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Matheme and mathematics. On the main concepts of the philosophy of Alain

Badiou

Article · May 2014

DOI: 10.2143/LEA.231.0.3141818 · Source: arXiv

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 Matheme and mathematics. On the main concepts of
the philosophy of Alain Badiou.
Maciej Malicki
arXiv:1406.0059v2 [math.LO] 27 Jul 2016

Department of Mathematics and Mathematical Economics,

Warsaw School of Economics,
mamalicki@gmail.com
Jan 19, 2014

Abstract
In this paper, I present a critical discussion of mathematical arguments employed
in the philosophy of event of Alain Badiou. On the basis of “Being and Event”
as well as his other writings, I analyze the main notions of his philosophy such as
the indiscernible, the undecidable, and the unnameable. The focus of my analysis
is both on their mathematical consistency, and their philosophical consequences. I
argue that the mathematical approach developed by Badiou is seriously defective,
and, as a result, that it cannot serve as an ontological basis for the concept of event
as presented in “Being and Event”.

1 Introduction
“Being and event” is an ontological theory of the effect of event, it is a science of the
possibility of novelty that breaks with beings determinants. Its existence can never be
decided once and for all, because the occurrence of an event is always an intervention:
its ultimate source lies in a decision of the subject who is constituted in this act. As a
result, a post-evental truth enters being. It is udecidable and indiscernible, which means
that it cannot be grounded nor described in terms of authoritative knowledge. It modifies
the situation by overruling some elements of knowledge, and making other veridical. Even
though a truth cannot be accessed in its entirety, the subject supporting a procedure of
truth can decide that something belongs to its realm. These gestures of fidelity give rise
to the subject language, which forces statements describing the state of affairs after the
occurrence of an event.
These are the core concepts of Badious philosophy of event in a nutshell. However —
and that is perhaps the most striking feature of “Being and Event” — all of its fundamental

1
categories have a mathematical character, and the main theses of this book derive from
subtle and quite technical considerations based on the area of mathematics called set theory.
Eventually, the science of event turns out to be the result of an investigation into set theory,
understood as ontology, or rather proved to be ontology, i.e. the theory of “being qua
being”.
In this paper, I am mostly concerned with the consistency of mathematical aspects
of Badious analysis, as well as some of its philosophical consequences in certain strictly
defined key aspects. It is an important reservation, as a large part of Badious thought
can be presented without referring to any technical terms. Many of its categories — such
as event itself, subject, fidelity, the void or excess — are well rooted in the language of
contemporary philosophy.
Taking a broader perspective, I am interested in the postulated deep ontological struc-
ture behind four fundamental domains of truth, which are science, politics, art and love.
Of course, we do not need any special doctrine in order to recognize the groundbreaking
character of basic examples of event discussed by Badiou — Mallarmes poetry, relativistic
physics, the communist revolution or dodecaphony, as well as some similarities between
them — a break involved in their occurrence, the resulting new paradigm, a peculiar in-
determinateness of their status. On the other hand, some of these examples do not seem
to have that much in common with others, at least on the surface of things. In order to
acknowledge the relevance of Badious position, more is needed than a simple rephrasing of
well known ideas in a new language: what is required is a convincing argument showing
that the ontological theory of event is an autonomous interpretative tool, independent of
specific subject matters. Moreover, it is rather hard to imagine an argument of this kind
that would not contain a proof that the mathematical part of Badious thought is consistent
and agrees with his fundamental philosophical aims. The formalized doctrine presented by
Badiou not only allows for a realization of this postulate but it explicitly requires it.
Finally, one could describe this article as a contribution to the reflection on the concept
of matheme. In “Being and Event”, a matheme is understood as a philosophical idea
subjected to rigors of deduction, and opposed to the pre-platonic poem. However, the
very term ‘matheme’ comes from late writings of Lacan, which are an important reference
point for Badiou. There it denotes mathematical objects such as the Boromean knot or
the Klein bottle — allowing to grasp the order of the real extending beyond the reach of
language. According to this understanding, a matheme would be a place in philosophy,
where mathematics attains an autonomous status, completing philosophical discourse, and
generating statements that are binding for it.
My assessment of the method employed in “Being and Event” is negative. After provid-
ing the first part of Badious doctrine, that is the identification of ontology with set theory,
and outlining mathematical foundations of the theory of event, I present a critical discussion
of four key concepts of this theory: the indiscernible, the undecidable, the unnameable and
the evental site. The conclusion is that their mathematical structure and its implications
for Badious philosophy turn out not to meet expectations. They are ill-designed, and this

2
leads to mathematical inconsistencies as well as philosophical consequences that contradict
Badious intentions. Far from rejecting the philosophical substance of these categories, I
claim that their mathematical side may serve as an inspiring metaphor or analogy, but it
has clearly defined bounds of meaningful interpretation.

