G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved,
the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national
existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and
the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where
he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for
services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising
clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley
and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation
of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
(5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They
require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed
the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does
exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney
at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of
the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our
review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

 MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among
others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar"
— I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in
the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We
have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on
the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years
is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of
a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have
the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on
the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less
than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer."
Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p.
15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an
individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice
alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership
and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the
members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most
firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous,
unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or
out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.,
145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626
[1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such
a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers
as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of
the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this
so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a
business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is
one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen
such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in
law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also
know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery
should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal
services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to
have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting,
and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective
for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important
ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these
special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both
by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work.
The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate
law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various
legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation
law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the
nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy
formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the
inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of
acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational
analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a
"model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses
of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of
the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized
attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged
in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute
attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in
securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de

campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons
and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with
the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal
problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation.
His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research,
acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an
ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of
the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming
involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation

(MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the
international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies
and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area
coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys
while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate
Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a
good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we
talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and
the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of
insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities;
and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the
firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy
at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing.
The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in
the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-
making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are
perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations.
( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to
be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct
group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and
temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating
work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external
activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial
mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective
managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations.
(Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the
role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic
problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques
now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels.
(Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties
and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the
general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at
that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm
to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic
and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment.
The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to
make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the
last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good
general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate
activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate
activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to
 be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business
Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a
grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception
in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups,
in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House
of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the
Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members
 of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff
Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as
key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of
the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development
of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law
Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of
a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects
of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p.
321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions
which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract.
A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the
recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for
foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose
kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar
of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of
law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution,
Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is

vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there
are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where
it stated:
 It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements
are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the
Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject
to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination;
(2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon
submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the
permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No.
L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for
three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law
is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the
practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the
1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for
ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of
a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident
from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense,
perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar,
who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without
first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say,
on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an
action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can
the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered
by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The
answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S.
Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot
two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had
happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood
flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 2540               September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 19791 and
passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together
with the successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he
failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.6

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the
entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and
taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated "under the mistaken
belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as
crucial to his status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and
compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten."9

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to
provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September
201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended
that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It
explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid
justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of
a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon
him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to
Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s
omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than
30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very
candidly replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa
‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of
what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath
as necessary.16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law,17 which is
more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine
Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics
of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of
the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at
the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy
Development Corporation.19

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar.  While the practice
1âwphi1

of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who
have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without
having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment."22

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts23 as it
negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact
when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of
Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could
no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he
was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to the
Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the
court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by
fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be
reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that
petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain
from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed
against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law,
the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of
Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law
students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of
law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year
period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that
doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with
severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A.
Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is
likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period,
petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5161, August 25, 2015

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS
A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.

For resolution is the Petition1 filed by respondent Rolando S. Torres (respondent) who seeks
judicial clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Records show that respondent was administratively charged by his sister-in-law, complainant
Isidra Ting-Dumali (complainant), for "presentation of false testimony; participation in, consent to,
and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant's signature in a purported Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from
such forgery."2 The particular charges are: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her
brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved
the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the
following acts or omissions: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury
committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear that
they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well
that the same was false. He presented that document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the
transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to
Antel Holdings[,] Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by, Felicisima
and Miriam.

2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of
complainant's signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995
involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an overseas
contract worker. He even presented the falsified document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to
transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in law Marcelina. The
forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment
was received and misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina.

3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re: Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original Copy.
and Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Cavite, filed by complainant's sisters Marcelina and Felicisima on 24, October 1995,
the respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that
Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and
Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names. With the reconstituted title,
and with the express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot
1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from the sale to the exclusion of their
other siblings. Partial payment was even received pending the reconstitution proceedings.

4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the
purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to release
the full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution would be
released within a month when he knew that it would be impossible because he presented evidence
in the reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even
used the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee. 3

In a Resolution4 dated April 14, 2004, the Court found merit in the complaint and, thus, held
respondent guilty of gross misconduct and of violating the lawyer's oath, as well as Canons 1 and
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, resulting in his disbarment from the practice of
law:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyer's oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal
profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

x x x x5

Aggrieved, respondent filed on May 20, 2004 a Motion for Reconsideration6 of the aforesaid
Resolution, which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution 7 dated June 29, 2004.

Unperturbed, he filed on September 15, 2004 a Motion for Leave to File and Admit Second Motion
for Reconsideration,8 which the Court denied for lack of merit in the Resolution 9 dated November 9,
2004, stating that "[n]o further pleadings will be entertained."

On January 26, 2006, respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment 10 begging that
compassion, mercy, and understanding be bestowed upon him by the Court in that his disbarment
be lifted. The same was, however, expunged from the records in a Resolution 11 dated June 13,
2006.

Still insistent, respondent wrote letters addressed to former Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga 12 and
former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, 13 reiterating his pleas for compassion and mercy.
However, these letters were similarly expunged from the records in a Resolution 14 dated
September 5, 2006, considering the previous directive that no further pleadings will be further
entertained in this case. These were followed by numerous submissions either seeking his
reinstatement to the bar15 or the reduction of his penalty of disbarment to suspension, 16 all of
which were either expunged from the records17 or denied18 by the Court.

More than ten (10) years from his disbarment, or on June 23, 2015, respondent filed the instant
Petition once more seeking judicial clemency from the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of
Attorneys.

The Court's Ruling

"Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted
and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish
their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though
the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court
owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are
opened, it is done so only as a matter of justice." 19
redarclaw

"The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the Iawver
has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. Whether the
applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion
of the Court. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or
she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which
he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement." 20 redarclaw

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Judicial Clemency21 the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests
for judicial clemency, to wit:
LawlibraryofCRAlaw

1. There 'must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not
be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or

legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal
system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public
service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.22 (emphases and underscoring supplied)

Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds that the instant petition is not
meritorious.

While more than ten (10) years had already passed since his disbarment on April 14, 2004,
respondent's present petition has failed to show substantial proof of his reformation as required in
the first guideline above.
The principle which should hold true not only for judges but also for lawyers, being officers of the
court, is that judicial "[c]lemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be
balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. Thus the Court will grant it only
if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and
promise are indispensable."23 redarclaw

In this case, the only ostensible proof of reformation that respondent has presented is a
Certification24 dated June 5, 2015 signed by Reverend Nelson D. Feranil, Administrative Pastor of
the Buenavista Evangelical Church in General Trias, Cavite, which generally states that
respondent, "before and after his disbarment," has been "assisting the poor and indigent litigants
in our community," and that "he has been very active in spreading the [w]ords and gospel of the
Almighty God[,] being an active member of the Couples of Christ FFL." Aside from these bare
statements, no other proof was presented to specify the actual engagements or activities by which
respondent had rendered free legal services to indigents or had ministered to the members of his
community or church, hence, insufficient to demonstrate any form of consistency in his supposed
desire to reform.

The other testimonials which respondent submits, particularly that of Atty. Teofilo Pugeda Jr., who
stated that "[a]s a former law practitioner, [respondent] is humble, simple, and respectful to
fellow lawyers, Court Personnel, and the Presiding Judge," and that "[h]e used to give free legal
advice and assisted indigent litigants in their court cases," 25 and that of Atty. Manuel Medina,
retired City Prosecutor of Cavite, who stated that "[d]uring my years as Prosecutor x x x I always
met him in the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City where I can say in all honesty and candor that
he was an exemplary officer of the court, punctual[,] and always prepared in handling his court
cases,"26 all relate to conduct or attributions prior to respondent's disbarment; hence, these are
incompetent evidence to prove his reformation which connotes consistent improvement
subsequent to his disbarment.

In similar vein, the testimonials attached to his previous Motion for Reconsideration 27 filed on May
20, 2004 which he now incorporates in support of his present petition,28 is equally
insufficient to conclude that he has already reformed. This is because all these testimonials were
executed in May 2004.29 Thus, they can only attest to respondent's conduct or attributions a mere
month removed from his disbarment on April 14, 2004.

More significantly, it should be discerned that the root cause of respondent's disbarment was his
fraudulent acts against his sister-in-law, the complainant herein. However, no proof was presented
to show that he had reconciled or even attempted to reconcile with her so as to show remorse for
his previous faults. The dismissal of the criminal complaint against him for Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Documents, filed by complainant is no proof of remorse since the same was
based on lack of probable cause.30  Likewise, its dismissal,' could not prove that he was actually
innocent of the administrative charges against him, since the parameters and considerations of an
administrative case are evidently different from that in a criminal case.  As in this case, the lack of
probable cause against respondent as found by the prosecutor does not negate his administrative
liability already adjudged by this Court. That the prosecutor found that respondent "merely
rendered legal services to the Ting siblings" 31 does not mean that he rendered the same in
accordance with the lawyer's oath and ethical canons.

To add, no other evidence was presented in his Petition to demonstrate his potential for public
service, or that he - now being 68 years of age 32 - still has productive years ahead of him that can
be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. Thus, the third and fourth guidelines
were neither complied with.
While the Court sympathizes with the predicaments of disbarred lawyers - may it be financial or
reputational in cause - it stands firm in its commitment to the public to preserve the integrity and
esteem of the Bar. As held in a previous case, "in considering [a lawyer's] application for
reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has
established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or
pity."33 Ultimately, with the above discussed guidelines not complied with, the Court has to be
objective and, therefore, denies the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No.7054               November 11, 2014

CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.

For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency  filed by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.
1

(respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member of the Philippine Bar.

Factual Background

In a Decision  dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred the respondent from the practice of law on the
2

following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions and forum-shopping; willful,
intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before the courts; maligning the name of his fellow
lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.

The material portions of the subject Decision provide:

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional misconduct and
thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot, agree,
however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should
we limit ourselves to the originally recommendedpenalty of suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of these
violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly
administration of justice,we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the
respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice
which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his
ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense of
everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court
cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s first ethical infraction of the same nature.
We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and
intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by
reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is
clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility.
It is time to put a finis to the respondent’s professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and
the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December 17,
2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional
misconduct for violations of the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and
12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;and Sections 20(d), 21
and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the
respondent should be DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion  praying that his license to
3

practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court En Bancresolved to deny the
petition for lack of merit.

The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and Mercy  asking the
4

Court to take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him. He maintained that Conrado N. Que (complainant)
failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed grossly immoral conduct meriting the
severe penalty of disbarment. He also attempted to pass the blame on another individual (a certain Gerolin
Piedad, General Manager of Kalayaan Development Corporation) to free himself from liability by claiming that
one of the charges leading to his disbarment was not of his own doing.

In a Resolution  dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the appeal.

5

The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011, reiterating his pleas for the Court’s compassion and
mercy.  He sought the Court’s forgiveness stating that he has learned his lesson; but at the same time,
6

questioning the Court’s finding for lackof factual support. He appended to his appeal proofs of his updated
payment of IBP membership dues,  MCLE compliance,  and a letter from the Bishop of Marinduque.  His appeal,
7 8 9

however, was denied by a Resolution  dated August 2, 2011.

10

On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter  addressed to the Members of the Court En Banc once again
11

reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among others that for more than three years that
he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he has never been involved in any immoral or illegal activities, has
devoted himself in the services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine, CommonwealthAvenue as Eucharistic Minister
leader, has conducted regular monthly lectures on the subject of marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches, and has
participated as monthly financial contributor to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged the Court to no
longer prolong his penalty since it had already served its purpose. The plea was also denied on July 3, 2012. 12

On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement professing repentance and remorse
for what he did.  He pleaded for the Court’s consideration, and vowed that he will no longer misuse the rules of
13

procedure but instead, devote his time and energy for its proper observance and implementation. He also stated
that for almost three years of being disbarred from the practice of law, he has never been involved in any
unlawful, dishonest, and immoral activities. He promised to maintain at all times a high degree of legal
proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal profession in accordance with
the values and morals embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In a Resolution  dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his petition for lack of merit. Aggrieved, the respondent
14

filed on March 27, 2013 a letter  pleading the Court to revisit his previousrequests for reinstatement.
15

Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the resolutions dated August 2, 2011, July3, 2012, and
October 9, 2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013 deniedthe motion with finality.  On July 18, 2014, the respondent
16

filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency  reiterating his apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty
17

of disbarment has already taken its toll on his health; he has now become most frail and weak; and he had been
diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed
that in the years that he had been excluded from the practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian and charity
pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter
Church, Quezon City.
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but to be made whole, to
recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. Heexpressed his sincere repentance and deep
remorse by taking full responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be lifted and that he
be reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition, he submitted a Medical
Abstract  evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a certification  from St. Peter Parish,
18 19

Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family are dedicated parishioners.

The Court's Ruling

We deny the present appeal.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.  It is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right
20

granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness inintellectual attainment and in moral character.  The same reasoning applies to
21

reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should
see to it that only those who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to
the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the
Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened,it
is done so only as a matter of justice.
22

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently
rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.  Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of
23

Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court.  The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove
24

by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take
into consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that
has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. 25

In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent had demonstrated an active
involvement and participation in community and church activities by joining Youth For Christ, Catechism, and
Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to the Bar, the respondent worked as Municipal Attorney in
Sta. Cruz, Marinduque rendering free legal assistance to his townmates who were inneed of legal service.
Thereafter, the respondentwas appointed as a Municipal Administrator and had continued extending assistance
to the indigent residents.

The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community projects, through the Marinduque
Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980 to 1981, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Marinduque
Chapter, where he served as a member, Director, and President from 1982 to 1987.

In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his indiscretions and claimed to have
taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the
respondent no longerquestioned the Court’s decision. According to him, he has long expressed deep remorse
and genuine repentance.

The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to reflect on his
professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to realize the gravity of his mistakes. After his
disbarment, the respondent continued lending assistance, and deviated his time and effort in pursuing civic and
religious work that significantly contributed to his character reformation.He professed that during his almost five
(5) years of disbarment, he has been an active member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage Encounter, and
Knights of Columbus; and through his affiliations with these groups, he had served in the ecclesial affairs in his
parish as an Extraordinary Minister for Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage Pre-Cana
and Marriage Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St. Peter in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown by his conduct
prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved moral reformation.

In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,  the Court, in deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia,
26

considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time hewas disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to
acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejiais already of
advanced years, has long repented, and suffered enough. The Court also notedthat he had made a significant
contribution by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing his religious and social writings; and the religious
organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the Court
considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions since he was disbarred.

Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,  the Court granted the reinstatement of the disbarred lawyer
27

(found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and considered the period of three (3) years
as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove that he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court took
into consideration the disbarred lawyer’s sincere admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion.

Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,  the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a
28

notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document in court) after considering the long period of
his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniw’s disbarment, he has been
persistent in reiterating his apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian and civic services, and retained
an unblemished record as an elected public servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous civic and
professional organizations, government institutions, and members of the judiciary.

In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after his disbarment,
the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for reinstatement, and more importantly, the
disbarred attorneys’ sincere realization and acknowledgement of guilt.

In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient to enable
the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.

We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent was accused and was found guilty of gross
misconduct.  The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,Jr.,  was
1âwphi1
29

likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing willful and intentional falsehood before the court;
misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers
in the illegal practice of law – mostly the same grounds on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd
disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and reduced
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two (2) years to six (6) months out of compassion to the
respondent.

Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty imposed as an
act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review by the Court, we are not fully and
convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not
considerably long considering the nature and perversityof the respondent’s misdeeds. We believe that it is still
early for the Court to consider the respondent’s reinstatement.

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt.  While he expressly
1âwphi1

stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the
blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his
assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus entertain
serious doubts that the respondent had completely reformed.

As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical condition, we stress that
in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine
whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity.
Surely at this point, this requirement was not met. Until such time when the respondent can demonstrate to the
Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our
decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Adm. Case No. 6148               January 22, 2013

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.
RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.

For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo (respondent)
who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Records show that in the Decision1 dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of
law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one
Josephine Constantino while his first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross
immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the subject Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory evidence to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline and to this Court that he is supporting or has made provisions for the regular
support of his two children by complainant.

Let respondent’s name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.2

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and Mercy3 which the Court
denied with finality in the Resolution4 dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed
the instant Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy)5 seeking

judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially treated the present suit as a
second motion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for lack of merit in the Resolution dated September
4, 2012.6 On December 18, 2012, the same petition was endorsed to this Court by the Office of the Vice
President7 for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the substantive merits of the case.

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for
Clemency,8 the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges
or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him
that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.9 (Citations omitted)

Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for admission to the
bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.10

Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant petition meritorious.

Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession and in
his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial
relationship with them as shown by the herein attached pictures.11 Records also show that after his disbarment,
respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking
care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008.12 In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of
Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-
Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he continues to serve to date.13 Moreover, he is a part-time
instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-
2012.14 Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who
are in dire need.

The following documents attest to respondent’s reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida P. Mabborang;15 (2)
Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez;16 (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud;17 (4) Certification from the Municipal Local
Government Office;18 (5) Certification by the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare
Development Officer;19 (6) Certification from the Election Officer of Enrile, Cagayan;20 (7) Affidavit of Police Senior
Inspector Jacinto T. Tuddao;21 (8) Certifications from nine (9) Barangay Chairpersons;22 (9) Certification from the
Office of the Provincial Assessor;23 (10) Certification from the Office of the Manager, Magsaka ca Multi-Purpose
Cooperative;24 and (11) Certification of the Office of the Federation of Senior Citizens, Enrile Chapter.25 The Office
of the Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent has no monetary accountabilities in relation to his
office26 while the Office of the Human Resource Management Officer attested that he has no pending
administrative case.27 He is not known to be involved in any irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) attested that he has no record on file as of May 31, 2011.28

Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Cagayan Chapter29 and by his former and present colleagues.30 His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr.,
certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church.31 He is also
observed to be a regular churchgoer.32 Records further reveal that respondent has already settled his previous
marital squabbles,33 as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends
regular support34 to his children in compliance with the Court’s directive in the Decision dated February 27, 2004.

The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and
recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School,35 and his fourteen (14)
years of dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft
Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice.36 From the attestations and certifications
presented, the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 5837 years of age, he
still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession
and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant
officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways,38 as in this case.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of law.  He is, however, reminded that such
1âwphi1

privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence. to the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness,
and strict compliance with the rules and the law are continuing requirements.39

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is
hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5118 September 9, 1999 (A.C. CBD No. 97-485)

MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.

For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of his oath as lawyer, respondent Atty.
Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment.

The facts of this administrative case, as found by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), 1 in its Report, are as follows:

Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992, she was referred to
the respondent who promised to process all necessary documents required for complainant's trip
to the USA for a fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).

On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the required fee in the amount
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which was received by Ester Calis, wife of the
respondent for which a receipt was issued.

From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several conferences with the
respondent regarding the processing of her travel documents. To facilitate the processing,
respondent demanded an additional amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and
prevailed upon complainant to resign from her job as stenographer with the Commission on
Human Rights.

On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents complainant issued
Planters Development Bank Check No. 12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos
(P65,000.00) in favor of Atty. D. Calis who issued a receipt. After receipt of said amount,
respondent furnished the complainant copies of Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa
Application (Of. 156) and a list of questions which would be asked during interviews.

When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that she will be
assuming the name Lizette P. Ferrer married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of
Matiao Marketing, Inc. The complainant was furnished documents to support her assumed
identity.
1âwphi1.nêt

Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the complainant demanded the
return of her money, however she was assured by respondent that there was nothing to worry
about for he has been engaged in the business for quite sometime; with the promise that her
money will be refunded if something goes wrong.

Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the required fee which was
paid by complainant, but the corresponding receipt was not given to her.

When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the complainant that it will be
given to her on her departure which was scheduled on September 6, 1994. On said date
 complainant was given her passport and visa issued in the name of Lizette P. Ferrer.
Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo and a certain Maribel who were also recruits of the
respondent.

Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer Belo and
Maribel were apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for carrying spurious travel
documents; Complainant contacted the respondent through overseas telephone call and informed
him of by her predicament. From September 6 to 9, 1994, complainant was detained at Changi
Prisons in Singapore.

On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the Philippines and respondent
fetched her from the airport and brought her to his residence at 872-A Tres Marias Street,
Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent took complainant's passport with a promise that he will secure
new travel documents for complainant. Since complainant opted not to pursue with her travel, she
demanded for the return of her money in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00).

On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial refunds of P15,000.00;
P6,000.00; and P5,000.00.

On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand letter to respondent for
the refund of a remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00)
which was ignored by the respondent.

Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent, however his wife informed
her that the respondent was in Cebu attending to business matters.

In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however she found out that the
respondent had transferred to an unknown residence apparently with intentions to evade
responsibility.

Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts for the amount paid by complainant,
applications for U.S.A. Visa, questions and answers asked during interviews; receipts
acknowledging partial refunds of fees paid by the complainant together with demand letter for the
remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00); which was
received by the respondent. 2

Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an answer to or comment on the complaint, there was no
response. Respondent likewise failed to attend the scheduled hearings of the case. No appearance whatsoever was
made by the respondent. 3 As a result of the inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of the respondent to comply
with the orders of the Commission, the investigation against him proceeded ex parte.

On September 24, 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report on the case, finding that:

It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged for the purpose of securing a visa for
a U.S.A. travel of complainant. There was no mention of job placement or employment abroad,
hence it is not correct to say that the respondent engaged in illegal recruitment.

The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A. visa for the complainant under an
assumed name was accepted by the complainant which negates deceit on the part of the
respondent. Noted likewise is the partial refunds made by the respondent of the fees paid by the
complainant. However, the transfer of residence without a forwarding address indicates his
attempt to escape responsibility.
 In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for violating
Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS be SUSPENDED

as a member of the bar until he fully refunds the fees paid to him by complainant and comply with
the order of the Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6, of the Rules of
Court. 4

Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this administrative case was elevated to the IBP Board of
Governors for review. The Board in a Resolution 5 dated December 4, 1998 resolved to adopt and approve with
amendment the recommendation of the Commission. The Resolution of the Board states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that Respondent
Atty. Dorotheo Calis be DISBARRED for having been found guilty of Gross Misconduct for
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

We are now called upon to evaluate, for final action, the IBP recommendation contained in its Resolution dated
December 4, 1998, with its supporting report.

After examination and careful consideration of the records in this case, we find the Resolution passed by the
Board of Governors of the IBP in order. We agree with the finding of the Commission that the charge of illegal
recruitment was not established because complainant failed to substantiate her allegation on the matter. In fact
she did not mention any particular job or employment promised to her by the respondent. The only service of the
respondent mentioned by the complainant was that of securing a visa for the United States.

We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution, that herein respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon I, Rule 101 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could give
her visa and travel documents; that despite spurious documents nothing untoward would happen; that he
guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in case
something went wrong. All for material gain.

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer's relationship with others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is
not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. 6 The nature of
the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. 7 This requisite is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law. 8 We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private
capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. 9

It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of complainant when he made her
travel with spurious documents. How often have victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal recruiters been
imprisoned in foreign lands because they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent totally disregarded the
personal safety of the complainant when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are respondent's acts
illegal, they are also detestable from the moral point of view. His utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat
to the Bar and the administration of justice.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 10 We must stress that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during
good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court
after giving him the opportunity to be heard. 11

Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the orders of the IBP and his total
disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct. Thus, we find
no hesitation in removing respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical, unscrupulous and
unconscionable conduct toward complainant.

Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the recovery of the P114,000.00 she paid the respondent is in
order. 12 Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return the complainant's money upon demand, but he stubbornly
persisted in holding on to it, unmindful of the hardship and humiliation suffered by the complainant.

WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be FURNISHED to the IBP and the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
personal records of respondent. Respondent is likewise ordered to pay to the complainant immediately the
amount of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand (P114,000.00) Pesos representing the amount he collected from
her.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

March 23, 1929

In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,

The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits
that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in
translation, reads as follows:

LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela

(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as
required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your
application and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a
lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or
against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and
is willing to help and serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home
municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into
office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction
into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the
province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any time here
in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.

I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in
Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the
 following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite
my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer
and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you
can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding
preparations of documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary
public even on Sundays.

I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief
that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified
to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make
it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here
in Echague.

I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your
meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with
you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet
contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with the registration of their land titles, I
would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for every
registration.

Yours respectfully,

(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA

Attorney
Notary Public.

The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code
of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation
of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof
the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."

The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics
provide:

27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome
of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter
of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation
of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or interview not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection
through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure the
drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be
influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance
of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high
calling, and are intolerable.

28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a lawyer

to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make
it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common
law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to
 the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or
those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or
runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the
bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians,
hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in
influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services.
A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of
such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender
may be disbarred.

Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the
common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes
intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar
itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover.
The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through
others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)

It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is
destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in
incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly
understood.

Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of
having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court
is to fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the
representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only
reprimanded. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this
character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would
amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the
respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth
and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period
of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this
result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this
particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind
will not be dealt with by disbarment.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be
and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,

[A.C. No. 1261. December 29, 1983.]

TAN TEK BENG, Complainant, v. TIMOTEO A. DAVID, Respondent.

1. LEGAL ETHICS; MEMBER OF THE BAR; SOLICITING CASES AT LAW FOR THE PURPOSE OF
GAIN; CONSTITUTES MALPRACTICE. — Where in the agreement lawyer David not only agreed to
give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound
himself not to deal directly with the clients, the Court held that the said agreement is void because
it was tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers" (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer.
Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828,
amending Sec. 21 of Act No. 190). That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that
the practice of law is a profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain
employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097
cited in In re Tagorda, 33 Phil. 37, 42).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; CAUSE FOR CENSURE. — The commercialization of
law practice is condemned in certain canons of professional ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association. "Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code
of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743). We
censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement. We
discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal
ethics) but because David should have known better.

DECISION

The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer Timoteo A.
David (admitted to the bar in 1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer (alleged missionary
of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-half of the attorney’s fees received by David from the clients
supplied by Tan Tek Beng. Their agreement reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"December 3, 1970

"Mr. Tan Tek Beng

"Manila

"Dear Mr. Tan: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In compliance with your request, I am now putting into writing our agreement which must be
followed in connection with the accounts that you will entrust to me for collection. Our terms and
conditions shall be as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. On all commission or attorney’s fees that we shall receive from our clients by virtue of the
collection that we shall be able to effect on their accounts, we shall divide fifty-fifty. Likewise you
are entitled to commission, 50/50 from domestic, inheritance and commercial from our said clients
or in any criminal cases where they are involved.

"2. I shall not deal directly with our clients without your consent.

"3. You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as advances for expenses for the cases
referred to us by our clients and careful in safeguarding our interest.

"4. It is understood that legal expenses that we shall recover from the debtors shall be turned over
to our clients. Other clients who directly or indirectly have been approached or related (sic) to you
as a result of your labor are your clients.

"I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father, that I will be sincere, honest and fair
with you in connection with our transactions with our clients. Likewise you must be sincere, honest
and fair with me.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Illegible

TIMOTEO A. DAVID

"P.S.

I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our clients.

(Sgd.) Initial

"CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate my sincerity to Atty. David as stated in the
last paragraph of this letter.

(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng

MR. TAN TEK BENG"

The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated August 5, 1969. Note that in said
agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an
intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients.

The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. There were mutual
accusations of doublecross. For allegedly not living up to the agreement, Tan Tek Beng in 1973
denounced David to Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office of Civil Relations at
Camp Crame and to this Court. He did not file any civil action to enforce the agreement.

In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was composed of himself as manager,
Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and financier. When
Jacinto became ill and the costs of office maintenance mounted, David suggested that Tan Tek
Beng should also invest some money or shoulder a part of the business expenses but Tan Tek
Beng refused. chanrobles.com : virtual law library

This case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Hearings were scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It was proposed that respondent should submit a
stipulation of facts but that did not materialize because the scheduled hearings were not held due
to the nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and his counsel.

On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the Philippine Union Colleges Compound, Baesa,
Caloocan City but it was only in the manifestation of his counsel dated August 10, 1981 that the
Solicitor General’s Office was informed of that fact. A report on this case dated March 21, 1983
was submitted by the Solicitor General to this Court.

We hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers" Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or
dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the
term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending sec. 21 of Act No. 190).

That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession,
not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for
to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42;
Malcolm, J., Jayme v. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce v. Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 569). The
commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons of professional ethics adopted by
the American Bar Association: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"34. Division of Fees. — No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer,
based upon a division of service or responsibility." cralaw virtua1aw library

"35. Intermediaries. — The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited
by any law agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer’s
responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the
performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer’s relation to his client
should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

"38. Compensation, Commissions and Rebates. — A lawyer should accept no compensation,

commissions, rebates or other advantages from others without the knowledge and consent of his
client after full disclosure." (Appendix, Malcolm, Legal Ethics).

We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement.
We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know
legal ethics) but because David should have known better. chanrobles law library

"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his
profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743).

WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice. A copy of this decision
should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant’s office.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. L-1117             March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant, vs. ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in
the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired,
and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything
confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and
mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to
the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was
published only once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and
his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them
to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-
changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of one
month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case,
however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more
elaborate and insistent.

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so
decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or
of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities
from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.  Tel. 1

521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming
that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,  reportedly decided by the
2

United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the (1)
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association
(PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP),
and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the
controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda.   The said bar associations readily responded and extended their
3

valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can
properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to
present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations
and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate
that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document
search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly
opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's
legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed. 4
 xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation
is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present
case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is
being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature
of the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers,
whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only
meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family
Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and

woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed
is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with
our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or
serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit.
At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex
"A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on
its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social
institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity
and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated
in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above
impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can
be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction
of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering,
storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like
services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time
and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the
Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the
great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be
doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice
of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may be
encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but
only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in
general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be
undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited

outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to
include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain
course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of
action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the

Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform
legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-
laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Rules of Court. 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal
support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.,"
and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which
thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial
advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law
belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation,
rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney
and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed.,
p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this
is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public
and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so
when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit.
Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of
the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of
the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers
who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who
wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal
right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice.6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment).
But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations
Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence
and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the
Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities
call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the
practice of law."
7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to
the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or
entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of
a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations.
Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify
these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time
to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do
not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures
to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general
public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case
that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who
advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services.  8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the

impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are
in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's
name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as
claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are
lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is
illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized
to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not
necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as
are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit
the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become
justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and
divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where
in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It
is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able
to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an
attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify
permanent elimination from the Bar.  10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy
firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by
Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service

unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to
suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of
law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most
men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our
knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only
when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws
touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect,
who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony with
the law. This is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is
required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board.
Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is
charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate
and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer
to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an
architect who performed this function would probably be considered to be
trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always
at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important
body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the
labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers,
it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge
and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that the larger
employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for

which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court
should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established
method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men
who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the
technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their
business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for
any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being
engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client
along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law.
But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are
along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within
which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits
the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice
of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees'
wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the

adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator.
This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations
and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and
the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the
business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by
brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed
right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then
it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I
need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by
the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies

of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor
Relations Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an
authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties
 before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the
agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the
right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky,
Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may
involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the
problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of
law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may
not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys
materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses
of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's
paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal
text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere
fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular
reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged
that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to
how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But
that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold
to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular
 individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary
to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer
general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person.
Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular
situation — in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did
not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment
under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction
against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed
material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the
memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an
interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against
his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does
fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit,
the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal
remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law,
particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed.
(State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It
is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such
would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a
factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate
the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be
secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is
not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of law"
has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles
and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill. 
12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman,
and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life,
liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law.  14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law.   One
15

who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and
asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law.   Giving advice for compensation regarding
16

the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law.   One
17

who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent,
practicing law. 
18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod,   after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to
19

determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken ,
129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in
the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo.
852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
 determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p.
262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject
to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation
to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It
is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed
by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all
times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar
associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of
computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission
and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal research;
encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers;
document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational
or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances, passports, local
or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like
foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the
foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in court; designing
and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law
offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services.  20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and
stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to
explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as
may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract
drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into
the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care
of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we
operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These
The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale
or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or
the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa
hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a
rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the
right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal
with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would
need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case.  21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is important is
that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it
within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and
are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish
that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a
client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings.
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law.  22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 
23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice
law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for his
thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for,
and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide.   The practice of law is
25

not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute
and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously
acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their
clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law.   The justification for excluding
26

from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition,
but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States of
paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its
merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and
not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines.   As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
28

guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by
the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs
(1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals
in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal
Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association.  29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are
limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor.  30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of
justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice
of law.   That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
31

remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state.  32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts.   He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
33

misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.   Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or
34

in return for, publicity to attract legal business.   Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility,
35
the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to
be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of
their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods.   The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business
37

rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot   an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which
38

are involved in the present proceeding,   was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
39

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of
Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is
highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares.
Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A
good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees
the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.  40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken.
The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions.  41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading
and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the
bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations
and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable
law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented."  42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that
reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the
dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being
taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services
rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-
mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona,   which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
45

justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the
present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a
proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by
such authority in that state."   This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked
46

by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception.
Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on the
attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped
significantly   with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
47

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by
media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative,
even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances   or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.   Considering that
48 49

Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc.
is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into
an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which
is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot
be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against
unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action,   after due ascertainment of the factual
50

background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That
spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or
similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E.
EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO,
NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G.
Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized
in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie,
which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay
Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested
that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using
the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional
partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world.
Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero &
Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a
representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to
multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents'
memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E.
Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)

WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A.
VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING
THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S.
ROCO, respondents.

G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996

PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner, vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's judicial system, upon which the workings of the
contentious and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are based — the sanctity of fiduciary duty in
the client-lawyer relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the law profession
a unique position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this instance, we have
no recourse but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds
from the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the
Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033),
entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." 1

Among the dependants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V.
Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini,
and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm
performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the organization and acquisition of
business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted
as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these services, the
members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e.,
stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of
trust or assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law
firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As
members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the
organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with the office
practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration
proceedings. 2

On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter referred to as
respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" which
excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party-
defendant.  Respondent PCGG based its exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-defendant on his
3

undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in PCGG Case No. 33. 4

Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint on the strength of the following allegations:

14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro
Regala, Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul
Roco of the Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised,
schemed conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the
 coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty other
coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares and
its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious
means and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investments
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3%
of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA
Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB which has
approximately 1,400,000 shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books show the name
Edgardo J. Angara as holding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984. 5

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:

4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the acts with which their codefendants are
charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.

4.4.1 In the course of rendering professional and legal services to clients,

defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A.
Vinluan and Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of stock in the
corporations listed under their respective names in Annex "A" of the expanded
Amended Complaint as incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such,
they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock.

