the strike being illegal. After coming to the conclusion
that the strike was illegal they held that the compensation that follows is based on the rule of
English common law regarding the tort of conspiracy and loss of business. The arbitrators
proceeded under this rule and awarded huge compensation to the employers against the workmen
for the losses incurred by the employers during the strike period.
The workmen challenged the award as illegal and void. The High Court upheld that part of the
award which directed that the workmen participating in the strike were not entitled to wages.
The High Court however, quashed the part of the award which directed payment of
compensation by the workers to the management.
According to the arbitrators, the strike was illegal being in violation of the Act. The illegal strike
was animated by inter-union power struggle and that it inflicted loss on the management by
Page 34 of 50

forced closure and that the loss flowing from the strike was liable to be recompensed by award
of damages.
Here the question of law whether an illegal strike causing loss of profit justifies award of
damages is involved. The Supreme Court held that employers do not have the right to claim
damages against the employee participating in an illegal strike and thereby causing loss of
production and business.
Difference between “lockout” and “closure”:
• In a lockout, there is no severance of the employer-employee relationship; in closure, there

is the severance of such a relationship.
• A lockout is affected pursuant to the existence and apprehension of an industrial dispute;

Closure need not be affected due to an industrial dispute.
• Lockout can serve as a weapon available to the employer to persuade workers by coercive
means; closure, on the other hand, refers to the closing of a business and, thereby, the end of
the bargaining process between employers and employees.
Page 35 of 50

7. Case Law for “retrenchment”
The definition of ‘retrenchment’ in S. 2 (00) should be read along with other relevant provisions
such as S. 25-F, S. 25-G, S. 25-H, S. 25-N and S. 25-B of the IDA.
Section 25B has no direct relevance to the concept of ‘retrenchment’, but it provides the meaning
of ‘continuous service’ and, hence, helps in reading S. 25-F and S. 25-N in which the phrase is
used.
Section 25-L provides the meaning of ‘industrial establishment’, a phrase which needs to be
understood while reading S. 25-N.
I. Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd. and Another v. K.N Joglekar and
Others (1980), Management of Karnataka State Road Transport
Corporation, Bangalore v. M. Boraiah (1983), Delhi Cloth & General
Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherjee and others (1978) and Punjab
Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding
Officer, Labour Court (1990)
If a literal meaning is given to the definition of “retrenchment” in S. 2(oo), every case of

termination of service by the employer would amount to retrenchment provided it is not by way
of disciplinary action and/or not excluded by sub clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the above definition.
Further, the phrase “for any reason whatsoever” used in the provision does not clearly state the
grounds on which an employer may affect retrenchment.
In the case of Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd. and Another v. K.N Joglekar and Others,
the court had considered comprehensively the language of the definition in S. 2 (oo) and came
to the conclusion that “retrenchment” bears no wider meaning than the ordinarily accepted
connotation of the word. It means the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for
any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action.
The Court found that the legislature in using the expression "for any reason whatsoever'' says in
effect "it does not matter why you are discharging the surplus". If the other requirements of the
definitions are fulfilled, then it is retrenchment.
Following the reasoning in Barsi, the Supreme Court in Management of Karnataka State Road
Transport Corporation, Bangalore v. M. Boraiah, found that the discharge of a workman on
the ground that she did not pass a test which would have enabled her to be confirmed (as an
employee) amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of S. 2 (oo) and, therefore, the
requirements of S. 25-F had to be complied with. In the words of the Court:
Page 36 of 50

“Once the conclusion is reached that retrenchment as defined in S. 2(oo) of the Industrial
Disputes Act covers every case of termination of service except those, which have been
embodied in the definition, discharge from employment or termination of service o f a
probationer would also amount to retrenchment.”
In Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherjee and others, Goswami,
Shinghal and Jaswant Singh, JJ., held that striking of the name of a workman from the rolls by
the management amounted to termination of the service which was retrenchment within the
meaning o f S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act:
“We hold, as a result of our discussion^ that the discharge of the workman on the ground
she did not pass the test, which would have enabled her to be confirmed was
“retrenchment” within the meaning o f S. 2(oo) and therefore, the requirements of S. 25F
had to be complied with....”
In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour
Court, the Supreme Court held that expression “retrenchment” means termination by employer
of services of workman for any reason whatsoever except those expressly excluded in the
Section itself.
II. Anand Bihari V. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (1991)