2 Mathematics as ontology
The edifice of Badious philosophy of “being qua being” is founded on a thesis establishing
the identity of mathematics and ontology. In order to accomplish this task, Badiou, in the
very first words of “Being and Event” goes back to the old Parmenidean dispute on the
status of the one and the multiple. He decides it by giving priority to the multiple, while
considering the one as an effect of operation of imposing structure upon being, organizing
the primordial inconsistent multiplicity. Inconsistent means here exactly this: “without
any unifying principle”.
Being such as it presents itself — and “no access to being is offered to us except pre-
sentations” [BE, p. 27] — is a consistent multiplicity. It is a multiplicity because “if the
one is not reciprocal with being, the multiple, however, is reciprocal with presentation.”
[BE, s. 28]; also, it is consistent because a presented being is always the result of certain
organizing principle, certain operation of counting-as-one. The inconsistent multiplicity is
a subtractive basis of an already structured presentation — it is possible to be discerned
only retroactively, as that something on which a count-as-one operated [BE, p. 25]. From
the perspective of presentation it is only the void because the effect of structure encom-
passes everything without exception. In this manner, the inconsistent multiplicity “sutures
presentation to being” [BE, p. 55]; the void is the name of being [BE, p. 56]. This estab-
lishment of a consistent multiplicity resulting from some operation of counting-as-one, a
combination of the earlier inconsistent and later consistent multiplicity, is called a situation.
It is the inconsistent multiplicity that forms the domain of ontology. “Ontology can
be solely the theory of inconsistent multiplicities as such. As such means that what is
presented in the ontological situation is the multiple without any other predicate than its
multiplicity.” [BE, p. 28] How is the presentation of being regarded as multiplicity — the
presentation of presentation — possible if “being has no structure” [BE, p. 27]? What
requirements does such a situation need to satisfy? Firstly, a multiple without one is a
multiple that consists only of multiplicities. Secondly, the operation of counting-as-one of
the ontological situation cannot be anything more than a collection of conditions through
which the multiple can be recognized as multiple. Finally, ontology must be a theory of “the
suture of presentation to being”, that is, a theory of the subtractive void of presentation.
In other words, it should derive the existence of its multiplicities only out of the void.
The science satisfying these postulates is set theory — a mathematical theory of the
relation of belonging , together with appropriate axioms: the axiom of extensionality,
regularity, pairing, union, infinity, power set, and the axiom schema of comprehension and

3
replacement. First of all, the universe of set theory contains only sets, so set theory presents
only multiplicities consisting of multiplicities. Moreover, set theory is an axiomatic theory,
and axioms are formal rules that do not explicitly define objects they refer to. Badiou says:
“an axiomatic presentation consists, on the basis of non-defined terms, in prescribing the
rule for their manipulation.” [BE, p. 29] Sets de facto satisfy axioms of set theory, however
the axioms themselves do not form the criteria of being a set. In other words, what axioms
determine about sets is that they are multiplicities, nothing more. Finally, the unpresented
subtractive void of situation appears in set theory in the form of the empty set, which is
a basic building block of all sets. It must be a set because every element presented in the
ontological situation is the effect of its operation of counting-as-one, however in fact, it is
a “multiple which is neither one nor multiple, being the multiple of nothing, and therefore,
as far as it is concerned, presenting nothing in the form of the multiple, no more than in
the form of the one. This way ontology states that presentation is certainly multiple, but
that the being of presentation that which is presented being void, is subtracted from the
one/multiple dialectic.” [BE, p. 59]