4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid
Marketing Corporation, which was organized for legitimate business purposes not related to the
allegations of the expanded Amended Complaint. However, he has long ago transferred any
material interest therein and therefore denies that the "shares" appearing in his name in Annex
"A" of the expanded Amended Complaint are his assets. 6

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the
allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth. 7

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991
with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-
defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.  The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners from the
8

complaint was duly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.

In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners,
namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-
client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its client
covering their respective
shareholdings. 9

Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by private respondent
Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to
wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous
request for reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by
private respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and
Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private respondent Roco
originally requesting the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its
Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33.  10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private respondent Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that
he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to
reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.  11

On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the
exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by
respondent PCGG. It held:

xxx xxx xxx

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom
they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their
clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists
cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein.

5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated his agency and that Roco has
apparently identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack of cause against him. This
in turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under
Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's ruling in Republic
v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).

The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers the same conditions availed of by
Roco; full disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's
COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have preferred not to make the
disclosures required by the PCGG.

The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as party
defendants. In the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same treatment
accorded to Roco.

Neither can this Court.

WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined
in by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco
is DENIED for lack of merit.  12

ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but the same was denied by the respondent
Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 105938,
invoking the following grounds:

The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA
lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict
application of the law of agency.

II
 The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering petitioners
ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.

1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken
to reveal, the identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.

2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a substantial
distinction as would make the classification reasonable under the equal protection
clause.

3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and undue preference in

favor of Mr. Roco in violation of the equal protection clause.

III

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the
facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing
the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG.

1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege includes the
identity of the client(s).

2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to the identity of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other privileged
matters.

IV

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not requiring that the
dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on reasonable and just grounds and
with due consideration to the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal
protection of the law.

Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution
which was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same grounds averred by
petitioners in G.R. No. 105938.

Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a
favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge the identity of his client, giving him an
advantage over them who are in the same footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further argue
that even granting that such an undertaking has been assumed by private respondent Roco, they are prohibited
from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at
all times the confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client relationship.

Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity
of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required
(deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee status.  13

In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as party-
defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case
No. 0033 as to Roco 'without an order of court by filing a notice of dismissal',"   and he has undertaken to identify
14

his principal. 
15

Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.

It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the
identity of their clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the "bigger fish" as they say in street
parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness to cut a deal with petitioners — the names of their
clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its questioned
resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client for whom
they have acted, i.e, their principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do identify their
clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists
cannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleaded by the PCGG as
defendants herein. (Emphasis ours)

In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled "Primavera Farms,
Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government" respondent PCGG, through counsel Mario
Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to establish through the
ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished
all the monies to those subscription payments in corporations included in Annex "A" of the Third Amended
Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in the name of
particular persons; some in blank.

We quote Atty. Ongkiko:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to establish through these ACCRA lawyers that,
one, their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to these subscription payments of these corporations who are now the
petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a
particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank deeds are important to our claim that some of
the shares are actually being held by the nominees for the late President Marcos. Fourth, they
also executed deeds of assignment and some of these assignments have also blank assignees.
Again, this is important to our claim that some of the shares are for Mr. Conjuangco and some are
for Mr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of thes e corporations are really just paper corporations. Why do
we say that? One: There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed sets of directors at the time of
incorporation and even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not only that, they have no
permits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their addresses now are care of
Villareal Law Office. They really have no address on records. These are some of the principal
things that we would ask of these nominees stockholders, as they called themselves.  16

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners
are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as
lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as
leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such
being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them
from the Third Amended Complaint.

II

The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without
reference to the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be
compensated by honorarium or for hire,   and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance
17

could be placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who
requested him.   But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
18

In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or servant,
because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client.   A lawyer is also as
19

independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior to those of an
ordinary agent.  Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since
20

he is in fact an officer of the Court   and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken
21

favorable to his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into
it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character,
requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith,   that is required by reason of necessity and public
22

interest   based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is
23

fatal to the administration of justice.  24

It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client that distinguishes him from any other
professional in society. This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of established and
stable tradition.   In Stockton v. Ford,  the U. S. Supreme Court held:
25 26

There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust and confidence than that of
attorney and client, or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few
more anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice;
and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and
industrious, to see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of
the rights of the party bestowing it.  27

In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine
Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids counsel, without authority of his
client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of
professional employment."   Passed on into various provisions of the Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege,
28

as currently worded provides:

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made
by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity.  29

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

 Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with
his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that:

Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.

Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:

The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be
taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor
or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law
of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is
steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not
without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand
of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own
conscience and not that of his client.

Considerations favoring confidentially in lawyer-client relationships are many and serve several constitutional and
policy concerns. In the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights
available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made to choose between legal representation
without effective communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets revealed then he
might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right to
counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information
would be curtailed thereby rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this represents against another
sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is at once self-evident.

Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal services opens the door to a whole spectrum of legal
options which would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information engendered by a fear of disclosure. An
effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between
lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of
information. It necessarily follows that in order to attain effective representation, the lawyer must invoke the
privilege not as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.

The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners'
client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be
in the affirmative.

As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery   Under this premise, the
30

general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client. 
31

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.

First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh
and blood.

Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary.
"A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is."   He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark
32

against unknown forces.  33

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions.

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.

In Ex-Parte Enzor,   a state supreme court reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of
34

her client on the ground that the subject matter of the relationship was so closely related to the issue of the
client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official,
informed his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to violate election laws or that he had
accepted a bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had advised her client to count the
votes correctly, but averred that she could not remember whether her client had been, in fact, bribed. The lawyer
was cited for contempt for her refusal to reveal his client's identity before a grand jury. Reversing the lower court's
contempt orders, the state supreme court held that under the circumstances of the case, and under the
exceptions described above, even the name of the client was privileged.

U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig,  involved the same exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in those instances
35

where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very
criminal activity for which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.

The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings inquiring into the activities of the "Sandino Gang," a
gang involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United States. The respondents, law partners, represented
key witnesses and suspects including the leader of the gang, Joe Sandino.

In connection with a tax investigation in November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and Zweig,
requiring them to produce documents and information regarding payment received by Sandino on behalf of any
other person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals, upholding non-disclosure under the facts and circumstances of the case, held:

A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where the
person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such
information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was
sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680. While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of
California law, the rule also reflects federal law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception
applies to this case.

The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the principal policy behind the attorney-client
privilege. "In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, the
apprehension of compelled disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed; hence, the law
must prohibit such disclosure except on the client's consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at
545. In furtherance of this policy, the client's identity and the nature of his fee arrangements are,
in exceptional cases, protected as confidential communications.  36

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his identity is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts
and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation,  prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a
37

lawyer's claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter to
civil litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by respondent
corporation, collided with a second taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action both against
defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identified in the information only as John Doe. It turned
out that when the attorney of defendant corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was somehow
revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of the owner of the second cab when a man, a client of the
insurance company, prior to the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that he was involved in a car
accident. It was apparent under the circumstances that the man was the owner of the second cab. The state
supreme court held that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professional capacity. The court said:

That his employment came about through the fact that the insurance company had hired him to
defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The attorney is such cases is clearly the attorney for
the policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to report an occurrence contemplating that it
would be used in an action or claim against him.  38

xxx xxx xxx

All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the purpose of professional advice or
assistance, are privileged, whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to any other
matter proper for such advice or aid; . . . And whenever the communication made, relates to a
matter so connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to afford presumption that it
was the ground of the address by the client, then it is privileged from disclosure. . .

It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of the second cab came to the attorney in
this case as a confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use the courts, and his
address cannot be disclosed on that theory, nor is the present action pending against him as
service of the summons on him has not been effected. The objections on which the court
reserved decision are sustained.  39

In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,  the lawyer involved was required by a lower court to
40

disclose whether he represented certain clients in a certain transaction. The purpose of the court's request was to
determine whether the unnamed persons as interested parties were connected with the purchase of properties
involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the
lawyer's refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held:

If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealed from, that he represented
certain persons in the purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in establishing by
such evidence their version of the litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by the witness
would compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney for certain people, but that, as the
result of communications made to him in the course of such employment as such attorney, he
knew that they were interested in certain transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no
case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to
disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such
information could be made the basis of a suit against his client. 
41

3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.

In Baird vs. Korner,  a lawyer was consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers
42

regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal charges
were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect and the taxes understated. The
clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they violated tax laws and sought advice from Baird on the
hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was then being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers.
Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of $12, 706.85, which had been
previously assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money representing his fee for the advice given.
Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining the payment, but
without naming his clients. The IRS demanded that Baird identify the lawyers, accountants, and other clients
involved. Baird refused on the ground that he did not know their names, and declined to name the attorney and
accountants because this constituted privileged communication. A petition was filed for the enforcement of the
IRS summons. For Baird's repeated refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed him
to pay sums of money to the government voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and
with no government audit or investigation into that client's income tax liability pending. The court emphasized the
exception that a client's name is privileged when so much has been revealed concerning the legal services
rendered that the disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to possible investigation and sanction by
government agencies. The Court held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the general rule. Here
money was received by the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they had not paid
a sufficient amount in income taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of the clients
are useful to the government for but one purpose — to ascertain which taxpayers think they were
delinquent, so that it may check the records for that one year or several years. The voluntary
nature of the payment indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes or interest or penalties
are due than the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes,
though whether it is criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime. Certainly the payment
and the feeling of guilt are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed — to advise his
clients what, under the circumstances, should be done.  43

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the general
rule.

For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the
subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance.   Moreover, where the nature of
44

the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be
confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result
in disclosure of the entire transaction. 45

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the
privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal
client confidences. 46

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the
instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client's name
would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case, which is privileged
information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without which
there would be not attorney-client relationship).

The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly establishes in
the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the
PCGG which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

 (c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients
covering their respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the
petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of
the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others, the
aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings.

There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel of petitioners' legal
service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers. Petitioners,
therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which
legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned
corporations.

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the
necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words of
Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . . crime." 
47

An important distinction must be made between a case where a client takes on the services of an attorney for
illicit purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose of committing illegal activities and
a case where a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults his attorney
about it. The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same cannot be invoked for purposes
illegal. The second case falls within the exception because whether or not the act for which the client sought
advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in
the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.

These cases may be readily distinguished, because the privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for an
illegal act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not have a case against the client in the second
example and cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case against the latter. The reason for the
first rule is that it is not within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice on the commission of a
crime.   The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed and are founded on the same
48

policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.

In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court therein stated that "under such conditions no case
has ever yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only
his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when such information could be made the basis
of a suit against his client."   "Communications made to an attorney in the course of any personal employment,
49

relating to the subject thereof, and which may be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of the relation in
which the parties stand to each other, are under the seal of confidence and entitled to protection as privileged
communications."  Where the communicated information, which clearly falls within the privilege, would suggest
50

possible criminal activity but there would be not much in the information known to the prosecution which would
sustain a charge except that revealing the name of the client would open up other privileged information which
would substantiate the prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so inextricably linked to the subject
matter itself that it falls within the protection. The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant
with the principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of
legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from attorneys must be eliminated. This
exception has likewise been sustained in In re Grand Jury Proceedings  and Tillotson v. Boughner.  What these
51 52

cases unanimously seek to avoid is the exploitation of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing
expedition by the prosecution.

There are, after all, alternative source of information available to the prosecutor which do not depend on utilizing
a defendant's counsel as a convenient and readily available source of information in the building of a case
against the latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name in circumstances such as the one which exists in the
case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and
will not countenance. When the nature of the transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an attorney's
retainer, such retainer is obviously protected by the privilege.   It follows that petitioner attorneys in the instant
53

case owe their client(s) a duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity which in turn requires them to
invoke the privilege.

In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has a case
against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their
own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients, information
which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may not be illegal. The logical
nexus between name and nature of transaction is so intimate in this case the it would be difficult to simply
dissociate one from the other. In this sense, the name is as much "communication" as information revealed
directly about the transaction in question itself, a communication which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A
lawyer cannot reveal such communication without exposing himself to charges of violating a principle which
forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client relationship.

The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for negligence
on the former. The ethical duties owing to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty, competence, diligence as
well as the responsibility to keep clients informed and protect their rights to make decisions have been zealously
sustained. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy v. Boon,  the US Second District Court rejected the plea of the
54

petitioner law firm that it breached its fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's former agent in closing a
deal for the agent's benefit only after its client hesitated in proceeding with the transaction, thus causing no harm
to its client. The Court instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary relationship in any context comprise a special
breed of cases that often loosen normally stringent requirements of causation and damages, and found in favor
of the client.

To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley P.A. v. Scheller  requiring
55

strict obligation of lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent fee lawyer was fired shortly before the end
of completion of his work, and sought payment quantum meruit of work done. The court, however, found that the
lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to pressure his client into signing a new fee agreement while
settlement negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client found a new lawyer during the interregnum,
events forced the client to settle for less than what was originally offered. Reiterating the principle of fiduciary
duty of lawyers to clients in Meinhard v. Salmon  famously attributed to Justice Benjamin Cardozo that "Not
56

honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior," the US Court
found that the lawyer involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.

The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty
to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the relationship, but extends
even after the termination of the relationship. 
57

Such are the unrelenting duties required by lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the lawyers are
sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes,   ". . . is an exacting goddess, demanding of her votaries
58

in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no less, is not prepared to accept respondents' position without
denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled by Justice Holmes in this wise:

Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to realize the
spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of life —
so share its passions its battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and actor? . . . But that
is not all. What a subject is this in which we are united — this abstraction called the Law, wherein
as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of all men that have
been. When I think on this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our
mistress, we who are here know that she is a mistress only to be won with sustained and lonely
passion — only to be won by straining all the faculties by which man is likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the
breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within recognized
exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information.

If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the lawyer-client confidential privilege under the circumstances
obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it would expose the lawyers themselves to possible
litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.

The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the defendants therein, including herein petitioners and
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up through the use of coconut levy funds the
financial and corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and
others and that through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned investment
arm, ACCRA Investment Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to
establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is their client and it was Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted as dummies, nominees
and/or agents by allowing themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten
wealth through government concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of official position and
authority, flagrant breach of public trust, unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and laws of the
Republic of the Philippines.

By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the PCGG
documents substantiating the client-lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of assignment petitioners
executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would exact from
petitioners a link "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a
crime."

III

In response to petitioners' last assignment of error, respondents alleged that the private respondent was
dropped as party defendant not only because of his admission that he acted merely as a nominee but
also because of his undertaking to testify to such facts and circumstances "as the interest of truth may
require, which includes . . . the identity of the principal." 59

First, as to the bare statement that private respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee, a
statement made in his out-of-court settlement with the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners have
likewise made the same claim not merely out-of-court but also in the Answer to plaintiff's Expanded
Amended Complaint, signed by counsel, claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of "legitimate
lawyering."  Being "similarly situated" in this regard, public respondents must show that there exist other
60

conditions and circumstances which would warrant their treating the private respondent differently from
petitioners in the case at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

To this end, public respondents contend that the primary consideration behind their decision to sustain
the PCGG's dropping of private respondent as a defendant was his promise to disclose the identities of
the clients in question. However, respondents failed to show — and absolute nothing exists in the records
of the case at bar — that private respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG.
Since the undertaking happens to be the leitmotif of the entire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the
PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the
private respondent from prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the
undertaking more substantial than a "bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed comply with the
undertaking. Instead, as manifested by the PCGG, only three documents were submitted for the purpose,
two of which were mere requests for re-investigation and one simply disclosed certain clients which
petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal. These were clients to whom both
petitioners and private respondent rendered legal services while all of them were partners at ACCRA, and
were not the clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the alleged questioned transactions. 61

To justify the dropping of the private respondent from the case or the filing of the suit in the respondent
court without him, therefore, the PCGG should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated as species
apart from the rest of the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a classification which made substantial
distinctions based on real differences. No such substantial distinctions exist from the records of the case
at bench, in violation of the equal protection clause.

The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application
of status and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of
legal norms so
that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment.   Those who fall
62

within a particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to privileges granted but also as to the
liabilities imposed.

. . . What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so
that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: "Favoritism
and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest. 63

We find that the condition precedent required by the respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their
exclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
The condition also constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.  It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly situated litigant from
64

prosecution without allowing the same exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only
touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but also on documents related to the suspected
transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right against
self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of
such rights.

An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client

confidentiality at this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called
to testify and examine as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their
objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not
willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right against self-
incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality.

It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further litigation when it is obvious
that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship and as a means of
coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to them
when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust
situation which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as a real and palpable threat, a
proverbial Sword of Damocles over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue a day longer.

While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not
sanction acts which violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against self-incrimination and
subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege.
 WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First
Division) promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G.
Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al."

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10952

ENGEL PAUL ACA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RONALDO P. SALVADO, Respondent.

This refers to the October 11, 2014 Resolution  of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors (IBP-
1

BOG) which adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation  of the Investigating
2

Commissioner suspending Atty. Ronaldo P. Salvado (Atty. Salvado) from the practice of law.

The Complaint:

On May 30, 2012, Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint  for disbarment against Atty. Salvado for
3

violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01  and Canon 7, Rule 7.03  of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
4 5

Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met Atty. Salvado through Atty. Samuel
Divina (Atty. Divina), his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado introduced himself as a lawyer and a businessman
engaged in several businesses including but not limited to the lending business; that on the same occasion, Atty.
Salvado enticed the complainant to invest in his business with a guarantee that he would be given a high interest
rate of 5% to 6% every month; and that he was assured of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the
latter had various clients and investors.

Because of these representations coupled by the assurance of Atty. Salvado that he would not place his
reputation as a lawyer on the line, complainant made an initial investment in his business. This initial investment
yielded an amount corresponding to the principal plus the promised interest. On various dates from 2010 to 2011,
complainant claimed that he was again induced by Atty. Salvado to invest with promises of high rates of return.

As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued several post-dated checks in the total amount of
P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus interests. All checks were drawn from PSBank Account
number 040331-00087-9, fully described as follows:

Check Number Date Issued Amount

0060144 August 14, 2011 P657 ,000.00

0060147 September 29, 2011 P 530,000.00

0060190 September 29, 2011 P60,000.00

0060194 October 16, 2011 P90,000.00

0060206 October 17, 2011 P2, 120,000.00

0060191 October 29, 2011 P1,060,000.00

0060195 November 16, 2011 P1,590,000.00

Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the aforementioned checks were dishonored
as these were drawn from insufficient funds or a closed account.

Complainant made several verbal and written demands upon Atty. Salvado, who at first, openly communicated
with him, assuring him that he would not abscond from his obligations and that he was just having difficulty
liquidating his assets and collecting from his own creditors. Complainant was even informed by Atty. Salvado that
he owned real properties that could serve as payment for his obligations. As time went by, however, Atty.
Salvado began to avoid complainant's calls and text messages. Attempts to meet up with him through common
friends also proved futile. This prompted complainant to refer the matter to his lawyer Atty. Divina, for appropriate
legal action.

On December 26, 2011, Atty. Divina personally served the Notice of Dishonor on Atty. Salvado, directing him to
settle his total obligation in the amount of P747,000.00, corresponding to the cash value of the first two (2)
PSBank checks, within seven (7) days from receipt of the said notice.  Nevertheless, Atty. Salvado refused to
6

receive the said notice when Atty. Divina's messenger attempted to serve it on him.

Sometime in April 2012, complainant yet again engaged the services of Atty. Divina, who, with his filing clerk and
the complainant's family, went to Atty. Salvado's house to personally serve the demand letter. A certain "Mark"
who opened the gate told the filing clerk that Atty. Salvado was no longer residing there and had been staying in
the province already.

As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived bearing Atty. Salvado. Complainant quickly alighted from his
vehicle and confronted him as he was about to enter the gate of the house. Obviously startled, Atty. Salvado told
him that he had not forgotten his debt and invited complainant to enter the house so they could talk. Complainant
refused the invitation and instead told Atty. Salvado that they should talk inside his vehicle where his companions
were.

During this conversation, Atty. Salvado assured complainant that he was working on "something" to pay his
obligations. He still refused to personally receive or, at the least, read the demand letter.

Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle his obligations.

For complainant, Atty. Salvado's act of issuing worthless checks not only constituted a violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) or the "Anti-Bouncing Checks Law," but also reflected his depraved character as
a lawyer. Atty. Salvado not only refused to comply with his obligation, but also used his knowledge of the law to
evade criminal prosecution. He had obviously instructed his household staff to lie as to his whereabouts and to
reject any correspondence sent to him. This resort to deceitful ways showed that Atty. Salvado was not fit to
remain as a member of the Bar.

The Defense of the Respondent

On July 24, 2012, Atty. Salvado filed his Answer,  denying that he told complainant that he had previously
7

entered into various government contracts and that he was previously engaged in some other businesses prior to
engaging in the lending and rediscounting business. Atty. Salvado asserted that he never enticed complainant to
invest in his business, but it was Atty. Divina's earnings of good interest that attracted him into making an
investment. He further stated that during their initial meeting, it was complainant who inquired if he still needed
additional investments; that it was Atty. Divina who assured complainant of high returns; and that complainant
was fully aware that the money invested in his businesses constituted a loan to his clients and/or borrowers.
Thus, from time to time, the return of investment and accrued interest when due – as reflected in the maturity
dates of the checks issued to complainant- could be delayed, whenever Atty. Salvado' s clients requested for an
extension or renewal of their respective loans. In other words, the checks he issued were merely intended as
security or evidence of investment.
Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there were instances when he would request complainant not to
deposit a check knowing that it was not backed up by sufficient funds. This arrangement had worked until the
dishonor of the checks, for which he readily offered his house and lot located in Marikina City as collateral.

The Reply of Complainant

On August 30, 2012, complainant filed his Reply,  pointing out that Atty. Salvado did not deny receiving money
8

from him by way of investment. Thus, he must be deemed to have admitted that he had issued several postdated
checks which were eventually dishonored. Atty. Salvado 's claim that it was complainant himself who prodded
him about making investments must be brushed aside for being self-serving and baseless.
Assuming arguendo, that complainant indeed made offers of investment, Atty. Salvado should have easily
refused knowing fully well that he could not fund the checks that he would be issuing when they become due. If it
were true that the checks were issued for complainant's security, Atty. Salvado could have drafted a document
evidencing such agreement. His failure to present such document, if one existed at all, only proved that the
subject checks were issued as payment for complainant's investment. 9

Complainant also clarified that his complaint against Atty. Salvado was never meant to harass him. Despite the
dishonor of the checks, he still tried to settle the dispute with Atty. Salvado who left him with no choice after he
refused to communicate with him properly.

Thereafter, the parties were required to file their respective mandatory conference briefs and position
papers.  Atty. Salvado insisted that he had acted in all honesty and good faith in his dealings with the
1âwphi1

complainant. He also emphasized that the title to his house and lot in Greenheights Subdivision, Marikina City,
had been transferred in the name of complainant after he executed a deed of sale as an expression of his "desire
and willingness to settle whatever is due to the complainant." 10

Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner

On January 2, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado be meted a penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for six ( 6) months for engaging in a conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law and for behaving in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Atty.
Salvado's act of issuing checks without sufficient funds to cover the same constituted willful dishonesty and
immoral conduct which undermine the public confidence in the legal profession.

The IBP-BOG Resolution

On October 11, 2014, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation with modification as to the
period of suspension. The IBP-BOG increased the period of Atty. Salvado's suspension from six (6) months to
two (2) years.

Neither a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-BOG nor a petition for review before this Court was filed.
Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of the case for appropriate action with the IBP
Resolution being merely recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section
12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. 11

The Court's Ruling

The parties gave conflicting versions of the controversy. Complainant, claimed to have been lured by Atty.
Salvado into investing in his businesses with the promise of yielding high interests, which he believed because he
was a lawyer who was expected to protect his public image at all times. Atty. Salvado, on the other hand, denied
having enticed the complainant, whom he claimed had invested by virtue of his own desire to gain profits. He
insisted that the checks that he issued in favor of complainant were in the form of security or evidence of
investment. It followed, according to Atty. Salvado, that he must be considered to have never ensured the
payment of the checks upon maturity. Atty. Salvado strongly added that the dishonor of the subject checks was
"purely a result of his gullibility and inadvertence, with the unfortunate result that he himself was a victim of failed
lending transactions xxx." 12

The Court sustains the findings of the IBP-BOG and adopts its recommendation in part.

First. A perusal of the records reveals that complainant's version deserves credence, not only due to the
unambiguous manner by which the narrative of events was laid down, but also by the coherent reasoning the
narrative has employed. The public is, indeed, inclined to rely on representations made by lawyers. As a man of
law, a lawyer is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen.  A man, learned in the
13

law like Atty. Salvado, is expected to make truthful representations when dealing with persons, clients or
otherwise. For the Court, and as the IBP-BOG had observed, complainant's being beguiled to part with his money
and believe Atty. Salvado as a lawyer and businessman was typical human behavior worthy of belief. The Court
finds it hard to believe that a person like the complainant would not find the profession of the person on whose
businesses he would invest as important to consider. Simply put, Atty. Salvado's stature as a member of the Bar
had, in one way or another, influenced complainant's decision to invest.

Second. It must be pointed out that the denials proffered by Atty. Salvado cannot belie the dishonor of the
checks. His strained explanation that the checks were mere securities cannot be countenanced. Of all people,
lawyers are expected to fully comprehend the legal import of bouncing checks. In Lozano v. Martinez,  the Court
14

ruled that the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check;
that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under
pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.

Hence, the excuse of "gullibility and inadvertence" deserves scant consideration. Surely, Atty. Salvado is aware
that promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the land is the primary obligation of lawyers. When
he issued the worthless checks, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws
were mere tools of convenience that could be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires.
In Lao v. Medel,  the Court wrote that the issuance of worthless checks constituted gross misconduct, and put
15

the erring lawyer's moral character in serious doubt, though it was not related to his professional duties as a
member of the Bar. Covered by this dictum is Atty. Salvado's business relationship with complainant. His
issuance of the subject checks display his doubtful fitness as an officer of the court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01
and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.

Third. Parenthetically, the Court cannot overlook Atty. Salvado's deceiving attempts to evade payment of his
obligations.  Instead of displaying a committed attitude to his creditor, Atty. Salvado refused to answer
1âwphi1

complainant's demands. He even tried to make the complainant believe that he was no longer residing at his
given address. These acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed
on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court. The subsequent offers he had made and the eventual
sale of his properties to the complainant, unfortunately cannot overturn his acts unbecoming of a member of the
Bar.

Fourth. The Court need not elaborate on the correctness of the Investigating Commissioner's reliance on
jurisprudence stating that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own and may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases, including violations of B.P. 22.

Accordingly, the only issue in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers is the respondent's fitness to remain as a
member of the Bar. The Court's findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may
choose to file against each other. 16

All told, the Court finds that Atty. Salvado's reprehensible conduct warrants a penalty commensurate to his
violation of the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ronaldo P. Salvado GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 7 .03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this decision be attached to the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10548               December 10, 2014

CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, Respondent.

This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), dated
January 3, 2013  and March 22, 2014,  adopting and approving the findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline
1 2

(CBD) which found Atty. Edgar 8. Francisco (Alty Francisco) administratively liable for multiple violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the
practice of law.

On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated July 14, 2007,  filed by Caroline Castañeda
3

Jimenez (complainant)against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations of the CPR. On October 24, 2007, Atty.
Francisco filed his Answer.  On June 26, 2009, the mandatory conference was held and terminated. Only the
4

counsel for Atty. Francisco appeared. The notice of the said conference addressed to complainant was returned
with the notation "unknown at the given address." No new address was provided by the complainant. Both parties
wererequired to submit their respective position papers. For this purpose, Atty. Francisco adopted his Answer.
The Antecedents

Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa against complainant, her
sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio, Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and
Isabel Gonzalez.  The said complaint was docketed as IS No. 074314 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
5

Makati City. Jimenez alleged that he was the true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty
and Development Corporation (Clarion), which was incorporated specifically for the purpose of purchasing a
residential house located in Forbes Park, Makati City (Forbes property). The incorporators and original
stockholders of Clarion were as follows:

Thomas K. Chua - ₱500,000.00

Teresita C. Alsua - ₱500,000.00

Myla Villanueva - ₱249,998.00

Edgar B. Francisco - ₱1.00

Soledad Gamat - ₱1.00

Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarion’s Articles of Incorporation, the above-named stockholders, except for
Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of assignment of their respective shares in favor of complainant, who
was then Jimenez’s common-law partner.Clarion’s total capitalization was only ₱5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to
achieve its purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant in the
amount of ₱80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the amount of ₱117,000,000.00
from Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check in the said amount which was funded entirely
by Jimenez. The sale, however, was undervalued. In the deed of sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes
property was purchased for ₱78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the purchase price was not
reflected in the books of Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in Clarion to Jimenez by virtue of a
deed of trust. On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997 shares were transferred to complainant based on a deed of
assignment. The remaining one (1) share was transferred to Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions
appeared in Clarion’s General Information Sheet (GIS)filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Resultantly, the subscribed shares of Clarion were as follows:

Mark Jimenez - P 500,000.00

Caroline Jimenez - P 749,997.00

Ma. Carolina C. Crespo - P 1.00

Edgar B. Francisco - P 1.00

Soledad Gamat - P 1.00

On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to complainant by another deed of assignment, making
her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to ₱1,249,997.00.

According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in prison in the United States in 2004, he learned from Atty.
Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the complainant and threatened her, claiming that
the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS)was about to go after their properties. Marcel succeeded in
persuading complainant to transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of
assignment. Again, this was reflected in Clarion’s GIS for the year 2004.

Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means, complainant and her co-
respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for sale sometimein August 2004. The said property was
eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro)for the amount of ₱118,000,000.00 without
Jimenez’s knowledge. This sale was again undervalued at ₱78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco
relayed to Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment for the sale of the Forbes property and that he
handed all the proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.

Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on complainant’s alleged participation in the fraudulent means in
selling the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with Jimenez’s money. Complainant was duty bound
to remit all the proceeds of the sale to Jimenez as the true and beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-
respondents, however, misappropriated and converted the fundsfor their personal use and benefit.

In support of Jimenez’s complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an affidavit reiterating its factual
averments.  A perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the following claims and admissions, among other
6

things, of Atty. Francisco:

1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for assistance in the documentation of the
sale of the Forbes property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco asked her if she had secured permission
from Mark Jimenez and complainant answered in the affirmative.

2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution authorizing him to negotiate the sale of the
property.

3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with Security Bank, San Francisco Del Monte branch.
When the cash payment was deposited, he withdrew the amount and handed the same to Rosemarie
Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.

4. All transfers of shares were caused without any consideration. The transfer taxes, however, were paid.
 5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he was able to confirm that the sale of the Forbes
property was without his knowledge and approval. The proceeds of the sale had already been farmed out
to different corporations established by complainant and her sister.

6. The frequent changes in stockholdings were premeditated in order to steal the money of Mark
Jimenez.

The Complaint

Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by Jimenez against her.
She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal
lawyer and Clarion’s corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case
against Atty. Francisco for representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty.
Francisco regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the principal documents
relative to the sale and transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the
members of his law office.  Atty. Francisco was the one who actively participated in the transactions involving the
7

sale of the Forbes property. Without admitting the truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that
its execution clearly betrayed the trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason,
complainant prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Francisco.

The Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,  Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his services in 1998 for the incorporation of
8

Clarion for the purpose of purchasing a residential house in Forbes Park, where he intended to live with his long-
time partner, the complainant; that the original incorporators and stockholders of Clarion held their respective
shares in trust for Jimenez; that the subsequent changes in the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were also
pursuant to Jimenez’s orders; and that as the corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he prepared all
the legal documentation togive effect to the said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of the Forbes property.

Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez was imprisoned in the United States for excessive
contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this time, Jimenez’s son, Marcel, and the complainant, asked
him again to changethe ownership of Clarion shares in order to avoid the attachment of Jimenez’s properties in a
tax evasion case; that he acceded to the request on the belief that this was in accordance with Jimenez’s wishes;
and that as a result, almost 100% of Clarion’s ownership was transferred in the name of Geraldine Antonio.

Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk to prospective buyers and to
negotiate the sale of the Forbes property until it was sold for ₱118,000,000.00; that Marcel and complainant led
him to believe that Jimenez had knowledge of the sale as they were in constant communication with him; that all
these representations, however, turned out to be false when Jimenez returned tothe Philippines and discovered
that the proceeds of the sale were coursed through other corporations set up by complainant and her sister; that
Jimenez likewise learned of the successive sale of his other properties, including Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the
members of his family; and that this led to the filing of the estafa case against the complainant and the others. As
a witness to the fraud committed against Jimenez, Atty. Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and
circumstances surrounding the said transactions.

Atty. Francisco mainly argued thathe violated neither the rule on disclosures of privileged communication nor the
proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the ground that complainant was not his client. He was
the lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion, but never of the complainant. He might have assisted her
in some matters, but these were all under the notion that Jimenez had given him authority to do so. Further,
though he acted as legal counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship between him and complainant was
formed, as a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its shareholders. While he admitted that the
legal documentation for the transfer of shares and the sale of the Forbes property were prepared by him and
notarized by the members of his law firm, he averred that these acts were performed in his capacity as the
corporate secretary and legal counsel ofClarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he served no
conflicting interests because it was not a "former client" and a "subsequent client" who were the opposing parties
in litigation.

He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on privileged communication does not
apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege, muchless prove, the requisites for the application of the
privilege. When Atty. Francisco denied being her lawyer, the complainant should have established, by clear and
convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client relationship indeed existed between them. Complainant failed to do this.

Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case was but a truthful narration of facts by a witness, Atty.
Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Cañete,  where the Court ruled that "the fact that one of the witnesses for the
9

defendant had been formerly the lawyer for the defendant in this suit was no ground for rejecting his testimony."
In this case, he merely attested to the fraudulent acts of complainant, in the course of which, he defended and
served Jimenez as a client. This was likewise pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal motives and purposes
were not covered by the privilege. It was just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of complainant.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

In the Commissioner’s Report,  dated November 7, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Jose I. dela
10

Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),found Atty. Francisco guilty of violations of the CPR and recommended
that he be suspended for one (1) year from the practice of law. Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted
that the subsequent affidavit of desistance executed by Jimenez in the estafa case did not affect the investigation
conducted by the CBD as it was not an ordinary court which accepted compromises or withdrawals of cases.
After weighing on the claims of the parties, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that nothing in the records
would show that a lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty. Francisco and Jimenez.  The circumstances
11

would show that Atty. Francisco was an original incorporator and shareholder of Clarion. He was also the legal
counsel and corporate secretary of the said corporation, the articles of incorporation of which did not include
Jimenez as an original incorporator. He became a stockholder only in 2001, when Jimenez acquired shares from
Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenez’s participation in Clarion affairs again stopped when he assigned the
entirety of his shares in favor of complainant.

Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the report stated that it
would appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations as to Clarion’s ownership to be reported to the SEC
through its GIS. The Investigating Commissioner also pointed out Atty. Francisco’s clear admission that the
transfer of shares within Clarion were "without any consideration," ran counter to the deeds of assignment that he
again admittedly executed as corporate counsel. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan and
undervalued the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. Further, when he executed the
affidavit containing allegations against the interest of Clarion and complainant, the Investigating Commissioner
held that Atty. Francisco violated the rule on privileged communication and engaged in an act that constituted
representation of conflicting interests in violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.

In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,  the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the findings and
12

recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.

The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved for its reconsideration. 13

Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the penalty of suspension of one
(1) year is too severe considering that in his more than three decades of practice, he had never been involved in
any act that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary action upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client,
Jimenez, experienced a difficult crisis involving his children and common-law partner that he experienced a major
upheaval in his professional life. He apologized for his not being too circumspect in dealing with the relatives of
Jimenez.
As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that his participation in the execution of the documents
pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all connected to his capacity as Clarion’s corporate secretary
and legal counsel, not to mention his ties with his client and friend, Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity to
Clarion and Jimenez, but denied that this duty extended to the incorporators and shareholders of Clarion. Thus,
when complainant sought advice in her capacity as a shareholder in Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose on his part.
In his own words, Atty. Francisco insisted that "Carol is not Clarion and vice versa."14

Attached to Atty. Francisco’s motion for reconsideration was an affidavit executed by Jimenez, stating that he had
retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999. Espousing Atty. Francisco’s defenses, Jimenez
asserted that Atty. Francisco’s law firm was in charge of all the companies he owned in the Philippines.He
directed Atty. Francisco to execute all the documentation to show his ownership of these companies, including
Clarion. These documents were in the possession of complainant for safekeeping. When Jimenez ran for
Congress in 2001,Atty. Francisco personally assisted him in the filing ofhis certificate of candidacy and the
proceedings before the electoral tribunals. While he was in prison in the United States, it was Atty. Francisco who
visited and told him that his children, Myla and Marcel, were then facilitating the sale of one of his companies,
Meridian Telekoms, Inc., without his knowledge. He asked Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about his children’s
betrayal and to wait until he could go home. When he filed the criminal cases against his children and
complainant, the latter even filed a frivolous kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco. According to Jimenez, the
people who committed crimes against him were now exhausting all possible means to keep Atty. Francisco silent
and to prevent the latter from performing his duties as a lawyer.

In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,  the IBP-BOG denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
15

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The Court’s Ruling

Violations of Canons 1 and 10

of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the best of his ability, a
lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A
lawyer’s personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience
tothe law, on the part of the public.

Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers.

Any act or omission that is contraryto, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or
disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although
the concept is broad enough to include such element.  To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat,
16

deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and
straight forwardness  while conduct that is "deceitful" means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
17

misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice
and damage of the party imposed upon. 18

Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known
to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach, inorder to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession.  "To say that lawyers must
19

at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be over
emphasized. Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the
law, it is imperative that they live by the law."
20

When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to "obey the laws," "do no falsehood," and
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. 21

In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his sworn duty. He is guilty of
engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to
actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its
corporate shareholdings. In the documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS,
Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the validity of these transfers of shares, making it appear
that these were done for consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged
orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was correct in pointing out that this ran counter to the deeds
of assignment which he executed as corporate counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed
safe to assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation law and the rules
enforced by the SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to register valid transfers of
stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to advance the interests of his clientele with patent disregard of his duties as a
lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan entered into by Clarion and to have
undervalued the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to
cheat the government of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a series of grave legal
infractions and was content to have granted the requests of the persons involved.

Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenez’s wishes, or pursuant to complainant’s
misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Francisco’s act of drafting, or at the very least,
permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in public documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular
practice for the specious reason that lawyers are constrained to obey their clients’ flawed scheming and
machinations, the Court would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This would undermine the role of
lawyers as officers of the court.

Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their clients should never be
attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be
emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and
mustbe held within the bounds of reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warranta course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions.22

In the same vein, Atty. Francisco’s admissions show that he lacks candor regarding his dealings. Canon 10 of the
CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court." Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of
the CPR provides that "a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he
mislead or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice." Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in
the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the
rule oflaw. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court.
23

From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied in the CPR, namely, to avoid
dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to actwith candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01,
Canon 10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his solemn oath not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of
the same.

Rule on Conflicting Interests and

Disclosure of Privileged
Communication
With respect to Atty. Francisco’s alleged representation of conflicting interests and disclosure of privileged
communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the IBP-BOG.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."  "The relationship between a lawyer and
24

his/her client should ideallybe imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her
lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and
discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions withthe client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard isto avoid representing conflicting
interests…"  Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline
25

professional employment if the same would trigger a violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest.

In Quiambao v. Bamba,  the Court discussed the application of the rule on conflict of interest in this wise:
26

In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty
to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose. Developments in jurisprudence have
particularized various tests to determine whether a lawyer’s conduct lies within this proscription. One test is
whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to
oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same
lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.

Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in
the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment.

The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation where the opposing parties are
present clients in the same actionor in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called
upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no
occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions
are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are
present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect
the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client relationship. The
purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary nature of the ties between an attorney and his client.
Conversely, a lawyer may not be precluded from accepting and representing other clients on the ground of
conflict of interests, if the lawyer-client relationship does not exist in favor of a party in the first place.

In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, a scrutiny of the parties’
submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco.

First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s client remains unsubstantiated, considering its detailed
refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty. Francisco was Clarion’s legal counsel and that
complainant sought advice and requested documentation of several transfers of shares and the sale of the
Forbes property. This was only successful in showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed, drafted the documents
pertaining to the transaction and that he was retained as legal counsel of Clarion. There was no detailed
explanation as to how she supposedly engaged the services of Atty. Francisco as her personal counsel and as to
what and how she communicated with the latter anent the dealings she had entered into. With the complaint
lacking in this regard, the unrebutted answer made by Atty. Francisco, accompanied with a detailed narrative of
his engagement as counsel of Jimenez and Clarion, would have to prevail.
Second, there is a stark disparity inthe amount of narrative details presented by the parties. Atty. Francisco’s
claim thathe was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and not of the complainant, was clearly established in a
sworn statement executed by Jimenez himself. Complainant’s evidence pales in comparison with her claims of
being the client of Atty. Francisco couched in general terms that lacked particularity of circumstances.

Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty. Francisco’s answer. This could have
given her opportunity to present evidence showing their professional relationship. She also failed to appear
during the mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD without even updating her residential address on record. Her
participation in the investigation of the case apparently ended at its filing.

In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the complaint by preponderant evidence.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there
is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the
case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts
to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts towhich they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number. 27

Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his entanglement with this fiasco among the members of
Jimenez’s family by taking an upfront and candid stance in dealing with Jimenez’s children and complainant. He
could have been staunch in reminding the latter that his tasks were performed in his capacity as legal counsel for
Clarion and Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty. Francisco’s indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that
the totality of evidence presented by the complainant miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving that
Atty. Francisco was her lawyer. At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the affirmation
presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say, complainant failed to establish that Atty. Francisco committed a violation
of the rule on conflict of interests.

Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo,  the Court elucidated on
28

the factors essential to establish the existence of the said privilege, viz:

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of
this relationship that the client made the communication.

Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even
if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. The reason
for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what
he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information
from the prospective client. xxx

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney
and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third
person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the
purpose for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a
lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for
settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity, are not privileged
communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the
purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have
been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.

If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege
does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.

[Emphases supplied]

Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on record fails to demonstrate
the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed to establish the professional relationship between
her and Atty. Francisco. The records are further bereft of any indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the
Forbes property was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of what she had
communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of circumstances under which the confidential communication was
relayed. All that complaint alleged in her complainant was that "she sought legal advice from respondent in
various occasions."  Considering that complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no
29

testimony as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It
is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged
communication. As held in Mercado, such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the
rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client
privilege.  It cannot be gainsaid then that complainant, who has the burden of proving that the privilege applies,
30

failed in this regard.

The Penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violating
of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR,  for the
31

practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are
qualified and who possess good moral character.  The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the
32

exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 33

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended
on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly
immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without
authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.

While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of privileged communication,
the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing Clarion tomake untruthful representations to the
SEC and in other public documents, still constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for
which a suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,
effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar
offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and furnished to the Office of
the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the
Philippines, for their information and guidance.

Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that the Court can
determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10579               December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.

This refers to the Resolution  of the Board or Governors (BOG). Integrated Bar of the Philippines (!BP), dated
1

March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who recommended
the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent)from the practice of law for one (1) year for
ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),received a complaint , 2

dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for "unlawful, dishonest, immoral
and deceitful"  acts as a lawyer.
3

In its July 1, 2011 Order,  the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt of the
4

order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint. On October 10,
2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order  setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing on
5

November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before the scheduled conference when
respondent filed his verified Answer. 6

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She submitted a set of
documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating
Commissioner  indicated that the said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if there
7

was a need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for resolution based on the
documents on file. The Minutes  of the mandatory conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in
8

the morning or after the proceeding was terminated.

On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions  of the Municipal Trial Court
9

in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay
complainant and her husband the sum of ₱100,000.00 and ₱22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of
12% per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit. 10

Complainant’s Position

From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal problem
regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their
discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for
which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent ₱20,000.00 as acceptance fee and ₱5,000.00 for
incidental expenses. 11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter  to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal problem
12

referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of ₱100,000.00, payable in
sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent being her
lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory note  evidenced the loan.
13

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a lot she
had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a
case for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter
received from complainant the amount of ₱150,000.00, as filing fee.  When asked about the exorbitant amount,
14

respondent cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for
the service of the summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the
filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only
amounted to ₱22,410.00 per trial court records. 15

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the one
who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this, respondent
merely replied that he would takea collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case. Upon reading a copy of
the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the
documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional
sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point of
contention in the case;and 4] the veryanomalies she complained of were not mentioned. Respondent, however,
assured her that those matters could be brought up during the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of
₱70,000.00 or ₱50,000.00 "in the moment of urgency or emergency."  Complainant obliged the request and gave
16

respondent the sum of ₱22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of ₱50,000.00,
purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on
this proposition but she eventually gave the amount of ₱25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt,  stating that
17

"it is understood that the balance of ₱25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda
Foster." On November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount be given by complainant prior to
the next hearing of the case, because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant
handed to respondent the amount of ₱25,000.00. 18

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent,
complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of the case
with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her
a copy of the order of dismissal.

On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for reconsideration.
On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to prepare a reply to the comment
filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts because the Land Registration
Authority would not accept the documents unless these were amended; and to make the additional averment that
the defendant was using false documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message from him
that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein.Upon reading the same, however,
complainant discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for
₱2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a
present. Complainant was also told thatoral arguments on the case had been set the following month. 19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and wrote him
a letter of termination,  after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that respondent had been
20
acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent, requesting
him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual cost of the filing fees.
Respondent never replied.

Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,  respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of law since
21

March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he
notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he qualified that he was not paid his
notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for which he claimed to have
received ₱10,000.00 as acceptance fee and ₱5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan of ₱100,000.00,
respondent averred that it was complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to
him for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction was declared as "no loan" and
he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards the amount of ₱150,000.00 he received for filing fees,
respondent claimed that the said amount was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in
covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court
would need the money for their hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the
same vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan of ₱50,000.00 and having received ₱22,000.00 from
complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would be discussed with the judge who would rule in
their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the possibility that the other
party would befriend the judge. He never said that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past.
Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that another counsel was
assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action and the
consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable law on reformation of contracts. Finally, by
way of counterclaim, respondentdemanded just compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for
the complainant.

Reply of Complainant

In her Reply,  complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the receipts inher
22

possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also
emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him. While respondent was
employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the
preparation of several documents involving Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise
owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of ₱100,000.00 she extended to respondent was
never considered as "no loan."

On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution, dated June
20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause against respondent for
estafa.
23

Findings and Recommendation

of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,  the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of
24

ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to
complainant: 1) his loan of ₱122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to ₱127,590.00.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.  Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging
25

respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest had been
issued.26

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution,the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but modified the
penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months.
Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant amounting to
₱127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to
respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged
violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." It is well established that a lawyer’s conduct is "not confined to the performance of his
professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court." 27

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and
private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were
worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land
involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an
act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the amount of ₱150,000.00 as filing fee, when
in truth, the same amounted only to ₱22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who suggested that amount
deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the
rigors of litigation, would propose such amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that
the complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint withthe trial
court, still, respondent should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to
be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual
amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the legal
profession.

Moreover, the "fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client."  Money entrusted to a
28

lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to
return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act isa gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession
and deserves punishment. 29

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from complainant
but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by
complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other
expenses. His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.  When a lawyer receives money from the
30

client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money
was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended
purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.  Somewhat showing a propensity to
31

demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct
when he asked for the amount of ₱50,000.00 as "representation expenses" allegedly for the benefit of the judge
handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that he
initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the
amount at the time the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross
misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money
from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of
his client’strust but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public inthe legal profession and the
entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their utmost fidelity to public
service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the
image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts.
The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any
liability. The absence of proof that the said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate
respondent’s actuations would seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010.  At this juncture, respondent
1âwphi1

proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the case, and left the
client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also
remiss in his duty to his client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal thathe likewise
violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that "[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client." In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but
two loans of considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed ₱100,000.00 for
the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan of ₱70,000.00 or ₱50,000.00 "in
the moment of urgency or emergency" but was only given ₱22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were
evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent.
These acts were committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with
complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in
him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that
these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of ₱100,000.00 and ₱22,000.00 were
surely not protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Respondent’s assertion that the
amounts were given to him out of the liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as "no loan,"does not
justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and
thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present,
respondent has not yet paid his obligations to complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain
not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the
people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their
duties tosociety, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
obligations.  Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not
32

confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but
also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law vest him with. Unfortunately,
respondent must be found guilty of misconduct on both scores.

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to modify the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented insufficient evidence of
respondent’s "lawyering" for the opposing party, Tierra Realty. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that
"[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts." The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full
disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of
information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer
based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in
this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests."  Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective
33

clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of the
prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a written consent from all the
parties after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for
representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which
he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having
notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in complainant’s case. While the
Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint inCivil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of
the said contract, and that only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the
Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the
dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty
and the clear admission of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of
whether it was the validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions
raised, respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case, knowing fully that he
was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the
participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent
was retained by clients who had close dealings with each other. More significantly, there is no record of any
written consent from any of the parties involved.

The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited "not only because the relation of attorney and client is one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste.
An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty.
Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession suffers." 34

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation
of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR.  For the
35

practice of law is "a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are
qualified and who possess good moral character."  The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the
36

exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 37

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended
on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly
immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without
authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.

Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal of
the trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three (3)
months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions of
respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His
incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal
profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less
thanthe penalty of disbarment. 38

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his private
capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,  the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant
39

if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities
which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers,
the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a memberof the Bar. The
only concern of the Court is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material
bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other.

To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed
directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum
of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required.
Preponderance of evidence is "a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."  In
40

administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere
scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
would suffice to hold one administratively liable.  Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive period
41

applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.
42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was co ITect in ordering respondent to return the amount of ₱127,590.00 representing the
balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyerclient
relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of ₱50,000.00 which respondent received from
complainant, as representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for the purported purchase of a
bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant. While
respondent's deplorable act of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity,
respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their professional relationship. As to his
other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as liable for the personal loans he contracted with
complainant, per the small claims cases filed against him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, "the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession."  The
43

Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by "purging the profession of
members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney."
44

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him
to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of ₱127,590.00, ₱50,000.00 and ₱2,500.00. Let a copy of
this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Con fidanl, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator to be circulated to ail courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9872               January 28, 2014

NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S. PRESBITERO, Complainants, vs.
ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.
This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated 26 May 2008, filed by Natividad P. Navarro (Navarro)
and Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBP-CBD, we gathered the following facts of the case:

On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the release of the payment
for the latter’s 2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod which was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The agreement also included the payment of the debts of Presbitero’s
late husband to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), the sale of the retained areas of the property, and the
collection of the rentals due for the retained areas from their occupants. It appeared that the DAR was supposed
to pay ₱700,000 for the property but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late husband to PNB for
₱1,200,000. Presbitero alleged that PNB’s claim had already prescribed, and she engaged the services of
respondent to represent her in the matter. Respondent proposed the filing of a case for quieting of title against
PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an attorney’s fee of 10% of the proceeds from the VOS or the sale of
the property, with the expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but deductible from respondent’s fees. Respondent
received ₱50,000 from Presbitero, supposedly for the expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it.

In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondent’s services to handle
the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced
her sister, Navarro, to finance the expenses for the registration of the property. Respondent undertook to register
the property in consideration of 30% of the value of the property once it is registered. Respondent obtained
₱200,000 from Navarro for the registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration decree over the
property was already issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would not have spent for
the registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the real situation of the property.

On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar trading business.
Respondent and Navarro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and agreed that the loan (a) shall be for
a period of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of 10% per month; and (c) shall be secured by a real estate
mortgage over a property located in Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
304688. They also agreed that respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the principal amount of the loan
as well as the interest thereon. Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro, drawn against an account in
Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence of Navarro.

In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a second MOA
with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro, through a messenger, postdated
checks drawn against an account in Bank of Commerce, Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise discussed
with Navarro about securing a "Tolling Agreement" with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. but no agreement was
signed.

At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third MOA, except that
the real estate mortgage was over a 263-square-meter property located in Barangay Taculing, Bacolod City.
Respondent sent Presbitero postdated checks drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch.

Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter property mortgaged under the third MOA, and
respondent promised to execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter parcel of land adjacent to the
4,000-square-meter property he mortgaged to Navarro.

However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional security.

Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able to pay complainants a total of ₱900,000.
Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon. In September 2006, the checks
issued by respondent to complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts against which they
were drawn were already closed. When complainants called respondent’s attention, he promised to pay the
agreed interest for September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the
succeeding months.

In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero terminated the
services of respondent as counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial foreclosure of the mortgages
executed by respondent in their favor. Respondent countered that the 10% monthly interest on the loan was
usurious and illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against
respondent.

Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans by offering very high interest rates. He
also prepared and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn against his son’s accounts. Complainants
further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the identity and value of the property he mortgaged
because he showed them a different property from that which he owned. Presbitero further alleged that
respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to her for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold it for only ₱150,000.

Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in sugar and realty business and that it was Yulo who
convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend him loans. Yulo also assured him that Presbitero would help him
with the refining of raw sugar through Victorias Milling Company, Inc. Respondent alleged that Navarro fixed the
interest rate and he agreed because he needed the money. He alleged that their business transactions were
secured by real estate mortgages and covered by postdated checks. Respondent denied that the property he
mortgaged to Presbitero was less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold the property because
the sale was actually rescinded. Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged to Navarro was valuable
and it was actually worth more than ₱8,000,000.

Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants when business was good but he was unable to
continue paying when the price of sugar went down and when the business with Victorias Milling Company, Inc.
did not push through because Presbitero did not help him. Respondent also denied that he was hiding from
complainants.

Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him ₱530,000 as interest due for September to December
2005. He denied making any false representations. He claimed that complainants were aware that he could no
longer open a current account and they were the ones who proposed that his wife and son issue the checks.
Respondent further alleged that he already started with the titling of Yulo’s lot but his services were terminated
before it could be completed.

A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent with accepting cases while under suspension. In
response, respondent alleged that he accepted Presbitero’s case in February 2006 and learned of his
suspension only in May 2006.

After conducting a hearing and considering the position papers submitted by the parties, the IBP-CBD found that
respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed ₱2,000,000 from Navarro and ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero which
he failed to pay in accordance with the MOAs he executed. The IBP-CBD found that based on the documents
presented by the parties, respondent did not act in good faith in obtaining the loans. The IBP-CBD found that
respondent either promised or agreed to pay the very high interest rates of the loans although he knew them to
be exorbitant in accordance with jurisprudence. Respondent likewise failed to deny that he misled Navarro and
her husband regarding the identity of the property mortgaged to them. Respondent also mortgaged a property to
Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but documents showed that its value was only ₱300,000. Documents also showed that
he sold that property for only ₱150,000. Respondent conspired with Yulo to secure loans by promising her a 10%
commission and later claimed that they agreed that Yulo would "ride" on the loan by borrowing ₱300,000 from
the amount he obtained from Navarro and Presbitero. Respondent could not explain how he lost all the money he
borrowed in three months except for his claim that the price of sugar went down.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled Navarro and Presbitero regarding the issuance of the postdated
checks, and there was nothing in the records that would show that he informed them that it would be his wife or
son who would issue the checks. The IBP-CBD also found that respondent had not been transparent in
liquidating the money he received in connection with Presbitero’s VOS with DAR. He was also negligent in his
accounting regarding the registration of Yulo’s property which was financed by Navarro.

The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for committing the following acts:

(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own account;

(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;

(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to her;

(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;

(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was exorbitant; and

(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts were already
closed.

The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he failed to properly account for the various funds he received from complainants.

In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which prohibits borrowing money from a client unless the client’s interest is fully protected or the client is given
independent advice.

On the matter of practicing law while under suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the records were not clear
whether the notice of suspension respondent received on 29 May 2006 was the report and recommendation of
the IBP-CBD or the final decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise found that there was insufficient evidence
to prove that respondent mishandled his cases.

The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of disbarment.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD with modification by reducing the recommended penalty from disbarment to
suspension from the practice of law for two years. The IBP Board of Governors likewise ordered respondent to
return the amount of his unpaid obligation to complainants.

Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the penalty of disbarment be instead imposed upon
respondent.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on the
loan he obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify
the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also established that
respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but he later sold the property
for only ₱150,000, showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of the mortgaged property.
Respondent’s allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did not
apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.

Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his son,
Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed that complainants knew that he could
no longer open a current bank account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for
him. However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that the
account belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he
issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to
Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts in
respondent’s name.

It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We have ruled that
conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties.  A lawyer may
1

be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity.  The test is whether his
2

conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders
him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.3

In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in respondent’s private capacity. Although Navarro
financed the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-client relationship. However,
respondent was Presbitero’s counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It was established that respondent
misled Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for his loan from her. To appease
Presbitero, respondent even made a Deed of Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-meter lot
as additional collateral but he failed to do so.

Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with
respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero
and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted the MOAs
knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of
the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his son’s account whose name was similar
to his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will show that respondent paid
or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants.

Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.  We agree with the IBP-CBD that
4

respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent received various
amounts from complainants but he could not account for all of them.

Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s 18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent received ₱265,000
from her. Respondent countered that ₱105,000 was paid for real estate taxes but he could not present any
receipt to prove his claim. Respondent also claimed that he paid ₱70,000 to the surveyor but the receipt was only
for ₱15,000. Respondent claimed that he paid ₱50,000 for filing fee, publication fee, and other expenses but
again, he could not substantiate his claims with any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had
been less than diligent in accounting for the funds he received from Navarro for the registration of Yulo’s
property.

Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who had since
passed away.

As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that respondent received ₱50,000 from
Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed out, the records do not show how respondent spent the funds because he
was not transparent in liquidating the money he received from Presbitero.

Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his client,
Presbitero.  Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he
1âwphi1

has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the
client.
5

Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed ₱1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the time he secured
the loan, respondent was already the retained counsel of Presbitero.

While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate mortgage, it
turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged and that the checks he issued
were not drawn from his account but from that of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the
MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable.
Finally, the checks issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were already
closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the
lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.  In his dealings with his client
6

Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in
him by his client.

We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors imposing on respondent the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years. Given the facts of the case, we see no reason to deviate from
the recommendation of the IBP-CBD imposing on respondent the penalty of disbarment. Respondent failed to
live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him as a member of the
legal profession.  Instead, respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of his
7

client to secure undue gains for himself  that warrants his removal from the practice of law. Likewise, we cannot
8

sustain the IBP Board of Governors’ recommendation ordering respondent to return his unpaid obligation to
complainants, except for advances for the expenses he received from his client, Presbitero, that were not
accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is
still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.  Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s
9

administrative liability. 10

Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each
other.  Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose involving the client-
11

attorney relationship, he is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that
particular purpose.  If the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, he must immediately return
12

the money to his client.  Respondent was given an opportunity to render an accounting, and he failed. He must
13

return the full amount of the advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01,
and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the
practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.

Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S. Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000,
and to submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with this order within thirty days from finality of
this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts all over the
country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657             February 23, 2004

HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,1 respondent.

May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite notary commission more than twenty
years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue presented for resolution before this Court.

The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck prayed for the
disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.

The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s appointment as RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated
the notarial law, thus:

Judge Santos, based on ANNEX "A," was not duly commissioned as notary public until January 9, 1984 but still
subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January
1980 uncommissioned until the 9th of January 1984.

a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986 to December 31st 1987 and January 6th
1988 to December 31st 1989 but the records fail to show any entry at the Clerk of Court after December
31st 1985 until December 31st 1989.

b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the expiration of his commission in December
1989.2

...

WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order respondent:

1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all future public service.

2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.

3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.

4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.

5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any delaying tactics from Judge Santos or
any agency and or public servants involved in this administrative case.
 6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this administrative case.

and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on the premises.3

The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, Regional Trial Court,
Misamis Oriental, which contained the following:

THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and available in this office, the following data
appear:

1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned notary public in the following
years:

a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985

b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987

c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989

2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony E. Santos submitted his notarial
reports in the ff. years:

a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980

b             February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June 6, 1980

c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980

d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of submission

e. November to December 1980-no entry

f. January to February 1981 - no entry

g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of submission

h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of submission

i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984

j. July to December 1983 - no entry

k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986

l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986

4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial documents under the name Atty. Anthony
Santos after December 1985.

5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission issued to Atty. Anthony Santos was on January 6,
1988 until December 31, 1989.4
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge categorically denied the charges against him. He also
submitted a certification5 from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized documents/notarial
register. The respondent further averred as follows:

That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and submitted by the respondent before
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on
account of the said notarized documents and therefore not the proper party to raise the said issues;

That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et
al. versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and Heinz Heck, for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the Presiding Judge.
The undersigned resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs.6

Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator recommending the need to resort to a full-blown
investigation to determine the veracity of the parties’ assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated September 10,
2001, resolved to: (a) treat the matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to Associate
Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.7

In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002, the complainant requested that the hearing be
held at Cagayan de Oro City. Justice Cruz initially denied the request but upon the complainant’s insistence, the
matter was forwarded to the Court, which favorably acted thereon in a Resolution dated July 8, 2002.8 The
complainant presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City before retired Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S.
Quimbo.9

In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made the following
recommendation:

It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be found guilty of violation of the Notarial
Law by (a) notarizing documents without commission; (b) tardiness in submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-
forwarding of his notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his commission; and [ii] that for these
infractions, he be suspended from the practice of law and barred from being commissioned as notary public, both
for one year, and his present commission, if any, be revoked.10

According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not adduce evidence in his defense, while the
complainant presented documentary evidence to support the charges:

It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the
years 1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. He merely alleged that "there was no proper
recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register." And, as already observed, he presented no evidence, particularly on his
appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983 (assuming he was so commissioned) and submission of notarial
reports and notarial register.

On the other hand, the second certification shows that "there were only two Record Books available in the
notarial section" of the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de Oro City); and that the "(f)irst book titled Petitions
for Notarial Commission contains items on the Name, Date Commission was issued and Expiration of
Commission of the notary public. First entry appearing was made on December 1982."

If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the "first book" would disclose so (at least, for the years
1982 and 1983). However, he did not present said book. Neither did he present a certification from the Clerk of
Court, RTC of Misamis Oriental, or documents from his files showing that he was commissioned in 1980 to 1983.
Similarly, he did not submit a certificate of appointment for all those years. Under Section 238 of the Notarial Law,
such certificate must be prepared and forwarded by the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor
General, together with the oath of office of the notary public.11

Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the evidence presented by the complainant, that the
respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983 without being commissioned as a notary public therefor,
considering that his earliest commission of record was on January 9, 1984.12

The Procedural Issues

Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant complaint, a brief backgrounder.

On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC

On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,13 to wit:

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular
and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for
the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have
been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against
the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith
be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one
decision or resolution.

Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar who
were likewise members of the court were treated separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases
against erring justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government service may be
automatically treated as disbarment cases. The Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002, also provides
that it shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative cases already filed
where the respondents have not yet been required to comment on the complaints.

Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing resolution, since the respondent filed his
Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.

The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment Cases Involving A Retired Judge For Acts Committed While He
Was Still A Practicing Lawyer

The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired judge; (2) the complainant prays for his
disbarment; and (3) the acts constituting the ground for disbarment were committed when the respondent was
still a practicing lawyer, before his appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not for
acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with notarizing documents without the
requisite notarial commission therefor.

Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys provides:

Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon verified complaint of any person. The
complaint shall state clearly, and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate
said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including
those in the government service: Provided, however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of Tax
Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court:
Provided, further, That charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to
their appointment to the Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication.14

The investigation may thereafter commence either before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), in
accordance with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or before the Supreme Court in accordance with
Sections 13 and 14, thus:

Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in

other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which
case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review
of the report shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.

Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated Investigator. Based upon the evidence
adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall
submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations together with the
record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the final action of the Supreme Court.

It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is cognizable by the Court itself, and its
indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for investigation, report and
recommendation to the Solicitor General, any officer of the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court
will thereafter base its final action.15

Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and
as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 616of the
1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the presiding
judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the
Court itself, as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent is a justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the
lower court, the complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court.17

The Substantive Issues

The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not Preclude The Filing Thereafter Of An Administrative Charge
Against Him For Which He Shall Still Be Held Answerable If Found Liable Therefor

The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service does not necessarily divest
the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary
authority over members of the bench. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero:18

The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact
that the respondent, had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to
pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule
would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent
public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well
and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable
under the situation.19
However, recognizing "the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases against
members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment," we issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC20 which took effect on
November 3, 2003. It reads in part:

1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court Administrator, an administrative
complaint against any Justice of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower courts
filed in connection with a case in court is shown to be clearly unfounded and baseless and intended to
harass the respondent, such a finding should be included in the report and recommendation of the Office
of the Court Administrator. If the recommendation is approved or affirmed by the Court, the complainant
may be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a
lawyer, he may further be required to show cause why he or she should not be administratively
sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the court.

2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b)
for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before such filing and (c) shown prima facie
that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not
the case, the Office of the Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment within ten
(10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and recommendation not later
than 30 days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of
compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such
date without prejudice to the release of the retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order
to be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.

Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed within six months from the
compulsory retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year before
such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the respondent.

In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was received by the Office of the Court
Administrator on March 26, 2001.21 The respondent retired compulsorily from the service more than a year later,
or on May 22, 2002. Likewise, the ground for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by
the respondent did not occur a year before the respondent’s separation from the service. Furthermore, and most
importantly, the instant complaint was not prima facie shown to be without merit and intended merely to harass
the respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not fall within the ambit of the foregoing resolution.

A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His Appointment To The Judiciary

It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary.22 In fact,
even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for
disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to
their appointment to the judiciary.23 It need not be shown that the respondent continued the doing of the act or
acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge on the respondent, considering
the gravity of the offense.

Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act complained of must be continuing in order for the
respondent judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v. Salubre,24 the respondent judge was charged with
violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for acts committed while he was still a practicing
lawyer. The respondent therein refused to turn over the funds of his client despite demands, and persisted in his
refusal even after he was appointed as a judge. However, the Court also stated in this case that the respondent’s
subsequent appointment as a judge will not exculpate him from taking responsibility for the consequences of his
acts as an officer of the court.25
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,26 we held that proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for
administrative discipline against a judge if he is not charged with immorality prior to his appointment. We
ratiocinated, thus:

...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered from the path of moral
righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond
information and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to
know, that he must pay a high price for that honor - his private and official conduct must at all times be free from
the appearance of impropriety. ...27

The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to prove the charges by substantial evidence.28 The
complainant therein presented evidence pertaining to the respondent’s previous indiscretion while still a
practicing lawyer; no evidence was, however, adduced to prove that the latter continued to engage in illicit acts
after being appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was exonerated in this case because the complainant
failed to present evidence that the indiscretion continued even after the respondent was appointed to the
judiciary.

The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public interest that it is both the right and duty of the State to
control and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control and
regulation in this Court.29 The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power
over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a bounden duty as well. This is why respect and fidelity to
the Court is demanded of its members.30

Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore Constitutes Malpractice, If Not The Crime
Of Falsification Of Public Documents

It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public.31 Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in
evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.32

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality.33 The Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission
therefore as "reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public
documents."34 For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the
practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even
disbarment.35

In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the occasion to state -

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no
authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a
notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the
Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal
intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These
violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."37

The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized. No less than the public
faith in the integrity of public documents is at stake in every aspect of that function.38

The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported By The Evidence On Record

The respondent did not object to the complainant’s formal offer of evidence, prompting the Investigating Justice
to decide the case on the basis of the pleadings filed.39 Neither did he claim that he was commissioned as notary
public for the years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. The respondent merely alleged
in his answer that "there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor
of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register." Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice, the
respondent presented no evidence of his commission as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, as well as
proof of submission of notarial reports and the notarial register.40

The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the charges and to controvert the evidence
against him in a formal investigation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough
that he deny the charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.41

The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of the documents so notarized, and as
such was not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of
his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor which include the statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule
13842 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts
and doings of public officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which
conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.43

An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar Does Not Prescribe

The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession,
but its continued possession is essential to maintain one’s good standing in the profession. It is a continuing
requirement to the practice of law and therefore does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper
complaint, into any question concerning one’s mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is
because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer.44 The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law.45

Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own, distinct from and may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.46 As we held in the leading case of In re Almacen:47

[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
[their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. ....48

In a case involving a mere court employee49 the Court disregarded the Court Administrator’s recommendation
that the charge for immorality against the respondent be dismissed on the ground that the complainants failed to
adduce evidence that the respondent’s immoral conduct was still ongoing. Aside from being found guilty of illicit
conduct, the respondent was also found guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her children’s certificates of live birth to
show that her paramour was the father. The complaint in this case was filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty
years after the illicit affair ended.50 The Court held that administrative offenses do not prescribe.51
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative complaint against an
erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending
act was committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be
emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private
complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from
whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the
practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench
and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at
unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. This should particularly apply in
this case, considering the seriousness of the matter involved - the respondent’s dishonesty and the sanctity of
notarial documents.

Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint, will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without
the requisite authority therefor.