and Workmen of the Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd.
v. Its management (1962)
[The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation terminated the services of the drivers of buses
who had put in a long service and were above 40 years of age but much less than the age of
superannuation of 58 years, on the ground that they do not have the required vision for driving
heavy motor vehicles, like buses, for which they were engaged by the corporation.
Aggrieved by this order the workman filed three individual writ petitions before the High Court
mainly on two grounds: (i) the termination amounted to “retrenchment” under section 2(oo) and
since the retrenchment was effected without following the mandatory provisions of Section 25F
of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was illegal; and (ii) the termination of service was illegal
because the order was passed against the circular issued by the corporation, which provided that
a job of helper would be given to an unfit driver.
The High Court dismissed two of the three writ petitions, and in the third case, which bore a
similar fact situation to the other two, the High Court held that although the workman had lost
the vision of one eye, he was fit to discharge the duties of any technician or helper or any other
Page 37 of 50

employee of that cadre. Accordingly, the High Court directed the corporation to absorb him in
the post of a helper or any other equivalent post for which he might be found fit.
The workmen in the first two petition and the corporation in the third petition filed an appeal by
special leave before the Supreme Court challenging the decision of the High Court.
The Supreme Court, while considering the matter, contemplated on the exact nature and scope
of the phrase “ill-health” in clause (c) of S. 2 (oo), IDA. On the one hand, it was contended on
behalf of the workmen that "ill-health" under clause (c) does not cover cases of loss of limb or
an organ or of its permanent use, and covers cases only of a general physical, mental disability
or incapacity to execute the work. On the other hand, it was argued on behalf of the corporation
that "ill-health" includes also cases of permanent loss or incapacity of a limb or an organ such
as eye or eyesight, ear or hearing capacity, of hand or leg, etc, which is necessary for the required
work.
The Supreme Court held that “illness” in sub-clause (c) has to be construed relatively and in its
context. The “illness” must have a bearing on the normal discharge of duties. It is not any illness
but that which interferes with the usual ordinary functioning of the duties of the post which
would be attracted by the sub-clause.
The Court interpreted the phrase “illness” in sub-clause (c), more broadly, in the following four
ways:
(i) A contextual interpretation:
“[T]he expression "ill-health" used in sub-clause (c) has to be construed relatively and in
the context. It must have a bearing on the normal discharge of duties. It is not any illness
but that which interferes with the usual ordinary functioning of the duties of the post
which would be attracted by the sub-clause. Conversely, even if the illness does not affect
general health or general capacity and is restricted only to a particular limb or organ but
affects the efficient working of the work entrusted it will be covered by the phrase.”
The court added that it is not the capacity in general but that which is necessary to perform the
duty for which the workman is engaged, is relevant and material.
(ii) Dictionary meaning:
The court also referred to the dictionary meaning of "ill-health". Thus, the expression "ill-
health" has been defined to mean, (a) "not good health; sick". (b) "disordered in physical
condition; diseases; unwell; sick". (c) "one of health; sick; with disease; with anxiety (of
health), unsound, disordered, morally bad." (d) "unsound, disordered; out of health, not well."
On the basis of these definitions the court came to the following conclusion:\
“Any disorder in health which incapacitates an individual from discharging the duties
entrusted to him or affects his work adversely or comes in the way of his normal and
effective functioning can be covered by the said phrase.”
Page 38 of 50

It is evident that the Supreme Court adopted a liberal and broad construction and rejected the
literal and ordinarily understood construction of the expression ill-health.
(iii) Consumer oriented interpretation:
The Supreme Court preferred to construe "ill-health" from the point of view of consumers of the
concerned products and services and observed:
“If on account of a workman's disease or incapacity or disability in functioning, the