3 Belonging, inclusion, and the impasse of being

Let us take a closer look at the mathematical structure of key categories of “Being and
Event”. Ontologically, situations — as it has been already said — take the form of sets:
multiplicities whose one is nothing more than the unity of the elements they consist of.
The two basic types of relations between sets are belonging, that is being an element of
a set, being presented in a situation, and inclusion, that is, being a subset of a set, or
being represented in a situation. Even though the latter relation is formally reducible to
the former one — y is a subset of x if and only if every element of y is an element of
x — their properties differ considerably. The tension between belonging and inclusion is
fundamental in so far as this is where the “impasse of being” arises, opening up a situation
to the interventional occurrence of an event. More light can be shed on this tension with
the help of the concept of power set.
The power set p(x) of x — the state of situation x or its metastructure [BE, p. 94] —
is defined as the set of all subsets of x. Now, basic relations between sets can be expressed
as the following relations between sets and their power sets. If for some x, every element
of x is also a subset of x, then x is a subset of p(x), and x can be reduced to its power set.
Conversely, if every subset of x is an element of x, then p(x) is a subset of x, and the power
set p(x) can be reduced to x. Sets that satisfy the first condition are called transitive. For
obvious reasons the empty set is transitive; other examples of transitive sets can also be
easily found. However, the second relation never holds. The mathematician Georg Cantor
proved that not only p(x) can never be a subset of x, but in some fundamental sense it is
strictly larger than x. On the other hand, axioms of set theory do not determine the extent
of this difference. Badiou says that it is an “excess of being”, an excess that at the same

4
time is its impasse.
In order to explain the mathematical sense of this statement, one needs to recall the
notion of cardinality, which clarifies and generalizes the common understanding of quantity.
We say that two sets x and y have the same cardinality if there exists a function defining
a one-to-one correspondence between elements of x and elements of y. For finite sets, this
definition agrees with common intuitions: if a finite set y has more elements than a finite
set x (say, y has 10 elements and x has 7 elements), then regardless of how elements of x
are assigned to elements of y, something (some 3 elements) will be left over in y precisely
because it is larger. In particular, if y contains x and some other elements, then y does not
have the same cardinality as x. This seemingly trivial fact is not always true outside of the
N
domain of finite sets. To give a simple example, the set of all natural numbers contains
quadratic numbers, that is, numbers of the form n2 , as well as some other numbers but the
set of all natural numbers, and the set of quadratic numbers have the same cardinality. The
correspondence witnessing this fact assigns to every number n a unique quadratic number,
namely n2 .
Counting finite sets has always been done via natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . In set theory,
the concept of such a canonical measure can be extended to infinite sets, using the notion
of cardinal numbers. Without getting into details of their definition, let us say that the
series of cardinal numbers begins with natural numbers, which are directly followed by
N
the number ω0 , that is, the size of the set of all natural numbers , then by ω1 , the first
uncountable cardinal numbers, etc. The hierarchy of cardinal numbers has the property
that every set x, finite or infinite, has cardinality (i.e. size) equal to exactly one cardinal
number κ. We say then that κ is the cardinality of x.
It is not hard to prove that the cardinality of the power set p(x) is 2n for every finite
set x of cardinality n. However, something quite paradoxical happens when infinite sets
are considered. Even though Cantors theorem does state that the cardinality of p(x) is
always larger than x — similarly as in the case of finite sets — axioms of set theory never
determine the exact cardinality of p(x). Moreover, one can formally prove that there exists
no proof determining the cardinality of the power sets of any given infinite set. There is
a general method of building models of set theory, discovered by the mathematician Paul
Cohen, and called forcing, that yields models, where — depending on construction details
— cardinalities of infinite power sets can take different values. Consequently, quantity —
“a fetish of objectivity” [BE, p. 83] as Badiou calls it — does not define a measure of being
but it leads to its impasse instead. It reveals an undetermined gap [BE, p. 83], where an
event can occur — “that-which-is-not being-qua-being” [BE, p. 184].

4 Forcing, truth and the place of the subject

In order to make the exposition more accessible, let us consider only the power set of the
set N of all natural numbers, which is the smallest infinite set — the countable infinity.