At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The Administrative Case Would Merely Mitigate The Respondent’s
Liability

Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment
of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality,
honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. 52 By his actuations, the respondent
failed to live up to such standards;53 he undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents and
thereby breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. The respondent also
violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.54 In representing that he was possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he was, in fact, not
so authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as
a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.

The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar him
where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.55 Furthermore, a tempering of justice is
mandated in this case, considering that the complaint against the respondent was filed twenty-four years after the
commission of the act complained of;56 that there was no private offended party who came forward and claimed to
have been adversely affected by the documents so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the
respondent is a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-earned retirement benefits.57 The
Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing documents without the
requisite notarial commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6490               July 9, 2013 (Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054)
LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants, vs. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.

This case involves a complaint for disbarment directly filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
charging respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott of engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).1

Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985, complainant Lilia Tabang sought the advice of Judge
Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott’s father. Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a total of thirty (30)
hectares of agricultural land located in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which consisted of
several parcels belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott noted that under the government’s agrarian reform
program, Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land as she already owned other
parcels. Thus, Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons.2

Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and obtained the corresponding Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) under the names of fictitious persons, as follows:

1. TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes;

2. TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy;
3. TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla;
4. TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio;
5. TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez;
6. TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan; and
7. TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy.3

Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels as they were in need of funds
for their medication and other expenses. Claiming that he would help complainants by offering the parcels to
prospective buyers, respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed from Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering the parcels.4

About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and after he failed to negotiate any sale, complainants
confronted respondent. Respondent then told the complainants that he had lost all seven titles.5

On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants, respondent advised them to file petitions in court for re-
issuance of titles. Pretending to be the "authorized agent-representative" of the fictitious owners of the seven
parcels, Lilia Tabang filed petitions for re-issuance of titles.6

In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed similarities in the signatures of the supposed
owners that were affixed on the Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed in favor of Lilia Tabang.
The public prosecutor, acting on his observation, asked the court to have the supposed owners summoned.7

Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the petitions voluntarily dismissed without prejudice to their
being re-filed.8

Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions. This time, she changed the fictitious owners’ signatures in
the hope of making them look more varied.9

Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of petitions, respondent executed several documents that
included revocations of SPAs and various affidavits of recovery purportedly signed by the parcels’ (fictitious)
owners. Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels.10

Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of the parcels and
announced that these were for sale.11 Later, respondent succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He received a
total of ?3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales.12
Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit, complainants filed their complaint
directly with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on February 3, 2003. The case was docketed as Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) Case No. 03-1054.

In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven parcels were not fictitious and that they had
voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He added that Lilia Tabang had been merely the broker for the seven parcels
and that she had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the sale of
the seven parcels. He alleged that after she had been refused to be given a "balato," Lilia Tabang had threatened
to defame him and seek his disbarment.13

In her Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2004,14 IBP Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro
found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

In a Resolution dated April 16, 2004,15 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report of Commissioner Navarro.
However, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty to disbarment. Thereafter, the case was referred to
the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

In a Resolution dated September 29, 2004,16 the Supreme Court remanded the case to the IBP. The Court noted
that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by complainants were mere photocopies and affidavits and that
the persons who supposedly executed such documents were neither presented nor subpoenaed. Thus, there
could not have been adequate basis for sustaining the imposition of a penalty as grave as disbarment.

The case was then assigned to Investigating Commissioner Dennis B. Funa. Hearings were conducted on March
22, 2005; October 7, 2005; July 18, 2006; August 29, 2006; November 7, 2006; February 23, 2007; and July 25,
2007.17

The complainants presented several witnesses. One was Dieter Heinze, President of the Swiss American
Lending Corporation.18 Heinze testified that in April 2001, a friend introduced him to respondent who, in turn,
introduced himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the
purchase of a lot priced at ₱900,000.00. His company, however, paid only ₱668,000.00. Heinze noted that his
company withheld payment upon his realization that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim
and upon respondent’s failure to produce Leonor Petronio, the alleged lot owner.

Another of complainants’ witnesses was Atty. Agerico Paras.19 He testified that Heinze introduced him to
respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
They agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at ₱2,300,000.00. He paid for the said parcel in two (2) installments.
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim, he wrote to respondent asking
him to either work on the cancellation of the claim or to reimburse him. He added that respondent was unable to
produce Amelia Andes, the ostensible owner of the parcel he had purchased.

Teodoro Gallinero, another buyer of one of the seven parcels, also testified for complainants.20 He testified that in
February 2001, he was introduced to respondent who claimed that several parcels with a total area of thirty (30)
hectares were owned by his mother. Gallinero agreed to purchase a parcel for the price of ₱2,000,000.00 which
he paid in cash and in kind (L-300 van).

Complainant Lilia Tabang also testified on the matters stated in the Complaint.21

On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa required the complainants to submit their Position Paper. Respondent
filed his Motion for Reconsideration and the Inhibition of Commissioner Funa who, respondent claimed, deprived
him of the chance to cross-examine complainants’ witnesses, and was "bent on prejudicing"22 him.

Commissioner Funa then inhibited himself. Following this, the case was reassigned to Investigating
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco.
In the meantime, with the Supreme Court En Banc’s approval of the IBP-CBD’s Rules of Procedure, it was
deemed proper for an Investigating Commissioner to submit his/her Report and Recommendation based on
matters discussed during the mandatory conferences, on the parties’ Position Papers (and supporting
documents), and on the results of clarificatory questioning (if such questioning was found to be necessary). As
such, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and he was required to file his Position Paper.23

On July 30, 2009, respondent filed his Position Paper.24 Subsequently, the case was deemed submitted for
Commissioner Limpingco’s Report and Recommendation.

In his Position Paper, respondent noted that he filed criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang on account of
Tabang’s statement that she had fabricated the identities of the owners of the seven (7) parcels. He claimed that
since 1996, he had relied on the Torrens Titles of the seven (7) owners who were introduced to him by Lilia
Tabang. He asserted that Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since the SPAs
executed by the parcels’ owners clearly made her a mere agent and him a sub-agent. He also assailed the
authenticity of the public announcements (where he supposedly offered the seven 7 parcels for sale) and
Memorandum of Agreement. He surmised that the signatures on such documents appearing above the name
"Glenn C. Gacott" had been mere forgeries and crude duplications of his own signature.

In his Report and Recommendation dated August 23, 2010,25 Commissioner Limpingco found respondent liable
for gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He likewise noted that respondent was absent in most of the hearings
without justifiable reason, in violation of Rule 12.04 of the CPR.26 He recommended that respondent be disbarred
and his name, stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 adopting the Report of Investigating
Commissioner Limpingco.

On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.28

Respondent then filed his Notice of Appeal with the IBP on August 8, 2011.

On August 17, 2011, respondent filed before the Supreme Court his Urgent Motion for Extension of Time (to file
Petition for Review/Appeal). On September 20, 2011, the Court granted respondent’s Motion and gave him an
extension of thirty (30) days to file his Appeal. The Supreme Court warned respondent that no further extension
will be given. Despite this, respondent filed two (2) more Motions for Extension – the first on September 29, 2011
and the second on November 3, 2011 – both of which were denied by the Court.

Despite the Court’s denials of his Motions for Extension, respondent filed on December 14, 2011 a Motion to
Admit Petition for Review/Appeal (with attached Petition/Appeal). This Motion was denied by the Court on April
17, 2012.

For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment.

After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and recommendation
of Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors. It is clear that respondent committed gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR when he executed the revocations of
SPAs and affidavits of recovery and in arrogating for himself the ownership of the seven (7) subject parcels.

While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the complainant’s own
complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his
offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing. Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his
knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit
action, he instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon
respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment.

Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred for any of the following
grounds:

deceit;
malpractice;
gross misconduct in office;
grossly immoral conduct;
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
violation of the lawyer's oath;
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is proper when lawyers commit gross misconduct, dishonesty,
and deceit in usurping the property rights of other persons. By way of examples:

In Brennisen v. Contawi:29 Respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi was disbarred for having used a spurious SPA to
mortgage and sell property entrusted to him for administration.

In Sabayle v. Tandayag:30 One of the respondents, Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor, was disbarred for having
acknowledged a Deed of Sale in the absence of the purported vendors and for taking advantage of his position
as Assistant Clerk of Court by purchasing one-half (1/2) of the land covered by said Deed of Sale knowing that
the deed was fictitious.

In Daroy v. Legaspi:31 The Court disbarred respondent Atty. Ramon Legaspi for having converted to his personal
use the funds that he received for his clients.

Nevertheless, recourse to disbarment must be done with utmost caution. As this Court noted in Moran v. Moron:32

Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious misconduct,
should no longer remain a member of the bar. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and,
as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons
and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe
– such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end desired.33

Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established that clearly preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify its imposition.34

As explained in Aba v. De Guzman,35 "[p]reponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one
side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."36

Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in determining preponderance of
evidence:

All the facts and circumstances of the case;

The witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which
they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony;
The witnesses’ interest or want of interest and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately
appear in the trial; and

The number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.

In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that respondent committed gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

Specifically, complainants have shown not only through Lilia Tabang’s testimony but more so through the
testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero that:

respondent misrepresented himself as the owner of or having the right to dispose of the subject parcels;

respondent actively sought to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject parcels;

respondent perfected the sales and received the proceeds of the sales – whether in cash or in kind – of the
subject parcels;

such sales were without the consent or authorization of complainants; and

respondent never remitted the proceeds of the sales to complainants.

More importantly, complainants’ witnesses showed that when respondent had been confronted with Lilia
Tabang’s adverse claims and asked to substantiate the identities of the supposed owners of the subject parcels,
he had failed to produce such persons or even show an iota of proof of their existence. In this regard, the
testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero are particularly significant in so far as
they have been made despite the fact that their interest as buyers is contrary to that of complainants’ interest as
adverse claimants.

In contrast, respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.

Respondent’s defense centered on his insistence that the owners of the seven parcels were not fictitious and that
they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. Respondent also evaded the allegations against him by flinging
counter-allegations. For instance, he alleged that Lilia Tabang had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" from the
proceeds of the sale of the subject parcels and that after she had been refused, she threatened to defame
respondent and seek his disbarment. In support of this allegation, he pointed out that he had filed criminal
complaints against Lilia Tabang. He also surmised that the signatures on the subject documents appearing
above the name "Glenn C. Gacott" were mere forgeries and crude duplications of his signature.

Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,37 the burden of proof is vested upon the party who alleges the truth
of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of
the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez38 where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to submit
evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation is sustained.

It was incumbent upon respondent to prove his allegation that the supposed owners of the seven parcels are real
persons. Quite the contrary, he failed to produce the slightest proof of their identities and existence, much less
produce their actual persons. As to his allegations regarding Lilia Tabang’s supposed extortion and threat and the
forgery or crude duplication of his signature, they remain just that – allegations. Respondent failed to aver facts
and circumstances which support these claims.

At best, respondent merely draws conclusions from the documents which form the very basis of complainants’
own allegations and which are actually being assailed by complainants as inaccurate, unreliable, and fraudulent.
Respondent makes much of how Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since her
name does not appear on the parcels’ TCTs39 and how he merely respected the title and ownership of the
ostensible owners.40 Similarly, he makes much of how Lilia Tabang was named as a mere agent in the
SPAs.41 However, respondent loses sight of the fact that it is precisely the accuracy of what the TCTs and SPAs
indicate and the deception they engender that are the crux of the present controversy. In urging this Court to
sustain him, respondent would have us rely on the very documents assailed as fraudulent.

Apart from these, all that respondent can come up with are generic, sweeping, and self-serving allegations of (1)
how he could not have obtained the TCTs from Tabang as "it is a standing policy of his law office not to accept
Torrens title [sic] unless it is related to a court case"42 and because "[he] does not borrow any Torrens title from
anybody and for whatever purpose;"43 (2) how complainants could not have confronted him to demand the return
of the TCTs and how he could not have told them that he lost the TCTs because "[a]s a lawyer, [he] always
respects and recognizes the right of an owner to keep in his custody or possession any of his properties of
value;"44 and (3) how he could not have met and talked with Lilia Tabang for the engagement of his services only
to refuse Lilia Tabang because legal practice constituted his livelihood, and there was no reason for him to refuse
an occasion to earn income.45

Rather than responding squarely to complainants’ allegations, respondent merely embarks on conjectures and
ascribes motives to complainants. He accuses Lilia Tabang of demanding a "balato" of twenty percent (20%)
from the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels, and of threatening to defame him and to seek his disbarment
after she had been refused.  This evasive posturing notwithstanding, what is clear is that respondent failed to
1âwphi1

adduce even the slightest proof to substantiate these claims. From all indications, Lilia Tabang had sufficient
basis to file the present Complaint and seek sanctions against respondent.

Given the glaring disparity between the evidence adduced by complainants and the sheer lack of evidence
adduced by respondent, this Court is led to no other reasonable conclusion than that respondent committed the
acts of which he is accused and that he acted in a manner that is unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful in
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State – the administration of justice – as an
officer of the court."46 Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."47

Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took
advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage on
others. He did so over the course of several years in a sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous
wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has
conducted himself in these proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging complainants’
plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly absenting himself from
the IBP’s hearings without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his Appeal despite his own
failure to comply with the much extended period given to him, thus inviting the Court to be a party in delaying
complainants’ cause. For all his perversity, respondent deserves none of this Court’s clemency.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly violated the Canons of Professional
Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
respondent's personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6470               July 8, 2014
MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ MALIT, Respondent.

Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent Atty. Juvy
Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and
unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

In the Affidavit-Complaint  filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she
1

alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market
stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued
complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of the
local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall was government-
owned. Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and financial
problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999 without
the signature of the lessees. However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been signed by
the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for another copy from respondent. The other contract was a
sale agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant
entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said
agreement, but did not advise complainant that the property was still covered by the period within which it could
not be alienated.

In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently submitted three Special
Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s
secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the principals named therein and bore only the signature of the
named attorneyin-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit corroborated complainant’s
allegations against respondent.2

On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to submit
her comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of notice. 3

In her Comment,  respondent explained thatthe mortgage contract was prepared in the presence of complainant
4

and that the latter had read it before affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently needed the loan
proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was only copied from a similar file in respondent’s computer, and
the phrase "absolute and registered owner" was inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for
disciplinary action, because complainant constructed the subject public market stall under a "Build Operate and
Transfer" contract with the local government unit and, technically, she could be considered its owner. Besides,
there had been a prior mortgage contract over the same property in which complainant was represented as the
property’s absolute owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against
complainant was not the representation ofherself as owner of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it
was free from all liens and encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the prosecutor
found that complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the previous mortgage contract
over the same market stall.

With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the Affidavit-
Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to complainant to accommodate the
latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainant’s
assurance that the lessees would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original copy for the court.
Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.

As regards the purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that complainant was
an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions of that transaction. Actually,
when the purchase agreement was notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement
mentioned nothing about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the property was the subject of a case
pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); complainant was thus notified
of the status of the subject property. Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs submitted by complainant as
additional evidence wereproperly notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the documents that the attorney-in-fact
personally appeared before respondent; hence,the notarization was limited to the former’s participation in the
execution ofthe document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the document must be notarized in
the principal’s place of residence.

An exchange of pleadings ensuedafter respondent submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder, complainant filed
an Urgent Ex-ParteMotion for Submission of Additional Evidence.  Attached thereto were copies of documents
5

notarized by respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the
SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the principal or the
attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures of the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn
Statement; (5) a lease contract that lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an
unsigned insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter toa potential
investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10)an unsigned Consent to Adoption.

After the mandatory conference and hearing, the parties submitted their respective Position Papers.  Notably,
6

respondent’s Position Paper did not tackle the additional documents attached to complainant’s Urgent Ex
ParteMotion.

THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP

In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the
immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two
years for her violation of her oath as such by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties who had
purportedly appeared before her. He accepted respondent’s explanations with respect to the lease agreement,
sale contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the
real estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of Canon 18  and Rule
7

18.03  of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also recommended that she besuspended from the
8

practice of law for six months.

9

The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008, unanimously adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year. 10

Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration  and Second Motion for Reconsideration.  She maintained
11 12

that the additional documents submitted by complainant were inadmissible, as they were obtained without
observing the procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice).  Moreover, the Urgent Ex ParteMotion of complainant was actually a supplemental pleading, which
13

was prohibited under the rules of procedure of the Committee on Bar Discipline; besides, she was not the proper
party to question those documents. Hence, the investigating commissioner should have expunged the documents
from the records, instead of giving them due course. Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances be
considered, specifically the following: absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive;
personal and emotional problems; timely goodfaith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of her
misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings;
character or reputation; remorse; and remoteness of prior offenses.

The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, deniedrespondent’s
motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify a reversal of the IBP’s findings.14

Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago – through a
letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio – transmitted the documents pertaining to the
disbarment Complaint against respondent. 15
THE COURT’S RULING

After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the parties’ submissions in this case,
the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.

Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall first dispose of some
procedural matters raised by respondent.

Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are inadmissible for having
been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was
raised in Tolentino v. Mendoza,  in which the respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth certificates of his
16

illegitimate children as evidence of his grossly immoral conduct, because those documents were obtained in violation
Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993.  Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as follows:
17

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible when it isrelevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules." There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are
relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said
birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the
ruleon confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does itstate that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule
would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides
for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized,
however, that said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person from
interference by the government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we explained that: The Constitutional proscription
enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only
tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted interference by any
department of government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case.
The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's office, can hardly fall
within the ambit of the constitutional proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.

Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as
evidence against respondent, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.

Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for
the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates inquestion, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and
should be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent. 18

Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents
obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly consideredin evidence the other notarized documents
submitted by complainant as additional evidence.

Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-ParteMotion of complainant constitutes a supplemental pleading must
fail as well. As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the
primary pleading. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with
respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.  Accordingly, it cannot
19

be said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant was a supplemental pleading. One of her charges
against respondent is that the latter notarizedincomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease
agreement attached to the Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred from submitting additional
evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint.

Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that she committed misconduct
and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has repeatedlystressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with substantive public interest.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled tofull faith and credit upon its face. It is for
this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his
notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined. 20

Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the
instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline
the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity
of the notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished.  In this 21

case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant
comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage contractdoes not make respondent any less guilty. If at
all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a
breach of Canon 1  and Rules 1.01  and 1.02  of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
22 23 24

Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant sometime in
September 1999  is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she
25

could have given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a
rarityin respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004,
respondent has notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties.
Technically, each document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to
demand that a document be signed in his or her presence. 26

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very same ones who
executed it and who personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what
are stated therein.  Thus, in acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared before her,
27

respondent also violated Rule 10.01  of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that
28

she shall do no falsehood.  Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary
29

public. In several instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were found to be utterly oblivious to
the solemnity of their oath as notaries public.  Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear
30

cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.  The blatmt
31

disregard by respondent of her basic duties as a notary public warrants the less severe punishment of
suspension from the practice of law and perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules 1.01,
1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still
existing, is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as a member of the bar and
furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts of the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5816 March 10, 2015
DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.

Before the Court is an administrative complaint  for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar 0. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the
1

Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen
E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960’s when they
were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in
1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to
court Dr. Perez. 2

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married
the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic
wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.  Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only
3

married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her
pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law
School.4

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his
marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently,
sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez
claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no
longer any impediment to their marriage. 5

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America
(USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic. 6

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that
was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When
she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union
once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also
promised to legally adopt their son.7

Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to
nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the
said petition.
8

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter  in the mail informing her of Atty.
9

Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter  written and
10

signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love
to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his "impediment is removed." Apparently, five months into their
relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to
obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of
his marriage to Gomez. 11

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in
Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen. 12
In a Resolution  dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective comments,
13

which they separately did on November 25, 2002. 14

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,  admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that
15

immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital
obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their
relationship simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty.
Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart could be
implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of property.
She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever value it
may have and comfort it may provide them. 16

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a
Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a
divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the
Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was
granted on June 23, 1984. 17

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by the
Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the
marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus,
Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA. 18

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to
Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of
losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.
19

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in October
2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing. 20

He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez
started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999;
and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise
pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001. 21

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began
courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures; she
told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said
that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his
law firm.
22

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation within 90 days from notice. 23

On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order  setting the mandatory
24

conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the
conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the
pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective position
papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on
October 17, 2003  and October 20, 2003,  respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper  on October 24, 2003.
25 26 27
 Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation,  which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule
28

1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed
out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez
still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The
Investigating Commissioner further opined that:

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig established a
pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt
or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal conduct, must
display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital adventurism
have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head up high and
expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he
failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he
has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a
serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the community. 29

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be
dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of the
alleged affair between the respondents.

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,  which adopted and approved the
30

recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration  of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors,
31

claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He
pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be
supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as
may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating
Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’ testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed the status
of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been transparent with both
Gomez and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution  dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion for
32

reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court
agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,  the Court held:

33

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the
legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and
honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character
expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. This must be so because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust
and confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all."  (Citation omitted)
34

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended
from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or
for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)

"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor."  Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
35

shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of
disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct. 36

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission,
indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but
reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968, which
was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths
crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his
first marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal
partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in
the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven
and earth just so he could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a semblance of legality.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican
Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew
that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly
declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr.
Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It
is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering
that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to
marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the
subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a façade
of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is
reprehensible to the highest degree. 1âwphi1

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order
to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he
finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already
entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be
considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards
immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty.
Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his
previous marriage to Gomez.

"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.’"  In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
37

warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who
has borne him a child. 38

Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his
legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels
the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they are uncorroborated and
not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration.
Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his
previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the Court to
render disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove the
claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to
prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having
an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys
the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
complaint. The evidence required m suspens10n or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. 39

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed
received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of
the allegations therein. Similarly,. the supposed love letter, if at all, only provesAtty.that Catindig wrote Atty.
Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty.
Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A.
Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision
shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all
appellate and trial courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo 1s hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10676               September 8, 2015

ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment  filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the Integrated Bar of the
1

Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April 12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A.
Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other
unscrupulous activities" which cause "undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant claims that
respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct in violation of
the Lawyer's Oath.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP)
College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After
passing the bar examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with
the IBP Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children.
Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with
married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:

a. AAA,  who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which
2

complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;

b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being already
married to Jardiolin;

c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with DDD;

d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin and while
still being romantically .involved with CCC;

e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until the filing of the
Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.
3

Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived CCC and DDD by representing
himself to be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two women to start a love affair with him, when in. truth, he was
then still married to Jardiolin.
4

Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of 1998 to 2000, respondent, as
a lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development
Corporation (KOC). However, despite being a public officer and a government counsel, respondent conspired
with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case,
and, in effect, that of the Philippine Government.5

Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation
proceedings in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was
allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The vehicle was seen
several times by respondent's classmates and officemates being driven and parked by respondent in his own
home and in the OGCC premises itself. 6

In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that respondent was summoned in a
Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation of the
alleged spurious land titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and
Justice & Human Rights Committees recommended that respondent be investigated and prosecuted by the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft and corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary sanction
by this Court for grave misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal Code. 7

It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent even attempted to conceal the
evidence by requesting complainant's parents, spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to have the
Toyota Corolla XL parked in their residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time. Respondent's
request, however, was refused by the spouses when they learned that the vehicle was the subject of the Senate
Inquiry.
8

It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding
probable cause against respondent, and an Information was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation
of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.  Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as
9

an educator in Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll
College, where respondent induced his male students to engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and entertained
the romantic gestures of his female students in exchange for passing grades.  The Petition was docketed as
10

CBD Case No. 07-1973.

In an Order  dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable Rogelio A. Vinluan, required
11

respondent to file his verified answer.

In his undated Answer,  respondent opted not to present any counter-statement of facts in supp01i of his
12

defense. Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition suffers from procedural and substantive infirmities,
claiming that petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations or charges against him. Respondent pointed out that
Annex "J" of the Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked formal requirements, and thus,
should be treated as a mere scrap of paper. Respondent also asserts that the e-mail messages attached to the
petition were inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.  He claims
13

that the identities of the owners of the e-mail messages, as well as the allegations of illicit relations and abuse of
authority, were not properly established. Respondent further argues that the statements of complainant's
witnesses were merely self-serving and deserved scant consideration.

Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer),  stating that the allegations in the complaint were
14

deemed admitted by reason of respondent's failure to make specific or even general denials of such in his
Answer.

In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant),  respondent simply denied all of complainant's accusations
15

in the petition, allegedly for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity
thereof."16

On August 3, 2007, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) set
the case for mandatory conference on August 28, 2007,  which respondent failed to attend. It appears that
17

respondent filed a Motion to Cancel Hearing,  praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference allegedly
18

due to a previously scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was opposed by complainant and
eventually denied by Commissioner Villadolid in his Order  dated August 28, 2007. In the same order,
19

complainant's Manifestation  praying that subpoenas be issued to several persons who shall be complainant's
20

hostile witnesses was granted by Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly, the case was scheduled for the
presentation of complainant's witnesses on September 11, 2007 and the respective subpoenas  were issued.
21

A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,  praying 22

that the Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and that the hearing be reset to sometime during the third
week of October. In said motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or more
commonly known as "sore eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at least one to two weeks while
his eyes are being treated. Attached to his motion were photocopies of two medical certificates, stating that a
certain R. Pangalangan was suffering from sore eyes.

During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed petitioner's motion, arguing that
based on his personal verification with the court personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Parafiaque City, there was no case calendared for hearing on the date of the previous setting. Complainant also
argued that this is another ploy of respondent to delay the proceedings because he knew that complainant
worked overseas and was only in the country for a limited period of time. Finding merit in complainant's
opposition, respondent's motion was denied and complainant was allowed to present his
witnesses.  Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl Miranda (ASG
23

Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T. Litong (Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty.
Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs. Visitacion Ecraela.
ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate Report had recommended the disbarment of respondent.

Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the email messages submitted by
complainant indeed originated from respondent based on their familiarity with respondent, paiiicularly, the email
messages which contained references to his daughter, his relationship with complainant, and respondent's high
blood pressure.

Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as his girlfriend and that sometime
in 2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another girl in Glorietta despite still being married to his wife. Atty.
Litong also recalled encountering respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC, whom she
perceived to be respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed that respondent had, in more than one
occasion, brought with him his students during their drinking sessions and had even one student driving for him.

For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about respondent's preoccupations with
his students. Atty. Corpus also testified that ODD called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her
that the latter had broken up with respondent upon learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus surmised
based on her telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not tell the latter his actual marital status.
Aside from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that during complainant's farewell party in February 2007, respondent
introduced CCC as his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.

To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of their affidavits since their
testimonies were based on the affidavits that complainant included in his petition.

Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory conference/hearing was terminated
and the parties were directed to submit their respective verified position papers with supporting documentary
evidence within thi1iy (30) days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After which, the case was
considered submitted for report and recommendation.

On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation (with Comments),  pertaining to
24

respondent's Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD to formally request for records from Branch
77 of MTC, Parañaque City to verify respondent's claim that he had a hearing in said court during the first
scheduled mandatory conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received complainant's Compliance (with
Comments),  submitting the certified photo copies of the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Resolution
25

dated January 22, 2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information dated June 30, 2003 filed with the
Sandiganbayan.

On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position Paper.  Complainant thereafter filed two
26

Manifestations,  asserting that respondent is already barred from submitting his verified position paper and that
27

any decision or judgment would have to be based solely on complainant's Verified Position Paper. 28

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid rendered a
Report,  finding that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing respondent's gross misconduct affecting
29

his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar.

On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code  and/or RA 3019  as reflected in the
30 31

Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that despite
respondent's denials, complainant was able to present certified true copies of the relevant documents which
support his allegations in the petition.

As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited complainant's asse1iion that
respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on the Rep01i,
complainant was not able to discharge the burden of proving the authenticity of the email messages pertaining to
this adulterous affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However, Commissioner Villadolid found merit in
complainant's claim that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by having illicit relations with ODD,
CCC, and BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable
social institution. is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.

xxxx

4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon I, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that .. a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct"' nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life. behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession".32

Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and recommendation: V.
Conclusion/Recommendations

5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing
Respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member
of the bar, this Commissioner respectfully recommends that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years with a STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform his conduct in a manner
consistent with the norms prescribed by the Canons of Professional Responsibility. 33

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution  adopting and approving, with
34

modification, the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of Governors
disbarred respondent, thus:

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280

CBD Case No. 07-1973

Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.

Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violations of Article XV of
the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is hereby DISBARRED and his name
Ordered Stricken Off from the Roll of Attorneys.

On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration  dated July 3, 2013, to which
35

complainant was required to submit his comment. 36

For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report dated June 28, 2012)  dated
37

August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was required to comment on complainant's motion in an Order  dated38

August 27, 2013. On the same date, complainant filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration).  Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for
39
Reconsideration with Leave  dated September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or
40

Opposition  dated September 20, 2013.

41

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration.  Thereafter, the Director for Bar Discipline forwarded the records of this case to this Court on
42

November 11, 2014. 43

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct, which would warrant his
disbarment.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of Governors' resolution finding that
Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully supported by the evidences offered.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for
the profession.  Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in
44

order to maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. 45

We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension proceedings against a member
of the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of administrative penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.:

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section I of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there
is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the
case; (b) the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts
to which they are testifying. the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of interest. and also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise
doctrine.
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in
favor of the respondent. 46

The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by which respondent has been
found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs. This Court has, in numerous occasions,
revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven to have not only failed to retain good moral character in their
professional and personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the institution of marriage by maintaining illicit
affairs.

In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed disrespect for an institution held
sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his
unfitness to be a lawyer. 47

A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked his privilege to practice law
after his philandering ways was proven by preponderant evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit.  We ruled:
48

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A
member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping a mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the
impression that he is flouting those moral standards.

xxxx

The fact that respondent s philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not save
the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the
actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with
which his license and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaw, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27,
Rule 138. of the Rules of Court are not !imitative and are broad enough to. cover any misconduct x x x of a
lawyer in his professional or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.49

Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig,  the Court disbarred respondent
50

Atty. Catindig for blatantly and purposefully disregarding our laws on marriage by resorting to various legal
strategies to render a facade of validity to his invalid second marriage, despite the existence of his first marriage.
We said:

The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance. which makes 'a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage." In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who
has borne him a child.  (emphasis ours.)
51

In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit relations with
both married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through
documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses
presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with DOD and CCC by preponderant
evidence. Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the same were not sufficiently
established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's petition contains self-serving averments
not supported by evidence. Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and, instead,
questioned the admissibility of the supporting documents.  Due to respondent's own failure to attend the hearings
1âwphi1
and even submit his own position paper, the existence of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain
uncontroverted.

The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically A1iicle XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.  (emphasis in the original.)
52

Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid' s findings that respondent
violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Rule I 0.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 10 - A LA WYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 -A
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.

xxx

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.

In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate Inquiry and had a pending case
for graft and corruption against him with the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees to
be investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the same as contained in their "Committee Final Report No.
367" herein attached as Annex D;

14. Respondent has also been recommended by the abovementioned committees to suffer the penalty of
disbarment, among others, as evidenced by the herein attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for graft
and corruption against him is still pending with the Sandiganbayan." 53

Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer that complainant failed to adduce
additional evidence that a case had been filed against him, and that complainant's statements were merely self-
serving averments not substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically denied
complainant's averments for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity
thereof."

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report, viz:

4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were made in attempt to mislead this
Commission. Respondent could have easily admitted or denied said allegations or explained the same, as he
(sic) clearly had knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose to take advantage of Complainant's position of being
not present in the country and not being able to acquire the necessary documents, skirt the issue, and mislead
the Commission. In doing so, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03
thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."
4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor
required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. In view of the foregoing, the
Commission finds that Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he should be disciplined.  (emphasis in the original.)
54

In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to mislead the IBP, which intention
was more so established because complainant was able to submit supporting documents in the form of certified
true copies of the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.

We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated the lawyer's oath which he took
before admission to the Bar, which states:

I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines: I will support
its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same: I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God.

In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of marriage,
and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate
in the proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of the
bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors approving and adopting, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross immorality
and of violating Section 2 of A1iicle XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03,
and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan with the
Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let
copies of this Decision be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the
Cou1i Administrator to all the cou1is in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457               February 3, 2015

MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.

Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio
(Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in the Court's
Resolution dated 30 September 2014.

A.C. No. 7973

On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar Confidant.
The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu.
They had two children, Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a dentist
and practiced his profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the
annulment of their marriage, which was eventually granted.

Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed
an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case,
Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007,
Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned abouthis return, Sesbreño filed a
Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that
Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño
should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.

In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar complaint against him before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-
2273. Sesbreño alleged that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he
acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.

In the Court’s Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation.

A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)

A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against
Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous conviction for
homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not
fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by
continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the
directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging basically the same
facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973.

In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with the
inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty
was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that
homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme
malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.

The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties agreed on the sole issue to
be resolved: whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD ruled that the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu found Sesbreño guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. On appeal, this Court downgraded the crime to homicide and sentenced Sesbreño to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of
reclusion temporalas maximum. The IBP-CBD found that Sesbreño was released from confinement on 27 July
2001 following his acceptance of the conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001.

The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension.
Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission,  the IBPCBD further ruled
1

that homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD
reviewed the decision of this Court convicting Sesbreño for the crime of homicide, and found that the
circumstances leading to the death of the victim involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:

Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher Yapchangco was shown to be a foe of
respondent and neither had the victim Luciano nor his companion Christopher shown to have wronged the
respondent. They simply happened to be at the wrong place and time the early morning of June 3, 1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent, bear the earmarks of moral
turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the respondent, by his
conduct, displayed extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. Respondent acted like a god who deserved
not to be slighted by a couple of drunks who may have shattered the stillness of the early morning with their
boisterous antics, natural display of loud bravado of drunken men who had one too many. Respondent’s
inordinate over reaction to the ramblings of drunken men who were not even directed at respondent reflected
poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent was not only vindictive without a cause;
he was cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority. 2

Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon  where the respondent was disbarred for having been
3

convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred and his name stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys.

In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

On 6 May 2013, Sesbreño filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD. Sesbreño alleged that the IBP-
CBD misunderstood and misapplied Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged that the attendant circumstances in
Sorianoare disparate, distinct, and different from his case. He further alleged that there was no condition set on
the grant of executive clemency to him; and thus, he was restored to his full civil and political rights. Finally,
Sesbreño alleged that after his wife died in an ambush, he already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in
the case for bigamy against Garcia and that he already advised his clients to settle their other cases. He alleged
that Garcia already withdrew the complaints against him.

On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2014-31 denying Sesbreño’s
motion for reconsideration. The IBPCBD transmitted the records of the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant on
20 May 2014. CBD Case No. 08-2273 was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the Court’s Resolution dated 30
September 2014, the Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457.