resultant product or the service is likely to be affected in any way or to become a risk to
the health, life or property of the consumer, the disease or incapacity has to be categorised
as ill-health for the purpose of clause (c) of section 2(oo)”
To hold otherwise, the court added, would frustrate the purpose of production for which the
services of the workmen are engaged and would endanger the lives and properties of the
consumers.
It appears that the court had to stretch and strain the expression "ill-health" to bring it outside
the purview of "retrenchment". This might have become necessary because in a catena of cases
the Supreme Court has held that "retrenchment" must include every termination of service of
workmen by an act of employer except those not expressly included. Be that as it may, if
termination of service on failure to pass the required test for confirmation, unsatisfactory service
during the period of probation, unauthorised absence from duty, inefficiency and incompetence
or insubordination, etc., was held to be retrenchment the termination of service of workmen
incapacitated to do the required work, not expressly mentioned under clause (c), might have
been a case of "retrenchment".
(iv) Based on decided cases:
The Supreme Court also referred to its earlier decision in Workmen of the Bangalore Woollen,
Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its management, wherein, while interpreting the definition of
‘retrenchment’, it observed:
“The definition “retrenchment” in Section 2(oo) of the Act means termination of service.
A service cannot be said to be terminated unless it was capable of being continued. If it
is not capable of being continued, that is to say, in the same manner in which it had been
going on before and it is, therefore, brought to an end, that is not a termination of the
service. It is the contract of service which is terminated and that contract requires certain
physical fitness in the workmen. Where therefore a workman is discharged on the ground
of ill-health, it is because he was unfit to discharge the service which he had undertaken
to render and therefore it had really come to an end itself. That this is the idea involved
Page 39 of 50

in the definition of the word "retrenchment" is also supported by S. 25-G of the Act
which provides that where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to
take in his employ any person, he shall give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen
to offer themselves for re-employment and the latter shall have preference over other
persons in the matter of employment. Obviously, it was not contemplated that one whose
services had been terminated on grounds of physical unfitness or ill-health would be
offered re-employment; it was because his physical condition prevented him from
carrying out the work which he had been given that he had to leave and no question of
asking such a person to take up the work again arises. If he could not do the work, he
could not be offered employment again. It would follow that such a person cannot be
said to have been retrenched within the meaning of the Act as amended by the
Ordinance.”
---
Making the above observations, the Court then held:
“In the view we have taken of the said sub-clause, it is obvious that termination of the
service of the workers in the present case being covered by sub-clause (c) of section 2
(oo) would not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of section 2 (oo) of the Act.
Hence, the termination per se is not illegal because the provisions of section 25-F have
not been followed while effecting it.”
Such a case, however, is also not a case of dismissal, hence, in these circumstances, there is
neither the need to conduct an enquiry nor pay compensation. However, the Supreme Court in
this case was concerned with the large number of termination of services of the drivers of the
RSRTC on account of developing weak eyesight. Hence, the Court directed that besides the
terminal, the terminated drivers be provided with alternative employment or additional
compensation.
Page 40 of 50

8. Case Law for The Equal Remuneration Act, 1976
I. Mackinnon Mackenzie v. Audrey D’Costa (1987)
After the services of the respondent, who was working as a Confidential Lady Stenographer with
the petitioner-company, were terminated on June 13, 1977, she instituted a petition before the
Adjudicatory Authority appointed under the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 complaining that
during the period of her employment, after the Act came into force, she was being paid
remuneration at the rates less favourable than those paid to the Stenographers of the male sex in
the petitioner’s establishment for performing the same or similar work and claimed that she was
entitled to recover the difference between remuneration paid to her and the male Stenographers.
The petitioner opposed the petition contending that the respondent and other lady Stenographers
who had been doing the duty as Confidential Stenographers were not doing the same or similar
work which the male Stenographers were discharging; and that since there was no discrimination
in salary on account of sex, the Act had not been violated.
The Authority found that the male Stenographers and the lady Stenographers were doing the
same kind of work, but rejected the complaint holding that in view of a settlement arrived at
between the employee’s Union and the management the respondent was not entitled to any relief.
The Appellate Authority allowed the appeal of Respondent holding that there was clear
discrimination and directed the petitioner to make the payment of the difference between the
basic salary and dearness allowances paid to respondent and her male counterparts.
The matter came before the SC in appeal and the court held that in order to grant relief under the
Act and to decide whether the work is the same or broadly similar and whether any differences
are of practical importance, the Authority should take an equally broad approach, for the very
concept of similar work implies differences in details, but these should not defeat a claim for
equality on trivial grounds.
It should look at the duties actually and generally performed not those theoretically possible by
men and women. Where, however, both men and women work at inconvenient times, there is
no requirement that all those who work e.g. at night shall be paid the same basic rate as all those
who work normal day shifts. Thus, a woman who works days cannot claim equality with a man
on higher basic rate for working nights if in fact there are women working nights on that rate
too, and the applicant herself would be entitled to that rate if she changed shifts.
It cannot be suggested that there can be no discrimination at all between men and women in the
matter of remuneration on the basis of nature of work which women may not be able to undertake
but in such cases, there cannot be any discrimination on the ground of sex. Discrimination arises
only where men and women doing the same or similar kind of work are paid differently.
Page 41 of 50

Wherever discrimination is alleged, there should be a proper job evaluation before any further
enquiry is made. In the instant case, the Authority, the Appellate Authority have found that the
Confidential Lady Stenographers were doing the same work or work of a similar nature, which
the male Stenographers in the establishment of the petitioner were performing. The lady
Stenographers were attached to the senior Executive working in the petitioner-company. In
addition to the work of the Stenographers they were also attending to the persons who came to
interview the senior Executives and to the work of filing, correspondence etc. There was
practically no difference between the work which the Confidential Lady Stenographers were
doing and the work of their male counter-parts.
The terms of the settlement have to defer to the provisions of the Act which clearly provide that
equal pay for equal work must be paid. The SC therefore affirmed the holdings and held that the
difference should be paid.
II. State of AP v. G. Sreenivasa Rao (1989)
The common question that arose for decision by this Court is whether payment of less salary to
a senior than his junior in the same cadre having the same scale of pay is violative of the principle
of “equal pay for equal work”. There are a bunch of appeals clubbed together.
The facts in relation to one appeal relate to Assistant Section Officers of Andhra Pradesh High
Court. Copyists and Assistants are the two feeder channels to the post of assistant Section
Officers. Prior to 1974 the Copyists were in the pay scale of Rs.70-130, and consequent upon
pay revision, they were given the pay scale of Rs.250-430. The Copyists represented that while
revising their grade, the additional emoluments which they were getting had not been taken into
consideration. On recommendation of the High Court, the State Government agreed to fix the
pay of the Copyists in the revised grade by adding to their basic pay Rs.83.34P, that being the
average remuneration that each Copyist was earning.
The common question that arose for decision by this Court is whether payment of less salary to
a senior than his junior in the same cadre having the same scale of pay is violative of the principle
of “equal pay for equal work”. There are a bunch of appeals clubbed together.
The facts in relation to one appeal relate to Assistant Section Officers of Andhra Pradesh High
Court. Copyists and Assistants are the two feeder channels to the post of assistant Section
Officers. Prior to 1974 the Copyists were in the pay scale of Rs.70-130, and consequent upon
pay revision, they were given the pay scale of Rs.250-430. The Copyists represented that while
revising their grade, the additional emoluments which they were getting had not been taken into
consideration. On recommendation of the High Court, the State Government agreed to fix the
pay of the Copyists in the revised grade by adding to their basic pay Rs.83.34P, that being the
average remuneration that each Copyist was earning.
Page 42 of 50

Another batch of appeals is filed by Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam. One B.V. Krishnamurthy
and 62 others working as Upper Division Clerks in the Devasthanam filed writ petition in the
High Court seeking that the Devasthanam be directed to pay salary to them at par with one D.
Gopaliah, U.D.C. who was junior to them. Gopaliah joined as Lower Division Clerk in 1967 and
was given Selection Grade in 1974. An incentive of Rs. 11 was added to his salary in 1977. He
was promoted in 1979 but was reverted in 1981. He was given further increase in pay upon
completion of 15 years’ service. He was again promoted and, in that cadre, on the basis of his
pay in the lower grade, his salary was fixed at Rs.861. On the other hand, Krishnamurthi who
joined as Lower Division Clerk in 1970, and promoted a little before Gopaliah, his salary was
fixed at Rs.615.
Therefore, Gopaliah though junior to Krishnamurthy started drawing more salary. Following his
earlier decision, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petitions filed by Krishnamurthy and
others similarly placed. Their Writ Appeals were dismissed. Hence these appeals by
Devasthanam. The Tribunal held that the rule of equal pay was violated under these facts.
Before the SC upon appeal, it was contended by the appellants employers that so long as there
is rational basis for giving higher pay to junior in the same cadre, the seniors can have no
grievance. The last pay drawn in the lower cadre has to be the basis for fixation of salaries and
following that basis, the salaries have been rightly fixed.
It was also argued that only if all the consideration, factors and incidents of service are identical
then only the principle of “Equal pay for equal work” is attracted. If there is justification under
the Rules or otherwise for giving a higher pay to the junior, then the principle in the abstract
sense is not attracted.
The Supreme Court held that doctrine of “Equal pay for equal work” cannot be put in a
straitjacket. Although the doctrine finds its place in the Directive Principles, this Court, in
various judgments, has authoritatively pronounced that right to “equal pay for equal work” is an
accompaniment of the equality Clause enshrined in Article 14 and 16.
Reasonable classification, based on intelligible criteria having nexus with the object sought to
be achieved, is permissible. “Equal pay for equal work” does not mean that all the members of
the cadre must receive the same pay packet irrespective of their seniority, source of recruitment,
educational qualifications and various other incidents of service. When a single running pay-
scale is provided for a post in a cadre, the Constitutional mandate of equal pay for equal work is
satisfied. Ordinarily grant of higher pay to a junior would ex facie be arbitrary but if there are
justifiable grounds in doing so, the seniors cannot invoke the equality doctrine.
Difference on grounds such as, when persons recruited from different services or promoted, is
based on intelligible criteria which has rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved and
it therefore does not violate the mandate of equal pay for equal work.
Page 43 of 50

III. Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982)

The Supreme Court first constitutionalised the right to equal pay for equal work – which is
Directive Principle 39(d) in the Constitution – in a 1982 judgment called Randhir Singh v.
Union of India, the Supreme Court grounded equal pay for equal work in Article 14 of the
Constitution, and observed that in cases where all “relevant considerations are the same”, the
government could not deny equal pay simply by performing the bureaucratic manoeuvre of
splitting the workforce into different posts, or different departments. In that case, because “there
cannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same
functions and duties as other drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central
Government”, equal pay for equal work was attracted.
The focus on the “same functions and duties” resembles the language of the CLRA – “same or
similar work“. However, in the years after Randhir Singh, the Supreme Court progressively
walked back on the broad principles that it laid down in 1982. In a number of judgments in the
1990s and the 2000s, the Court effectively gutted the principle of equal pay for equal work,
incorporating into it the multiple additional aspects referred to by the Gujarat High Court –
including mode of recruitment, qualifications etc (see e.g., State of Haryana v. Charanjeet
Singh). Equality of work was no longer about the manner or character of the work, but much
more about the relative positions of the workers. In other words, the Supreme Court effectively
converted equal pay for equal work from a constitutional principle requiring effective equality,
to a service law principle that focuses on the prerogative of employers to create hierarchies of
posts in their workforce, by splitting it up into different cadres, departments, etc.
Page 44 of 50

9. Case Law for Minimum Wages Act, 1948
I. Kamani Metals and Alloys v. Their Workmen (1957)
Supreme Court summarized the following principles based on which wages are to be fixed –
(i) “Broadly speaking the first principle is that there is a minimum wage which, in any
event must be paid, irrespective of the extent of profits, the financial condition or
availability of workmen. This minimum wage is independent of the kind of industry
and applies to all alike big or small.
(ii) The second principle is that wages must be fair, i.e. sufficiently high to provide a
standard family with food, shelter, clothing, medical care and education of children
appropriate for the workmen but not at a rate exceeding his wage-earning capacity in
the class of establishment to which he belongs. A fair wage is thus related to the
earning capacity and the workload.
(iii) Third principle is the goal should be to pay living wages meant a wage which is
sufficient to provide not only the essential above mentioned but a fair measure of
frugal comfort with an ability to provide for old age and evil days.”
II. Workmen of Reptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Management (2008)
• The court held that a worker’s wages is no longer a contract between an employer and an
employee. It has the force of collective bargaining under the labour laws. Each category of
the wage structure has to be tested at the anvil of social justice which is the live-fiber of our
society today.
• Keeping in view the socio-economic aspect of the wage structure one more component to
minimum wage should be added, namely, children education, medical requirement,
minimum recreation including festivals/ ceremonies and provision for old age, marriages,
etc. should further constitute 25% of the total minimum wages.
• The employees are entitled to minimum wages at all times and under all circumstances. An
employer who cannot pay the minimum wage has no right to engage labour and no
justification to run the industry.
Page 45 of 50

10. Case Law for Trade Unions Act
I. Rangaswami v. Registrar of Trade Unions (1962)
• This case stems from a petition seeking to set aside the order of the Registrar of Trade
Unions, Madras, who refused to register the union of employees of the Madras Raj Bhavan
as a trade union.
• At Raj Bhavan in Ooty and in Guindy, there are various employees employed to look after
the governor and state guests.
• There are two categories of employees: (1) those whose services are of a domestic nature.
They are 102 in number. The services of these persons are pensionable and are governed by
certain rules framed by the Governor of Madras; and (2) maistries and gardeners. There are
33 such persons employed at Guindy and 35 at Ootacamund. Their duties consist of
maintaining the gardens. Their service is not pensionable but they would be entitled to
gratuity at certain rates.
• With the object of securing better service conditions and to facilitate collective bargaining
with the employer, the employees formed themselves into a union called the Madras Raj
Bhavan Workers’ Union and applied to the Registrar of Trade Unions, Madras for
registration of their union.
• The Registrar was of the view that before a union can be registered, the members must be
connected with a trade or industry or business of an employer, and that condition not being
fulfilled in the present case to entitle them to the registration. The application for registration
was rejected. The basis was that the work they were engaged in was domestic in nature and
therefore can’t be seen as connected with a trade or industry.
• Refer to the definition of “industrial dispute”.
• The applicants did not claim before the Registrar that the employees were engaged in either
trade or an industry. The claim was that their services could not be held to be purely domestic
services and that therefore their union would be entitled to the benefits of registration.
• The workers argued that the Act refers to workmen employed in an industry. Although there
is no definition of the term industry in the Act itself, the definition of the term given in the
Industrial Disputes Act could be adopted for ascertaining its meaning. The term “industry”
is defined to include an undertaking would be comprehensive enough to cover the case of
employees like these engaged in services at the Raj Bhavan who systematically do material
Page 46 of 50

service for the benefit of not merely the members of the Governor’s household but also to
visitors and guests as well.
• The High Court however disagreed with this proposition. It said that the definition of “trade
dispute” explains that “Workman means all persons employed in trade or industry whether
or not in the employment of the employer with whom the trade dispute arises.“ The court
opined that the manner in which the concept if encapsulated is different from the definition
of “industry” under the IDA. It is intended only for interpreting the term “trade dispute”. It
is obvious that the industry should be one as would amount to a trade or business, i.e. a
commercial undertaking.
• The object behind the IDA is to secure industrial peace and speedy remedy for labour
discontent or unrest. A comprehensive meaning of the term “industry” was thought
necessary by the legislature in regard to IDA. But the same thing cannot be said of the Trade
Unions Act. The history and object of that enactment show that it was intended purely to
render lawful, organization of labour to enable collective bargaining. The provisions of the
Act contemplate the admission of even outsiders as members and participation in political
activities. I am very doubtful whether at all it could be said that the IDA and the TUA form
a system or codes of legislation to be read together and interpret one in the light of another.
• It cannot be said that the employer in the present case is having such a trade or business.
• The services rendered to the State guests are personal services to them and indirectly to the
employer. They would not amount to a trade or business. The mere fact that employees serve
the visitors and State guests of Raj Bhavan, would show that there was co-operation between
the employer and the employees for the purpose of a trade or business.
II. Bokajan Cement Corpn. Employees’ Union v. Cement Corpn. of India

Ltd. (2004)
• The question for determination here is whether an employee would lose his right to continue
as a member of the trade union if he ceases to be an employee. The High Court held that the
employee cannot continue as a member and the appeal is before the SC.
• The High Court held that the membership of a trade union is not a benefit that accrues to the
employee so as to claim its continuance even after he ceases to be in employment.
• The Supreme Court on the other hand stated that there is no specific provision in the Act
which provides for automatic cessation of membership of the trade union. However, the Act
requires that the rules of the trade union should provide for admission of members who shall
be persons actually engaged or employed in an industry with which the trade union is
connected.
Page 47 of 50

• The Supreme Court assessed the provisions of the TUA and the constitution of the trade
union and ruled that membership related provisions provided for the criteria for the
admission of members. Furthermore, they also set down scenarios in which the membership
of a person would be liable to be cancelled, which include non-payment of dues, misconduct
etc. The SC felt that if automatic cessation of membership upon cessation of employment
was the intent of the legislature, it would have been so provided under the Act. However, in
the absence of such provision, it cannot be held that any such automatic cessation should
happen.
III. Balmer Lawrie Workers Union, Bombay v. Balmer Lawrie & Company
(1984)
The Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act
1971 provides for recognition of a union if it complies with certain conditions specified in the
Act. The Act also enumerated the rights of a recognized Union, which included an exclusive
right of the recognized union to represent workmen of an undertaking in disputes and make the
decision made in such proceedings binding on all the employees.
The facts are that after a strike, the employer entered into a settlement in respect of a number of
pending industrial disputes with its union, which was recognized under the 1971 Act. Clause 17
of the Settlement provided that the company shall deduct an amount equivalent to 15% of the
gross arrears payable under the Settlement to each employee towards contribution to the fund of
the recognized union.
The appellant, a non-recognized union challenged before the High Court the constitutional
validity of Clause 17 of the Settlement on the grounds, inter alia. (i) that Clause 17 permits a
compulsory deduction not warranted by the Payment of Wages Act from workmen who are not
the members of the recognized union; (ii) that the 1971 Act is unconstitutional, since (a) it denies
to the workman who are not members of a recognized union, the fundamental freedom
guaranteed under by compelling the Workmen to join the union which has acquired the status of
a recognized union even if it followed a socio-economic or socio-political philosophy contrary
to the philosophy of non-members; (b) it denies to the unrecognized union, the right to
effectively participate in any proceeding concerning the workmen of an industrial undertaking,
some of whom have formed a separate trade union and (c) it does not treat all the unions at par
as the members of non-recognized union are compelled to be bound by the action of the
recognized union.
The High Court dismissed the petition and the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court. The
SC reviewed the Scheme of the 1971. It observed that upon the advent of industrial revolution
which aimed at mass production of commodities, large scale industrial units came to be set up
resulting in concentration of workmen at one place under one employer. Trade union movement
representing the organized labour developed as an adjunct of political party. The organized
Page 48 of 50

Labour as a vote bank was wooed by political parties. Every political party with a view to
controlling vote banks set up its labour wings. Combinations and fragmentations of politics]
parties had an adverse effect on trade unions. Multiplicity of political parties led to multiplicity
of trade unions seeking to represent workmen in an industrial undertaking. The fall out of the
multiplicity of unions was inter union and intra-union rivalry which threatened peaceful working
of the industrial undertaking.
Each union tried to over-reach the rival by occasionally making untenable demands. The
emerging situation led to conflict and confrontation disturbing industrial peace and harmony
directly affecting production. Therefore, a need was felt that where there are multiple unions
seeking to represent workmen in an undertaking or in an industry, a concept of recognized union
must be developed. In fact, even amongst trade union leaders there was near unanimity that the
concept of recognized union as the sole bargaining agent must be developed in the larger interest
of industrial peace and harmony. Then the question arises as to the method of ascertaining which
amongst various unions must be accorded the status of a recognized union. Initially it was the
view that the union which represents the largest number of workmen working in the undertaking
must acquire the status as that would be in tune with the concept of industrial democracy.
A recognized union has an exclusive right to represent workmen in any proceeding under the
IDA. However, an individual workman, who has his individual dispute with the employer arising
out of his dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or termination of service will not suffer any
disadvantage if any recognized union would not espouse his case and he will be able to pursue
his remedy under the IDA. Once this protection is assured, the question is whether the status to
represent workmen conferred on a recognized union to the exclusion of any individual workman
or one or two workmen and who are not members of the recognized onion would deny to such
workmen the fundamental freedom guaranteed under Article 19. The court held that the
restriction on the right to appear and participate in a proceeding, of a workman who is not
prepared to be represented by the recognized union, in respect of a dispute not personal to him
alone does not deny him the freedom of speech and expression or to form an association.
Conferring the status of a recognized union on the union satisfying certain pre-requisites which
the other union is not in a position to satisfy does not deny the right to form association.
A recognized union has an exclusive right to represent workmen in any proceeding under the
IDA. However, an individual workman, who has his individual dispute with the employer arising
out of his dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or termination of service will not suffer any
disadvantage if any recognized union would not espouse his case and he will be able to pursue
his remedy under the IDA. Once this protection is assured, the question is whether the status to
represent workmen conferred on a recognized union to the exclusion of any individual workman
or one or two workmen and who are not members of the recognized onion would deny to such
workmen the fundamental freedom guaranteed under Article 19. The court held that the
restriction on the right to appear and participate in a proceeding, of a workman who is not
prepared to be represented by the recognized union, in respect of a dispute not personal to him
alone does not deny him the freedom of speech and expression or to form an association.
Page 49 of 50

Conferring the status of a recognized union on the union satisfying certain pre-requisites which
the other union is not in a position to satisfy does not deny the right to form association.
When a settlement is reached in a proceeding under the IDA in which a representative union has
appeared, the same is to be binding on all the workmen of the undertaking. However, the
representative union has the obligation to act in a manner as not to discriminate between its
members and other workmen of the undertaking who are not its members. Both the benefits,
advantages, disadvantages or liabilities arising out of a settlement by a representative union shall
be equally applicable to each workman in the undertaking.
No deduction could be made from the wages and salary payable to a workman governed by the
Payment of Wages Act unless authorized by that Act. However, a settlement arrived at on
consent of parties can permit a deduction as it is the outcome of understanding between the
parties even though such deduction may not be authorized under the Payment of Wages Act.
Through the settlement, all workers are getting rights as well as liabilities. Making the settlement
applicable in its totality has to be understood in the context of strengthening the trade union
movement There is nothing objectionable in Clause 17 of the Settlement which directs the
employer to make a deduction under the settlement as contribution to the trade union funds.
Thereby the workman is not subscribing to the philosophy of rival union, but he is merely paying
the price of the advantage obtained. Therefore, deduction clause of the Settlement would not be
invalid despite the lack of consent of the workmen who are members of the unrecognized union.
The settlement having been made by the representative union, its right to represent all workmen
would imply the consent of the members of the rival union.
Page 50 of 50

01 Labour Law 1 - Notes - Anirudh Belle

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

01 Labour Law 1 - Notes - Anirudh Belle

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

01 Labour Law 1 - Notes - Anirudh Belle

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case Notes for Labour Law – 1 / 2018

1. Case Law on the Constitutional Framework and

I. PUDR v. Union of India (1982)

PUDR v. Union of India (1982)

• PUDR is an organisation formed for the purpose of protecting democratic rights. It

• Based on these investigations, the petitioner addressed a letter to Justice Bhagwati

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

2. Case Law for “industry” under Section 2(j), Industrial

I. Madras Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union v. Madras Gymkhana

II. D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherji (1953)

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

III. Baroda Borough Municipality v. Its Workmen (1957)

IV. Corporation of City of Nagpur v. Its Employees (1960)

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

- In coming to the conclusion that municipal functions were ‘analogous to trade or

- A workable and reasonable test to determine if a Municipal Corporation’s activity

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

V. State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (1960)

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

VI. University of Delhi v. Ram Nath (1963)

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

VII. Madras Gymkhana Club Employees’ Union v. Madras Gymkhana

VIII. Management of Safdarjung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh (1970)

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

IX. Bombay Pinjrapole v. The Workmen (1971)

X. National Union of Commercial Employees v. M.R. Meher, Industrial

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

XI. Bangalore Water Supply and Sewage Board v. A. Rajappa (BWSS)

BWSS overruled the Safdarjung, Solicitors, Gymkhana, Delhi University, Dhanrajgirji

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

The holding in BWSS is summarised as follows:

(h) Self-Sufficiency Test: A restricted category of professions, clubs, co-operatives and

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

XII. Physical Research Laboratory v. K.G. Sharma (1997)

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

XIII. Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Ashok Harikuni (2000)

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

XV. Coir Board, Ernakulam, Cochin v. Indira Devi P.S. (1998)

XVI. State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh (2005)

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

3. Case Law for “industrial dispute” under Section 2(k),

I. Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate (1958)

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

II. Workmen v. Dharampal Premchand (1968)

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

The dispute should relate to employment or non-employment or terms of employment or

The “employment or non-employment” is concerned with the employer’s failure or refusal to

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

4. Case Law for “workmen” under Section 2(s),

I. S.K. Maini v. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. (1994)

II. S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra (1983)

III. H.R. Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. (1994)

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

“If every employee of an industry was to be a workman except those mentioned

Anirudh Belle / LL.B. 2016 / Jindal Global Law School

IV. Hussain Bhai v. Alath Factory Employees Union (1978)

Holding: The workmen were employees of the principal.