5
Simplifying things slightly, the argument proceeds as follows. By a model of set theory we
understand a set in which — if we restrict ourselves to its elements only — all axioms of
set theory are satisfied. It follows from Gödels completeness theorem that as long as set
theory is consistent, no statement which is true in some model of set theory can contradict
N
logical consequences of its axioms. If the cardinality of p( ) was such a consequence, there
N
would exist a cardinal number κ such that the sentence the cardinality of p( ) is κ would
be true in all the models. However, for every cardinal κ the technique of forcing allows for
N
finding a model M where the cardinality of p( ) is not equal to κ. Thus, for no κ, the
N
sentence the cardinality of p( ) is κ is a consequence of the axioms of set theory, i.e. they
N
do not decide the cardinality of p( ).
The starting point of forcing is a model M of set theory — called the ground model —
which is countably infinite and transitive (this is a crucial assumption). As a matter of
fact, the existence of such a model cannot be proved but it is known that there exists a
countable and transitive model for every finite subset of axioms. As far as the logic of the
construction is concerned, in particular the decidability of sentences obtained by forcing,
this difference does not play any role.
A characteristic subtlety can be observed here. From the perspective of an inhabitant
of the universe, that is, if all the sets are considered, the model M is only a small part
of this universe. It is deficient in almost every respect; for example all of its elements are
countable, even though the existence of uncountable sets is a consequence of the axioms
of set theory. However, from the point of view of an inhabitant of M, that is, if elements
outside of M are disregarded, everything is in order. Some of M because in this model
there are no functions establishing a one-to-one correspondence between them and ω0 . One
could say that M simulates the properties of the whole universe.
The main objective of forcing is to build a new model M[G] based on M, which con-
tains M, and satisfies certain additional properties. The model M[G] is called the generic
extension of M. In order to accomplish this goal, a particular set is distinguished in M
its elements are referred to as conditions which will be used to determine basic properties
of the generic extension. In case of the forcing that proves the undecidability of the car-
N
dinality of p( ), the set of conditions codes finite fragments of a function witnessing the
N
correspondence between p( ) and a fixed cardinal κ.
In the next step, an appropriately chosen set G is added to M as well as other sets
that are indispensable in order for M[G] to satisfy the axioms of set theory. This set —
called generic — is a subset of the set of conditions that always lays outside of M. The
construction of M[G] is exceptional in the sense that its key properties can be described
and proved using M only, or just the conditions, thus, without referring to the generic set.
This is possible for three reasons. First of all, every element x of M[G] has a name existing
already in M (that is, an element in M that codes x in some particular way). Secondly,
based on these names, one can design a language called the forcing language or — as
Badiou terms it — the subject language that is powerful enough to express every sentence
of set theory referring to the generic extension. Finally, it turns out that the validity of

6
sentences of the forcing language in the extension M[G] depends on the set of conditions:
the conditions force validity of sentences of the forcing language in a precisely specified
sense. As it has already been said, the generic set G consists of some of the conditions, so
even though G is outside of M, its elements are in M. Recognizing which of them will end
up in G is not possible for an inhabitant of M, however in some cases the following can
be proved: provided that the condition p is an element of G, the sentence S is true in the
generic extension constructed using this generic set G. We say then that p forces S.
In this way, with an aid of the forcing language, one can prove that every generic set of
the Cohen forcing codes an entire function defining a one-to-one correspondence between
N
elements of p( ) and a fixed (uncountable) cardinal number — it turns out that all the
conditions force the sentence stating this property of G, so regardless of which conditions
end up in the generic set, it is always true in the generic extension. On the other hand,
the existence of a generic set in the model M cannot follow from axioms of set theory,
N
otherwise they would decide the cardinality of p( ).
The method of forcing is of fundamental importance for Badious philosophy. The event
escapes ontology; it is “that-which-is-not-being-qua-being”, so it has no place in set theory
or the forcing construction. However, the post-evental truth that enters, and modifies the
situation, is presented by forcing in the form of a generic set leading to an extension of
the ground model. In other words, the situation, understood as the ground model M, is
transformed by a post-evental truth identified with a generic set G, and becomes the generic
model M[G]. Moreover, the knowledge of the situation is interpreted as the language of set
theory, serving to discern elements of the situation; and as axioms of set theory, deciding
validity of statements about the situation. Knowledge, understood in this way, does not
decide the existence of a generic set in the situation nor can it point to its elements (this
property of truth will be thoroughly discussed later). A generic set is always undecidable
and indiscernible.
Therefore, from the perspective of knowledge, it is not possible to establish, whether a
situation is still the ground-model or it has undergone a generic extension resulting from
the occurrence of an event; only the subject can interventionally decide this. And it is only
the subject who decides about the belonging of particular elements to the generic set (i.e.
the truth). A procedure of truth or procedure of fidelity [BE, p. 329] supported in this way
gives rise to the subject language. It consists of sentences of set theory, so in this respect
it is a part of knowledge, although the veridicity of the subject language originates from
decisions of the faithful subject. Consequently, a procedure of fidelity forces statements
about the situation as it is after being extended, and modified by the operation of truth.

5 Mathemes of the undecidable and of the evental site

According to Badiou, the undecidable truth is located beyond the boundaries of author-
itative claims of knowledge. At the same time, undecidability indicates that truth has a

7
post-evental character: “the heart of the truth is that the event in which it originates is
undecidable” [BE, p. 221]. Badiou explains that, in terms of forcing, undecidability means
that the conditions belonging to the generic set force sentences that are not consequences of
axioms of set theory. However, one also needs to answer the question about the role played
by axioms in the structure of historical situations. If in the domains of specific languages
(of politics, science, art or love) the effects of event are not visible, the content of “Being
and Event” is an empty exercise in abstraction: even science — perhaps excluding some
entirely formalized areas of theoretical physics — let alone art or love — cannot for obvious
reasons be exhaustively described solely in terms of the relation of belonging. Anyway, it
is doubtful that — to consider just one example — the status of the French revolution is
different from the status of the absolute monarchy preceding it as far as the axioms of set
theory are concerned. In other words, most likely either all historical facts are decidable
or none of them is. Both possibilities lead to a trivial notion of the undecidable.
Judging by numerous examples discussed by Badiou, it seems that he distances himself
form such a narrow interpretation of the function played by axioms. He rather regards
them as collections of basic convictions that organize situations, the conceptual or ideolog-
ical framework of a historical situation. For example, the nature of politics in Rousseaus
writings is formulated in the following way: “The major axiom is that in order to definitely
have the expression of the general will, [there must] be no partial society in the State”
[BE, p. 348]. This approach is also indicated in the only part of “Being and Event” which
considers that issue in general terms: “Let us agree that a proposition is singular (. . . ) if,
within a historically structured mathematical situation, it implies many other significant
propositions, yet it cannot itself be deduced from the axioms which organize the situation.
(. . . ) Say that A is this proposition. (. . . ) An event, named by an intervention, is then,
at the theoretical site indexed by the proposition A, a new apparatus, demonstrative or
axiomatic, such that A is henceforth clearly admissible as a proposition of the situation.”
[BE, p. 246] Accordingly, the undecidability of a truth would consist in transcending the
theoretical framework of a historical situation or even breaking with it in the sense that
the faithful subject accepts beliefs that are impossible to reconcile with the old mode of
thinking.
A clear illustration of the effect of event which in Badious opinion results in breaking
with the determinants of the old paradigm, rather than just in moving beyond them, is the
birth of relativistic physics: “After Einsteins texts of 1905, if I am faithful to their radical
novelty, I cannot continue to practice physics within its classical framework” [Ethics, p.
42]. The novelty of relativistic physics cannot be reduced to a mere substitution of certain
equations with different, more precise ones, because it gives rise to a completely new under-
standing of fundamental physical categories such as space, time, reference point or motion.
For profound reasons classical mechanics rules out — instead of simply not deciding it —
the very possibility of the theory of relativity emerging within its own conceptual frame-
work. Similarly, the French revolution and communism — essential examples of the effect
of event — violently rupture the historical order preceding them. The French revolution

8
overthrew the king and established the sovereignty of the people. And if something can
be said with certainty about any real or imaginary realization of the communist idea, it is
that it definitely abolishes the “capital-parliamentarism”.
However, if one consequently identifies the effect of event with the structure of the
generic extension, they need to conclude that these historical situations are by no means
the effects of event. This is because a crucial property of every generic extension is that
axioms of set theory remain valid within it. It is the very core of the method of forcing,
stated in the Theorem of the Generic Model [Jech, Th. 14.5]. Without this assumption,
Cohens original construction would have no raison detre because it would not establish the
undecidability of the cardinality of infinite power sets. Let us say this once more: every
generic extension satisfies axioms of set theory. In reference to historical situations, it must
be conceded that a procedure of fidelity may modify a situation by forcing undecidable
sentences, nonetheless it never overrules its organizing principles.
From the point of view of the generic theory of truth, some hypothetical type of so-
cial democracy might be considered as the effect of event. It would abolish chaos and
inequalities, resulting from mechanisms of democratically controlled market economy, by
the operation of a new idea transfiguring the nature of these mechanisms from within. As
a religious event, transgressing the Law without literally breaching it, one could proba-
bly point to Messianic Judaism or Protestantism. Another interesting case is a theory of
the Danish astronomer Tycho de Brahe who in the 16th century proposed a solution that
allowed for keeping the empirical advantages of the heliocentric model, while letting the
Earth stay in the center of the Universe. In this conception, all the planets revolve around
the Sun, except for Earth, which is encircled by the Sun. In terms of kinetics, that is, if
the force of gravity — unknown at that time — is disregarded, de Brahes model is entirely
equivalent to the Copernican one.
Another notion which cannot be located within the generic theory of truth without
extreme consequences is evental site. An evental site — an element “on the edge of the
void” [BE, p. 175] — opens up a situation to the possibility of an event [BE, p. 179].
Ontologically, it is defined as “a multiple such that none of its elements are presented in
the situation” [BE, p. 175]. In other words, it is a set such that neither itself nor any of
its subsets are elements of the state of the situation. As the double meaning of this word
indicates, the state (état) in the context of historical situations takes the shape of the State
(État) [BE, p. 104]. A paradigmatic example of a historical evental site is the proletariat
— “entirely dispossessed, and absent from the political stage” [Ethics, p. 69].
The existence of an evental site in a situation is a necessary requirement for an event to
occur. Badiou is very strict about this point: “we shall posit once and for all that there are
no natural events, nor are there neutral events” [BE, p. 178] — and it should be clarified
that situations are divided into natural, neutral, and those that contain an evental site.
The very matheme of event — its formal definition is of no importance here is based on
the evental site [Ethics, p. 179]. The event raises the evental site to the surface, making
it represented on the level of the state of the situation. Moreover, a novelty that has the