The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12
February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as
attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that
disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.  Moral
4

turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or
to society in general, contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.5

The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was discussed by this Court in
International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC  where it ruled:
6

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude.  Homicide may or
1âwphi1

may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every
criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a
crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve
moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows
therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the
process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.7
In People v. Sesbreño,  the Court found Sesbreño guilty of homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE, the assailed
8

decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is hereby
MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreñois hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a
prison term of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal, as a maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Luciano Amparado in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. 9

We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances show the
presence of moral turpitude.

The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion Christopher
Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just passed by Sesbreño’s house when the latter, without any
provocation from the former, went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and started firing at them. According to
Yapchangco, theywere about five meters, more or less, from the gate of Sesbreño when they heard the
screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around, they saw Sesbreño aiming his rifle at them.
Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes),
recalled that he heard shots and opened the window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and Amparado running
away while Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes’ house in the process. Another witness,
Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being shot, then saw Sesbreño in the middle of the street, carrying
a long firearm, and walking back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and
Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing
done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado.

We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights.
Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio  to bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty. Parcasio was granted "an absolute
10

and unconditional pardon"  which restored his "full civil and political rights,"  a circumstance not present inthese
11 12

cases. Here, the Order of Commutation  did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional. The
13

accessory penalties were not mentioned when the original sentence was recited in the Order of Commutation
and they were also not mentioned in stating the commuted sentence. It only states: By virtue of the authority
conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the
original sentence of prisoner RAUL SESBREÑO Y HERDA convicted by the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and
Supreme Court and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from 9 years and 1 day to 16 years and 4
months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an indeterminate prison
term of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00. 14

Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional and restored Sesbreño
to his full civil and political rights.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves,
commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.  In this case, the
15

executive clemency merely "commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years
imprisonment" the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty.  Commutation
16

only partially extinguished criminal liability.  The penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He served
17

the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. More importantly, the Final
Release and Discharge  stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory penalties of the law as have not
18

been expressly remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no application here. Even if
Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a full and unconditional
pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege.  It is granted only to those possessing good
19

moral character.  A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
20

appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment. 21

WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately upon his receipt of this
Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts all over the
country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10134               November 26, 2014

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), represented by its President, ATTY.
VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, Respondent.

This resolves the complaint for suspension or disbarment filed by the Philippine Association of Court Employees
(PACE) through its president, Atty. Virginia C. Rafael (Atty. Rafael), on July 17, 2008 against Atty. Edna M.
Alibutdan-Diaz (Atty. Diaz), former National Treasurer of PACE, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).1

PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees in the Judiciary held its 11th National
Convention/Seminar in Davao City from October 6 to 8, 2005. As then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty. Diaz
was entrusted with all the money matters of PACE.

The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention was submitted by Atty. Diaz
only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national convention in Iloilo City ; that during the 12th convention,
2

an election of officers was conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position of National Treasurer, but she was not
elected; that on the last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007,the outgoing Board of Directors, including
Atty. Diaz, passed and approved Resolution No. 1-2007 appropriating the amount of 30,000.00as term-end
bonus for each PACE official qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for the 12th
convention; that there was no turn over of monies belonging to the association as a matter of procedure despite a
letter of demand, dated June 20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz;  and that the new set of PACE officers issued Board
3

Resolution No. 00-07 directing past president, Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why
they failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for the Davao and Iloilo conventions. 4

In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 11th national
convention in Davao in less than a week after the said convention; that it was duly audited by the national auditor,
Letecia Agbayani; that the net proceeds of that convention was "fully accounted, liquidated and entirely deposited
to PACE accounts;"  that she also filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 12th national convention on May 22,
5

2007; that the report, together with the cash, checks and original receipts, were received by Rosita Amisola and
witnessed by former PACE officers;  that she denied running for re-election as PACE national treasurer during
6

the Iloilo convention as she had already filed her certificate of candidacy for Board Member of the First District of
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay;  that the approval of the ₱30,000.00 term-end bonus did not rest with her solely, rather,
7

it was approved by the previous board of directors; and that she never sponsored the bonus, as it was initiated by
Aliven Maderaza and seconded by Atty. Lourdes Garcia and Sarah Ampong.

On her part, Atty. Garcia averred that she was not privy to the disbursement of the said term-end bonus. 8

Initially, the case was assigned to IBP Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano. After an exchange of pleadings, the
mandatory conference was held. Afterwards, the protagonists were directed to submit their respective position
papers. Thereafter, the case was re-assigned to IBP Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner
Fernandez). 9

The lone issue here is whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which reads:
"A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28, 2010, Commissioner Fernandez recommended the dismissal
of the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of merit. Atty. Diaz offered documentary evidence to show that she was
able to submit the liquidation reports for the two aforementioned conventions of PACE. He also took note that
Atty. Rafael herself acknowledged the liquidation report made by Atty. Diaz with respect to the Davao City
convention.  As to the sufficiency and completeness of these reports, this would be better resolvedthrough an
10

audit rather than in disbarment proceedings.  Besides, Commissioner Fernandez did not consider the position of
1âwphi1

Atty. Diaz as national treasurer of PACE to have any connection with her being as a lawyer. Thus, according to
him, she should be sanctioned in accordance with the by-laws of PACE instead of a disbarment case. 11

As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz ran for re-election in the PACE elections even though she was no
longer connected with the Judiciary and therefore disqualified, Commissioner Fernandez opined that the best
evidence, which was the "certificate of candidacy," was never offered,  and that Atty. Diaz, being a lawyer, knew
12

that her bid for re-election would be a useless exercise since she would not beable to assume office if she won. 13

Finally, Commissioner Fernandez believed Atty. Diaz’s assertion that she never sponsored the appropriation of
the 30,000.00 term-end bonus and that the approval of Resolution No. 1-2007 was a collegial action among the
Board of Directors. Again, Commissioner Fernandez was of the view that her participation in the passage of the
questioned board resolution was not connected to her being a lawyer. 14

On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) passed a resolution adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, and dismissed the complaint against Atty. Diaz. 15

On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the Extended Resolution,16 dated June 21, 2013, granting the
complainant’s motion for reconsideration. It reversedand set asideits earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz
from the practice of law for one (1) year. 17

The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz’ liquidation of PACE funds;(ii) her running for
re-election when she was no longer with the Judiciary; and (iii) her entitlement to the term-end bonus when she
was no longer working in the Judiciary, constituted a "triple -whammy" of questionable actions  committed by
18

Atty. Diaz in contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended Resolution. Everyone should keep
in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is definitely not a right. Inorder to enjoy this privilege, one
must show that he possesses, and continues to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege.

One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very
essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the
highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their
clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth
and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts
and their clients.  Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted only to those of good
19

moral character. The Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus, lawyers must conduct
themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a
violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment. 20

It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession which society entrusts with
the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. For this, he or she is an exemplar for others to emulate
and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been
exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. They are always
expected to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of this noble
profession.21

Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election, including her non-
admission that she ran for said election as shown not by her certificate of candidacy but by the affidavits of
former PACE officers; and her involvement in the approval or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of
PACE officers, including herself even though she was no longer working in the Judiciary, were definitely not the
candor the Court speaks of. There was much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
months.

This decision shall be immediately executory.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for its distribution to all courts of the land; the
IBP; and the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into respondent's personal records as a member of the
Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10576               January 14, 2015

ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.

Before us is a complaint  for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine Antenor-Cruz Limpin
1

for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
thus violating Canon 1  and Rule 1.01  of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
2 3

The facts are culled from the pleadings.

In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as President
of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his post effective
August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Luke's Medical Center as the Vice President for Finance.

On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation
under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for "updating purposes". The GIS  identified Guarin as
4

Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President.

Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December 18, 2008, LCI applied for
voluntary dissolution with the SEC.

On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing
him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned
and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He also
never received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken up. He has
never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.

Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD
and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It would have
been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred
that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served to attest to the information
from the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008. 5

She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October 13, 2008, she sent
Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so hemay sign a Deed of Assignment concerning
shareholdings. Guarin responded in the affirmative and said that he would meet with her on Friday, October 17,
2008. Guarin, however, neglected to show up at the arranged time and place for reasons unknown to Atty.
Limpin. On the strength of Guarin’s positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November 27, 2008.

To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented Secretary’s Certificates dated
May 16, 2006  , May 22, 2006  , and June 13, 2007  bearing Guarin’s signature.
6 7 8

Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the directors and officers of
LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et al.  and SEC v. 9

Legacy Card, Inc.  In those proceedings, Guarin raised as a defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was
10

spurious and/or perjured. She averred that this Court held that "when the criminal prosecution based on the same
act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the
outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings."  During the mandatory preliminary conference,
11

however, both parties stipulated that the complaint filed by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to Guarin. 12

Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant disbarment.  She stated
1âwphi1

that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as proof of any unethical conduct, harassment and
malpractice.

In its Report,  the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02  of the CPR and thus
13 14

recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three months. It noted that based on the
submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible tobe a
member of the BOD. Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere signatory
of LCI’s bank accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin untrue. 15

Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint or designate directors or
officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this procedure was not legally permissible. Despite knowing this
to be irregular, she allowed herself to be dictated upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder,
chairman and president of the company. The Secretary’s Certificates with Guarin’s signature Atty. Limpin
presented were of no moment since inthese Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of bank accounts and
these do not show that Guarin was a stockholder.

The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution  adopted in totothe CBD Report. Atty. Limpin moved
16

for reconsideration  but was denied in the March 21, 2014 Resolution  of the IBP Board of Governors.
17 18

We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01and Rule 1.02
of the CPR.

Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, ratherthan seek
exceptions as loopholes.  A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the
19

law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer. 20

Disbarment proceedings are sui generisand can proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.  As Justice
1âwphi1

Malcolm stated "[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a
clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the
charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." 21
Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27,  Rule 138 of the Rules of
22

Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and (2)
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice.

After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP that there is no
indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the
BOD and be the president of the company.  It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a
23

stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also
contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin
believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We
also note that there was no submission which would support the allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder.
We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which did
not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR. 1âwphi1

We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de los
Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in the
Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the
CPR.

However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin's action m submitting a false document we see it fit to
increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C.
Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal
record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7766               August 5, 2014

JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant, vs. PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.

For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint  for disbarment dated February 1, 2008 filed by
1

complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S. Diamante (respondent), charging him of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s oath for fabricating and using a spurious
court order, and for failing to keep his client informed of the status of the case.

The Facts

On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan, secured the
services of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis
and Natividad Valencia-Tan.  After accepting the engagement, respondent filed the corresponding
2

complaint  before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-
3

11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed by the RTC in an Order  dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of
4

action and insufficiency of evidence.  While respondent was notified of such dismissal as early as August 14,
5

2007,  complainant learned of the same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office.  On such
6 7

occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the amount of ₱10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other
costs, but since complainant could not produce the said amount at that time, respondent, instead, asked and was
given the amount of ₱500.00 purportedly as payment of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal
before the RTC.  On September 12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of ₱10,000.00 to respondent, who on even
8

date, filed a notice of appeal  before the RTC.

9 10

In an Order  dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal for having been filed beyond
11

the reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent, however, did not disclose such fact and, instead,
showed complainant an Order  dated November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007
12

Order) directing the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15
days from receipt of the notice. Considering the technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant
proceeded to the RTC and requested for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was then that he
discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTC’s Clerk of
Court.  Complainant also found out that, contrary to the representations of respondent, his appeal had long been
13

dismissed.  Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent.
14

In his Comments/Compliance  dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was complainant’s failure to
15

timely produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the appeal fees that resulted in the late filing of his appeal.
According to him, he informed complainant of the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter
insisted in pursuing the same. He also claimed to have assisted complainant "not for money or malice" but being
a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the court’s unfavorable decision. 16

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation  dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
17

Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly recommended that the
penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year be meted out against him. 18

The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against respondent to be well-founded,

observing that instead of meeting complainant’s allegations squarely, particularly, the issue of the nondisclosure
of the dismissal of the partition case, respondent sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly had an effect
on the issues at hand. 19

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondent’s accusation that the spurious
November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant, ratiocinating that it was respondent who was motivated to
fabricate the same to cover up his lapses that brought about the dismissal of complainant’s appeal and make it
appear that there is still an available relief left for Tan. 20

In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the
aforesaid report and recommendation. 21

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating
the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the modification of
the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client constantly updated on the
developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence, to wit:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to client’s request for information.

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important information he may
have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to
decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case
will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the
client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests.  In this connection, the lawyer must
22

constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client.
Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a
client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence
but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause. 23

In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of the dismissal of
complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to inform complainant of such
dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office. To add
insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing complainant’s appeal only on September 12, 2007,
or way beyond the reglementary period therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed
to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such
matters of professional employment. 24

Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by fabricating the November 9,
2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it appear that complainant’s appeal had been
given due course, when in truth, the same had long been denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part of
complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,  failing in which whether in his personal or private capacity, he
25

becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law.  A lawyer’s inexcusable neglect to serve his client’s interests
26

with utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in
order to conceal such neglect should never be countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.

In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to keep complainant
in the dark and conceal his case’s true status through the use of a falsified court order evidently constitutes Gross
Misconduct.  His acts should not just be deemed as unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
27

dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.  In this regard, the Court’s
28

pronouncement in Sebastian v. Calis  is instructive, viz.:

29

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer.  They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s relationship with others should be characterized by the
1âwphi1

highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is
not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of
the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a
condition precedent to the admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his
professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders
him unfit to continue in the practice of law.  (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
30
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their clients of the status of their
respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of six (6) months. In Mejares v. Romana,  the Court
31

suspended the lawyer for the same period for his failure to timely and adequately inform his clients of the
dismissal of their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.,  the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer
32

who consistently failed to update his client of the status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.

However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by falsifying documents,
the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In Brennisen v. Contawi,  the Court
33

disbarred the lawyer who falsified a special power of attorney in order to mortgage and sell his client’s property.
Also, in Embido v. Pe,  the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who falsified an in existent
34

court decision for a fee.

As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his client, i.e.,
complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his case, when in reality, his case had long been dismissed
for failure to timely file an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondent’s acts are
so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to
discharge his duties as a member of the bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the
legal profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused to
his client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct and violations of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is
ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in this Court. Further, let
copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J March 11, 2014

Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC. (REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH B.
USITA) AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON.
SESINANDO E. VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO

Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade their judicial office, and interfere with the
due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The complainant may be held liable for indirect contempt of court
as a means of vindicating the integrity and reputation of the judges and the Judiciary.

AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative complaint against Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser,
Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, all members of the Court of
Appeals (CA), charging them with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of
their oaths on account of their promulgation of the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994 entitled Wack Wack
Residents Association, Inc. v. The Honorable Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in San
Juan, and AMA Land, Inc.

Antecedents

AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium project located along Epifanio Delos Santos
Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack, Mandaluyong City.  Due to the project’s location, AMALI would
1

have to use Fordham Street as an access road and staging area for the construction activities. In that regard,
AMALI needed the consent of the Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent a
notice to WWRAI, which ignored the notice. Left with no option, AMALI set up a field office along Fordham Street
that it enclosed with a temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the field office and set up a fence to
deny access to AMALI’s construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file a petition for the enforcement of an
easement of right of way in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City. The petition, which included an
application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI), was
docketed as Civil Case No. 65668.  On July 24, 1997, the RTC granted AMALI’s prayer for the WPMI.
2 3

In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium project into a 34-storey building of mixed use (to be known
as the AMA Residences) after AMALI’s petition for corporate rehabilitation was approved. 4

On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No. 65668 an urgent motion to set for hearing its prayer for a
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) contained in its answer. The denial of the prayer for injunction by
the RTC impelled WWRAI to bring a petition for certiorari with an application for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction in the CA to enjoin the RTC from proceeding in Civil Case No. 65668. 5

After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted AMALI to file an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve
Temporary Restraining Order and later on a Compliance and Motion for Reconsideration.

On July 28, 2011, the CA issued a preliminary injunction and required AMALI to file its Comment. AMALI
complied and filed a Comment which also served as its motion for partial reconsideration of the July 28, 2011
Resolution. On October 12, 2011, AMALI filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve and to Approve Counterbond.
Allegedly, these motions were left unresolved when the CA Tenth Division, which included Associate Justices
Bueser and Rosario, required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 6

On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a decision granting the petition of
WWRAI. 7

AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on certiorari in this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 202342, entitled
AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. 8

AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had conspired with the
counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and Atty. Myra Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in rendering
an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious
and deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, respondent Justices were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.

Issue

Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01;
Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court?

Ruling

The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the complaint by
substantial evidence.  Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the complaint for its lack of merit. This is
9

because an administrative charge against any official of the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial
evidence.  But when the charge equates to a criminal offense, such that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy
10

sanctions of dismissal from the service, the showing of culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be
nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal in character. 11
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment against
respondent Justices.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense. Article 204, Revised Penal Code,
provides that any judge who "knowingly render[s] an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision" is
punished with prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender must be
a judge who is adequately shown to have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely committed an error
of judgment or taken the unpopular side of a controversial point of law.  The term knowingly means "sure
12

knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice."  Thus, the complainant must not only prove
13

beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by the evidence but that it
was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge of rendering an
unjust decision.  In other words, the judge was motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or some other similar motive
14

in issuing the judgment.  Bad faith is, therefore, the ground for liability.  The failure of the judge to correctly
15 16

interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him
administratively liable.
17

But who is to determine and declare that the judgment or final order that the judicial officer knowingly rendered or
issued was unjust? May such determination and declaration be made in administrative investigations and
proceedings like a preliminary investigation by the public prosecutor? The answers to these queries are obvious
– only a superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial actions
involved may make such determination and declaration. Otherwise, the public prosecutor or administrative
hearing officer may be usurping a basic judicial power of review or supervision lodged by the Constitution or by
law elsewhere in the appellate court.

Moreover, AMALI’s allegations directly attacked the validity of the proceedings in the CA through an
administrative complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the pernicious practice by disgruntled litigants and
their lawyers of resorting to administrative charges against sitting judges instead of exhausting all their available
remedies. We do not tolerate the practice. In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the
Board/CEO of FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.,
Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals,  we emphatically
18

held that the filing of administrative complaints or even threats of the filing subverted and undermined the
independence of the Judiciary, to wit:

It is evident to us that Ongjoco’s objective in filing the administrative complaint was to take respondent Justices to
task for the regular performance of their sworn duty of upholding the rule of law. He would thereby lay the
groundwork for getting back at them for not favoring his unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at
all, for even a mere threat of administrative investigation and prosecution made against a judge to influence or
intimidate him in his regular performance of the judicial office always subverts and undermines the independence
of the Judiciary.

We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought
against any judge in relation to the performance of his official functions are neither complementary to nor
suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved
should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions. (Bold emphasis supplied)

It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against judicial officers who rule against it in its cases. That
impression is not at all devoid of basis.  The complaint herein is actually the second one that AMALI has brought
1âwphi1

against respondent Justices in relation to the performance of their judicial duty in the same case. In its first
complaint entitled Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E.
Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,  AMALI accused respondent
19

Justices of: (a) dishonesty and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, gross misconduct, and knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment or order, in violation of Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; and (b) violating provisions of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court dismissed the first complaint upon finding that it centered on the
propriety of the interlocutory orders issued by respondent Justices in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994. The Court
appropriately observed:

A perusal of the records of the case as well as the parties’ respective allegations disclosed that the acts
complained of relate to the validity of the proceedings before the respondent CA Justices and the propriety of
their orders in CA-G.R. SP No. 118994 which were done in the exercise of their judicial functions. Jurisprudence
is replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions
cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial
remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against justices do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial
remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved
by their erroneous orders or judgments.

xxxx

In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for review on certiorari challenging the questioned order of the
respondent CA justices which is still pending final action by the Court. Consequently, a decision on the validity of
the proceedings and propriety of the orders of the respondent CA Justices in this administrative proceeding
would be premature. Besides, even if the subject decision or portions thereof turn out to be erroneous,
administrative liability will only attach upon proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated
by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to exist in
this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial.
In the same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a
party. Here, other than AMALI’s bare and self-serving claim that respondent CA Justices "conspired with
WWRAI’s counsel in knowingly and in bad faith rendering an unjust judgment and in committing xxx other
misconduct," no act clearly indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for the claim that respondent CA
Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the respondent judge has regularly
performed his duties shall prevail. Moreover, the matters raised are best addressed to the evaluation of the Court
in the resolution of AMALI’s petition for review on certiorari.

Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the judicial issues involved
constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice and further clog the courts’ dockets. Those who seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to ignore
basic legal rules and abuse of court processes in their efforts to vindicate their rights. (Bold emphasis supplied)

This administrative case is no different from the first. They are identical, with the complaint herein containing only
a few but insignificant changes in relation to the first. Both were intended to intimidate or to disparage respondent
Justices in the performance of their judicial functions.

The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by AMALI was not only repulsive, but also an outright
disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court. Unfounded administrative charges against judges truly
degrade the judicial office, and interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. Although the
Court did not then deem fit to hold in the first administrative case AMALI or its representative personally
responsible for the unfounded charges brought against respondent Justices, it is now time, proper and imperative
to do so in order to uphold the dignity and reputation of respondent Justices, of the CA itself, and of the rest of
the Judiciary. AMALI and its representatives have thereby demonstrated their penchant for harassment of the
judges who did not do its bidding, and they have not stopped doing so even if the latter were sitting judges. To
tolerate the actuations of AMALI and its representatives would be to reward them with undeserved impunity for
an obviously wrong attitude towards the Court and its judicial officers.

Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being held to account or to answer for performing his
judicial functions and office because such performance is a matter of public duty and responsibility. The office
and duty to render and administer justice area function of sovereignty, and should not be simply taken for
granted. As a recognized commentator on public offices and public officers has written: 20
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil action can be sustained
against a judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one claiming to have been injured by the officer’s judicial
action within his jurisdiction. From the very nature of the case, the officer is called upon by law to exercise his
judgment in the matter, and the law holds his duty to the individual to be performed when he has exercised it,
however erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it may appear either to the party or to others.

A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been advanced in support of this rule. Thus it is said of the
judge: "His doing justice as between particular individuals, when they have a controversy before him, is not the
end and object which were in view when his court was created, and he was selected to preside over or sit in it.
Courts are created on public grounds; they are to do justice as between suitors, to the end that peace and order
may prevail in the political society, and that rights may be protected and preserved. The duty is public, and the
end to be accomplished is public; the individual advantage or loss results from the proper and thorough or
improper and imperfect performance of a duty for which his controversy is only the occasion. The judge performs
his duty to the public by doing justice between individuals, or, if he fails to do justice as between individuals, he
may be called to account by the State in such form and before such tribunal as the law may have provided. But
as the duty neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil redress, as for an individual injury, is not admissible."
21

Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI’s authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita, its Senior Assistant Vice
President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of AMALI who had authorized Usita to file the present
complaint, to show cause in writing why they should not be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the
unfounded and baseless charges against respondent Justices not only once but twice. To be clear, the filing of
unfounded and baseless administrative charges against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt
under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:

(a)Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;

(b)Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act
of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process
of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such
real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting
direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d)Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice;

(e)Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f)Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g)The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an
order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the
respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)
Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association
of the Philippines:
22

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad
sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an
interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to
disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense,
contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is
generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted by statute. It lies
at the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the
power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to
their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution.
The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for
the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration
of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the
stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.  (Bold emphasis supplied)
23

ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint against Associate Justice Danton Q.
Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario for its utter lack of merit;
and (b) ORDERS Joseph B. Usita, the Senior Assistant Vice President of AMA Land, Inc., and all the members of
the Board of Directors of AMA Land, Inc. who had authorized Usita to bring the administrative complaint against
respondent Associate Justices to show cause in writing within 10 days from notice why they should not be
punished for indirect contempt of court for degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate Justices, and for
interfering with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015

SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.
The Case

This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure to
comply with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar
Matter No. 850.

The Antecedent Facts

In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the attention of this
Court to the practice of respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption under process" in
his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and "MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. Complainant informed the Court that he inquired from
the MCLE Office about the status of respondent's compliance and received the following
Certification, dated 2 January 2013, from Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano), MCLE's
Executive Director: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll Number 14118 of IBP
MIS AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850 for the
following compliance periods: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

a. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)

b. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -April 14, 2007)
 c. Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -April 14, 2010)

This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application for Exemption from the MCLE
requirement on (sic) January 2009 but was DENIED by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic) its
January 14, 2009 meeting.1

In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE Committee for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive
Officer of the MCLE Office, forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case together with the MCLE
Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and Recommendation. 2 In its Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation3 dated 14 August 2013,4 the MCLE Governing Board, through retired Supreme
Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE Chairman, informed the Court
that respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods covering 15
April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007, respectively, on the ground of
"expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing Board
denied the request on 14 January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that
respondent neither applied for exemption nor complied with the Third Compliance period from 15
April 2007 to 14 April 2010.

In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division  Clerk of Court to
furnish respondent with complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The Court likewise required
respondent to file his comment within ten days from notice.

In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that he did not
receive a copy of the 5 August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was wondering why
his application for exemption could not be granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a
formal denial of his application for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the notice
sent by Prof. Feliciano was based on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and
Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents, the Romualdo family. Respondent
alleged that the Romualdo family controlled Camiguin and had total control of the judges and
prosecutors in the province. He further alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in
Camiguin except for himself.

Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law
for about 50 years. He stated:

xxxx

Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM
PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, offered, immediately after she took over government in
February 1986, a seat as Justice of the Supreme Court but I refused the intended appointment
because I did not like some members of the Cory crowd to get me to the SC in an effort to buy my
silence;

Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO in the canvassing of the
results of the 1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally
resulted to the EDSAI revolution;

xxxx

Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in the
national canvassing before the National Canvassing Board when she ran for President against then
GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN
CUEVAS;

Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP CASES for leading generals like
ABENINA and COMMENDAOR and COLONELS like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the SIX
OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, including now SENATOR ANTONIO TRILL ANES;

Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and validity of the
2010 national elections, still undecided up to this day;

Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality
and legality of the Corona impeachment which the SC only decided after the Senate decided his
case and former SC Chief Justice Corona conceding to the decision, thus the SC declaring the case
moot and academic;

Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws as GOVERNOR
OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and the senior member of the Opposition
in the regular Parliament in the Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional Amendments;

Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election
Law;

Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that prepared and
orchestrated the debate in the complaint for impeachment against PRESIDENT FERDINAND
MARCOS;

Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now with appearances before the
Supreme Court when Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL REYES; in the Court of
Appeals; and numerous courts all over the country;

Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions from the
MCLE;

x x x x6

Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From Marcos to Arroyo;
(2) Presidentiables and Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning, Hope and Change; (4) Ideas,
Principles and Lost Opportunities; and (5) Corona Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a
reconsideration of the notice for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption from MCLE
compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while complying with the
MCLE requirements.

In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and Comment to the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported that respondent
applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods on the ground of expertise in
law. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed
respondent of the denial of his application in a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC reported that
according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be exempted (from compliance) pursuant to
expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the applicant must submit
sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his expertise in a certain area of law." The
OBC reported that respondent failed to meet the requirements necessary for the exemption.

The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to indicate in all their
pleadings filed with the courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption pursuant to 6ar Matter No. 1922. The OBC further reported that the MCLE Office has no
record that respondent filed a motion for reconsideration; and thus, his representation in a
pleading that his "MCLE Application for Exemption [is] for Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.

The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE requirements shall result to the
dismissal of the case and the striking out of the pleadings from the records. 7 The OBC also
reported that under Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, a member of the Bar
who failed to comply with the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of notification to
explain his deficiency or to show his compliance with the requirements. Section 12(e) also provides
that a member who fails to comply within the given period shall pay a non-compliance fee of
PI,000 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-
Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013. The OBC also reported that on 14 August
2013, the MCLE Governing Board recommended that cases be filed against respondent in
connection with the pleadings he filed without the MCLE compliance/exemption number for the
immediately preceding compliance period and that the pleadings he filed be expunged from the
records.

The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated
that respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his
clients because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off from the records and considered invalid.

The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of
non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for six months with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended that
respondent be directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing Board.

The Issue

The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with
the MCLE requirements.

The Ruling of this Court

Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure
that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of
the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law." 8 The First Compliance Period was
from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14
April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
Complainant's letter covered respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 which
means respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance
Period from 15 April 2010 to 14 April 2013.

The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four compliance
periods. The records also showed that respondent filed an application for exemption only on 5
January 2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board, respondent's application for exemption
covered the First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for exemption for the
Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's application for
exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the application did not meet the requirements
of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Office failed
to convey the denial of the application for exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only
informed respondent, through its letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it
received inquiries from complainant, Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial
Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent's MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October 2013, which the MCLE Governing
Board denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was
sent to respondent in a letter9 dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo.

Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter No.
850. His application for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the
compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He
furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February 2012 10 to the MCLE Office asking the office to
act on his application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the MCLE
Office.11 He did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.

In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the
requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November 2013
letter denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his application for exemption. The OBC
also reported that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013. Under
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60 days from receipt of the
notification to comply. However, in his Compliance and Comment before this Court, respondent
stated that because of his involvement in public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he
could comply with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and that he already
registered with the MCLE Program of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.

Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:

Section 12. Compliance Procedures

xxxx

(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or
evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.

A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will receive a Non-
Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the receipt
of the notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements.
Such notice shall be written in capital letters as follows:

YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF

COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE
SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED
TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE
MCLE COMMITTEE.

The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE requirement.
Credit units earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior
period requirement unless units in excess of the requirement are earned in which case the excess
may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.

A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-
compliance fee of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the IBP
Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 13 9-A
of the Rules of Court shall apply.

Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only
cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third,
and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First
Compliance Period.

The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the requirements
of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his application for exemption, filed after the compliance
periods, would be granted. He purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his
application but claimed that his secretary forgot to send the letter. He now wants the Court to
again reconsider the MCLE Office's denial of his application for exemption when his motion for
reconsideration was already denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November
2013. He had the temerity to inform the Court that the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14
February 2014, which was beyond the 60-day period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, and without even indicating when he intended to comply with his
deficiencies br the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to
allow him to continue practicing law while complying with the MCLE requirements.

The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application for
exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office three years to inform respondent of the denial of
his application. The MCLE Office only informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it received
inquiries regarding the status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period when
respondent indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings, he was not
aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board on his application for exemption. However, after
he had been informed of the denial of his application for exemption, it still took respondent one
year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
respondent still took, and is still aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In
addition, when respondent indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a
pleading, he had not filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Office.

Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the
MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. While the MCLE
Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of
Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that prevents the Court
from using its administrative power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from directing
the IBP Board of Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP.

The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six months. We agree.
In addition, his listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to suspension because he
shall not be permitted to practice law until such time as he submits proof of full compliance to the
IBP Board of Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his
reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper
to declare respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to suspend him from the practice of
law for six months or until he has fully complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the First,
Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the
required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:

(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that
require its immediate attention, such as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to
communicate its action to the interested parties within a reasonable period;

(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as the
matter had already been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013;

(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully
complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods,
whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the Office
of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all courts in the land. Let copies be also furnished the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing
Board for their appropriate actions.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2439 (Formerly: OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3989-RTJ), August 26, 2015
ARIEL "AGA" MUHLACH, Complainant, v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE MA. ANGELA ACOMPAÑADO-
ARROYO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE CITY, CAMARINES SUR, Respondent.

This resolves the complaint dated 6 November 2012 filed by Ariel "Aga" Muhlach (complainant)
charging Executive Judge Ma. Angela Acompañado-Arroyo (EJ Arroyo), Regional Trial Court (RTC),
San Jose City, Camarines Sur with gross ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

On 5 October 2012, Francisco Perico Dizon, Edgar Malate, Crispin Imperial and Ferdinand Fernando
Felix Monasterio filed a petition before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Jose-
Presentacion, Camarines Sur praying for the exclusion of Ariel and Charlene Mae G. Muhlach
(Spouses Muhlach) from the list of voters of Precinct No. 10A, Brgy. San Juan, San Jose,
Camarines Sur. The case was docketed as Spec. Pro. No. 80.

On even date, Hon. Angel A. Tadeo, MCTC, San Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur voluntarily
recused himself from hearing the case on the ground that petitioner Edgar Malate is a cousin of his
late mother-in-law and Francisco Perico-Dazon is the son-in-law of the his former clerk of court,
Florecito V. Patrocinio.1

Acting on such inhibition, EJ Arroyo scheduled the raffle of the case among judges of the first level
courts within her administrative jurisdiction to determine who among them will be assigned to try
and decide the case.

The case was eventually raffled to Judge Ricky C. Begino (Judge Begino).

In an Order2 dated 12 October 2012, Judge Begino set the case for hearing on 16 October 2012.

On 15 October 2012, Spouses Muhlach filed a motion to dismiss Spec. Procs. No. 80.
In the morning of 16 October 2012, the Office of the Clerk of Court received a copy of the Order of
Inhibition of Judge Begino, which states that:
An (sic) oral motion of the counsel of the respondents, undersigned judge hereby inhibit (sic)
himself from further trying and ruling of this case to avoid any doubt as to the impartiality of this
court.3
In the morning of 16 October 2012 also, the counsel for Spouses Muhlach filed with MCTC, San
Jose-Presentacion an Urgent Omnibus Motion: 1) to inhibit the Judge Begino; and 2) to re-raffle
and assign the case to another judge.

In the afternoon of the same date, EJ Arroyo issued the assailed order which rendered ineffective
the order of inhibition of Judge Begino. It further directed Judge Begino to continue to hear and
decide the case. EJ Arroyo noted that the counsel for Spouses Muhlach's oral motion failed to
state'the grounds to justify the inhibition of the judge. It likewise did not explain why doubts as to
the impartiality of the court could exist.4

Judge Begino proceeded with the hearing of the case and on 19 October 2012, resolved, among
others, the 16 October 2012 Urgent Motion to Inhibit filed by counsel for the Spouses Muhlach. He
ruled, thus:
The Court is not convinced of the merit being shown by [Spouses Muhlach] for the Undersigned
Judge (Judge for brevity) to inhibit from hearing and deciding this case.

The movants miserably failed to show what judicial actuations made by the Judge which may be
perceived that he has already predetermined the facts and issues involved in this case. If, the
judicial actuations they are referring to is in connection with the Order of the Judge denying their
Motion to Dismiss, the same is not sufficient for a Judge to inhibit himself from hearing and
deciding the case considering that the denial was based on law.

xxxx

All told, the [Spouses Muhlach[s] belief that the Judge and his sibling Agnes are political allies of
Mr. Fuentebella is unfounded, untrue and baseless.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion to Inhibit the Honorable Presiding Judge Ricky C. Begino
and to Re-Raffle and Assign Case to Another Presiding Judge is hereby ordered DENIED. The
undersigned Judge will continue to hear and decide this case with the assurance to all parties
concerned that he will take his role to dispense justice according to law and evidence without fear
or favor.5
Dissatisfied, Spouses Muhlach filed on 23 October 2012 an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration (of
the Orders dated 17 and 19 October 2012).

In a Decision6 dated 25 October 2012, Judge Begino granted the petition for exclusion filed by
Francisco Perico Dizon, Edgar Malate, Crispin Imperial and Ferdinand Fernando Felix Monasterio.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition to exclude ARIEL AQUINO MUHLACH and
CHARLENE MAE BONNIN MUHLACH from the list of voters of Precinct No. 10A Barangay, San Juan,
San Jose, Camarines Sur is hereby GRANTED. The Election Registration Board is hereby ordered
to EXCLUDE THE NAMES OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FROM THE LIST OF VOTERS OF
PRECINCT NO. 10A BARANGAY SAN JUAN, SAN JOSE, CAMARINES SUR and REMOVE
THEIR REGISTRATION RECORDS FROM THE CORRESPONDING BOOK OF VOTERS and
to ENTER THE ORDER OF EXCLUSION therein; and thereafter, to PLACE THE RECORDS IN
THE INACTIVE FILE, for lack of residency requirement. 7
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against EJ Arroyo. He accused EJ
Arroyo of having issued the Order dated 16 October 2012 with abuse of authority and with gross
ignorance of law and procedure. Complainant contended that EJ Arroyo had no authority to reverse
Judge Begino's order inhibiting himself as such power is vested solely in the Supreme Court.

In her comment,8 EJ Arroyo explained that immediately upon receipt of Judge Begino's order of
inhibition, she noticed that the order, on its face, was improper or defective. She stressed that the
procedure prescribed for the disqualification of a judge must be substantially followed, citing the
resolution of the Supreme Court dated 31 August 1978 in A.M. No. 2128-JC. 9 She averred that she
was not ignorant of Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1998 when she issued the
questioned order. Under the cited circular, the duty of the executive judge is to appoint another
trial judge under his/her supervision to handle the inhibited case or to elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court. Considering that the inhibition order issued by Judge Begino was "patently
defective," she saw no point in referring the same to the Court, through the Office of the Court
Administrator, for evaluation "because in the first place, there was nothing for the latter to
evaluate."

EJ Arroyo further explained that the subject case is a petition for exclusion of the names of
Spouses Muhlach from the list of voters which should be decided within ten days from its filing as
provided for under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8189.10 In view of the status of the Spouses Muhlach, EJ
Arroyo claimed that no judge would want to handle the case. Thus, when she received a copy of
Judge Begino's order of inhibition, she felt that it was her duty as executive judge to ensure that
the case is decided, as much as possible, within the period prescribed under the law. She reasoned
that if she were to approve Judge Begino's inhibition order which, on its face, was defective,
nothing would stop other judges from recusing themselves from the case on flimsy grounds. She
felt that it would result in an endless cycle leaving the case unresolved.

EJ Arroyo surmised that the complaint was filed for the sole purpose of delaying the resolution of
Spec. Pro. No. 80. She alleged that after Judge Begino decided the case in favor of the petitioners
and ordered the exclusion of Spouses Muhlach from the voters list, Spouses Muhlach appealed the
decision to the RTC. It was raffled to Branch 40 presided over by Judge Noel Paulite (Judge
Paulite) who eventually rendered a decision affirming the decision of Judge Begino. Spouses
Muhlach thereafter filed a Motion for the Inhibition of Judge Paulite on 13 November 2012, after
the instant complaint was filed on 7 November 2012. EJ Arroyo submits that should Judge Paulite
grant the motion for inhibition, a dilemma would arise because the case would be assigned to
Branch 58 where she is the presiding judge, there being only two branches in RTC San Jose. She
claimed that such scenario would lead her to inhibit from the case because of the administrative
complaint filed against her. Consequently, the case will be referred to the nearest RTC and raffled
among the judges in that jurisdiction. She opined that other delaying tactics may be employed,
and soon, it would already be elections day without the case having decided. 11

Finally, she averred that she had been a judge for 11 years and this is the first time that an
administrative case has been filed against her.

We find the charges of ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion bereft of merit.

The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is set forth in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he,
or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. (Emphasis supplied.)
The aforesaid rule enumerates the specific grounds upon which a judge may be disqualified from
participating in a trial. It must be borne in mind that the inhibition of judges is rooted in the
Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which requires that a hearing is conducted
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal because unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to
nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All the other elements of due process,
like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial
and biased judge.12 Certainly, a presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of
the parties-litigants.

We agree with EJ Arroyo that the inhibition of Judge Begino is lacking in some elements. Judge
Begino simply ruled that he is inhibiting from the case to avoid any doubts as to the impartiality of
the court. Although voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on
the part of the judge, such should still comply with the provisions of the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules, that is, it should be based on just or valid reasons. In the subject
order, the reason for the inhibition of the judge was not stated. Neither could it be determined
from the motion of the Spouses Muhlach's counsel since the motion was done orally, in violation of
Section 213 of the same rule.

When EJ Arroyo declared that Judge Begino's order of inhibition was ineffective, she was in a way,
returning the case back to the presiding judge for the latter to either cure the deficiency or take
cognizance of the case if he finds no basis for the motion. As EJ Arroyo explained, she was aware
that she had no authority to revoke or disapprove the order of inhibition, as such is vested only in
the Supreme Court. It was for that reason that she used the word "ineffective." Tersely put, EJ
Arroyo did not reverse the Order of Inhibition of Judge Begino. She correctly asked that the Order
be completed to comply with the Rule on Inhibition of Judges.

When Judge Begino continued with the proceedings, it was a manifestation and admission on his
part that he can hear and decide the case with the cold neutrality expected from an impartial
magistrate. His. subsequent ruling on the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by counsel for the Spouses
Muhlach affirmed EJ Arroyo's position that the earlier order issued on the basis of the oral motion
was defective. The assailed order of EJ Arroyo was issued in the proper exercise of her
administrative functions.

Moreover, to be held liable for gross ignorance of the law, the judge must be shown to have
committed an error that was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. 14 Here, it was clearly
established that the only intention of EJ Arroyo was to ensure that the case is decided
expeditiously and within the period provided under the law. There was no showing that she was
moved by ill-will or malicious intention to violate existing Court issuances. In fact, bad faith may
be attributed to the complainant for filing successive motions for inhibition.

While it was pronounced in relation to the performance by judges of their judicial functions, we
find that in the matter of their administrative duties, it can likewise be said that as a matter of
public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 15
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the instant administrative complaint filed by
Ariel "Aga" Muhlach against Executive Judge Ma. Angela Acompafiado-Arroyo, Regional Trial Court,
San Jose City, Camarines Sur for ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405               January 12, 2015 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ]
ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, JULIETA D. TOLEDO,
JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E. LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L. NOGUERA, FIDEL S.
SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T. TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M. COLONIA, ERIC S. PASTRANA,
and MARIVEL B. ISON Complainants, vs. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., Branch 45, Regional
Trial Court, San Jose Occidental Mindoro, Respondent.

This is an administrative Complaint  for gross and serious violations of the Canons of the Code of Judicial
1

Conduct & Judicial Ethics and Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, against Judge Jose S. Jacinto Jr. (respondent) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 45, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Complainants Antonio Ascafio, Jr., Consolacion D. Dantes, Basilisa A.
Obalo, Julieta D. Toledo, Joseph Z. Maac, Fidel S. Sarmiento, Sr., Dan T. Taunan, Amalia G. Santos, Emiliano
E. Lumboy, Tita F. Bernardo, Igmedio L. Noguera, Avelina Colonia, Eric S. Pastrana, and Marivel B. Ison
(collectively, complainants) were allegedly section leaders of the lessees of market stalls in the public market
ofOccidental Mindoro. The Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (the Municipality), Jose T.
Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa or the Mayor) allegedly wanted to demolish the public market, so that the Municipality
can use the space to erect the new "San Jose Commercial Complex."  Thus, on 26 June 2012, complainants filed
2

a Petition for Prohibition With Urgent Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) against the Municipality and Mayor Villarosa. The case was docketed as
Special Civil Action No. R-1731 and was raffled to respondent’s sala.

Respondent issued a TRO, which had a 72-hour validity, on 27 June 2012. Hearings for the determination of the
propriety of extending the TRO or issuing the WPI against the Municipality were scheduled on 2 and 3 July 2012.
Mayor Villarosa waived his right to present his evidence and submitted the case for resolution.3

While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none of whom were parties to the case, were all allowed inside the
courtroom during the 2 July 2012 hearing,  only 12 out of the more than 500 members accompanying
4

complainants on that day were allowed to enter.  Worse, upon the motion of the Mayor, all the complainants were
5

escorted out of the courtroom except for Julieta D. Toledo, who was scheduled to giveher testimony that day. 6

Complainants claimed that the questions propounded by respondent to their witnesses "were all geared towards
establishing" that they should have no right to oppose the Mayor’s plan, as "this will be good for all and the
progress and development of the municipality." 7

After the hearing, respondent issuedan open-court Order stating that "the Court is not inclined to extend for
seventeen (17) days the said TRO." 8

At the next hearing held on 3 July2012, Mayor Villarosa stepped out of the courtroom to take a call. He exited
through the door used by the judge and the employees of the court.  According to complainants, the Mayor did
9

not speak to anyone, not even his lawyer, before leaving the courtroom. Thus, it came as a surprise to everyone
when respondent suddenly explained that the Mayor had to excuse himself for an important appointment. 10

Respondent eventually issued an Order lifting the TRO. 11

Petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on 2 and 3 July 2012, respondent "argued, berated, accused,
scolded, confused and admonished petitioners without basis or justification."  They further claimed that
12

respondent judge asked complainants "confusing and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit
answers damaging to the cause of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their adversary." 13

Complainants alleged that it is common knowledge to the entire community of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, that
respondent is beholden to Mayor Villarosa and is identified with the causes, friends, and allies of the latter.  They
14

also alleged that all cases in the RTC before respondent involving Mayor Villarosa or his relatives, political allies,
supporters, and close friends were decided in favor of the Mayor or his relatives and supporters.  Thus,
15

complainants filed the instant complaint charging respondent with serious violations of the canons of the Codes
of Judicial Conduct and Judicial Ethics and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

Respondent denied the foregoing accusations and cited several cases in which he issued an order/ruling against
Mayor Villarosaand the latter’s supposed supporters. 16

In a Resolution  dated 25 November 2013, this Court referred the Complaint to the Presiding Justice of the Court
17

of Appeals, Manila (CA) "for raffle among the Justices thereat, for investigation, report and recommendation."
The case was raffled to CA Justice Pedro B. Corales on 24 February 2014. This Court received his Report and
Recommendation (Report)  on 9 June 2014.
18

We adopt the findings and recommendation of Justice Corales.

Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that respondent acted with bias and partiality. Mere suspicion
that a judge is partial is not enough.  Clear and convincing evidence is necessary to prove a charge of bias and
19

partiality.  The circumstances detailed by petitioners failed to prove that respondent exhibited "manifest partiality,
20

evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence" in the discharge of his judicial functions, as required by
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, when he issued the Order lifting the TRO.

This Court cannot accept the contention that respondent’s bias and partiality can be gleaned from the mere fact
that he did not allow the "more than 500 members" who accompanied petitioners during the hearing to enter the
courtroom. As indicated in the report, due to the standard sizes of our courtrooms, it is highly improbable that this
huge group could have been accommodated inside.  With respect to the exclusion of the other witnesses while
21

Julieta Toledo was giving her testimony, this is sanctioned by Section 15, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 22

We now go to the claim of petitioners that respondent berated, scolded, confused and admonished their
witnesses without basis or justification. According to the investigating justice, respondent failed to submit the
transcript of notes for the 3 July 2012 hearing without plausible reason.  As regards what transpired in the 2 July
23

2012 hearing, the investigating justice found that apart from raising his voice when addressing Toledo and
making "abrasive and unnecessary statements to her,"  respondent also made the following"insulting, sometimes
24

needlessly lengthy statements"  in open court:

25

1. Respondent declared that he no longer wanted to go to the market, because he might be mistreated by
petitioners.26

2. He told petitioners: "Mga taga-palengke na nagkakaso sa akin xxx pero ‘di naman nila alam ang
kanilang ginagawa." 27

3. He told Toledo while the latter was testifying: "[B]asta na lang kayo pirma pirma na gawa naman ng
abogado niyo." 28

4. He asked Toledo: "You mentioned about that ‘walang pwesto na nakikipwesto sa inyo,’ is that not a
violation to your lease contract that you are allowing somebody to occupy your portion so that they can
also engage in business? Is this not an additional earning on your part and you are violating your lease
contract? Is that not depriving the coffer of the Municipal Government?"  The investigating justice found
29
 that the foregoing statements "definitely imperiled the respect and deference"  rightly due to respondent’s
30

position.

We agree.

As stated in the report, respondent raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to petitioners’
witness.  Respondent failed to conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New
31

Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,  which reads:

32

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an
official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control.

A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court,  viz:33

It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence
and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or
spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing
speech increases his persuasiveness. 34

This Court likewise finds that respondent violated Section 1 of Canon 2 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which read:

CANON 2

INTEGRITY

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it isperceived to be so inview
of a reasonable observer.

CANON 4

PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.  The above
1âwphi1

provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety, but even acts that have the
appearance of impropriety.  This is because appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial
35

functions. A judge — like Ceasar's wife — must not only be pure and faithful, but must also be above suspicion. 36

In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court’s permission to leave while the
trial was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the former’s advocate. He did so by declaring in open court
that the abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the latter had an important appointment to attend.
Respondent does not deny this in his Comment.  It was the Mayor’s lawyer, and not respondent judge, who had
37

the duty of explaining why the mayor left the courtroom without asking for the court’s permission.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which
may erode the people's faith in the Judiciary.  Members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and
38

suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official
duties, as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life.39
The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a judge.  He gave
1âwphi1

petitioners reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality. Petitioners cannot be blamed for thinking that respondent
must have directly communicated with Mayor Villarosa. Otherwise, he would not have been able to explain that
the Mayor could no longer return to attend the hearing after leaving, when not even the latter’s own lawyers knew
that. Thus, respondent is also guilty of violating Section 2 of Canon 3, which reads:

CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal p rofession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

It is clear from all the foregoing that respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming a judge.

We note that in a previous case, Taran v. Jacinto, Jr.,  this Court has already found Respondent Judge Jacinto
40

liable for his failure to supervise his personnel closely and for issuing orders relayed over the phone. Judge
Jacinto was found guilty of violating Supreme Court Circular No. 26-97 by failing to compel his Clerk of Court to
issue official receipts for all monies received by the latter. In the foregoing case, respondent judge was fined in
the sum of ₱11,000 and was warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Under Section 10 in relation to Section 11(C), paragraph 1 of Rule 140  of the Rules of Court, as amended,
41

"unbecoming conduct" is classified as a light charge, punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a fine of
not less than ₱1,000, but not exceeding ₱10,000; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4) admonition with
warning.42

Considering that this is respondent judge's second infraction already, the Court finds that the penalties of a fine in
the amount of Pl 0,000 and admonition with warning, as recommended by the investigating justice, are proper
under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. guilty of unbecoming conduct and is
hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000) and REPRIMANDED with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426               June 16, 2015 [Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-83-MTC]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATION, Complainant, vs.JUDGE ALEXANDER BALUT, Respondent.

On October 9, 2007, the Court partially resolved this case by disposing it as follows:

WHEREFORE the Court finds and declares:

1. Judge Alexander S. Balut GUILTY of undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for decision and in
failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period. He is FINED twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000.00), with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.

2. Judith En. Salimpade GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct. She is
DISMISSED from the service. She is DIRECTED to RESTITUTE the amount of ₱1,817,378.59
representing the amount of shortages in her collections. Her withheld salaries are to be applied to her
accountabilities. The Office of Administrative Services, OCA is DIRECTED to compute Ms. Salimpade's
leave credits and forward the same to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA which shall
compute the money value of the same, the amount to be deducted from the shortages to be restituted.
 3. Eduardo Esconde GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. He is DISMISSED from the service. He is also
ORDERED to restitute his accountabilities in the amount of ₱58,100.00

4. Lydia O. Ramos GUILTY of neglect of duty. She is FINED ₱5,000, which should be deducted from her
retirement benefits.

The Office of the Court Administrator Legal Office is DIRECTED to file appropriate criminal charges against
Judge Alexander Balut, Judith En. Salimpade and Eduardo Esconde.

SO ORDERED.

As stated in the October 9, 2007 Resolution, the facts of the case are as follows:

On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit and physical inventory of
cases at the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) of Bayombong and Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Alexander S. Balut
was the acting presiding judge in both courts.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was also conducted in the MTCs of Bayombong and Solano as well
as the MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe.

In the MTC, Bayombong, where Judith En. Salimpade was Clerk of Court II, the audit team found an unremitted
amount of ₱18,702.oo representing the court's collection from August 3, 2003 to August 18, 2003. Said amount
was deposited only on August 18, 2003, upon advise by the audit team, in the Land Bank of the Philippines
account. Furthermore, 31 booklets of accountable forms issued to Ms. Salimpade by the Property Division, SC
and OCA were not accounted for. Also, the court had a total Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) collection of
₱348,993.60 from January 1990 to August 2003. However, only ₱186,330.98 was remitted by Ms. Salimpade
leaving a balance of ₱162,662.62; the total Clerk of Court General Fund (CCGF) collections from January 1996
to August 2003 (audit scope) showed an unremitted amount of ₱30,411. 70; and as of August 31, 2003 the
Fiduciary Fund had a total cash shortage of ₱1,864,304.27 which covered the collections from 1995 to August
2003.

In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred by Salimpade as of August 31, 2003 totalled ₱2,057,378.59.

Salimpade, when asked about the shortages, explained that Judge Balut, since 1995 had been getting money
from the JDF collections. She had given in to the requests of Judge Balut out of fear of him. She also admitted
that she lent her co-employees money which she took from her collections.

Parenthetically, in September 2003, Judge Balut turned over ₱240,000.00 to Salimpade and the latter issued a
certification stating that the former had completely settled his monetary accountability to the MTC, Bayombong.
Judge Balut delivered to the Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court Management Office (CMO) OCA the certification
and deposit slip evidencing the turnover of the ₱240,000.00.

The audit team also found that Salimpade failed to regularly submit her monthly report of collections, as required
in Supreme Court Circular No. 32-93. Consequently, Salimpade's salaries were withheld effective August 2003 to
the present.

In the MTC, Solano, the spot cash count on the court's collection disclosed that Eduardo Esconde, Clerk of Court,
had an unremitted/undeposited cash on hand amounting to ₱59,545.oo. However, the Official Receipts issued to
cover said amounts were not accounted for. The said cash amount was deposited on August 21, 2003 to Land
Bank JDF Account No. 0591-0116-34.
A review of the receipts on file from May 2001 to July 2003 also showed a total cash shortage of ₱106,527.80.
However, on August 29, 2003, Esconde deposited in the CCGF and JDF bank accounts sums corresponding to
the said shortage. Esconde explained to the audit team that Judge Balut borrowed various amounts from the
collections. He stated that Judge Balut started borrowing funds when the former was still the Clerk of Court of
MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe. He transferred to MTC, Solano, to get out of the shadow of Judge Balut. But, much to his
dismay, Judge Balut was designated Acting Presiding Judge of MTC, Solano and continued the practice of
borrowing money from the collections of the court.

In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court, succeeded Eduardo S.
Esconde on July 16, 2000, without proper turnover of accountabilities. The team also found that the amount of
₱540.00, part of the JDF collections from August 1, 2003 to August 21, 2003, remained undeposited at the time
of audit. Said amount was remitted to the Chief Accountant, Supreme Court on September 10, 2003. Also, Mrs.
Ramos opened an account at the Rural Bank of Aritao, Inc. for the Fiduciary Fund of the court instead of
maintaining an account with Landbank. Said account was closed on September 11, 2003 and an account was
opened at Landbank, Bambang, on the same date. A comparison of the court's CCGF collections and
remittances for the period of November 1995 to July 2003 revealed a shortage of ₱510.00. Mr. Esconde incurred
during his incumbency a cash shortage of ₱430.00 while Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of ₱80.00 as of July
31, 2003. From August 2003 to June 5, 2004, Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of ₱430.00. She deposited the
amount of ₱400.00 on August 23, 2004 leaving a shortage of 1!30.00. Withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund
account on various dates, totalling ₱243,900.00 for the refund and return of cash bonds to 20 litigants, were not
supported by any official court orders. Of the 20 litigants 15 did not acknowledge receipt of the amount refunded.
The Fiduciary Fund collection of the court from April 1996 to August 31, 2003 amounted to ₱2,064,978.00. As of
August 31, 2003, however, the amount of ₱846,710.00 was unaccounted for by Mr. Esconde and Mrs. Ramos.
Both denied that the shortages incurred were of their own doing and they instead pointed to Judge Balut as the
offender.

Ramos related to the audit team the constant requests/orders of Judge Balut to hand over to him money from the
Fiduciary Fund collections.  In these instances, she requested Judge Balut to affix his signature at the back
1âwphi1

portion of the withdrawal slips as the cash recipient. However, not all of the transactions were evidenced by an
acknowledgement receipt. Ramos further stated that Judge Balut also collected the money through Salvador
Briones, Court Interpreter of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, whose signature also appeared at the back portion of
withdrawal slips as cash recipient. The total withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund Account given to Judge Balut,
as evidenced by withdrawal slips bearing the signatures of Judge Balut and Briones, for the benefit of the former,
as cash recipients, amounted to ₱193,500.00.

Aside from these, withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account totalling ₱90,500.oo were also given to Judge
Balut. On the face of the slips of this class of withdrawals were notations such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by
Judge xxx" and "given to Judge" written by Ramos.

On May 9, 2002, Judge Balut issued a Certification stating that his accountability with the Fiduciary Fund
collection of MCTC Aritao-Sta. Fe as of April 2002 amounted to .₱207,774.42. However, before the final report on
the court's shortages was completed, various amounts totalling ₱802,299.82 were deposited by Judge Balut,
Esconde and Ramos in the court's LBP Account No. 3251-0544-51, as restitution/payment of part of the shortage
of ₱846, 710.00.

As of August, 2004, Ramos had fully settled the balance of her accountability. On the other hand, Esconde still
had a balance of accountability in MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe of ₱58,100.oo which, as of the time this case was
submitted by the OCA for the Court's consideration, has remained unsettled. (Emphases supplied)

In its Resolution,  the Court ordered Respondent Judge Alexander Balut (Judge Balut) to pay a fine for his failure
1

to decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly requesting for an extension. The Court, however, did not
rule on the administrative liability of Judge Balut with respect to the result of the financial audit for the reason that
he was not given a chance to present his side on the matter.
Consequently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum,  sought reconsideration of the
2

Court's decision stating that although Judge Balut was not formally required to comment on the findings of the
audit team regarding the shortage in the court collections, he was not denied due process of law. The OCA
explained that Judge Balut was able to present his side in his Letter  to OCA, dated December 9, 2006. The
3

OCA, thus, asked for the re-opening of the case or in the alternative, that Judge Balut be required to comment on
the findings of the financial audit.

In its Resolution,  dated December 16, 2008, the Court directed Judge Balut to comment on the audit report and,
4

upon the recommendation  of the OCA, referred the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report
5

and recommendation. 6

Thereafter, the CA, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended the dismissal of the charges against
Judge Balut for failure of the OCA to clearly substantiate and prove the participation of Judge Balut in the
financial transactions of the courts. On his admission that he borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA
opined that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized as he was previously fined by the Court in its October 9,
2007 Resolution.

The Court finds itself unable to agree with the recommendation of the CA.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  The standard of substantial evidence is
7

justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant. 8

A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court collections. The three clerks of
court of MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe categorically stated that Judge Balut borrowed
money from the court funds and executed certifications to that effect. They separately reported that Judge Balut
had been borrowing money from the various funds of the court collections. In fact, Lydia Ramos (Ramos), the
Clerk of Court of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, presented several withdrawal slips  where the back portions were signed
9

either by Judge Balut or his court interpreter, Salvador Briones, as the recipient of the cash withdrawn from the
funds of the court. These withdrawal slips likewise bore the notations of Ramos such as "Judge," "for Judge,"
"taken by Judge," and "given to Judge" to serve as her reminder that the money withdrawn were given to Judge
Balut.

Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the Certification  stating that his cash accountability as of April 2002
10

with the Fiduciary Fund was ₱207,774.42 and there were certifications issued by the clerks of court attesting that
he had settled his accountabilities with the court funds.

The CA opinion that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized for his admission that he had borrowed money
from the judiciary fund because the Court already fined him in its October 9, 2007 resolution is erroneous. In the
said resolution, the Court categorically stated that Judge Balut was fined for undue delay in deciding 33 cases
submitted for decision and for failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period.

Once again, the Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct.  Because of the
11

sensitivity of his position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity
and to observe exacting standards of morality, decency and competence.  He should adhere to the highest
12

standards of public accountability lest his action erode the public faith in the Judiciary.
13

Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the court. He knowingly and
deliberately made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the proper administration of court funds.  He
14

miserably failed to become a role model of his staff and other court personnel in the observance of the standards
of morality and decency, both in his official and personal conduct.
The act of misappropriating court -funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal
from the service even on the first offense.  For said reason, the respondent deserves a penalty no lighter than
15

dismissal. This Court has never tolerated and will never condone any conduct which violates the norms of public
accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. 16

The Court has considered the recommendation of imposing the penalty of suspension. That, however, would be
unfair to Clerk of Court Judith En. Salimpade, Municipal Trial Courts of Bayombong and Solano; and Clerk of
Court Eduardo Esconde of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Arita-Sta. Fe, who were both dismissed from the
service for the same offense. Clerk of Court Lydia Ramos was fined but only because she had already retired
from the service. And it would send a wrong message to the public that the Court has different standards - one
for the magistrates and another for the rank-and-file.

The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash liabilities will not shield him from the consequences of his
wrongdoings. His unwarranted interference in the Court collections deserves administrative sanction and not
even the full payment of his accountabilities will exempt him from liability. "It matters not that these personal
borrowings were paid as what counts is the fact that these funds were used outside of official business." 17

Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would not serve to mitigate his liability. His offense was not a single or
isolated act but it constituted a series of acts committed in a span of several years. In other words, he was a
repeated offender, perpetrating his misdeeds with impunity not once, not twice, but several times in three (3)
different stations. In the case of In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Koronadal City,  it was written:
18

For misappropriating court funds in concert with Ines, Judge Sardido has been charged with grave misconduct.
Admitting that he indeed "borrowed" money from court funds, the latter recounted that on four occasions in 1994,
he had borrowed ₱130,ooo to be able to purchase a car and thereafter borrowed intermittently through the years,
for reasons ranging from the schooling needs of his children to the illness of his parents. That he intended to
repay the amounts "borrowed" is immaterial. These funds should never be used outside of official business. Rule
5.04 of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:

"A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone
except as may be allowed by law."

Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more
importantly, of justice. It is from him that the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge
to return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow."

Sadly, the foregoing facts clearly show that Judge Sardido has not only miserably failed to present himself as an
example to his staff and to others, but has also shown no compunction in violating the law, as well as the rules
and regulations. His dishonesty, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law tarnish the image of the
judiciary and would have warranted the maximum penalty of dismissal. were it not for the fact that he had already
been dismissed from the service in another administrative case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, finding Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of gross misconduct, the Court hereby imposes upon him
the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except
the money value of accrued earned leave credits.

Judge Balut is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any order or decision, or from
continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon receipt of a copy of this resolution.

This disposition is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that a copy of this resolution be immediately served on the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366               February 4, 2015. [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ]
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, vs. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.

For consideration is the Report and Recommendation  of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice Diy), Court of
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Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to its January 14, 2013 Resolution,  referring the complaint
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filed by Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge Paredes), Presiding Judge,
Branch 13, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Facts

In her Affidavit/Complaint,  dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was
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a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the
Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge
Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis),then Presiding Judge of Branch 4,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu
City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge,
corrupt, and ignorant of the law.

Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times. In one
session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis
(Francis),son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a "court-noted addict."  She was absent from class at that
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time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of
her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to
another law school in Tacloban City.

Jill also disclosed thatin the case entitled "Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis"  (Lachica v. Tormis), her mother
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was suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the
temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge
Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be
reduced to severe reprimand.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by her mother. She
averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos
(₱6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Lita
Guioguio,"docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R,  then pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio
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case).

Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.

Comment of Judge Paredes

In his Comment,  dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated thatJudge
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Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a result of the
investigations, he recommended sanctionsagainst Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to
get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis’
involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by the Court; that
he never personally attacked Judge Tormis’ dignity and credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City
constituted a negative experience for all the judges and should be discussed so that other judges, court
employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams werealso discussed
during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where remediallaw and legal ethics were taught; that he talked
about past and resolvedcases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in
discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the legal
community and some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal
publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend
her ways, butshe resented his advice.

Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or dispute his
discussions in class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also brought to
the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge
Tormis had a son named Francis who was a drug addict and thatdrug dependents had no place in the judiciary;
and that he suggested thatFrancis should be removed from the judiciary.

He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a result of the influence of
Judge Tormis. She is not an influential person and it is the Supreme Court who determines the persons to be
appointed as court employees. JudgeTormis, however, allowed her drug dependent son to apply for a position in
the judiciary.

Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally accepted a cash bail
bond of 6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio onMarch 13, 2011. He claimed though that the
approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed
executive judges to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special
days. Judge Paredes explained that he merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a
temporary receipt and on the following business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit
the cash bond to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an
official receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the
afternoon of March 21, 2011.

Lastly, Judge Paredes averred thatthe discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge Tormiscould not
be the subject of an administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance of his judicial duties.

Reply of the Complainant

In her Verified-Reply,  dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had nothing to do with the filing of
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the present complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City to continue her law studies elsewhere
because she could no longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about by
Judge Paredes’ frequent discussions in class of her mother’s administrative cases; that her mother was indeed
one of the judges implicated in the marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes discussed the matter in his
classes, the case of her mother was not yet resolved by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and
that Judge Paredes was aware that administrative cases were confidential in nature.

Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded her brother,
Francis, as a "drug addict."

Rejoinder of Judge Paredes

In his Rejoinder,  dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not premature to discuss the
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marriage scams in class because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also written
in many legal publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of Justice of Cebu
City.

In its Report,  dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that the conflicting
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allegations by the parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on the evidence on record
then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive natureof the charges, a full-blown investigation should be
conducted by the CA.
On January 14, 2013, pursuant tothe recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the administrative
complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation, report and recommendation within
sixty (60) days from receipt of the records.
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On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice Diy. Thereafter, the
appropriate notices were issued and the confidential hearings were conducted. Afterwards, Justice Diy received
the respective memoranda of the parties.

In her memorandum,  Jill contended that Judge Paredes’ act of discussing Judge Tormis’ cases in class where
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she was present was an open display of insensitivity, impropriety and lack of delicadezabordering on oppressive
and abusive conduct, which fell short of the exacting standards of behavior demanded of magistrates. She
asserted that the defense of Judge Paredes that he could not be made administratively liable as the act was not
made in the performance of his official duties did not hold water because a judge should be the embodiment of
whatwas just and fair not only in the performance of his official duties but also in his everyday life.

Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudicerule when he discussed the marriage scam involving
Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case was still being investigated; that the administrative case
relative to the marriage scam was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes was not the Executive
Judge ofthe MTCC when he received the cash bail bond in the Guiguiocase; that he could not prove that the
executive judge of the MTCC was unavailable before accepting the cash bail bond; and that the assertion of
Judge Paredes of his being an anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the
Foundation of Judicial Excellence did not exculpate him from committing the acts complained of. In his Reply-
Memorandum,  Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations contained in his previous pleadings. He added that the
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marriage scams scandalized the Judiciary and became public knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA
held a press conference on the matter; that, hence, every citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in
the hierarchy of rights, freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that Judge Tormis never intervened in the
present case; that ifhe indeed made derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis, she should havefiled a criminal
action for oral defamation; and that calling for the ouster of drug addicts could not be considered an abuse, but
was meant for the protection of the Judiciary. 14

In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.
She opined that his use of intemperate language during class discussions was inappropriate. His statements in
class, tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and
clearly insensitive and inexcusable.

Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the administrative case of Judge
Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary  which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of propriety at all times.
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She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which stated that "Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves
in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary."
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Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’ position that he could not be held administratively liable for his
comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was not in the exercise of his
judicial functions. Jurisprudence,  as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct, required that he conduct himself
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beyond reproach, not only in the discharge of his judicial functions, but also inhis other professional endeavors
and everyday activities.

Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes violated the subjudicerule when the latter discussed
the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still being investigated. She cited,
as basis for JudgeParedes’ liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguiocase, Justice Diy absolved
him ofany liability as the charge of grave misconduct was not supported by sufficient evidence. She accepted
Judge Paredes’ explanation that he merely followed the procedure laid down in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No.
03-8-02-SC when he approved the bail bond.

Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations, thus:

The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised
Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than
₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first offense and considering the factual milieu and the peculiar
circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out with the
penalty of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.18

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the penalty.

Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person
who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another
person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.19

To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of
his official duties.  Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were
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made by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as "misconduct." They are simply
not related to the discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for
misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.

Discussion of a subjudicematter, however, is another thing.

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 ofthe New Code of Judicial Conduct provides: CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment
that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or
issue. (Emphasis supplied)

The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.  The rationale for the rule
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was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,  where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of
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civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune
from every extraneous influence; thatfacts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.  Notably, when Judge
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Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case
had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2,
2013.  In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its
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resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in
contravention of the subjudicerule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated
Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing the marriage
scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency
of the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes
unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of
the said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on
the issue. There was no need for Judge Paredes to "rub salt to the wound,"  as Justice Diy put it.
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Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge Tormisas a
corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge
by Justice Dy.

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify propriety at all
times. Canon 4 instructs:

CANON 4
PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

xxx

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect
for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety and self-restraint. Heshould choose his words and exercise more caution and control inexpressing
himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not
descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and
sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language. 26

In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the Code and to use
temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct
unbecoming of a judge.

When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal
circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being discussed
in class, it strongly indicated his intention to taint their reputations.

The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge Paredes who
merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right,
however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on
judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise
of his right to freedomof expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary ofwhich he is
a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have been
more circumspect inhis language. Beinga judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to speak
with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.

The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held administratively liable for his
negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of
the ethical conduct expected of him asa judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his
professional and private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code mandates:

CANON 2
INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure thatnot only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in
the view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the
judiciary.  Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. (Emphases supplied)
1âwphi1

Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should not be tolerated
for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that
the conduct of a judge mustbe free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties, but also to his behavior outside his salaand as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a
public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s
official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service.
The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion. 27

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case,Justice Diy correctly found that it cannot
be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court findsmerit in the position of Judge Paredes that the approval, as
well as the receipt, ofthe cash bail bond, was in accordance with the rules. Thus:

Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jill’s allegation that Judge Paredes committed grave misconduct
when he personally received cash bailbond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes justified his action by
stating that he was merely following the procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which
authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays,
official holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the
executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor.
Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot beheld administratively liable for his
act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case.

Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court
where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest.

Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are authorized to exercise
other powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the performance of their functions in relation
to court administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his
functions as anExecutive Judge since he was the only judge available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably,
Lita Guioguio’s payment for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assignedto the court
where the Guioguio case was then pending and the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available
to receive the bail bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice was for one judge to be
present on Saturdays. However, there was no judge assigned for duty during Sundays.

Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any irregularity reflected in
the issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by sufficient evidence. 28

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the circumstances is
admonition.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and ADMONISHES him therefor.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200               April 2, 2014. (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant, vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent.

We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints  filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana (complainant) against
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Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City.

The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the Petition to have
Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the
Proposed Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the respondent was the presiding
judge. The complainant was the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the
Philippines (SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.

i. Complaint

In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-
7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct,
Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection,
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCP’s
objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed rehabilitation receiver for
SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of
the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.

2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative meetings" in her
Order  dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel
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and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and
features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings
that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.
 3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent
dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and effectively usurped and
pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions.

4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that there
would be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).

5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the
knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.

6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser and, at the
same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and development of the rehabilitation
plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at SCP’s expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of
Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.

7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP, leading to
EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management committee.

8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP could
confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the creation of a
management committee), the respondent denied SCP’s requests and delayed the issuance of the order
until the last minute.

9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty. Ferdinand
Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his appearances in court; and made
condescending and snide remarks.

10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days
given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court
(SC).

11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the court’s
power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify and alter it.

12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIB’s favor and
made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and personal
involvement in the case.

ii. Supplemental Complaint

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint  dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that the
3

respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social networking website
called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a
compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that
nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement  dated March 18, 2008, referred the
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complaints to the respondent for comment.

a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint

The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she crafted a workable,
feasible rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she did so only to render fairness and equity
to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the
rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action.
Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were premature because judicial remedies were still
available. 5

The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences. On the contrary,
she argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in view of the summary and non-adversarial nature of
rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules  gives the rehabilitation receiver the power to
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meet with the creditors, then there is all the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to
approve the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed out that it was SCP which
suggested that informal meetings be called and that she only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that
all the parties would attend.

As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved the rehabilitation
plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of granting extension of time under Section
11, Rule 4 of the Rules  pertains not to the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.
7

The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her denial of the
complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on her part but due to lack of basis.
Second, she argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP
itself (as some other creditors did) promptly appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did
not remove Atty. Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the
complainant raised warranted his removal.

She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the rest of the
complainant’s allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by evidence.

The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a subpoena as Section
1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules specifically states that the court may
decide matters on the basis of affidavits and other documentary evidence.

On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven and substantiated by
evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was nothing improper in expressing her ideas during
the informal meetings.

b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint

In her comment  on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she posted in the
8

social networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an "off-
shouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further
stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been
aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge
Makilala  should not be applied to her case since the facts are different.
9

On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,  insisting that the respondent’s acts of posting "seductive" pictures
10

and maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01,  2.02  and
11 12

2.03,  Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

13

In a Resolution  dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular administrative
14

matters, and referred them to the CA for investigation, report and recommendation.

The CA’s Report and Recommendation

On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a hearing,
followed by the submission of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010 Report and
Recommendation,  Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly meritorious. She found that the
15

issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the respondent’s appreciation of evidence.

She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondent’s decision in the rehabilitation
proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of authority, but because the rehabilitation
plan could no longer be implemented in view of SCP’s financial predicament.

On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice Gonzales-Sison
ruled that the complainant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that the respondent intentionally and
deliberately acted against SCP’s interests; the complaint merely relied on his opinions and surmises.

On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on mandatory
inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting judge and is primarily a matter of
conscience.

With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing irregular despite the
out-of-court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties, including SCP’s creditors. She also found
satisfactory the respondent’s explanation in approving the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period
prescribed by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with
SCP’s legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were reflective of arrogance and superiority. In
the words of the Justice Gonzales-Sison:

Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with what would appear to
be a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum expected
of a judge. Her statements appear to be done recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in
all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their
language at all times. Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge
Austria should be held liable.16

On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal social networking
account (displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a magistrate in the account) – even
during these changing times when social networking websites seem to be the trend – constitutes an act of
impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the public’s acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that
propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge and that
judges shall conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16, 2006 Decision  in CA-G.R. SP No. 100941 finding that
17

the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the creation of a management committee without
first conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled
that such professional incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and
recommended a fine of ₱20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be admonished for failing to
observe strict propriety and judicial decorum required by her office.

The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In its Memorandum  dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:
18

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:
 1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be NOTED;

2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City, Batangas, be
found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct;

3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00); and

4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of impropriety with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt with more severely. 19

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law
as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings were not
supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in the charge of failure to observe the
reglementary period.

Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence are judicial
in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on allegations of
conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of
circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the respondent’s
act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the
Code.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition of a fine on
the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross
ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a management committee without
conducting an evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no
magistrate should be forgetful or careless about.

On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his
complaint by substantial evidence.  In the present case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in
20

the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the
complainant failed to establish the respondent’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to
circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to
prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof." 21

"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate
intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in
the adjudication of cases."22

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best, legal
errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the
complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or
decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal."  Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through
23

administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead through judicial remedies. 24

On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless. The truth about the
respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the complainant’s verified complaint.
Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office
to administer justice without respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich.  There should be
25

clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. 26

In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the
complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof
indicating the respondent’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would
have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the
respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainant’s failure to establish
with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and partiality must fail.

On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official
duties renders him liable.  "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
27

judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous." 28

In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s application of Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules,
which provides:

Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the
opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of
the debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable. 29

The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the modifications she
found necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged that in modifying the plan, she exceeded her
authority and effectively usurped the functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to
show that the respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge
of gross ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to render judicial
office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice
can be infallible in his judgment." 30

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the
performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption  or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to
31

bad faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud,
corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan.
Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad
faith cannot be presumed  and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually
32

proven.

With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management committee without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find the error to be so egregious as to amount to
bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance of the law, as charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands. In rehabilitation
proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the existence of an imminent
danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtor-company’s assets and properties that are or may
be prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.  The rehabilitation
33

court should hear both sides, allow them to present proof and conscientiously deliberate, based on their
submissions, on whether the appointment of a management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement
in every adversarial proceeding that no judge or magistrate can disregard.

In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its evidence, nor to
confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision, found that the respondent’s act
of denying SCP the opportunity to disprove the grounds for the appointment of a management committee was
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:

[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing the procedures
prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. 34

Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he
renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care in the performance of his/her official
functions.  When a basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross and patent, error can produce
35

an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law.  On this basis, we conclude that
36

the respondent’s act of promptly ordering the creation of a management committee, without the benefit of a
hearing and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law.

On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period

On the respondent’s failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find the respondent’s
explanation to be satisfactory.

Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one hundred
eighty (180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an extension beyond this period only if
it appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no
instance, however, shall the period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18)
months from the date of filing of the petition.
37

Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period carried a good
measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether the rehabilitation court could act by itself or
whether Supreme Court approval was still required. Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No.
00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.

Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:

Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year from the date of
filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to secure an extension of the period from the
Supreme Court. 38

Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s approval of the
rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the respondent liable for the extension she
granted and for the consequent delay.
On the Ground of Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
states that:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an
official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to
their influence, direction or control. 39

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect
for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint.  He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in
40

expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. 41

As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas,  a judge should be considerate,
42

courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always keep his passion guarded. He can
never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of
a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.

Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,  the Court declared that "although respondent judge
43

may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands
from him courteous speech in and out of court.

Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language."

Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation
over trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are
conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.

Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe judicial temperament
and to conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the decorum required by the Code and to use
temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she] should ensure that [her] conduct is always above
reproach and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an
appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety." 44

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in
the view of a reasonable observer.

In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section 6, Canon 6
and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

On the Ground of Impropriety

We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet – a new medium
through which more and more Filipinos communicate with each other.  While judges are not prohibited from
45

becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, we remind them that they do not
thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and
duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that we judge the
respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or
maintaining an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right
"includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through any media
regardless of frontiers."  Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The
46

respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative restriction on
judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it be in the
course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall
conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety
required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and
made this available for public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind that what
they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties – creates and
contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part.
This is especially true when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close
friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to her family and
close friends, but when she made this picture available for public consumption, she placed herself in a situation
where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The
nature of cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive
had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible personification of law and justice,
however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves. 47

This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters.  The very nature of
1âwphi1

their functions requires behavior under exacting standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the
performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach.  Judges necessarily
48

accept this standard of conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.

Imposable Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the
law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, a serious charge
merits any of the following sanctions:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
 controlled corporations; provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six
(6), months; or

3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.

On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than
₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable for any
wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair and proper to temper the penalty for
her offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for
which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED
to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with
the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10945 February 23, 2016 (Formerly CBD 09-2507)

ANGELITO RAMISCAL and MERCEDES ORZAME, Complainants, vs. ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO, Respondent.

The fiduciary duty of every lawyer towards his client requires him to conscientiously act in advancing and
safeguarding the latter's interest. His failure or neglect to do so constitutes a serious breach of his Lawyer's Oath
and the canons of professional ethics, and renders him liable for gross misconduct that may warrant his
suspension from the practice of law.

Antecedents

Complainants Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and Mercedes Orzame (Ramiscals) engaged the legal services of
respondent Atty. Edgar S. Orro to handle a case in which they were the defendants seeking the declaration of the
nullity of title to a parcel of land situated in the Province of Isabela.
1

Upon receiving the P10,000.00 acceptance fee from them, the respondent handled the trial of the case until the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided it in their favor.  As expected, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals
1âwphi1

(CA), and they ultimately filed their appellants’ brief. Upon receipt of the appellants’ brief, the respondent
requested from the complainants an additional amount of P30,000.00 for the preparation and submission of their
appellees’ brief in the CA. They obliged and paid him the amount requested. 2

Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform the Ramiscals of the adverse
decision of the CA which they only learned about from their neighbors. They endeavored to communicate with
the respondent but their efforts were initially in vain. When they finally reached him, he asked an additional
P7,000.00 from them as his fee in filing a motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such
motion would already be belated. Even so, they paid to him the amount sought. To their dismay, they later
discovered that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the decision attained finality, eventually
resulting in the loss of their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a probable worth of P3,391,600.00. 3
Consequently, the Ramiscals brought this administrative complaint against the respondent. The Court referred
the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate evaluation, report and
recommendation. 4

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

Despite due notice, the Ramiscals and the respondent did not appear during the scheduled mandatory
conferences set by the IBP. Neither did they submit their respective evidence.

IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda rendered his findings to the effect that the respondent had violated Canon
18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from
the practice law for one year.5

On October 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-829,  whereby it adopted the
6

report of IBP Commissioner Almeyda but modified his recommendation of the penalty by increasing the period of
suspension to two years, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with

modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and for violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility aggravated by his disregard of the notices from the Commission and considering the extent of the
damage suffered by Complainant, Atty. Edgar S. Orro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years.

Ruling of the Court

We agree with the IBP’s findings that the respondent did not competently and diligently discharge his duties as
the lawyer of the Ramiscals.

Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer’s Oath, by which he
vows, among others, that: "I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients."
If he should violate the vow, he contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon 17,
and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, viz.:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.

It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued with trust and
confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship commences, with the lawyer being bound to serve
his clients with full competence, and to attend to their cause with utmost diligence, care and devotion.  To accord
7

with this highly fiduciary relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of the former’s cause and
to be diligent in handling the former’s legal affairs.  As an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the
8
client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the developments of the case.  The lawyer 9

who neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. 10

As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing professional and ethical
burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best of his knowledge and discretion and with all
good fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking up their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance
and defend their interest therein. Even if he could not thereby guarantee to them the favorable outcome of the
litigation, he reneged on his commitment nonetheless because he did not file the motion for reconsideration in
their behalf despite receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He further neglected to
regularly update them on the status of the case, particularly on the adverse result, thereby leaving them in the
dark on the proceedings that were gradually turning against their interest. Updating the clients could have
prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling them to engage another competent lawyer to handle their case.
As it happened, his neglect in that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were then available. His various
omissions manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards them.

We further underscore that the respondent owed it to himself and to the entire Legal Profession of the Philippines
to exhibit due respect towards the IBP as the national organization of all the members of the Legal Profession.
His unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him by the IBP to comment and to appear in the administrative
investigation of his misconduct revealed his irresponsibility as well as his disrespect for the IBP and its
proceedings. He thereby exposed a character flaw that should not tarnish the nobility of the Legal
Profession.   He should always bear in mind that his being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a
11

person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others.   He should never 12

forget that his duty to serve his clients with unwavering loyalty and diligence carried with it the corresponding
responsibilities towards the Court, to the Bar, and to the public in general. 
13

There can be no question that a lawyer is guilty of misconduct sufficient to justify his suspension or disbarment if
he so acts as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence involved in his official oath and is found to be wanting in
that honesty and integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar in the performance of their professional
duties.   Based on all the circumstances in this case, we approve the recommendation of the IBP for the
14

respondent's suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years. Although the Court imposed a six-
month suspension from the practice of law on lawyers violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,   the recommended penalty is condign and proportionate to the offense charged and established
15

because his display of disrespectful defiance of the orders of the IBP aggravated his misconduct.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO guilty of violating

Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for a period for TWO YEARS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE, with the STERN WARNING that any
similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the respondent's
personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the Philippines for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016

ADELPHA E. MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.

The Case

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed (complainant) against
Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña (respondent) for dishonesty and grave misconduct. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 The Facts

In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007, complainant charged respondent with dishonesty for
"deliberately and repeatedly making falsehood" that "misled the Court." First, complainant claimed
that the Certificate to File Action in the complaint filed by respondent refers to a different
complaint, that is the complaint filed by complainant's brother against Fortunato Jadulco. In effect,
there was no Certificate to File Action, which is required for the filing of a civil action, in the
complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his client Fortunato Jadulco.

Second, complainant alleged that respondent did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the free
patent covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent forwarded a copy to
the Court of Appeals. Complainant claimed that she could not properly defend herself without a
copy of the title. She further claimed that the title presented by respondent was fabricated. To
support such claim, complainant presented Certifications from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and the Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran, allegedly confirming that
there is no file in their offices of OCT No. 1730.

Complainant also alleged that respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the
occupants of the lot owned by complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel of land to the
Roman Catholic Church, which deed of donation respondent notarized.

Complainant further accused respondent of conniving with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval,
Biliran, Branch 16 Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in an administrative case, to
rule in his clients' favor. Complainant narrated the outcomes in the "cases of Estrellers which were
filed in the [Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction to favor respondent x x x and his client[s] x x x."

Complainant charged respondent with grave misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of
his dismissal as a judge. Respondent worked as Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval
Institute of Technology (NIT) - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a
government institution, and received salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of
dismissal which is his perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any government office.

In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007, respondent basically denied the charges against him.
Respondent alleged that "the [Certificate to File Action] he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-]
1118 for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the
certification of Lupon Chairman, the late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on May 9, 2001." 3 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was attached to the folio of the records in Civil
Case No. B-1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to complainant's counsel. Assuming
opposing counsel was not furnished, respondent wondered why he raised this matter only upon
filing of the instant complaint.

Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of donation had no relation to the case filed
against the occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed that the matter regarding Judge
Asis's rulings favorable to his clients should be addressed to Judge Asis himself.

As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying the accessory penalty of dismissal from the
service, respondent admitted that he accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the
NIT - University of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a government institution. However,
respondent countered that he was no longer connected with the NIT College of Law; and thus, this
issue had become moot. Respondent further claimed that his designation as Assistant Dean was
only temporary, and he had not received any salary except honorarium. Respondent stated that he
even furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the MCLE Office a copy of his designation
as Associate Dean, and since there were no objections, he proceeded to perform the functions
appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the
administrative case against him, who interposed no objection to his petition for judicial clemency
filed before this Court.

Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January 2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply 5 on
20 February 2008. Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20 February
2008. All these submissions basically reiterated the respective arguments of the parties and denied
each other's allegations. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the IBP

In his Report and Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner

Norberto B. Ruiz noted the foul language used by respondent in his pleadings submitted before the
IBP. Respondent described complainant's counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant of
"cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man died." According to the
IBP Commissioner, such offensive language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of respondent's gross
misconduct that seriously affect his standing and character as an officer of the court."

With respect to the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, the IBP Commissioner found that
respondent is guilty of the same "as evidenced by the numerous documents attached by
complainant in all the pleadings she has submitted." Respondent committed acts of dishonesty and
grave misconduct (1) for using a Certificate to File Action which was used in a complaint filed by
complainant's brother Conrado Estreller against Fortunato Jadulco, who is respondent's client; (2)
for not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the free patent covered by OCT No. 1730
which was attached to the Comment respondent filed with the Court of Appeals; and (3) for
accepting the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University of Eastern
Philippines College of Law and receiving salaries therefor, in violation of the accessory penalty of
prohibition on reemployment in any government office as a result of his dismissal as a judge.

The IBP Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one year.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution adopting the IBP
Commissioner's recommendation. The Resolution reads:   
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137
Adm. Case No. 7594
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty. Meljohn De La Peña

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De La Peña is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) year.9 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Ruling of the Court

Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Using foul language in pleadings

In his Comment, respondent called complainant's counsel "silahis by nature and complexion" 10 and
accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before the wife of that married man
died."11 In his Rejoinder, respondent maintained that such language is not foul, but a "dissertation
of truth designed to debunk complainant's and her counsel's credibility in filing the administrative
case."12 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We are not convinced. Aside from such language being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the
resolution of this case. While respondent is entitled and very much expected to defend himself with
vigor, he must refrain from using improper language in his pleadings. In Saberon v. Larong,13 we
stated:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x [W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does
not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but
not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings, respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which states: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action

The submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences the non-conciliation between the
parties in the barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court. 14 Complainant
claims that there is no such certificate in the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of Fortunato
Jadulco, et al. Instead, what respondent submitted was the certificate to file action in the
complaint filed by complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller, against Fortunato Jadulco. 15 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of
Title, etc. x x x was the certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x x x."

Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the
RTC on 18 October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement, which respondent claimed was the
certificate to file action he used in Civil Case No. B-1118, was issued on 9 May 2001, or after the
filing of the complaint on 18 October 2000. It is apparent that the Certificate of Endorsement did
not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed. In other words, there is no
truth to respondent's allegation that the subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was brought
before the Lupon Tagapamayapa and that a certificate to file action was issued prior to the filing of
the complaint. Clearly, respondent misrepresented that he filed a certificate to file action when
there was none, which act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, x x x.
 Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy of title

With regard to respondent's alleged act of not furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy of the
free patent title, we find that it does not constitute dishonesty.

Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which means that a copy
of the title exists. There is no showing that respondent deliberately did not furnish complainant's
counsel with a copy of the title. The remedy of complainant should have been to file with the Court
of Appeals a motion to furnish complainant or counsel with a copy of the title so she and her
counsel could examine the same.

Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a question of fact
demanding an examination of the parties' respective evidence. Obviously, this matter falls outside
the scope of this administrative case, absent any clear and convincing proof that respondent
himself orchestrated such fabrication. The DENR and Registry of Deeds certifications do not prove
that respondent manufactured OCT No. 1730. Such documents merely confirm that OCT No. 1730
does not exist in their official records.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Conflict of interest

Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of interest when the latter allegedly notarized a deed
of donation of a parcel of land executed by complainant's family in favor of the Roman Catholic
Church. Eventually, respondent allegedly sought to litigate as counsel for the opposing parties who
are occupants in the lot owned by complainant's family.

Suffice to state that notarization is different from representation. A notary public simply performs
the notarial acts authorized by the Rules on Notarial Practice, namely, acknowledgments, oaths
and affirmations, jurats, signature witnessings, and copy certifications. Legal representation, on
the other hand, refers to the act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.

As regards complainant's serious accusations against respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and
conspiring with the latter to render judgments favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare
allegations, without any proof. Complainant simply narrated the outcomes of the proceedings in
Civil Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973, which were filed by the Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by
the RTC. Complainant conveniently failed to present any concrete evidence proving her grave
accusation of conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis. Moreover, charges of bias and
partiality on the part of the presiding judge should be filed against the judge, and not against the
counsel allegedly favored by the judge. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Violation of prohibition on reemployment in government office

In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed respondent as Acting Judge of Municipal Trial
Court of Naval, Leyte and Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba,
Leyte for partiality, with prejudice to reappointment to any public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.

There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the consequences of his dismissal as a judge,
one of which is the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any
government office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Despite being
disqualified, respondent accepted the positions of Associate Dean and Professor of NIT-College of
Law, a government institution, and received compensation therefor.

Respondent alleges that his designation was only temporary, and "no fixed salary was attached to
his designation except for honorarium." Respondent also claims that he furnished a copy of his
designation to the OBC and MCLE office as a "gesture of x x x respect, courtesy and approval from
the Supreme Court." He further avers that complainant in the administrative case against him (as
a judge) posed no objection to his petition for clemency.

Respondent's contentions are untenable. The prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish
between permanent and temporary appointments. Hence, that his designation was only temporary
does not absolve him from liability. Further, furnishing a copy of his designation to the OBC and
MCLE office does not in any way extinguish his permanent disqualification from reemployment in a
government office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his previous administrative case did
not object to his petition for clemency.

In view of his disqualification from reemployment in any government office, respondent should
have declined from accepting the designation and desisted from performing the functions of such
positions.17 Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the prohibition on reemployment in a public office
imposed upon him by the Court.

In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer "willfully disobeyed this Court when she
continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order," the Court held that failure to
comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which
merits a lawyer's suspension or even disbarment. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Gross Misconduct

In sum, respondent committed gross misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that he submitted a
certificate to file action issued by the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there was none prior to
the institution of the civil action of his client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil Case No. B-1118; (2) using
improper language in his pleadings; and (3) defying willfully the Court's prohibition on
reemployment in any government office as accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge. Gross
misconduct is defined as "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a
wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment." 19 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a ground for disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross misconduct, we increase the IBP's recommended penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross misconduct and

accordingly SUSPEND him from the practice of law for two (2) years with a WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and all courts in the Philippines for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016

NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS, Respondent.

This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney towards his client in
which the former is found and declared to be lacking in knowledge and skill sufficient for the
engagement. Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney fails to accomplish tasks which he is
naturally expected to perform during his professional engagement?

Antecedents

Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent) with
misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his
professional services despite his not having performed the contemplated professional services. She
avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her in the
annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the respondent
accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of
P5,000.00/hearing; that she then gave to him the initial amount of P90,000.00; 1 that she had
gone to his residence in May 2005 to inquire on the developments in her case, but he told her that
he would only start working on the case upon her full payment of the acceptance fee; that she had
only learned then that what he had contemplated to file for her was a petition for legal separation,
not one for the annulment of her marriage; that he further told her that she would have to pay a
higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage; 2 that she subsequently withdrew the
case from him, and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he refused to do the
same as he had already started working on the case; 3 that she had sent him a letter, through Atty.
Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less whatever amount corresponded to
the legal services he had already performed;4 that the respondent did not heed her demand letter
despite his not having rendered any appreciable legal services to her; 5 and that his constant
refusal to return the amounts prompted her to bring an administrative complaint against him 6 in
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.

In his answer dated May 21, 2007,7 the respondent alleges that the complainant and her British
fiancee sought his legal services to bring the petition for the annulment of her marriage; that
based on his evaluation of her situation, the more appropriate case would be one for legal
separation anchored on the psychological incapacity of her husband; that she and her British
fiancee agreed on P150,000.00 for his legal services to bring the action for legal separation, with
the fiancee paying him P70,000.00, as evidenced by his handwritten receipt; 8 that for purposes of
the petition for legal separation he required the complainant to submit copies of her marriage
contract and the birth certificates of her children with her husband, as well as for her to submit to
further interviews by him to establish the grounds for legal separation; that he later on
communicated with her and her fiancee upon finalizing the petition, but they did not promptly
respond to his communications; that in May 2005, she admitted to him that she had spent the
money that her fiancee had given to pay the balance of his professional fees; and that in June
2005, she returned to him with a note at the back of the prepared petition for legal separation
essentially requesting him not to file the petition because she had meanwhile opted to bring the
action for the annulment of her marriage instead.

The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from Atty. Martinez, but states that he
dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of paper because the demand lacked basis in law. It is noted
that he wrote in the last part of his answer dated May 21, 2007 in relation to the demand letter
the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for refund dated 15 August 2005
(Annex "B" of the complaint) as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her
counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ, who unskillfully relied on an unverified information
furnished him, to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful purpose. 9 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) summoned the parties to a mandatory
conference on August 3, 2007,10 but only the complainant and her counsel attended the
conference. On his part, the respondent sent a letter dated July 20, 2007 to the IBP-CBD to
reiterate his answer.11 Due to his non-appearance, the IBP-CBD terminated the conference on the
same day, but required the complainant to submit a verified position paper within 10 days. She did
not submit the position paper in the end.

In his commissioner's report dated July 25, 2008,12 IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La
Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent's insistence that he could have brought a petition for legal
separation based on the psychological incapacity of the complainant's husband was sanctionable
because he himself was apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal separation; that
because he rendered some legal services to the complainant, he was entitled to receive only
P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the value
of the services rendered under the principle of quantum meruit; and that, accordingly, he should
be made to return to her the amount of P30,000.00.

IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. observed that the respondent's statement in the
last part of his answer, to the effect that the demand letter sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the
complainant should be treated as a scrap of paper, or should have been addressed "to the urinal
project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful purpose," was uncalled for and improper; and
he opined that such offensive and improper language uttered by the respondent against a fellow
lawyer violated Rule 8.0113 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. ultimately recommended as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The undersigned Commissioner is most respectfully recommending the following:

(1) To order the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of P30,000.00 which he received
for the purpose of preparing a petition for legal separation. Undersigned believes that considering
the degree of professional services he has extended, the amount of P40,000.00 he received on March
10, 2005 would be sufficient payment for the same.
(2) For failure to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and annulment of marriage,
respondent should be sanctioned.
(3) Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness towards his colleagues and for using
offensive or improper language in his pleading, which was filed right before the Commission on Bar
Discipline, he must also be sanctioned and disciplined in order to avoid repetition of the said
misconduct.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended that Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos be ordered to return to complainant Nenita D. Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00 which
the former received as payment for his services because it is excessive.

It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months for failure to show his respect to his fellow lawyer and for using
offensive and improper language in his pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008, 14 the IBP Board of Governors
affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr., but modified the
recommendation of the penalty, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondent's failure to show respect to his fellow lawyer and for showing offensive and improper
words in his pleadings, Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos, is hereby WARNED and Ordered to Return the
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice.15 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, 16 which the IBP Board of Governors denied
through Resolution No. XXI-2014-177 dated March 23, 2014. 17

Issues

The two issues for consideration and resolution are: (a) whether or not the respondent should be
held administratively liable for misconduct; and (b) whether or not he should be ordered to return
the attorney's fees paid.

Ruling of the Court

We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-177, but modify
the recommended penalty.

1.

Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to return the entire
amount received from the client

The respondent offered himself to the complainant as a lawyer who had the requisite professional
competence and skill to handle the action for the annulment of marriage for her. He required her
to pay P150,000.00 as attorney's fees, exclusive of the filing fees and his appearance fee of
P5,000.00/hearing. Of that amount, he received the sum of P70,000.00.

On the respondent's conduct of himself in his professional relationship with the complainant as his
client, we reiterate and adopt the thorough analysis and findings by IBP Investigating
Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As appearing in Annex "4", which is the handwritten retainer's contract between the respondent
and the complainant, there is a sweeping evidence that there is an attorney-client relationship.
The respondent agreed to accept the case in the amount of P150,000.00. The acceptance fee was
agreed upon to be paid on installment basis. Excluded in the agreement is the payment of
appearance fee, filing fee and other legal documentation.

That next question is - for what case the P150,000.00 was intended for? Was it intended for the
filing of the annulment case or legal separation?

In the verified Answer filed by the respondent, even the latter is quite confused as to what action
he is going to file in court. The intention of the British national and the complainant was to get
married. At that time and maybe up to now, the complainant is still legally married to a certain
Jovencio C. Sanchez. That considering that the two are intending to get married, we can safely
assume that the complainant was contemplating of filing a petition for annulment of marriage in
order to free her from the marriage bond with her husband. It is only then, granting that the
petition will be granted, that the complainant will be free to marry the British subject. The legal
separation is but a separation of husband and wife from board and bed and the marriage bond still
exists. Granting that the petition for legal separation will be granted, one is not free to marry
another person.

A reading of the answer filed by the respondent would show that he himself is not well versed in
the grounds for legal separation. He stated the following;
. . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a legal separation case for the
alleged psychological incapacity of her husband to comply with his marital obligations developed or
of their marriage on February 6, 1999. (please see par. 2 of the Answer).
If the intention was to file a petition for legal separation, under A.M. 02-11-11-SC, the grounds are
as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 2. Petition-

(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the
husband or the wife, as the case may be, within five years from the time of the occurrence of any
of the following causes:

(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner;

(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;

(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;

(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in or outside the
Philippines;

(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;

(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or

(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Psychological incapacity, contrary to what respondent explained to the complainant, is not one of
those mentioned in any of the grounds for legal separation.

Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, psychological incapacity is never a ground
for the purpose of filing a petition for legal separation.

On the other hand, psychological incapacity has always been used for the purpose of filing a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage.
That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it stales that "a marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization."

That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in continuing legal
education program (Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent
repetition of such kind of advise that respondent gave to the complainant. In giving an advise, he
should be able to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and grounds for annulment
of marriage. But as the respondent stated in his answer, it appears that he is mixed up with the
basic provisions of the law.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant.
As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal
separation and for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected
of him as a lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either causes of action. His
explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be
disbelieved. The case unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which his services was
engaged, was no other than an action for annulment of the complainant's marriage with her
husband with the intention of marrying her British fiancee. They did not contemplate legal
separation at all, for legal separation would still render her incapacitated to re-marry. That the
respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition for legal separation, and
that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for annulment was,
therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim
for services rendered.

As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an attorney. He thus
transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he knows or should
know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the
consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the
matter.

Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)
The next to be dealt with is the matter of the attorney's fees. We can easily agree that every
attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed
at the special instance and request of his client. As long as the attorney is in good faith and
honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable
compensation for such services.19

The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between the client and the
attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to law,
good morals, good customs, public policy or public order. 20 The underlying theory is that the
retainer's agreement between them gives to the client the reasonable notice of the arrangement
on the fees. Once the attorney has performed the task assigned to him in a valid agreement, his
compensation is determined on the basis of what he and the client agreed. 21 In the absence of the
written agreement, the lawyer's compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which means
"as much as he deserved."22 The determination of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum
meruit is also authorized "when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to
its conclusion."23 Moreover, quantum meruit becomes the basis of recovery of compensation by the
attorney where the circumstances of the engagement indicate that it will be contrary to the
parties' expectation to deprive the attorney of all compensation.

Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is reasonable compensation based on
the obtaining circumstances,24 provided that the attorney does not receive more than what is
reasonable, in keeping with Section 24 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees - An attorney shall be entitled to

have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a
view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of
attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony
and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
The courts supervision of the lawyer's compensation for legal services rendered is not only for the
purpose of ensuring the reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees charged, but also for the
purpose of preserving the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. 25
cralawred

The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was later revealed, it was
way above his ability and competence to handle the case for annulment of marriage. As a
consequence, he had no basis to accept any amount as attorney's fees from the complainant. He
did not even begin to perform the contemplated task he undertook for the complainant because it
was improbable that the agreement with her was to bring the action for legal separation. His
having supposedly prepared the petition for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment
of marriage was either his way of covering up for his incompetence, or his means of charging her
more. Either way did not entitle him to retain the amount he had already received.

The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows that the respondent received P70,000.00 as
acceptance fee. His refusal to return the amount to the complainant rested on his claim of having
already completed the first phase of the preparation of the petition for legal separation after
having held conferences with the complainant and her British fiancee. In this respect, IBP
Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. opined that the respondent could retain P40,000.00 of
the P70,000.00 because the respondent had rendered some legal services to the complainant,
specifically: (a) having the complainant undergo further interviews towards establishing the
ground for legal separation; (b) reducing into writing the grounds discussed during the interviews
based on her statement in her own dialect (Annexes 1 and 2) after he could not understand the
written statement prepared for the purpose by her British fiancee; (c) requiring her to submit her
marriage contract with her husband Jovencio C. Sanchez (Annex 3), and the certificates of live
birth of her four children: Mary Joy, Timothy, Christine, and Janette Anne, all surnamed Sanchez
(Annexes 4, 5, 6 and 7); and (d) finalizing her petition for legal separation (Annex 8) in the later
part of April, 2007.

The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. in favor of the respondent was too
generous. We cannot see how the respondent deserved any compensation because he did not
really begin to perform the contemplated tasks if, even based on his version, he would prepare the
petition for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage. The attorney who
fails to accomplish the tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform during his professional
engagement does not discharge his professional responsibility and ethical duty toward his client.
The respondent was thus guilty of misconduct, and may be sanctioned according to the degree of
the misconduct. As a consequence, he may be ordered to restitute to the client the amount
received from the latter in consideration of the professional engagement, subject to the rule
on quantum meruit, if warranted.

Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for his misrepresentation
of his professional competence, and he is further to be ordered to return the entire amount of
P70,000.00 received from the client, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date
of this decision until full payment.

2.

Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleague

The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to "abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged." 26 This duty of lawyers is
further emphasized in the Code of Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A lawyer
shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically demands
that: "A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper."

The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has necessitated lawyers to
use strong language in the advancement of the interest of their clients. 27 However, as members of
a noble profession, lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent their clients' cause,
or, as in this case, to represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal but that should
not be used as license for the use of offensive and abusive language. In maintaining the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language - spoken or in his pleadings - must be
dignified.28 As such, every lawyer is mandated to carry out his duty as an agent in the
administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and respect not only towards his clients, the court
and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in the Legal Profession.

The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez should be treated
"as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel x x x to the urinal project
of the MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose" constituted simple misconduct that this
Court cannot tolerate.

In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive and improper
language by asserting that the phraseology was not per se uncalled for and improper. He
explained that he had sufficient cause for maintaining that the demand letter should be treated as
a mere scrap of paper and should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not excuse the
offensiveness and impropriety of his language. He could have easily been respectful and proper in
responding to the letter.

As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded, with the stern warning that a
repetition of the offense will be severely punished.
chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty.
Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional competence to
the client, and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper language towards his
fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense shall be severely punished.

The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant within thirty (30) days
from notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of
this decision until full payment.