9
structure of the generic set but it does not emerge from the void of an evental site, leads
to a simulacrum of truth [Ethics, p. 72], which is one of the figures of Evil [Ethics, p. 87].
An example of utterly destructive effects of a simulacrum of truth is the Nazi revolution
whose source was the “plenitude” of the German people [Ethics, p. 73].
However, if one takes the mathematical framework of Badious concept of event seriously,
it turns out that there is no place for the evental site there — it is forbidden by the
assumption of transitivity of the ground model M. This ingredient plays a fundamental
role in forcing, and its removal would ruin the whole construction of the generic extension.
As it has already been mentioned, transitivity means that if a set belongs to M, all its
elements also belong to M. However, an evental site is a set none of whose elements belongs
to M. Therefore, contrary to Badious intentions, there cannot exist evental sites in the
ground model. Using Badious terminology one can say that forcing may only be the theory
of the simulacrum of truth.

6 The mathemes of the indiscernible and unnameable

“Thought is nothing other than the desire to finish with the exorbitant excess of the state”
[BE, p. 282]. Since Cantors theorem implies that this excess cannot be removed or reduced
to the situation itself, the only way left is to take control of it. A basic, paradigmatic
strategy for achieving this goal is to subject the excess to the power of language. Its
essence has been expressed by Leibniz in the form of the principle of indiscernibles: there
cannot exist two things whose difference cannot be marked by a describable property [BE,
p. 283]. In this manner, language assumes the role of a “law of being” [BE, p. 283],
postulating identity, where it cannot find a difference. Meanwhile — according to Badiou
— the generic truth is indiscernible: there is no property expressible in the language of
set theory that characterizes elements of the generic set. Truth is beyond the power of
knowledge, only the subject can support a procedure of fidelity by deciding what belongs
to a truth. This key thesis is established using purely formal means, so it should be regarded
as one of the peak moments of the mathematical method employed by Badiou. In order
to assess its grounding and possible limitations, one needs to analyze the matheme of the
indiscernible as closely as possible.
To the reader’s surprise, Badiou composes the indiscernible out of as many as three
different mathematical notions. First of all, he decides that it corresponds to the concept
of the inconstructible [BE, p. 355]. Later, however, he writes that “a set δ is discernible
(. . . ) if there exists (. . . ) an explicit formula λ(x) (. . . ) such that ’belong to δ‘ and
’have the property expressed by λ(x)‘ coincide” [BE, p. 367]. Finally, at the outset of the
argument designed to demonstrate the indiscernibility of truth he brings in yet another
definition: “let us suppose the contrary: the discernibility of G. A formula thus exists
λ(x, a1 , . . . , an ) with parameters a1 . . . , an belonging to M[G] such that for an inhabitant
of M[G] it defines the multiple G” [BE, p. 386]. In short, discernibility is understood as:

10
 1. constructibility

2. definability by a formula F (y) with one free variable and no parameters. In this
approach, a set a is definable if there exists a formula F (y) such that b is an element
of a if and only if F (b) holds.

3. definability by a formula F (y, z1 . . . , zn ) with parameters. This time, a set a is defin-

able if there exists a formula F (y, z1, . . . , zn ) and sets a1 , . . . , an such that after sub-
stituting z1 = a1 , . . . , zn = an , an element b belongs to a if and only if F (b, a1 , . . . , an )
holds.

Even though in “Being and Event” Badiou does not explain the reasons for this vari-
ation, it clearly follows from his other writings (such as [Conditions, p. 135]) that he is
convinced that these notions are equivalent. It should be emphasized then that this is not
true: a set may be discernible in one sense, but indiscernible in another. First of all, the
last definition has been included probably by mistake because it is trivial. Every set in
M[G] is discernible in this sense because for every set a the formula F (y, x) defined as y
belongs to x defines a after substituting x = a. Accepting this version of indiscernibility
would lead to the conclusion that truth is always discernible, while Badiou claims that it
is not so. In particular, the proof of the indiscernibility of truth presented by Badiou on
page 386 of “Being and Event”, based on this definition of indiscernibility, is incorrect∗ .
Is it not possible to choose the second option and identify discernibility with definability
by a formula with no parameters? After all, this notion is most similar to the original idea
of Leibniz intuitively, the formula F (y) expresses a property characterizing elements of
the set defined by it. Unfortunately, this solution does not warrant indiscernibility of the
generic set either. There are examples of generic extensions M[G], where the generic set
is definable, or even definable in M[G], by a formula with no parameters (see [Enayat],
and [Fuchs].) Therefore, in this approach truth may be seized by knowledge replacing the
intervening subject.
As a matter of fact, assuming that in ontology, that is, in set theory, discernibility cor-
responds to constructibility, Badiou is right that the generic set is necessarily indiscernible.
However, constructibility is a highly technical notion, and its philosophical interpretation
seems very problematic. Let us take a closer look at it.
The class of constructible sets — usually denoted by the letter L — forms a hierarchy
indexed or numbered by ordinal numbers. Without getting into details of the definition of
the ordinal number — closely related to that of cardinal number — the inductive procedure
of constructing the constructible hierarchy goes as follows. The lowest level L0 is simply
the empty set. Assuming that some level — let us denote it by Lα — has already been
∗
There are several flaws in the proof but the most important one is that Badiou wrongly assumes that
an element defined by a formula with parameters in the ground model must be an element of the ground
model as well. This is not true as the following discussion will show.

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constructed, the next level Lα+1 is constructed by choosing all subsets of L that can be
defined by a formula (possibly with parameters) bounded to the lower level Lα .
Bounding a formula to Lα means that its parameters must belong to Lα and that its
quantifiers are restricted to elements of Lα . For instance, the formula ’there exists z such
that z is in y‘ simply says that y is not empty. After bounding it to Lα this formula takes
the form ’there exists z in Lα such that z is in y‘, so it says that y is not empty, and some
element from Lα witnesses it. Accordingly, the set defined by it consists of precisely those
sets in Lα that contain an element from Lα .
After constructing an infinite sequence of levels (or — strictly speaking — a limit
sequence of levels) the level directly above them all is simply the set of all elements con-
structed so far. For example, the first infinite level Lω consists of all elements constructed
on levels L0 , L1 , L2 , . . ..
As a result of applying this inductive definition, on each level of the hierarchy all the
formulas are used, so that two distinct sets may be defined by the same formula. On
the other hand, only bounded formulas take part in the construction. The definition of
constructibility offers too little (because only bounded formulas are accepted) and too much
at the same time (because many sets can be defined by one formula). This technical notion
resembles the Leibnizian discernibility only in so far as it refers to formulas. In set theory
there are more notions of this type though.
To realize difficulties involved in attempts to philosophically interpret constructibility,
one may consider a slight, purely technical, extension of it. Let us also accept sets that can
be defined by a formula F (y, z1 , . . . , zn ) with constructible parameters, that is, parameters
coming from L. Such a step does not lead further away from the common understanding
of Leibnizs principle than constructibility itself: if parameters coming from lower levels of
the hierarchy are admissible when constructing a new set, why not admit others as well,
especially since this condition has no philosophical justification?
Actually, one can accept parameters coming from an even more restricted class, e.g.,
the class of ordinal numbers. Then we will obtain the notion of definability from ordinal
numbers (OD). This minor modification of the concept of constructibility — a relaxation
of the requirement that the procedure of construction has to be restricted to lower levels
of the hierarchy — results in drastic consequences. Kenneth McAloon ([McAloon]) proved
in 1972 that the generic set as well as all other elements of the generic extension may be
definable from ordinal numbers. Therefore, replacing constructibility with a concept very
similar to it — one essentially identical from the point of view of Badiou’s philosophical
motivations — leads to an ontology allowing for the discernibility of truth.
Another example of such a heterogeneous composition is the matheme of unnameable.
In “Being and Event” this notion functions as a synonym of the indiscernible, however in
Badiou’s later writings — especially “Conditions” and “Ethics” — it becomes a distinct,
autonomous concept. Referring to Lacanian psychoanalysis, Badiou says: “in the field
determined by a situation and the generic becoming of its truth, a real is attested to by
a term, a point, and only one, at which the power of truth is suspended. There is only

12
one term in relation to which no anticipatory hypothesis on the generic subset permits us
to force a judgment, (. . . ) no naming is appropriate for this term. That is why I call it
unnameable” [Conditions, p. 141]. Also, the unnameable understood in the same manner
— as a “point that the truth cannot force” [Ethics, p. 85] — witnesses the “powerlessness
of truth” in Badiou’s ethical thought. A totally powerful truth — its subject language
reaching all the elements of the situation — leads to a “disaster”, which is another figure
of Evil, along with the simulacrum of truth [Ethics, p. 85].
Thus in set theory, the unnameable has a precisely defined form: it is the unique element
of the generic extension such that no condition forces a sentence of the forcing language
referring to this element. Unfortunately, the mathematical content of this definition turns
out to be empty — forcing unequivocally rules out the existence of the unnameable. This
is because one of the basic features of the forcing language is ([Jech, Th. 14. 7 ii) a)]) that
if no condition forces a given sentence S, then every condition forces the negation of S. In
the generic extension, the unnameable does not exist.
Yet Badiou’s position is that mathematics indicates the possibility of the unnameable.
He points to a construction due to Furkhen “in which one term exists, and only one,
which cannot receive a name in the sense that it cannot be identified by a formula in the
language” [Conditions, p. 143]. A familiar substitution can be recognized here. Initially,
the unnameable is defined in terms of the forcing language, however Furkhen’s construction
refers to definability by a formula. It should be emphasized that this object is not even a
model of set theory [Conditions, p. 120]; it requires a richer language, and it does not satisfy
the axioms of set theory. Therefore it cannot serve as a ground model or a generic extension
— forcing has simply no use in this framework. Moreover, the unnameable becomes the
indiscernible again with an additional requirement of uniqueness. Is a truth a real of the
situation then? Such a suggestion never appears in Badiou’s writings. Otherwise, there
always exist at least two indiscernible elements — a truth and a real of the situation — even
though the unnameable is supposed to be unique. In presence of these overwhelming formal
and interpretative difficulties, one should rather conclude that the matheme of unnameable
is an ill-conceived concept.

***

The mathematical form of the undecidable implies that a truth never overrules the
fundamental conceptual framework of a situation from before the occurrence of an event.
This consequence remains in sharp contrast with basic examples of the effect of event
considered by Badiou. An evental site cannot open up a situation to an evental truth
because forcing rules out the very existence of an evental site in ground models. As a result,
the generic set may possibly describe the structure of the simulacrum of truth — using
Badious terminology — but not the structure of truth itself. Two two remaining mathemes
— the indiscernible and the unnameable — are built out of mathematical concepts that do
not fit together; moreover, their properties are not as Badiou claims.

13
 This list of problems can be extended. The “name of the event” is not “prohibited by
being” [BE, p. 184] because the axiom of foundation may be consistently replaced with its
negation — for example, the Aczel antifoundation axiom is consistent with the remaining
axioms of set theory. Finite sets are not necessarily definable, even though Badiou tries to
prove the opposite [Conditions, p. 137], mistakenly identifying finite sets with numerals.
In the so called nonstandard models of set theory the standard omega is finite and non
definable. Generic sets are not coextensive with unconstructible sets [Conditions, p. 135] —
for example, under the Ground Axiom. It seems though that the discussion of the mathemes
of indiscernible, undecidable, unnameable, and evental site is sufficient to defend the main
thesis of this paper. Mathematics — forced to accept compromises going definitely too far
— responds with outcomes which are hostile to fundamental philosophical motivations of
Badious doctrine. Despite some points of convergence, his generic theory of truth and his
philosophy of event can coexist only at a price of selective and instrumental interpretation
of the mathematical component. Therefore one has to conclude that “Being and Event”
provides no grounding for a deep ontological structure behind the realms of science, art,
love and politics, and that the mathematical formulation of the theory of event has no
positive content.

References
[BE] A. Badiou, Being and Event, Continuum 2005.

[Ethics] A.Badiou, Ethics:An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, Verso 2002.

[Conditions] A.Badiou, Conditions, Continuum 2009.

[Enayat] A.Enyat, Models of set theory with definable ordinals, Archive for Math. Logic,
vol. 44, 3 (2005), pp. 363-385.

[Fuchs] G.Fuchs, J.D.Hamkins, Degrees of rigidity for Souslin trees, J. Symb. Logic, vol.
74, 2 (2009), pp. 423–454.

[Jech] T.Jech, Set theory, Springer 2006.

[McAloon] K.McAloon, Consistency results about ordinal defnability, Annals of Math.

Logic, vol. 2 (1971), pp.449-467.

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