Let copies of this decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos as a
member of the Philippine Bar, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all
courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10781 [Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2764]

COBALT RESOURCES, INC., Complainant, vs. ATTY. RONALD AGUADO, Respondent.

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Cobalt Resources, Inc. (CRI) against respondent Atty.
Ronald C. Aguado (Atty. Aguado) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violation of Rules 1.01
and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the lawyer's oath.

The Antecedents

In its Complaint,  CRI alleged that on March 5, 2010, a group of armed men, clad in vests bearing the mark
1

"PASG" and pretending to be agents of the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group (PASG), hi-jacked its delivery van
which was then loaded with cellular phones worth P1.3 million; that Dennis Balmaceda (Balmaceda), the driver of
the delivery van, and his companions were all forcibly taken away at gun point and were dropped at the Country
Hill and Golf Club; that Balmaceda called Antonio Angeles (Angeles), the Security Director of CRI, who
immediately reported the incident to the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation Detection Unit (PNP-
CIDU); that with the use of Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) Tracking Device installed in the cellular phones,
Angeles and the PNPCIDU tracked down the location of the cellular phones to be in front of Pegasus Bar along
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City; that the PNP-CIDU, together with Angeles proceeded to Pegasus Bar and found
three (3) vehicles parked in front of the bar: (1) Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 owned by Atty. Aguado,
(2) Chevrolet Optra with Plate No. ZDW-764 and (3) a motorcycle with Plate No. NK-1180; that when the PNP-
CIDU approached the vehicles, Anthony Palmes (Palmes) ran but he was chased by the police officers and was
arrested; that Atty. Aguado who was then standing in the reception area of Pegasus Bar was not arrested as
none of the police officers knew, at that time, of his participation in the crime; that the PNP-CIDU searched the
vehicles and found the cellular phones, the Identification Card (ID) showing Atty. Aguado as Legal Consultant of
the PASG, the Mission Order identifying Atty. Aguado as the Assistant Team Leader, and a vest bearing the
mark PASG.

CRI further averred that the men who hijacked its delivery van used the fake mission order when it flagged down
the delivery van; that the mission order identified Atty. Aguado as the assistant team leader and authorized the
armed men to seize CRI’s cellular phones; that the PASG issued a certification stating that the mission order was
fake; that Atty. Aguado carried an ID bearing his picture and name which showed that he was a PASG legal
consultant; and that this ID was likewise fake as evidenced by a certification issued by the PASG.

Based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay,  dated September 8, 2010, executed by Palmes, CRI concluded that it was
2

Atty. Aguado who prepared the fake mission order and masterminded the crime as he was the one who
conceived it and laid down the nitty-gritty details of its execution; and that it was he who recruited the armed men
who actually executed the hijacking.

Eventually, two separate Informations for Robbery  and Carnapping  were filed against Atty. Aguado and several
3 4

others.

The IBP directed Atty. Aguado to submit his answer but, despite several extensions, he failed to do so.

The IBP then set the case for mandatory conference.

In his Conference Brief,  Atty. Aguado denied the allegations. He averred that "on March 5, 2010, at about 11:00
5

to 12:00 in the afternoon,"  his Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 was carnapped along Scout Mandarin
6

while in the custody of his driver; that he reported the incident to the police authorities; that on March 7, 2010, he
was awakened by relatives informing him that his name was on the front page of several tabloids in a story
connecting him to the alleged hijacking; and that he was indicted in the case because of the ID found hanging in
his carnapped vehicle.

In its Report and Recommendation,  dated May 3, 2011, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty.
7

Aguado liable for unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in falsifying the ID and mission order
showing him as the Legal Consultant and the Assistant Team Leader, respectively, of the PASG. The IBP-CBD
recommended that he be suspended for two (2) years. It, however, deferred the issue of Atty. Aguado’s
purported participation in the alleged hijacking incident as the issue pertained to a judicial function.

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the CBD, as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful
conduct by falsifying the ID and Mission Order, Atty. Ronaldo Aguado is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for two (2) years. 8

Not satisfied, CRI filed a motion for reconsideration  praying that the May 3, 2011 report of the IBP-CBD be set
9

aside and that a new resolution ordering the disbarment of Atty. Aguado be issued. CRI claimed that Atty.
Aguado deserved the ultimate penalty of disbarment as the falsification of public documents was sufficiently
established and, as the CBD knew, he masterminded the hijacking using his profession to commit the crime.

On July 25, 2013, Atty. Aguado also filed a motion for Reconsideration  of the March 20, 2013 Resolution praying
10

that it be set aside and a new one be issued dismissing the complaint. He averred that the charges of usurpation
of authority and falsification filed against him had been dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City; that he could not be presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was never in possession of
the falsified ID and mission order; and that he never used, took advantage or profit therefrom. Atty. Aguado
asserted that this case should, at the very least, be suspended pending the resolution of the robbery and
carnapping charges against him.

In a Resolution,[[11] dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied both motions and affirmed
its March 20, 2013 Resolution.

Pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, CRI filed a petition for review  before the Court. CRI
12

was firm in its stand that Atty. Aguado be meted out the penalty of disbarment for his falsification of a PASG
mission order and ID and for his involvement in the hijacking of the CIR delivery van and its cargo.

Similarly, Atty. Aguado filed a petition for review insisting on his innocence and praying for the dismissal of the
complaint.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition of CRI.

It must be emphasized that a disbarment proceeding, being administrative in nature, is separate and distinct from
a criminal action filed against a lawyer and they may proceed independently of each other.  A finding of guilt in
13

the criminal case does not necessarily mean a finding of liability in the administrative case.  In the same way, the
14

dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence against an accused, who is also a
respondent in an administrative case, does not necessarily exculpate him administratively because the quantum
of evidence required is different. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required.  "In administrative
15

cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant
evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant."  Preponderance of evidence means "evidence
16

which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."
17

Clearly, Atty. Aguado committed the act complained of as it was established that he was in possession of a
falsified ID showing him as a legal consultant of the PASG and mission order identifying him as the Assistant
Team Leader of the anti-smuggling operation. Although Atty. Aguado claimed in his Conference Brief that he was
indicted merely on the basis of an ID found hanging in his carnapped Toyota Fortuner,  his counsel, Atty. Letecia
18

Amon (Atty. Amon), during the mandatory conference held on February 25, 2011, acknowledged that the ID
and mission order were found in the Toyota Fortuner owned by Atty. Aguado, thus:

ATTY. HARON:

Is she willing to admit that respondent is the same person referred to in the document called mission order
marked as Annex "F" issued by the PASG.

ATTY. AMON:

I have no exact knowledge on that, Your Honor.

ATTY. HARON:

I’m showing counsel for respondent with a copy of a mission order marked as Annex "F"….

COMM. CACHAPERO:

Machine copy.

ATTY. HARON:

This is the copy.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

Take a look, is that a machine copy?

ATTY. HARON:

Yes, Your Honor. Annex "F" states that Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is the assistant team leader of the team by
mission order.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

He is only asking, the respondent is the one who owns that document. He is not yet asking whether that
document is authentic or not.

ATTY. AMON:

Yes, Your Honor, as written here.

COMM. CACHAPERO:
Yes, he is the one.

ATTY. HARON:

Would the respondent also like to admit that the identification card and the mission order were found
inside his Toyota Fortuner, Plate No. UNO-68.

ATTY. AMON:

Of which he is the owner, yes.

ATTY. HARON:

Admitted also, Your Honor.

ATTY. HARON:

Would the respondent also like to admit the certifications Annexes "G" and "H" issued by the PASG are genuine
and duly executed. I’m showing counsel copies of the certifications, Your Honor, marked as Annexes "G" and "H"
which bears the seal of that office, Your Honor.

COMM. CACHAPERO:

What is your proposal Atty. Haron?

x x x.  [Emphasis supplied]
19

Moreover, the Sinumpaang Salaysay  of Palmes explicitly described Atty. Aguado’s participation in the crime as
20

follows:

xxx

2. Alam ko kung sinu-sino ang mga taong kasama sa pagplano at pagsasagawa ng nasabing ‘hijacking’.
Bagamat may partisipasyon ako sa krimen, hindi ko alam na ang gagawing paghuli sa mga nasabing
cellphone ay labag sa batas dahil ako ay pinaniwala na ang gagawin naming paghuli sa mga cellphone
ng Cobalt ay isang lehitimong operasyon ng PASG.

3. Bago pa man naganap ang nasabing hijacking ay dati akong empleyado ng Cobalt na nakatalaga sa
Delivery Section/Pull Out Service. Ngunit hindi nagtagal ay nag-resign ako.

4. Noong ikalawang lingo ng Pebrero, nilapitan ako ni Jaime "James" Abedes at sinabi sa akin ng kung
pwede ay i-monitor ko daw ang ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt at ako ay bibgyan niya ng "budget" upang
ang kanyang grupo ay makapagsagawa ng ‘seizure operations.’

5. Noong una ay nag-alangan akong sumangayon sa mungkahi ni James ngunit ako ay pinapanatag niya
na lahat ng dokumento at papeles ay kumpleto. Sabi pa ni James, "Si Atty. Aguado ang magbibigay ng
complete documents at Mission Order dahil naka-direkta siya sa PASG Malacañang para ma-flag down
ang delivery van".

6. Ako ay naniwala sa kanyang sinabi dahil sa pagbanggit niya na may kasama kaming abogado. Dahil
dito ay pumayag ako sa mungkahi ni James.
7. Kinabukasan ay nagkita kami ni James sa Caltex Pioneer corner Shaw Boulevard. Nalaman ko kay
James na may hawak siyang Security Guard doon. Pinakilala niya ako kay Eliseo De Rosas alias Nonoy
na isa ring tauhan ni James. Siya ay may gamit na Honda na motorsiklo na kulay berde na may plakang
1180 NK. Noong araw din na iyon ay nagtungo kami sa Brixton Street upang i-monitor ang warehouse ng
Cobalt dahil may warehouse ang Cobalt sa Brixton Street.

8. Pagkatapos naming pumunta sa Brixton Street ay nagtungo naman kami sa P. Tuazon Street kung
saan may mga clients ang Cobalt, at doon naming nakita ang delivery van na Mitsubishi L-300 ng Cobalt.

9. Sinimulan namin ni Nonoy ang pagmonitor ng ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt. Sa aming ginawang pag-
monitor ay napansin naming madalas magpakarga ng gas ang nasabing delivery van sa Petron Station
sa Ortigas Avenue corner B. Serrano Street. Isang lingo kaming nag-monitor ni Nonoy sa ruta ng Cobalt.

Ipinaalam naming kay James ang nakakalap naming impormasyon. Noong natiyak naming ang ruta ng
delivery van ay nagpaschedule si James ng ‘meeting’ kay Atty. Aguado.

10. Ika-22 ng Pebrero 2010 alas-6 ng gabi sa McDonald’s Quezon Avenue ay nag meeting kami. Ang
mga kasama sa meeting ay si James, Atty. Aguado, Joe Almonte, at Nonoy. Noong kami ay nandoon ay
lumipat ng lamesa si Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte at sila ay nagusap.

11. Pagkatapos ng usapan nila ay pumunta sa amin si James at sinabi sa amin kung ano ang kanilang
napagusapan. Sinabi sa amin ni James na mag-iisue daw ng Mission Order si Atty. Aguado. Si Atty.
Aguado na rin daw ang magbubuo ng grupo ng mga lalake upang i-flag down ang delivery van ng Cobalt.

12. Noong ika-25 ng Pebrero 2010 alas 7 ng gabi, ay muli kaming nagkita nila James, Nonoy at Joe
Almonte sa McDonald’s Quezon Avenue. Pagsapit ng alas-8 ng gabi ay tumawag si Atty. Aguado na
nasa Starbucks Cafe sa Tomas Morato Avenue daw siya naka-puwesto. Kaya’t kaming apat ay sumunod
sa Starbucks. Pagdating naming sa Starbucks ay nandoon nga si Atty. Aguado at may kasama siyang
isang pulis.

13. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis sila Atty. Aguado at James sakay ng Toyota Fortuner na may plakang UNO-
68. Sinabi sa amin ni James na sila ay magsasagawa ng "ocular" ng lugar kung saan gagawin ang pag-
flag down ng delivery van. Nang sila ay magbalik, kami ay sinabihan na gagawin namin ang operasyon
sa umaga ng kinabukasan (ika-26 ng Pebrero, Biernes).

Ayon pa sa kanila, ako raw ay pupuwesto sa Petron Station sa may Boni Serrano corner Ortigas Avenue
ng alas-8 ng umaga upang doon abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van. Samantalang, ang mga taong
magsasagawa ng pag flag down (pawang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado) ay pupuwesto na rin sa may Benitez
Street. Kapag nakita ko na raw ang delivery van ay agad akong tumawag kay James upang ipagbigay
alam ang pagdaan nito at i-alert ang mga nasabing mga lalake, pagkatapos ay tumungo raw ako sa
Benitez Street upang siguraduhin na tama ang delivery van na ipa-flagdown.

Pagkatapos ng meeting ng gabi na iyon ay isa-isa na kaming nagsi-uwian.

14. Kaya’t kinabukasan, ika-26 ng Pebrero, alas-8 ng umaga ay nagtungo ako sa nasabing Petron
Station. Ngunit tumawag si James na hindi raw matutuloy ang operation dahil kulang sa tao si Atty.
Aguado.

15. Kami (ako, Joe Almonte at Nonoy) ay muling pinulong ni James sa McDonald’s Quezon Avenue
noong ika-1 ng Marso alas-7 ng gabi. Bandang alas-8 ng gabi ay dumating na rin si Atty. Aguado. Sila
Atty. Aguado, James at Joe Almonte [ay] nag-usap sa labas ng Smoking Area samantalang kami ni
Nonoy ay nanatili sa loob.
 16. Nang matapos ang usapan ay sinabi sa amin ni James na nag-set ulit ng operation si Atty. Aguado
kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, Martes, ngunit hintayin daw naming ang feedback mula kay Atty. Aguado
dahil kelangan daw ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado.

17. Muli akong nagtungo kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso, alas-8 ng umaga, ngunit maya-maya lamang ay
tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na hindi na naman daw tuloy ang operation dahil hindi
nakakuha ng gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado.

Sa puntong ito ay sinabi ko na kay James na sana sigurado ang mga papeles ni Atty. Aguado dahil ayaw
ko ng illegal na trabaho. Sinabi naman sa akin ni James na kumpleto naman daw ang mga papeles at
legal ang gagawing operation.

18. Ika-4 ng Marso 2010, ay tumawag sa akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na tuloy na daw ang
operation kinabukasan (ika-5 ng Marso). Sinabi rin niya sa akin na alas-8 ng umaga ay kailangan daw na
naka-puwesto na ako sa Petron Station.

19. Kaya noong ika-5 ng Marso 2010, alas-8 ng umaga, ako ay pumuwesto na sa Petron Gasoline
Station sa Boni Serrano corner Ortigas Avenue sakay ng isang motorsiklo. Bandang alas-8:30 ng umaga
ay dumating naman si James sakay ng isang Chevrolet na may plakang ZDW 764 at may kasama pa
siya na pinakilala sa aking "Larry."

Bandang alas-9 ng umaga ay dumating ang Toyota Fortuner ni Atty. Aguado. Nakita ko na sakay ng
nasabing Toyota Fortuner si Atty. Aguado at Joe Almonte. Hindi sila bumaba bagkus ay nagpakarga
lamang ito ng gasolina sa nasabing Petron Station. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis na rin sila. Sumunod
namang umalis si James at Larry sakay ng Chevrolet.

20. Bandang alas-9:30 ng umaga, nakita ko na dumating ang delivery van ng Cobalt sa Petron upang ito
ay magpakarga ng gasolina. Tumawag ako kay James gamit ang aking cellphone at sinabi ko, "Nandito
na ang delivery van na white, may plakang NKQ 734." Sumagot si James, "ok nakapuwesto na kami.
Andito na kami sa area."

21. Agad akong umalis patungo sa Benitez Street upang abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van upang
ma-flag down ito. Gamit ang aking motorsiklo, ako ay dali-daling nagtungo sa Benitez Street.

Pagdating ko doon ay nakita ko ang nasabing Chevrolet ni James at isang L-300 van na kulay blue-green
na may plakang DFN-733. Nadatnan ko rin ang tatlong lalake na pawang armado at nakasuot ng
tsalekong may tatak na PASG at nag-aabang sa gilid ng daan. Mayroon din akong napansin na
nakasakay sa loob ng nasabing blue-green na L-300 van ngunit hindi ko na nabilang ang dami nila.

22. Ako ay pumunta sa Chevrolet (driver side), at binuksan naman ni James ang bintana nito. Sinabi ko
ulit sa kanya na parating na ang delivery van. Sumagot siya, "Sige. Timbrehan mo lang sila pag malapit
na. Hintayin mo relay kung saan ka susunod ." Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na sila.

23. Pagkaalis nila, kami at nang tatlong nasabing lalake ay nag-abang sa pagdaan ng delivery van. Nang
makita ko itong paparating, agad kong sinabi "approaching na. yang puti, yang puti." Pagkatapos noon ay
agad pinara ng isa sa mga nasabing lalakeng nakasumbrero ang delivery van. Sumenyas ito sa driver ng
delivery van na itabi ito sa gilid. Pilit binuksan ng tatlong lalake ang magkabilang pintuan ng delivery van
at nang mabuksan ang mga nasabing pintuan ay agad hinila palabas ang tatlo nitong pahinante at agad
silang pinosasan.

xxxx

From the foregoing, it can be clearly deduced that Atty. Aguado had participation in the crime as charged in the
complaint, from the planning stage up to its execution. These falsified documents found in his possession, as
certified found in his possession, as certified as evidenced by the PASG, were used to facilitate the commission
of the crime. The well-settled rule is that "in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of
and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification."  Atty. Aguado failed to rebut
21

the allegations. Other than the police blotter showing that he reported the carnapping of his vehicle, Atty. Aguado
presented no other convincing evidence to support his denial of the crime. He also failed to show any ill motive
on the part of Palmes in testifying against him whom he claimed to have met only in February 2010.

Moreover, his story of the carnapping of his Fortuner cannot be given credence considering his inconsistent
statements on the matter. In this regard, the Court quotes a portion of the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Oliver Cachapero. Thus:

He, too, blabbered about the supposed carnapping of his Fortuner car on the same day the hijacking was staged
by supposed PASG personnel suggesting that he was a victim and not a perpetrator. However, his allegations in
this regard is put in serious doubt. In the QC PD alarm sheet, Respondent reported that the carnapping took
place at 2:30 of March 5, 2010 while in his sworn statement, he claimed that his car was carnapped at 4:31 p.m.
the precise time the supposed carnapping was staged is too vital that Respondent could not have overlooked the
same in his narration of facts in his counter-affidavit or in his statement before the police authorities expecially
because he supposedly reported the incident on the very same day it happened. But as correctly observed by the
Complainant, even if the report on the time of the carnapping incident would have been properly made, the
hijacking took place much earlier and therefore the same does not negate the commission of the crime by the
Respondent. Also, the reporting did not prove the fact of carnapping especially where, as in this case, no
eyewitness account was presented, no suspect apprehended, and no criminal case was filed. 22

The Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) explicitly mandates:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.

It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar is a privilege laden with conditions,  and granted only to
23

those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers as instruments in the
effective and efficient administration of justice.  As officers of the courts and keepers of the public’s faith, lawyers
24

are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and so mandated to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor.  They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also this high
25

standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. 26

Atty. Aguado has committed acts that showed he was unfit and unable to faithfully discharge his bounden duties
as a member of the legal profession. Because he failed to live up to the exacting standards demanded of him, he
proved himself unworthy of the privilege to practice law. As vanguards of our legal system, lawyers, are expected
at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal professor and to refrain from any act or omission which
might diminish the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession. 27

In several cases, the Court, after finding the lawyer guilty of gross dishonesty, imposed the supreme penalty of
disbarment for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful acts by falsifying documents. In Brennisen v. Atty.
Contawi,   the Court disbarred the lawyer when he falsified a special power of attorney so he could mortgage and
28

sell his client's property. In Embido v. Atty. Pe, Jr.,  the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer
29

who authored the falsification of an inexistent court decision.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is DISBARRED for gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and
1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF the roll of attorneys.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be made part of his personal records;
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 8172, April 12, 2016

ALEX NULADA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO S. PAULMA, Respondent.

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint 1 for disbarment by reason of
dishonesty and conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude filed by Complainant Alex Nulada
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma (respondent).

The Facts

Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005, respondent issued in his favor a check in the
amount of P650,000.00 as payment for the latter's debt. Because of respondent's standing as a
respected member of the community and his being a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Miagao,2 Province of Iloilo, complainant accepted the check without question. 3

Unfortunately, when he presented the check for payment, it was dishonored due to insufficient
fluids. Respondent failed to make good the amount of the check despite notice of dishonor and
repeated demands, prompting complainant to file a criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 224 against respondent,5 before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
Province of Iloilo, docketed as I.S. No. 2006-637,6 which issued a Resolution7 dated May 26, 2006
recommending the filing of the appropriate information against respondent before the Municipal
Trial Court of Miagao, Province of Iloilo (MTC).8 Subsequently, said information was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 2604.9

After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a Decision10 dated October 30, 2008 finding respondent
guilty of violation of BP 22 and ordering him to pay the amount of P150,000.00 as fine, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay. Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the
sum of P650,000.00 representing the amount of the check with interest pegged at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time of the filing of the complaint; (2) filing
fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and (3) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 plus
appearance fees of P1,500.00 per hearing. 11

Records show that respondent appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Guimbal,
Iloilo, Branch 67 (RTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 346. 12 In a Decision13 dated March 13,
2009, the RTC affirmed in toto the MTC ruling. On April 16, 2009, the RTC Decision became final
and executory.14

Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision, or on February 12, 2009, complainant filed this
administrative complaint before the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant.

In his defense,15 respondent denied that he committed dishonesty against complainant, as prior to

September 30, 2005, he informed the latter that there were insufficient funds to cover the amount
of the check. Respondent claimed that he merely issued the check in order to accommodate a
friend in whose favor he obtained the loan, stressing that he did not personally benefit from the
proceeds thereof.16 Unfortunately, said friend had died and respondent had no means by which to
pay for the amount of the check.17 He also claimed that complainant threatened him and used his
unfunded check to the latter's personal advantage. 18

Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated November 14, 2011, 19 referred this administrative
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation, report, and
recommendation.
 The IBP's Report and Recommendation

After conducting mandatory conferences, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP
issued a Report and Recommendation20 dated June 26, 2013, recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for violation of the lawyer's oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as for having been found guilty of a
crime involving moral turpitude.21

It found that the offense for which respondent was found guilty of, i.e., violation of BP 22, involved
moral turpitude, and that he violated his lawyer's oath and the CPR when he committed the said
offense. Stressing the importance of the lawyer's oath, the IBP held that by his conviction of the
said crime, respondent has shown that he is "unfit to protect the administration of justice or that
he is no longer of good moral character"22 which justifies either his suspension or disbarment. 23

Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Notice of
Resolution24 adopting and approving with modification the IBP's Report and Recommendation
dated June 26, 2013, suspending respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years
for having violated the lawyer's oath and the CPR, as well as for having been found guilty of a
crime involving moral turpitude.25cralawred

The Issue Before the Court

The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be
administratively disciplined for having been found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the CBD of the IBP, as approved, adopted, and
modified by the IBP Board of Governors.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, Or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar "to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law x x x." Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's oath, a lawyer becomes
a guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly administration of
justice.26 As such, he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity,
which renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. 27 cralawred

In Enriquez v. De Vera,28 the Court discussed the purpose and nature of a violation of BP 22 in

relation to an administrative case against a lawyer, as in this case, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by
[BP] 22 [x x x] is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and
altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient
funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public
order to be abated.

xxxx

Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If he did
not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in character and
application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated [BP] 22, and
exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public
order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support the Constitution and
obey the laws.29 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's unfitness
for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action.30

In this case, respondent's conviction for violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral turpitude, had
been indubitably established. Such conviction has, in fact, already become final. Consequently,
respondent violated the lawyer's oath, as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, as aptly found by
the IBP and, thus, must be subjected to disciplinary action.

In Heenan v. Espejo,31 the Court suspended therein respondent from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency
of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,32 the same penalty was imposed by the Court to
respondent who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan. Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza,33 the
Court meted the penalty of suspension for a period of two (2) years to respondent for having
issued bouncing checks, among other infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya II,34 respondent was
ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, because aside from
issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, respondent also breached his client's trust
and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in
the course of its proceedings. Accordingly, and in view of the foregoing instances when the erring
lawyer was suspended for a period of two (2) years for the same violation, the Court finds it
appropriate to mete the same penalty to respondent in this case.

As a final word, it should be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege
burdened with conditions.35 A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her
actions whether acting in a public or private capacity. 36 Any transgression of this duty on his part
would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the
legal profession as a whole.37 In this case, respondent's conduct fell short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a member of the bar, for which he must suffer the necessary
consequences. chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of

law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Paulma's personal record with the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and copies be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED. c
A.C. No. 10483, March 18, 2016
THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., PICO LOCAL CENTER,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDWIN A. PANTE, Complainant, v. ATTY.
DANIEL D. MANGALLAY, Respondent.

This administrative case against the respondent attorney did not arise from any attorney-client
relationship gone wrong between the parties but from the ejectment action in which the
respondent attorney, as the plaintiff, successfully defeated the local congregation of the Christian
Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc., Pico Local Center (CSP-PLC), whose church building and other
structures were the objects of the action. After the defendants filed their notice of appeal, the
parties agreed to settle among themselves, with the defendants withdrawing the notice of appeal
and agreeing to voluntarily vacate and remove their structures by August 31, 2013 in
consideration of the respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00. But, despite receiving the
respondent's financial assistance, the defendants reneged on their end of the agreement; hence,
at the respondent's instance, the trial court issued the writ of execution and the writ of demolition,
by virtue of which the structures of the defendants were ultimately demolished.

The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante (Pante), to
bring the disbarment complaint against the respondent based on his allegedly gross misconduct
and deceit in causing the demolition of the structures without the demolition order from the court,
violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and disobedience to a lawful order of the court, positing that he
thereby abused his legal knowledge.

Antecedents

Pante avers that the CSP-PLC constructed its church building on the land located in JE 176 Pico, La
Trinidad, Benguet, which was owned by Maria Omiles who had bought it from Larry Ogas; 1 that on
June 11, 2012, Omiles and Pastor Elvis Maliked received the summons issued by the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet requiring them to answer the complaint for unlawful
detainer filed against them by the respondent; that based on the allegations of the complaint
(docketed as Civil Case No. R-1256 entitled Daniel Dazon Mangallay v. Maria Tomino Omiles and
all persons staying with and/or acting on her behalf, including all Officers and/or patrons of the
Church of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, represented by Pastor Elvis S. Maliked), the
respondent claimed ownership of the land where the church of the CSP-PLC had been erected,
attaching the copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 45241 issued by the Register of Deeds
of Benguet, and the deed of absolute sale executed between him and one Pedro Loy; 2 that the
MTC later on decided the case by declaring the respondent to have the better right of possession;
and that the MTC further declared that the CSP-PLC was a builder in good faith, without prejudice
to the respondent exercising his option to appropriate the building in accordance with Article 448
of the Civil Code.3

As earlier mentioned, the respondent sought and obtained the writ of execution from the MTC after
the defendants, including the complainant, reneged on the promise to voluntarily vacate and
surrender the premises by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial
assistance of P300,000.00. The writ of execution was issued on December 13, 2013 and the writ of
demolition on December 19, 2013. Sheriffs Joselito S. Tumbaga and John Marie O. Ocasla,
accompanied by the respondent and elements of the Philippine National Police, implemented the
writ of execution and writ of demolition on January 22 and January 23, 2014 by demolishing the
church building and the pastoral house of the CSP-PLC. 4

Pante now insists that the demolition was done without a demolition order from the MTC; that the
dismantled materials worth P462,236.00 were forcibly taken away by the respondent, who had
taken advantage of his legal knowledge to cause the premature demolition of the structures sans
the demolition order; that such taking away of the dismantled materials constituted robbery and
malicious mischief; and that his act warranted his disbarment.

In response, the respondent denies any wrong doing. He counters that the demolition was backed
up by a court order;5 that after receiving the decision of the MTC, the parties entered into a
compromise agreement by virtue of which the CSP-PLC withdrew its appeal and promised to
voluntarily vacate and surrender the disputed premises in consideration of P300,000.00 to be paid
by him;6 that despite his having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not vacate the premises even
within the grace period given to them;7 that he then moved for the execution of the judgment, and
his motion was granted by the MTC;8 that the sheriffs report dated November 21, 2013 9 stated
that after the CSP-PLC did not comply with the writ of execution to remove or demolish its
structures on the premises; that he consequently sought from the MTC the writ of demolition; and
that the MTC issued the writ of demolition. 10

The respondent avers that it was not he but the sheriffs who implemented the writ of demolition;
that the sheriffs report dated January 30, 2014 stated that the conduct of the implementation was
peaceful, and that Pante and the other members of the church personally observed the conduct of
the demolition; and that the sheriffs report further stated that Pante showed no defiance of the
lawful order of the court.11

The respondent submits that there was nothing wrong in his appropriating the dismantled
materials to ensure compensation for the expenses incurred in the demolition; and that the
complaint for his disbarment should be dismissed.

Ruling of the Court

The complaint for disbarment is absolutely devoid of merit and substance.

Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, provides as follows:

Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the
facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of
the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may,  motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against erring attorneys including those in the government service. Provided, however, That all
charges against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court
of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed with
the Supreme Court;  Provided, further, That charges filed against Justices and Judges before the
IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary, shall immediately be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication

Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary
of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for
assignment to an investigator. (As amended, Bar Matter No. 1960, May 1, 2000.)

Under the foregoing rule, the proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of an
attorney may be taken by the Court, motu proprio, or by the IBP itself upon the verified complaint
of any person.
Should the disciplinary complaint against the attorney be filed directly with the Court, the
complaint is referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. The reference to the
IBP is resorted to whenever the factual basis for the charge may be contested or disputed, or may
require the reception of the evidence of the complainant and the respondent attorney. After the
referral and hearings, the IBP renders its findings and recommendations on the complaint, subject
to the review by the Court.12 Yet, the Court may dispense with the referral to the IBP and resolve
the charge without delay. This happens particularly when the charge is patently frivolous, or
insincere, or unwarranted, or intended only to harass and spite the respondent attorney.

The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits the direct filing with it of administrative
complaints against attorneys in order to emphasize its role as the guardian of the legal profession
with the ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. The disciplinary power of the Court is both a
right and a duty.13 Quite recently, however, the Court has revised Rule 139-B 14 to eliminate any
ambiguity about the authority of the Court to directly receive administrative complaints against
attorneys, thus:

Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or upon the filing of a verified complaint
of any person before the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The
complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by
affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate disposition all complaints for
disbarment, suspension and discipline filed against incumbent Justices of the Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts, or against lawyers in the
government service, whether or not they are charged singly or jointly with other respondents, and
whether or not such complaint deals with acts unrelated to the discharge of their official functions.
If the complaint is filed before the IBP. six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with
the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the
same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an investigator.

xxxx

B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT

Section 13. Investigation of complaints. - In proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court, or in

other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the
case for investigation to the Office of the Bar Confidant, or to any officer of the Supreme
Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same
manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation
shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.

The complaint may also be referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation, [bold emphasis supplied to indicate the revisions]

Under the foregoing revisions of Rule 139-B, the administrative complaints against attorneys are
generally not dismissed outright but are instead referred for investigation, report and
recommendation either to the IBP, or the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), or any office of the
Court or even a judge of a lower court. Such referral ensures that the parties' right to due process
is respected as to matters that require further inquiry and which cannot be resolved by the mere
evaluation of the documents attached to the pleadings. 15 Consequently, whenever the referral is
made by the Court, the IBP, the OBC or other authorized office or individual must conduct the
formal investigation of the administrative complaint, and this investigation is a mandatory
requirement that cannot be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons because it
serves the purpose of threshing out all the factual issues that no cursory evaluation of the
pleadings can determine.16

However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory when the administrative case can be decided on
the basis of the pleadings filed with the Court, or when the referral to the IBP for the conduct of
formal investigation would be redundant or unnecessary, such as when the protraction of the
investigation equates to undue delay. Dismissal of the case may even be directed at the outset
should the Court find the complaint to be clearly wanting in merit. 17 Indeed, the Rules of
Court should not be read as preventing the giving of speedy relief whenever such speedy relief is
warranted.

It is upon this that we dispense with the need to refer the complaint against the respondent to the
IBP for the conduct of the formal investigation. The documents he submitted to substantiate his
denial of professional wrongdoing are part of the records of the trial court, and, as such, are
sufficient to establish the unworthiness of the complaint as well as his lawful entitlement to the
demolition of the structures of the defendants in Civil Case No. R-1256.

Specifically, the demolition was authorized by the order issued by the MTC on December 19,
2013.18 In the execution of the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. R-1256, the sheriffs
dutifully discharged their functions. The presence of the respondent during the execution
proceedings was by no means irregular or improper, for he was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-
1256. The complainant was then represented by Pante and some other members of the
congregation, who did not manifest any resistance' or objection to any irregularity in the conduct
of the execution. After all, elements of the Philippine National Police were also present to ensure
the peaceful implementation of the writ of execution.

Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all criminal, in the act of the respondent of taking away
the materials of the demolished structures. The parties put an end to their dispute by the
defendants, including the complainant and Pante, opting to withdraw their notice of appeal and
undertaking to voluntarily vacate and to peacefully turn over the premises to the respondent by
August 31, 2013 in exchange for the latter's financial assistance of the P300,000.00. The
respondent paid the amount in the MTC on March 20, 2013, and the amount was later on received
by Maria Omiles, Feliciano Omiles, Jr., and Noralyn T. Abad as the representatives of the CSP-PLC
on the same day.19 But the latter reneged on their part of the agreement without returning the
P300,000.00 to the respondent, who was left to exhaust his legal remedies to enforce the
judgment against them. It is notable that the judgment expressly directed him "to exercise his
option pursuant to the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines within
thirty (30) days from the finality of this judgment insofar as the improvements introduced by the
defendants on the subject property."20 Article 448 of the Civil Code granted to him as the owner of
the premises, among others, "the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548." His act of taking the
materials of the demolished structures was undoubtedly the exercise of the right of appropriating
them in light of the fact that the P300,000.00 earlier delivered as financial assistance was most
likely meant to indemnify the supposed builders in good faith.

The respondent has called attention to the letter of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines,
Inc.,21 the mother organization to which the CSP-PLC belonged, to the effect that it was disavowing
knowledge of or participation in the disbarment complaint, and that it was categorically declaring
that the complaint had been filed by Pante only for his personal interest at the expense of the
congregation. The sentiments expressed in the letter manifested the inanity of the complaint, and
the ill motives behind Pante's filing of the complaint against the respondent. The proper outcome
for such a complaint is its immediate dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Daniel Dazon

Mangallay for its utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED