CO NT E N T S .

P A RT I .

THE F R S I T P H A SE : FR OM T HE S OM ME TO YP R ES
C HA P .

I . I N T R O DUCT O R Y : N
THE G E ESIS O F THE L A N D SH I P
II . T HE M A RK I . A ND M A R K Iv . TA N K S : T HE F IRST CO M P A N IES
III . THE SO M M E BATT L ES
Iv . EX P A N SIO N : T HE B ATT L ES IN F RON T O F A R RAs

v . T HE P A L EST IN E D ETA C H M EN T
VI . M ESSIN ES
V II . Y P R ES : T HE P R EL IM IN A RIES
VIII . Y P R ES : THE 3 IST JUL Y
1x . P
Y R ES : THE 3 I ST JULY ( con ti n ued )
x . THE
“
H U SH ”
O P ERAT IO N A ND THE C O CKC R O F T
x1 . THE CO C KC RO F T ( con ti n ued )
X II . F RO M THE C O CKC R O F T TO C A M BRA I

P A RT II .

T HE S EC O ND P H A SE : CA M BR A I A ND A F T ER .

X III . C A M BRA I
X IV . M ISCELL A N EO U S . T HE G ER M A N S A ND THE TA N K : THE

F REN C H A RT ILLER IE ’
D ASSAUT

xv . THE G ER MAN O FF EN SIV E . M EA UL T E, BO U IG N Y,

V A ND
BE TH U N E
 C O NT E N T S

THE G ER M AN O FF EN SIV E (con ti n ued ) . A NN EQ U IN : AND

T HE TA N K C O R P S IN R ET R EAT 3 28
X V I I HA M EL M O R EU I L AND THE THI RD B ATT L E O F T HE SO MM E
.
, , 3 47

X V I I I T HE G R EAT A D V A N C E F R O M B UC Q U O Y TO B A P AU M E
. : 3 68
X I X THE F I G HTI N G F O R B EU G N Y AND T HE A D V A N C E TO THE
.
,

CAN A L D U N O RD
X X THE CA N A L D U N O RD AND B O U R L O N
.

XX I T HE F I G HT I N G R O U N D CA M B R AI : SA N C O U R T
.

XX I I F R O M N I ER G N I ES TO THE A R M I STIC E : C O NC L U SI O N
.

I N D EX
 IL L U ST R A T IO NS .

C R O SSI N G THE STEENBEEK FO R THE A TTACK BE O N Y D ST

J U L I EN ( THE C O CKC R O F T ) A U G U ST 1 9 1 9 1 7 , ,

THE M A R K V TA N K .

D ISA BL ED M A R K II TA N K A R R A S 1 9 1 7 .
, ,

TA N K O N O UT P OST H ILL G A ZA ,

K I TCH EN ER S W O O D A ND G ER M A N SECOND L IN E P H O T O
’
.

TA K EN JUL Y 3 1 9 1 7 SH O W IN G P O SITI O N O F TA N K S
, .

G 4 5 AN D 46

T A N K G 4 6 AS I L EF T HER ( EX C EP T F O R H I T O N T R ACK ) ,

A U G U ST 1 1 9 1 7 ,

D B A TT A L I O N TA N K D ITCH ED O N R EM AI N S O F P O EL
C A P ELL E C H U RC H O CT O B ER 4 1 9 1 7 , ,

P O ELCAP ELLE C H U R C H BEF O R E THE AD V A N C E I N A U G U ST ,

SEP T EM BER ETC 1 9 1 7: ( G ER M A N P H O T O )

,
.
,

B A TT L E O F CA M B R AI B O U R L O N W O O D A N D V I LL A G E W ITH
.
,

B A P A U M E CA M BRAI R OAD I N F R O N T
-

D I SA B L ED T A N K I N F O N T A I N E N O T R E D A M E N OV EM BER - -
,

1 91 7 ( G ER M A N P HO To)
.

G B A TTA L I O N TA N K S AT THE SH O O T I N G Box B O U R L O N -

,

W OO D N O V EM BER 1 9 1 7
, ( G ER M A N P H O T O ) .

G ER M A N T A N K AD A L B ER T ( G ER M A N P H O T O )
,
“
.

F R EN C H H EA VY SCH N EI D ER T A N K CA R R Y I N G 7 5 F I EL D , .

G U N ( GER M A N P H O T O )
.
x I LLU S TRATI O N S

A BL AI N ZEV ELL E, LO G EAST W O O D, A N D ACH I ET -

LE- G RAN D
B UC Q U O Y A N D ACH I ET LE P ET I T
- -

B A P AU M E B U R N I N G END O F AU G U ST 1 9 1 8
.

CA N A L D U N O RD AT LO CK 4
TA N K S O F A ” C O MP A N Y 7TE B A TTA LI O N P A R K ED I N
“
, ,

C A N A L D U N O R D A F T ER CA P TU R I N G B O U R L O N V I LLAG E ,

SEP T EM B ER 2 7 1 9 1 8
, .
( O FF ICIA L P H O T O )
SA N C O U R T W ITH CA M B R AI D O UAI R O A D A N D RA I L W AY
,
-

CA P TU R ED EN G L I SH TA N KS B EI N G U SED DU R I N G THE
R EV O L UTI O N IN B ER L I N
M A R K V T A N K S O F THE 1 2 TH BA TT A L I O N AT C O L O G N E
.
 P A RT I.

THE F I R ST P H A SE
F RO M THE SO M M E TO YPRES
 C H A PT E R I
.

I NT R O D U CTO RY : I
T HE G ENES S O F T HE L A ND SH IP .

T H I S b ook is not in a formal sen se a h istory O f th e T a n k

, ,

C or p s . Suc h a history must necessarily be i mpersonal in

tone and probab l y would aim at being j udicial i n m anner
,

this last an almost i mpossible feat i n ou r present state O f

kn owledge A more e l astic form O f narrative based to som e
.
,

d egree on my own experien ces as a subaltern in the corps ,

appears to m e to be preferable as it will allow greater ,

freedom O f method and O pinion an d a large scope for th e

merely i nteresting and pictu resque M oreo v er there already .
,

is in preparation ( an d likely to be i n print be fore this

appears ) more than on e semi O ffi c i a l history It is my aim
-
.
,

therefore to avoid giving a monotonous tale O f battles

,

which ( to the lay m ind ) seem very familiar in type and to ,

describe instead in general terms the actual work O f the

tank in action at v ariou s stages O f i ts career as an arm of
the serv i ce with its problems its tactics and its influence
, , ,

upon the war as a W h ole .

At the sam e ti me it i s necessary to use chronological

,

facts as a scaffoldi n g The O perations O f the T a nk Corps

.

in the field up to th e date O f the Armistice fall n atural l y

, ,

into two phases marked v ery happ ily by a chang e in n omen

,

c l a tur e D urin g the first phase as th e H eavy S ection of

.
,

the M achine G un Corps the new organisation was definite l y

,
4 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

on trial finding its feet learning its j ob conquerin g

, , ,

O bstruction indifference and other impediments : durin g

, ,

the second phase as a separate arm with a name and

,

establishment of its own the corps moved onward from ,

success to success became indispen sable and ubiquitous

, ,

grew to an astounding Size suffered ( from friend and ,

enemy ) the sincerest form O f flattery and e ffected a com ,

p l ete re volution in the tactics O f battle The turn i n g point -

.

i n its fortunes is marked approximat e ly by two actions O f ,

widely different Scop e fough t in the autu mn O f 1 9 1 7— th e

,

little a ffair known as th e Cockcroft on August 1 9 th and , ,

the first battle O f Cambrai ten weeks later Such m ile .

stones as these and certai n O f the final O peration s i n which

,

the corps played a conspicuou s part a n d with which I am

personally familiar I Sha l l treat at considerable length ;
,

but for the rest a mere skeleton O f h istory will amply serve .

Introductions ,if SO labelled are often left u n read ; and for,

this reason I have introduced already into this chapter

matter belonging more properly to a preface Th e r e remain .

certain other points which should be borne continually in

m ind by all who read th is ( or any other ) account O f the
birth growth and achievement of the corps I am e num e
, ,
.

rating them here out O f their rea l order in the narrative

, ,

because in th e present general ignorance O f the subj ect it

, ,

is only by the help O f some such basis for j udgment that an

adequate estimate O f performance can be attempted .

Th e point s are these

( 1 ) The tank even when the war ended was still in an
, ,

experimenta l stage .

( 2) The T a nk Corps was the only arm of the service

equ ipped with an ent irely novel weapon which
was formed wh ile the war act ually was in pro
gress Every one had to learn everything from
.
I N TRO D U C TO R Y : GE N ES I S O F T HE LAN D S H I P 5

th e beginning Th e r e were n o trad i tions nor

.
,

any experience of any kind to draw on until the

first battle had bee n fought .

The corps suffered at the outset from a surfeit O f

parents For months it was governed in turn or
.

together by a number O f departments ; and O ften

the right hand did not know what the left han d
was about .

Perhaps at t hat ti me it was taken s eriously by only

two classes O f person s — fi r s tl y th e actual pro ,

j ectors a few naval and military O ffi ce rs and civil

,

engineers who worked tirelessly without reward

, ,

or even recognition and to wh om m ost O f the ,

credit for the eventual triu mph is due ; and ,

secondly that com mercial element wh ich i n ou r

, ,

country profits by e v ery n ational crisis an d sees

,

in every new and struggling enterprise for the

public b en efit only an other opportu n ity O f mak i n g
m oney .

U nti l the fi rst battle o f Cambrai the corps was still

on probation It had enem ies amon g th e co n
.

s er va ti ves at the War O ffi ce and at G H Q in . . .

France ; and its early fights wh ich in effect were ,

practical experiments on an ever i ncreasing scale -

,

abounding in lesson s for those who cared to learn ,

were taken as proo f O f its permanently limited

valu e At Cambrai for the first time it was
.
, ,

given a chance under favourable conditi o ns ; and

after that all was changed NO one c o uld have
, .

too ma n y tanks Infantry comm anders clam o ured

.

for them in and out of season .

The functions and limitation s O f the tank as a

weapon were very imperfect l y apprehende d in the
b eginning by the other arms O f t h e service Again .

it was Cambrai that greatest O f all m ilitary ex

,

p e r i m e n ts which by its magnitude and success

, , ,

drove hom e on ce for all the lesson that notw i th

 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

standing wire entrench ments and machine guns

, ,
-
,

surprise frontal attacks on a large scale were

become practicable once more .

The tank was now taken up in earnest Co .

O peration with infantry u n heard of as a feature

,

of traini n g until j ust before that battle was p ra c ,

ti s ed regularly behi n d certain army fronts and ,

was n ot suspended even during the G erman

O ffensives in the fo l lowing spring It was realised .

at l ast that when we r e gained the initiative we

shou l d be in possession of a weapo n which had
revolution ised the principles of attack The evil .

of th e l o n g prelimi n a r y bombardment warning ,

the enemy days and weeks before an assault and ,

destroying on e set of O bstacles only to set up

another of its own making had reached excessive ,

proportions at Ypres in the past autu mn It was .

now laid for ever The sound of it at least from

.
,

th e British lines was hardly heard again du rin g

,

th e remainder of the war The tank was to lead .

the infantry over instead .

If any one i nvention hastened the end it was the ,

tan k . Th e G erman H igher Command w h o ,

ought to know repeat e dly coupled the new

,

weapon W ith the blockade as one of the ulti

mate causes o f their defeat Captured G erman .

orders during th e final year were filled with warn

ings and instructions concerning tanks T e l e .

phonic messages referri n g t o th e m were to have

priority over all others T r oop s were t o be .

t rained or caj oled into learning to face them .

Special O fficers to deal with a n ti tank defence

,
-
,

were attached to divisional headquarters T r a p s .

were to be dug M i nefi e l d s were to be laid

. .

Anti tan k stocka d es in village streets or d e fil es

-
, ,

were a common feature of the l ater battlefields .

If it sounds extravagant to claim that tanks won

 I NT ROD U C TO R Y : GE NESI S O F T HE LA N DSH I P 7

the war it is indisputable that they hastened its

,

end by six months or a year The final advance .

would have been an impossibility without them .

( 9 ) The corps was consistent l y disregarded in O fficial

despatches It was hampered at every tu rn by
.

t he conservative outlook of sen ior O ffi cers O ut of .

Si x army com manders only th ree fought offe n sive

,

actions over ground where tan ks could properly be

u sed and they at least u nderstood thei r value
, , , .

B ut f or a j ust appreciation one must turn t o the

O ffi cial reports and grateful personal a c k n ow l e d g

m ents O f infantry brigade and battali on com m a n

ders and to the infantry rank and file themselves
, .

( IO ) A S som e proof of the v i ta l part which tanks played

in t he fi nal advance it may be pointed out that
, ,

from the 8 th Augu st 1 9 1 8 to the 7 th N ovember

approximately n inety days —the corps led the
infantry of two armies in seventy en gagements ,

ranging from full dress battle where two or three

-
,

hundred tanks were employed t o the daily local ,

attacks i n which only h alf a dozen t ook part .

Simu ltaneously t he French were u sing th ei r

,

light Renaults i n s cores : the American s took

Renaults in at S t M ihiel and ou r M ark V s .
’

beyond Le Cateau ; and one of th e few G erman

counter attacks wh ich gained a temporary
success was led by tanks captu red from u s in
the March retreat O n this occasion a serious
.

reverse was on l y stayed by the arrival of some

O f our own machin es which drove the G er m an s
,

O ff when ou r infantry was breaking .

Enough has been said at th is stage It will be n ecessary .

,

at t h e risk of becom in g tedious to reiterate and amplify ,

these point s from t ime t o ti me as the narrat i ve grows ; but

it is well to get them tabulated here We can proceed now .

to a br i e f con sideration of the modern tank its genesis its , ,

growth and its early days of experimen t and train ing

, .
8 T HE TAN K IN ACT I O N

The curiou s m ight Sp e n d a profitable week or SO at the

British M useum investigating the origins of the landship .

Th e s e are indeed O bvious enough for although there is a ,

school ( in the halfpenny press ) wh ich traces them no further

back than to a story by M r H G We l l s the tank is in
. .
, ,

fact the lineal descendant of the kn ight in armour the

, ,
”
war carts of the Scots the Rom an testudo the elephants
, ,

of H annibal and the chariots of B oadicea Among the i n

, .

nu merable activities of Leonardo da V in ci was a scheme

for secure and covered chariots carryin g gu ns ; and as
“
,

rece n t l y as 1 8 8 8 ( but still forestalling Mr Wells ) a steam

driven vehicle on the caterpillar principle was proj ected .

All of these manifestations were but varieties O f shock

troops calcu lated to overcome the defensive tactics of their
,

period Perhaps the elephant was the least reliable as he

.
,

Showed a tende n cy to turn about in the heat of battle and

forthwith trample down his own friends Within the last .

twenty years the caterpillar tractor the i mmediate ancestor ,

O f the tank was pul l ing 6 0 pounder gun s over ditches on

,
-

Salisbury Plain ; and this form of locomotive was stil l in u se

for such haulage purposes when war broke out in 1 9 1 4 .

It occurred to no one i n the first stages O f this conflict

that a contine n t would prove too small for the man oeuvres
of modern arm ies .B ut the open fighting in the early
autum n of 1 9 1 4 cam e to an en d with the race for the
coast ; and the O pposing forces found themselves e n trenched
along the who l e of the i mmense front their flan ks resting ,

on Switzerland and the Chan ne l and therefore perfectly ,

s ecure a n d with n o apparent way out of this i mp a sse but

,

the cost l y method of frontal assaults He r e in fact was .

, ,
”
t hat G erman bugbear the parallel battle
, The enemy .

proceeded to lau nch his series of attacks in Flanders i n ,

an endeavour to create a flank and learnt again that a,

stubborn and disciplined in fantry given time to dig itself ,

”
in even if only with a spoon could beat O ff greatly
,
“
,
10 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

fare And this in 1 9 1 5 ! Th e r e was to be no passi n g

.

through for any arm u ntil the tanks broke the Hi nd e n

burg Line at Cambrai ; and even then we had not th e
courage of our convictions and the cava l ry was fou r ,

hours late .

All this of course is the O bviou s wisdom after the event

, ,

but there were m any who had misgivin gs at the time .

Certainly there was then at work in England a sma l l

committee cons isting of naval and military o fficers an d
,

techn ical advisers who realisi n g that n o expenditure o f

, ,

blo o d and shel l s as then e mployed , wou l d carry an attack

,

far enough against modern prepared positions were seeki n g ,

for a mean s by which to overcome the di ffi culty T r e n c h .

warfare indeed was hardly begun before they were ready

, ,

with a suggestion AS early as N ovember 1 9 1 4 the Com

.
,

m i ttee O f Imperial Defence was approached by Colonel

Swinton with a p rO p os a l for the construction of SO C alled -

l a n d s h i p s for use on the Western Front .

It will be fittin g here to set down the names of these

in novators T h ey were Colonel E D Swinton ; Admiral
.
, . .

Sir R H S Bacon ; Captain T J Tulloch manager O f the

. . . . .
,

Chilworth Powder Factory ; M r Di pl ock who had designed ,

an improved gun tractor earlier in the year ; and M aj or

-

H etheringto n of the ,

The problem they were attempting to solve has been

i ndicated a l ready and with its developments wi l l be con
, , ,

s i d e re d m ore fully later on ; but it may be repeated that in

essential s it was this : HO W to break dow n the triple O b

struction of trench es wir e and machine guns to such an , ,
-

extent as would al l ow th e infantry to reach an O bj ective

with s ufli ci e n t nu mbers and Spirit l eft to ensure its capture
and retention Th i s roughly was the limited aim of the
.
, ,

first landship It was known or suspected that artil l ery

.

alone could not be counted on to do the work thorough l y .

After the m ost intense bombardment patches of wire wou l d ,

remain uncut strongly e mplaced mach ine gun s u ndestroyed

,
-

if not in the first hostile l ine then i n the second or the ,

third ; and in any case we had not then enough guns or

, ,
 I N TR O D U C TO R Y : GE NESI S O F T HE LAN D S H I P II

ammun i tion to make even the effort worth the while B ut .

i f i n addition to gun fi r e some secondary means of crushi n g

-

wire and neutralising machine guns could be devised much -

,

might be effected later on The answer to this problem i n

.
,

the O pinion of Colonel Swinton and his colleagues was a ,

combination of two existing m achines th e t ractor and th e ,

armoured car— i n other words th e ta n k , .

Perhaps this idea s melt too much O f M r W e lls and Jule s

V ern e for the Committee of Imperial D efen ce Perhaps it .

really was not their business after al l In any case they . ,

displayed n o marked enthusiasm for it but seem to hav e ,

forwarded it a little later not as m ight have been expected

, , ,

t o th e War Department but to Mr Winston Churchi ll then

, ,

First Lord O f the Admiralty Th e y m ay have thought that

.

SO chimerical a proj ect introduced moreover by an O ffice r

, , ,

who had been gu ilty of writing fiction was somethin g ,

peculiar l y in M r C hurch ill s lin e If they did reason i n

’
.

this man ner they wrought better than they knew Th e y

, .

ren d ered excellent service to the buddin g enterprise which ,

secu red in th e First Lord a powerful and pertinaciou s a d vo

cate A man SO restless an d intelligent could n ot fail t o
.

score a h i t with some of h is sh ots ; an d amid the long cata

logue of his disastrous experiments it should at least be laid
to h is credit that he saw at once some of the possibilities of
this new weapon of offence Whether he foresaw a l l th e .

de v elopments of warfare which it entailed may be doubted ;

but the thing itself was novel and startling : it appeale d
instantly to his imagination ; and he wrote forthwith a lon g
letter t o the m ilitary authoritie s recommending its i m mediate
adoption and in cidentally rebuking them for havin g failed to
,

thin k of something o f the sort themselves H e pointed out .

that modern battles bein g fought at Short ra n ge assaulting

, ,

troops were exposed t o a storm of bu l lets from th e momen t

th ey left their cov e r and that som e kind of steel Shelter
, ,

runnin g on caterpi llar tracks a n d carrying guns would be ,

invaluab l e for convoying them through wire and machin e

gun fire Suc h an experi ment would cost little i f it fai l ed
. ,

no harm was done ; and i f it was m oderately successful i ts ,

 I2 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

moral e ffect alone would be great G oing somewhat beyond .

h is brief the First Lord then proposed the manu facture of

,

steel shields O f various types — to be carried t o be worn as ,

body armour and to be pushed on whee l s , H e rec om .

mended a l so the u se O f smoke screens i n th e attack and -

,

e nded by remarki n g that if we did not take th e lead at O nce

in this departme n t of warfare we might find that the enemy
had forestalled us .

Th i s letter was written in J anuary 1 9 1 5 It produced no .

i mmediate effect Proba b ly any suggestion s from this source

.

were suspect at th e War Office and stood little chan ce of ,

consideration on their merits ; and it is true that M r

Churchi l l s l e tter was not conciliatory in tone About th is
’
.

time Colonel Swinton endeavour e d to obtain a hearing on

his own accou nt but W ith no better result Short l y after , .
,

he returned to his duties in France H ere during the next

'

.
,

s ix months he made repeated uno fficial attempts to get th e

,

landship idea considered and these may have paved the ,

way ; for when on 4 th J une he tried O fficial chan n els again

, ,

and forwarded a me morandu m on the subj ect to he

received some encouragement at last S ir J ohn French .
,

with practica l experience of the difficu l ties before him in

the fie l d thought we l l enough of the idea to submit it t o
,

the War O ffi ce 1
.

In the mea n time however things had been moving in , ,

Engla n d although i n a mann er impossible one would

, ,

i magine in a n y other country While the War O ffi ce had

, .

long forgotten a ll about this pestilent and u n practical pro

posal the Admira l ty had been defrayi n g the cost of various
,

experiments carr i e d out with a Foster tractor by Admiral

Bacon and M aj or H e therington and with an adapted H olt ,

tractor by Captain Tu l l och The tria l s of the H olt machin e .

at Shoeburyness were highly successful Immense cutters .

,

like lobster claws had been fitted for Sheari n g wire e ntangle ,

1
fi r t r p l y t thi m m ra dum fr m th E gi r i Chi f w charact r
The s e o s e o n o e n n ee -
n- e as e

i ti
s A ft r a f w p r l imi ary O bj cti
c. e e G ra l F wk c c l ud d f ll w
e n e on s , en e o e on e as o o s
“
I th r f r thi k that b f r c
e e o e n id ri g thi pr p a l w h u l d d c d fr m
e o e ons e n s o os e s o es en o

th r a l m f imagi ti t l id fact ”
e e s o na on o so s.
 I N TR O D U C TOR Y : GE NESIS O F T HE LA N D S H I P I3

ments but it was found that the tractor fl attened out the
,

w i re so e ffectually that these implements were not needed .

And now wh ile Colonel Swinto n was drafting his m emoran

,

du m i n France a Landsh ip Com mittee came i n to bei n g at

,

the in stance O f M r Church ill The President was Mr ( now .

Si r Eustace ) D Eyn co ur t The Con sultin g Engineer was

’
.

Lieut enant ( now Maj or) W G Wilson ; and M r ( n ow S ir . .

William ) Tritton not only lent hi s great auth ority an d

technical ex perience but produced at o n ce design s for an
,

arm oured tractor to be ru n either on W heels or caterpillar

,

tracks The first two genuine l a n d s hi p s evolved from these

.

an d earlier designs kn own respective l y as M other and

,
”
Little Willie were discarded ; but B ig Willie their
, ,

successor th e j oint product of M r Tritton and Lieutenant

,

Wilson was to embody all the m ain features of the M ark

,

I Tan k
. .

The S ituation as regards th e War O ffi c e was now rather

, ,

ludicrous For when that D epartment stirred at length

.
,

int o activity by Sir J oh n Fren ch s advocacy of C olo n el ’

Sw i nton s Scheme began t o look arou nd and m ake i n

’
,

q u i r i e s it
,
di scovered with aston ishm en t that the Adm iralty
had taken u p the idea m onth s before and had been exp er i ,

m e n ti n g quietly ever sin ce It was impossible however .

, ,

that the work could be co n tinued u n der a dual control ;

and accordi n gly toward the e n d of J une a j oint com mittee
,

was formed to manage the whole enterprise H enceforth .

,

in e ffect the tan k became a child of th e Army ; but it is

,

doubt ful if the public ever knew that it was adopted more
or le ss u nder compulsion and to th e Adm iralty is du e the ,

credit of h aving realised its possibilities long before the

War O ffi ce took a step in the m atter The work n ow .

proceeded steadily toward fulfilment Colonel Swinton .

,

return i n g in J uly to assu me the post of Assistant Secretary -

to the Committee of Imperial Defe n ce was able to watch ,

over his sch e me and help it on its way Littl e Wi ll ie .

“
,

already on the stock s u n d er t he aegis of th e original com

m i ttee was te sted at Lincoln and found wanting ; but in
,

the meantime th e new j oi n t control had ordered the build -

I4 THE TA N K IN A C TI O N

i ng of Big Willie on the lines laid down by Tritton and

Wilson Th i s experimental mach ine was tri e d at Wembley
.

and a cccp te d as a basis for future construction and M essrs

Foster of Lincoln Agricultu ral Implement M akers em
, ,

barked a t once on the Sl ightly modified copy which becam e

the M ark I tank Th i s was indeed ( to quote from M r
. .

Williams Ellis s book ) a case of beat in g ou r ploughshares

-
1’

i nto swords At the close o f th e year M r Church ill still

.
,

true to h is O l d love sent t o G H Q in Franc e a memo

,
. . .

”
r a n d um on V ariants of the Offensive in which he re
“
,

capitulated his earlier suggestions for an attack by armour .

AS a d irect resu l t of this Lieut C olonel H J Elles R E,

.
-
. .
, . .
,

was ordered tO En gl a n d i n J anuary 1 9 1 6 to report on th e

~

progress m ade ; and on February 2 nd the improved Wem

bley machi n e carried out trials a t H at field before rep re
s e n ta ti ve s of th e Army Council and G H Q in France . . . .

The demonstration was successful Within a week app l i .

cation was made Officially for the construction by M essrs

Foster of 1 5 0 similar machines i n Si x months By this .

ti me the j oint co n tro l had ceased to exist at least in name ;

-
,

for the new M i n istry of M u n ition s seeki n g what it m ight ,

devour had descended upon the La n d s h i p s Committee

, ,

swallowed it entire defined its powers by charter and then

, ,

r e i n d ue d it with l ife as the T a n k Committee But it was .

soon felt that here a great chance had been let Slip : n o
G overnment i n stitution could thrive beneath 8 0 Simple and
b a n al a designation ; and in August by yet one m ore feat ,

of l egerdem ain the much harassed co n trol becam e th e

,
-

M echanica l Warfare Supp l y Department All was now .

well ; and under thi s euphonious title it continued to supp l y

the British Army with tan ks u ntil the end of the war .

H and in hand With thes e events a military unit was ,

formed to fight the n e w machines The H eavy Section .

of the M achi n e G u n Corps came into being i n March with

-
,

Colonel Swinton in com mand .

Th T k C rp C A Wi ll iam El l i
’
1
e an o s . . . s- s .
 CHAPTE R II.

T HE M AR K I
. AND M AR K IV . TA NKS : T HE F I R ST C O M P A N ES
I .

T HE tank was only j ust emerging from the pr i miti v e st age

w hen th e war ended The M ark V which entered th e
.

fie l d in 1 9 1 8 ( in excellent ti me for the Amiens retreat ) ,

was i n the O pin ion of many people th e first tank worthy

O f th e name But the heat an d bu rden of the day
.

had been borne by the earlier types whose carcases ,

littered a dozen battlefields all down th e line from the ,

S a l ient to Cambrai and whose s uccesse s and misfortunes

,

provided the fou ndation for the final triu mph It will be .

conven ien t to deal here with those early types M arks 1 , .

an d IV together for they differed on l y in comparat ively

.
, ,

m i n or features M arks II and I I I h ad n o genuine exist

. . .

en ce The Mark II was Simply th e M ark I in a Slightly

. . .

advanced stage of evolution without its tail and the Mark ,

I I I was eX p e r i m e nta l
. .

H alf a chapter on the i diosyncrasies of these mach i nes

will not be excitin g It will be diffi cult even to make it
.

interesting B ut such details have to be faced sooner or

.

later and are better done with for good and all early in
,

the book .

“
Big Willi e and its on e hundred and fifty M ark I .

successors were designed to cope with the conditions

encountered on what was then considered t o be a typical
modern b attl e fi el d — namely that O f Loos O n account , .
1 6 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

Of its very limited success an d d i SprO porti onate casualties ,

th i s battle won many converts to the theory of the attack

”
by armour ; but it misled to some extent those who we re
r e spon sible for Specifyin g the capabilities required O f th e
new weapon It was not fully realised that by the date when
.

the tanks would be ready for the field the conditions on ,

most battle fronts m ust certainly have changed materially

-

for the worse Owing t o the enorm ous proj ected increase
.

in our art illery the autumn of 1 9 1 6 was likely to find the

,

t errain i mmediately behind the enemy s front l i n e pounded ’

to atoms But no one foresaw the appallingly destructive

.

e ffect of such gun fi re as was to blast the Som me an d -

Ypres battlefields du rin g the two ensu ing years It is .

commonly supposed that the original tan k was constructed

expr e ssly to m eet this di ffi cult y It was not : it was .

designed to fight over the moderately She l led areas ( as they

seem t o us now) with wh ich we were familiar at the end of
1 91 5 . Actually i t m ade its entry upon ground which for ,

miles ahead was convulsed as if by an earthquake or

, ,

water logged like a quagmire ; and not until Cambrai did

-

tanks operate u nder anything approaching favourable

condition s .

It was desired to have a machine which in the first ,

p l ace would cross a trench nine feet wide The engineers

, .
’

ear l iest s olution e mbodied huge wheels with caterpillar

tracks But as these wheels to fulfil the specification
.
, ,

must have had a diameter of fifteen feet they were ru led ,

out as O fferi n g too big a target ; and after several inter

mediate stages i n which varieties of the ordinary tractor
,
” ”
model ( such as M other and Little Wil l ie ) were tried “

and discarded an ingen ious compromise was discovered

, .

In the M ark I tan k ( and all later types conformed to this

.

Shape ) the tracks passed completely round the body of the

machine The underside of this b Od y was in effect a

.

segment of a wh e e l , as will be apparent t o any one who

looks at the outline ; and the tracks instead of continuing ,

round the whole periphery turned back Virtual l y at right ,

 THE M AR K I . AND M AR K IV . TA N K S I7

angles over the nose an d SO along the top of the body .

The width of trench wh ich could b e crossed by machines

of this design depended only on their length or in other , ,

words on the circu mference of the wheel The Mark I

, . .
,

2 6 feet long could in fact cross an 1 1 foot gap climb a

,
-
,

vertical O bstacle 5 feet high an d crawl up any slope of ,

1 in 2 Craters however big presented no difficulty pro

.
, ,

vi d e d th e ground was fi rm .

O n the level the tank was resti n g on no m ore than 4 or

5 feet of its length ( the wheel again ) wh ich gave it when ,

moving a Slight fore an d aft rocking m otion The point of - -

.

gravity was al most in the centre and with this admirable ,

balance a skilfu l driver could lower h is m ach in e qu ite

gently down over any drop that was n ot abso l utely sheer .

In th e Mark I this operat ion was facilitated by a cu mber .

som e atrocity known as the hydraulic stabiliser or more , ,

Simply the tai l —a pivoted structure at the stern carrying

, ,

two l arge wheels which was controlled ( in theory) by an

hydraulic ram Th i s t ail wa s designed also to assist
.

steering but when the tank was swun g ( of wh ich more

,

later) th e W h ole affair had to be raised It was an a b om i n .

ation from the start ; it t ook anything from five minutes

to half an hour to lift ; and in action it was the first thing
t o be disabled or Sh ot away It was discarded after the .

S omm e batt l es where it was foun d that its loss m ade ,

little or no difference t o the e fficiency of the m achine and ,

was from every other point of view a godsend

, , .

The tan k mounted its main armament in Spon s o ns — a

form of proj ecting gu n casemate borrowed from naval -

arch itecture 1
The male tan k carried two H otchkiss
.

6 pounder Q F naval guns on recoil mou ntin gs protected

-
. .
,

1 l th ugh th N a vy h p cia l i d i th ci c f m cha ica l war far nd

A o e as s e se n e s en e O e n e, a

a l th ugh th v ry id a f th l a d hip i v lv th app l icati

o e e e la d f o e
“
n s n o es e on on n o

so m f th pri cipl f war at

e o e th A rmy
n it a um d c tr l f
es o s ea , e , as s oon a s ss e on o o

th ta k
e r f d t pr fi t by th xp rt k w l dg at i t di p a l H ad it b
n s, e us e o o e e e no e e s s os . ee n

p ib l
os s d ubt v ry trac f th ta k rigi a l par tag w u l d ha v b
e, no o e e e o e n s
’
o n en e o e een

se du l u l y ra d A it w th p
o s e se d th 6 p u d r g
. f whi c h
S as , e s on s on an e -
o n e un, or no

f ib l m il itary qui va l t c u l d b pr p d c ari l y w r r tai d but

eas e e en s o e o os e , n e es s e e e ne on

B
 1 8 T HE TA N K IN A CT I O N

by close fi tti ng revolving sh ie l ds wh ich ga v e an arc of fire

-
,

O f about 1 2 0 degrees Th e s e are extremely handy little .

weapons especially when shortened as in th e Mark IV

, .
,

and could be loaded and fired if necessary by one man .

With a calibre of 2 % inches they fired percussion com mon ,

Shell and case Shot ; and although Sighted up to 2 6 00 yards

-
,

were u sed normally at quite short ranges when their ,

enormous flash and detonation out O f all proportion to ,

their size had a great m oral effect

, In addition t here .
,

was a port i n each sponson for a H otchkis s machine gun -

or automat i c rifle The tank com mander also was pro .

vi d e d with on e of these weapons to be fired ( with extreme ,

di ffi cu l ty ) through a port i n the cab .

The Mark I female carried V ickers machine guns two

.
’
-
,

to a sponson or f our in all beh ind revolving shields The

, , .

water j ackets were protected by a kind O f armoured slee v e

-
,

and th e gun ners sat on bicycle seats which m oved with -

the Sh i elds The tan k com man der was again given a
.

H otchkiss The V ickers a beautiful gun was perfectly

.
, ,

satisfactory i n a tank ; but in th e M ark IV either on .

,

account of a shortage of V ickers or o f some commercial ’

i nfluence th e Lewis gun was introduced as the light

,

weapon th roughout both male and female types AS n o .

armoured casing was provided for the barrel it was dis ,

abled V ery easily by bullets alone a defect wh ich the ,

G ermans did n ot fail to dis cover ; and i n the Mark V .

and later types the H otchkiss ( whi ch is all but inde

s tr u cti b l e ) reappeared .

The sponsons o f the M ark I tank were h eavy a ffairs .

bolted to the side O f the mach i ne The latter t hen being .

too wide over all for carriage by rail it was necessary

-
,

before entrainment to unbolt the sponsons and hoist the m

by a laborious process with a girder and tackle on to

such t ech nica l qu s ti ons s v nti l ati on th e us e O f t l egra p h s nd th e v ari ou s

e a e , e , a

m echanica l c on tri v ance i n r e p ct O f which the tank i n i t s ma ll way r esemb l s

s s e ,
s , e

th engi ne r oom O f a hi p a ll th e s ugg es ti ons put forward by e p ri en c ed nautica l

e -
s , x e

engi nee r s w er e c on t e m p tu ou s l y r j ct ed e e .
 T HE M AR K I
. A ND M AR K IV . TAN KS 1 9

S pecially constructed trolleys which were towed by the ,

tank In the M ark IV an infinite l y superior system was

. .

s ubstituted The male spon son reduced i n Size and

.
,

weight could be pu shed i nwards gu n an d al l after

, , ,

unbolting O n the female tanks a double door flu sh with

.
,

the body replaced the lower half of th e old sponson ; the

,

remain ing upper half also m ore compact than in the ,

M ark I was bolted down th e m iddle and hinged t o the

.
,

m ain structure at each end It was necessary only to .

u nscrew these few bolts an d swin g th e two portion s back

o n their hinges Although not SO simple as they sou nd
.
,

these operation s were child s play i n compar i son with the ’

earlier abomination o f girder and tackle M oreove r this .

,

n e w arrangement on the female tan k had th e great a d

v antage of facilitating the entran ce or escape of th e crew .

The m anhole in the roof and a dreadful little aperture

beside the radiator in the stern we re comm on t o both
types ; but for ordinary u se the M ark I female possesse d .

o nly a s mall door some two feet high in either spon son ;
, ,

an d if th e tank were h it an d set on fire some o f her ,

me n were almost cert a in to be trapped With the i m .

a

pro v ed sponson all coul d ge s cap e i n a few seconds M ale .

sponsons it may b e noted always allow for qu ite reasonable

, ,

door s .

SO much for the shell an d arm ament of the landship .

The motive power was a more d i ffi cult problem There .

w a s n o time to design and con struct Special plant : some

petrol drive n engine already in use had to be selected
-
.

The choice fell eventually o n th e D aimler 1 05 H P Si x . .

cylinder Sl e eve va l ve tractor un i t It mu st be left to the

‘
.

mechan i cally minded to decide wheth er a m ore suitable

-

e ngi ne could hav e been discovered The greatest merit of .

the Da i mler was its comparative Simplicity It was very .

nearly fool proof It took up an im mense amount of Sp ace

-
.
,

however for i n the M ark I the d ifferential gear radiato r

, .
, ,

and pe trol supply were all enclosed i n the body of the t ank
-
.

There was left j ust su ffic i ent room for a narrow gangway
20 T HE TA N K IN ACT I O N

on either s ide between the engin e and the sponson for ,

the two seats for the o fficer and driver in the cab in front ,

and for further seats on the casing above t h e crank shaft -

and gear box Over this casing was the cra n k handle for
-
.
-

starting up th e engi n e — a process which required norma ll y

the efforts of three or four men .

A seriou s fault existed in the method of tran smitting the

motive power from the engine to the tracks Working off .

the differ e n t ial and manipu l ated by l e vers a primitive and

, ,

i nfuriati n g syste m of secondary gears pi n io n s and Coventry , ,

chains connected W ith th e Sprocket wh e e ls which performed

the actual l abour of propu l sio n Two m en were required .

t o work these gears ; and no member of any tan k crew

who took a M ark I or Mark IV into act ion is ever likely
. .

to forget the sweat a n d tears and b l asphemy expended over

this atrocious system Apart from the labou r and waste
.

of t ime ( and consequent danger ) which it involved it has ,

been asserted by pessimists t hat 7 5 per cent o f power was

lost in the secon dary gears and transmission In addition .

to changes of speed these gears played a prominent part

,
”
i n th e m ore freque n t act of swi n gi n g To alter direction .

to a n y appreciable degree the tank had to be swu ng Th e .

di fferent ial was lock e d the track on the Side toward which
,

the turn was i ntended was disconnected by putting th e

secondary gears on that side i n to n eutral and th e other ,

track with the whole drive behind it then pu l led the tank
, ,

rou nd— i f the soil was firm virtua ll y on its axis H a n d , .

brakes working from the O fficer s seat to the extension

,
’

Shafts on the differential assisted in the process and could

, ,

be u sed alone for small chang e s of direction Swinging .

with this t ransmission was u nsatisfactory in the extreme .

It required the work o f four men and often was very Slow , .

In the M ark V epicyc l ic gears and a one man control were

.
,
-

introduced .

In the Mark I the petrol supply was carried in two tanks

.
-
,

on e on either Side of the cab i n front With th is arrange .

ment wh oever else might escape when the machine was set
,
 T HE M AR K I . A ND M AR K IV . TAN KS 21

on fire the o fficer and driver stood an excellent chance of

,

being burnt alive ; and i n the Mark IV an armoured tank .

h olding sixty gallons placed outside i n rear was substituted

, , .

In all types every available i nch of Space within was utilised

,

for am munition racks The m ale tan k was designed to .

carry 1 6 0 rounds of 6 pounder Shell and 1 5 00 rounds of -

,

the female t o carry 7 8 00 rou nds of th e latter ; but ,

in fact these n umbers were often exceeded a n d as m uch as

, ,

rounds of S A A have been t aken into action i n a

. . .

tank Spare supplies of water oil an d grease together

.
, , ,

with two days rations and the crew s equipment were

’ ’

t ucked away wherever room could be fou n d It will be .

apparent therefore that there was little Scop e for move

, ,

m ent and n o possibility of comfort i n a fully loaded tank -

.

Although ve n tilation was assisted by a rotary fan placed -

,

in the ste m and worked off the half ti me shaft the heat was -
,

terrific : no one cou ld sta n d u pright ; and th e u proar of th e

engine was so loud that orders h ad to be trans mitted by
Signs . V isibility was li m ited i n the extreme The o ffi cer .

and dr i ver had flaps which when fully open , gave a fair ,

range of Vision i mm ediately i n front ; bu t when it was

necessary t o close these there re mained only a number o f
double glass prisms let into the arm our and some i n a d e
1
,

quate periscopes thrust up through the roof After a wh ile .

naval compasses on gimbals were provided but i n such a ,

m ass of steel and iron they proved of very small value .

A few words must be said as to a tank s method of pro ’

res s i on T h e two caterpi l lar tracks passi n g completely

g .
,

roun d the body of t h e mach ine con sisted each of n inety ,

hard steel plates with lips for gripping the surface These .

tracks did not actu ally m ove over the ground ; the tan k in
effect laid its own t rack clawed its way along it by mean s ,

of the two Sprocket whee l s in th e rear and then picked it ,

up behin d and passed it over its head as it were before , ,

layi n g it down in front agai n D uring th is process the .

whole weight of th e mach ine rested on a n u mber of flanged

1
St l p l at
ee with pi h l p r f rati
es , n r p l ac d th p ri m i n th Mark IV
o e e o on s , e e e s s e .
 TA NK
'

22 T HE IN A C TI O N

rollers which wore out v ery rapidly as did the early

, ,

Sprocket wheels Tracks an d rollers required continual

.

lubrication — the latter by inj ections from grease gun s The -

.

less said of th is ghast l y operation the better .

It will be fitting to include in so tedious a section a few

statistics The length of the Mark I tan k was 2 6 feet
. .

6 inches ; its width ( including sponson s ) 1 2 feet 9 in ches i n

the male 1 0 feet 5 i nches in the female ; an d its height was
,

8 feet 1 inch It weighed approximately 2 6 tons

. Th e .

armour throughout the body was 1 2 m m th ick but on the .

,

sponsons for some obscure reason only 1 0 mm It was

, , .

proof against Shrapnel and ordinary but fa i led t o

keep out th e K armour piercing bullet wh ich the G e r
” “
-

m ans apparently on t he strength of vague warnings re

,

cei ve d had j ust introduced

, .

Combination s of the prim ary and secondary gears gave

fou r different speeds forward and one reverse the highest ,

reaching someth ing over four mile s an hour on level groun d .

Not more than 3 0 to 4 0 yards a m inute was expected of a

tank across trench systems and heavily shelled areas The -
.

estimated radius of action without a refill was ten hours ;

and it was n ot believed that a crew could endure for longer
the exhausting conditions am id which they mu st work and
fight Fin ally it was thought that the track rollers and the
.
,
-

sprockets and pin ions of the secondary gears would require

to be replaced after about fifty hours run nin g AS a matter ’
.

o f fact most of these estimat es were conse rvative Tan ks

, .

ran for fi fteen hours a n d more without a refi ll ; their crews

withstood the h e at and gases for even longer p e riods ; a n d
with i mproved st e el i n the sprockets and pinions these were
found to survive such j ourn eys as wer e n ot dreamed of in
the e arly days .

The M ark IV was Virtually identical with the M ark I in

. .

Shape dimensions and method of propu l sion Owing to

, , .

its modified sponsons it was o f less width Its armour was .

”
slightly thicker and harder and kept out th e K bullets
, ,

although the i mpact of the latter drove splinters from the

24 T HE TA N K IN A CT I O N

from a French truck as the train was taking a sharp curve .

And for that battle some 4 70 were detraine d in a few days

i n the same area .

In Easter week 1 9 1 6 two n ew companies of the M G C

, ,
. .

kn own as the H eavy Section and lettered K and L ,

“
,

were formed at Bisley u nder Lieut Colonel Brad l ey . .

C o l onel Swinton remained at H eadquarters in London .

The personnel was recruited principa l ly from the A S C . . .

and from th e classes attested u nder the Derby

scheme For o ffi cers vo l unteers for what was described
.
,

as a n ew armoured car u nit were gathered i n from the

-

ranks of the 1 8 th 1 9 th and 2 1 s t R oyal Fu siliers — the SO

, ,

cal l ed public school battalions then i n France— a n d from

-
,

the M otor M ach ine G un Corps There being as yet n o

-
.

tan ks available for training purposes the program me of ,

work at B isley was limited virtua l ly to dri l l and courses i n

the H otchkiss guns It would be absurd to pretend that
.

any of this was taken very serious l y The other establish ed .

arms of the service now expanding beyond belief absorbed

, ,

a l l the best regular soldiers left in England ; and the n ew

formation su ffered inevitably from a lack of competent and
en erget ic sen ior o ffi cers M any of us must be fami l iar with
.

the casual methods and discipline which obtained in such

embryo organisat ion s in those days and it is u nnecessary ,

t o fi l l in the detai l s O f the suba l tern o fficers probably 7 5

.
,

per ce n t represented as good materia l as could be found

anywhere — a high proportion in View of the extraordinary ,

and haphazard processes by which the com mission e d ranks

of the N ew Army were fil l e d and one which compared very ,

favourably with that of most infantry u nits From the ou t .

break of war wh ile th e u nedu cated and un intelligent were

,

obtai n ing commissions for the asking there were fighti n g ,

and dying as private soldiers or thousands of men

 T HE MA R K I . A ND M AR K IV . TAN K S 2
5

accu stomed to responsibility and leadersh ip and amid th is

criminal wastage the n ew corps was lucky to obtain so
good a nucleu s As for the original rank an d file they
.
,

were admirable A large nu mb e r of course were ski ll ed

.
, ,

mechanics ; an d th e fighti n g qualities of all u nder condi ,

t ions entirely novel and trying in th e extreme to n erve and

body were beyond praise
, .

The prelude at B isley did not continue long Arrange .

me n ts had been made to take over Lord Ive a g h s estate at ’

Th etford in N orfolk for training purposes ; an d th e H eavy

, ,

Section was tran slated thither in J un e to m ake the a c

quaintance of its new mach in es Within th e estate the .

R E s had constructed a model battlefield with trenches

’
. .
, ,

craters and oth er obstacles S ince the enterprise th e ore ti

, .
,

ca l ly was Sh rouded in mystery the whole area was swept

, ,

c l ear of inh abitants Farm s and cottages were evacuated

. .

Fences barbed wire an d sentries kept the East C oa s t l a b our er

, ,

i ntrigued and amused Aeroplan es which came too near .

were fired at These m ethods seem on the whole t o h ave

.
, ,

been su ccessful It was i mpossible to conceal the fact that

.

som ething was doing : b eautiful female Spies and their less
attractive colleagues of th e other sex are said t o have trans
m i tted vague warn ings to th e enemy ; but until the M ark I s
’
.

appeared on the S om m e front the G erman s had no defin ite

information to work on M essrs Foster bu i l ding the first .
,

1 5 0 at Lincoln preferred simpler yet perhaps more subtle

, , ,

deceptions There was no secrecy i n their yards Any one

. .

cou l d see what they were doing They were bu ilding mobile .

water tan ks for th e Ru ssian s those u seful people Russia

-
, ,

b e ing notoriou s l y a waterless country a n d badly served with

roads There are sti l l to be seen a few old training mach ines
.

which bear inscribed on their sides a legend in large white

Ru ssian characters setting forth t heir a ll eged pu rpose an d
,

d e st ination This last was Petrograd In such a ma n ner

. .

”
the word tan k came into u se as a convenie n t code
“

expression and remained to stay And as the completed

, .

ta n ks arrived by rail at the training area after dark it is ,

26 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

probab l e that few persons ou tside the corps were aware of

any con nection between th e simple Ru ssian water carriers -

at Linco l n and the mysterious armoured cars which m a n

oeuvre d behi n d the walls of the huge enclosure at Thetford .

O n its arrival in the new area the H eavy S ection began

work in earnest on the machines avai l ab l e At first un .
,

fortunately there were not many : there was some delay in

,

delivery and a l ready there were upwards of a thousa n d

,

o fficers and men to be trained It had been decided to .

form six fighting compan ies of which fou r were to be ready ,

by the begi n n i n g of August These compa n ies were now .

” ”
lettered fro m A to F and were each t o be composed ,

of four section s of six tanks ( three male and three fema l e ) ,

with one reserve tank m akin g twenty fi ve in all Each ,

-
.

Se cti on was divided again into three sub sections o f two -

tanks A tan k crew consisted of a subaltern three drivers

.
, ,

and four gun ners including an N C O The company was

,
. . .

commanded by a maj or the section s by captains The ,

.

total strength was thirty one o fficers and about 2 00 other -

ranks To every tw o compan ies there was a quartermaster s

.
’

establish ment and a workshop s section of thre e ofli c e r s and ’

th irty m en By the 1 4 th August the first four companies

.

A B C an d D— were complete as regards personnel ; and

, , ,

th e right half of C with thirteen tanks had already left for

, ,

France .

We can prepare to follow There is no need to enlarge .

upon the train ing at Thetford With the arrival of the .

actual machin e s decorated with Russian characters i nterest

, ,

a n d zeal revived It was di fficult t o remai n e nthusiast ic

.

about the H otchkiss gu n for weeks on e n d ; but to d rive a

ta n k across trenches and i n and out of c raters even in ,

J uly was a n ovel and piquant form of work It was felt

,
.

that things were moving at l ast : the atmosphere of secrecy

was attractive and there were m any indicatio n s of the i m
,

portance already attachi n g to the n ew arm G e n e r a l s i a n d

‘

staff o fficers came down to witness de monstrations a n d th e ,

necessary element of hu mour was provide d when a tan k load -

 T HE M AR K I
. AND M AR K IV . TA N K S 27

of them was upset in a t rench The men were both cl ever

.

and keen and th e most serious trouble was th e insufficient

,

supply of machines in which to train them M any drivers .

had spent no more than an hour or two i n a tank wh en they

left for France It may well seem indeed that th e first
.
, ,

companies were rushed out too soon ; but there were good
argu ment s for th e m ove The di fficulties en cou ntered i n
.

the S om m e offensive led to a requ est for the early departure

of tanks ; and altho ugh the training of both offi cers and m en
was lamentably incomplete it was thought that a month or
,

two of actual battle experience wou ld outweigh all the

manifest disadvantages of a premature entry The w i nter .

could then be spent i n profiting by the lesson s learnt A .

startling success in the beginning was not anticipated by

any on e who realised the di ffi culties to be overcome Th e .

danger rat her was of a complete failure and consequent ,

discouragement ; and this possibility had to be faced It .

was hoped however that the new arm would at least play
, ,

so good a part as t o j ustify its present claims and its d e

mands for future development .

AS we have seen the right half of C Company left Eng

,

land on the 1 3 th August The left half followe d on th e

.

22n d. D was the next to go and then A a n d B There

, .

rema i ned the two l ater compan ies E and F but these never , ,

left the cou ntry as units The other four did all that was
.

asked of them : the experi ment was j ustified ; and E and F

stayed to form the nucleus of the battalions raised at home
when the great expan sion of the corps was authorised later
in the year .
 C H APT E R III .

T HE SO MME BA TT L E S .

A s the compan ies of the H eavy S ection arrived i n France ,

th e y W ere as sembled with their tanks at Yvrench near ,

Abbe v ille This was before the days of th e Chan nel Ferry
. .

The heavy machines h ad to be Shipped like any other form

of ordnance ; and they were b ut a part of th e load which
required to be carri e d o v erseas S everal complete work .

shops dozen s of sponson trolleys light cars lorries and

, , , ,

motor b icyc l es tog e th e r with ton s upon tons of spare

-
,

parts furnished the fi rst i nstalments of that vast collection

,

of material which the Tank Corps came to accu mulate in

France .

A train ing centre was established at Yvrench at fi rst ,

under Lieut Co l onel Brough but early i n September

.
-
,

Colonel B radley came out to take over the command It .

was known that the u nit would soon be called upon and ,

there still was an imm ense a mou nt of work to be done .

Drivers a n d gunners had to receive further training Th e .

ta n ks required to be ov e rhauled and tuned up Work .

shops and depots must be estab l ished Above all a host .

,

of nove l prob l ems concerning admi n istration supp l y tactics , ,

-
i n short the who l e m ethod a n d man n er of tank work i n
,
-

the fi el d — fe l l to be solved without d e lay and what was , ,

more without assistance

, The tan k companies in France
.

were nobody s children Their nominal parent the M G C

’
.
,
. . .
 T HE S O M M E B ATT LE S 29

( itsel f a mushroom growth of doubtful antecedents and

future ) had in fact n o actual connection with them what
,

ever ; and it would seem that a n ew tech n ical un it in SO ,

experimental a stage should m ore properly have been made

,

a branch of an established tech nical corps such as the ,

R oyal Engineers AS it was the compan ies were self

.
,

contained and u nattached Th e infantry whom they had .

,

come to help knew nothing of them except by rum our

, .

The G enerals and staff offi cers who cam e t o see the m per
form regarded them as a curiou s and rather dangerou s
innovation u nlikely to be of m uch pract ical value In SO
, .

far as thi s isolation was intent ional it is very doubtful ,

whether the measure of secrecy obtained by it outweighed

its disadvantages The first batt l e was n ear at hand ; and
.

a few m inutes after zero the secret would be exploded for

ever In the meantime a fuller comprehension by other
.
,

arms a more liberal interchange of views in especial some

, ,

tuition of the infantry who were to co operate in action -

,

might ha v e saved m uch disappointment and m any lives .

N othin g of the kind was attempted ; and t he compan ies

had C to think out and m ast er other people s problem s in
’

addition to their own in the field and with small aid from
,

outside Som e contingencies inevitably were overlooked

. .

N ot only was experience of this new warfare yet to seek ,

but many of th e o fficers and a larger proportion of th e

me n actua l ly were in France for the first time and knew ,

n othing of normal battle condition s It is surprising how .

much was foreseen a n d provided for i n Spite of these dis

ad v antages The matter of supply for example seems to
.
, ,

have been de alt wit h adequ ately from th e begin ning for ,

the tan ks were seldom hampered for want of petrol or

ammunition wherever they m ight be As regards general
,
.

tactics the new u nit was fortunate in possessing a basis

,

to work on i n a va l uable memorandu m i ssued by Colonel

Swinton ear l y in the year In this h e outlined the probable .

scope of tank warfare dealt with in fantry c o operation and

,
-

artillery support and laid down a definite syste m of attack

,
 30 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

which i n essentials is i n u se to day O n the other han d -

.
1
,

less thought was given to a Department that proved to be

of vital im portance This was Intelligence or ( as the .
,

branch of that service in the Tank C orps i s more accu rately

styled ) Reconnaissance Circumsta n ces peculiar to tan k .

operat ion s ca l l for the training of Special o ffi cers i n this

d uty alone as wel l as an unu sually high standard of
,

proficiency i n all tank com manders ; but these n eeds

were not recogn ised fully at the outset and on e In ,

t e l l i ge n ce o fficer Captain Hotb l a ck was responsible for , ,

the welfare of all fou r companies A little later and .

,

there were seven Reconnaissance O ffi cers to each battalion

and the corps soon won so high a reputation for thoro ugh
ness i n this work that every f ormation in the Army from ,

H eadquarters downward came to it for as s istance , .

In the begin ning of September the situ ation al o ng th e

Som me Front was as follows
After two months very sanguinary fighting tw o stages o f
’

1
Th tactica l r c mm d ati n
e t t i n t h i d cum
e o t w r di r gard d om
en o s se ou s o en e e s e e c

p l t l y by th e g n ra l taff u ti l th c mpu l i
e e e f v t
e f rc d th ir ad pti
s n e o s on o e en s en o e e o on .

C l n l Swi t
o o e i i t d th c ity f tank l adi g th attack i ma
n on ns s e on e ne es s o s e n e n s s es ,

an d p i t d ut that t
o n e ur th ra p id pl itati n f y p i g th y h u l d
o , o ens e e ex o o o an o en n e S o

mak a v ry l arg f rc f i fa t y mu t b l au ch d at c b hi d th m
e, e e o e o n n r s e n e on e e n e .

N t ly h ay
o
"
on d it m that th ta k wi ll c f r th p w r t f rc
,
e s s, oes s ee e n s on e e o e o o e

suc i v c mp l t
ces s e d u batt r d d f c l i
o but h b
e e an x pl ai d th
n e e e en e n es , , as as een e ne , e

m r p dy d u i t rrupt d th ir ad va c th gr at r th cha c f th ir
o e s ee an n n e e e n e, e e e e n e o e

sur v i v i g u ffi ci t l y l g t d thi It i p i bl tb f
n s en on tl t W! t o
’
o s. s oss e, er e or e za an 7 o

br ea k r ig /i t tlz r ozcg lz tlz e en emy s d ef ens i ve z on e in one d ay m ay n ow be con tem p l a ted

as f a p peas i bl e ambrai n twith tandi g
r o os i ti on ha lf h art ed s upp ort
.
”
C , o s n th e -
e

a fford d p rov ed ab ol ut l y th ju tic of th s c ont enti on ; nd i n 1 9 1 8 th y

e s e e s e e e s a e

w er accep t d as a matt er of c our s e—with out h ow v r ny ack now l edgm ent of

,

e e , e e , a

th ir origi n C lon l Swi nt on a l s p oi nt ed out that fi el d arti l l ry w th e ta k s

e . o e o e as n
’

chi ef dang r nd one whi ch c ou l d b c ou nt e r ed onl y by th e h el p of oth e r arm s

e , a e .

N um er ou s mi nor r ec omm ndati ons s uc h s th e us e of cas e h ot s m ok e nd , a s , e, a

wirel ess th e nec s s ity of i nt ell ig en t co op e rati on by i nfantry nd arti l l ry nd

,
e -
a e , a

qu e ti ons of admi ni trati on s u p p l y nd tran p ort i n th e fi l d w er e ei th er turned

s s , , a s e ,

d w n at on c e by th e gen ra l s ta ff or w re di s r egar d ed ; y t every one of th em

o e e e

sub qu ent l y h d to b ad op t ed
se a e .
3 2 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

orders were is sued for a vigorous exploitation of any

open ing a poor hope on the Som me— and once more the
—
Cavalry Corps with all its impedimenta clatt e red noisi l y
, ,

u p toward the battlefie l d to be at hand if need e d .

The tanks were to mak e their e n try in thi s attack C and .

D Companies commanded respectively by Maj or H olford

,

Walker and M aj or Summers were a l lotted to the ,

two arm ies and on the r oth moved up to the railway centre
,

called th e Loop near Bray From there the tanks trekked

, .

to their lying up positions for the batt l e — C to the Briquet

-

t e ri e near Tr ones Wood and D to the G ree n D ump b e hi n d ,

Delville Wood The compan ies h e adquarters followed on

.
’

the 1 4 th For the actual attack the ta n ks were to be dis

.

tributed as fo l lows
Thre e sections of each company ( 1 7 tanks apiece ) worked
on the right and right centre with the 1 4 th and 1 s th Corps
-
.

One section of 8 ta n ks of D Company was attached t o the

3 r d Corps i n the centre while the remai n ing section of C
,

(7 tanks ) came u n der the orders of the Reserve Army on the

left This made a tota l of 4 9 It was int e n d e d for the
. .

machines to be used in sub sections of two or three against -

specified strong points There was some discussion as to .

W hether they Should preced e or fol l ow the i n fantry at zero .

If they led it was feared that the noise of their approach to

,

the front l ine wou l d bri n g down the enemy s barrage upon ’

our assembly trenches ; and eve n tual l y it was decided that

their arrival should be SO timed that they could reach the
first obj ectives — roughly the line of villages — fi ve min utes
before the infa n try For this purpose lanes were to be
.

left i n ou r ow n barrage .

I Shall not attempt a detailed account of this or any

other ear l y tank action In th e first place it would be .
,

difficult to do so for th e records of those days are meagre

,

and inaccurate Again the 7 5 16 of the ta n ks on the Somme

.
,

was SO large l y experi me n tal and subsidiary that i n fa n try

O peration orders even after the s e cret was b l own were
, ,

framed to be carried out irrespect ive of the action of what

 THE S O M M E B ATTL E S 33

was then regarded i n m ost quarters as an u nreliable in nova

t ion of doubtful future . As regards the tactical methods
employed an organisation in its in fan cy with everyth ing
, ,

to learn had to take what chances it was offered and

, ,

had litt l e say i n th e direction of events N o attempt was .

o r could be made at thi s stage or for long after to i n, ,

trod u ce those revolutionary tactics ( already d iscussed and

advocated by Colone l Swinton an d others ) i n which the
tank was to be the Vital instru ment and wherein lies th e ,

chief i nterest of its h isto ry Final l y Since all tan k battles

.
,

as such bear very si m i lar features I prefer to concentrate,

on later ones of which I have personal knowledge .

The attack on the 1 5 th Septe mber was highly successful

o n th e left and centre but failed on the right wh ere th e
, ,

strong point known as th e Q uadrilateral held up our advance

a gainst Morval and Les Boeufs O n the whole it m ay be
.
,

said that the work of the tanks fully j ustified e xp ectat ion s .

No startling triu mph could be recorded bu t under the ,

circumstances none was anticipated En ough was d on e to .

dem onstrate the inheren t sou ndness of th e design the cor ,

r e ctn e s s of the tactical axioms laid down and the enormou s ,

potential value of the machine when fau lts had been rectified
and the person nel more h ighly t rained Th e test to which .

t he H eavy Section had been put was a severe one The .

grou nd everywhere was SO pulverised by the ferocious

shelling of th e past two m onths that out of 4 9 tanks ,

wh ich left the Bri que tte r i e and G reen D ump that night 1 7 ,

failed t o reach their starting points These broke down or

-
.

were ditched on the way th e absence of any un d i tc h i ng

,

gear such as was supplied later proving a seriou s handicap

, , .

H alf an hour before zero wh ich fell at dawn the other 3 2

, ,

b egan t o crawl forward t o the front line The three section s .

of C Compa n y on the right had been particularly u nfortun

, ,

ate during t he approach march an d the few tanks remain,

i n g were able to effect l itt l e or nothing again st the Quadri

lateral and Les B oeufs In m ost cases th e y were ditched or
.

knocked out by Shell fi re soon after they crossed th e G er m an

-

C
34 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

front line D Company s three sections working with the

.
’

1 s th Corps farther north were far more successful Ev e ry,

.

one who read the newspapers at th e ti me knows how one

tan k preceded the N ew Zealanders up the m ain street of
Flers drivi n g the terrified G ermans down into the cellars
, ,

where the in fantry rou nded them up The tank then .

moved on to a trench stro n gly held by the enemy e n fi l a d e d ,

it moved along behind it and took 3 00 prisoners Farther

, , .

n orth the two sections assisting the 3 r d Corps and the

,

R eserve Army reach ed G ueudecourt and the famous sugar

factory at Courcelette In almost every case where a tank
.

succeeded in arrivi n g at its obj ective the mere sigh t of it ,

was enough Save for some picked machine gunn e rs an d a

.
-

few other desperate men the enemy fled or surrendered on ,

th e spot .

The moral effect all proverbs about fa miliarity t o the

,

c ontrary i s sti l l and will always remain th e chief asset of

,

the tan k as a weapon N o body of in fantry un l ess very .

,

closely supported by guns will stand for long in the open ,

before a properly concerted attack led by tanks Th e y .

can not : accidents apart they are entirely he l p l ess and they
, ,

know it The fire from the machine m ay be errat ic as

.
,

u sual l y it is for th e gun ners can see very little and their
, ,

platform is continua l ly in m otion ; but th is does not abate

i n any degree the moral e ffect of its onset In the last five .

m onths of the war whe n t he proper u se of tanks had come

,

at last to be u nderstood it was only by the bold u se and ,

sacrifice of field art i l lery pushed far forward that the , ,

G erman arm ies were able to protract for as l ong as they

did the fina l struggle And this m oral influence works .

both ways : it helps the attacker as mu ch as it demoralise s

th e attacked Th e tank is terrifying or inspiring and
.
,

rather ludicrous accordin g t o whether it is again st you or

,

for you It i s not only a known antidote to the dreadful

.

trinity of trench wire and machine gun Its very appear

, ,
-
.

ance i s a comfort Its shape u n l ike that of any other

.
,

example of man s h andiwork its deliberate but at times

’

,
 T HE S O M M E B ATT L ES 35

curiously active and disconcerting movem ents its obviou s ,

weight and power even the two ports like lidded eyes
, , ,

which ornamen t t he front of th e cab combine irresistibly ,

( as a l l j our n ali sts will testify ) t o suggest some huge pre

historic animal —som e giant sloth or toad Indeed to Visit .
,

a training ground i n the evenin g whe n som e dozen s of these

-

creatures are rolling hom e t o their stalls or hangars is for ,

all the world like being at a Zoo during the Ple i stocene
,

Age . Th e striking pattern o f colours with which th e

machines were painted in the early days only aided th e
illusion The B ritish sold ier whose great m erit i t is t o
.
,

see th e comic side of everythin g cou ld not fail to be ,

exh i larated by these gorgeou s m onsters It was lon g .

before he cam e to re l y on the m as he could rely let u S ,

say on an old establi shed and perfected arm like th e

,
-

artillery ; but thi s is n ot re markable Rather i s it some .

thing o f a miracle and an ab iding testim ony to the e ff orts

,

of the n ew corps that a Sim ilar confidence between infantry

,

and tan ks actual l y was created during th e war s lifetime ’

.

And from the very first their mere appearance i n th e field

was a great mora l factor in our favour .

In thi s their fi rst battle their casualties i n personne l

, ,

were i nsignificant On e tank after attackin g a field

.
,

battery in G ueudecourt and destroying one gu n was ,

itself hit and burnt out only two of the crew escaping
, .

M ost of th e others got off l ightly Altogether ten were .

disabled by She l l fi r e and se v en more were hit but returned

-
, ,

to th e rallying point-
.

R eserving remarks and criticism for the e nd of th e ch ap

ter we will run thro ugh the remain ing action s fought by
,

th e H eavy S ection that autu m n and winter A comparative .

lull of rather m ore than a week ( marked by a s uccessful

m in or operation wh ich gave u s the Qu adrilateral ) fol l owed
on th e battle of the 1 5 th ; but during this period the tan k
compa n ie s were feverish l y busy At first n o fewer th an
.

5 0 tanks were asked for t o assist i n the n ext attack So .

large a demand at that stage meant an i mm ense amount

3 6 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

of work ; and in the end nothing like this number was

required the co operation of the H eavy Section being
,
-

limited to the north ern assault on G ueudecourt Thiepval , ,

and the height overlooking the Ancre from the south .

Work on the tanks was hampered by the multitude of

v isitors wh o cam e to see these n ovelties now that the secret
was disclosed There was much u ncertainty as to th e
.

method of attack the supply of maps was insu ffi cient , ,

and operation orders when they did arrive were meagre , ,

and ambiguous .

The ground along the Thiepval ridge was i n an appa l ling

condition It had been She ll ed more or less continuously
.

for upwards of three months by guns of every calibre O n .

top of this came two or three days of heavy rain j ust before
the attack The p l an
. to quote Colonel Buchan was
“
, ,
“

for an attack by the 4 th Army on M onday the 2 5 th with , ,

ou its left wing — small obj ectives ; but on the right an d ,

centre aiming at completing th e captures which had been

,

the ultimate obj ectives of the advance of the 1 s th The .

fo l lowing d a y the right wing of the s th Army would come

into action and it was hoped that from Thiepval to
,

Combles t he enemy wou ld be driven back to h is fourth

line of defence and our own front pushed up we l l within
,

”
assau l ting distance The enemy s fourth line of defence .
’

ran j ust in front of B apau me Five tanks on l y were .

detailed eventually to work with the 4 th Army on the 2 5 th ,

and they were able to effect little or noth i n g U nable t o .

leave their starting point u ntil zero for the attack was -
,

made at midday they seem to have become ditched very

,

early They were hardly needed except at one point

.
, .

The assau l t was entirely successful everywhere but at

G u e udecourt where u ncut wire held up the 2 1 s t D ivision
, .

It had been a bitterly disappointing day for the tanks but ,

the fault was hardly theirs It was an error in the first .

place to employ them at all i n an operation starting in

broad day l ight for it was impossib l e to conceal them n ear
,

enough to the front line to enable them to go over with

 T HE S O M M E B ATT LES 37

the in fantry Corps and divisional com manders had n ot

.

yet learnt th e e l ements of tank warfare Secondly th e .

,

ground was SO riven an d pulverise d so absolutely rotten ,

with shelling and rain that withou t any u nd i tch i n g gear

,

or spuds ( iron shoes afterwards provided to grip sodden

or crumbling soil) the odds were all against thei r gett in g
far.

As it happened an opportunity was soon offered of re

,

deeming these m ishaps and was seized i n a very brilliant

,

man ner Th e 2 1 s t Division we have seen was brought to

.
, ,

a standstill i n front of G u eudecourt H ere was a formidable .

obstacle known as G ird Trench an d as a preliminary to a ,

further assault on th e v illage it was essential that this

Should be cleared Orders were issued that nigh t for an
.

a ttack at dawn and the help of a tank was asked for

, .

With i mmense toil one was brought u p in the dark across

the frightful waste of ha l f obliterated trenches and shell
-

holes and water For th e ensuin g action I wi ll quote the

.

report of the 1 5 th Corps .

“
O n the 2 s th Septe mber th e 6 4 th B rigade 2 1 5 t , ,

D ivision s attack on G ird Trench was hung up and

’

u nable to make a n y progress A footing had been .

obtained i n G ird Trench at N 3 2 d 9 1 and ou r troops .

,

he l d the trench from N 2 6 c 4 5 northwards B etween

. .

these two points there remai n ed approximately 1 5 00

yards of trench very stro n gly held by the G erman s and
we l l wired the wire n ot havi n g been cut Arrange
,
.

ments were mad e for a ta n k ( female ) to move u p for

an attack next m orning The tank arrived at .

fol l owed by bombers It start e d m oving south east

.
-

ward a l o n g th e G ird Tren ch firin g its machi n e gu n s ,

-
.

As the trench gradual l y fell into our ha n ds stron g ,

point s w e re mad e in it by two compan ies of in fant ry

wh ich were following i n rear for that purpose N o .

di fficulty was experienced The enemy surrendered .

freely as the ta n k moved down the trench They .

were unable to escape owing to ou r holding the trench

,
38 T HE TAN K IN ACT I O N

at t he southern end at N 3 2 d 9 1 By AM th e . . .

whole length of the trench had been cleared and the ,

1 s th D L I moved over th e O pen and took over the

. . .

captured trench The infantry then advanced to their

.

final obj ective ( G ueudecourt ) where the tan k rendered ,

very va l uable assistance The tan k finally ran short of .

petrol south east of G ueudecourt In th e capture of

-
.

G ird Trench 8 o fficers and 3 6 2 other ranks were ma d e

prisoners and a great many G ermans were killed
,
.

O ur casualties only amounted to 5 N early 1 5 00 yard s .

of trench were captured in less than an hour What .

would h ave proved a very di fficult operation i nvol v ,

ing probably heavy l osses was taken with the greatest ,

ease entire l y owing to th e assistance rendered by the

t a nk fi
’

It hould be added that an aeroplane also lent a hand

S ,

flying low over the t rench and machine gunn ing the -

defenders .

This admirable little demonstration of what a tan k could

do came at a most opportune moment The months o f .

Slaughter on th e Somme were in fact having their inevitable

e ffect on the armies in France Already the best of the .

volunteers who enlisted in the first year of the war were

gone and the new r e cruits were of a very di fferent type
, .

Again and again battalions brigades wh ole division s even , , ,

came out of the line deci mated and shaken from what was
trumpeted at home as a cheap and g l orious success A .

m ile or two of trenche s a wood or a village had i ndeed , ,

been won and with m uch glory

, But at what a cost ! .

Wh ether or no these Pyrrhic victories wer e worth the

s a c r i fi c e — an d presu mably they were — the men on the Spot ,

seeing o n l y their sma l l corner remembered nothing but the ,

horror of it a l l The Som me together with G allipoli and

.
, ,

the third battle of Ypres stand apart in the minds of those

,

who l ived through them as long drawn nightmares ; and it -

was the peculiar abomination o f the fi r s t named that it -

seemed but the foretaste of an endless future The w a r .

40 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

stalemate had been reached on the main battlefield To .

relieve this it was decided to make a flank attack alon g

and north of the Ancre where we had bee n repu l sed i n ,

J uly The capture of the Thiepval height had improved

.

the prospect of a fresh attempt i n th is quarter The .

northern edg e of th e salien t we had created now ran east

and west alon g high ground south of the river ; and it was
possible for our artillery to e n fi l a d e an d even t ake i n
reverse the immense l y stron g positions of Beaucourt and
Beau mont H ame l .

The attack was fixed for the 1 3 th N ovember O riginally .

,

twenty tanks were t o have been used but th e weather was ,

so bad that this nu mber was reduced to fi ve— three to assist

at St Pierre D ivion south of the Ancre while the other
, ,

two endeavoured to reach B eau mont H amel By this time .

t he absolute necessity of good recon naissan ce had bee n

recog n ised ; and be fore the action tank commanders were ,

t aken to observation points from which they could see

-

somethin g of the ground b eyond the front line Landmarks .

were indicated to them aeroplane photographs were studied

, ,

and on zero night the tank routes were taped as far as

, ,

possible But no foresight could avail against the weather

. .

G ales blew the rai n fel l and on the night of the 1 2 th 1 3 th

, , ,
-
,

came snow The three southern tanks were bogged in the

.

m ud as they moved up The northern pair fou n d the tapes

.

obliterated by the snow but Captain Hotbl a ck the In tel

, ,

l i ge n ce O ffi cer led on e forward u nder heavy fire and then

, ,

going b a ck brought up the second to a point where the

,

infantry was hung up B oth these tanks did good work

.

before getti n g ditched and Hotb l a ck rec e ived the D S O

, . . .

M eanwhile th e attack had succeeded beyond expectation .

St Pierre Divion and Beau mont H amel were taken although ,

once more an assau l t on Serre was repulsed On e battalion .

of th e N aval Division led by Lieut Colonel Freyburg

, .
-
,

actually pushed right up t he rive r valley to the outskirts

of Beaucourt H ere it hung on all day far ahead of our
.
,

m ain ad v ance Th e failure to capture a powerfu l redoubt

.
 T HE S O M M E B ATT LES 41

between Beaucourt an d B eaumont H ame l prevented any

adequate support reach ing the batta l ion but Freyburg , ,

who was wounded in al l four times refused to with d raw , .

A Territorial u nit contriv e d to get i n touch with him and ,

communication of a sort was mai n tained with the rear

along the river bank But h is position was as precariou s
.

as it was valuable ; and that n ight three tanks were brought

up for another attack on th e r e doubt O ne was hit by a .

Shell an d disabled The others got within close range o f

.

th e stro n g point before g e tt in g ditched They we re able .

t o bri n g their gun s to bear an d in a Short tim e the place

,

surrendered n o fewer than 4 00 prisoners falling to the

,

two tanks alone Th e subsequent infantry advance closed

.

up the lin e and en abled F r eyb urg to crown his exploit by

capturi n g Beaucourt at the head of h is men .

A few days later the battles of th e Som me cam e definitely

t o an e n d If th e autu mn advance had come up t o expecta
.

tions there was an intention of continui n g the offensive

through out the winter but the powers which m odern
,

weapon s give to the defe nce combined with the O ctober

,

rain s had li mited our successes a n d brought the army to

,

a pitch of exhaustion ; an d n ow a com p l ete break up of -

the weather put any idea of furth e r operations ou t of th e

question . The troops set abou t m aking themselves as
comfortable as possible i n their n e w positi on s Shattered .

roads wer e remad e a n d light rail w ays laid down across

th e waste beh ind the front lin e Preparations began for a .

renewed on sla u ght in th e spri n g With the rest th e com .

,

p a n i es of the H eavy Section were to be very bu sy that

winter The increasing di ffi culties of th e attack and their
.
,

o w n demonstratio n of h ow those difficulties m ight be over

come had established their position as a va l uable i f n ot

, ,

y e t an indispen sable auxiliary,

But th ey had fought their
.

last battle as i ndividual u n its The corps was growing ;

.

an d they withdr e w from th e line only to form the nucleu s

of the four batta l ions wh ich were to be rai sed in France .
42 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

An i mmense amount of nonse n se was talked and written

about th e first appearance of the tanks in the fie l d The .

n ewspapers as perhaps was to be expected exce l led them

, ,

selves i n absurdity Any lie was good enough for them

. .

The war correspondents i n their safe and comfortable ,

ch a teau in the vall e y of the Ter n oise ran sacked Scripture ,

and zoology for suitable sim iles There is a story of those .

halfpenny strategists M essrs G ibbs and Beach Thomas

,
1
,

tossing up a coin ( no doubt a halfpen n y ) to decide who

should u se the word Behem oth Al l this ignorant flap .

doodle did an il l servi ce to th e new unit Its exploits in .

battle had been witnessed by few ; but tens of thousands

h ad seen tanks lying derelict in the Somm e mud or holding
up tra ffic through mechanical breakdowns on important
thoroughfares ; and exaggerated encomium s in ill informed -

newspaper articles on l y brought ridicule upon men who had

don e wonders in circumstances inconceivable to the writers .

The H eavy Section in its early days is said to have been

, ,

the victim of more chaff ( and not always good natured ) than -

any un it except the London Scottish People at home who .

,

believe anything they read in pri nt and have the Press

they deser v e naturally expected m iracles of machines wh ich
,

pushed down houses on battlefields where in fact no , , ,

house had been stan d ing for months .

N o on e dis l iked this sort of thing more than the men

concerned They knew well enough where they had suc
.

c e e d e d and where they had failed The necessary ex pe r i.

ence had been bought ; and there were ma n y lessons to be

l earnt from it and carried into practice so far as was possible , ,

before th e next battle It was proved that the Mark I was

. .

designed on sound lines and needed only a few structural

,

alteration s t o make it equa l to al l reasonable demands until

such tim e as it could be superseded by an altogether
1
N w I b l i v Si P hi l ip Gibb nd Si B ach Th ma
o , e e e, r s a r e o s.
 T HE S O M M E B ATT L E S 43

superior type Th e H ydraulic Stabi l iser o r tail for

.
“
,

example m ust be got rid of Its essential worthlessnes s

, .

was discovered quite early when a t a n k cam e u nder shell ,

fi re wh ile waiting for zero beh ind our front line Th e .

whole crew being in side for Shelter with th e engin e j u st ,

ticking over a proj ectile burst u nder the stern an d blew th e

,

tail away without doing any other damage : a m id the general

uproar n o on e was aware of what had happened ; and the
tan k moved forward and was in action for som e time before
the loss of this absurd appendage was d iscovered O ther .

faults to be remedied were th e position o f th e petrol tanks -

,

the overhead exhau st outlet emitting conspicuous flame an d -

,

sp arks the n eedlessly broad sponson s ( accessories i n many

,

cases o f ditching ) and th e lack of any gear by which a

,

ditched tank could fre e itself u nder its own power .

”
D itching an unpleas ant commonplace of t ank warfare
, ,

can happen in many ways ; but i n essentials this m i s for

tune mean s one of two things Either the m achine has .

got itsel f into such a position tail down in a wide and

very d eep trench ) that although the tracks will grip the
surface the engine power i s insu ffi cient to pul l it out ; or
-

the belly with a dead weight of n early 3 0 ton s on top

,

of it is resting on comparatively hard ground wh ile the

, ,

tracks happen i n g on soft patches cut th rough with o u t

, ,

gripping at all The tank for example is movin g parallel

.
, ,

and close t o th e forward edge o f a trench The edge gives .

way u nder th e weight of the n ear track which Slides down ,

u ntil the sponson on that side hits the rear wall of the
trench The fallen t rack i s n ow revolving uselessly i n air
.

or cru mbling earth th e belly of th e tan k is resting heavily

,

on the parapet an d th e e fforts of the outer track still on

, ,

firm grou nd to overcome th e consequent friction on l y

, ,

succeed in embedding th e sponson in the parados until th e

engine can n o longer force th e machine forward What .

was needed was someth ing which would give one or both
tracks a more secure grip or leverage in such cases After .

the experiences on the S om me two separate devices were ,

44 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

adopted For permanent use over soft ground iron Shoes

.

or spuds were clamped at intervals alo n g the tracks ;

“

wh i le in addition each tank carried a pair of what were

known as torpedo booms These were cigar shaped obj ects
-
.
-

of wood and iron about six feet lon g to be clamped to each

, ,

track by chains when the tan k became ditched As the .

t racks revolved th e se booms i n theory were pulled roun d

,

u nderneath the tank u n til they becam e j ammed in the

ground when the tracks being thus brought to a standstill
, , ,

the machine was able to climb out over the m in the n ormal
way In practice although of great use on m any occasion s
.
, ,

these booms were found t o be too sma ll and weak In soft .

groun d they often w e re dragg e d under the whole length

of the ta n k and up to the surface again behin d : in hard
ground th e chain s were apt to part u nder the strain A
,
.

greatly superior development of this idea ( to be described

in its turn ) was tested and adopted after the battle of ‘

M essines .

I offer n o apolo gy for this digression on u n d i tch i n g .

Throughout the batt l es of the Somme Arras M essine s an d , , ,

Ypres by day and by night during approach marches an d

, ,

u nder fire in action this unsavoury process m ight fa l l at any

,

moment to the lot of any crew O n at least one occasion .

at Ypres a who l e company of twelve tanks was ditched

hope l ess l y before it even reached the front line and a few ,

days before in the same dismal area out of two companies

, ,

of the sam e batt alion ( my own ) which went over at zero ,

only one tank retur n ed before the end of the day On e .

other had bee n blown to pieces the remaini n g twenty on e ,

-

were ditched temporarily or for ever here and there about

, ,

our litt l e sector of that water logged batt l efie l d M ost of -

.

them had struggled somehow into action and some were ,

extricated from bogs or shell ho l e s half a dozen times before -

their exhausted crews gave up the strugg l e At least .

a n other fifty from other battalion s were in similar case that

evening Ypres of course was exceptional and tanks
.
, , ,

should never have been used there ; but until their proper
 T HE S O M M E B ATT LE S 45

funct i on was discovered at Cambrai he was a fortunate ,

commander who could take his machin e in and out of action

anywhere without a case of ditchin g on the way .

R evert ing finally to the lesson s of the S omme it was felt ,

by most o fficers and men of th e n ew un it that well as they ,

h ad done on many occasions m ore might have bee n a ccom ,

p l i s h ed. They su ffered n one of th e delu s ion s wh ich th e

Press was fostering at h ome Th e lack of foresight in some .

direction s was obvious enou gh n ow At th e same t ime it .

was realised that the tanks had been put to an un reasonable

test They were constructed for fair grou nd and fair weather ;
.

they had been grant ed neith er There had been insu ffi cient .

ti me to train the crews O n account of the secrecy mai n

.

t a i n e d at the start it was imp ossible for in fantry com

,

manders and th eir m en to become acquainted with tan k

tactics but thi s want of co operation was not remedied a s -
,

it Should have been be fore the late r actions Springi n g

, .

from the same source of ignorance was the m ischievou s

tendency t o u se tanks i n driblets instead of in masses— a
tendency which the Tank Corps had t o fight throughout i ts
exi st ence .

It was proved that the preparations for a battle required

an infinite amount of work and forethought There wer e .

contingencies t o be considered such as affected n o othe r

arm Especia ll y was this the case with reconnaissan ce ;
.

for su ccess or failure hung upon th e tank com manders ’

familiarity from thorough coaching beforehand with th e

, ,

ground they had t o cover O n ce in act ion they cou ld see

.
,

v ery little while m aps were almost useless i n a devastated

,

count ry and each o fficer in stead had to carry in h is m ind

,

the look of almost every tree stu mp and every mound o f -

ru bble .

If tanks lost their way apart from other consequ ences

, ,

the in fantry were very apt to follow them and lose their own
direction Another di fficu l ty spri n gi n g in part from t he
.
,

s mall Size of the u n it a n d in part from the bad practice o f

employing tanks in driblets was that subaltern tan k officer s
,
4 6 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

o ften found themse l ves working alone or i n pairs wit h

d ivisions or even with corps and conferring on tactical
,

points with and G enerals They had not the .

e xperience or authority needed t o combat ill advised -

d emands a n d as a result were often set t o perform i m

,

possible tasks .

If the H eavy Section was to remain still more if it was ,

to be e xpanded everything went to Show the urgent need of

,

reforming it as a ful l y equipped and independent organisa

t ion like the Flying Corps whose requirements i n many
,

ways resembled its own It must have its responsible staff

.

t o decide finally a l l questions dea l i n g purely with tank war

fare its inte l ligen ce branch run on individual lines its
, ,

technica l o fficers its signal service its workshops and

, ,

d e pots its tran sport and supply

,
Such a proposal was put
.

forward after the first Som me battles an d as a proo f that ,

the mistakes and disappointments of that period were out

weighted greatly on the credit Side the suggestion was ,

a dopted at once Before the end of September the ex

.

p a n s i on and new establish ment were authorised Lieut . .

Colonel Elles was given the com mand i n France ; and the
bu ilding of a thou sand improved tanks was put in han d
w ithout delay .
48 T HE TA N K IN A CT I O N

ing two tank brigades in the field and the headqu arters o f ,

a third formed to receive the new battalions from England .

H e had ten battalions under hi m when he became a Maj or

G eneral U ntil he received that step his brigade com
.

manders w e re only colonels so that although i n action

, ,

they worked directly with Army Corps any infantry , .

Brigadier was senior to them Apart from the Slur on .

the corps and its officers this deliberate omission caused

,

serious inconvenience In its ear l y days the Tank Corps

.

needed every ou nce of authority it could get to help it

through its inevitable di fficulties N otwithstanding these .
,

at th e end of 1 9 1 8 it had eighteen batta l io n s in France and

seven m ore in En g l and : it had created im mense workshops ,

S chools and depots in both cou n tries : it had sent detach

,

m ents to Ire l and and Egypt ; a n d in the fi nal months it

h ad not only led the infantry of three armies in almost every
attack but had dictated i n the most important respects how
,

those attacks should be conducted Yet the o fficer directing .

this enormous force in the field had th e rank only of a

d ivisional com mander This plain l y was wrong in prin
.

ci pl e . H ad the Royal Air Force ( let us Sa y) W hose position .

was in m any ways comparable fou n d itse l f in a similar ,

predicame n t : had it been cast brand new during the war -

i nstead of developing from a pre war regular estab l ishment -

with its machinery complete it wou l d have advertised its,

disabi l ities in Par l iament and i n the Press a n d would have ,

forced a terrified offi c i a l d om to invest its chief with some

fantastic tit l e and costu me inve n ted by the Daily M ai l
‘ 1
.
’

Th e Tank Corps however for all its youth and i n e x p e r i

, ,

ence has assimilated at l e ast on e of the better tradition s of

,

th e regular service : it does not advertise I do not suppose .

there are a thousand people outsid e th e Army who know

anything about its work As the tank its e lf has no money
.

making future i n peace time it can have n o permanent ,

i nterest for newspaper proprietors And for th is relief at .

,

1 Th epirit of p r oph cy mu t ha v i pir d thi r mark it w writt

S e s e ns e s e , as as en s o me
m onth b efore th e creati on of Ai Mar ha l nd oth r h av l y b odi
s r s s a e e en es .
E X P AN S I O N : T HE B ATT LE S IN F RO N T OF A RRA S 49

l east much thanks

,
. The corps has don e th e better work
because of it .

The antagonistic Spirit to wh ich I have advert e d dis

covered another fertile field for its in trigues in Eng l and .

Expansion was in progress there as we l l There c a n be no .

difference of opi n ion as to the u nexpected common sense -

which placed Co l on e l Ell es an experienced soldier from a ,

tech nical corps in com mand in France ; nor u nhappily

, , ,

can there be any as t o the inj ustice ( to put it on the lowest

grounds ) of shelving C olonel Swinton at hom e H e a l so .

was an engin eer an d therefore peculiar l y suitable for the

,

command ; but apart fro m that if any on e man was r e s pon ,

s ible for the officia l adoption of th e ta n k — the solitary

triumphant experiment which the war produced— i t was he .

There was n o s o cal l ed public pressure engendered by t he

-
,

agitation of cheap newspapers ; for neither Press n or pub l ic

knew anything worth disclosing u ntil th e first m achi n es were
a l ready at Thetford It was C olonel Swi n ton s fertility of
.
’

thought the inspiration of h is belief his influence and

, ,

persisten t advocacy wh i ch did more than all else to wear

,

d own the maddening barrier of departmental indifferen ce .

H e won at last some measure of support for his ideas : h e

organised th e new u nit an d saw h is hopes of it j ustified in ,

the field ; and then j ust as the embryo was expanding into
,

fu l l l ife and vigour th e old influences ma d e themselves felt

,

once m ore Som e body said ( or so it will be most charitabl e

.

to suppose) H ullo here s an other o f these infern al

, ,
’

sappers ! This wo n t do ! The whole war is bein g run by ’

R E s and gunners as it is We m ust get rid of h im !

’
. . .
,

H e was got rid of It was foun d ( most opportunely ) that

.

th e Com mitt ee of Imperial Defence could d o with out h is

services n o longer and h e r e turned to his duties as Assistant
,

Secretary An infantry B rigadier who had performed a

.
,

v e ry n otable feat of arms in the first months of the war but ,

who knew nothing about tanks came down to Thetford to ,

take over the com mand and gave an encouragi n g ton e ,

to the proceedings by declaring quite openly the moment ,

D
50 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

he arrived that he was com e t o pu t some discipline into the

,

corps that he took n o i n terest whatever in the tanks and

, ,

that h e did not want to see them .

In View of these and other examples of our methods and

man ners the rapid a n d e normous growth of the corps may
,

seem surprisi n g To a great d egree i t wrought its own

.

sa l vation B ut in fact the oppositio n came mostly from

.

those quarters at home where every r e asonable bei n g would

expect to fin d it and could to that extent be disregard e d as
,

mere l y symptomatic an d inevitab l e ; and the supporters of

the enterpris e were far more influential In France a l so .

there was an ever increasing body of opi n io n i n its favou r

-
.

And once it was taken up in ear n e st those qualities of ,

en e r gy and thoroughness which our race seems always t o

reserve for times of crisis cam e fu ll y into p l ay It is .

i n deed refresh ing to turn from th e se petty irritatio n s t o

th e rea ll y astonish ing work which now was carried through
in both cou ntries At home the camp at Th e tford was
.
,

aba n do n ed E and F Companies or what was l e ft of them

.
, ,

with al l their tanks and stores and baggage were transfe rre d ,

bodi l y t o th e other end of En gland At Bovington near .

,

Woo l i n D orsetshire a hutted camp capable of holding as

,

it stood half a doze n infantry battalions h ad been taken

over toward th e end of 1 9 1 6 By the first weeks of the .

new year five tank batta l ion s and a reinforcement d e pot

were in process of formatio n t h ere O n th e great moors .

which stretched away to the north there was ample room

for traini n g ; and once more rows of h a n gars and repair
shops were springi n g up trenches were being dug and ,

crat e rs b l own wh i l e the i n hab itants of Woo l were annoyed

,

rather than mystified by the m elodramatic precaution s

atte n ding the arrival of every trainload of tanks In s tru c .

tors appeared l ike mushrooms : th ere were courses i n ta n k

driving maintenance gunnery signal l ing reconnaissance
, , , , ,

bombing and the care of pigeo n s N ear Lulworth C ov e

,
.
,

wh e re trippers u sed t o make pilgrimage before the war a ,

battle practice range came into being A little l ater whi l e

-
.
,
E X PA N S I O N : T HE B ATTL ES IN F RO N T OF ARR A S 5 1

Bovington itself was growing week by week other camps ,

were taken over at Wareham and Swanage u ntil most o f ,

the military acco mmodation in the Is l e of Purbeck housed

what once had been the H eavy Section And in the mean .

ti m e development s even more st riking had been taki n g

,

p l ace in France From four rather forlorn little companies

.
,

living as it were from hand to m outh th e corps sprang at a ,

bou n d into a huge an d complicated organisation with its ,

own territory w or k s a n d depots an d every apparatus for

, , ,

carrying on its l ethal industry A large area lyi n g between .

,

the river Ternoise and the direct H esdi n St Pol road -

,

was a ll otted to it To Bermicourt a Villag e a l most in th e

.
,

centre of this country Colonel Ell es removed his h ead ,

quarters from Beau quesn e ear l y in O ctober 1 6 Twe n ty ’

.

four acres near the river were taken for central workshops
and stores In a few weeks as we l l a s the ubiquitous
.
,

hangars immense steel and iro n sheds had arisen and

, ,

continued to grow i n n umbers a n d size u ntil they covered

Si x acres Sta l ls for tan ks like the old e l ephant stables
.
,

of Carthage lined one side of the testing ground

, There -
.

were huts for a staff which grew to 1 2 00 officers a nd men ,

cinema th eatres a rest camp and hospital a compoun d

-
,
-
,

holding 5 00 Chinese labourers and for a ti me a reinforce , , ,

ment depot From Eri n Station eleven lines of rai l with

.
, ,

feet of sidings l ed into the main enclosure A few , .

hundred yards away was a driving and mechanical schoo l ,

w i th i ts own training ground

.
An d l ong before the e n d
-
.

of 1 9 1 7 the original twenty four acres of stores an d work -

shops were getting overcrowded In addition to the vast .

accum u l ation of equipment ra n ging from e n gines an d ,

armour plate down to split pins and motor bicycle parts

- - -
,

there were always there two or three hu n dred tanks i n

every stage of dismem berme n t or reco n struction Every .

machine sent out from England ( perhaps 3 000 i n al l )

cam e from Le H avre to Eri n to be tested equipped an d , ,

issued to units ; and every machine salved on the battle

field was returned there for repair M ore ground th e refore .
, ,
 52 T HE TA N K IN A CT I O N

was taken over in the area itself ; a great driving school -

was formed on the old front li n e at Wailly near Arras ; ,

the whole reinforcement depot moved out to Le Treport ;

and a school of gunnery capable before long of taking three
,

battalions at a tim e came into being among the sand dunes

,
-

and gimcrack vi ll as of M erlimont on the coast ne a r Etaples ,

.

In th e Bermicourt area there was not a village now which

did n ot hous e some detai l o f th e corps — M I Workshops .
,

Salvage Supp l y and Signal Companies & c — or w a s not

, , , .

reserved for billeting batta l ions as they arrived from En g

land or r e turned from the li n e t o refit It Shou l d be n eed .

less to add th at th e h e adquarters in Bermicourt Ch ateau

kept pace with thi s expa n sion In the beginn ing the staff .

was pa l p a b l y i nadequate ; before the end it was comparable

in size to that of an army .

Taking it a ll i n a ll I doubt if there can be anything even

, ,

in the exceptiona l records of this war to equal for extent ,

and variety the growth of th e technica l instructio n a l and , ,

supply branches of the Tank Corps during the l ast two

years It was th e natu ra l habit of the combatant u nits to
.

complai n l oud l y of a l l three ; but to visit Erin at any time ,

to see there th e scores of tanks the acre s of vast workshops ,

and store sheds the miles of sidings and the tons upon ton s
-
, ,

of gear and equipment and to reflect that every pound of

,

this materia l had come from Eng l and since the winter of
’
1 6 was enough to make one pause and wonder ; and
,

looking back n ow at the wh o l e industry raised i n so short ,

a time from n oth ing at a ll it appears with all its obvious , ,

shortcomings a highly remarkab l e achievement of fore

,

thought an d energy .

I have gon e a l ittle far ahead The growth was rapid .

,

but it was not a l l accomplished at a blow ; and it was the

least k n own and advertised aspect of th e expan sion Side
. .

by side with the rise of Erin as a base the combatant ,

branch was growing also The old compan ies i n France .

had becom e battalion s and the latter were multiplying at

,

a rate of one a month .

E X PA N S I O N : T HE B ATTL E S IN FRO N T OF A RRA S 53

About th e time when E an d F Com panies were lea v in g

Thetford for B ovin gton A B C and D were withdrawn , , , ,

from Acheux to Bermicourt They were raised at once to .

their new status u nder the same a l ph abetical designation s

, ,

and volunteers were called for from other arm s of th e ser

vice O riginally each of these n ew battalions was to ha v e
.

had 7 2 tanks ; bu t partly on account of the difficu l ties of

production part l y for s implicity of tact ical handling thi s
, ,

number was by degrees wh ittled down to on e half The -

.

eventual establish men t for a battalion was fixed at three

companies of 1 2 tanks each and a Workshops Company ; ,

m akin g a total of 3 6 tan ks and som e 8 00 officers and men , ,

commanded by a Lieutenant Colon el Each combatan t -

.

compa n y co n sisted of three fightin g sectio n s of 4 tanks ,

and one Spare or supply section The Workshops Com .

pa n y l ike the others was com manded by a M aj or and was

, , ,

responsible for the upkeep of the tanks and for all repairs
wh ich could be executed i n the field At a later date these .

battalion workshops were abolished and m erged i nto

brigad e organisation s Engineer O ffi cers with a s mall , ,

staff remaining with the u n its

, The latter in theory .
,

( and t o a l arge extent in fact ) were n ow capable of effectin g ,

their own m in or repairs and m ainten ance .

There was an Equipment O ffic e r to each battalion and ,

subsequently three assistants for th e companies N o less .

important was th e Reco n naissance branch In addition .

to the Battalion R O ( a Captain ) there were three com

. .
,

pa ny R O s and three assistants with a staff o f draughts

. .
’

men . In most of the battalions the standard of this

essential work both i n th e office and i n the field was very
, ,

high The Tank Corps was respon sible for m any inno
.

v a ti o n s i n this branch of Intelligen ce such as th e more ,

general use of layered maps and of the study of a e roplan e ,

photograph s Th e G ermans whose map maki n g odd l y

.
,
-
,

enough was u sua l ly poor were led t o adopt the device

, ,

of layering by examples which they found in captu red

ta n ks .
54 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

Fina ll y each battalion started l ife with an imposing

,

array of every type of m otor transport — l ight cars box cars ,

-
,

l orries mobile repai r shops motor bicyc l e s & c B ut th is

, ,
-
, .

U topian equipment was too good to l ast In France the .

transport was poo l ed ; and over this fatal step and the ,

appeals and recriminat io n s evok e d by it ever si n ce it is ,

better to be Si l ent G enera l G rant has said th at mi l itary

.

history should be truthful ; but n o good purpose can be

s erv e d by dwel l i n g on such tragedies They are com mon .

to the hu man race — or at any rate t o the hu man army .

With th e nine batta l ion s n ow in process of formation ,

four in France and five at home it was proposed to make ,

up three brigades Two came at once into being : the I s t

.
,

consisting of C and D Battalions u nder Co l onel C D A , . . .

Baker Carr
-
, and the z ud of A and B Batta l ions , ,

u nder Colone l A Courage M C The 3 r d Brigade H Q

.
, . . . .
,

Colonel J Ha rd r e s s Llo y d
. commanding was
, ,

formed soon after t o await th e new arrivals AS the latter .

assemb l ed in France the units would be redistributed u ntil

there were three batta l ions in e ach b rigade .

Before fi n ishi n g with th e subj ect of expansion certai n ,

auxiliary services fall t o be mentioned Th e Tan k Corps .

had its own Signal branch inc l udin g wire l ess and pigeons
,
.

The former was tried in tanks especially fitted for the

purpose but was n ot striking l y successful Cable l aying
, .
-

mach ines were also u sed in the Ypres salient Pig e ons .
,

u n til th e fi n al advance when the lofts could not keep up

, ,

proved by far the most rapid and r e l iable m e a n s of com

m u n i ca ti on duri n g a n actio n Two bi r ds whe n avai l abl e
.
, ,

were carried in each ta n k ; a n d th e ir b e haviour in the most

tryi n g circumstances im agi n ab l e was tru l y ex e mp l ary I .

sha l l n ev e r forget the p l acid and a l most bl as e air with which ’

a coup l e in my own tank continued t o sip their water and ,

tak e appare n t l y a n i nte l lige n t interest i n th e proceedi n gs

whi l e in a sweat ing at mosphere of petrol fu m e s high
, ,

explosive a n d decomposi n g hu manity w e were crashi n g

, ,

over fallen tree trunks alo n g the P oel ca p el l e roa d

-
.
5 6 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

centage of casualties This was especially the case in the

.

Ypres sa l ient in th e dreadful winter of 1 9 1 7 1 8 when there -

were close on 1 9 0 t a n ks lying rusting i n the m ud Some .

had disappeared a l most complete l y and round oth ers coffer ,

d ams had to be built to raise them fro m the lagoons i n

wh ich they lay half submerged Yet n inety were salved
-
.

here in ten m onths ; and from the battalions fresh from the ,

fighting i n this G od forsaken area came volunteers to help

-
,

in the work ! N o words can do j ustice to the difficulties

which the salvers had to overcome in that morass or to the ,

labour and ingenu ity which overcam e them I can speak .

with some authority on these amph ibiou s conditions for I ,

left my own tank there with two fe et of water already above

the floor and a ll the K ing s coffer dam s an d a l l the K ing s
,
’
-
’

men failed to get her out I have no figu res to qu ote as t o .

th e numbers salved on l ater and less inhuman battlefie l ds ,

but the total mu st have run into hu ndreds And th i s .

d e voted work un recognised as it was had its unexpected

, ,

reward When strikes at hom e were delaying product ion

.
,

it was th e old rescued tanks lying i n scores at Erin that

wer e furbished up and put i n to commission agai n to brin g
battalions up to strength for Cambrai and the big battles of
August 1 9 1 8 .

While expa n sion was i n progress the lessons of th e

So m me with regard to the capabilities of th e tanks them
se l ves were considered and put to good purpose In .

N ovember 1 6 at a conference of the M echanica l War

’

fare Supply D e partment Lieut Colonel Stern th e chief ,

.
-
,

engineer dealt with the programme of futur e con structio n

, .

There were then in France seventy M ark I t a nks Fifty . .

Mark II S were t o arrive by J anuary a n d a Simi l ar

.
’
,

nu mber of M ark III s by th e following m onth ( These .

’
.

last of course never mater i alised ) From February to

, ,
.
E X PA N S I O N : T HE B ATT LE S IN FRONT OF A RRA S 57

M ay M ark IV S were t o be produced at the rate of

.
’

twenty a week ; M ark V s would be available in August ; .

’

”
and a new light tank th e M ediu m A or Whippet , ,

by Christmas We have already dealt with the M ark IV

and th e M ark V and Whippets can be considered whe n
.

eventually they did make an appearance For this pro .

gramm e was t oo optim istic : n o M ark IV S arrived until .

’

after the battl e of Arras an d th e M ark V was n ot ready i n ,

.

a n y n umbers for another year .

In the Spring of 1 9 1 7 therefore when the Tan k C orps , ,

went into battle for th e first ti me in its new form th e situa ,

tion was as follows : At B ovington Brigadier G eneral G ore ,

-

An l ey, with Colo n el M B M atthew La nn ow e as . .

superint ended the training of the five new

battalions u ntil i n March he went to the Ad mi nistrative
,

H eadquarters of the H eavy B ranch in London where two ,

m onths later he was succeeded by M aj or G eneral S ir J ohn -

Capper , RE B rigadier G eneral W G lasgow

. .
-
.
,

took over th e co m man d at B ovington In .

February o r M arch the fi rst M ark IV S arriv e d there for .

’

training purposes followed in April by an experimenta l

,

Whippet M eanwhile i n Fran ce Colonel El les and h i s

.

briga d e com mand e rs were organ isi n g an d t rain ing the n ew

establish ment and the great shops at Erin were growi n g
,

appreciab l y every day A highly interestin g deve l opment .

,

lau nched the previous autu mn from Thetford — name l y the ,

Palestine detachm ent — was near in g th e day of trial i n th at

i n hospitable region and will b e dealt with i n th e n ext
,

chapter .

The general s ituation in France and Flanders was altered

great l y by th e G erman with d rawal i n M arch During the .

wi nter minor O peration s had cleared th e e n emy out of th e

positions north of the Ancre which h e had h e ld so te n a
c i ou s l y and so long an d by the begi n n in g of M arch we
,

were withi n 2 000 yards of Bapau m e o n t h e A l bert road .

Between Bapaume a n d Arras the G erm ans n ow occupied a

very pronounced salient A proposal to drive i n its northern .
58 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

flank with the help of two batta l ions of ta n ks was cancelled

because it was found impossible to provide the l atter at the
time B efore anythi n g further cou l d b e do n e the enemy
.

forestalled this and other p l an s of attack by an extensive

and very ski l fu l retreat r e achi n g at on e point a d e pth of
,

twenty miles The pursuing armies fo ll owing up from

.
,

Arras to Soisson s found themselves co n fronted by the

,

H indenburg Li n e whose existe n ce was w e ll known but whose

,

character had been hitherto a matter of co nj ecture It is .

the custom to depreciate this m uch advertised d e fe n ce -

System . Colon e l Buchan a l lowi n g his natural hankering

,

after proph e cy to outru n his u sua l discretion observed ,

rather rash l y ( in the begi n n ing of 1 9 1 8 ) that the marve ll ous “

new S iegfri e d l i n e was n ot a fortress from wh ich he ( the

”
enemy) cou l d sa l ly but a prison
, In view of the sallies
.

which fo l lowed hard upon th is assertion it would appear , ,

with others of it s ki n d to be susceptible of modification

,
.

In point of fact the H i n de n burg Line was n either a fortress

,

nor a prison : it simp l y was what it professed to be an ,

extr e m e l y stro n g e n tre n ched system designed for an e special

purpose which on the who l e it adequately fulfi l led
, ,
.

S ir Douglas H aig writing of th e i n te n ded stroke wh ich

,

w a s frustrated in part by the withdrawal of the en e my ,

says ,
“
My obj e ct was t o d e al h im a blow which wou l d
”
force hi m to u se up reserves South of the Ancre such
.

a blow was now out of th e question : th e pursuing armies

found t h e ms e l ves faced by this new defe n sive system whi l e ,

behi n d them ther e lay the whole devastated area of the

S omm e to complicat e their l ines of supp l y M uch had to .

b e do n e befor e an adva n c e was possib l e here But the .

northern ha l f of the plan t o drive th e e n e my farther back

,

from Arras and from off the V imy Ri d g e remai n ed un ,

affe cted ; a n d it was decided to carry it through Its m a i n .

obj ect was sti ll to div e rt the mass of G erman res e rves away
fro m th e S oisso n s regio n wh e re the Fre n ch were to m ake
,

the principa l attack on t he southern pivot o f the H ind on

burg Li n e .
E X PA N S I O N : T HE B ATTL E S IN F RO N T OF A RRA S 59

The battle of Arras as it i s ca l led was timed to O pe n at

, ,

dawn on the 9th April Three arm ies were taking part
.
,

a n d Colonel Baker Carr s 1 s t Ta n k Brigade was to co ’

-

operat e with all t hree O nly 6 0 tanks M arks I and I I.

,
. .
,

were available of which 8 w e re a ll otted to the I s t Army

,

i n the attack on the V i my Ridge 4 0 to the 3 r d Army ,

astrid e th e Scarpe and 1 2 to the 5 th Army ( which d id

,

not com e into th e battle u ntil th e 1 1 th ) on the right As .

this O peration had bee n long foreseen the reco n naissance ,

o fficers of th e I s t Brigade had begun their survey of the

area as early as J anuary Du mps were formed at N euvil l e .

St V aast Rocli n court Achicourt and Beaurains

, ,
The , .

three groups of tan ks we re detrained respectively at Acq ,

M o n tenescourt and Achiet l e —G rand These preliminary

,
-
.

movements wer e as trying as they always a r e : th e trains

were forty eight hours late the sponso n trolleys gave end
-
,

less trouble by breaki n g away or overtur n ing and much ,

extra work a n d anxiety resu l ted from the loss of

gallon s o f petrol in a railway accident Some days before .

the battle h owever a l l the machi n es were lying u p in

, ,

positi ons c l ose t o the fro n t li n e s ome of C Battalion ,

bei n g co n cealed i n th e ditch of th e citadel of Arras .

For tan k operation s the ground north of the Scarpe

possessed every possib l e disadva n tage N o on e who has .

s e en the r e gio n of th e old fro n t l in e about Ecurie a n d

N euvi ll e St V aast in early spri n g c a n wonder that
M ark II tanks provid e d o n l y with torpedo boom s for
.
,
-

u n d i tc h i n g fai l ed to get far

, The soil is heavy loam .

abov e chalk i n c l i n ed to b e wet in a n y s e aso n ; a n d

,

as i t had be e n fought over s inc e 1 9 1 4 it was on e gr e at ,

maze of half obliterated tre n ches an d craters whose wa ll s

-

cr u mb l ed at a tou ch S outh of Arras conditio n s w e r e

.

Sl ight l y b e tt e r The ground was hardly l e ss cut u p but

.
,

the surface was firmer M uch d e pe n d e d how e v e r upon

.
, ,

t h e w e ath e r The ear l y days of April wer e fi n e a n d c l e ar

.
,

and the soil except in the marsh y valley of the Scarpe

, ,

dried rapidly But on z e ro n ight with that fatality which

.
,
60 T HE T AN K IN A C TI O N

seemed to pursu e our efforts for so lo n g the wind Shifted , ,

th e sky clouded over a n d rain began t o fa l l Be fore long

,
.

it was snowing .

Zero was at A M With every big offensive our

. .

artillery fi re had i n creased in intensity ; and on this morn

ing after seven d ays pre l iminary bombardment the ope n ing
,
’
,

barrage was more tremendous than a n ythi n g which had been

seen on the Somme U n der its protection the Canadia n s
.

a n d the 1 2 th Corps reached th e crest of the V imy with

l itt l e t r oubl e Bu t the ta n ks w e re u n ab l e to follow Whi l e

. .

the r e al struggle was begi n n i n g i n the rai n and s l eet arou n d

La Fo l i e Farm a n d H il l 1 4 5 the eight tank crews wer e toi l in g
,

with their i n effective gear t o extricate their machin es from

th e hopeless ground on th e slope below N ot one of them .

got into action To the right however in the Scarpe

.
, ,

V alley the section worki n g with th e 6 th Corps had done

,

good work ; and south of the r1 ver C Batta l ion had given ,

a n other convincing example to those who had eyes to see , ,

of the new methods which we r e subv e rting the ancient

princip l es of attack Th e night had begu n with a serious
.

disaster Th e ta n ks started from the vil l age of Achicourt

. .

The litt l e riv e r C r i n ch o n flowing i n to the Scarpe had , ,

created patches of bog which in places had becom e

covered with a crust of what appeared to be hard soi l .

Th e reconnaissance of the route had been perfunctory it :

l ed straight over on e of these concealed traps ; and the

officer responsib l e had not eve n tested the grou n d with
h i s stick The night was int e nsely dark the wind was
.
,

gusty a n d the rain fa ll i n g h e avi l y ; whi l e in Achicourt

, ,

c l ose by a d u m p had been b l own up a n d was sti ll burn

, ,

i n g a n d drawi n g the e nemy s fi re Amid this uproar a n d

’
.

confusion Si x ta n ks drove on e after the other into the bog ,

a n d w e re e n gu l fe d beyond a ll i mmediate repair This i n .

excusable ca l amity wou l d have e n tailed more s e riou s con

s e quences tha n it did but for th e admirab l e work of other
ta n ks e n gaged i n the same regio n The G erma n positio n .

here w a s on e of great strength South of the elaborate .

E X P AN S I O N : T HE B ATTL ES IN F RO N T OF ARRA S 61

S ystem of trenches arou nd Tilloy les M offla i n e s extended - -

a form idable work upward s of half a mile long known

, ,

from its shape as the H arp It marked the j un ction of .

the northern end of th e H indenburg Line with the old

fro n t system a n d it rested partly on th e height called
,

Te l egraph H i ll a l so heavily fortified

, The H arp t o .
“
,

quot e Co l onel B ucha n was such a place as in t he early

,
“

days of the Somme would have baffl e d us for a m onth or

mor e It was St ronger than Contalmaison or Pozi ere s or
.

G uillemont .It was rushed by a batch of tanks som e of ,

wh ich stuck fast i n its entanglements whil e others forced ,

th e ir way thro u gh to th e p l ai n b e yo n d In a very short .

t i me ther e was no H arp a n d th e garrison were on their

,
”
way westward to the cages N o one acquainted with th e.

de l iberate progres s of the M ark II over bad ground would .

”
speak of it as rushin g a n ything ; but fast or Slow th e se
“
, ,

old machin e s on this occasion achieved a real l y notable

success on a large scale Wh ile some had been dealing.

faithfully with the H arp oth ers to n orth and south had
,

cleared Tilloy and craw l ed u p an d over Telegraph H i l l ;

and their exertions were large l y respo n s ible for the capture
by the 3 rd Army of the who l e G erman second posit ion sout h
of the Scarpe inc l uding two miles of the H indenburg Line
, ,

within four hou rs after zero .

The 5 th Army attack was n ot due to begin until the

1 1 th
. B ut an attempt arra n ged at the last moment was
, ,

made the same m orni n g t o break th e lin e opposite B u l le

court with a company of tan ks of D Battalion It suffered .

t he fate of most enterprises so hastily planned A regular .

blizzard broke soon after dark : th e tanks altho ugh they ,

never l ost their way cou ld n ot arrive in t ime ; an d the

,

Australians who h ad been lying out all night on the railway

,

embankm ent south of B ullecourt w e r e withdraw n before ,

daybreak . H ad the attack m aterialised it would h ave ,

possessed especial interest for it was designed on t he prin ,

c i p l es advocated t hroughout by the Tan k Corps itse l f and

now u niversally accepted The t anks massed on a narrow

.
,
62 THE TA N K IN A C TI O N

front were t o have preceded the infantry with n o artillery

,

preparation and n o barrage until they actua l ly reached th e

G erman front line In oth e r words a ge n ui n e surprise was
.
,

aim ed at But the fiasco caused by the snowstorm dis

.

c our a ge d the 5 th Army Staff When the attempt was re .

p e a te d o n the original date April 1 1 th they reverted to the

, ,

u sua l methods with lamentab l e results The enemy .

,

a l ready on the alert by reason of the battle farther north ,

was warned of the attack by th e barrage coming down at

zero be fore the tanks had crossed N o M an s Land Field ’
.

guns pushed far forward for anti tank d e fence w e re ready

,
-

to get on to th e ir ma r k at once ; wh ile the ta n ks Showed up

c l ear l y on the s n o w the m oment the dawn broke The .

sections of the compa n y were scattered on a wide fro n t and ,

one i n the ce n tre was detailed to push through the Hi n d e n

, ,

burg Line without a n y infa n try s upport at all There were .

e l even tanks i n all most of which hand l ed with extrem e

, ,

ga ll a n try crossed the dreaded H i n denburg trenches and got

,

wel l i n to the fight O n e with a l l on board wou n ded and

.
,

every round sp e nt was hit and disabled on its way back

, .

Another reached th e edge of Bu ll ecou rt Village came to ,

a sta n dsti l l there through gear trouble wh ich could not be

remedi e d a n d aft e r ho l ding out for s ome t ime without see
,

ing a n y of the infantry who Should have b een in support ,

was on l y e vacuated when the G erma n s brought a fi e l d gun -

into the houses and open ed fi r e A th ird less fortunate .

, ,

received a she l l i n the petrol ta n ks on th e edge of the -

e n emy s wire and we n t up instant l y in flam e s on l y thre e of

’

, ,

t h e crew escapi n g A fourth was hit twice withi n a minute

.
,

the first she ll coming i n through the cab d e capitating the ,

d r iver and then bursti n g i n side In al l nine tanks were .

,

known to have been disab l ed by sh e l l fi r e although one -

,

of the m returned l ater with a ho l e in its roof O f the fate .

of the r e maining two nothing was ever know n with cer

tainty They disappeared i n to the b l ue M aj or W H L
. . . . .

Watson ,
who com ma n ded the company gives the ,

following account of their loss : Our aeroplanes had seen

64 T HE TA N K IN A CT I O N

tanks had proved that even this was n o obstacle to th e m ;

but i f they were used at all th e y shou ld have been used in ,

greater numbers and in m as s with i n fa n try trained before ,

hand and supported by a barrage designed not to warn

, ,

but to aid in surprising the enemy Far m ore j u st tha n the , .

Australians comp l ai n ts was C o l one l El l es s remark after

’ ’

” 1
th e battle : This is the best thing ta n ks have don e yet .

O n the same morning C Battalion was i n action again ,

i n front of Arras H e re the G ermans still h e ld the Vil l ages

.

of Fampoux and M o n chy with the H indenburg trench e s ,

south of Telegraph H i ll In the ce n tre of this position .

,

south east of Arras between th e Scarp e and the Cambrai ,

road there rises a very conspicu ou s height k n own to fame

,

as Orange H il l It com mands a View behind the w hg le

.

le n gth of the V i my Ridge and in con sequence over , , ,

“

looked our new battery posit io n s and l ines of approach

on that s ide O n th e eastern end of the hill b eyond a
.
,

slight dip in the crest stood the vi ll age of Monchy l e ,

-

Preux once a pleasant cluster of trees and red ti l ed roofs

,
-

but now since ou r heavy howitzers h ad been at work

,

on it no more than a mass of rubble and splintered

,

stumps It is a famous Village not only for the fighting

.
,

which has centred about it but a l so for the remarkable ,

myth which it perpetuates The attack launched on the .

3 r d A rmy front on A pril 1 1 th had M onchy for its main

obj ective ; and before tel l ing the t rue story of i ts ca pture
X.

_ ,

it is interesting to note how the latter is usua l ly represented .

In Sir Doug l as Ha i g s despatch the event i s described

’

as follows : Two English i n fantry brigades acting in co

“
,

operation with cava l ry attacke d M o n chy l e Preux at 5 A M ,

- -
. .
,

and aft e r hard fight ing i n whi ch ta nks a r r i ved a t a n opp or tune
,
”
m om ent carried the position
,
The ita l ics of course are .
, ,

my own Colon el Buchan always too faithful to his brief

.
, ,

goes one better H e does not m ention tanks at a l l H e

. .

does however mention the cavalry

, ,
N ext day the 1 1 th .
, ,

he says M onchy was carried with the assistance of a

, ,

A C m p a y f Ta k by Maj r Wat n
I c ’
o n o n s, o so .
E X PA N S I O N : T HE B ATTL E S IN F RO NT OF ARRA S 65

detachment of cavalry but not without heavy losses ,

.

N ow i n the first place as thou sand s of people know wh at

, ,

really h appened at M onchy these repeated references to ,

th e m ount e d arm almost compel on e to paraphrase th e

plaintiff i n Whistler Ruskin an d ask Why dr a g in th e , ,
“

” ’
cavalry ! The skeletons of G e n eral B ulkeley J ohnson s -

men and horses still l itter O rang e H ill to testify that th e

1

tactics of Balaclava Salisbury Plain and Am ien s are in

, , ,

n o sen se suitable to modern warfare Secondly t his dis .

,

tor ti on of the facts has don e a grave inj ustice to a n ewer

and less socially popular corps There is a st ill m ore per .

ti n e n t question which might be asked : Why leave out the

”
tanks ! For what actually happened at M onchy l e Preux - -
,

put very briefly was this , .

O n the even in g of 1 oth April there were in the n ei gh v

b ou r h ood o f Feuchy Chapel on the C ambrai road at th e ,

:

foot of Orange H i l l th e headqu arters of one of the infantry

,

brigades due to attack M onchy next morn in g a brigade of ,

cavalry and six tan ks of C B attalion w h o were to lead

, ,

the assault O ur l ine then ran beyond the crest of th e

.

hill within five hundred yards of M onchy itself Zero had

,
.

been fixed for 5 A M After dark fou r tanks ( the other tw o

. .

having developed m echanical trouble ) moved forward O n e .

soon became bad l y ditched ; but th e remaining thre e

cli mbed the slope duri n g the black early hours of the 1 1 th ,,

and at the advertised time of zero passed thr o ugh the lin e
of half frozen outposts lyin g in shell holes acros s the hill
- -
.

B ut no barrage came down n or was there any Sign of th e ,

supporting i n fantry Although n o notification whateve r

.

had reached the tan k com manders or even their com

pany headquarters which was C lose to that of the in fantry
,

brigade at Feuchy Chapel zero after being altered twice , , ,

had been postponed finally for two hours ! In th e m ean

time dawn was breaking ; an d for the tanks to loiter abou t
th e sn ow covered grou nd of N o M an s Land on the summit
-
’

1
Thi w as writt n i n th pri ng of 1 9 1 9 wh en th e b on of h or s es nd a great
s e e s , es a

accumu l ati on of r otti g cav al ry quipm ent s ti l l l a y thick i n front of M onchy

n e .

E
66 THE TA N K IN A CT I O N

of the b i l l would have been to invite destruction After

, .

waiting a short ti me the tank commanders therefore de ,

cided to go on a l o n e trusting to th e in fantry to overtake ,

t hem As day came the trio sti l l e n tirely unsupported

.
, , ,

e n tered M onchy They proceeded methodica ll y to clear

.

the whole vil l age cru isi n g about the ru ins and driving out
,

before th em after some stiff fighti n g all of the garrison

, ,

w h o had n ot gone to earth i n dug outs or cellars Fo ll ow -

.

i n g up th e fugitives the tanks presently emerged through ,

t h e last demo l ished houses on th e far side They w e re .

n ow on the reverse Sl ope of the hi l l ; a n d their triumphant

c rews cou l d see on the fa ll ing ground along the Scarpe

,

V al l ey the e n emy s supports hurryi n g forward and ev e n

’
, ,

t h e smoke of the light trai n s bringin g up h is supplies .

In the meanti me however the dispossessed garrison of , ,

M onchy having been cursed e xhorted and rein forced a n d

, , , ,

realising that no infantry was following the tanks began ,

t o work back round the outskirts of the village to n orth

and south It reoccupied th e western edge co ll e cted
.
,

odd parties who were cowering i n dug outs and re -

,

m a n ned its abandon ed machine guns This manoeuvre -

.
,

besides interposing a considerab l e force between the

t anks and our still Silent lines h e l ped also to bring ,

about th e great cavalry fiasco B ulkeley J ohnson s bri .

-
’

gade which had lost its commander the day before was
, ,

s tandin g by its horses near Feuchy Chape l when it was ,

d isc overed by one of the G erman aeroplanes which u sually

c a m e over about daybreak The aeroplane dropped a few .

c oloured lights and departed Short l y after shells began .

,

to fa l l am on g the horsemen ; whereupon instead of with ,

d rawing to the rear or flank they mou nted and rode forward ,

u p the hill The returned G erman machine gun ners in the

.
-

e nclosures west of M onchy were astonished and delighted ,

a little later to perceive the whole brigade appear on the

,

s ummit and trot down upon them in a formation impossible

1

1Orang H i ll trict l y p aki g i o l y a pur f th h ight n which M chy

e , s s e n , s n s o e e o on

s tand nd i p arat d fr m th l att r by a l ight d p r i

s, a s se e o e e s e ess on .
EX PA N S I O N : THE B ATT LES IN F RO N T OF ARRA S 67

to m iss The result was a mere massacre H undreds of men

. .

and horses dropped i n a few m inutes ; and t he remainder ,

turn ing about fled for Shelter again behind the crest
,
1
.

All this t ime the three tanks were still isolated in the
village D iscoverin g that th e G erman s had got rou nd
.

behind them they started back through th e ruin s to clear

,

the way once more and to look for their own i nfantry It .

was nearly seven o clock ; for a n hour a nd a ha lf i n broad day

’
,

light they had maintained their lone battle actually within

,

Monchy l e Preux needi n g only a couple of platoons to take

- -
,

over what they had won And now it was too late At . .

seven as they reached the near side of the village again

,

and began to disperse th e enemy gatheri n g there for th e

second t i m e our delayed attack ope n ed : the barrage
,

came down with a crash upon M o n chy ; and one after ,

the other a l l three tanks were h it and disabled by our own

,

shells !
It is di fficult to write patient l y about the man n er in
wh ich this a ffair was wi l fully m isre presente d It may l iter .

ally be true to say that our infantry carried M onchy after “

”
hard fighting ; for wh en at length they advanced the ,

G erman s had reoccupied the place in force an d the tanks , ,

through our own negligence w e re disabled Yet even this , .

stateme n t i s a mere j u gg l ing with words And as for the .

operation reports which m isled th e compilers of the o ffi cial

despatch at G H Q into describi n g the s ingle ha n ded vic
. . .
-

t ory of th e tan ks as an arrival at an opportune “ “

m oment and which presumably b urked all reference t o

,

the blunders of the staffs concerned n o adequate com ment ,

seem s possible The distortion of the facts may be left to

.

Speak for itself .

Circu mstances rather Similar although not attend ed by ,

such u nhappy results marked a second operation u nder ,

taken by C Battalion that m or n i n gi Fou r ta n ks started

with the infantry at the p roper tim e from N euville V itasse
1
Th ca v a l ry a l
e n i t th h ti l barr g which f ll n
s o ra f r nt l i n
n o e os e a e e o our o e as

s o n
o th ta k a d v a nc d
as e n s e .
68 THE TA N K IN A C TI O N

to attack that portion of the H indenburg Line which the

enemy still held from below Telegraph H ill to the vi l lage of
H e n inel on the Coj eul river Working down th e tren ches
, .
,

followed by bombing parties the tanks killed many of the ,

enemy drove the remainder underground and he l ped to

, ,

secure the front syste m at a very m oderate cost H avin g .

reach e d the latera l l i mit of their obj ective at H en inel itself ,

the four sti l l together turned n orth east through the village
, ,
-
,

and moving up the n orth ban k of the Coj eu l reached Wan

, ,

court a larger place about a mile i n rear But the infantry

, .

was unab l e to fo ll ow The tanks e n tered Wancourt a l on e

.
,

and carried on there for a lo n g time amid intermittent fa ll s ,

of s now j ust such a rambling fight as their fellows had

,

waged a few hours before in M onchy They s ignal l ed .

repeatedly to the i n fantry to com e on but in vain ; and by ,

themselves they cou l d secure n o perm anent hold on the

village At le n gth as their supp l ies of petrol were runni n g
.
,

low th ey effected a successful withdrawal This was i n th e

, .

afternoon for they were in action altogether for eight or n ine

,

hours In such execrable weather the whole performance

.

was m ost creditable and deserved better support than it ,

received .

So far as the British armies were concerned the battle o f ,

Arras might n ow have been allowed to die a n atural d e ath .

With the capture of the V imy Ridge O range H ill and th e , ,

Siegfried Line to the south our immediate limited obj ectiv es ,

had been secured and it was plain that the larg e r succes s
,

hoped for was beyo n d our powers It had been l aid down .
,

as a co n dition antecedent to any serious attempt at breaking

through that not on l y the H ind e nburg or S iegfried Lin e
, ,

but also the Drocourt Queant Switch beyond should b e -

,

carried within forty eight hours That period had elapsed

-
.
,

and we had not touched the Switch except at Bu l lecourt ,

which was only an outwork to the j unction at Queant .

The enemy was getting up his reserves and beginni n g to

counter attack B ut it was necessary to hold these reserves
-
.

on our front to aid the French o ffen sive in Champagne ; a n d

,
E X PA N S I O N : T HE B ATT LE S IN F RO NT OF A RRA S 69

i n consequen ce the battle was continued far beyond the

limits necessary to round off our in itial victory It was .

cont inued in fact for anothe r month and produced some

, , ,

of the m ost san guinary fightin g of the whole war The .

tanks took part in several actions notably at the Roeux ,

Chemical Works on the 2 3 rd wh en they received the ,

thanks of the corps and division al commanders with W hose

u nits they were working Finally they went in again at .
,

Bulleco urt on 8 th M ay when th e infantry fail e d t o support

,

them an d th ey suffered heavy losses to no purpose

, .

The two battalions were n ow comp l etely crippl e d .

They had fought in n early a dozen separate actio n s i n a

mo n th The losses i n experienced person nel had been
.

severe and cou ld not easi l y be replaced As for tanks

, .
,

which mattered less since M ark II S would never agai n

, .
’

b e used as fighti n g mach ines C Battalion had non e left at ,

a ll an d D only two or three The Shattered brigade th ere

, .
,

fore was withdrawn to the B ermicourt area i n the m iddle

,

of M ay There it rested and t rai n ed received rein force

.

'
,

ments drew M ark IV S from Erin and u nderwent that

, .
’

r es h u ffl i n g of battalions which preceded its n ext appearance

in the field in the Ypres Salient .

The Arras battles m arked a great step forward i n t he

history of the Tan ks Corps N ot o n ly had it p l aced a .

brigade of two battalion s in t h e fi e l d but its own tactical ,

ideas had begun insensibly to leave n the old established -

theories of attack The capt u re of the H arp the wasted

.
,

heroism at H en decourt and M onchy e ven the first Bu l le ,

court fiasco on 1 0 th April— all poi n ted the sam e way It .

had b e e n shown more by local accid e nts than by d esign

, ,

that the classica l methods of artillery preparation could

be rep l aced by a more effe ctive substitute ; and co n vers e ly , ,

that the long prelim inary bombardment was high l y p rej u

70 THE TA N K IN A C TI O N

to the u se o f tanks It was proved once more that

d i ci a l .

trenches unless of exceptional width were no obstacle at

, ,

all . Another lesson to be drawn was the necessity of

devising a more effective u n d i tchi ng gear for u se in badly
broken or boggy ground The old moral of co operation
.
-

with other arms was rubbed i n again and again The .

senseless complaint that th e tanks let down the infantry

would n ever have been uttered if the latter had taken the
obvious course of tryin g t o learn something about the
former s di ffi culties and methods and had grasped th e fact
’

that they never were i n tended for use in suc h conditions as

the guns and weather between them had produced on the
Arras front as well as on th e Somme This point was the .

th e more i mportant because a gratifying feature of the

operations had been the small percentage of mechanical
breakdowns — a proof that o fficers and men were profiting
rapidly by experience .

By the loss of the two tanks at H endecourt — the first

which the enemy had captured — a great fault in the M arks

1 and II was disclosed to h im

. . This was the penetration
.

of t he armour by his K bullets M any casualties had .

been incurred in this way : in the attack on th e Roeux

Chem ical Wo rks on 2 3 r d May five tanks out of e leven had
,

the maj ority of their crews disabled by armour pierci n g -

bu l let wounds The G ermans now ordered every infantry

.

m a n to carry a clip of this ammu n ition whi l e several ,

hu n dreds of rounds were issued to each machine gun team -

.

But happi l y this discovery came too late to do a ny harm .

The next tank action was fought by M ark IV S whose .

’

improved armour was proof a gainst the K bu ll ets “

,

which at very short range only splintered its inner

facings .
72 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

II.
’
fresh from the makers eight old training machines
S, , ,

which had been i n use for months and were due to proceed
t o the new camp in Dorset were shipped at Avo n mouth , ,

wh i l e the Egyptian detachment s tanks wer e on their way ’

to B ovington ! Before the Admira l ty could be informed of

t h e mistake tons of cargo i n cluding heavy gun s had bee n
, , ,

lowered on top of the changeli n gs i n the ship and the n ,

permission to unload the l att e r was refused The company .

,

there fore on its arrival i n Egypt in J anu ary fou nd itself

, ,

with o n ly two thirds of its estab l ishment of tanks and those

-
,

n ot even n ew Som e of them inde e d were n e ar l y wor n out

.
, , ,

a n d a ll were dirty ; a n d the Thetford mud baked hard by a ,

m onth in a ship s hold c l ose to the e n gine room had to be

’
-
,

c hipped out of the tracks with C h isels It was a week or .

m ore before some of the machines could be m oved at a l l .

The secrecy which in th eory shrouded their com ing was

, ,

s o fallaciou s that within Si x weeks photog r aphs of them

w e re found on a captured Bedou in This i n itself was a .

s mal l matter ; but it was a pity that th e demonstrations

carried out on the desert at G i l b a n which adv e rtised to a l l ,

a n d sundry the fact of the tanks arriva l were not d e voted

’

t o a b e tter purpos e than the satisfaction of th e n atural

curiosity of G e n era l o fficers and th e ir staffs N o infantry .

took part in these disp l ays O n l y after the s e co n d batt l e of

.

G aza were combined r e h e a r s e l s by the two arms i n stituted

as a regu l ar featu re of training N e v e rth e l ess the army in.
,

Egypt seems t o have rea l ised far sooner th a n the army in

Fra n ce that withou t co O peratio n founded on m utual
f ami l iarity with each others tactics and limitation s tanks
’

a n d i n fantry wo u l d n e ver work togeth e r to the best a d

v antage In Egypt a l so th e re was from th e start less of

.

the j ealou sy and obstruction which hampered the heavy

branch nearer hom e The isolation of the d etachment put
.

it t o some extent out of reach of meddling interference and ,

e nabled it to solve its pecu l iar problems in its own way .

When the detachme n t arrived Sir Archibald Murray was

already across the Si n ai desert and had reached t he
Egyptian frontier While the railway was being pushed
.
 THE P AL ES TI N E D E TA C H M E NT 73

up behind h im along the coast t o El Arish a n d Rafa the ,

Turkish Army commanded by the G erman G eneral vo n

Kre s s en s te i n withdrew to a prepared position i n front of
G aza This position we attacked on 2 6 th M arch but a
.
,

dense sea fog at dawn u pset the tim e table and after
- -
,

su ffering 4 000 casua l ties such grou n d as we had gained ,

was abandoned u nder pr e ssure of heavy cou nter attacks -

an d a threat against our fla n k by rein forcem ents from

B eersheba The tank d e tach ment rushed up at a few
.
,

hours notice on Egyptian 3 0 t0 n tru cks to take part i n

’
-

these operations was de l ayed at El Arish an d it detrained

, ,

at K han Yunus fifteen miles south west of G aza only t o

,
-
,

find the battle over At K han Yu nus it remai n ed for ten

.

days O n 6 th April the tanks trekked for eight mile s

.

across soft sand to D eir e l Belah nearer to the l i n e - -

, ,

preparatory to the seco n d assault on the G aza position .

G aza a city of great a ge acquai n ted with n umerou s

, ,

battles and si e ges sta n ds amid vast fi g grove s about two

,
-

miles from the sea shore on the old coast road from Egypt
-
,
-

to Syria Th e Turkish position defended now by five

.
,

infantry division s on e cavalry division and nu merou s

, ,

batteries — i n al l perhaps m en — was on e of great

,

natura l strength as we had discovered in M arch Since

, .

our first attack miles of n ew t renches had been dug an d

the whole front was very heavi l y wir e d It stretched from .

Sheikh H assa n amo n g th e sand du n es on the coast by

,
-
,

El Arish Redoubt and Samson s Ridge t o the Cairo road

’
,

two mi l es south of G aza a n d thence south east along a series

,
-

of b i l l s to the Ata w i n e h Ridge Within this lin e was the .

strong l y fortified Ali M untar Ridge im mediate l y i n front of ,

G aza Detach m e n t s of cava l ry and i n fantry at He re i r a

.
,

Sixteen m i l es fro m the coast protected the left fla n k The , .

h ills seamed with gullies and old water cou rses wh e re

,
-
,

i n fantry and m ach in e —guns foun d perfect cover were a d ,

m i ra bl y adapted to d e fence and the trenches u nd er G erman , ,

supervision had been skilful l y sited

,
.

S ir Archibald M urray had four Territorial i n fantry

d ivision s the 5 2n d 5 3 rd s 4 th and 7 4 th ( dism ounted
, , , ,
74 THE TAN K IN A CT I O N

Yeomanry ) two m ou nted div i sions and the Camel C orps

, , .

H is line of com mu nications was a single railway track

running for 1 5 0 miles across the S inai Desert Ev e ry .

thing the army needed even water came by this line out, ,

of Egypt .

The plan of the second attack on G aza fell i nto two

phases divided by an i nterval of forty eight hours In
,
-
.

the firs t phase while a desert column attended to the

,

Turkish left at Here i ra three i nfantry divisions and the

,

tank detachme n t were to carry th e Sheikh Abbas and

Man sura Ridges east of the Cairo road The attack was
, .

fixed for dawn on April 1 7 th After dusk on the 1 s th the .

,

eight ta n ks trekked n orthward again from Deir e l Belah - -

,

and befor e daybreak had reached their final lying up posi -

tion s along a dry water course called th e Wadi G huzze -

,

wh ich ran parallel to our front l ine By this time after .

,

three m onths experience i n Egypt and Syria all steps

’
,

possible u nder the circumstan ces had been take n to C ope

with the novel condition s attending tank operations over
sand It was fou n d for example that the ordinary process
.
, ,

of soaki n g the track l inks and rollers in oil produced i n

th e desert a perfect grindi n g mixture which wore out v e ry
rapidly the driving sprockets All such lubrication there .
,

fore was aba n doned The t racks were ru n abso l utely dry
, .
,

a n d with satisfactory results ; for a l though the Sprocket

whee l s were of the early soft steel type they seem t o have -
,

endured lon ger u nder these arid conditions than in the mud
of European battlefields While the mud stuck everywhere.
,

and brought with it grit and stones which induced friction ,

sa n d mere l y ran out of the tracks l ike water From every .

point of View indeed o n ce thi s and a few other m od i fi ca

, ,

tio n s of treatment a n d mechanism had been i n t roduced th e ,

tanks showed a surprising aptitude for desert warfare .

D itching was almost unknown : the sand ran away from

u n der the bel l y o f th e m achine wh ile the tracks with th ei r , ,

broad bearin g surface compressed it and got a grip ; an d

,

for sim ilar reasons the steepest sand dunes a n d hi l ls were -

climbed with ease and at any angle The chief troub l es .

 T HE P A LE S T I N E D E TA C H M E N T 75

were the heat and the di fficulty of obta i n i ng water and thes e ,

were felt by every other arm although at least as regard s , ,

the former not so severely O n account of the heat n o

, .

movement o f tan ks save in battle or som e other exceptional

,

circu mstance took place after eight o clock i n the m orn ing
,
’
.

S ix tan ks were detailed for th e first phase of th e battle .

Fou r i f requ ired were to assist th e 5 2 n d D ivision i n th e

, ,

capture of the Mansura Ridge Thes e advanced behind the .

assaultin g infantry up th e Wadi el Nu k h a b i r a gully with - -

,

high ban ks a ffordin g perfect cover which ran like a huge ,

c ommu nication trench d ownward from the ridge to the ,

Wadi G huzze The t anks were not needed however for

.
, ,

the enemy taken by surprise ow i ng to th e absenc e of any

,

arti l lery preparation beyon d th e ordinary counter battery -

work fled i n con fusion from th e ridge which was i n posses

, ,

sion of the 1 5 7 th Brigade soon after six o clock M ean ’

.

while on the right the other two tanks had led th e troops
, ,

of the 5 4 th D ivision toward Sheikh Abbas R idge H ere .

also the Turks were surprised but they put u p a st outer ,

resistance than the i r fellows on Mansura Th e tan ks .

,

lackin g such a covered approach as the big gully on the

left provided came un der observation Soo n after dawn
, ,

before they had reached the ene my s trenches a n d one soon ’

,

received a direct hit Two of the c rew were ki l led and th e

.
,

o ffi cer lost an eye fro m a splinter The hosti l e gu ns now .

concentrated o n the derelict mach ine which after it had , ,

been abandoned was h it again and agai n set on fire a n d

, ,

destroyed Th e second tank however was able to carry

.
, ,

out its task of clearin g the trenches to the north and n orth
west of the ridge giving the in fa n t ry valuable help When
, .

the position was consolidated th e tank retu rned and rallied

in the Wadi el Nuk h a b i r having cover e d in all some
- -
,

yards from th e time it crossed the Wadi G huzze to its

return The crew wh o had bee n i n the tan k for fo urteen
.
,

hours were completely exhausted In such co n dition s of

, .

heat as they suffered their gallantry and e n du ra nce were ,

remarkable .

The second phase of th e battle wh i ch opened at AM , . .

7 6 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

on the 1 9th was designed to capture the final positio ns

,

c overing G aza — name l y El Arish R e doubt and Samson s ,

’

Ridge between the sea and the C airo road an d the A l i

, ,

M untar Ridge with its foot hills to th e south and south east - -

o f the city From left t o right the divisions and tanks

.

employed were as follows : 5 3 r d D ivision ( two tanks ) 5 2 n d ,

( fou r tanks ) 5 4 th ( one tank ) TO the right o f the s 4 th

, .
,

mou n ted divisions were t o carry out subsidiary operation s

as before against the Turkish l eft The Fre n ch battleship .

R équi n a n d two British monitors assisted from the sea .

The forty eight hou rs interval between our attacks how

-
’
,

ever unavoidable was u nfortunate The Turks to some

, .
,

extent demoralised on the 1 7 th had time to recover them ,

se l ves again and their main posit ion on Ali M u ntar was
,

one of exc e ptional stren gth This ridge ten or more miles .
,

i n length is an attenuated Spine of sandy hills covered

, ,

with cactus scrub which ru ns parallel t o the coast j ust

,

east of G aza It forms rough l y a right angle with th e

.
-

M ansura heights farther to the east Its l oftiest cr e st .

,

2 6 5 feet above th e s e a looks down on th e city from south ,

of the Beersheba road From th is point the Spine fa l ls .

away southward by succ e ssive narrow hillocks known to

,

us as O utpost H i l l Lees H ill Queen s H i ll K urd H i ll and

, ,
’
, ,

so on to the valley of the Wadi G huzze T wo thousand

, .

yards west of th e ridge a n d also parall e l to it i s the Cairo , ,

road beyond wh ich Samson s Ridge rises fairly steeply to

,
’

a height of 2 00 fe e t b e fore descending to the low sea cliffs -

at Sheikh Aj l i n From Samson s Ridge the Turkish.

’

trenches ran n orth east by El Arish Redoubt up the coast -

to Sheikh H assan These seaward trenches were the o b .

j e cti v e s of the 5 3 r d D ivision on the l eft with whose ,

operations we wil l deal first .

For the whole of t his b attl e I will paraphrase or quote

textually the o fficial report on operations drawn up by
M aj or O A Forsyth M aj or seco n d in command of th e
. .
-
,

tank detachment who writes as follows of the events on

,

the 5 3 rd Division s front ( Italics and interpolation s in

’
.

brackets are my own ) .

 THE P A LE S TI N E D E T A C H M E N T 77

E
LAHTR

YUNUSTR .

“
SH
EHM IL

SKETC H M AP TO
ILLUSTRAY E r a t
“
3 5 91 1 7 1 23

or q A .

T URKIS HT RENCHES t n n ru uv v

APP ROX IM AT E can;

YA RDS 6 “ FRONT LIN G , HQ Q N f
we or Now I" “7 1 7
. .
78 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

O f th e two tanks al l otted to this division one ,

broke a track soon after going into action and remained

hors d e com ba t for the ensu i n g operations The other .

‘
tank the Tiger therefore undertook the advance
, ,
’

alone a n d proce e ded ( in front of th e infantry ) across

,

the sand dunes to Samson Ridge where it captured

-
,

th e r e do ubts awaited the infa n try s arrival and thence

,
’
,

advanced to attack El Arish Redoubt being all th is time ,

under co n centrated enemy machine gun fire H aving -

.

reached this second obj ective the tank was u nable to ,

swing and the o ffi cer i n command receivi n g no sup

, ,

port whatsoever from the i n fantry which advanced ,

n o farther owing to the changed t actical situation

,

occurri n g in the centre of the general attack returned ,

ov e r the sand dunes i n r ever s e u nder Shell an d machine

-

gu n fire t ill it reached a point n ear Regent s Park ’

( upwards of 5 000 yards S W of El Arish ) havi n g .

,

fi re d r oun ds of ammunition during th is action .

All the crew i ncluding the o ffi cer were wounded and

, , ,

a ll except th e o fficer who took the driver s place

, ,
’

were i n a state of complete collapse as a result of

”
Si x hours continuous strain u nd e r heavy fire
’
.

Further advance on this flank had been postponed owing

to the failure i n the centre where the 5 2 md Division with , ,

four tanks was to advance from M ansu ra Ridge against

,

O utpost H ill th e strong poi n t known as the Labyrinth

, ,

a n d A l i M untar itself The tanks we re ready and their

.
,

routes taped to avoid th e gullies which abounded when , ,

at the last mome n t the G O C 5 2 n d D ivision cancelled

, . . .

their orders They were now t o l d to move from Mansura

.

Ri d ge to the foot of K urd H il l 3 000 yards to the westward , ,

and there await further orders It was pointed out to the .

says the report that such a m ove in complete ,

“

darkness over u n k n own count ry might resu l t in the tanks

d isapp e ari n g i n to the deep gullies which intersected the
suggested route and that e ven if the tanks reached
,

K urd H ill it was highly impracticable to attack positions

,

which had never been observed i n daylight and over groun d

which had not be e n recon noitre d by the tank personnel .
 THE P A LES TI N E D E TA C H M E N T 79

The was obdurate however and at 9 P M the four , , . .

tanks started In the pitchy darkness wh ich prevai l ed the

.

cross country route was considered too risky and accord

-
,

i ngl y they moved by the Wadi Nuk h a b i r and th e Wadi

G huzze — i n other words rou nd three sides of a squ are , .

They did n ot reach K u rd H ill u ntil 2 A M zero being at . .

,

As the o fficers were e n tirely ignorant as to what

they were expected to do four hours later they had th e ,

temerity t o arouse the G O C 1 s 5 th B rigade from h is Sleep

. . .
,

but as he felt disinclin ed to discuss matters at that ear l y

hour they were told that all n ecessary in structions would
,

be issued at A M At Si x o clock n o i n struction s had

. .
’

been received : a subalter n came from the brigade howev e r , ,

t o point out the route to the i n fa n try starti n g poi n t With -

.

out waiti n g any longer the tanks m oved forward to this,

li n e reaching it j ust as th e barrage fell at zero and th e

,

e n emy bega n to reply N o further orders of any ki n d had

.

arrived and the second i n com ma n d of the d etach ment

,

spent th e n ext hour gallopi n g about u nder fire col l ect ing ,

information from th e i n fantry and by these haphazard ,

means determ i n ing what the tan ks were expected to do .

Two of them it appeared were to rem ai n i n reserve at

, ,

K urd H ill O f the other pair one was to he l p in th e

.
,

assault on Lees a n d Outpost H i ll s Th is ta n k however .

, ,

fe ll into a gul l y whose sides collapsed and did n ot get into ,

action The re mainin g machine havi n g been assigned an

.
,

obj ective on Ali M untar was recalled to O utpost H ill ,

owing to the breakdown of the tank on its left It climbed .

the hill killed a n u mber of Turks i n the tren ches there

, ,

and was still waiting for th e infantry when it was disabled

by a direct hit The i nfantry being u nable to advance o n e
.
,

of the reserve tanks was su m mon ed ; but alth ough after ,

repeated attempt s and murderou s losses the crest at length ,

was gained it could not be held ; an d ou r lin e eventually

,

fel l back t o its original position on Qu een s H i l l Th e first ’

.

tank lyi n g derelict in th e Turkish trenches had already

, ,

been abandoned by its crew The second returned in safety .

to its companion i n reserve .

80 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

The report gives the following accou nt o f the loss of the

remain ing tank in action with the s 4 th D ivision on th e
,

right
To the tank operating on this front had bee n
assigned the captu re of the large redoubt north west -

of K hirbet S iha n ( n orth of the Sh e ikh Abbas Ridge on

the Beersheba road ) As instruction s to this effect had
.

on l y reached th e tank commander during the previo us

night he was likewise confronted with the task of
,

attacking an u nfami l iar obj ective over un fami l iar ground .

H owever this tan k fi n ally reached the redoubt in

,

question and captured its Turkish garriso n O ur i n .

fa n tr y th e n arrived and conso l idated the new position .

The ta n k had n o sooner swu n g rou nd to return to its

ral l ying poi n t at Abbas when a she l l struck one of its
-
,

tracks whereupon it was subj ected to a systematic

,

bombardment Th e enemy the n counter attacked and

.
-

captured the British i nfa n try and tank The com .

mander and several members of the crew had mean

whi l e been severely wounded The officer and on e .

other ra n k subsequently died of wounds in a Turkish

”
hospital .

Except for a modified success on the left the attack , ,

although pressed with extreme gallantry had defin ite l y ,

fai l ed S ir Archibald M urray wished to renew it the follow

.

ing morn ing but was d issu aded fro m makin g the attempt
, .

With n o superiority of n u mbers i n the begin ning we had ,

lost m e n : every on e was exhausted : we were short

of wat e r ; and the Ali M untar position notwithsta n ding a ,

bombardme n t by h eavy gu n s of every calibre including ,

those of the R é qni n and the 1 1 i nch pi e ces on the mo n itors-

,

seemed little damaged and plain l y was impregnable to a

,

frontal assault with the mean s at our disposa l The army .

,

therefore settled down on the ground it occupied at the

,

close of the fighting For the next Si x months no further

.

attempt was made t o capture G aza .

The tank detachment after withdrawi n g across the ,

Wadi G huzze to some fi g groves west of Sheikh Nebh a n -

,
 T HE P AL E S TI N E D E TA C H M E N T 8I

returned eventually t o its old quarters near Deir e l B elah - -

railhead Its proportionate losses had been h eavy Twenty

. .

eight o fficers an d men wer e killed wounded or m issing 4 0 — , ,

per cent of th e total engaged Three tanks ou t of eight .

were permanently disabled or lost Th e report which I .

have used so freely already conc l ud e s with some general

observations on the work of tanks i n th e battle This .

work was fully appreciated by the infantry wh o gener ,

“

ous l y attributed their own success to the opportu nities

”
created by the tanks The th ree divisional comma n ders
.

also expressed their admiration Th at some of th e fleetin g .

O peni n gs made by the tanks were not promptly seize d was “

l ess due to lack of i n itiative on the part of i nfantry leaders

than to the whol l y u nexpected i n te n sity of the enemy s well ’

directed fire At the sam e time further co operat ive

.
,
-

traini n g was show n to be very n ecessary Refe r e nce o f .

,

cou rse is mad e to t h e faulty staff work through which on

, ,

1 9 th April the centre section was left without any i n s truc

,

tions after its original orders had been cancel l ed at th e

e l eventh hour It i s pointed out also ( although thi s perhaps
.

was u navoidabl e ) that the task al l otted t o the tanks was far
t oo ambitious for t heir n u mbers The eight operated on .

a fi v e mile front where th irty or forty wou l d not have been

-
,

too many The successful assem bly prior t o zero was held
.

to prove that tanks which are properly look e d after by

“

competent crews need not necessarily be placed i n forward

positio n s as they can be trusted ( accidents apart ) t o
,

accomplish up to t im e fin al approach marches o f con -

s i d e r a b l e length And this brings us to what were per

.
,

haps the most notable features of the operations — the

,

actual distances covered by these obso l ete and worn out -

machines and the absence of any mechanical breakdow n s .

In both respects the work of the little detachmen t compares

very favourably i n deed with that performed by th e larger
units in Fran ce Some of the t anks travelled forty mi l es
.

and fought two actions between the t ime they l eft D eir e l -

B elah on the 1 5 th an d th eir final withdrawal behind the

Wa d i G huzze five days later ; an d every machine wh ich le ft
F
82 T HE TAN K IN ACT I O N

England got into action or was read y to do so on zero

, ,

morn ing Such e fficiency is a high testimonial to the

.

labours of the commanding o ffi cer and his combatant and

engineering personnel .

It will be convenient at the expense of strict chrono

,

logical sequence to carry th e story of th e Palestin e

,

detachment to its conc l usion i n on e chapter Six month s .

supervened between the second and th ird battles of G aza .

D uring this period ou r disposition s were readj usted r e in ,

forcements arrived ( inc l uding French Italian Indian and , , ,

West Indian detai l s ) and Sir Archibald M urray having

,

returned home Sir Edmu nd Allenby came from the 3 rd

,
-

Army i n France to take over the command The surviving .

tanks meanwhile were overhauled and provided with some

, ,

especial roller sprockets constructed in the workshops of

-

the Egyptia n State Railways Requests for more and .

newer tanks had been sent to En gland ; but the on l y t e

i n force m e n t received consisted of three M ark IV S O ne ’
. .

or more others of this type together with a supp l y of mu ch

,

n eeded spare parts for the original M ark L s were lost in a ’

,

torpedoed transport .

Towards the end of the autumn preparat io n s for a re n e wed

attempt on G aza had reached completion Our line i n .

front of the city sti l l ran where th e second battle had left it
— from Sheikh Aj l i n on th e coast by Sam son s Ridge an d
, ,
’

the M ansura and Abbas Ri d ges dow n to th e Wadi G huzze , ,

and the n ce t o the new rai l head at She ll al on th e right The .

Tu rkish defences on Ali M untar h ad been strengthened still

further ; and now that our increased forces permitted u s
to choose it was d e cided to avoid the hazards of another
,

frontal assault Instead wh ile the enemy s centre was

.
,
’

kept employed with demonstrations the main attacks were ,

t o de v elop between He re i r a and Beersheba and on the

western flank from G aza to the sea
, The whole area .

o f operation s exten d ed o v er forty m iles The Aus tra .

“
 T HE P A LE S T I N E D E TA C H M E N T 83

lian Corps and desert colum n were responsible for the

O perat ion s fro m B eersheba n orth westwards to Here i ra -
.

N umerous m ounted and dism ou nted divisions were

entrusted with the frontage from and aroun d Here i r a
towards G aza wh ile a compos ite force of Fre nch
, ,

Italian and West Indian troops were assign ed the task

,

of executing minor raids near O utpost H ill The opera .

tion s aroun d G aza were entrusted to th e z r s t Army Corps ,

wh ich began to make the necessary preparation s fo r a

general assau lt on the defences between U mbrella H ill
”1
( north o f S am son s Ridge ) and the sea This was to be
’
.

the main attack with its left rest ing on the coast an d its
,

right on the Cairo road In th e second phase of th e last

.

battle our only permanent success h ad been won on this

flank ; and ou r extreme left at Sh eikh Aj l i n was du e west
of G aza .The general lin e of the assault th e refore was
n orth eastward w ith the idea of so far enveloping the city
-

as to threaten its com mun ications fro m th e n orth Th e .

distance from the Cairo road to t he sea was less than 5 000
yards ; and the i n itial penetrati on aimed at was moderate
two mi l es up the coast on the extrem e left and e l sewhere ,

an average of a mile For this narrow f rontage and depth

.

of attack four in fantry brigades were available ( the whole

s 4 th D ivision and one brigade of th e 5 2 md ) assisted by ,

an Indian cavalry d ivision the s 4 th D ivisional Artillery

’

, ,

a m achine gu n company an d t he tank detachment of

-
,

eight machines ( The presen ce of a number of anti tank

.
-

guns of 1 % inch calibre about G reen an d O utpost H ills led

-

to the tank operations being confined to the left sector ) .

The N avy again was to c o operate from the sea Th e wh ole -

.

area over which this advance was to take place was a wilder
ness of sand dun es covered here and there with coarse grass
-

and cactus and rising in places to a height of 1 5 0 feet

,
.

There had been am ple tim e on this occasion for recon

naissance and other prelimin aries All tank commanders .

and surveyed the enemy s position both from ’

th e land and from a drifter off the coast In addition t o .

R p rt
1
Ta k O p rati n i n Egyp t d P a l tin &
e o on n e o s an es e, c.
84 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

combined rehearsals by tanks and infantry already carried

out during the su mmer o fficers and other ranks of the
,
“

tank detachment and the v ariou s i n fantry brigades with

whom they were to work were attached to each other for ten
days in order persona l ly to get to know each other an d
study the characteristics of the other s particular arm ’
.

O Si s i c om nes ’ An adequate supply of large scale maps and

.
-

”
aeroplane photograph s was provided by th e 2 1 5 t Corps I ,

together with a barrage tab l e and map for every tan k

-

com mander Each tank was to carry two pigeons to be

.
,

releas e d at pre arranged points ; and a l so a t on of R E

-
.

supp l ies and ammu n ition for the i n fantry The whole .

question of supp l y was a seriou s one as the o n ly roads ,

behind our line in this coasta l area wer e constructed by

the simp l e process of laying down wire netting on the sand -
,

which provided a surface suitable for marching infantry or

even light cars but of no use for heavy vehicles
, Th e .

detachment workshops rendered a sig n al service by i m

p ro vi s i n
g a nu mber of tractor trucks out of old track plates -

driving sprockets and iron girders The necessary dumps

, .

of oi l and ammunition were th e n f form e d n ear Sheikh Aj l i n ,

lorries and tractors conveyi n g the m ateria l thither after

dark by way of th e beach Fina l ly as the attack itse l f was
.
,

du e t o start in the n ight t ime the tanks were various l y

-
,

camouflaged to suit the conditions amid which they m ight

expect to find themselves at dawn Two were daubed with .

different colours and another pair were painted white and

,

Splashed with sand while t he remain ing fou r were disguised

,

with i mitation cactus .

As litt l e as possib l e had been left to chance ; and I have

enu merated the main fe atures of this preparatory work both
on account of its thoroughness and forethought and because ,

it is a characteristic exam ple of the prelimi n aries to a tan k

action Before s uch an action there are always a hundred
.

odd thi n gs of this kind to be seen to ; and i n this case un ,

li ke some others nearer home they were seen to The , .

labou r expended over them was fu l ly j ustified in th e

results .

The coming attack was divide d into fou r phases known ,

86 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

we had been counting The tanks however advancing on .

, ,

compass bearings successfully reached their first obj ectives

-
,

within three minutes wel l ahead of the in fantry In the ,

.

prevailing gloom som e of the latter lost direction almost at

once and a tank o fficer observing from a point called ,

Windy Post on our front li n e co ll ected som e hundreds of

, ,

men of one battalion and dire cted them to their obj ective .

The first Turkish lin e n evertheless was carried without , ,

di fficulty the attack coming as a complete surprise B ehind

, .

the cre e ping barrage the tanks and i n fantry pr e ssed on ; and
although the two brigad e s i n the ce n tre met with stiff opposi
tion on the seco n d line a n d lost ground before a succession ,

of counter attacks on both flanks and especia l ly on t he all

-
, ,

i mportant left e veryth i n g went m ore or less accordi n g to

,

program me By 6 o clock the 1 6 2 nd Brigade had consoli

.
’

dated its final obj ective at Sheikh H assan O n the right .

El Arish Redoubt had at last been captu red and our troops ,

were on th e fe d ge of the fi g groves which Shelter G aza to the -

south west
-
.

The tanks had done all and more than all that was , ,

expected of them O n the right two had helped i n the

.

taking of El Arish It was s till dark when they pushed on

.

into the maze of trenches beyond and both became ditched , ,

one eventually being disabled by a She l l The crews took .

out their machine guns and j oined the infantry N umbers

-
.

3 an d 4 next on the l eft working with the 1 6 1 5 t Brigade

, , ,

attack e d a n d carried with the latter the Rafa Redoubt a n d

the trenches to the north west Owing to the m ist they had -
.

great di fficulty in reaching their furth e r obj ectives and fi n d ,

ing that the i n fantry had been u nable to advance beyond the
redoubt th e y returned to the ra l lyi n g poi n t having d e posit ed
,
-

their spare am mu n iti on and R E stores N umber 5 broke . .

a t r ack at Beach Post its first obj ective and was unab l e t o
, ,

assist in the next phase O n the extreme l eft N u mber 6 had .

a varied a n d exciti n g career To quote from the report it .

,
“
captur e d Sea Post ( close to the beach ) moved a l ong the ,

enemy s trench l ine crushi n g the wire as far as Beach Post

’

, ,

turn e d n orth an d attacked Cricket Redoubt then proceeded ,

to G un H ill and Tortoise H i l l both of wh ich positions it ,

 THE P A LE S TI N E D E TA C H M E N T 87

subj ected to 6 pounder and machine gun fire an d fi nally

- -
,

reached Sheikh H assan where it depos ited its l oad of R E

, . .

stores Thence it desc ended to the beach and endeavoured

.

to attack A5 (a Turkish stron g point on the coast b eyon d -

our farthest obj ective ) but in scaling the cliff broke a track
, .

The crew removed all machin e guns rendered th e engin e -

,

u seless re moved the 6 pounder wedges and retired t o

,
-

Sheikh H assan wh ere they reported to the in fantry com

,

mander As the abandoned tank was several hundred

.

yards in advance of our front the enemy was able duri n g ,

the en suing night to creep up and place a charge beneath

it the explosion of which in addition to effecting other
, ,

damage bent th e cran k sh aft When after the retreat of

,
-
.
,

the Turkish Army a few days later it was possible t o m ove ,

the machin e it was found necessary to rem ove the engin e

,

and tow the h u l l back to Deir e l Be l ah - -

.

In the meanti me the reserve ta n ks N u mbers 7 and 8 had , ,

com e into act ion At 4 A M they received orders to support

. . .

th e in fantry on the right beyond El Arish redoubt Both , .

tanks were loaded with R E material and u nfortu nately . .

, , ,

were carrying empty sandbags on the roof N u mber 7 was .

set on fire from thi s cause as it reached its first obj ective ,

east of th e captured redoubt Wh ile it was attempting t o .

return to shelter the tracks j umped and broke th e switches

, ,

and the tan k was left ablaze between the lines N umber 8 .

a l so caught fire It was n ow broad day l ight and the tank

.
,

was in vi e w of th e enemy who proceeded to shell it ; bu t ,

being screened to som e extent by vege t ation with which it s ,

own camouflage blended it was never h it , .

By 8 o clock three tan ks had rallied at Sheikh Aj l i n an d

’
, ,

a fourth returned three hours later D uring the batt l e som e .

machi n es had been i n action for five hours and had covered ,

upwards of yards ; but the casualties i n person n el

were extraordinarily light only one man being ki ll ed and ,

two woun d ed At th is trifling cost the tank detach m en t

.

had helped materially to place ou r left flan k i n such a

position that the Turkish Army arou n d G aza was serious l y
enda n gered O n the right progress had been m ade also
.
, ,

and the double t h reat was enough Within a few days t he .

.
88 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

enemy evacuated the city and the position he h ad held so

long and retreated toward J affa and J erusalem
,
.

With the third battle of G aza the work of the tanks in

Palestine came to a fitting end Although most of the machi n es .

were soon prepared for action again all were manifestly worn ,

out and it was fe lt that they would be of little use in the

,

limestone h ills of J udah am id wh ich the army was n ow ,

adva n cin g O n the other ha n d the need was felt for some
.
,

light and swift m achi n e to help th e mounted colum ns in th e

desert area ; and to this end Maj or N utt a n d the second in
command were sent to Fra n ce ear l y in 1 9 1 8 to ask for a
detachment of the new M ediu m A s or Whippets which ’
, ,

were then lyi n g idl e Th e arrival of this mission at.

Bermicourt however coincided with the great G erman

, ,

offensive on 2 1 s t March In the strain consequent upon .

that b l ow and the others wh ich followed it not a Whippet

, ,

could be spared The two officers returned to Syria and

.
,

after further consideration it was d e cided to disband the

d e tachme n t The tanks were ha n ded i n to the ordnance
.

depot at Al exa n dria where probab l y they still remain

, ,

wh ile the perso n n el return e d to En g l and .

I have gone at some l e n gth into th e se orienta l adventures

for various r e asons One of the chief perhaps was the
.
, ,

pleasure to be gain ed in working fro m a narrative so lucid

a n d well arranged as the official Report on Operations ,

&c . which I have used with such freedom

, This may .

not be a good reason for discursiveness but after exhaust ,

ing strugg l es with th e loose j u mbl e of irreleva n cies and mis

statements which constitute the norma l un it history m uch ,

may be forgiven An d i n d e e d the Pa l estine detachment

.
, ,

has other and far better c l aims to a r e surrection from

the obscurity i n which its accomp l ishments have lain
hidden Th ere is n o need to labour thos e claims again
.

here They Speak for th e mselves in the e n ergy and cour

.

age the foresight adaptability and fertility of invention

, , ,
i

which overcame all the ob s ta cl e s th a t a strange country

and climate could add to an initial poverty of means .
90 T HE TAN K IN ACT I O N

ru n due eastward t o K emmel over the Belgian border , ,

and thence curve round Ypres to the north The e n emy .

held the whole o f this curve wh ich from the village o f , ,

Wytschaete 2 5 0 feet above t he sea falls gradually away

, ,

t o nothi n g beyond th e forest of Houth ou l s t O ur first .

obj ect was to dispossess him of the Wytschaete or Messines

Ridge which overlooks the whole Ypres salient
, The .

second stage would be the capture after an interval of the

rest of the curve known as the Passchendaele Ridge , .

This it was estimated would be effected in three or four

, ,

days The moment the ridge was ours the third stage
.
,

was to O pen with the land i n g of a force of all arms ,

includi n g even tanks at M iddelkerke between N ieuport , ,

and Ostend to get behind the enemy s forces along the

,
’

Yser and so facilitate an advance on that water logged

,
-

front N o one can say how far this ambitiou s scheme

.

would have prospered if the weather had remained fair .

AS it fell out the first stage alone was carried through

,

successfully Wytschaete and M essines were taken in a

.

few hours but owing to the rain it took us three month s

,

i nstead of three days to reach Passchendaele ; and l ong

before that the amphibious enterprise at M iddelkerke the ,

most interesting and hazardou s feature of the whole p l an ,

had perforce been cance l led I Shall gi v e some account of .

its elaborate machinery later on .

Sir H erbert Plumer and the 2 n d Army had been facing

the M essines Ridge for two years an d plans for it s capture ,

had been developed at leisure The surface soil in th e .

neighbourhood lay upon a substratu m of clay very suitable ,

for tunnelling ; and for upwards o f twelve mo n ths we had

be e n driving mine shafts beneath the G erman trenches The
-
.

ridge was enclosed in a s mall salient with the c h ord of the ,

arc about Si x miles lon g represented by the enemy s third

, ,
’

defence system kno wn as the O os ta ve r n e Line Th is was

, .

to be our final obj ect ive The battle was to be finished in .

one day Con sidering the lengthy and precise preparation s

.

for it th e moral effect of the explosion of twenty huge

,
 M ES S I N ES 9 1

mines an d the powerful artillery fire wh i ch was to be con

,

ce n tra te d on the s mall area within th e salient it w ill be ,

apparent that there was no very urgent need for tan ks .

Th e state of the grou nd moreover already ha d would not

, , ,

be improve d by the seven days prelimin ary bombardment

’

and if rain fell it would soon become i mpassable M e ssines .

,

in fact was not a tan k battle at all It was on e of those

, .

rare occasion s when a section or two to deal with obstin ate ,

strong points would have been as usefu l as the entire brigade

-
,

which ultimately went i nto action .

Warning of possible operations i n the Ypre s salient had

been received at B erm icourt early in the year The In tel l i .

gence branch of the corps began a survey of the who l e area

in M arch ; and the following month when the 2 n d Brigade ,

was detailed to assist i n the attack at M essines the R O S , . .

’

of A and B Batta l ion s went forward to reconnoitre the

southern sector Ample i n formation was available for th e
.
,

z u d Army knew all that t here was to be known about

the G erman position It had also constructed one of th e

.

fam iliar large sca l e m odels of th e ridge and the cou ntry
-

beyond ; but although such representation s are always

worth a visit it i s doubtful i f they are of much valu e from
,

a tank commander s standpoint ’

They bear no real .

resemblance t o th e actual grou nd to be t raversed and t he ,

View from a tan k is s o lim ited that the larger details of a

landscape are of s mall use in getting beari n gs .

B e tween the 2 3 rd and z 7 th M ay the t anks of th e t wo

batta l ion s were detrained at O uderdom an d Clapham
J unction ( near D ranoutre) They lay up before the battle
.

in the neighbourhood of th e railheads — B B attalion s ’

machines i n a wood and those of A i n timber an d canvas

,

shelters bui l t to represe n t huts These assembly position s

.

were within four m iles of the line Th e us ual precaution s

.

were take n to conceal th e fact of th e tanks arrival the ’

,

tracks left by th e ir move ment s (which show u p very clearly

i n aeroplane photographs ) being obliterated by harrows .

This was the first appearance of M ark IV S in the field ; .

’
9 2 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

and another novelty was the use of old Mark II s for supply .
’

purposes Twelve were attached to the brigade carrying

.
,

between them one complete fill of petrol oil grease and , , ,

am mu n ition for a ll the 7 6 fighting tanks .

The attack was t o take place at dawn on 7 th Jun e Three .

corps were taking part — from l eft to right the 1 oth 9 th , , ,

and z ud Eventua ll y 6 4 tanks were allotted to them — 4 0 to

.

attack the first obj ective the G erman second line beyond ,

the crest of the ridge and 2 4 more to help i n the fina l ru sh

,

for the O os ta ve r n e trenches O n 2 4 th May the pre l im inary .

bombardme n t O pen ed The weather was hot a n d dry

.

there had been no rain for a fort n ight ; and n ow day after ,

day the ridge was s mothered in dust clouds thrown up by

,
-

the bursti n g shel l s The gun fi re slackened on the last day

.
-
,

6 th M ay ; but the enemy became nervous after dark an d

began to sh e ll the back areas H e used a l arge amount of .

gas which caused m uch discomfort to the tank c rews on the

,

fina l approach march to the front line for that invaluable ,

device the sma l l box respirator is more than usual l y i n con

,
-
,

ve n i e n t when worn inside a ta n k Lat e r in the night a .

h eavy thunderstorm broke ; but by A M the sky was . .

cl e ar o nce m ore .

At on the very edge of dawn the G erman front lin e ,

betwee n H il l 6 0 and M essin e s went up into th e air with an

ind e scribable shock and noise as th e n i n etee n huge m ine s ,

exploded Simu l tan e ously the barrage fe ll th rough the dust

.

clouds upo n th e still movi n g earth With so tr e mendous a

-
.

preparatio n the first stage of the attack went like c l ock

,

work M essines was carried by 7 A M and Wyt schaete

. . .
,

before m idday The ta n ks were seldom n eeded and indeed

.
,

were u nab l e in most cases to keep up with the very rapid

advance O ne howev e r by a combination of luck and
.
, ,

skilful driving was ab l e to lead the Au stralian and N ew

,

Zea l and troops of the 2 n d Corps the whole way to the

second obj e ct ive a distance o f two mi l es in an hour and
, ,

forty mi n utes Another the Wytschaete Express con

.
”
,
“
,

voy e d the U lster D ivision into that village ; and a third

94 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

five hours he made repeated attempts to issue from the

valley in every case h e was repulsed with heavy losses
, ,

i nflicted largely by the 6 pou n der an d machine gu n fire - -

o f the two tank crews At ou r barrage O pened again

.

a nd final l y d ispersed the as sailants .

In th is battle the two tan k battalion s lost 3 officers and

1 6 m en killed or died of wounds and 2 6 o fficers and 73 men ,

wounded or missing Eleven tanks were disabled by direct .

hits ; 4 8 were ditched and 2 were hit after ditching There ,

.

were n ineteen recorded cases in wh ich they helped the i n

fa n try The M ark IV S with their lighter sponsons and
. .
’
,

other improvements were shown t o be fa r handier than ,

the old type of mach ine Apart from th e obviou s con .

c l us i o n s that tanks need n ot have been u sed at all in the

first phase of the attack an d that the grou nd was thoroughly ,

u nsu itable for any combined e ffort on their part the chief ,

lesson to be drawn from M essines was on e already taken t o

heart — the necessity namely of providing a more effici e nt , ,

u n d i tc h i n g apparat us for use in su ch pulverised ter r a i n .

M any casua l ties would have been avoided an d many more ,

tanks would have got into action and returned that n ight i f ,

the long u n d i tch i n g spar issued shortly after had been in u se

during the battle .

The qu e stion of th e advisability of u sing tanks at

M essines raises an other which i t may be of i n terest to
consider before we close th is chapter Th e third battle .
“

of Ypres s ays Colon el Buchan

,
1
was the residuu m left ,
“

to S ir Douglas H aig of the great plan of a Flanders

offen sive which he had conceived th e previou s winter .

Events which he could not control had postponed it ti l l

”
too late in the summer H ere as elsewhere the writer .
, ,

implies that the di l em ma in which we found ourselves was

1
p l gi p rhap
A o o es d f th c
e ti uals a ref thi b k
ue N l n H i t ry
or e on n us e o s oo e so
’
s s o

of th War e a t l ki g has but i p it f th di ffi cu l ti att di g i t p

s a n e
ors e n s e o e es en n s ro

ducti d i t c l aim t b
on , a n sm r tha a p pu l ar hi tory C l l Buchan had
o e no o e n o s , o on e

exc pti a l O pp rtu iti f gai i g i f rmati

e on o n d th w rk i i fact th
es o n n ly n o on , a n e o s n e on

fu ll d r l iab l acc u t f th war y t i n p ri t

an e e o n o e as e n .
 M ES S I N E S 95

c aused wholly by the fai l ure of the French advance on

Laon . M an ifestly the work of th e Allied armies w a s
,

interdependent ; but the principle of assum in g at all costs

the per fection of ou r own disposition s can b e carried too
far There was in any case a bold alternative to the Ypres
.

o ffensive which actually was propose d and might well have

,

been adopted even before the postponement of the latter

,
-

comprom i sed its prospects This alternative was a tank .

attack on a large scale against th e central portion o f the

H indenburg Line — to take place after Messin es In other .

words the battle of Cambrai was to be fought i n the early

,

sum mer on the same lines as e v entu ally were adopted i n

,

the l ate autumn In the Arras b attles the M ark I tanks

. .

were used for the las t time an d as n one really were needed ,

at M essines the improved M ark IV S and th e experienced

, .
’

p e rsonnel lost there m ight have been preserved for a greater

occasion The enemy s attention was drawn northward by
.
’

the 2 n d Army s victory H e began at once to transfer

’
.

reserves to m eet th e obviou s coro l lary of an attack from

Ypres ; and to foster this b elief by various stratagem s was
no more di ffi cult in J une than in N ovember M eanwhile .
,

let u s suppose the fou r or IgIn a l tank battalions reinforced ,

i n M ay by F an d G t o be preparing at B erm icourt an d

,

Wai l ly for the secret blow far t o the south By the end of .

J u ne when the three brigades began to assemble in th e

,

Sa l ient it would have been possible t o arm the m with

,

1 00 tanks apiece — 3 00 in all ( 2 1 6 fighting m achin es were .

actually i n B elgiu m for the battle of J uly 3 I s t ) O ur co m .

m u n i ca ti on s across the devastated S om me area were then so

far complete ( or could ha v e been made s o ) as to permit of a
rapid and secret concentrat ion on that front and the plan ,

O f attack adopted with such startling results on N ovember

2 0th m ight have been a n ticipated i n almost every detai l ,

with this great additional advantage—twelve or fifteen fresh

divisions instead of Si x tired ones cou l d have followed th e
, ,

tanks Th e grou nd was perfect virtually u ntouched by war

.
, ,

a n d not l i k e l t o be affected seriously by rain The enemy

y
‘

.
96 T HE TA N K IN A CT I O N

was unprepared And of the possible obstacles th e fabulou s

.
,

H indenburg trenches whose rear systems were n ot even

,

completed by midsum mer were the least to be feared , .

S uch was the scheme put forward a n d strongly urged by

the supporters of the n e w weapon If it did not seem t o .

o ffer so glittering a reward as a victorious advance a l on g

the coast its prospects of s uccess were im measurably
,

higher . It would possess the elements for which tank s

were designed — surprise and normal country Apart from .

the ordinary di fficulties con front ing an attack out of th e

Salient where th e enemy was ful l y prepared for o ne th e
, ,

effect of bad weather and gun fi r e upon the ruined soi l -

reduced every ambitious military operation there to th e

nature of a gamb l e It is int e resting to note that quite
.

early in the year after th e recon naissance m ade by t he

,

H eavy Section of the whole area the ground n orth of ,

M essines was declared utterly u nfit for tanks ; and far les s
rain than actua l ly fell in Au gust would have ruined ou r
o ffensive ( As it happe n ed J une and J uly about wh en it
.
, ,

was proposed to fight the a l ternat ive tank battle were ,

bril l iantly fi n e ) N or were the strategic prospects of a b l ow

.

at Cambrai to be under estimated A success of wh ich

-
.
,

there was every probability wou l d have threatened direct l y

,

the great line of supp l y running southward through M au

,

beug e by which th e G erman armies i n Champagn e were

,

fed and c l othed and armed Such a th reat was the obj ect .

o f the N ovember attack and of the second battle of

,

Cambrai ten months later when at length it was carried ,

through to a practical con c l usio n .

This excursion into strategy a n d speculation m ay seem

out of place in a book of this n ature But one of my main .

obj ects i n writi n g is to Show how a belated appreciation of

the correct use of tanks i n batt l e came to overset all the
theories stereotyped by years of stationary warfare and h ow ,

th e tactical beliefs held by th e Tank Corps itself were ulti

mate l y acc e pted as gospel by the Army as a w h ol e Already .

there are signs of backsliding and i n a few years we sh all ,

 CHAPTE R V II .

Y P R ES : T HE P R EL I M I NAR I ES .

F RO M now onward my own experiences with the Tan k

Corps in France wil l take up a large part of the narrative .

I came out from England as a ta n k command e r in G

B attalion toward th e end of May 1 9 1 7 O nly the personnel
.

were on the boat as by this time the tanks wer e Shipped

,

across in batches as they were comp l eted new batta l io n s on ,

their arrival drawing their quota from the park at Erin .

F Battalion had preceded G by a week these two u n its ,

being the first to l eave of those raised at home u nder th e

new estab l ishme n t .

The month of J un e notable for brilliant weather we

, ,

spent part l y in the Bermicourt area where my own company

,

bill e ted i n satisfactory isolation i n the village of Pierremont ,

and partly at Wailly where each company went for a week s

,
’

drivin g practice Th e combata n t compan ies i n the H eavy

.

B ranch were then nu mbered consecutive l y throughout the

corps and not by their battalions ; so th at G as the
, ,

seventh of the latter i n alphabetical order consisted of ,

1 9 20 and 21 Compan ies — the last n amed bei n g my own

-
.
, ,

At Pierremont we l ed a very p l acid existence for a few

weeks We route marched and drilled a little t oyed with
.
-
,

Lewis guns and played cricket : we su ffered not over

, ,

g l adly th e presence in our mess of two u nshaven and

,

lugubr i ous members of the ( which occasionally

 YP R E S : T HE P R EL I M I NAR I E S 99

errs in selecting its personnel ) whom we knew only as

”
“
Watch and Pray a n d eventual l y
“
with the rest of ,

th e battalio n we m arched over to Eri n about four mi l es

, ,

distant to draw thirty six M ark IV tank s We drove our

,
-
. .

own twelve back to a park a l ready e stab l ished in the village .

A t this ti me however I had no tan k to com mand There

, , .

were i n my section three rather senior lieutenants hai l in g ,

from the preh istoric Thetford age wh o naturally secured a ,

tank apiece The maj ority of the subaltern s in G includ

.
,

ing myself had been comm issioned from the ranks on th e

,

s am e day som e Si x month s earlier and j oined th e battalion ,

togeth e r and t h e ir se n iority nece ssari l y was d e t e rmi n ed by

,

the alphabet In conseque n ce of this law the fourth tan k

.

in the section fell t o my friend and contemporary Bras s

i n gton ( kil l e d a year l ater by M onu me n t Wood outside ,

” ”
Bapau me ) sin ce Bra comes before Bro
,
“
O n such “
.

accide n ts of orthography in the Army m ay one s futu re , ,

’

depend ! I was left for the ti me being in com mand of th e

fifth or reserve crew .

In the mea n while M essines had been fought We heard .

the gu n s from Pierremont an d a little later learnt that we , , ,

Should soon m ove up t o the Salient ourse l ves to take part

in the forthcom ing development of th e offe n sive there I .

reme mber Torbett the company comm ander return in g one , ,

evening abou t this time from some conference bringing ,

with him a l arge scale map of the cou ntry over which the
-

battalion was expected to O perate Few or n one of us had .

seen the Sa l ient then ; and on this sheet carefully layered ,

and thick with sym metrical vi ll ages and roads it looked ,

quite attractive and v ery ordinary I date fro m that event .

an i n stinctive mistrust of maps depict ing strange cou ntry

in war time I believe it wou l d have helped u s greatly in
-
.

this war to have had maps drawn e specially to represent ,

so far as was possible the actua l co n dition of the grou n d on

,

most battlefields This Shou l d n ot have been di ffi cult

.

primarily it would m ean inventing a series of entirely new

con v entional signs for m u d an d shelled areas and obliterated
 1 00 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

villages and roads to take the place o f the n ormal peace

,

time symbols of the cartographer suppleme n ted on l y by ,

obscure l e ge n ds which nobody reads I have experimented .

with such a map myse l f The ordi n ary production show .

,

ing every house and he d gerow and b y way i n ( l et us say) -

P oel ca p e l l e or Pozi e res which Simply had ceased to exist

, ,

was pecu liarly m isleading ; and so strong is h abit the more , ,

accustomed one was to hand l i n g maps before the war ( an

eccentricity not common it is t rue i n the r e gular Army) , ,

the more mis l eadi n g it becam e Looking now at any Sheet .

professi n g to repres e n t the P i l ke m Ridge a n d the Ste en b e e k

V alley and reca ll ing what that atrocious n eighbourhood
,

rea l ly looked like it is a marv e l to m e that we ever found

,

our way about it at a ll I am quite certain that in m any

.

cases los s of direction or m isstatement s as t o position i n

,

action — errors which were o n ly too com mon —were due not
to or d i n a ry b a d map reading although that also was p reva
.
-
,

lent enough but to excusable inabi l ity on the part of an

,

o fficer to recon cile the print e d Sheet with the actual appear
ance of the country : a di fficulty that might have been
mitigated in part by the use of some m ore appropriate
system of cartography .

Toward the e n d of J u ne the I s t Tank B rigade consist ,

ing n ow of G and D Battalions received defi n ite move ,

m e n t orders ; and a few days later an advan ce party of G ,

which I accompanied moved by lorry to the Salient t o

,

prepare a camp We reached our destination at Oosthoek

.

Wood beyo n d Poperinghe about 3 o clock of a blazing

, ,
’

J u l y aftern oon at the exact m oment when a G erman aero

,

plane was attacking one of our observat ion balloons which -

hung immediate l y overhead There was a hideous racket .

of futile rifle a n d m ach in e gun fire : along the who l e l ine

of balloon s stretching northward observers were descending
in parachutes ; and two dissolving spirals of black smoke
above the trees Showed where a couple of the fragile gas
bags had already been destroyed As we tu mbled out of .

our lorries wonderin g what all the pandemoniu m was abo ut

, ,
 “
1 02 THE TA NK IN A C TI O N
-
n

sam e distance from Ypres It was bisected by a timbered .

mi l itary road ( a sple n did piece of work capable of taking ,

three lorries abreast ) wh ich ran from the direction of Lovie

Ch a teau across the triangle to V lamertinghe Beside this .

road a double l ine of rails had been l aid from Pese l hoek
railhead to a n ew and very conspicuou s detraining ramp
built at the entrance to the wood for th e use of our brigade .

H al f a m ile farther north a second ramp served th e 3 rd

Brigade ( The 2 n d B rigade was already in the area having
.
,

remained at Ouderdom Sin ce the battle of M essines ) A .

series of other woo d s diversified the country between

O osthoek and Lovie Ch a teau The latter bui l ding stand .
,

ing i n b e autifu l grounds was about seven m iles from the

,

line— u ncommon l y far forward nevertheless for an army , ,

headquarters It was indeed i n front of the 1 8 th Corps

.
, ,

H eadquarters close by The whole of this low lyin g and

, .
-

u n interesting region was under cu ltivation as far as Oost

hoek itself ; a n d there were people livin g in the farms on
the western outskirts of that wood The battered and .

unpl e asant town of Poperinghe although She l led i n ter ,

m i tte n tl y and bombed at one t ime almost every night ,

was of course full of squalid Shops and extortionate shop

keepers most of them wome n To carry on for three or
,
.

four years a retail business under fire within five miles of ,

the enemy implies a certain enthusiasm for gain ; but per

,

haps the ordeal j ustified the imposition of high prices ; and

the ordinary Englishman s passion for buyin g rubbish is ’

a direc t invitation t o it The restaura n ts and tea Shops in

.
-

the town a n d th e rest — swarmed

al l day with garru l ou s o fficers and Shou l d have formed ,

useful media of information for the G ermans As for the .

depressed and slattern l y creatures in the farm s nearer to

t h e i l i n e it was general l y taken for granted that they were
,

spies Th e usual stories flew about of lamps flashing by

.

n ight and cattle man oeuvring Suspiciously by day ; and

rumour was always Shooting somebody And if th e re was .

espionage as there mu st have been it had a mass of mis

, ,
 YP R E S : T HE P R E L I M I N AR I ES 1 03

m aterial to sift and report on

ce l l a n e ou s The whole .

cou nt ry was crowded with troops In th e Salient alon e .

there were two armies i n one army area Sir H ubert G ough ,

havi n g brought fou r corps from in front of Cambrai to take

post on the 2 n d Army s left To his left again th e 1 s t
’
.

Fren ch Army had taken over from th e B elgians the line

bet w een B oesinghe and Noord s ch oote ; while Raw l inson s ’

4 th Army had come in on the sea coast i n readiness for that -

flanking operation which n ever mater i alised There could .

be n o attempt to keep this huge concentration a secret or ,

at any rate there was n one S uch a th ing was n ot th ought.

of in those days Everything went for w ard deliberately o n

.

old establish ed lines in fu l l View of the enemy who were

-
, ,

i n doubt only ( and that n ot for long ) as to the actual day

of attack .

The decision to employ three brigade s of tanks or the ,

whole of the H eavy Bran ch had been come to in M ay , ,

notwithstandi n g the adverse reports on the ground sub

m i tte d by the Corps Reconnaissance Staff From the first .

introduction of tan ks in th e field the condition s with which ,

t hey had to contend had gone from bad to worse Ypres .

was the climax The tanks were sent by scores an d the n

.
,

by hundreds to drown ineffectually in a morass a n d t he

, ,

v ery existence of the corps was imperilled by this misu sage .

The w hole countryside was waterlogged : reclaimed fro m

the sea for even Ypres once had been a port its u sefulness
, ,

an d habitability depended i n normal ti mes u pon an i n

tri ca te system of drainage for whose upkeep th e farmers ,

w ere responsible and for th e n eglect of wh ich they were

,

heavily fined This drain age had n ow been destroyed or

.
,

had fallen into desuetude and decay over th e whole area ,

about the front lin es D uring our recon naissances in J uly

.

the deplorable results were n ot at first very apparent Th e .

weather was fine and the surface soil dry an d cru mbling
,

we walked so far as it was safe over what seemed to be

, ,

so l id earth covered with the u sual coarse grass and weeds ;

and the n from observat ion points in well constructed
,
- -
1 04 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

trenches peered out through our binoculars upon a barren

,

and dun coloured landscape void of any Sign of huma n life

-
, ,

its dreary sky l i n e broken only by a few j agg e d stumps of

trees From th is desolation c l ouds of dust shot up where
.

our she ll s were falling It was much the sam e as any other
.

batt l efield to all appearance But even then th e duck

,
.

boards u nder foot in the tren ches were squelching upon

water ; and a few hours rain d issolved the fallacious crust
’

into a bottom l ess and evil smel l ing paste of liquid mud -
.

An d rain was th e least offender It was our own bombard .

me n t which finished the work of ruin pulverised the ground ,

beyond repair destroyed what drainage ther e was left an d

, ,

brought the water we ll i n g up within the she ll holes as fast -

as they were formed Lo n g before any prolonged down

.

pour had fal l en i n deed after the hottest spells of weather

, ,

the little white discs on the aeroplan e photographs were

multiplying daily from end t o end of the field of operations .

The actual detraini ng of th e tanks of G Battalion at

Oosthoek Wood was accomp l i shed without any seriou s
hitch It took place of course after dark a n d spread over
.
, , ,

three successive n ights each company requiring a comp l ete

,

train The worksh ops had already trave ll ed up by road

. .

My company was the first to arrive ; and the Brigadier and

staff the Colo n el and the company com man der G ordon
, , ,

the company R O and myse l f were at the ramp to meet

. .
, ,

it We stood about th e re i n the dark in some anxiety for

.
,

a night or two earlier a train of C Battalio n s had been ’

she l led as it dre w in t o the n orthern railhead There had .

been stories of signal rockets going up in the neighbourhood

as the train pulled i n The new white woode n ramps must
.

have shown u p c l early on aerop l ane photographs and no ,

on e had thought of c a m oufl a gi n g them This night .

,

happily was exceptionally quiet ; only a few heavy Shells

,
1 06 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

running no risks The camouflage nets were suspended

.

from the trees a few feet above th e tanks the Sides bei n g ,

drawn down at a slant and pegged to the ground Al l this .

was exhau sting work in the pitchy darkness and very trying ,

t o the temper At the same time a party was ob l iteratin g

.

the tracks we had made between th e ramp and th e wood .

By three o clock th e work was don e and we lay down in

’

a n d u nder the tanks to sleep for a few hours Lorrie s were .

du e to arrive at six to take all the personnel except a guard , ,

back to th e camp at Lovie C h ateau .

It was very cold and personal l y I hardly Slept at all

,
.

About five o c l ock every on e was aroused very effectually

’

by th e arrival of a high velocity shell which burst u n der -

,

the n ose of a tank m ade a small hole in another blew half

, ,

a camouflage net to tatters and flun g a haversack into a ,

t ree We were still collecting our wits an d a few di

.
,

s h e ve l l e d figures were crawlin g out of sponson doors when ,

a seco n d she l l burst twenty yards beyo n d the first ; and

with that every tan k disgorged its occupants in a hurry and
all of us dived for shelter There were various old pits and .

trenches in th e wood and within these we crou ch ed for a

,

Short tim e whi l e the shell s co n tinued to arrive punctua l ly

,

at half m inute i n tervals A l l of them except the first on e

-
.

fortunate l y burst beyond the ta n ks although near e n ough ,

for fragments to fly among the latter and over our heads .

As the wood man ifestly was n o place for repose at the

moment we were ordered to leave it ; and having co l lected
,

the scatter e d parties ( a proceedi n g interrupted periodically

by the whist l e of another approach ing She l l ) we retired i n ,

some disorder upo n the m ilitary road near the ramp where , ,

a party o f negro labourers was watchi n g the bombardment

with marked uneasin ess The m e thodical gun however .
, ,

made no attempt to traverse or elevate : it co n tinued to

p l ant its proj ectiles arou nd the same spot for another ten
minutes a n d then fell silent O ur on l y casualty was X
, . .

( as we will call h im ) who ran into a tank in the pardo n ab l e

,

excit e ment of the moment cut his forehead and was , ,

 YP R E S : T HE P R EL I M I N A RI ES 1 07

remove d with i n half an hour t o th e C C S on the Elver . . .

dinghe road There was n o further shelling of the wood

.

that morning We had every O pportun ity of establishing

.

this fact as owin g to som e mu d d l e over the lorries they

, , ,

were fou r hours late Tired h ungry and dirty feeling

.
, , ,

acutely that n o on e loved u s we sat by that accursed ,

mil itary road u ntil m idday when at len gth the transport ,

appeared and carried u s back to th e n ew camp at Lovie .

During th e two en suin g m ights 1 9 and 2 0 Compan ies

detrained i n peace an d were followed sh ortly after by
D Battalion F Battalion having also j oined C the I s t
.
,

and 3 rd Brigades were n ow con centrated near t o one

another m ustering between them ( including supply and
,

signal m achines ) n early 1 7 0 tanks Every day the crews of .

th e four battalions marched down from Lovie Ch a teau t o

their work i n the wood return in g after tea By thi s tim e
,
.

the G erman s had acquired th e habit o f shellin g O osthoek

in a rather desultory fashion every day In t he centre o f .

the wood where a nu m ber of camps an d hutment s clu stered

,

about som e cross roads casualties becam e SO frequent that

-
,

the whole of the troops in the n eighbourhood were with

drawn : the baths canteens an d Church Army huts were
, ,

closed down ; and only a few details remained to dig the m

selves i n and hope for the best At ou r end the nuisance .
,

was less pronoun ced although qu ite troublesom e enough

, .

In additio n to our old frien d the high velocity gun wh ich -

, ,

situated apparently somewhere n ear La n gemarck favoured ,

u s with its attentions almost every day other p ieces of ,

ordnance took a hand occasion ally ; but in th e 1 s t Brigade

neither men nor tan ks were ever hit As the latter were .

packed together like herrings one or two heavy proj ectiles ,

among them m ight have don e a lot of damage The 3 rd .

Brigade less fortunate suffered several casualties five m en

, , ,

being kille d an d five wounded in one mornin g We u sed .

to debit this u npleasantness to th e growi n g accou n t of

Sergeant Phillips This gentleman ( whose actual regiment
.
,

a We l sh on e I have forgotten ) havin g been captured in a

, ,
1 08 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

raid proceeded to give to the enemy every atom of informa

,

tion i n his possession M ost of it was fair l y accurate

. .

Among other things he dis closed the pr e sence and a pp rox i

,

m ate numbers of the ta n ks hidden in Oosthoek Wood .

This piece of treachery having com e to the know l edge of

o ur Intellige n ce Corps a su mmary of the disclosures
, ,

together with a prophecy as to th e offender s probable ’

destiny if ever he returned to England was ordered to be ,

read out every week on parade throughout the Army N ow .

that the war is ov e r and the prison e rs are return ed I have

, ,

often wondered what really has happened to Sergeant

Phi ll ips AS he appeared to be a man of some intel ligence
.
,

he probab l y has rem ained in G ermany .

AS soon as G B attalion was settled down at LovIe

C h é te a u recon n aissance of the area by tank com manders
,

and was b e gu n O ur part i n the forthcomin g

.

attack had been decided upon a month before We .

were working with G eneral M a xs e S 1 8 th Corps on the ’

left centre of th e s th Army front G enera l Elles was .

opposed to the use o f tanks anywhere n orth of the

Wie l tj e road ; but the corps commander asked urgently
for two compa n ies and guaranteed that his engineers
,

would if n ecessary get them to th e crossing of th e

, ,

Ste e n b e e k at St J ul ien The action of the tanks never

.
,

th el es s was to be subsidiary to the infantry assau l t as

, ,

the batt l e was bein g conducted on the stereotyped lines

which h ad fail e d s o often before 1 9 and 2 1 Compan ies .

of my battalion were detailed to the 1 8 th Corps 2 0 ,

C ompa n y remai n ing in corps reserve D Batta l ion for .

,

t h e t ime b e i n g was i n army reserve

, Th e obj e ct of th e .

fi rst day s attack was the capture of the enemy s first and
’ ’

second systems on th e P i l ke m Ridge and the securin g of ,

th e Ste e n b e e k crossings This was to be followed on the

.

second day by a push for the third system and the Pass
c h e n d a e l e Ridge beyon d ; after which it was h oped t o
br e ak through in the direction of Thourout simultaneously
with an offensive by the 4 th Army on th e coast and the
 1 10 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

Al o n g N o M an s Land j u st in front of and parallel to ou r

’
,

trenches ran an u nhappy thoroughfare ca ll e d Admiral s

,
’

Road down which for two years and a half neither

, , ,

admiral s nor common folk ( except the nightly patrols )

had ever stepped The G erman front l ine trenches took
.
-

in a nu mber of farms — M ousetrap H ampshire Canadian , , ,

K rupp and others ; but these w e re only names upon th e

,

map . Even the remnants of the buildin gs had vanished

utterly long before : there was not a brick remai n ing to
m ark the sites ; nothin g was l eft but foul water and mud
and a fe w pollarded wi l lows that somehow had su rvived
the an nihilati n g pesti l ence of high exp l osives These F l em .

ish farm steads were surrou nded almost i n variab l y by moat s

and pools and th e water had now overlapp e d its ruined
,

c o n fi n e s and inundated acres of ground on every side And

'

behind this barrier along the crest of the P i l ke m Ridge

, ,

another series of ob l iterated a n d wat erlogged farm s

J u l iet Oblong Racecourse Below — formed outpost s to
, , ,

the secon d G erman system N or was this the end of .

these amphibious obstac l es Beyond the ridge lay what .

once had been the Ste e n b e e k— a s l uggish stream craw l in g

between muddy banks ten or fifteen fe et i n width and th ree,

or four in depth ; now a strip of quagm ire believed to be ,

impassable for tanks except at the ruined bridge of St

J u l ien — a n obvious defile marked down and taped to a
yard by the G erma n batteries N or again was this all .
, , .

It was indeed on l y the beginning Eas t of the Ste e n b e e k .

,

V on Armin commandin g the 4 th G erman Army had ex

, ,

temporised for defence in a di fferent manner a third series

o f farmhouses ( in front of his third line ) by filling their ,

ruins with reinforced concrete S imilar stro n g points on .

-

a sma ll er scale known generica l ly as pill boxes were

,
” “
-
,

d otted thickly about the P i l ke m Ridge ; but it was i n the

a rea behind out of our observatio n that this type of
, ,

pocket fortress reached its climax of strength and i n

-

ge nu i ty H ere also were the main battery positions The

.
-
.

e nemy had come to realise after Arras and M essines that , ,

 YP R E S T HE P R EL I M I NAR I E S III

any front l ine could be made u nten able by a heavy bom

b a r d m e n t and that even the seco n d lin e shou l d be r e
,

gard e d chiefly as a mean s of delaying and disorgan ising

the assault The third l ine covered by a forward system
.
,

of strong points was the main zone of resistance beh ind

-
, ,

which in comparative secu rity reserves could be massed

, ,
”
for a counter attack Adapted by th e pi ll box system
-
.
,
“ -

t o the abn orma l condition s of th e Salie n t ( where d e ep

dug outs and in some places ade quate tren ches eve n
-
, ,

were ou t of the question ) this was the first applicat io n of,

”
the principle of an e l astic d efe nce i n depth as opposed “
,

to th e rigid obstacle of such fortification s as th e Hi n d e n

burg Line Resistan ce hardened automatical l y as the
.

attack progressed The field batteries were kep t well

.

back The scheme d e pended for succ e ss upon the quality

.

o f the defending infantry and machine gun n ers wh o m ust -

,

be equ al t o the task of holding iso l ated posts u n supported

for a period lo n g enough to disorga n is e and weary the
assaila n ts an d allow th e cou nter preparations to m atu re
,
-
.

U pon this perso n al factor u nder th e influence of tanks th e

, ,

method broke down during our fi na l offe nsive a year later ;

but at the end of 1 9 1 7 the G erm an m or a l was sti l l high and ,

in the Salient th e tanks had fe w chanc e s of u n d erm ining it .

S uch then was the position the two compan ies of G

, ,

B attalion had to assist the infantry to capture O n our .

l e ft the 1 4 th Corps a n d G enera l An th oi n e s Fren chmen ’

were attacking without tanks u p the Ypres Staden rai l way -

,

and toward the dismal For e st of Ho uth oul s t South of our .

sector the 2 n d an d 3 rd Ta n k Brigades were operating with

the 2 n d and 1 9th Corps respect ively against Frezenberg and
the frightfu l region beyond H ooge H ere the conditions .

were Similar to those with wh ich we should have to

contend : if possible even worse The approach marches
, .
-

of these brigades were complicated n ot only by the canal , ,

but also by two streams called the K em mel Beck and the
,

Lombart Beek over which five causeways had to be bu ilt

, .

Th is work as well as th e construction of sp l inter proof

,
-
1 1 2 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

shelters the filli n g i n of sm aller dykes and craters the

, ,

bridging of innumerable trenches and ev e ry other form ,

of engineering device necessary was performed by th e,

1 8 4 th Tunnel l ing Company attached to the H eavy Branch

,

for the operations O n e section of this company worked

.

with each brigade and al l rendered invaluable service

, .

The third battle of Ypres was unique i n th e history o f

the Tank Corps in the facilities afforded for pr e l imi n ary
recon n aissance A natural prej ud ice impels me to th e
.

conclusion that in this department as in all the rest th e , ,

work of my own battalio n was more thorough than that

of most others ; and undoubtedly some of the older u nits
were inc l ined to think that because they had been in action
on the Som me they knew everything about ta n k warfare .

Th is was much as if the cava l ry Shou l d be l ieve Pinkie

Cleugh to be the last word on mou n ted tactics — as som e
t imes i t appears that they do For much had been done
.

and more l earnt since Flers and Courcelette In any case .

,

a l l of u s had exc e ptional opportu nities for preparation i n

th e Salient It was a pity they were squandered on so
.

u n profitable a battlefield The 2 n d B rigade had been in

.

th e area since M essines and the Recon naissance O ffi cers

,

of the other two had lived in O osthoek Wood for a fort

n ight before the person ne l arrived By the time section .

a n d tank commanders were free to begin their individual

surveys a great mass of in formation had already been

,

gathered and sorted out Aerop l ane photographs had

.

bee n collected Specia l maps prepared landmarks i d en ti

, ,

fi e d and rou tes to th e front l in e decided upon

,
And still .

there was ample time for every crew to becom e fami l iar
( so far as was possib l e from a distance ) with the d ep l or
able country over which it would have to fight For three .

weeks parties of o fficers , and men of G Battalion

1 1 4 T HE TA N K IN ACT I O N

day Leaving this lugubriou s mansion with s ome haste

.
,

therefore we u sed t o pu sh forward on foot to another

,

unhealthy spot Bridge 4 over the canal This was a

,
.

ti mber structure for infant ry and fi el d guns bu ilt over the -

,

wreck of a sunke n steamboat It was constantly shel l ed .

,

and I suppose at that time was hit on an average at least

once a day ; while i f high explosive was not comi n g over ,

one cou l d always expect a few bursts of heavy Shrapnel

above on e s head Owing to the causeways which blocked
’
.

the canal lower down the water here was stagnant and ,

choked with weeds ; but i n fine weather i f the G erman ,

guns were qu iet men u sua ll y were bathing in it ; and as

, ,

somebody remark e d it rea l ly became more l ike the

,
“

Serpentine every day B eyond Bridge 4 we ent e red the

.

annihilated region of the real Salient Alo n g the high ca n al .

bank with its terraces of sand bagged dug outs named and
,
- -
,

n umbered lik e suburban thoroughfares stood the wreckage ,

of a line of magnificent t rees the counterpart of that on the ,

west ba n k H a l f of th e se were mere sp l intered tru n ks or

.

lay ent ire l y prostrate a n d those st ill er e ct were gashed and

,

torn They ro se m our n ful l y above the frightfu l welter of

.

shell ho l e s and trenches the li tter o f timber and rubbish

-
, ,

the ru sted entanglements and the patches of marsh li n ed ,

with u n happy pollard s which sloped up gently to Frascati

,

and the remain s of La Brique O u r rout e from the bridge .

u sual l y took u s i n one of two directions across thi s wasted

lan d .Either we descended at o n ce into trenches and
m ade our way to various point s in the reserve or support
l ines from which we could obtain a fair View of the P i l k e m
Ridge or we wa l ked above ground with some disq u ietude of
,

Spirit through Frascati and La Brique to Wilson s Post a

’
,

concrete observation point on the forward s l ope beyond

-
.

This j our n ey never was an u n mixed j oy We h ad to pass .

through the garden of the last hou se ( or to be accurate , ,

what had been the garde n of what had been the l ast hous e) -

i n La Brique At one time the ruins of this building had

.

been used as a mach i ne gun post The G ermans having -

.
,
 YP R ES T HE P R E L I M I NAR I E S I1 5

become aware of this shelled it heavily and th e gun s were

, ,

withdrawn The derelict hou s e however was still an

.
, ,

occasiona l target and was yet an other poin t w here n o

,

sensi ble man li n gered Wi l son s Post a quarter of a m ile

.
’

in front was a small two storied tower e mbedded literally

,
-

t o its eyelids in the earth its cran iu m co n c e aled in wi ll ows

,

and other Shrubs It was approached fro m La Briqu e by

.

an unfinished trench about the depth of a roadside gutter .

In the bottom storey i l luminated by a candle a n orderly

, ,

sat over a t e l e phone ; in the upper chamber— about five

—
fe et s quare and eached by a ladder a te l escope p e ered
r

through two shallow sl its on the grou n d l evel a n d swept -

from a n angle the who l e fro n t over which my battalion was

to attack S itting on a little ben ch with on e s feet dangling
.
’

ov e r the trap d oor one could see the brown Slope of the
-
,

P i l ke m Ridge se a med with lighter colou red lin e s which

,
-

marked th e enemy s tre n ches the fo l iage of K itchener s

’
,
’

Wood appeari n g over the crest and away to the left th e , , ,

debris of the estaminet called B och e Cast l e and a few

cl umps of s keleton trees which on that obl it e rated cou ntry ,

—
side s e rved u s for la dmarks En glish Trees M arsou in
n
, ,

T rees H urst Park and that so l itary but usefu l vegetable

, ,

known to us as Lone Tre e ( Th e fate of English Trees .

,

marki n g th e site of a va n ish e d farm was follow e d by us ,

with pecu l iar i n terest and odds w e re l aid on or against

,

th eir surviva l Origi n ally they were eleven i n nu mb e r

.
,

but our preliminary bombardment thi n ned their ranks and ,

the ec l ipse of on e or another was sedu l ous l y recorded an d ,

the vita l information circu lated through out th e battalion .

About half a dozen I think all considerably the worse for

, ,

wear survived the ordeal and may be standi n g yet ) Far

, , .

beyond th e se outposts we cou l d see the h azy woods about

P i l k e m and La n gemarck and P o e l ca p e l l e We were pro .

vi d e d with ske tches professing t o depict all these features ,

and even such detai l s as Lan gemarck C hurch and the

Institute (whatever t hat m ight be ) at Passchenda e le ; but
no two of u s cou l d ever agree i n identifyi n g these remote
1 1 6 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

buildings O f far greater merit was a panorama taking in

.
,

our entire front drawn from Wilson s Post by an R E

,
’
. .

ofli c e r n amed B ren nan This was of real service t o u s '

. .

One si n gular obj ect I remem ber Situated pro minently on

, ,

the ridge top in front of K itchener s Wood puzzled us till

-
’

the end It was square i n outline and of the size of a small

.

cottage only n o cottage could be standing there and n one

,

was marked on the m ap The m ap on the contrary mis l ed

.
, ,

apparently by a light railway which aeroplan e photograph s

showed runn in g out to it from the wood marked it as an ,

am mu n itio n dum p ! This palpably was absurd a n d was ,

the result of some one making a guess withou t looking at

the ground O n l y a l unatic would erect a dump ten or
.

twelve feet h igh a thousand yards from the front line and
in fu l l View of the enemy I saw this mystery at c l ose .

quarters for the first t ime on the aftern oon of I s t August ,

when I was trudging homeward th rough th e mud and rain

with the remains of my crew and the n discovered it to be ,

a large concrete machi n e gu n for t covered with sheets of

-

brown camouflag e netting It had been hit more than .

once probab l y by the

, Shells with which we bombarded

the en emy s second l ine ; bu t these huge proj ectiles had

’

on l y cracked the wa l ls The effect of th e concu ssion in sid e

.
,

however must have been terrible A dead G erman with

, .
,

wide open blue eyes staring out of a grey face was l ying on
-
,

his back half out of the entrance and n o doubt ther e were ,

others within I was in n o mood for grisly investigations

.
,

and even my crew were too scared and exhausted to indulge

the ru l ing passion for souvenirs .

Amo n g the other attract ion s of La Briqu e and its

salubriou s n e ighbourhood were a couple of trees fitted
with i ron rungs and used as occasional and a third
dummy stump m ade o f steel inside which the ob server ,

insinuated h imself I never asce n ded the tal l est tree

.
,

eighty feet high and never had the least desire to do so ;

,

b ut I clambered once up the shorter one which stood at ,

the head of the ditch leading to Wilson s Post I did not ’

.
1 1 8 T HE TA N K IN A CT I O N

t inghe to the canal it w a s an obvious target and under

, ,

the continual i mpa ct of high explosive shell it decayed very

-

rapidly In the autumn of 1 9 1 6 it was sti l l inhabite d : by

.

the following spring it was a m e re avenue of e mpty ruin s ;

a n d when I left the Sa l ient i n October 1 7 most of the
’
,

debris even had been carted away as road bal l ast And .

during our recon n aissances it was n o u ncom mo n thing to

wait a n xious l y for an hour in the grou n ds of Reigersberg
Ch a teau with on e eye upon the sand bagged cel l ars there
,
-
,

watchi n g the fr a gme n t s of B rielen two or three hundred ,

yards up t he road ascending grac e fu l ly at regular and

, ,

freque n t i n tervals i n to the air

, .

It may be said that thi s sort of thing was child s play to

’

the conditions endu r ed in the line itself And so in one .

,

sen se undoubtedly it was A wa l k to Frascati or St Jean

, .

and back was on the face of it preferable to a week s

, ,
’

residence in either of th ose p l aces Yet I thi n k that every .

on e who knew the Salient in the sum mer of 1 9 1 7 will agree

that its most disagreeable feature during what would be ,

cal l ed inactive periods was this persistent shelling of back

,

areas O n any other front on e felt mo d erately safe two

.

miles behind the l in e but never at Ypres For troops in

, .

support there was n o rea l peace ea st of Poperinghe While .

the front trenches might be wrapped i n quiet Shells would ‘

be falling all day i n Bri e len or V lamertinghe or even in

Oosthoek Wood And the reason was obvious The Salient
. .

was very narrow as well as very pro n ounced AS a pur ely .

military position it was absurd A gu n of quite mod e rate .

calibre emp l aced on either flank cou l d have fired right

, ,

across th e chord of the arc At Boesi n ghe the en e my .

actually was north west of Ypres : in fro n t of Wytschaete

-
,

before the battle of M essi n es he was south west of it ; and

,
-

between these two points th e distance was only seven mi l es .

From the centre of a line drawn from one to th e other th e ,

Salient proj ected about four m iles Even after M essines the .

line of investment sti ll ran through half a circle and com ,

m a n d e d from the concentric P il ke m Ridge almost all t h e

, ,
 YP R E S : T HE P R E L I M I N ARI E S I I9

ground up to the canal With in this en closure o n l y half the

. ,

size of the city of Paris the cou ntry was flat marshy an d
, , ,

i ntersected by m inor streams and dykes ; while the obstacle

of the canal cau sed all the mai n ro a ds from the west down ,

which our men and supplies mus t march t o converge on ,

t he crossings at Ypres itself O n these roads there fore on .

, ,

the points where they were cut by lateral thorough fares and ,

especia l ly on the poi n t of convergence the hostile fire natu r ,

ally was directed And there were a t h ousand other target s

.

for less conce ntrated e ffort Troops swarmed e verywhere .

from Ypres to the B elgian frontier ; and i n the forward area ,

in addition to the camps of in fantry and gunners there were ,

hosts of en gineers and labour m e n digging gu n pits laying -

,

roads and railways putting u p horse lines an d dumps and

,
-

water systems Light and h eavy trains moved up and

.

down a l l day The Germans were perfectly aware of this

.

activity ; and it was an u nlucky battery that could not score

a hit or two i n the cou rse of twenty four hours speculative -
’

Shooting over so con gested a countryside .

O ur camp of bell tent s in the copse at Lovie C h a teau

-
,

where we Spe n t our nights was outside th e n ormal area o f,

this u np l e asantness Poperinghe of course two m iles t o

.
, ,

the south was Shelled for half an hour or so e v ery morning

, ,

often in the e v en in g and occasional l y at odd hours durin g

,

the day The Shel l s passed almost over our camp ; and
.

wh ile one was dress ing or preparin g to turn i n for the night
one used to hear th e whistle overhead and then th e distan t
crash and echo i n the un fortunate tow n An d once we .

were genuinely entertain ed by a crisis nearer at ha n d An .

enterprisi n g 1 5 inch gu n probably travel l i n g i n luxury on a

-
,

train took a few pot shots at the 5 th Army H eadquarters

,
-

in the ch a teau itself Whe n one or two of these colossal

.

proj ectiles bu rst i n the aerodrome across the road the ,

1 20 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

army became alarmed assu med hurriedly the un familiar

,

steel he l met and presently departed bag a n d ba gga gej for

, ,

Proven The G ermans we l l informed as usua l lear n t

.
, ,

almost at once of th is translation : the 1 5 i n ch gu n was -

turned on the new refuge ; and the H igher Command ,

choosing th e most comfortable of two evils came back to ,

Lovie again greatly t o the a n noyance of the Flying Corps

, ,

who in th e meantime had occupied the ch a teau The .

hu mour of this episode wil l be apparent to every one who

has seen the vast paraphernalia accompa n yi n g a Britis h
army h e adquarters in the fi e l d — the scores of o ffices the ,

hosts of C l erks order l ies and , ,

interpreters the attached French m ission s and Belgian

,

missions and missions from Liberia and Paraguay and th e

,

G reat Cham the number l ess boxes of maps and crockery

,

and retur n s and red tape — a l l of which had to be conveyed

-

i n an armada of cars and lorries from Lovie to Proven a n d

back from Prove n to Lovie agai n within a fortnight If .

three domesti c re mova l s are as bad as a fire two moves o f ,

an army headquarters can be compared only to a n earth

quake After the secon d hegira the enemy feel i ng n o
.
, ,

doubt that a continuance of this barbarous treatme n t ( if it

ever came to l igh t) wou l d bri n g down upon h im the j ust
execration of the civi l ised wor l d diverted his gun to m ore ,

appropriate targets and fell back upo n a n accept e d method

,

of irritati n g such exalted quarters — namely bombing , .

Bombing indeed was a very serious plague throughout

, ,

the area that su mmer ; and the subj ect raises an u n pleasa n t
question on which a few words must be said both on ,
,

genera l grounds a n d because it affected th e tank units in a

peculiar degree There can be n o two opin ions as t o who
.

held command of the air ( to us e the cant phrase ) in the

Ypres sector in 1 9 1 7 O ur photographic and gun Spotting
.
-

machines continued to perform their dangerous and tha n k

less tasks with u nfaili n g skill and courage as they have ,

throughout the war ; but their work required experience ,

its results could be checked and it was therefore in the ,

 1 22 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

recognised in the corps and it is high time some protest

,

was uttered agai n st the un scrupulou s nonsense which has

floo d ed our newspapers for th e past few years The point .
,

however that I wish to bring out at the moment is that th e

,

results of employi n g bad m at e rial for tasks requiring a

peculiar degree of n erve and a strong sense of responsibility
were seriously fe lt for the first time at Ypres i n 1 9 1 7 Th e .

O l d Som me fighters were dead or captured ; and now th e

back areas of the Salient were in fested day and night by

G erman bombing squadron s The G ermans presumably
.
, ,

picked their aviators as they picked th eir machine gunners

i
-
.

Th ey did n ot lose their h e a d s a fte r a cost l y batt l e and rush

to commission thousan ds of Berlin cou nter j umpers who -
,

might be excel l ent in the ranks but we re u seless as o fficers .

The di ffi culties of cou n teri n g n ight attacks by aeroplanes

were obvious ; but it was humiliating as well as unpleasant
to have a dozen enemy machines sai l in g over the lines two
or thr e e t imes a day bombing camps and towns destroying
, ,

balloons driving off the slow and he l pless gun Spotters an d

,
-

photographers (a n d their escorts) and obtaining into the ,

bargain much valuabl e informatio n During fou r month s .

in the area while th is infliction was occu rring almost every

,

day I saw only one G erman aeroplane brought down behin d

,

our own lines ; and this was destroyed above two of our ,

aerodromes by a couple of French pilots Possibly ou r

,
.

own squadron s were simultaneously bombin g Roul l ers or

Menin On e hopes they were B ut every aerodrome was
. .

crowded with fi gh ti ng machines which used to perform

-
,

tricks overh ead when all was quiet but made n o apparent ,

atte m pt to cut off the enemy s raiders On e corps com ’

.

mander inform ed the squadron attached to h im that if he

did not s ee it do more u seful work he would make every ,

pilot fly for two additional hours a day .

I have written e n ough perhaps too much on this u m

, ,

savoury topic And it may be asked — What has a l l this

.

recrimination to do with tan ks It has i n point of fact a , ,

great deal to do with them Ta n k warfare can be assisted

.
 YP R ES T HE P R EL I M I N AR I E S 1 23

or hindered to a mark ed degree by aeroplane co operation -

or the lack of it A m an or a ta n k or even a column of

.
,

troops can often elude observat ion from above merely by

,

rem aining still It is movement which betrays In fantry

. .
,

moreover can always take cover rapid l y ; but it is i mpossible

,

t o camouflage a tank in the open i n a few seconds In con .

seque n ce it is inadvisable to m ove tanks during daylight

near the front line i f any of the enemy s aeropla n es are ,
’

likely t o be about In the Salien t th ey were always about

.

and things had got to this pitch — that although we were

h idden in a wood with clearings close at h and wh ere we,

could have t e sted our machines secu re from direct obs e rva
tion dur i ng the wh ol e m onth of j nly n o ta nk w as p er m i tted to
,

m ove a y a r d excep t by ni ght At any hou r of th e day som e .

”
G erman aeroplane u n mo l ested except by Archies which
, ,

were more dan gerous t o u s below than t o the pilot m ight ,

com e flyin g low over O osthoek In my own case a fortnight .

,

before the battle I took over a new tan k j ust arrived from
Erin by night and driven into the wood by another crew
, .

I had n o opportunity of testing it u n der way u ntil we actu

ally moved off on our approach march to H alfway H ouse on -

the even ing of 2 9th J uly AS was to be expected of a brand .

n ew machi ne on e or two mech an ical parts were then fou nd

,

to require slight adju stments A Sl ipping clutch wh ich .

,

would have been discovered and remedied in a few m inutes

during a preliminary trial gave considerab l e trouble and , ,

held up all the tanks behind m e for some t ime .

Second l y contact aeroplanes can b e of the greatest use

,

i n battle by reporting the Situation o f tanks of which ,

battalio n and company com ma n ders can have little or n o

knowledge Infantry send back ru n ners ; but tanks except
.
,

for their pigeo n s reserved ( wh en available at all) for u se at

,

definite obj ectives have n o mea n s as yet of com mu nicatin g

,

their whereabouts or condition on ce they have crossed th e

front line In view of this arrangements were made with
.
,

the Flying Corps for tanks to carry certain permanent marks

which wou ld attract th e attention of contact pilots Every -
.
1 24 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

mach ine had its nu mber pai n ted i n large black characters
on a white grou n d on top of the cab and carried in addition ,

a Square of white cloth to be tied on the roof when ditched .

The duty o f a contact pilot as everybody knows is to fly at -

, ,

a su fficient l y low altitude to discover th e position of his own

infantry a n d a ta n k eve n without any distinguishing m arks
, , ,

is more co n spicuou s than a row of mud plastered hu man -

fi gures But no reliable i n formation so far as my battalion

.
,

was concerned ever came through from this sou rce : i n fact
, ,

I do n ot thi n k the position of a single tan k was reported .

M ost of them of cours e were ditched during a l arge part of

, ,

t he day a n d possibly the other tank com manders acted as

,

I did . When I foun d myself hope l essly bogged on the

P i l ke m Ridge the last thing I dreamt of doing was t o ha n g
,

out my conspicuous square of cloth I was at some pain s .

even to obliterat e with m ud t he n umber on my cab I was .

convinced that if any aeroplanes flew low above me in all ,

probability they would be G e rmans And in fact many .

ditched tanks l ying well behind ou r i n fantry were attacked

, ,

by the enemy s pi l ots who machi n e gunned the crews as

’
,
-

they strugg l ed with booms and shovels to ge t under way

again .

The foregoing may see m rather a len gthy and un n e ce s

sary digr e ssion but it is a poor book which one cannot
,

write i n o n e s own way And war after all ca n not be made

’
.
, ,

or described ( as some think) In water tight compartments -

.

Each arm is dependent upon the rest and sees m uch of their ,

work An d a fair l y long and varied experience has driven

.

home to m ost civilian soldiers l ike myself certain co n clu

sio n s regardi n g the variou s bra n ches of the British Army in
Eu r ope The cavalry Sin ce 1 9 1 4 1 5 ( when they fought
.
,
-

on foot ) have been utterly useless in part becaus e t hey ,

will not see things as they are ; the Flying C orps ,

Si n ce 1 9 1 6 has declined steadily in quality and value ;

,

but throughout for th e infantry the gunners and the , , ,

engin e ers on the whole no praise can be too high

, .
1 26 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

the Salient —a towering accu mulatio n of every size and type

of shell t ogether with thousands of cases of
, rock e ts ,

grenades V ery lights and other i n flam matory stuff— a n d

, ,

even from where we stood the effect o f its destru ction was
prodigious and alarming A great red g l are b l azed u p .

s uddenly above the trees b roa d e n e d a n d grew higher ; , , ,

volumes of b l ood shot smoke streaked with rockets -

, ,

covered half th e sky ; and present l y through the pop pop ,

-

pop of e xplodin g rifle ammunition and the louder detona

tions of She ll s we could hear the crackle of burning timber
,

as the neighbouri n g trees themse l ves caught fire In this .

lay a s e rious me n ace to the tanks for the wood although , ,

stragg l ing was continu ous It was n ot long before we could

,
.

s e e the dista n t flames through the trees i n fron t of us In .

t h e mea n time preced e d by magnific e n t eruptio n s of fire

,

and sparks there had burst two terrific exp l osions whose
, ,

concussions shook the ground h it u s like blows and flu n g , ,

fragm e nts of wh ite hot meta l on t o the mi l itary road -

.

H appily what l ittle wind there was b l ew away from us

, ,

and the fire made n o appreciable gain in our directio n ; a n d

after standing by until m idn ight prepared to drive the ,

tanks out of the wood if n e c e ssary we decided that we ,

might go home It was surprisi n g that the G erman s ( so

.

far at l east as one could j udg e amid the prevailin g uproar)

refrai n ed from stimulating things in general by a litt l e
j udicious she l ling The g l are of the great co n fl a gra ti on
.
,

which lit up the whole Sa l ient must have been visible ,

from Cou rtrai It was still b l azi n g and explodi n g as

.

we le ft ; and two hours l ater at Lovie Ch a teau four , ,

m iles away I heard another series of crashing de

,

t o n a ti o n s .

The fo l lowi n g morn ing I marched my crew d own t o the

n ew ta n k I decided n atural l y to take with m e my own
.

m en with who m by n ow I was well acquai n ted in pre

, ,

ference t o th e strange drivers a n d gunners whose o fficer

I had rep l aced Th e l a tte r I think were as d isappointed
.
, ,

as my own crew was pleased by this translation ; for

 YP R E S : T HE 3 I ST J U LY 1 27

throughout the battalion the spirit in th e ranks was admi t

able M ost of the
. a n d a large proport ion of the

m e n cam e from the original F Company of the H eavy

B ranch an d very few of them ( in my crew for e xamp l e
, , ,

n one at all ) had ever seen a Shel l bu rst u ntil they came to
th e Salient ; and wh ile i t is true that so l d iers ofte n look
forward to their first battle with a confiden ce bor n si m ply
of ignorance and deteriorate in m or a l as their experie n ce
,

of horrors i ncreases the person n el of th e Tank Corps m ain

,

ta i n e d to the end a conspicuous l y high standard An d t o .

go int o action in a tank as I hope to show is n ot the bed

, ,

o f roses some rash people used to th i n k it I put this con .

s istent excelle n ce down i n part to the class of man which

the corps attracted .

There was plenty of work to be don e when I took over

G 4 6 whose m ore i ntimate name — transferred from her dis
,

—
ab l ed predecessor an d n on e o f my choosi n g w a s G i n a
,
”
.

( Th e tanks and each battalion were christened with names

beginning with the i n itial letter of their u n it Thus we .

were all G ina appropriate l y en ough was a

, ,

female ; but i n fact it seem s natu ra l to speak of al l tanks as

feminine as i f they were ships ) I have said already that
,
.

n o movement was perm itted i n O osthoek Wood and th at ,

in con sequence it was i mpossible to test the tran smission of

my new comma n d En gines cou l d be run quietly how
.
,

ever ; and my first driver a boy named J ohnsto n e from the

,

Arm strong C ol l e ge at N ewcastle who was one o f thos e ,

fortunate beings with a fla i r for anything mechan ical ,

t inkered away affectionately at th e magneto and other

parts until th e engine of G 4 6 ran like a dream Through .

out her Short mi l itary career it gave no trouble of any

kind unti l the water on the P i l ke m Ridge got i nto the
clutch and put the whole thing out of action at once and
for ever .

M ost of the novelties in th e M ark IV hav e been described .

already ; but I have omitted so far any accou nt of the n ew

u n d i tch i n g gear tested by u s for the first t ime at Wailly and ,
1 28 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

now to be u sed with a vengea n ce i n the Salient In place .

of the two Short torpedo spars each tan k was n ow fitted,

with a single squared boom about tw e lve feet long a n d

,

stre n gthe n ed with steel It was a most heart breaki n g

.
-

affair to m a n handle for it weighed nine hundredweight ;

-
,

but for its particular work it was high l y efficient A pair .

of l on g i tu d i n a l rails lifted it clear of al l obstruction s on the

roof a n d when not in use it lay at right angles across these

,
-

j ust above the Spud box fitted on the stern o f the tank its
-
,

ends proj ecting a coupl e of feet on each Side of the latter .

Origi n al l y the boom was l ashed in p l ace ; but afterwards

,

C lips were provided to secure it to the rails When r e .

quired for un d i tc h i n g it was attached to the track plates

,

on eith er side in the same manner as the old Spars by a ,

pair of chains and clamps This attach ment could be .

effected by a couple of m e n standing behind th e tank ,

u sually the most Sheltered Spot O n its comp l etion th e

.

heavy boom was carried forward along the rails as the tracks
revolved slid down on to the m in front of the cab and was
, ,

the n pu ll ed u nder the tank where its great l ength a n d stiff

,

resistance tra n sverse l y t o the direction of the l atter s m ove ’

ment enab l ed the machi ne t o climb out of almost any

position This boo m was tested first in the sodden area
.

of M essines after that battle ; and it was i n u se with all

,

heavy tanks to the end of the war Its only d i s a d va n

.

tage — a n inevitable one — was its weight Added to that .

of thirty or forty iron spuds or shoes it comp l eted an ,

extra load of a couple of ton s ; a n d on occasion s when

the heavier M ark IV males became badly ditched it was
.

found that the engine was not powerfu l enough to ov e r

come this ha n dicap I have seen a boom on a tank l ying at
.

a rath e r acute ang l e refuse to m ove at al l B ut for all normal .

cases of ditching it was invaluab l e .

In those days tank equipment was devised and issued on

a lavish scale One took over with the machine a vast
.

assortment of instruments calculated to soften the asperities

of a very cramped and u ncomfortable mode of warfare and ,
 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

required to be washed dow n and scrubbed for Sh e cam e ,

s traight from the workshops in a filthy condition Th e .

s i x Lewis guns had to be c l ea n e d and the 2 7 6 drums filled

,

with ammunition Track plates spuds camouflage nets

.
, , ,

p etrol oil and grease had to be procured from the advanced

, ,

stores a n d dump beside th e ramp At the same time further

.

reco n n aissance was carried out a n d we all we n t to see the

,

l arge scale model of our sector of the attack which the 1 8 th

-

C orp s h ad built out of sand and brick rubble in th e centre

of the wood I cannot honestly say t hat this ingenious
.

curiosity was of much he l p to us H ere however som e .

, ,

s o r t of liaison was effected with the i n fa n try with whom

w e were to work M eanwh ile back in camp at Lovie Ch a

.
,

t eau there were conferences with R econnaissance o fficers

a n d d i scussions with company comma n ders after dinn e r .

Aeroplane photographs were studied and Special ta n k charts,

c omposed (
. E very tank commander so far as was possible
, ,

made h is o wn chart on a scale of Then there was

 YP R E S : T HE 3 I ST J U LY 1 31

the question of supply to be con sidered A l l cre w s took .

i n to action two days ordinary rations i n addition to the

’

emergency ration ; but this food was supplemented by a

few delicacies considered su itable to th e fe stive occasion .

Thus most o f us carried also oranges lemons chocolates , , ,

a n d biscuits on e water bottle filled with rum and a bottle

,
-
,

o f wh isky Personally I took two bottles of whisky and

.
, ,

was extremely thankful that I did .

Tu rn in g to the operatio n s themselves the 1 8 th Corps ,

was attacking on a front of two division s : th e s 1 s t D ivi sion

on the left a n d the 3 9 th on the right The two companies .

of G Batta l ion were allotted as follows : 1 9 Compa n y with ,

my own section — N o 1 0 of 2 1 Company ( 1 6 ta n ks i n all)

.
-

was to advance i n two waves with the 3 9 th Division The .

two remai n i n g sections of 2 1 Compa n y ( 8 tanks ) worked

i n a sing l e wave with the 5 I s t D ivision The task of these .

troops was t o carry th e G erm an first and second system s

on the P i l ke m Ridge and then secure the crossi n gs of the
Ste e n b e e k
. The position s of these crossi n gs at or n ear ,

St J ulien on the 3 9 th D ivisional front determined the dis ,

t r i b uti on of the tanks it being the b usiness of the second

,

wave on the right t o endeavour to get over the strea m and

help the infantry of the 1 1 8 th Brigade to con solidate on t he
far side My section in the first wave rec e ived the following
.
, ,

orders :
After cross ing the G erman front line N o 1 0 Sec , .

tion will split u p Th e left han d pair G 4 5 and G 4 6

.
-
, ,

pass t o th e north of K u ltur Farm and take the northern

end o f K itchener s Wood givin g special attention to
’
,

B oche Castle and strong point ; then proceed round-

the wood an d m op up i n conj un ction with the infantry

u ntil the barrage at line S lifts at zero plus when
they will advance with the infantry giving special ,

attention to Regina Cross Th e right hand pair G 4 7

.
-
,

and G 4 8 passing t o the south of K u l tur Farm will

, ,

take the southern en d of K itchener s Wood and on ’

,

the l ifting of the barrage on line S at zero plus w i ll

1 3 2 T HE TA N K IN A CT I O N

devote their attention to the strong point at Alberta -

,

and pu sh forward at the discretion of the commander

t owards H ugel H ol l ow .

AS s oon as the infantry are consolidated on the

“

Stee n b e e k Line tanks will rally at C 1 1 d , (north

of Alberta ) .

I despair of making any one u n fam iliar with the Salient

u nderstand what lay behind these clear and appare n tly
Simp l e i n structions Some of the difficulties before u s wi l l
.

be described i n the context I will remark here however .

, ,

that every ta n k had to cross the enemy s front line by a ’

Single narrow g a p between two flood e d areas which marked

th e Sites of H ampshire and Canadian Farms — themselves

utterly demolished We were warned that th is front system
.

was likely to become a seriou s obstacle Lying in a hollow .

,

always wet it was to be subj ected to a terrific barrage

, ,

which would destroy it complete l y break down the revet ,

ments and all such firm surfaces as parapet s and parados

provided and i n short reduce the whole lin e to a grisly
, , ,

conglomeratio n of mounds of mud and pools of water .

And once across things would become even worse For

, .

sixteen days before th e attack the who l e P i l ke m Ridge was

blasted by heavy calibre Shells The am ount of artillery
-
.

we had conce n trated in the Salient was unprecedented .

Three thousand guns I believe were in position on that , ,

restricted front R ound about Brielen V lamertinghe and

.
, ,

the ch a teau called Les Trois Tours batteries o f 6 inch ,

-
,

8 inch
-
, inch howitzers and 6 o pounder guns li n ed every
-
,
-

hedge : down both sides of one narrow track that I r e

member one pass e d them every few yards ; and when the
preliminary bombardment was at its height it was sheer
t orture to be in the neighbourhood AS a result every .
,

where behind the G erman line th e water was w elling up

and spreading u ntil the whole surface was a mere crust
that would dissolve at a touch The final barrage at zero .
,

which as usual was to fall at dawn would finish the work , .

The enemy s second line along the crest was to be deluged

’
, ,
 YP R E S : T HE 3 I ST JU LY 1 33

with 9 2 s ; while 1 5 inch railway gu n s had been shelling

.
’
-

for some days th e strong point at B och e C ast l e for which

-
,

my own tan k was to make Im a gine a cou n try like the .

Lincolnsh ire flats or th e valley of th e K entish Stour or

, ,

any other piece of rec l aimed and water logged land in -

England subj ected at th e end of three years systematic

, ,
’

annihilation by high explosives to this three weeks wild ,

’

crescendo of destruction and some idea may be gathered

,

of what the area behind the hosti l e front had become even
before th e downpour on the 3 I St and after added the ulti ,

mat e touches of d isintegration and horror and misery .

The probab le conditions awaiting us were known to all ;

but n one of our conj ectu res equalled the reality Before .

the battle we were more concerned over what proved in th e

even t a comparative l y m i n or evil —the difficulty we shoul d
experience i n fi n ding our way t o ou r variou s obj ectives .

The view from i n s ide a tank as one cannot repeat too often
, ,

is restricted an d m isleadin g O nce we had crossed ou r .

front line th e few m iserab l e tree clumps which we had

,
-

studied from a dista n ce m ight appear very d ifferent near

at hand They might have been destroyed or we might
.
,

fail to see them at all The one u n mistakable landmark

.
,

K itchener s Wood — a plantation still i n fai r condition

’
, ,

some 7 0 0 yards in length — was actual l y ou t of sight u ntil

we had climbed out of so me dead ground at the foot of
the ridge ; and with the dust and s moke of the batt l e the
first hou r after dawn was certain to be dark and confusing .

As our compasses were thorough l y unreliab l e there was a ,

danger of losing dir e ction at the very start A few tanks .

,

indeed quite excusably did so And throughou t th e day

,
.
,

all over a battlefield whose utter bewilderi n g sameness n o

words can express t here was much gropi n g and guessing
,

and ge n eral u n certainty O ne of G B atta l ion s tanks

.
’

wandered right across two corps front s B ut on the whole ’

.

our lengthy an d sedulou s coaching was very triumphantly

vindicated : rou tes were maintained and obj ectives reached
with su rprising accuracy and punctuality Delays in most .
1 34 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

cases were due to the appa l lin g state of the ground som e ,

tanks havi n g to be u nditched two or three times before they

got into action at all .

If the belief still lingers that the B ritish soldier keen ,

and wil l ing as he is always goes i n to battle ( as th e Ollivier

,

Cabinet once went to war ) with a light heart it mu st be ,

due to too much readi n g in trashy books and j ournals of

, ,

th e productions of half educated persons with a bias against

-

truth For very few m e n of whatever race can even

.
, ,

approach the front l ine in these scientific days with any

real equanimity of spirit The processes by which on e
.

can be hurt are too many and various an d i mpend too ,

n ear l y to permit of it N o hea l thy bei n g l ikes the idea

.

of being killed or mutilated A com mon se n se of s u b or d i

.

n ation and comradeship the fear of bein g thought afraid

, ,

and the power of hab it take one further than all the high
,

flown cant about glory and the j oy of battle And indeed .

i f we all went i n to battle with a light heart there wou l d

be n o merit in the thin g : such tokens as m edals and
ribbons would lose what small Significance they still possess ;
and we should be more ( or less ) than hu man .

It is during the days immediately before a long expected -

action that men Show in their several w ays that they are ,

o n the contrary very hu man indeed The strain which

,
.

perhaps for weeks has be e n there is sudde n ly increased .

N erves begin to wear tempers to rise u ncomfortab l e moods

, ,

to superve n e . O nly the very youn g and inexperienced

sometimes are superior to this faili n g I k n ow that m ost .

of u s in the camp by Lovie Ch ateau grew rather irritable

and contentious toward the end of ou r period o f waiting .

The depressi n g influence wh ich seemed al w ays to brood

over the Salient and the feeling that we were embarkin g
,

upon a n ovel and gigantic gamble were en ough t o accoun t ,

1 3 6 T HE TAN K IN ACT I O N

light In stead of keeping out of sight the whole batta l ion

.
,

ru shed out to see the raiders The latter might have over .

l ooked the camouflaged tent s and huts but the sudden ,

appearance of a mass of white upturned face s caught thei r

attention at once with the inevitab le r e su l t A few bombs
,
.

were released and th e crowd of spectators becam e a

,

shambles The Ty n es i d e rs lost 1 4 0 men in as many

.

seconds .

Toward the end o f J u l y the shelling of Oosthoek and

other likely p l aces a l so i n creased in vo l u m e The enemy .

was perfect l y aware of the i mmi n ence of the attack and ,

also as it app eared of the origin al date an d the first post

, ,

p o n e m e n t ; and the back areas suffered in con sequence .

The red dust floated over Ypres all day Poperinghe .

rec e iv e d i ncreas e d attention an d was bombed heavi l y into,

the bargain The can al becam e more than ordinarily

.

unpleasant B ut th e G erm an artillerists i n addition to

.
,

persecuti n g these obvious targets had a system of p l aster ,

ing with shel l s certai n empty areas which appeared to

offer n o attractions to a gun n er This wastefu l method .

gathered i n no doubt a few stray victim s but at a d i s p ro ,

p or ti on a te cost in am mu n ition The forward region about .

,

Frascat i an d La B rique was perhaps more n atura l ly a ,

”
favourite one for this blind area shooti n g for field ,

batteries were hidde n among the wi l lows ; and the enemy s ’

i ncreasing suspicion of this neighbourhood caused u s a

good deal of annoyance duri n g our final j ourneys on
recon n aissance I rememb er how K essel Merchant and
.
, ,

I having been up the li n e one morni n g were sitti n g u n der

, ,

a hedge n ear Frascati eating bul l y sa n d w iches and d iscu ss

,

ing ( of a l l things ) the fourth dim e n sion whe n we found ,

ourselves th e unworthy centre of one of these displays of

hate To u s it seemed purpose l ess and uncalled for to a
.

degree There was n o working party i n the neighbour

.

hood ; no one indeed was i n sight anywhere an d th e

, , ,

batteries some distance away were n ot firing B ut high

, , .

velocity shells arrived in streams and when we were ,

 YP R E S : T HE 3 I S T J U LY 1 37

back very than kfully at the canal the dust clouds were
, , ,
-

s till rising busily i n the desert waste betwee n u s and the

During these last days our preparat ion s in Oosthoek

Wood were completed The fighting tanks were ready .

—
for action The supply t anks two per compa y were
. n —
fi lled u p wit h petrol oil an d a mm un it ion ; limbered
, ,

waggon s drawn by mules were att ach ed to us t o work

between Frascat i and the base and we h ad also one ,

wire l ess and one cab le laying tank O ranges chocolates

-
.
, ,

and whisky had been collected We had received barrage .

maps and time tables and had visited the h eadquarters of

-
,

the various infantry u nits with whom we were to work .

M erchant and myself w ith G 4 5 and G 4 6 were c o operat

, ,
-

i ng with a b attalion of the Rifle Brigade This had m oved .

up to a bivouac on the edge of O osthoek and I wa l ked ,

over one m orn ing to discuss the attack with th e Colonel

and his O ffi cers They were very anxious about som e
.

a lleged wire i n front of th e Stee n b e e k which I undertook ,

to crush for them i f I ever got so far In the event I got .

n owhere near it and I was of litt l e or n o u se to these

,

i nfantry I am afraid that not m any of the officers I met

.

that morning were left after the battle for the 1 1 7 th ,

B rigade to which the battalion belonged suffered cruelly

, ,

o n the 3 I s t .

D urin g the night of th e 2 4 th 2 5 th J uly the tanks o f -

2 1 Company ( l ess N o 1 0 Section ) moved from O osthoek

.

Wood to H alfway H ouse O n the 2 4 th I had been working .

late with my m en on G 4 6 m aking the fi nal preparatio n s ,

for ou r own departure the following evening an d as we left ,

the wood about seve n o clock we m et the eight crews ’

m arch ing in t o their tanks Their m ove was atte n ded by .

o n e disaster The night was exceedingly dark rai n had

.
,

been fallin g and the surface of the narrow winding track

,
1 38 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

which 1 have described as leadi n g through the w ood t o

H ospital Farm had become greasy a n d treacherous A .

male tank swingin g too far to avoid a tree slid off the
, ,

ca m bered road into the wide moat which surrounded the

farm The water rose a foot above the floor boards i n
.
,

s ta n tl y putting the engine out of action As nothing could .

be done that n ight the tan k (whose roof was bare l y level
,

with the road ) was camouflaged and left the crew bivouack ,

i ng c l ose at hand Th e remai n der pushed on and after

.
,

being harassed by some she ll ing which fortunately did n o

harm parked up u n der the bu shes at H alfway H ouse
,
.

Owing to the postpo n ement of the attack for another three

days the sun ken tan k having been towed ashore the next
, ,

night with infinite di fficulty was got runn ing again i n ,

time t o rej oin th e company before the latter moved on to

Frascati .

About five o clock on the afternoon of the 2 5 th I was

’

having tea with K essel M erchant an d some others u nder , ,

the lee of a tank We were due to start our own move

.

at n ine that even ing H aving already consu med our own .

tea ration we were drinking an extraordinary mud coloured

,
-

beverage in fused from one of those compressed concoctions ,

strong l y resembling tobacco which friends and relations ,

u sed to send out as b e ing especially suitab l e for active

service Possib l y the Sinister influence of this drug was
.

accountable in part for the fact that n on e o f us were looking

forwar d to th e forthcoming approach march with the proper
military e n thusiasm It was t rue that the d a y was hu mid
.

and depressing ; that the wood was squelchy u nderfoot and

sme l t l ike a badly kept mau soleu m hurried l y washed in
-

petrol ; an d th at some of 2 1 Company having returned in ,

lorries from H a l fway H ou se for a few hours rest at Lovie ’

,

had brought discouraging reports of the route and th e

general conditions n earer to the line Brisk shel l ing was i n .

progress The tan ks of another batta l ion uncomfortably

.
,

embedded among heavy howitzers u nder the trees of Les

Trois Tou rs had come in for the enemy s counter battery
,
’
-
1 40 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

Yet curiously enough as it happened there seemed for

, , ,

a few hours a possibility of H oog l ede and many other

d istant villages comi n g qu ickly into the scheme of things .

For one effect of the last postpon emen t of our attack was to
m islead the e n emy to a certain extent Still a n ticipating .

it on the 2 8 th he withdrew hi s troops the n ight before

,

from 3 00 0 yards of his fro n t line on the canal opposite

B oesi n ghe The G uards and French immediately crossed
.

the canal occupied the abandoned trench es an d during the

, ,

night co n structed seventeen bridges Subsequent attempts .

to ej ect them were repu l sed Th is affair started a fi n e crop .

o f rumours about a more pro n ounced retr e at alo n g the

whole front B ut the G erman s had n o intention whatever
.

of retreati n g The evacuation of the ca n al trenches either

.

was a blu n der or had been designed as a trap and evidently ,

was regretted O ur movements ther e fore were carried

.
, ,

out as arra n ged ; and on the even i n g of the 2 8 th about ,

dusk the ta n ks of 1 9 C ompany and my own section began

,

their approach march to H alfway H ouse

-
.

N o one ev e r troubles to inquire how tanks are brought

u p to a battlefie l d They are there m iraculous l y at zero
.
, , ,

and that is enough Approach marches are usua l ly described

.
-

in a few words and their d e tails taken for gra n ted Yet
, .

they can be and often are the most exhausti n g a n d n erve

, ,

racking feature of tank operations They have to be u nder .

taken a t night Lights must be shown very sparingly if at

.
,

a l l even inside the t anks Th e glow of a cigarett e or a

, .
,

white ha n dkerch ief or map are often all that a n officer can ,

use to dir e ct h is driver The early stages of a march are .

m ade commo n ly over roads and tracks both for he l p in ,

guidance a n d to avoid leavin g spoors which hostile aero

p l anes cou l d observe or photograph ; and the breakdown
o f one machine on a bridge or in some street or defi l e may

h old up all the others behind it to say n oth ing of any ,

traffic on the route N otwithstanding the greatest care in

.

constr ucting t ime tables no trek is comp l ete that does not
-
,

involve meeting and consequent trouble w i th transport .

 YP R E S : T HE 3 I ST J U LY 1 4 1

Light railways timber tracks bridges ground lines pipe

,
-
, ,
-
,

l ines air lines —all these mu st suffer i n spite of precautions

,
-
,
.

Th e rate of progress wi l l be madde n ing l y slow Although .

even a Mark IV could m ove at a fair Speed under n ormal

.

conditions it i s i mpossible to maintain anyth ing l ike thi s

,

when moving a dozen or two by night into battle Ther e .

will be frequent halts t o let th ose beh ind c l ose up It i s .

almost certain that somebody will become d itched or break ,

a fa n belt or get on fi re or fa ll into trouble of som e kind

-
, ,
.

Such accidents t rifli n g in a p e aceful dayligh t trek becom e

, ,

agonising amid the circu mstance s of an approach march by -

night whe n repairs have to be effected i n th e dark and

, ,

when prolonged delay m ay be fata l In many cases a l l .

ranks will h ave been worki n g most of the precedi n g day .

They will be up al l n ight Probably they wi l l work again .

during part of the n ext day and will be m ovi n g once more ,

throughout a second n ight They are lucky if they can .

obtain any genu in e rest d uring the few hours allotted for
th at purpose Those hours a r e sure to be Spe n t in th e
.

forward battery area liable to be shelled or gassed at a n y

,

time a n d always i ntolerably noisy

, And as th e tanks .

approach the fron t lin e there is an increasin g l ik e lihood of

their com ing under Shell fi r e which they can n either dodge
-

nor counter An in fantry colu mn so caught can at least

.

scatter or take cover ; but the tank crews remain boxed up

i n their craw l ing machines com mitted t o a definite rout e ,

which may lead into the heart of the trouble seeing and ,

hearing little or nothin g but imagi n ing much and with , ,

none of the stimulant s of action to su stain them Probably .

their officers are compelled still to walk outside as gu ides .

Add finally to all this the inevitable strain and a n xiety

involved i n the general situation ; the actual physical labou r
attending all work con nected with tanks ; the extrem e heat
endured for hours by the crews ; and it wil l be apparent
that th e latter are n ot exactly fresh when the tim e comes
to go into action .

J ustice has never been done t o this side of tan k warfare ,

1 4 2 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

or to the Corps achievements i n r e spect of it Before

’
.

every one of the hundred actions i n which tan ks have taken

part some such ordeal as I h ave described with variation s
, ,

for better or worse according to C ircumstances has been ,

u ndergone Exc l uding the very e ar l y days when everythin g

.
,

was against the n e w u nit the occasions on which the great ,

maj ority of every section or company detai l ed ( often at th e

last mome n t ) for action did not arrive at the front line in
time w e re extreme l y rare Far more often tha n not e very .

mach ine arrived i n time The climax of this efficien cy was .

reached in the l ast batt l e before Am i e ns on the 8 th August ,

1 9 1 8 wh en out of 4 3 5 tan ks coll e ct e d hastily from a l l over

,

Fra n ce 4 3 0 started i n front of the infantry at zero B ut

,
.

even th e i nfantry n ever fu ll y appreciated becau se they were ,

nev e r made to u n dersta n d the amount of sheer labou r a n d ,

persistence put forth o n their beha l f They call e d for ta n ks .

from somewhere at three o r fou r hours notice — and the ’

tanks came An d that after a l l was what chiefly mattered

.
, , .

Our trek to H al fway H ouse was accomplish e d with on l y

one seriou s hitch O n accou n t of the accident to the tank
.

at H ospita l Farm we were to avoid that p l ace by taking

,

a paral l e l track through the wood wh ich increased slight l y

the length of th e route My section was to lead About . .

an hour before we started something we n t wrong with the

differential of Merchant s t ank and h e did not l eave with ’
,

the rest When about n i n e o clock in the eve n i n g the

.
,
’
,

other two tanks of N o 1 0 pul l ed out from the trees south

.

o f the mi l itary road and swung on to the t imbered thor

o u gh far e G 4 6 was waiti n g on the north side to fa l l i n

,

b e hi n d 1 9 Company fo ll owed afte r me Spectators from

. .

the infantry bivouacs now springing u p again in the wood

lined the roadside to watch the l ong l ine of tanks m oving
o ff in the dusk but all wheeled traffic had been stopped or
,

d iverted for an h our B efore that period was up a l l the

.

fifteen tanks had left the road and were proceeding north ,

ward along th e lane u n der the t rees The night was misty .

but clear and l ighted brilliantly with stars ; but there was
,
1 44 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

th at we were astonished by th e arriva l of M erchant s tank ’

,

which we had left i n O osthoek Wood with its differential

casing removed The repairs had been effected very
.

rapidly and the tank had then covered th e whole rout e

,

on fourth speed actually overtaking us i n lit tle more than

,

an hour Th e enclosure at H a l fway H ouse was r s ota n

.

gu l ar a n d t o e n ter it we had to cross a wide ditch choke d

, ,

with ferocious brambl e s and break through a towering ,

hedge . My sectio n was to l i e u p under some lo n g n e

g l e c t e d fru i t trees and a n other h e dge on th e far side ; and

a good d e al of man oeuvring—infuriati n g work i n the dark

with the Mark IV secondary gears — was required before .

we were satisfactorily hidden Cam ouflage nets had the n .

to be strung up to the trees pegg e d down and suppl e , ,

m e n te d by foliage All ranks as fast as their tanks wer e

.
,

secured for the n ight he l ped to efface our tracks through ,

the h edge a n d a cross th e en closure The work was fi n ished .

about 2 A M and l eavin g two m en per crew and one officer

. .
, ,

per section with the tan ks the rest of u s t railed than kfu l ly ,

back to the beginning of Ru m Road where lorries were ,

waiting to carry us to Lovie for a final rest in camp Such .

arra n gements for one s com fort it may be n ot ed were ’

, ,

peculiar in my experience to this operat ion alon e They .

were made possible by the length of the route and could ,

be applied only to this short initial stage U sually they .

are ou t of th e question .

The ensu i n g eveni n g that of the 2 9th we retu rned by , ,

lorry to H a l fw ay H ouse at dusk The dangerous part of .

the j ourney includin g the crossi n g of the cana l had now

, ,

to be acco mp l ished Rain had fa ll en agai n the sky wa s

.
,

clouded and the night promised to be a black one

, It .

was i n deed already very dark whe n 2 1 Company pulled

out of the enclosure A section of 1 9 Company fol l owed .
,

and then my own My exasperating clutch although i t

.
,

had been tightened up durin g the day proved to be still ,

refractory I was obliged to ha l t again after a while to

.

make a further adj ustment ; and as the operation was n ot

 YP R E S : THE 3 IST J U LY 1 45

a lengthy one I asked the tank commander behind me

,

( Lynch ,
who was killed thirty six hours later ) to wait
-
as ,

I wished to maintain my position i n the colu mn We .

were off again i n fact very shortly after

, , B ut at this .

stage every on e was becoming anxious and irritable a n d ,

the stoppage brought exalted personages ravi ng about

G 4 6 clamouring for it to proceed
,
As it happened .
,

haste wou ld have helped nobody for about this time ,

serious disaste r overtook the sect ion in front Our rout e .

left Rum Road a quarter of a mile from the canal and ,

took thence a narrow track leadin g direct to M arengo

Causeway This track was bounded by a dense hedge
. ,

with trees on one hand and by a deep ditch on th e other

, ,

its sur face was greasy after the rain and th e two leading ,

tanks of 1 9 C ompany slid off into th e ditch They still .

blocked the track and u n til they were got out no one
,

could advance I soon caught up this paralysed advance

.

guard where crews were labouri n g with booms and shovels

, ,

and o ffi cers were peeri ng at their watches and whispering

anxiously . H enriques the R econnaissance O ffi cer o f 1 9
,

C ompany came to me muttering that things were very

,
“

”
seriou s . As indeed th ey were for the nights at the end ,

of J uly are sh ort : it was already nearly one o clock ; an d ’

i t was essent ia l for u s a l l t o reach the sh e lter of th e trees

at Frascati before mornin g If dawn fou nd a n y tanks in .

th e O pen east of th e canal all sort s of calamities would

,
’

have ensued The whole offensive would have been

.

j eopardised as our presen ce so far forward must have

,

advert ised its i mmediate onfall to the enemy t o say ,

n oth ing of the consequences to ourselves Added to these .

apprehension s for th e morrow there fel l the present fear ,

that at any moment the G ermans might begin to Sh e ll

th e canal and its approaches Their gunners had been .

very quiet so far that night ; but if they chose to i ndulge

i n their favourite pasti me while ou r fi fteen tanks were he l d
u p i n a line a coup l e of hu ndred yards from the Causeway
, ,

the results probably would be highly unpleasant V ery .

K
1 46 T HE TA N K IN A CT I O N

fortunately nothing happened and the di fficulty was over

, ,

come The ditched tanks got the m selves out and w e

.
,

crawled one by one on to Marengo Causeway which ,

2 1 Company had crossed safe l y half an hour before H ere .

again our luck he l d : at this most critical point i n the whole

route not a shel l fell to disturb us and the whole column , ,

passing o v er without mishap entered the d ismal wilderness ,

of old trenches wire smashed trees and Shell holes on th e

, , ,
-

farther Side From here o nwards our route had been taped
.

by the and but for this assistance half of the tanks

must hav e ditched thems e lves or lost their way The broken .

ground which had looked nasty enough by day became a p

, ,

pa ll ing i n the pitchy darkness ; and I recall this final stage of

the j ourney as a long b l ack nightmare of fatigue and a p p re
h e n s i on There was no track and in many places even the
.
,

tape had vanished displaced or buried by the leading tan ks

, .

Over the com munication trenches still in use narrow wooden

bridges had been built and these required skilful negoti a
,

tion As I walked in front of G 4 6 knowing that all my

.
,

driver could see of me was the faint white patch on my

back I was contin ual l y fal l ing into sh e ll holes trippi n g
,
-
,

over debris or getting hu n g u p in wire ; and with the

,

tank lumbering b l in dly alo n g a few feet behin d m e these ,

accidents put me in infinite terror of being run over At .

least one tank com mander Alden had in fact a very , ,

narrow escape from death or inj ury that night through

becoming entangle d in a mass of wire H is tank cleared .

h im by inches while he was still struggling to get free ,

and then the track caught th e wi re and pu ll ed him help

lessly after H e was bei n g carried on to the roof when
.

the driver someho w discovered what had happened an d

pu l led Up .

The enemy now began to i nterfere to add to our d i s ,

comfort by bombard ing the whole n eighbourhood fairly

,

heavily with gas shells There was a battery of .

howitzers fir i ng i n the open close to our route and pos ,

s ibl y this was his target V ery fortunately we had been

.
1 48 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

Frascati Farm stood j ust east of the road wh ich ran ,

para ll el to the canal from P i l ke m through La Brique to

,

Ypres The trees about the farm their scars then concealed
.
,

in part by heavy foliage came down to the roadside ; and to ,

the right of them as one approached from the causeways

, ,

a gap in a h e dge gave entra n ce to a She ll pitted field O u r -

.

tanks having been l ed through this gap now l ay parked up

, , ,

n os e to tail against som e im men se overgrown bushes which

,

lined th e southern e d ge of the timber The camouflag e nets .

,

j oined together stretched over the who l e long line AS day

, .

broke we co u ld see some very new shell holes in the field ; -

and we learnt that the place had been shelled that night
while 2 1 Company was moving in One o ffi cer had been .

h it in the leg but insisted on staying with h is tank and

,

taking i t into action —a piece of plucky quixotry which kept

h im in hospital a fterwards for m any m o n ths .

We spent that day th e 3 oth i n attempts t o get s l eep or

, ,

at l east rest u nder the tanks and camouflage netting The .

weather was non descript and depressing— a lowering sky

threatened rain but none fell Throughout the day G erman
, .

aeroplanes came and went with i mpunity above us and ,

periodically Shells whistled over th e trees and burst i n

black plumes of earth beyond the hedge along the far side
of our field between us and Ypres N one happi l y fell
, .
, ,

any nearer O f Ypres itself on the low ground abou t a

.
,

mile away the higher ruins dominated by the ragged

, ,

tower of the Cloth H all were j ust Visible above the hedge ,

top The town was being shelled continual l y so that at

.
,

t imes qu ite a haze of the familiar red brick dust floated -

over it The uproar of our own artillery seemed les s

.

intense perhaps because we were now in front of the most

,

advanced fi e l d guns -
.

During those hours of wa i ting the incident I remembe r

most clearly was a discussion we had at lunch t ime on th e -
 YP R ES : THE 3 I ST J U LY 1 49

su bj ect of English country p l aces we had known It seem s .

n ow an odd thing to have been sitti n g the re in that forlorn ,

region our backs against a tan k peering th rough the cam ou

, ,

fl a ge netting at the shells bursting in Ypres and comparing ,

the peaceful beauties of Su ssex and Cornwall and the Eastern

S hires . O f the little company of u s gathered th ere K essel ,

was a C orn ish man whose work was i n the north ; Merchan t
was a n East Anglian from India ; B rassington came from
the valley of the Eden and Alden and myself were by way
o f being Cockneys of French extraction or interests Be .

tween us we had seen a fair part of England and there ,

was a pecul i ar fascination in the circu mstances in recalling

, ,

pleasant holidays and j ou rneys ac hieved in those remot e

days when soldiering was th e last of all human profession s
we e v er expected to adopt All of u s I think as very normal
.
, ,

u nheroic people would have given a good deal then to be

,

back in our own country .

A little later toward tea time M aj or Fernie then com

,
-
, ,

manding 1 9 C o mpany appeared on the scene to wish u s

,

good l uck and i ssu e final i nstru ctions C ompany head .

quarters during the battle were to be established in the dug

o ut at H ill Top Farm a pile of rubble an d sandbags about
,

a fragmen t of wall which stood up l ike a h uge tooth m idway

between Frascati and the front line Throughout the ex .

p a n s i on of the Tank Corps the company has remained th e

u n it of battle ; the battalion is Virtually a brigade and ,

advanced batta l ion head quarters lives dur i ng O peration s

with the infantry division or army corps concern ed In .

this case Colonel H an key a few hours before zero estab

, ,

l i s h e d himself at the 3 9 th D ivisional H eadquarters i n

O osthoek Wood .

As dusk fell we began to clear for action We filled u p .

with petrol from the du mp among the trees and piled there
a l l camouflage nets tarpaulins and spare kit
, A tank pre
, .

pared for action cluttered up as it is with necessary stores

,

a n d am munition h as n o room for other i mpedimenta

, The .

c rew wear i ng ordinary workshop overalls take with them

, ,
1 50 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

o n ly revolvers In the m iddle of this work the enemy who

.
,

had left u s in comparative peace a l l day started to shell the ,

neighbourhood with gas ; and for some time we had to carry

o n handicapped by box respirators The tedious business
-
.

of fixing spuds occupied the last hour before the move .

Spuds were always carried i n the box on the roof u ntil the
l ast possible moment as any hard surface such as that o f a
, ,

road crushed them and put a dangerous strain on th e hard

,

steel track p l ates -

Each tank carried forty four of these
.
-

iron shoes of which we had to clamp on about thirty that

,

night at Frascati — a laborious process with stiff nuts and

bolts and an inad e quate supp l y of spanners My crew and
, .

I were ab l e to fix on l y half of our quota in the time and the ,

remainder we flung into a d itch under the bushes where for ,

all I know they lie to this day u nl e ss they have been dis ,

covered by some puzzled Belgian labourer .

At all engines were started up and at 1 1 o clock we ,

’

moved off O ne tank of 1 9 Company developed some internal

.

troub l e and was left beh ind The trek for a long time was
.

devoid of any incident The Reconnaissance officers led

.

my section was now the l ast in the l i n e ; and I simply

fol l owed the tan k in front o f me I can remember n oth in g .

that happened u n til we reached H ammond s Corner a ro a d ’

,

j unction near H il l Top Farm and about a thou sand yard s

from the front line We were so well ahead of time that
.

we ha l t e d for an hour at this poi n t The n ight was very .

quiet for there was a lull i n the gun h re The Sky was
,
-
.

c l ouded and dark ; but unc e asingly around the cur ve of the ,

Sa l ient — to our right and l eft and ev e n in our rear— the V e ry

l ights rose s l ow l y a n d hung for a space and faded their ,

diffused radianc e refl e ct e d in th e crater poo l s a n d impri n t

i ng continu a ll y alo n g the horizon ephemera l si l hou e ttes of
naked and eerie trees Th e G erma n s were using then a
.

very pretty variant of this i ll umination ( or so I suppose it to

have been ) a kind of s l ow rocket that soared up obliquely i n
,

straight bars of brilliant light on e below the other In fact

, .

the Ypres salient depressing in its utter ru in in the day

,
1 52 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

trucks as u sed for anti aircraft work might have bee n

,
-
,

brought up to the sum mit of the P il ke m Ridge at many

points ; and if employed with discretion for short periods
and moved continually ou r gunners would have found it
,

very di fficult to hit them ; wh ile once our tan ks had been
see n an d held in the rays they m ight have been knocked to
pieces in a few minutes At Ypres it is true the G erma n s
.
, ,

( with some j ustice ) were not greatly afraid of tanks but in

later battles particularly during the final autumn of the
,

war when elaborate road systems in fair condition ran

,

behind the armies the valu e of mobile searchlights fo r

'

cou ntering expected tank attacks would appear to have

been so cons iderable as to j ustify any sacrifice involved .

B ut on no occasio n so far as I am aware were they used

, ,

for this purpos e In th e c ours e of our last advance successive

.

assaults which m ight have been disorganised and possibly

,

ruined by a premature discovery of tanks moving up were ,

allowed to come as a surprise .

Th e ulti mate m in utes before z ero passed without event .

With the aid of th e V ery l ights I endeavoured once more to

read the map which hu ng in front of me and peered con ,

t i n ua l l y at my clock A tot of whisky was passed roun d

.

the crew Th e engin e j ust t icking over drowned by its

.
, ,

throbbing the n oise O f the machine gun barrage which still -

,

continued In front the long line of ta n ks stood m otionl e ss

.

on the gentle s l ope And so in a dim l it silent world we

.
,
-

waited for the moment of attack .

 C H APT E R IX .

Y P R ES : T HE 3 I ST JU LY (conti nued) .

I H AV E been told that the gigantic clap of sound pro

d uce d by the simultaneou s discharge of two or three
thousand gu ns at zero that morning was a phenomenon
never to be forgotten by those wh o heard it But I do .

n ot remember hearing it at all Enclosed in a vibrating.

box o f steel the subdued throbbing of my engine drown ed

,

even this apocalypt ic crash And this e ffect of silen ce

.

for we were all so accustom ed to the local n oise of ou r

m achinery that i t may be said we were u nconscious o f i t
made yet more wonderful the really astounding display of
pe tech n i cs wh ich in a second blazed up around the whole
arc of the Salient At . A M when I looked at my
. .
,

clock for the last time th e night was dark and m isty an d
,

very still .H eavier clouds had rolled up and there was ,

no Sign of th e dawn O nly the pistol lights still soared

.

and died away about us Precisely at . two or three

thousand shells of every calibre burst virtually together i n
two great semicircles on or over the e n emy s first an d ’

second lines—ten m iles or so of sudden flam e and horror .

A few hundred yards i n front of our leading tank th e

very earth seemed to erupt It spouted fire and fragme n ts
.

like a volcano The mist which hung over the trenches i n

.

th e little valley was rent to tatters in a blaze of orange

light while hundreds of shrapnel bursts Sparkled above
,
-
,
1 54 T HE TA N K IN A CT I O N

and the drum s o f thermit poured down their molten oil

like burning rain Far behind where the
. barrage fell ,

along the crown of the ridg e great tongues of flame leapt and ,

wavered i n vo l umes of scarlet s mok e And from out O f this .

instantan eous infern o arose strings of green and crimson

rockets — the S O S calls of the enemy
. . . It was the .

apotheosis of the artillery barrage although n o on e sus ,

p ec te d it then : the greatest blast of gun fi re ever con

-

ce n tr a ted at once on any battlefield and so far at least , ,

as the British Army was concerned the last of its kind ,

.

The next offensive battle at Cambrai was to inaugurate , ,

a new order of things .

From H ill Top or Frascati this great curve of spoutin g

, ,

fire must have been a magnificent spectacle and the sudde n ,

shattering n oise of it appalling ; and I was so fascinated

by the small part of it which I could see that I forgot
entirely to start the tan k The whole of my crew was .

crowded forward behind the driver and myself craning ,

over our Shou l ders to watch through the flaps such a dis
play of fireworks as they had never dreamed of Realising .

suddenly that th e interval between G 4 6 and the tank in

front was increasing I t ouched J ohnstone on the arm ;
,

and the roar of th e engine deepened as with a s l ight ,

j erk we also began to move Already th e glare of the

, .

bursti n g shel l s sti l l rai n ing down upon the zero line was
, ,

dulled by a pa l l of s moke and dust The spectacular gl ory .

of the barrage was at an end Within a few s e conds it .

was due to l ift forward at a rate of a hundred yards every

four m inutes B ut it still showed as a flick e ring haze of
.

l ight across our front ; and agai n st this one could see the
long l i n e of ta n ks moving downward to Forward Cottage ,

about which point groups of dark figures were standing

on the parapets or wa l king carelessly forward across
Admiral s Road toward the G erman trenche s
’
.

It seemed a long time before G 4 6 reached these

trenches There were in fact co n tinual stoppages as
.
, ,

th e tanks i n front struggled to find a crossin g in th e

1 5 6 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

at the prospect of cru mbli ng an d s l ithery mud heaps in -

front of u s ; and I was about to leave the tan k to search for

a crossing p l ace myself when K essel unexpected l y appeared
-

o utside . With h is help we got over at a point where some ,

revetting stakes and wire still survived ho l ding the soil to

-
,

gether and prov i ding a quas i stable surface for the tracks -

to grip .

Once across K essel scramb l ed in through one of the

,

S ponson doors-
and as we lurched warily round the lagoon
,
”
he i n formed me by shouts that all this was great fun
( a point which had escaped me) and that poor Brassington ,

was bogged hopelessly somewhere near at hand We were .

n o w c l imbin g out of the dead ground in which the front

li n e had run The light was improving rapidly but so

.
,

d ense a screen of s moke and m ist hung over the ridge

that n o landmarks were visible In front o f me a line of .

tanks — the leading section of 1 9 Company —was moving

o bliquely to the right N earer at hand was one on fi re
.
,

a n d a second apparently ditched N o shel l s seemed to be .

fal l ing in ou r n eighbourhood but far ahead a flicker of light ,

i n the fog showed where our barrage continued its a nni h il a t

ing progress up the s l ope Indistinct groups of fi gures moved
.

about in the gloom — signallers layi n g lines of wire platoons ,

i n support digging them selves in stretcher bearers run n ers ,

-
, ,

a n d walking woun d ed trailing back to the aid posts The -

.

d amp air reeked of the pungent gases of high explosives .

The ground although one intricate net of she l l holes grew

,
-
,

fi rmer as we left the infamou s region about the front lin e ;

and with ski l ful driving we were able to m ake fair pro
, ,

g r e ss without runni n g extravagant risks J oh n stone indeed .

, ,

drove extraordinari l y we l l The great trouble at first was .

t o find our right direction for all our famous groups of ,

trees were still invisible a n d K itchener s Wood was veiled

,
’

c omplete l y by the smoke and du st of the barrage The .

G erman trenches which we had studi e d on the map were

blow n to pieces and un recognisable O ne cou l d see nothing .

anywhere i n fact but a brown waste of mud blasted

, ,
 YP R E S : T HE 3 I ST J U LY 1 57

into ridges and hollows like a frozen sea littered with ,

d ebr i s and me l ting on all hands into the prevailing haze

, .

The gradient of the ridge was too slight to be a guide u nde r

the circu mstances ; my compass was chasing its tai l and
behaving generally as i f it was drun k ; and after we had ,

swung a dozen tim es to avoid the more dangerous crater s

that lay in ou r way we might have been heading in almost
,

any direction It was th erefore with some relief that

.

K essel and I detected presently in th e smoky distance a , ,

familiar obj ect that both of us like Captain Reece s ,

’

washerwoman long had loved from afar This was Lon e

, .

Tree — a rotun d bushy shrub near K ultur Farm whos e ,

exceeding merit it was to look the same from every point

of View It was u nm istakable ; and now happily preserved
.
,

amid the u n iversal ruin i t still stood a little battered and

, ,

e n tire l y denuded o f foliage as a signpost on the way V ery

, .

shortly after the ragged tree tops of K itchener s Wo od -

’

came also into View .

Abo u t this time K essel scrambled out lea v ing behind ,

him vari ou s impedim enta inc l uding a haversack and the,

section flag — this last an e mblem of red and green th e ,

battalion co l ours with a large white 1 0 sewn on to it

,
“
.

I could now see M erchant s tank apparently in trouble in

’
, ,

a sort of marshy gully to my right front ; but a l ittle while

later he passed me again going in great style Time w a s , .

Slipping away : it was n early five o clock and already w e ’

were late owing to the delays at the front line We wer e

, .

, ,
—
n ot far however from our first obj ectives Boche Cast l e
and the G erman second syste m in front of K itchener s ’

Wood where I still hoped to overtake the in fantry Th e

,
.

heavy howitzers had n ow lifted t o the Stee n b e e k and

beyond and the creepi n g barrage was crashing in th e
,

wood itself above which h ung clouds o f smoke

, Th e .

enemy s cou n ter barrage falling i n the begi n n ing o n

’
-
,

ou r front and assemb l y trenches had developed into a ,

heavy but promiscuous bombardment of the western

slope of th e ridge ; and for the first time since zero ,
1 58 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

I saw the sinister b l ack fountains of earth spouting up in

front and heard the occasio n al ratt l e of fragments on th e
,

roof of G 4 6 It was presumab l y on e of these pieces of

.
, ,

shell or perhaps a shrapnel ba ll that cut the lashings of

, ,

my un d i tchi ng beam about this time As we dipped our .

n ose into a shell hole the beam slid dow n over the cab
-

on to th e grou nd Stoppi n g at once I got my whole

.
,

crew out to recover it ; but to lift on to the roof again

9 cwt of steel and wood in so u nhandy a form was beyond
.

ou r powers ; a n d the occasion bei n g urgent I decided to ,

a bandon the thing rather than waste time in man oeuvring

the tan k a n d fixing the c l amps or other tackle .

We obtained a more comprehen sive View of the outer

world during this excursion but there was little to be ,

seen The battlefield wore that melancholy and deserted

.

a i r characteristic of modern war Acres of foul slime .

be l ow dark and heavy clouds hangin g l ow overhead

, ,

odours of gases and corruption a few tree stumps a few ,

-
,

bodies lying crumpled in the mud half a dozen tanks ,

labouring awkward l y in the middle distance and th e ,

She l l bursts shooting upward l ike vast ephemeral mush

-

rooms — and that was a l l There was hardly a Sign o f .

life in all that mournful and chilling la n dscape The .

d ark but busy interior of G 4 6 crowded with humanity , ,

was homely by comparison and i n fi n itely quieter War .

has been tra n slated i n to term s of sound and the racket ,

o f gun fi re was appa ll ing

-
Coming from inside a ta n k .
,

where one heard noth i n g but the fam iliar roar of the
e ngine this eternal throbbing blast of noise deafened
,

a n d bewildered Overhead the she l ls were rushing in a

.

t orrent with a continual cry l ike that of a gale amo n g

tr e es — whee u whee u whee u whee u
“ -
, For -
,
-
,
-

th e first few m inutes u nti l I can becom e used to it any

, ,

l oud and sudde n n oise ( a n d this was worse than any

ever heard before ) always renders m e virtually imbecile ,

almost incapable of coherent thought or action ; and I

was hearti l y glad t o clamber back again to the com
1 60 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

the result was a congeries of immense craters which I ,

believed to be caused by mines until I reflected that no ,

mine shafts could have been driven so far The mebu s

-
.

itself had been u prooted bodily like a plaything and n ow , ,

lay flat upon its side cracked but still more or less entire
, ,

— a n advertise ment of the resisting p o wers of reinforced

concrete .

From this and other indications the absence of dead

or wounded on the ground except at one spot to be noted ,

later ) it was c l ear that there had been no v e ry serious fi gh t

,

ing about this point ; and indeed the first impact of 9 2 s at .

’

zero followed later by the lighter creeping barrage had

, ,

Virtua l ly obliterated the whole system in front of the wood .

It was n o easy task for a tank to thread its way among

these vast excavation s about Boche Castle and things ,

were complicated by the presence of a large patch of

boggy grou nd there which had also to be avoided As .

we proceeded we discovered that Merchant s tank less

,
’
,

fortunate than ou r own had become ditched in one of ,

the biggest craters where it lay at a most uncomfortable

,

ang l e looking very much like a drowned beetle in the

,

bottom of a wine glass -

.

O ur own ultim ate d isaster was near at hand There ran .

out of the salient the dism al remain s of a thorough fare

known to u s as Boundary Road wh ich after crossing , ,

Admiral s R oad in N o M an s Land and then the G erm an

’ ’

front line zigzagged past the reserve trenches at K empton

,

Park and G atwick Cottage to H urst Park and Boche C astle

itself from where it hugged the north end of K itchener s
,
’

Wood before desce n ding the r e verse s l ope to a culvert over

the Ste e nb e e k U p this l atter part of it was laid a light
.

railway as disc l osed by aeroplane photographs and duly

, ,

recorded on the map Information from prisoners led to .

th e b e lief that th is road was mined ; and Merchant and I

had been warned time and again on no account to move
along it We were to cross it in the neighbourhood o f
.

Boche Castle proceed parallel to it on the north and

, ,
 YP R E S : THE 3 I ST J U LY 1 6 1

recross it beyond the woo d thu s reducing to a min imu m ,

the risk of strikin g one of th e m ines The road itse l f when .

,

I arrived at it was indistinguishable from the su rrou nding

,

mud ; but the twis ted m etals of the light railway betrayed
its site ; and in accorda n ce with my instructions without ,

thinking twice about it I drove straigh t over it at a point

,

m idway between the wood and the prostrate mebus at

Boche Castle I then swung t o the ri g ht and moved
.

for w ard parallel to it As written down this m an oeuvre

.
,

sou n ds a simple one ; but already an oth er pecu l iarity of t he

Sa l ient was disturbingly m an ifest Owin g as I suppos e .
, ,

t o some arrangem ent of strata—th e sa m e phenomenon i s

t o be found in parts of Dorsetshire among other places ,

the water with which Flanders is too abu n dantly provided

collects on top of the ridges as well as i n the adj acent
val l eys The boggy patch on the other S ide of Boch e
.

Cast l e before mentio n ed was a sympto m of th is eccentricity .

An d across th e vanished road th e conditions became at

once appalling Th e ground was one n etwork of big shell
.

holes and every on e was fu l l of water There was n o

, .

escapin g it O n all hands lay these brim m ing pools

.
,

divided only by a sort of mesh of semi liquid mud I -

.

tried at once to get back to the road preferring the pos ,

s i b i l i ty of mines to the certai nty of bei n g ignomin iously

engulfed but in that amphibiou s world the engine was not

,

powerful enough to induce th e tan k to reverse or swin g .

She would only plough her way slowly forward through

the mud The end was in evitable We covered ( and th is
. .

i n itself was something of a m iracle ) about two hu ndred

yards of this quagmire forcing ou r way through it rather
,

than over i t It was durin g this final lap that I he ard

.

my left hand pair of gun ners O pen fire with their Lewis
-

guns K nowing that we were still behind our infantry I

.
,

induced them to stop by ham mering the nearest man on

the back ; and it was not until som e time later that I learnt
the cause of their firing All this while we tried continually
.

to swin g back t oward the road a hundred yards away but , ,

1 62 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

the tank was sunk i n mud to her bel l y and would move ,

o nly in the one direction We arri v ed at length at a point

.

abreast o f the far edge of K itchener s Wood : water lay ’

everywhere about us ; and immediately in front were two

or three large shell holes full to the bri m It being i m
-
,
.

possible to avoid them G 4 6 like a relu ctant suicide

, , ,

crawled straight into the first which we could only hope ,

was shal l ower than it appeared to be The water rushed .

in through the tracks and Sponson doors covered the fl o or ,

boards a n d flooded the sump : the fly wheel thrashed

,
-

through it for a second or two sendi n g showers about the ,

i nterior ; and then the tank not having been constructed ,

for submarine warfare gave up the struggle The en gine

, .

raced with an increased but futile noise for the wet clutch ,

had ceased to grip an d we did not move

,
.

It was nearly six o clock and the rain had begun to fa ll

’
.
,

To take stock of the s ituation we had to climb out through

the manhole in th e roof the water having risen to such a
,

height above the floor that we could n ot use the spon son
doors Once outside it was man ifest that there was n oth
.
,

ing to be done The lost u nd i tch i n g beam would not have

.

helped us with the c l utch half under water The tail of the .

tank j ust touched th e muddy rim of the shell hole but on -

,

every other Side the great pool extended for several feet .

The accompanying photograph although taken a couple ,

of months later after the ta n k had been hit on one track

,

and elsewhere shows her exactly as Sh e lay at that moment

, ,

and as we left her the following afternoon A hundred .

yards to our right was the northern corner of K itchener s ’

Wood Three or four hu ndred yards to the left was a

.

ruined building converted with concrete into a machin e

,

gun post which was known as V on Werder H ouse Th is

, .

was not visible until one stood on top of the tank for the ,

latter was sunk deep in the shell hole an d was screened -

,

also on this side by the tattered remnants of a hedge A .

quarter of a mile in front of us the ridge fell away toward

the Stee nb ee k and over the edge we could see the tops
,
 YP R E S : THE 3 I ST J U LY 1 63

o f the trees wh ich lined the banks o f t hat stream ; while

t o our rear beyon d a row of wrecked sheds m ade of t imber
,

and corrugated iron rose the wh ite pile of rubble and

,

c oncrete where Boche Castle had stood O ccasional she l ls .

burst along the ridge The shriek of ou r own proj ecti l es

.

rushing overhead was continuous an d the actual throbbi n g ,

blast of gu n fi re a torture to the nerves ; but n ot a living

-

soul except ourselves was with in eyesight I did n ot know .

how far our infantry had progressed but supposed them t o ,

b e somewhere n ear the Stee nb eek A heavy rattle of r i fle .

a n d mach ine gu n fire sou nded ou t of the valley

-
N earer .

at hand but i nvisible one or two V ickers gu ns were i n

, ,
’

d ul gi n g i n overhead fire .

H aving satisfied myself t hat the tank was bogged beyon d

i mm ediate repair ( a fact indeed so obviou s that n o con , ,

s ideration was needed ) I sent my crew in side again an d

,

started to walk back t o Merchant s G 4 5 lyin g i n the big ’

,

crater by Boche Castle where I expected to fi nd K essel , .

The distance was about five hundred yards It was n ow .

raining heavily an d walking was reduced to a maddenin g

,

process of dragging one s feet th rough deliquescent mud ’

s liding into sh ell holes and crawling sometimes on all

-
, ,

fours laboriously out again

, A s I drew near to B oche .

Castle I crossed what was left of the support trenches of

the G erman second line an d h ere lying face downward , ,

s ide by side over a fragm ent of parados were the bodies of ,

Si x B ritish infa n trymen a l l shot th rou gh th e head — killed

,

together as they were in the act of climbing out of the

t rench . I was to become only too familiar with these
u nfortu nates i n the course of that day and the next A .

little farther beyon d was the series of great craters about

the strong poi nt O n reach ing the lip of the one i n wh ich
-
.

G 4 5 sti l l lay engu l fed I saw K essel M erchant and the

, , ,

c rew grouped far below m e rou nd th e tan k They i n .

s ta n tl y made violen t signals to me to come i nt o cover an d ,

I s l i d down the side of the crater with some precipitation .

Believing that all th e enemy mu st ha v e been driven off the

1 64 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

ridge in our neighb ourhood since the i nfantry was out of

,

sight ahea d I had taken no precautions in walking across

,

beyond listening anxiously for the whistle of u nfriend l y

shells ; but on arriving muddy and breathless among the
, ,

others in the crater bottom I l e arnt that all this while there
,

was a G erman machi n e gun still in action in V on Werde r

-

H ouse then n ear l y half a mile behind our front Its very
,
.

gallant gun crew ( 1 never knew if there was only on e m a n

-

there or more ) cut o ff by the annihilation or flight o f the

,

defenders of the seco n d l ine apparent l y went to ground

,

u nti l our attacki n g waves had passed by o n l y to reappear ,

afterwards and begi n snipi n g conscientious l y at any one

who came within range Th is sort of co n duct always
.

seems to me the height of heroism or fanaticism for the ,

ultimate fate of such isolated rearguards is certain In .

all ignorance I had walked right across th e front of this

u n within a few hu ndred yards of it and I ca n only
g ,

suppose that at th e t ime the gunn ers were occupied at a

loophole on the other side of the mebus It appeared that .

Merchant had left his true course and so become ditched ,

i n the crater i n an attempt to reach and Silence this

,

nu isance ; and wh en I return ed later to my own tan k I

learnt that it was th e ta p tap of bullet s on the arm ou r
“ -
,

no doubt from the same source that had provoked my ,

gun n ers to open fi re An d I imagine that the Si x dead

.

infantrymen whom I had j ust seen were also among the

victim s of V on Werder H ouse .

H aving reported to K essel the hopeless situation of G 4 6 ,

I was told to evacuate her leavi n g however two men as a

, , ,

guard This was i n accordance with orders and was in one

.
,

sense a very necessary provision ; for it had been found

that any ditched or disabled tan k left unguarded was sure
to be stripped within a few hours of every removable part .

But the duty never popular was likely to be peculiarly

, ,

dangerous i n the Salient on accou nt of the persistent

,

shelling to be expected there N ear M ousetrap Farm a .

,

day or two later four men were killed wh ile guarding a

,
1 66 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

H ouse Presumably the pl ucky G erman gunner had been

.

killed Scrambling back into G 4 6 I told my crew ( sitting

.
,

dism ally immersed to th e knees i n water and oi l ) to draw

lots for the doubtful privilege of remaining behind with me .

The duty fell to my Seco n d driver Swain who successfully , ,

dissembled his j oy The others began to collect their kit

.
,

most of which was under wat e r for in a tan k everything ,

gravitates eventual l y to th e floor These men would have .

t o carry with them also the Si x Lewis guns and the compass ,

a n d their j ourney through the shells and rain and clinging

mud to Frascati thus encumbered promised few p l easures

, , .

There was still a j ob of work for them t o do before they

left I wished to camouflage the tank t o some extent with
.

mud and bran ches and especia ll y to obliterate the con

,

s p i c u ou s number painted on the roof of the cab ( I have .

explained already my reason s for this d i ffi d e nce ) At this .

work we toiled for half an h our slipping an d Splashin g ,

i n the surroundin g pool ; but the rain now falling in sheets , ,

washed th e mud away almost as fast as we sh ovelled i t on ,

and we h ad to depend upon the relics of the adj acent

hedge It was nearly n in e o clock when my corporal
.
’

M itchell and th e other five prepared fina l ly to l eave the

,

tank At this j unct ure another tank appeared homeward

.
,

bound rou nd th e corner of K itchener s Wood It was one

,
’
.

of 1 9 Company s commanded by Maelor J ones It had

’

,
.

been across the Stee n be ek into St J ulien where it had been ,

attacked by in fantry with hand grenades and M aelor Jone s -

,

himself had shot a G erman N C O with h is revolver . . .

through the flap H e was now struggling home with a

.

badly leaking radiator I do not remember how he cam e

.

to be so far off his direct route which was south of the ,

wood a mile away I gave him all my spare water and

,
.
,

also put int o his ta n k my six Lewis guns t o save my crew ,

this extra burden When he m oved off again h e contrived

.

to navigate the lake district about u s without disaster ; bu t

eventually ( as I discovered later ) came to a sta n dstill with ,

an empty radiator half a m ile beyond B oche Castle where

, ,
 YP R E S : T HE 3 I ST J U LY 1 67

the tan k was hit soon after At the same time my six me n .

left me for H ill Top Farm and Frascati with orders t o ,

report to the com pany com mander at the fi rs t named place -

.

Swai n and I rem ained alone in G 4 6 with a prospect ( at ,

the best ) of indefin ite discomfort before u s The o n l y thing .

remainin g for me to do was to despatch my two pigeo n s

with duplicate messages g i v i ng my exact state and ,

S ituat ion .

The tank as I have said was alm ost knee deep i n water
, ,
-
.

The rain dripped in steadily through the i mperfectly fitting

armour plating of the roof
-
And ab out t his time the .

enemy s shelling scattered hitherto i n a desultory fash ion

’
,

over his lost position s settled down to a sustained and

,

h eavy bombardment o f the whole crest of the ridge It .

fell with particular i ntens ity on certain areas of wh ich ,

our own deserted and i mpract icable n eighbourhood u n

fortunately was one Possibly the G erman s thought we
.

were using or repairin g th e road ; but except for on e

platoon o f infantry ploughing along it in single file on
,

either side to avoid ( as I suppose) the legendary mines I

, ,

never saw a living soul upon that obliterated highway an d ,

very few anywhere else about u s Whatever the reason .

,

from about ten o clock on the morn ing of th e 3 r s t until I

’

left the place at four in the afternoon of the followin g day ,

a period of thirty h ours Shells fell ab out u s without

,

intermission at the rate of on e every minute Th e p arti c u .

lar gun or gun s responsible for our little sector maintai ned
with Teuton ic exactitude the sam e invariable line re p re ,

sented approximate l y by G 4 6 on top of th e crest Boche ,

Castle 3 00 yards in rear and M erchant s tank 2 00 yards

,
’

beyond that ; an d th e feature o f th is apparent ly senseless

expenditure of metal was th e fact that neither t ank was h it
during this t ime .
 1 68 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

It might appear the obvious remedy i n these circu m ,

”
stances to have left the half d rowned G ina for some
,
-
“

other shelter a few hundred yards away But there was n o .

shelter to be found or I could find none Trenches had

,
.

be e n beaten to a muddy pulp ; dug outs if they existed -

, ,

were u ndisco v erable in the prevailing devastation ; water

lay eve rywhere ; and shells were falli n g a l most as th ickly
i n K itchener s Wood and about V on Werder H ouse as i n
’

our i mmediate neighbourhood The tank at least o ffered .

protection against sp l inters and apart from a few leaks , , ,

against the cease l ess downpour of rain It held our food .

and other possessions wh ich were kept moderately dry

,
.

And it is a well known if illogical truth th at any overhead

-
, , ,

cover i s better than none A parasol would give on e infinite

.

com fort i n battle G 4 6 ne v ertheless was not an ideal

.
, ,

home She vibrated periodically fro m the concussions n ear

.

at hand : every fifteen minutes or so came an explosion so

close that lumps of m ud pattered heavi l y upon the roof ;
and once or twice the whole thirty tons of metal seemed
to j ump bodily With the engine Silent one heard the
.
,

crescendo of every approach i n g shel l and had ample t ime ,

to speculate on its point of arrival It is one thin g to be .

shelled in this manner when you are actively e n gaged in

some work which h elps to occupy you r m ind : it is altogether
another to have to sit through two days and a night of it
within a few feet of thirty or forty gallons of refined and
expensive petrol with nothing whatever to do but wonder
,

what exactly will happen when you are h it It was natural .

to dwell upon t he fact that a proj ecti l e goes through a

tank s armour as if it was paper an d then bursts in side
’

, .

Thirty hou rs of t his life in short became i n the end a

, ,

l ittle weari ng ; and I hope sincerely never to repeat the

experience .

Yet of a l l that long period which seemed so interminab l e

,

at the time I fou nd afterwards I could remember very litt l e

, .

When Swain an d I were left alone in the tan k we proceeded ,

t o make ourselves as comfortable as circu mstances allowed .

1 70 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

loud throb of gun fi re behind us it was c l ear that fi e l d

-

batteries had in some miraculou s manner been got ove r

, ,

th e G erman front line an d through the slough beyond I .

returned to the tank as the infantry platoon began its

stu mbling progress forward again ; and the last I s a w of
it was a scattered line of figures disappearing beyond the
brow of the b i l l This was th e only formed body of troops
.

that came within sight du ring our stay on the ridge .

The next incident I remember was th e startling return ,

about 4 o c l ock of Corporal M itche l l an d three others of

’

my crew who had l eft u s s ix hours ear l ier It appeared

, .

that having reached th e dug out at H ill Top Farm after -

,

losing their way several times a n d enduring other unpleasant

vicissitudes the original six had reported to the company
,

commander there only to be told to return and stand by

,

the tank a complete reversal of our original instructions

,
.

Orders to this effect had been sent to Merchant by runner

i m mediately on receipt of a pigeon message from h im
announcing h is hope l ess situation ; but the runner havi n g ,

intercepted this crew j ust as it wa s starting for home had ,

returned without bringing on th e order to me In a n y .

event nothing was to be gained by leaving the two crews

, ,

except a certainty of more casualties if either tank should be

h it ; and trained tank personnel was never so easily come
by that it cou l d be risked without a proper cause The .

crew of a tank left derel ict on or near the front line can
often be of u se by getting out and helping the infantry
with Lewis gun s but we we re respectively half and three
,

quarters of a mi l e behind I had sent my gun s back per .

,

haps rather foo l ishly by M aelor J ones and both mach ines
, ,

were so p l aced that they would be of l ittle or no help in

repelling a counter attack In short this c l earl y was a case
-
.
,

where the section and tank comma n ders on th e Spot ought

to decide on the best course of actio n AS for my own m e n .
,

this deve l opment entailed for them the additional fatigue and
danger of the two mile tramp back from H ill Top to th e
-

tank They started to return at once Almost i mmediately

. .
 YP R E S : THE 3 I ST J U LY 1 71

one of th e gunners was hit in the head by a shrapnel bullet ,

an d a second man was left with him to he l p him to th e

n earest dressing station The othe r four eventually re .

j oined m e after six hours continuous struggle through slime ’

,

rain and Shell fi re and they were so famished and exhausted

,
-
,

that although a certain amou nt of petro l was floati n g about

,

in the tank I went to th e risk of lighting a pri mu s stove in

,

one of the sponson s in order to make them some tea .

B raced with a little ru m this drink like godliness w ith , ,

contentment was great gain It was n o easy matter now

, .

to pack six men inside G 4 6 above water level bu t with the -

,

aid of engine covers and petrol and oil tins the returned
- -
,

wanderers contrived someh ow to fit themselves in .

Shortly after this I paid a Visit to M erchant N ever an .

attractive expedition as it involved a good deal o f wading

,

to begin with and subsequent periodic dives into the mud

to dodge Sh ell fragments this occas ion provid e d me with ,

a quite superfluou s thrill H earing suddenly the alarming .

crescendo of a comin g apparently straight at my head ,

I dropped i n a hurry j ust as it landed with in a very few

yards of me Fortu nately it plunged some ten feet down
.

into the semi liquid groun d before it burst so that beyon d

-
,

a bad shaking and a temporary immersion beneath a perfect

deluge of mud I was non e the worse A little dashed by
, .

the incident however I ran ( or attempted to run ) the rest

, ,

of the way and of cou rse almost fe l l over the six dead
,

i n fantrymen lying so neatly Spaced in front of Boche Castle .

I was glad to get down into the fallaciou s shelter of

M erchant s gigantic crater wh ere I found his crew brew
’
,

ing tea on a primu s in the rain They had with them two .

G erman prisoners com mandeered t o help in a last hope ‘

less e ffort to dig out the tank O ne of these m en was .

dazed speechless an d useless ; and it was supposed that

, ,

h e was suffering from shock u ntil some one discovered that

the poor wretch had been hit in the stomach H eav e n .

knows how he managed to stand upright H e va n ished after .

a while probably t o die miserably in som e shell hole ; and

,
-
I 72 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

his comrade havi n g been m ade to understa n d with di fficulty

,

that his services were no lo n ger required h urried off toward ,

the rear with every symptom of re l ief M erchant I found .

, ,

had received no further orders nor i ndeed any news what ,

ever and h e and his m e n were as weary of this mode of

,

life as I and min e a l though spared ou r amph ibious dis

,

comforts H is . Sergeant Meyrick a Sp l endid type ,

of long service so l dier from the

-
had the beginnings
of an attack of fe ver a n d was shaking like St V itus wh ile
, ,

his first driver Wa ll er was a l so i l l ( Both these men cam e

, , .

t o be associated with me i n circu mstances peculiarly ,

creditable to them in our n ext action wh en I l e arn t

, ,

thorough l y t o appreciate their merits ) While I was in .

the crater at this time a number of shells burst so near t o

u s that we left the tank in an endea v ou r to find shelter
elsewhere bu t we soon abandoned the search As in my
, .

own case the derelict machine remained the most a ttra c

,

tive of the several u nsatisfactory a l ternatives I may point .

out once m ore that this i n sti n ctiv e desir e to leave a ditched
tank when she l ls are fa l l ing about it arises from the fact that
the protection the tank O ffers against sp l i n ters is heavi l y out
weighed by the knowledge of what almost certainly will
happen if it receives a direct hit especially from such a ,

proj ectile as a The terrific explosion in the restricted

space the whirlwind of flying white hot meta l and th e
,
-
,

inevitable fire which follows l eave the crew with a poor ,

hope of escaping as was prov e d in severa l tragic in stances

,

that mor n ing ; whereas i n the open lying flat behind a ,

lump of mud the probabilities are all the oth e r way I

,
.

think it was the rain an d the genera l wretch edness of

things outside as much as the total lack of any standin g
,

cover which induced u s t o remain throughout inside ou r

,

tanks .

H aving spent about half an hour with M erchant I started ,

on my return In Spite of a fixed intention of avoiding th e

.

six corpses on my route I ran into them once more but , ,

arrived at my own watery home without further unpleasant

 1 74 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

box on top of gallons of i nflam mab l e spirit protected over ,

head by n othing more than a thi n p l ate which a substantial

sledge ham mer would have dented I have said all th is
-
.

before and it may appear scarcely to warrant the previous

,

digressio n but I wi l l not labour to excuse the latter It

, .

represents the reflections which occurred to me afterwards .

N o doubt they have occurred to mi l lions of others since th e

fi rst prehistoric battle ; and the whole thing may be su mmed
up in the axiom that whe n in doubt or tribulation it i s
, ,

a very material he l p to b e forced to act a part .

That night was pecu l iarly u np l easa n t Owing to our .

positio n on the crest it was inadvisable to show any ade q uate

light ( It mu st be remembered a l so that we were entirely
.

ignorant of the day s events For al l we knew the G ermans

’
.

might h ave regained ground elsewhere on the ridge from

which the tan k was in View at short range One can learn .

n othing from a mere inspection of a modern battlefield for ,

there is nothing to be seen ) N ormal l y tan ks are l ighted .

,

by s mall e l ectric festoon lamps hung under the roof but i n ,

G 4 6 these were n ow out of action the accumulators being ,

u nder water In a ny case I shou l d not have u sed them

.
, ,

as even with everyth ing shut down the light escaped

through numerous small chinks arou nd th e gun ports an d -

Sh ie l ds The more powerful hand lamps wer e tabooed for -

.

the same reason There remained only the pair of coloured

.

bulbs on the signal l ing belt of which the green besides , ,

m aking u s look as if we were i n the last stages o f d ecom

position was too brilliant t o please me The feeble glow
,
.

o f the red bulb however cou l d hard l y have been seen by

, ,

some one standing close outside I had to emp l oy it spar .

i n gl y as I did not know how long the small battery wou l d

,

last but when at intervals I switched it on the effect was

,

r ather curious The du l l crimson light was reflected in the

.

water beneath u s the rain drops collecti n g along the j oints

,
-

o f the roof shone like rubies a n d the complication of ,

e xhaust pipes and am munition boxes above the engine

- -

c ast over half the interior a great wavering Shadow in ,

 YP R E S : THE 3 I S T J U LY 1
75

which I could see d imly the faces of my crew huddled in ,

the sponsons and about th e differential Between these .

theatrical glimpses we l ived i n pitchy darkness talking a ,

l ittle s l eeping hardly at all feelin g acutely the bolt heads

, ,
-

an d angles in our backs drinking a periodic tot of whisky

,

( for we were soaked an d ch illed ) listening to the rain a n d ,

the shell bursts and the occasional o minous patter of mud on

-

the roof a n d praying for the dawn When at length i t

,
.

broke dreary an d weeping and we could see once more the

, ,

too fami l iar landscape the latter was as desert and u n i n vi t

,

ing as before There was more water about and a large

.
,

shell h ole in front of u s was brim ming over into ours We

-
.

lit the pri mus again regardless of possible consequ ences

, ,

and rum maged about for our som ewhat sodden Victuals A .

good dea l of food includin g several l oaves was submerged

, , ,

a n d our two days rations began to look small

’
.

The morning was a repetition of the previous day The .

rain fell as i f it had n ever rained before the shells whistled ,

and crashed and for all that we could see we might have
, , ,

been in the Ark on Ararat whose situat ion indeed must have
,

born e many points of resemblance to our own We had .

even despat ched our doves or pigeon s But there were n o , .

high explosives on Ararat About 1 1 o clock I ventured .

’

forth again rath er reluctantly and stu mbled over the m ud ,

to call on M erchant For the fourth time I encountered

.

o n the way th e six infantrymen now Showing unequ ivocal ,

signs of having been dead for a good many h ours In th e .

big crater I found neither orders n or n ews although there ,

had arrived a very superfluous visitor i n th e person of a

salvage o fficer com e to len d u s th e ass istance of h is i n
,

t e l l e ct toward the bu siness of extricating our tanks ! To

Merchant h e offered s ome hint s on the u se of Sleepers ,

h ints whose value was impaired by the fact that no Sleepers

were to ha n d When I retur n ed to G 4 6 I took h im with
.

me as I wanted a n independent report on the tan k which

,

hitherto no one had Visited H e was not impressed favou r .

a bly with the neighbourhood perhaps because we arr i ved ,

1 7 6 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

j ust in tim e to dodge a salvo of 5 9 s ; an d having advised .

’

m e to bale ou t my shell hole with petro l tins ( l) h e left in

- -
,

a hu rry I never saw th is u seless i ndivid ual again and I

.
,

have forgotten his name but I took an instinctive dislike

,

to him .

Merchant and I agreed at this meeting that if no orders

had reached u s by four that afternoon we would l ook up the
tanks and march back to Frascati Accordingly after a .
,

second visit t o him in the afternoon when I found him still ,

without a n y news I returned onc e more to make my own

,

fi n al arra n ge me n ts by which time I was coming very

,

thorough l y to hate this so l itary j ourney with its inevitable

accompani ment of shells and rain My crew collected .

their kit ( i n most cases it was u n der water ) and we fi l led ,

our haversacks a n d pockets with the unspoiled residue of

our rations and with the small equipment which had to be
salved — th e clock periscopes l amps & c —and j ust before
, , , .

four o clock we climbed very thankfu l ly out o f th e manhole

’

and padlocked it behind u s Only a beaver or an Indian .

pearl d iver cou l d have got at the Sponso n doors : any child
-
,

on the other ha n d cou l d have broke n the padlock But

, .

that was not ou r concern It was impossible to pretend .

sorrow at parting fro m G 4 6 : our main apprehension ,

indeed was t hat sooner or later we Should have to return

,

to her .

Merchant and his m en were ready to move when we

reached the crater and w e set off together on our dreary
,

trudge back to Frascati We e ach took our turn at carry

.

ing his fou r Lewis guns Enough has been written of the
.

discomfort of marching an ywhere i n the Salient in bad

weath e r a n d I wi l l not dilate upon this hegira of which in
, , ,

fact I re member v ery litt l e One odd incident h owever

,
.
, ,

sticks in my memory as worth record ing As we struggled .

past the front of K itchener s Wood where the G erman ’

,

shells were still crashing and approached the big camou ,

fl a ge d mebus which I have mentioned in an earlier ch apter ,

a flock of little black an d white birds flew out from the

- -
1 78 T HE TAN K IN ACT I O N

C orner where we had halted before th e attack This

, .

branch called Buffs Road subsequent l y was timbered

, ,

a l most throu ghout and with the continuation through St

, ,

J ulien cam e to be known only too well by all ranks of the

,

I s t Ta n k Brigade We stu mb l ed and splashed along it

.
,

invo l ved i n end l ess lines of mules and horses toward ,

Frascati which di l apidat e d haven l oathed by a l l two days

, ,

before now becko n ed t o u s like home We reached i t at

,
.

length to find it transformed out of all know l edge Its

, .

She l l pitted fields l ast seen deserted swarmed with men a n d

-
, ,

anima l s ; e n gineers and labou r troops were digging a n d

bu i l din g rows of horse lines had sprun g up dumps were
,
-
,

accumulati n g a n d a dressi n g station was established under

,

the trees The sma l l ruined lanes behind were packed with
.

amm un ition train s and ambu lan ce convoys and always an ,

end l ess tide of soaked and muddied tra n sport flowed by th e

outskirts toward the front line Around La Brique where .
,

we had been used to venture with such misgivings 6 0 ,

pounder gun s were firing noisily while behind them rest e d ,

the novel gun carrying tanks which had brought th em i nto

-

action .

In some iron and timber shacks in the m idd l e of the

t rees by our own petrol dump we found K esse l Winters
, , ,

( second i n com mand of 1 9 Company ) and variou s details , ,

including Deakin of my ow n crew who had been left behind ,

at H ill Top with the wounded man Every one l ooked .

t ired and dirty and h ad a th ree days growth of beard but

,
-
’
,

they wer e perfect d O r s a ys by comparison with ou r dis

’

reputab l e party Winters who was in comma n d on the

.
,

Spot had some dutifu l misgivi n gs as to the strict propriety

,

of our leaving our tanks without orders a n d even suggest e d ,

that we might h ave to return t o them but M erchant and I

held forth so vigorously on the subj ect that th is idea died
a very rapid death O ur men in fact ( to say nothing o f
.
,
 YP R ES : T HE 3 I S T J U LY 1 79

ourselves ) were dead beat while it was because ou r

,
-

remaining with the ta n ks was so palpably u seless that we

had com e away The disadva n tages of being attached
.

temporari l y t o another company were man ifest throughout ‘

th is affair N o one in 1 9 Company took much interest in

.

N o 1 0 Sect ion It appeared that th e company comm a nde r

. . ,

without worrying at all about u s had gone back to Lovie ,

to sleep on the previous evening with th e rest of h is own

people although their tanks with one exception were also
, , ,

ditched at variou s points about th e batt l efield H e had not .

been seen Since K essel havin g been in charge at Frascati

.
,

during the greater part of the day had been u nable to come ,

out to u s as he had i ntende d In Short if we had not taken .

,

matters into our own hands there appeared rea ll y to be no ,

reason why we should not have been left indefin itely on the
ridge without rat ions or orders .

H avi n g seen the men settled down with some h ot food ,

M erchant and I looked a fter oursel v es I remember very .

vivid l y th e excellence of a mess tin full o f scalding stew -

wh ich K essel s servant procu red for m e During th is m eal

’
.

we learnt som e of the details of the p revIou s day s fighting ’

.

Considering the conditions our two companies had don e ,

uncomm on ly well at a light cost M ost of the tanks got .

into action The two sections of 2 1 Company on the left

.

had tak e n the s 1 5 t D ivision to its final obj ective on the

Stee n b e e k losing o n e section com mander on e tan k com
, ,

mander and about half a dozen men wounded

, O f my .

section attached to 1 9 Compa n y th e m isfortu nes of three

, ,

tanks were known to us Th e fourth Alden s had a ha p .

,
’
,

pier career It reached its obj ective at Alberta beyond

.
,

K itchener s Wood assisted the infantry to captu re this and

’
, ,

then proceeding onward passed inadvertent l y through our

, ,

stationary barrage and engaged in a u nique duel across

the Stee nb e e k with a light rai l way train carrying a small
gun wh ich it drove away Alden received th e M ilitary
, .

Cross for that morning s work M e anwhi l e on h is right ’

.
, ,

1 9 Company had attacked in two waves up the St J ulien

1 80 THE TAN K IN A CT I O N

road Four or five tanks of the second wave got across

.

the half ruined bridge and into the vil l age One Jordan s
-
.
,
’
,

actually push ed on as far as Springfie l d a fortified farm ,

on the Langemarck Zonnebeke road b ut the infantry could

-

not follow This tank with Ma e lor J ones s alone of those

.
,
’
,

which crossed the stream returned to the west bank Th e, .

othe r s were all disabled by arti l lery fire or ditch e d Poor .

Ly n ch ran upon a howitzer firing as a fi e l d gun over -

open sights and h e and his who l e crew w e re ki l led by a

,

shel l which came through the front of the cab and burst
i nside Th e fo ll owing year wh e n I was n ear Bethun e I
.
, ,

m et a chaplain who had seen th is t ank a couple of months

after it was hit H e had fou nd th e skeleto n s of the crew
.

still lying among the shattered machinery This complete .

destruction of a crew represented th e m aj ority of fatal

casualties in the battalion that mornin g There were in .

addition in th e two com pan ies fou r men kill ed and se v en

, ,

o fficers and n inete e n men wou n ded .

H aving acquired this information and consumed l arge

qua n tities of stew M erchant and I assembled our crews
,

again and trudged off to Reigersberg where a lorry from

’

th e camp was due t o arrive at six o clock In the dismal

’
.

ch a teau grounds a 1 5 inch howitzer was now firing from

-

a railway truck the 8 inch weapons wh ich had helped to

,
-

make the p l ace so unhealthy having moved a mile or so

farther for w ard The j ourney back in the l orry was a slow
.

bu sines s for th e roads were j am med with transport an d it

, ,

was after eight w hen we arrived at Lovie again .

1 82 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

some 8 00 of all ranks who went into action In many .

cases valuab l e help was given t o the infantry especial l y by ,

the 3 rd Brigade ( C a n d F Battalions) working with th e ,

1 9 th Corps against Spree and Bank Farms Beck H ouse and ,

Capricorn and Frezenberg The 2 n d B rigade was ham

, .

pered by the appa l ling state of the ground in the H ooge

area Most of its ta n ks were late in comi n g up and the
.
,

infantry in th e mea n while having bee n checked machine ,

after machine was hit in the n arrow d e fi l e s by which they

endeavoured t o get forward O u r cou n ter battery wo r k
.
-
,

thorough as it appeare d to be failed complet e ly in th is ,

region to keep down the G erman arti l lery fire The two .

t a n k battalions A a n d B lost more tanks and m en than

, ,

the other tw o brigades together .

Individual ta n k actions duri n g this day presented on e ,

and a l l similar features and I shall not con sider them here
, ,
.

The m achines dragged themselves laboriou sly through the

mud became ditched and extricated them selves and then
, ,

probably becam e ditched again Crews wh ile i n the O pen .

,

during u n d i tc hi ng operations were much harassed by ,

machine gun fire from low flyi ng a e roplanes There were

- -
.

fi fty one recorded cases in which tanks assisted the infantry

-
.

Sixteen of these were credited to our two companies on the

left and there can b e no doubt that G Battalio n i n its
, ,

first action carried off such honours as the H eavy Branch

,

gained in th at dismal battle Whether this performance .

was due to the ground in ou r sector being a trifle l ess

atrociou s than e l sewhere ( although in all truth it was bad
e nough ) or whether as one likes t o think it was due
, , ,

rather to the excelle n t trai n i n g and Spirit of the battalio n ,

must remain a matter of perso n al O pi n io n It i s certain .

,

however that our discussion s with th e infantry beforehand

,

l e d to a standard of co operatio n i n the field which doe s

-

n ot seem to have been reached in other cases On several .

occasion s the i nfantry directed our tanks on t o obj ectives ,

or ca l led them up fro m a con siderab l e distance ; for we h ad

bro ught their o fficers t o understand that the View from a
 T HE HUSH O PE RATI O N AND T HE C O C KC R O F T 83
“
1

tank is so restr i cted that without such he l p half its Valu e

will be wasted .

‘
Week l y Tan k N otes a con cise hi story of the corps
,
’

issued rece n tly from the H eadquarters in Lo n don sets out ,

the m am lesso n s to be drawn from this day s fightin g as ’

,

follows : The u nsuitability of the M ark IV ta n k to swamp .

warfare ; the danger of attempting to m ove tanks through

d e fil es which are swept by hostile artil l ery fire ; the n e c e s
s i ty for i m mediate i n fantry c o O peration whenever th e -

presence of a tan k forces an open ing and the continued ,

m oral e ffect of the tan k on both the enemy and our own
”
troops . This last was exemplified very striking l y i n the
case of one of 2 1 Company s tan ks which led th e s 1 s t ’
,

D ivision t o the Ste e n b ee k and helped i t to establish itself

,

there without firin g a shot

, Successive G erman posts
.

surrendered as soon as the tan k came with in ra n ge AS .

for swamp warfare the u n su itabi l ity for this of an e xp er i

,

mental machin e weighin g t hirty tons had been man ifest to

every on e in the corps itself long before But t o infantry .

com manders regular British offi cers with the conservative

,

outlook and the prej udices common to their type this ,

consideration carried n o weight They had never liked .

this newfan gled weapon It was absurd in their eyes t o

.
, ,

attempt to introduce th e tactics of n aval warfare on land ,

and they seized u pon the inevitable failures at Ypres as a

h appy confirmat ion of all their doubts The three corps .

commanders concerned supplied the s th Army H Q with . .

their opin ions on th e work of tanks durin g the battle .

M ajor Williams Ellis in his book deals with th is incident so

-

, ,

effectively that I cannot do b etter than qu ote him .

The three su m maries were agreed that the cour a ge

and perseveran ce Shown by tan k personnel had been
admirable .O n e corps however had given way , ,

thoroughly to the spirit of the t ime They practica ll y .

reported that tanks had been of n o use to any on e ,

and m oreover that they were never likely to be Wit h .

the 3 oth Division they had been u nable to deal with

1 84 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

certain machine gu n emplacements ; with the 2 4 th

-

they had been late —they always drew enemy Shell fi r e ; -

and with the 8 th D ivision one tank had even lost

direction and been reported as firing on our own men .

Another corps had found tanks helpful an d said al l ,

they could for them Tanks had greatly assisted the

.

G ordon s and B l ack Watch at Frezenberg ; they had

dealt effective l y with concrete dug outs with the 5 s th -

D ivisio n they had broken the wave of an enemy

cou nter attack at Winnipeg and everywhere their
-
,

m ora l effect on the enemy h ad been of great assistance .

Twenty fou r ta n ks had been put ou t of action by bad

-

going or she l l fi re -
.

“
A third corps with fewer machines had in many
, ,

cases reached their obj ective withou t bei n g held u p .

The tanks had in these cases merely fol l owed the

infantry but they reported that without tan ks th e
,

capture of the stro n gly wired position of Alberta would

-

h ave cost the 3 9 th Division dear and th at on the ,

Ste e n b e e k near Ferdinand Farm the enemy who had ,

bo l ted at the mere sight of a ta n k had been dealt with ,

at ease with a machine gun by infant r y of the s 1 s t -

D ivision U pon these summaries a n d upon later fai l ures

.

the commander of the s th Army was subsequ e ntly to

base a genera ll y u nfavourable r e port upon tanks .

The report may be condensed i nto a simple

syllogism
.1 Tanks were unable to negot iate bad ground .

.2 The ground on a battlefield will always be bad .

.
3 Therefore tanks are no good on a batt l e field .

H e added to this that b e i n g n o l onger a surprise to

,

the enemy he considered that tanks had lost their

,

moral effect and had no value u s ed in masses Th is

, .

report was not o fficial l y presented for some weeks bu t ,

the H igher Ta n k Command must early have p e rceived

” 1
the drift of affairs .

Th Ta k C r p
‘
C A Wi ll iam El l i
1 ’
e n o s . . . s- s .
1 86 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

success which following immediately after re endued th e

, ,
-

Ta n k Corps with life and hope an other and u nique enter ,

prise fal l s to be noticed .

The most interesting phase of the third battle of Ypres as ,

originally pla n n e d was never fought This was the l anding

, .

on th e Fla n d e rs coast Ta n ks were to have played an .

important a n d i n deed essential part in the undertaking .

The landing was designed to tak e plac e i n the neighbour

hood of M iddelkerke a l ittle p la ge m idway between N ieuport
,

and Ostend The sea front along the whole of this flat
.
-

coast is protected by a high concrete wa l l o n the top of ,

wh ich ru ns the u sual esplanade and roadway O n the .

other Side of th e road are the vi l las and cafés and p ens i ons
where in happier days Visitors crowded during the summer
, ,

and autumn The w hole esplanad e now was all but hidden
.

by barbed wire and th ere was more wire along the beach ;
,

batteri e s were emp l aced at c l ose intervals along the wa l l ;

and the ground fl oors and cellars of the lodging houses
- -

were becom e concrete machine gun posts A landing here -

.

presented ext raordinary di fficulties but the main problem ,

befor e the assailants ( assu m ing that all else went well ) was
how to haul fi el d gun s and supplies rapidly over t he concrete
-

wall u nder fire In fantry might be got ashore u nder cover

.

of a smoke screen and a bombardment from th e sea ; but i n

-

fa n tr y alone even if it could capture that fortified esp l anade

, ,

co u ld n ot hope to hold it G uns were esse n tial and i f .

, ,

possible some other factor which wou l d upset the enemy s

,
’

m or a l an d preven t hi m recovering from the i n itial sur

prise . For this purpose tanks of all things were to be , ,

e mployed .

The attacking force consisted of th e I s t Division several ,

batteries of fi e l d guns and howitzers a company or two

-
,

of engi n eers and n ine M ark IV tanks To throw this

,
. .
 T HE HU SH O PE RATI O N A ND T HE C O CK C R O F T 87
“
1

considerable force ashore three i m mense pontoons or barges

were co n structed each 7 00 feet l o n g These were take n
,
.

over to D unkirk harbou r toward the end of J u l y On .

the night of the attack ( which as I have said before was to , ,

fol l o w the capture of the Passchendaele Ri d ge provided ,

that was effected within three or fou r days ) these barges

were t o be pushed on t o the beach by pai rs of monitors ,

lashed together on e barge at M iddelkerke itself and o n e on

,

either Side of that place Each barge carried a brigade of

.

infantry several batteries three tanks an d some motor

, , ,

lorries . The landing was to take place j ust before dawn ,

covered by a d ense smoke an d ordi n ary bombardment from

warships supplied by th e Dover Patro l which was in charge ,

of the naval side of the e n t erpri se .

The wall itself was a very serious obstacle It rose t o .

a height of some thirty feet Slopi n g up from the beach at ,

an easy angle but ending at the top i n a vertical copin g

,

with a lip or overhang A tank fitted with Special shoes

.
,

on the tracks could clim b th e slope easily enough but

, ,

th e vertical coping was too high t o be surm ounted with

out additional applian ces To each tan k therefore was .
, ,

fitted in front a massive detachable steel ramp slightly ,

wider than the machine supported on lattice work girders

,
-

carrying a pair of wheels and so constructed that it slope d

,

u pward from the inclined part o f the sea wall t o th e top -

o f the overhang When the tan k reached the foot of th e

.

incline the ramp would b e lowered by tackle u ntil it s

,

wheels rested on the concrete pushed up agai n st th e ,

copi n g and there d etached

, Th e ta n k could then cl i mb
.

over it o n to the esplanade Afterwards this highly .

ingen iou s contrivan ce was to be u sed for the haulage o f

guns and motor lorries over the obstacle the tanks bein g
-
,

fitted with special cables and attach me n ts for this purpose .

Anothe r clever device was a syste m of wooden s l edges

carryi n g ammun ition boxes the sledges bein g simp l y j am med
-

on to a rope and haul e d u p by the t anks re l easing them ,

selves automatically as they cleared the top of th e overhang .

1 88 T HE TAN K IN ACT I O N

The actual disembarkatio n fro m the huge barges to the

beach was effected by strong hinged gangways which fell ,

over the bows .

The troops detailed fo r this hazardous attempt were

trained very thorough l y The infa n try segregated for weeks.
,

i n a camp near D unkirk practised repeatedly the whole ,

attac k with th e aid of a concrete model of a section of the

sea wa l l A similar model was bui l t at M er l imont where
-
.
,

the specia l tank detach ment comma n ded by Maj or th e ,

H on J D Y Bingham a n d made up of volunteers from

. . . .
,

the original four batta l ions climb e d up and down with their ,

machines towed up guns and lorries and demonstrate d

, ,

conc l usiv e ly that this essential part of the enterprise was

perfectly feasible The ramps worked admirably M aj or
. .

B i n gha m informs m e that tanks made as many as 2 00 ascents

of th e model at M erlim ont .

H ad this attack taken place it would have been pro ,

foun d l y interesti n g O bviously it was an immense gamble

. .

It bore many points of resemblance to the successfu l raid

at Zeebrugge with this great difference : it was intended not
,

as a raid but as a perm anent landing O n ce troops and .

tanks were ashore it is difficult to see h ow they could ha v e

,

been got off again if things wen t wrong The great barges .

would have been blown to matchwood if they r emained on

the beach after daybreak u n l ess an extensive c l earance of ,

the s e a fro n t was effe cted at the very start The roadway
-
.

above the sea wall was none too wide and there were doubts
-

as to whether t h e tanks would have room to tow the gun s ,

to say nothi n g of the l orries up the narrow ramps It was ,

.

fou n d aft e rwards that the l ower storeys of the houses acros s
the road w e re veritable fortresses of co n crete There were .

a hu ndred other obstac l es to success which m ight arise such ,

as bad weather premature discovery or even a wind s u ffi

, ,

cient to dissipate the s moke scree n And it seems probable -

.

that We l l as the secret was kept i n Eng l and the G ermans

, ,

had some uncertain in formation about it I believe that .

the camp n ear Dunkirk was bo mbed with quite exceptional

1 90 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

of a speculative mind could write pages of inconclusive

arguments .

We wi l l return from these cursory surveys of the whole

field of operations to the s ma l l world of Oosthoek Wood and
the camp by Lovie Ch a teau .

Th e morning aft e r I rej oined from Frascati the tan k ,

comma n ders left in our two companies — eight out of the

t w enty three had become casua l ties — were interviewed by
-

the brigade com mander and his Inte l lige n ce officer that ,

same Maj or ( then Captain ) Wi l liams Ellis whose book I -

have qu ot e d For the n ext t w o or three days most of

.

u s were suffering from the reaction after the strain and

fatigue of the approach marches and the battle itself For
-
.

all ta n k personn e l ( and this app l ied to every other arm ) the
fighting at Ypres was by far the m ost exhausti n g and nerve
wracking ordeal u ndergone throughout the war The .

d readful conditio n s of grou nd and weather on top of all ,

the ordinary tria l s o f warfare brough t every one to the limit

,

o f endurance very quick l y The hard labour involved in

.

taking and fighting tanks anywhere was multiplied ten

fold i n the Sa l ient ; and after a severe action there it was ,

a physical impossibility for any crew to go in again until it

had been given a com plete rest O n other fronts the sam e .

ta n ks an d m en often were fit enough for a ren ewed march

and attack after a few hours sleep In our case th ere was ’
.

now l itt l e or nothi n g for some of u s t o do for the two ,

compa n ies were l e ft for the moment virtually without tanks .

Of the twenty three which went into action one on l y r e

-
,

turned the same day to the neighbourhood of Frascati .

Four which had received direct hits were lying in the

, ,

n ew NO M an s Land arou nd St Ju l ie n ; others like G 4 6

’

, ,

were derelict i n positions where sa l vage work at present

was out of th e question ; and the rest half engulfed or ,
 T HE HUSH O P E RATI O N A ND T HE C O CKC R O F T 1 9 1

mechanically crippled or both lay scattered about the , ,

west Slope of the P i l ke m Ridge D uring the n ext fort .

night most of these n earer mach ines were brought back

to a Spot known as G hent Cottages near B rielen where , ,

t he battalion had established an advanced base .

In the meantime it rained The camp at Lovie its .

,

leaky tents im mersed in dripping shrubs and undergrowth ,

and surrounded by sodden parapet s of sandbags as a pro

t ecti on against the persistent bombing raids grew always ,

m ore evil smelling steamy and unhea l thy and those o f

-
, , ,

u s who h ad little to do became more melanch oly every

day There was a time some four days after the battle
.
, ,

when th e reaction was at its worst an d when perso n al l y , , ,

I fe lt I could cut my throat for t w opence An expedition .

up the line t o retrieve my six Lewis guns from M aelor

J ones s tank was a diversion but not a striking l y attract ive
’
,

one For once i t i s true it was not rain ing ; I do not

.
, ,

know why We went by lorry t o Salvation Corner a

.
,

miserab l e road j unction n ear the Dead En d of Ypres an d

-
,

t hence walked once m ore over the familiar route by

Bridge 4 Frascati and La B rique
, At Frascati un der
, .
,

t he trees where our ta n ks had lain during Y Z day -

,

h owitzers were bei n g assembled —i f one may u se this “

expression with regard to such imposing weapon s A few .

duckboard tracks h ad been laid over the tu mbled waste

o f m ud an d water beyond by which we proceeded with ,

comparative ease for a part of the way I was able for .

th e first t ime to examin e at leisure the ground over which

we had advanced and it appeared to m e to be rather as
,

ton i s h i n g that tanks h ad got over it at all A good .

n umber of dead were still lyin g about amo n g them a ,

whole batch of H igh l anders I remember near H urst , ,

Park and everywhere hung the horrib l e sweet odour of

,

decomposing ani mal matter Away on the top of the .

ridge the G ermans with a cu riou s futile industry were

, ,

shelling with heavy metal the big concrete mebus i n front

o f K itchen er s Wood ’
.
1 92 THE TAN K IN A C TI O N

O ur direction s for findi n g the tank were not too explicit ,

and even so large an obj ect was easi l y m issed in that dis
t or te d wilderness where everythi n g was mud coloured
,
-
.

When at length we d iscovered it we found it had been ,

hit on one track The guns were lying rusting inside

.

amid a litter of tools petro l tins and rubbish and mud

,
-
, ,

was everywhere I had inte n ded to go on to G 4 6 i f

.
,

th e situation seemed propitious to co ll e ct K esse l s cher

’
,

i s h e d flag and my binoculars wh ich I had left som ewhere ,

under water but the auguries wer e not favourabl e The

, .

enemy b e gan to bu rst heavy black shrap n e l overhead As .

n o on e e l se was within sight I con cluded that my little ,

party probably was u nd e r observation a n d the epidemic ,

of high exp l osive on the crest appearin g to Spread at the

same time we m ade for home with all the speed of which
,

we were capable hampered as we were by ha l f a dozen

,

Lewis guns J oh nstone wh o was n ot in good health

.
, ,

present l y became so ill that I took his bur d en from him .

It was while I was staggering along under this doub l e load ,

gingerly circumnavigating craters an d cursing th e very

n ame of the American Co l onel who invented the weapons ,

that I st e pped l it e rally i n to an ingloriou s predicament I .

tried foo l ish l y to cross a well churned artil l ery track went -
,

i nto the soft mud up to my knees and there stuck a b s o , ,

l u te l y helpless with the wretched guns occupying both my

,

h a nds and weighing m e down and at the same tim e totally ,

un ab l e to move my legs It required the cautious assistance

.

of most of my crew helped by some provident ial gunners

,

wh o brought bits of board to get m e out , .

There ensued another week of rain squalor a n d de , ,

pression at Lovie Ca m p O ur doctor was despatching

.

o fficers and m en by twos and th rees to a rest camp at -

Wormhoudt j u st over the Belgian fro n tier and I managed

, ,

to get Johnston e away with one of these parties H e was .

not over strong and he had never recovered from th e

,

strain of ou r thirty six hours Vigil on the ridge following

-
’

on that of driving for the best part of three successive

1 94 T HE TA N K -
IN A CT I O N

h undred yards from the start As she could not be got out .

that night I was detailed on the following day to take my

,

crew down and see what I cou l d do wh ile her own peop l e ,

came back to camp for the short rest We worked th e .

whole afternoon diggi n g round the tank which was su nk

, ,

to the sponsons and building a small causeway of timber

,

and brick rubble i n front ; and when her crew returned i n

-

the evening they were able with the help of the u n d i tch i n g
,

beam to pull her out at once But if this s ort of thi n g

,
.

happened on Ru m Road what would happen in the she ll ed ,

zon e ! In fact the progress of the company across the old

,

tre n ch syste ms and u p the s l ope toward St J u l ien during ,

t h e dark hours of the 1 4 th and 1 s th was one l ong n ight ,

mare o f ditching and un d i tc h i ng under shell fi r e and gas -

.

Four only got anywhere near the fro n t l ine and at length ,

it was c l ear that even these could not arrive in time .

Whe n th e infantry attacked these four were still a mi l e ,

b e hind So far as the 1 s t Tank Brigade was concerned

.
,

this was th e l ast attempt made to move tanks across

cou ntry in the Salient .

The i nfantry assau l t w a s in resu l ts very simi l ar to that

, ,

of the 3 1 s t The left where Langemarck was carried by

.
,

eight o clock in the m orning was successful but from St

’
, ,

J u l ie n southwards little or no progress was made In thi s .

part of the field we had now come up against the main

system of fortified farms a n d other strong field forts already
mentio n ed A cluster of these forts j ust beyond St Ju l ie n
.
, ,

checked every attempt to debouch from the vi l lage up th e

P oe l c a p e l l e road ; and until they could be carried no further
ge n eral adva n c e was possible as ou r li n e n ow bu l ged out ,

i n to a n awkward l ittle sa l ient in the north G eneral Maxse .

,

comma n di n g the 1 8 th Corps was to l d that an attack on ,

th e se forts wou l d cost him 6 00 to 1 0 00 casualties without ,

any guarantee that we should capture them in th e end .

The Lieutenant G eneral who had m ore faith in tanks than

-
,

some of h is colleagues for they had served him well o n th e

,

3 1 s t,
consulted with th e Brigadier of the I s t Tank Brigade .
T HE HUSH O PE RATI O N AND THE C O C KC RO F T 1 95

The p os i tIon of the forts dispo sed about a triangle of roads

, ,

was such that tanks could get C lose to them and in some ,

cases absolute l y alongside without necessarily venturing ,

into the Slough of mud on either side of the p a ve D e tai l s ’

of the operation were accordingly h urriedly worked out .

O n e company of tanks was to be used and G Battalion , ,

straitened for machines as it was once more was called ,

upon . This at least was a notable compliment for

, , ,

D B attalion one of the old originals as it n ever failed

, ,

to remi n d us by word and b ehaviou r had not yet been ,

i nto action at all .

About midday on 1 7th Augu st K essel I and severa l , , ,

oth ers were sta n ding together i n the marquee which served
u s for a company m es s at Lovie dri n kin g the usua l sherry ,

an d bitters or something of th e ki nd befor e l unch To

, ,
.

u s e ntered Paisley seco n d i n command of the company

,
.

H e held a sh eet of paper fro m which h e proc e eded to read

, .

The following ofli cer s wi l l tak e over tan ks this aft e rn oon ,

fill up with pet r ol oi l and am mu n ition an d be prepared

, , ,

to move at Si x o clock The o fficers named were Coutts

’
,

Claughton Chaddock B ubb and myse l f It tra n spired

, , , .

further that fou r ta n ks from 2 0 Company and three from ,

1 9 also were to m ove : that w e were to trek that night to

B e l levue on th e o l d G erm an fro n t li n e and again the night

, ,

fo l lowing t o St J ulien ; and that we were goi n g i n to action

on th e mor n i n g of the 1 9 th The charge of thi s composite .

detach ment h ad been given t o M aj or B roome who had j u st ,

arrived fro m th e depot at Erin to rep l ace Torbett invalided ,

h ome i n command of my own company There were to

, .

be three section com manders K esse l G uy of 2 0 Company , , ,

and Wright of 1 9 .

Sudd en orders of this kind when one has b een contem ,

plating a quiet aft e rnoon with a book are always somewhat ,

d isturbing There en sued n ow the i ne v itable bustle for

.
,
1 96 THE TA N K IN A C TI O N

there was n o t ime to lose as we were leavi ng by lorry at

,

My first task was to make Up my crew I had lost .

one man on th e 3 I s t and now J oh nstone was away ; and

,

it was essential to get a good first driver in place of the

latter I went immediate l y to find Serg e ant M eyrick the
. ,

section sergeant ( already mentioned as Merchant s ’

and told h i m what I wanted H e volunteered on the Spot .

to come himself as an ordinary gunner under my own

corporal M eyrick was I think one of those rare people
.
, ,

who positively enj oy a battle and what was more valuable , , ,

h e was a pecu lia r l y i nte ll igent and compet e nt regu l ar

soldier who had come out with his battery in the original
,

Expeditionary Force For a first driver he recom mended

.

Waller of his own crew who vo l unteered as promptly I

, , .

was extreme l y fortunate i n obtain ing these two men .

Leaving M eyrick an d Corporal M itche ll to arrange about

ration s and other detai l s I reported with the rest of th e
, ,

tank comma n ders to the Maj or for further instruction s

, .

The first thi n g t o b e settled was the a l lotme n t of ta n k s

to one or two of us who had no n e M y own of course was .
, ,

sti l l lyi n g by K itchener s Wood ; but by this t i m e some six

’

or eight of the others had bee n got back to G hent Cottages ,

where th e y were parked under a hedg e in various stage s

of u nr e adiness or actual disrepair We could j ust abou t .

manage to provide five d e pendab l e machines J oh n Alden .

being away at the Wormhoudt rest —camp I was to l d to ,

”
take over his ta n k G 4 7 or G itana my second eponym
, , ,

from the variety stage The ge n eral idea and tactics of th e

.

proposed attack wer e then discussed At this ti m e our .

outpost line j ust skirted S t Ju l ie n on the north and east .

A thousand yard s beyond the vi ll ag e two important road s

cross one a n other — the St J u l ien P oe l ca p e l l e road pointing -
,

almost due north at this point and th e Zonnebeke Lange ,

-

marck road running north w e st A triangle of which thes e

,
-
.
,

thoroughfares form two sides has for its base a third road , ,

ru n n ing eastward from St J ulien and cutting the Lange

marck road at Wi n n ipeg A fourth road whose directio n
.
1 98 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

much to the disgust o f the weary gunners who manned

them and who had j ust gone back to rest The infantry
, .

concerned were the 4 8 th and 1 1 th D ivisions the former ,

a M idland unit O ur own arrange m ents for the attack

.

and the particular obj ectives allotted to tanks will be

better left until I come to deal with the D ivisiona l con
ference held on the 1 8 th when we were told o f the modi ,

fi ca ti on already referred to and when all final details ,

were decided .

H avin g O btained this rough outline of the scheme we ,

ate a hasty and uninspiring lunch ; collected such articles

as we t hought we m ight require ; were loaded i n addition
with m a ps periscopes compasses a n d clocks ; and de
, , ,

parted by lorry at V ery fortunately the weather w a s

fine and remained so by som e miracle over the next tw o
, , ,

days O n arriving at G hen t Cottages — a row of melan

.

c h ol y ruins on th e Brielen road — I fou nd that I had a

great deal of work to get through i n a very short time .

G 4 7 having suffered from some mechanical trouble it ,

had taken Alden and his crew several days and nights to
repair her temporari l y and drive her back from M ousetra p
Farm where he had left her on the 3 I s t to her present
, ,

quarters Since then she had been i n the hands of our

.

workshops personnel Although very dirty she app e are d .

,

now t o be in good order mechan ically but she had to b e ,

greased up and filled with water oil and petrol She w a s , , .

Short of about a hundred Lewis drums ( Alden must h ave

u sed a fair amount of am munition in capturing Albert a

and engaging th e G erman train ) and many tools and Spare ,

parts were m issing This last calam ity we co n sidered per

.
,

haps u nj ustly to be inevitable when workshops had been

,

about I raided a supp l y tank and replac e d m ost of th e

.
-

deficie n cies whi l e my crew c l eared up insid e greased the

, ,

rollers and stauffers and c l eaned th e Si x Lewis guns we

,

had brought with u s from store We had time for tea a n d .

,

were ready to start whe n th e first ta n k moved off j ust after

six o c l ock I should have mention ed that there were only
’
.
 T HE H USH O PE RATI O N AND T HE C O CK C RO F T 1 99

e l even fit tanks at G hent Cottages O ur twelfth machin e .

a doubtful starter b elon ging to 1 9 Company —was on th e

other side of the canal where sh e had lai n since th e 3 1 5 t

,

with a twisted extension shaft and badly ditched into th e

-

bargain .To such an impoverished state had the Salient

already reduced us !
The first stage o f th e n ight s j ourney was a sh ort one ’
.

As we did n ot wish t o cross the canal before dusk we ,

pu ll ed up before seven o clock at M urat Farm close to ’

M arengo Causeway I never saw a ny vestige o f a farm

.

at this place ; but there was a row of tall splintered trees

h un g with camouflage netting a few muddy enclosures ,

bounded by overgrown h edgerows and the usual squal id ,

dug outs an d elephant iron shelters

-
B ehind one of the
-
.

h edges was a naval gun on a railway mou nting Th e .

brigade had formed a petrol dump here and we took in ,

a final supply of th e spirit Although we had com e such .

a short distance th e water i n my radiator was boiling

furiou sly and for som e tim e we could not discover the
,

cause until with the he l p of Paramor th e engineer of

, , ,

2 0 C ompany who was m inistering to th e detach ment we

, ,

found that the workshops people had u nscrewed a large

b a ffl e plate from one side of th e copper envelopes an d
-

omitted to replace it The plate was lyin g on th e floor

.

beneath a n accu mulat ion of oil dru ms and water tins We - -

.

readj usted this by when the eleven tanks moved off

again .

We now began one o f th e most wearisome and ma d den

ing treks I have ever undertaken with tanks At first .

everything went well The evening was fine : the G erman

.

artillery was i no ffensive although ou r own was very n oisy

,

and persistent ; and we crossed th e causeway and th e bad

ground beyond without a hitch for there was still light ,

t o see by W e passed 1 9 Company s ditched tank still

.
’
,

i m mobile and p l ainly in no condition t o attempt even t o

catch u s up l ater It was j ust getti n g dark when we
.

swung out of th e wire and shell ho l es on t o B oundary -

2 00 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

R oad with th e trees of Frascati to our left Boundary

, .

Road as I have m ent ioned in the last chapter e ve ntu

, ,

ally crosses the old front lines passes the n orth end of ,

K itchener s Wood and then desce nds to the Stee nb ee k

’
,
.

O ur route now followed it as far as ou r old acquaintan ce

H ammond s Corner and thence by Bu ffs Road to th e
’
,

main St J ulien h ighway Both B u ffs and Boundary R oad s

.
,

pr e sumably having been ( at a prehistoric era ) ordinary

cou ntry lanes had gone utterly to pieces u nd e r the i m
,

pact of h igh explosive and long stretches of them sin ce

,

our advance had been timbered A tank on a timbered .

road can do a great deal of damage especially if the ,

d river is inexpert and swings too often During this trek .

I had the misfortun e to meet the R E o fficer responsible . .

for th e upkeep of Buffs Road at the moment when G 4 7

was swingi n g unavoidably round a bend and when t o , ,

th e accompaniment of loud Te n d i n g and crashing noises ,

all the beautifully laid and clamped baulks of timber on

ou r off or turn ing side were O pe n ing upward and outward
like a fan It was not my fault as I hope he realised
.
,

after a period of reflection At the moment his language .

and despairing gestures seemed fully adequate t o the

situation and I was too much occupied with my own
,

troubles to spare much sympathy for his For l ong before .

this we had begun to experience some of the vicissitudes

which attend the movemen t of tank s by road at night
anywhere near the front line O ur first encou nter after.

getting on to Bou ndary R oad was with one of our own

machines on its way h ome in charge of a young o fficer , ,

Wayne who had j oined th e batta l ion on l y the day b e fore

, .

To acc l imat ise him without delay Wayn e had be e n detai l ed ,

i mmediately to bri n g i n th is tank from some unhealthy

spot n ear St J ulien where it had been lyin g in the m ud
,

u ndergoing repairs Since the last battle By this time it .

was growing d ark rapid l y and we now began to encounter

,

the mules I have never seen so m any mules as we

.

met that night I did n ot know there were so many i n

.
20 2 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

themselves every night and all night to such arteries as th e

St J ulien road Th e y would have found it far more p rofi t
.

”
able than the blind area shooting to wh ich they were s o
addicted I am speaking of course in the j udicial spirit
.
, ,

that come s with comfortable surroundings where 5 9 s a r e .

’

not There were nights and to spare when the G erman s

.

did shell the roads and turned them into Shambles and I ,

shall be the last to complain because they omitted to do so

that even ing Wedged for hours amid th e stream of de
.

moralised animals th e expectancy was bad enough We,

.

were infinitely fortunate that it was not realised For our .

progress up that road was in itse l f l ike some fiendish torture

invente d for ani mal haters by the H our after
hour went by the night grew blacker and blacker dawn
, , ,

e ven ,was drawing near and still we were embedded in ,

mules U nder the circu mstances no better ob stacle to

.
,

tanks cou l d have been devised We were entirely help l ess . .

We could not drive over the mu l es if only because they ,

were control l ed i n theory by human beings who ( when

, , ,

they were not falling off) were blaspheming and raving i n

their sadd l e s We could not drive round them because in
.
,

the dark we did not dare to leav e the road We could only .

wait their pleasure Like ships struggling against a Vio l e nt

.

current we forged Slowly very slowly ahead I do n ot

, , ,
.

Wish t o appear to be exaggerating and a trivial arithmetical ,

computation will prove in a few lines what has taken me

several pages to explain in words From the point where .

we turned on to Bou n dary Road t o our destination at

Be ll evue is roughly a m ile and a ha l f : it is actua l ly 2 5 0 0
yards ( 1 have j ust m easured it on a large scale map with
.
-

a simple but ingenious instru ment lik e a speedometer ) .

J udging by the light it cannot have been later than ,

P M when I struck the road Whe n I turned off th e

. . .

road again at Be l levue it was two o clock i n th e morning

,
’
.

It had taken me five and a half h ours to cover those 2 5 00

—
yards o n a road With n o obstructions the tank could
.
,

have done it in th irty minutes .

T HE HUSH O PE RAT I O N AND THE C O C K C RO F T
“
20 3

If I have wr i tten fl i ppa n tl y about this j ourney it did n ot ,

strike m e as being in th e least amusing at the tim e I .

walked outside of course throughout and nothing is i n

, , ,

itself more fatiguing than this sort of enforced crawl with

frequent stoppages Added to it was a consuming anxi e ty
.

about shells and other things peculiar t o an approach

march Waller who drove most o f th e way must have
.
, ,

been even wearier than I was I do not remember how I .

d iscovered Bellevu e which was nothing but a nam e on the

,

map but I th ink I overtook the tank i n front thanks t o

, ,

som e u nexpected h iatu s i n the torrent of mules K essel .

was there however to guide me t o a vacant Space beh ind

, ,

an exiguou s h edge The place stru ck me as being extra

.

ordinarily noi sy We were i n fact surrou nded by fie l d

.
, ,

batteries all of wh ich were very busily i n action The

, .

gun fl a s h es supplied ou r only i l lumination and this was

-
,

i nsu fficient as I discovered when I had fa ll en three t imes

,

into a cesspool under the n ose of my tank while helping

to rig up the camouflage net After this we lighted primu s .

stoves brewed ou rse l ves some cocoa wound up with a tot

, ,

of rum and then crawled inside with an optimistic notion

,

of obtain ing a little Sleep It was j ust o n three o clock

.
’
.
 C H APT E R X I .

T HE C O C KC R O F T ( conti nued ) .

V ER Y few of us contrived to sleep before dawn The .

1 8 pounder for it s si z e makes the most ear splitting report

-
, ,
-

of any gun and there were batteries so n ear to us that their

,

fi re which n ever ceased kept th e tanks i n a continual state

, ,

o f Vibration The only pi l low avai l able for most of u s was

.

m ade of armour plate studded with bolt heads and now

-
,
-
,

being hit by these concussion s as if by mil l ions of muffled

but infu riated ham mers U nder these circu mstances any .

s ort of rest was out of the question Toward dawn how .

,

ever the bombar d ment slackened

, I had j ust begun .

t hankfully t o doze when I was aroused again by some on e

shouting my name It turned out t o be the M aj or who
.
,

v ery thoughtful l y had walked across at that u nconscionable

hour from Company H Q ( established overn ight on the . .

c anal bank ) to take some of us back for a wash a rest and , ,

a meal before we attended a D ivisional conference at m id

d ay . It was now j ust afte r fi ve and a bright sunny ,

morning When I j oined the Maj or outside the tank I

.
,

obtained my first day l ight View of ou r quarters wh ich were ,

much as one might have expected I do not know the .

c ynic who nam ed the Spot Bellevue but no doubt h e had ,

his reasons It was the site apparently of a small farm

.
, ,

a building at least was marked on the m ap although long

, , ,

Since invisible t o the naked eye ; and it was happily situated

206 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

table or two in each and everywhere there were flies O n e

, .

o f these tenements was given over to ou r Signallers runners , ,

and other details Into its fellow we crowded as thankfully

.

a s if it had been the Ritz and Sa t about on the beds and ,

floor while kindly people brought us tea and bacon and

bread . K esse l was there and with h im his invaluable ,

servant Taylor who always seemed to ha v e a hot drin k

, ,

ready at the psychological moment .

We passed the morn in g at G ordon Terrace wash ing , ,

s having and behaving genera l ly l ike gentlemen of leisure

, ,

worried only by the malignant flies and the telephon e ,

which con spired successfu l ly to rob u s of what we needed

most — two or three hours sl e ep Shortly before m idday ’
.
,

C laughton Chaddock and I left with the M aj or for the

, ,

con ference at the 4 8 th D ivisional H eadquarters Coutts .

was working by hims e lf with the 3 3 r d Brigade of the 1 1 th

D ivision and had already gone off to hu nt for his B rigadier
, ,

wh o was living in some remote dug ou t east of the canal -

.

O ur destination was nearer at hand There runs Side by .

side with the canal north of Ypres a sluggish stream called ,

I think the Yp e rl e e
, Overhanging this there h ad been bu ilt
.
,

into the western canal bank a series of dug outs and Shelters -

s imilar to those on the east side and divisional head ,

quarters occupied a quite com modious su ite in this part ,

with a railed balcony proj ecting over th e stream H ere .

were a great number of im maculate person s wearing red

tabs ; and scattered humbly among them like poor rela ,

tions a few more workmanlike figures in steel helmets and

,

privates tunics — the officers of the two in fantry battalions

’

wh ich with ourselves were going to do the fighting

, , .

At these conferen ces one is always kept waitin g the ,

d e l ay usually being in strict ratio t o the presiding G eneral s

’

d ign ity ; and on this occasion it was n early one o clock

’

before any of the actual performers were called upon We .

s pent the interval profitably in becoming acquainted with

our i nfantry co l leagues I discovered the platoon com .

m ander of the 7 th Warwicks who was t o follow the fortunes

 T HE C O CKC RO F T 20 7

of G 47 Th e M aj or w as then su mmoned to con sultation

.

with the infantry battalion comman d ers and we conti nued ,

to stand pati e ntly about and wonder when we were goi n g

to get any lunch At length th e conference was over : it
.

a ppeared that none of u s except the M aj or had been , ,

wa n ted at all ; and we trooped thankfully back t o G ordon

T e rrace where we fou nd M erchant and some other faithful
,

s ouls wh o had come all the way from Lovie to brin g us our

l etters and wish u s luck .

Th e D i visional con fere nce all natural misgivings n ot ,

withstanding had a t lea st accomplished som ethi n g : the

,

s cope an d detai l s of the attack were agreed upon — for how

l ong of course n o on e could prophesy Th e operation had .

been modifie d as I have exp l ained until it took i n only

, ,

th e western Side of the triangle of roads It was limited .

,

that is t o the P oel ca p e l l e road itself the apex and the

, , ,

two form idab l e works to the w est and north west of the -

l atter N in e ta n ks were t o go in the other two rem ain i n g

.
,

in reserve at B e l levue Tanks were detailed for obj ectives .

a s follows and w e re to m ove in this order

,

Coutts with Willard of 1 9 C ompany for the Cockcroft

, , ,

th e m ost distant fort to be attacked ( it was a mile n orth of

St J ulien ) Charles Baker and K ane of 2 0 C ompany for
.
,

M aison d u H ibou ; M organ and Close of 2 0 Company for ,

T riangle Farm and V ancouver at the apex ; Claughton of ,

2 1 Compa n y for H i ll ock Farm at th e side of the Poel

, ,

c apelle road 4 00 yards south of Tr i angle Farm ; mys e l f

,

for a row of fortified gu n pits lying almost O pposite H illock -

Farm but wel l off the road toward the m iddl e of th e

, ,

t riangle Chaddock with th e n inth tank was t o follow

.
, ,

me and m ake himsel f useful where possib l e We were t o .

cross th e Steenb e ek not by the ruined b ridge at St J ulien

, ,

but at a point 1 00 yards t o the left where the engine e rs ,

that night were going to l ay fascine s i n the bed of th e

stream As this n ecessitated our leavin g the road for a
.

s h ort distance rej oining it i n the village itself G uy an d

, ,

Kessel were detailed to tape the crossing after dark Our .

20 8 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

battle headquarters would be established be fore zero at

Cheddar V i l la a large concrete mebus by the roadside
,

o n the crest o f the ridge from where a good view w as ,

O btained over the who l e area of the attack .

It was u n fortunate that there were only two male tanks

in the detachment — Willard s and Baker s Six pounder ’ ’
.
-

guns are of great service against these field forts especially ,

i f the tan k can get round to th e rear of th e latter where ,

the concrete is a l ways weaker and where the entrance i s

Situated This weakness is intentional as it facilitates a
.
,

lost post s recapture with the aid of fi el d guns whose She ll s

’
-

penetrate the thin rear wall As the Cockcroft was believed .

to be the most form idable of the St J ulien forts Wi l lard ,

with his 6 pounder was detailed to assist C outts s female

-
’

machine but i n the event Willard did not get into action
, .

H is tank was n ot running well and from th e first it was ,

thou ght likely that Coutts m ight have to tack l e the Co ok

croft single handed Chaddock there fore i f required and
-
.
, ,

i f he cou l d pass th e other tanks in f ront of h im on th e

road was to push on to C outts s help The Maison d u
,
’
.

H ibou almost as pow e rful as the Cockcroft was allotted

, ,

for the same tactica l reasons to B aker s remaining male ’

t a nk assisted by K ane
,
.

Coutts returned from his i nter v iew with the 3 3 rd B rigade

while we were having lunch at G ordon Terrace H e w as .

not in the best of spirits as he had been impressed un ,

favourably by what he had seen of the infantry who wer e

to work with him As it fell o ut his misgivings were j usti
.
,

fi ed . About this ti me Brown the assistant Reconnaissance ,

Officer of 2 1 Compa n y arrived with some aeroplane photo

,

graphs a n d additional maps ; and a little later Co l onel

H ankey and the Adj utant appeared with t he batta l ion
R O H atton H all
. .
,
.

We spent the afternoon loungin g about near the dug out -

,

a dreary interval of waiting without any genuin e rest A .

slight shower fell but toward evening the weather cleared

,

again and gave promise of a fi ne night At eight o clock th e .

’
 2 10 T HE TA N K IN A C TI O N

with the dark The road wound on des e rted i n front of

.

u s and on either side were only mud sandbags dead

, , ,

a nimals and Skeleton trees Even t h e guns were silent

,
. .

Impressed as we were with the unpleasant possibilities of

t h e morning s batt l e we compared reflections of a genera l ly
’

pessimistic tone as we tramped through the twilight whi l e ,

t h e wilderness abou t us awoke to its noctur n al life ; and

l ooking back upon it that walk appears as on e of the l east ,

e xhilarating I can recall We had some excuse for dubiety .

,

e specia ll y Coutts who had the most di fficu l t task of all an d

,

w h o mistrusted the people who wer e to support him The .

w hole O p e ration before us con fe ssed l y was another gamble ,

o f a n ovel and more than ordinari l y hazardous nature so

far as tanks wer e concerned It had be e n an axiom i n .

t h e corps u ntil th e latter was plu n ged into liqu id mud at

,

Y pres that i n action tanks should avoid roads like the

,

plague for obviou s reasons In the present case the field

, .
,

forts themselves did not worry u s an atom bu t i f everything

w ent wrong — i f the smoke b a rrage failed or if the enemy by
a n y means su spected in time what was happ e n i n g —then our

t anks strung out a l o n g a highroad which they dared not

,

leave on which it was doubtful if two could pass each oth e r

, ,

and which the G erman batteri e s on the next rise knew to a

yard stood every chance of b e i n g blown to pieces in a
,

f ew m inutes A l though as it h appened ou r attack proved

.

a
: complete surprise and was succ e ssful in all ess e ntia l
,

.details those of us who remained on the road to th e end

,

e scaped damage or destruction very narrowly ; a n d s u b s e

q uent operations on sim ilar l in e s were mostly disastrou s

failures And during that even ing walk we could not foresee
.

e vents — w e could only imagine them .

It was quit e dark whe n we arrived back at Bel l evue .

Already some of the batteries in our n eighbourhood had

 T HE C O C KC RO F T 21 1

begun their night fi ring and all rou nd the Salient the cold ,

white flares and V ery lights were rising and glowi n g and
fading o n ce more The tan k crews h ad passed a peaceful
.

day sleeping during the mornin g an d completing their

,

batt l e preparations in th e afternoon They had been Visited .

by th e Chaplain who brought them l etters newspapers

, , ,

a n d cigarettes H e also held a Commun ion service before

.

he l eft a proceeding which provoked th e Maj or to a char

,
”
acte r i s ti c utterance That s the worst of these sp eci a l i s ts
’
.
,

he remarked a day or two later th ey re always butting i n ,

“ ’

where they ve no busines s to be

’
1
The Chaplain i n fact , ,

had th e temerity to wish to be of som e real use on th ese

occas ion s H e had accompan ied th e tanks of 2 0 Com
.

pany on their dismal fiasco a few days before an d had don e ,

admirable work preparin g food an d hot dri n ks under shell

fi r e for crews whose m ach in e s were ditched winding u p by ,

assisti n g to bri n g home a tank W hose officer had been gassed .

H e was given the M ilitary Cros s for his work that day .

I found there was little or noth ing for me t o do before , ,

the time ca m e for u s to s tart M eyrick and Corporal .

M itchell h ad thought of everyth ing and G 4 7 was as ready ,

to go into action as sh e ever was lik e ly to be Th e .

pigeons even had arrived and our pair was stowed away
, , ,

i n their basket beneath my seat in c l ose proxim ity to the

l e ft hand track O iler a conj u n ction which they seemed to
- -

fi nd beneficial I explained t o my crew exactly what was

.

required of us but tactically our part in th e affair was so

,

simp l e that very little discussion was n ecessary It m erely .

resolved itse l f into a question of going up a road and with a ,

percentage of luck coming down it again In these final

,
.

conferences one does not enlarge u pon unpleasant contin

g e n c i e s
. We examined the map an d ph otograph s i n side

th e ta n k by the l ight of an electric torch an d then after the ,

inevitab l e ritual of bully cocoa and rum disposed ou r , , ,

se l ves for s l eep if such was to be had We had still two

,
.

h ours and a half before we n eed be disturbed .

S Wi l l ia m I I I nd Bi h p Wa l k r at th Boyn
1
ee . a s o e e e.
21 2 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

The tanks were to be formed up i n th e road i n their ,

fighting order by 1 A M G uy and K essel having gone

, . .

on to tape the crossing over the Ste e n b ee k Wright ,

was in charge of this stage of the proceedings I must .

have fallen asleep n otwithstandin g the noisy batteries and

,

my vibrati n g steel pi ll ow because I remember h im waking ,

me prematurely t o ask me some qu estion which at th e ,

tim e I considered superfluous I did n ot get t o Sleep

,
.

again At . I rou sed the crew and we started the ,

e n gine Soon after this Coutts a n d Willard the leadin g

.
, ,

pair were moving on to the road and before one o clock

, ,
’

all the nine ta n ks were lined up their engines t icking over ,

almost silent l y ready to start ,

.

We were away on the stroke of one with three hours and ,

three quarters before u s i n which t o get to St J ulien a

-
,

distance by th e road of only 2 5 00 yards or less than a mi l e ,

and a half The whole trek however was to be taken very

.
, ,

s l owly and th e latter part from Cheddar V illa onwar d

, , ,

mu st be covered at a mere crawl for then we should ,

be descending the reverse Slope of the ridge without any

covering noise except the normal n ight firing from our field
batteries It may be as well to correct here any m isappre
.

h e n s i on that shal l have arisen from all this talk about ridges
and va l leys Thes e term s have on l y a relative sign ificance
.
,

and the read e r who is so fortunate as to know nothing of

the Salient must not picture u s climbi n g an d descending
a range of h ills like the Pen n ines or even like the Chiltern s ,
.

It is n ecessary however humi l iating to confess that the

, ,

famous P i l ke m Ridge at the highest point attained by the

,

St J ulien road rises no more than 8 1 feet abov e sea l eve l

,
-
.

The valley of the Ste en b e ek is only some 4 0 fe e t lower In .

the country of t he bli n d however the one eyed man i s , ,

-

kin g ; and a geographical excrescence neg l igib l e anywhere

else becomes a prominent feature in Flanders The Steen .

be e k val l ey is a gen uine depression led down to by a level ,

Slope over a m ile in length and it carries sound as we l l ,

as any sim ilar if m ore pronounced depression elsewhere .

21 4 T HE T AN K m ACT IO N

lines I cou ld imagine n ow at times that I could see a

.

little mist over the Stee nb e ek below u s and even the vague ,

out l ine of the farther ridge ; and presently wh en far away ,

i n the G erman rear a fire brok e out a short strip of skyline ,

i n the direction of Langemarck was clear l y visible against

t he glow In reality however one saw virtually noth ing
.
, ,

but the stumps of trees on either side the faint shine of ,

water in ruts and pools on the roadway and the darker ,

shadow of the tank i n front After a while cam e another .

halt du e to further troub l e in Willard s machine In our

,
’
.

exposed position any experiments with th e exhaust were

,

impossible and he had to proc e ed eventual l y a s best h e

,

could with everything flung open to admit fresh air

,
.

The n ext event I remember was the appearan ce on th e

right of the road of a c l ump of ruined buildings— pres um
ably V a n h e ul e Farm Away to the left the trees in fron t
.

of J uliet Farm were j ust visible V a n h eul e was only some .

6 00 yards from the crest but this distance seemed to have ,

taken us hours The time in fact was . And at this , ,

point th e first rea l ly unpleasant interruption of ou r march

occu rred with the whin e and crash of a shell which burst
,

somewher e beh ind th e farm Several m ore followed in .

our neighbourhood and somehow it was additiona ll y dis

,

t u r b i n g to perceive the flashes of the guns that were firing ,

apparent l y n ot so very far away If we co uld see these .

flashes on e could not hel p the i l logical suspicion that the

,

gunners could see u s In any case I decided I should b e

.
,

more happy inside the tank as shell fragments have a way ,

of travelli n g unexpected distances I scrambled in accord .

i ngl y h opi n g devoutly that this sudden activity was a mere

,

caprice having no co n n ectio n with our presence on th e

,

road Once in side I could hear noth ing but I be l ieve this
.
,

shelling was a spasmodic burst directed vagu e l y at some

suspected target near V a n h e u l e Farm We w e re not .

troubled again duri n g the rest of ou r j ourney .

Owing to our deliberate pace and the several delays i n

the front of the co l umn most of the tanks had little time
,
 THE C O C K C ROFT 2l 5

to spare after all C outts unhampered pushed on w e l l

, .
, ,

ah e ad and was in S t J ulien a quarter of an hour befor e

,

z ero at which t ime the rest of u s were crossing or waitin g

, ,

to cross the Ste e nb e e k This stream when I arrived a t

,
.
,

it presented in the growin g light ( for dawn was j ust abou t

,

to break ) so forbiddin g a spectacle that I got hurriedly ou t

of th e ta n k to lead the way across myself At one time a n .

insignifica n t trickle of water a cou ple o f yards wid e at th e

m ost but enclosed between banks 6 to 8 feet high th e
, ,

poundin g of our own barrage followed during the pas t ,

th ree weeks by that of the G ermans h ad multiplied i ts ,

di fficu l ties ten fold There was l ittle water to be seen n ow

.
,

only a sort of boggy su rface several yards across beneat h , ,

which the fascines laid that ni ght by th e engineers h a d

already disappeared completely under the weight of th e
leading tanks Some of these tanks were now climbin g
.

a perfect precipice of mu d on th e O pposite s ide the blac k ,

n ose of one pointi ng almost vertically upward against th e

rapidly brighten ing sky i n the east Two h owever out o f .
, ,

the seven in front of m e had not got so far Close t o m y , .

left was Willard s unfortu nate m achine apparently ditched

’
, .

Behind this was a second ta n k wh ich I discovered afte r ,

wards t o be K ane s H e had m issed t h e tape or attempte d

’
.
,

t o find a crossing for hi mself an d was ditched hopelessly ,

i n consequence I had little tim e for i nvestigation howeve r

.
, ,

for I was pounced on im mediately by G uy who was waitin g ,

there to see a l l the tanks across — a most u nattractive duty ,

as the G erman barrage always fel l on the stream He . :

abused m e roundly for being outside pointed out th e way , ,

and then pushed m e in again The fascines it appeared .

, ,

were there a l though invisible and we crossed the stream

, ,

and mounted the farther bank without di fficulty A fina l .

climb over the debris of a house and we were in the mai n ,

street of St J ulien on th e stroke of zero I did n ot even .

pau se there As we swun g left handed on the brick littere d

.
- -

p a vé and saw the tail of C l a ugh to n s tank with its large ’

,

painted nu mber G 4 4 m ovin g forward a few yards i n

, ,
21 6 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

front the ye l low sky beyo nd was dotted suddenly with

,

shrapnel bursts a dense cloud of wh ite smoke billowed

,

upward from the far end of the vi ll age and a l most simul ,

ta n e ou s l y there soared above this the red and green rockets

from the startled G erman forts .

I find that my memory plays me curious tricks on or ,

after occasions of this kind I gained a distinct impression

,
.
,

for e xampl e that I moved down a street whose houses

, ,

although battered w e re for the m ost part stan ding to a

,

cons iderable height It appears h owever that there was

.
, ,

n othin g sta n din g i n St J u l ien at all The place was merely .

a series of rubbish heaps O n the other hand I remember

-
.
,

with un necessary accuracy certain obj ects lying amid the

reddish brick rubble and dust which covered the muddy
-

road — a d ead G erman soldier on his face two of ou r own ,

i n fantrymen a l so dead ( and not rece n t l y t o j udge by

, ,

appearanc e s ) a neat rol l of wire n etting half an iron bed

,
-
,

stead a d e capitated mule a n d several yards distant the

, , , ,

mu l e s h e ad I do not k n ow why I should have noted these

’
.

particular it e ms among the assort e d domestic m i l itary and , ,

human debris which littered th e street St J ulien had been .

systematical l y destroyed only with in th e last few w e eks .

Before that being h idden from direct observation ( un l ike

,

St Jea n its equ iva l ent on our side ) probably it was in fair
, ,

preservation and in us e for billetin g troops on their way

into or out of the l ine I have a n idea that there were a
.

n umber of fragm e ntary art ic l es of fur n iture lying about ,

perhaps dragged from the cel l ars to make hasty obstacles

duri n g the rece n t fighti n g in the place It is curiou s how .

often such trumpery thin gs survive the effects of a bombard

men t You wil l see a hou se dissolved into its elements a n d
.
, ,

am id the wreckage some old bird cage or an almost perfect

,
-

chair .
21 8 T HE TAN K IN ACT I O N

near my gun pits and since its bed had been destroyed by
-
,

th e sh e l ling its waters had welled up and Spr e ad over a

,

wide area of ground from St J ulien to Triangle Farm This .

i nu ndation was shown clearly on aerop l ane photographs ,

and it put out of the question any attempt on my part ,

had I wished to make one to leave the road My only ,

.

course of action was to remain on the p a vé and engage

the strong point across the i nterven ing 1 5 0 yards of
-

quagmire .

We had to get there first however and this was a delicate , ,

matter As we emerged from the village I saw C l a ugh ton s

.
’

tank 5 0 yards ahead surmou nti n g the first fal l en tree A

, ,
.

big tree is an u n p l easant impediment to a tank as it is ,

i mpossible to balance on the rounded trunk an d one comes ,

down inevitably on the other side with a j arring crash O n .

th e P oe l ca pel l e road these trees became a dangerous

O bstac l e because in crashing down over them with the
, ,

nose of the tank fallin g from a great height a n d the whole

thing entirely out of th e driver s contro l the machine was ’
,

very likely to slip straight O ff the greasy p a vé which was ,

none too wide into on e of the gulfs on either side ( This

, .

happened eventua ll y I believe t o M organ s tank when h e

, ,
’

was tryi n g to draw closer to Triang l e Farm ) Th e re a l so .

was a danger of breaking a track plate on the stones The -

.

a n gle at which the trees could best be taken lying as they ,

did in all directions required to be j udged and when this

, ,

was done th ey might move suddenly under the tracks and

precipitate a crash at th e wron g moment N egligible in .
,

short as they would have been on a good road in th e

, ,

circumstances they cau sed u s all a great deal of anxiety .

Everythi n g depend e d on the drivers ; a n d the fact that all

seven tanks reach e d at l east the c l ose vicinity of their
obj ectives was a distinct feather in the cap O f every one o f
these admirab l e men Waller drove G 4 7 over a succession
.

of trees without a semb l ance of trouble Everythi n g loose .

insi d e of course includi n g the crew fell h e l pless l y about

, , ,

each time we crashed ; but this was a part of the ordinary

 T HE C O C K C ROF T 21 9

day s work The pigeons as I have remarked before bore

’
.
, ,

this repeated experience which must have seemed to the m ,

like a series of earthquakes with as much equanimity as ,

anybody although their basket usua l ly was dislo d ged and

,

upset .

All this t ime I was peering out for som e sign of my gu n

pits The smoke was still very dense and vi sibility a matter
.
,

of a couple of hundred yards G 4 4 sometimes faded to a .

mere blur in front The first recogn isable fe ature I saw

.

was a wide sheet O f water to the right of the road which I ,

took correctly to mark the actual cou rse of the flo o ded

stream Im mediately after my right hand pair of gunners
.
,
-

Sergeant M eyrick and Carter O pened fire It appeared , .

that they had sighted not only the gu n pit s but also some -

figures moving out from th e m carrying a machine gun I -

.

could sti l l see n othing from the flap i n front but on cran i n g ,

over Wal l er s h ead and open in g a revolver loophole on that

’

side of the cab I discovered at once a row of h igh mounds

, ,

looking enorm ou s through the smoke about I 5 0 yar ds from ,

the road It had been O bviou s fro m an inspection of aero

.

plane photograph s that these pit s had been constructed

for heavy guns but I had n ot expected to fin d the m so
,

conspicuou s Further investigation was curtai l ed rather

.

su mmarily by a rapid tat tat tat tat u pon the side of the - - -

cab i n dicati n g two things : ( a ) that some on e in or near

,

the gu n pits was firing at u s with a machi n e gun ; and ( b)

- -

that if he could see and was ai ming at my revolver loophole

, , ,

h e was m aking remarkably good shooting and must b e ,

blessed with far better eyesigh t than I could c l ai m It is .

true that by th is time the G erman mach ine gun ner knew all -

about tanks wh ile we mu st have presented a fairly clear cut

,
-

target I closed the loophole instantly an d te l ling Waller

.
,

to hold G 4 7 in her present posit ion broadside on to th e ,

strong point proceeded to fish about in the l ocker for ou r

-
,

periscopes It is impossible to see a n ything on a flan k

.

through the front flaps n or if one can u s e them is it , , ,

advisable to do s o under mach ine gu n fire We carried six -

.
2 20 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

periscopes drawn in a hurry from store before we left camp

,
.

It was on l y when I had pushed all six through the ho l e in

the roof and had failed utterly to see anything through any
,

one of them that I remembered that we had lashed our

,

camouflage n e t on top of the cab N ormal l y the net i s .

carried on the spud box in the rear but it i s th en v ery apt

-
,

to be shake n on to the red hot exhaust pipe whe n it catches - -

,

fire I had a horror of fires on a tank and was determined

.
,

on this occasion to put the net i n some safer p l ace forgetting ,

that I m ight wa n t to use th e periscopes .

D uri n g this time M eyrick a n d Carter had co n tinued to

fire busi l y and there was a periodic clatter of emptied Lewis
,

dru ms on the floor The tattoo on the cab having ceased I

.
,

resorted again to the revolver port There was not a sig n of .

life about the gu n pits but so long as the smoke continued

-
,

to hang over the grou nd they might have co n cea l ed a

batta l ion of infantry for all we could see My gunners in .
,

addition to C laimi n g the destruction of the party seen to

ru n out i n the begi n ning asserted that th e ir fi r e was hot l y
,

returned ; a n d the lead splashes on G 4 7 s exposed flank ’

proved th at there was some truth i n t his contention ; but

my be l ief is that the garrison of the pits abandoned them
after the first few m inutes — a fact which i f true in n o , ,

sense detracts from the spirit and g e neral exce ll ence of

our performance And as we had no means of telling
.

what had happened we could on l y continue firin g u n ti l

,

the situatio n ( a n d th e light ) became clearer After a while .

I moved the tan k a short distance up the road with the .

,

s l ight h O p e that I m ight fi n d a patch of groun d firm enough

to j ustify our att e mpting to get to c l oser q uarters ; but
b e tween us a n d the enigmatic gun pits the swamp lay -

everywhere .

In all this curiou s due l lasted for about a quarter of an

,

hou r Whi l e it proceeded I could see C l a ugh ton s tank

.
’

a little way ahead motionless alongside the ruins of H i ll ock

,

Farm which abutted on to the road H is guns appeared to

, .

be firing point blan k through what was left of the windows

-
.
222 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

now also in the act of swinging round For the same reason .
,

Chaddock who had a roving com mission and who wished

, ,

to go on to C outts s help could not pass G 4 7 There was

’

, .

nothing for it ther e fore but to return as soon as the infantry

, ,

were i n the gun pits The business of swi n ging on the

-
.

narrow greasy camber of the p a vé was not easy but ,

Waller accomplished it with h i s usual skil l and I foun d ,

myself presently facing Chaddock s tank and waving to ’

him out of my flap H e was about twenty yards behind

.

me and his guns also had been firing at the gun pits A
,
-
.

li n e of infantry was now visible close at hand the m en ,

crouch ing in a sort of drain which ran outward from the

road I b e ckoned to the nearest man who was kneeling
.
,

behind a fragment of wall by the roadside and on h is ,

running cautious l y to the front of the tank I learnt that

these people were the second wave O f my supports The .

leadin g platoon had m oved on to the gun pits O ur work -

.
,

therefore was done , Chaddock in his turn was edging

.
, ,

carefully roun d on th e p a vé to start for home ; C l aughton

was C lose astern of me ; a n d i n a fe w minutes the three
tanks were maki n g for St J u l ie n again at their best
spe e d N o n e of us kn ew what h ad happened to th e
.

other four in front .

Th e time was the su n was up the smoke and dust ,

about the vil l age had vanished away and as we crashed ,

once more over the fallen trees I could see to the left , ,

between S t J u l ien and Winnipeg two of 1 9 Company s ,

’

disabled tanks lying where they had been hit on the 3 I s t

o f J uly At this time although I did not know it the
.
, ,

G erman batteries had at last turned their guns upon the

road Possib l y we were now in sight as we j olted down
.

it
. Three or fou r sh e ll s burst C l ean on the p a vé between ,

G 4 4 and my own tank so that Claughton thought we had ,

been h it but we heard n othing of th is u ntil after

, It .

appears to have been a narrow escape for both of u s In .

the street O f St J u l ien we were able to push on at top

speed until I remembered that I had not despatched the
,
 T HE C O C K C RO FT 223

n ecessary pigeon message We slowed u p while I wrot e

-
.

it thus letting i n C laughton who passed u s at a great

, ,

pace I have in front of me n ow my C opy of Army B ook

.

4 1 8 A containi n g
, the carbon duplicate o f that historic
document It is all but i l legib l e H aving released th e
. .

bird we put on speed again and made for the Ste e n b e e k

,

crossing .

That u npleasant spot appear e d less formidable in day

light but it was t o provi d e us with a fin al nerve wracking
,
-

incident before we fi nished with it As we m ounted the .

ruined house again an d looked d own upon the muddy gulf

belo w it was congested with tan ks Willard with his
, .
,

asphyxiating box of tricks was st ill in much the same ,

position as when I had passed hi m before zero — hou rs

ago as it seem ed now
,
H e had contrived however to .
, ,

u n d i tc h hims e lf partial l y and crawl a few yards forward , ,

so that he almost blocked th e n arrow crossing Close .

beside hi m was G 44 clawing its way precariously rou n d , .

B ehi n d was K ane s tank sti l l in its old place whi l e ’

, ,

Chaddock who had got across i n safety was close to

, ,

K ane I h ad begu n to descend t oward this congregation

.

before I realised that it was goi n g to be very di ffi cult to get

past Wi l lard The passage where lay the bu ried fasci n es
.

was on l y j u st broad enough to take a tank and on either ,

side was th e bog which repres e nted the true bed of th e

Stee n b eek We slid down th e ba n k rather more rapid l y
.

th an I intended and brought up nose to nose again st ,

Wil l ard s tank We tried to swing and failed We tried

’
.
, .

t o reverse and failed again It was a repet ition of our

,
.

experience at K itchener s Wood We were sun k too deep ’

.

i n mud to permit of any movement but a forward one ,

which was rendered impossible by th e tank in front .

External measures were necessary and I led the way ,

outside It was then that I di scovered that the village

.

beh ind us and also the Ste e n b ee k itself were being she l led
, ,

heavily We had stopped in fact on the l ine of the G erman

.
, ,

counter barrage which fell automatically along the stream

-
, ,
224 T HE TAN K IN ACTI O N

particular attention being paid to the neighbourhood O f St

J ulien This was an un fortunate circu mstance a n d I do
.
,

not think any of u s ca n ever have worked harder or more ,

apprehensively than we did in the course of the next twe n ty

,

m inutes Chaddock an d Claughton by this ti m e had got

.

c l ear of the imbroglio although th e form e r d e ciding for

, ,

some reaso n not t o return to the road got himself ditched ,

hope l essly farther on Willard and some of his crew a p

.

e a r e d from his ta n k and asked for assistance i n startin g

p
up th e engine They a l l seemed rather dazed a n d helpl e ss
.
,

from the poisonous exhaust fumes as I supposed ; a n d fi nd ,

ing them still sta n di n g about i n th e open after I had sent

two O f my me n to he l p I pointed out to Wi ll ard that they
,

would b e very much safer inside fu mes or n o fu mes , .

H eavy shells were explodin g about u s much C loser a n d

more frequently than was pleasant and fragments fl e w ,

whinin g overhead continually Twice we were deluged .

with brick rubble from the remains of a house on th e

bank above Presently Deakin was h it in the back by
.

a flying piece of brick which knocked hi m down ; but ,

as it struck a buckle of his equipment it did him n o ,

harm A ll this time we were labouring fe verishly diggin g

.
,

away the mud piled a gainst one side of th e tank as it pre ,

vented her swingi n g collectin g bits o f timber boughs of

, ,

trees bricks and other rubbish t o form a ho l di n g surface

, , ,
-

beneath her C lamping on th e u n d i tc h i ng beam and r e m ov

,
-
,

ing the cam ouflage net from the cab wh e re it interfered ,

with the beam s action These varied pursuits took up a

’
.

considerable amount of time as any on e who has engaged ,

in them will believe and we were interrupt e d p e riodic a ll y

,

and impelled to shelter against the ta n k by the sudden

rush and exp l osion O f some more imm inent shel l Al to .

gether this j ob must have taken us near l y half an hour

, ,

for a premature attempt to swing G 4 7 failed and we had ,

to back her again and continue ou r work At length we .

had prepared what seemed an adequat e base for her

man oeuvre and I pu shed most O f th e cre w ins i de again
,
 2 26 T HE TA N K IN ACTI O N

troops abandoning their third line trenches ( wh ich nobody -

had approached ) and streami n g away over the farther,

crest . A little later we passed B ellevue and fou nd it ,

deserted the two reserve tanks h avi n g been ordered

,

t o return From the battery positions i n this region

.
,

gu n n er o fficers came out to inquire anxiously about th e

e ffi cacy of th eir smoke barrage Bei n g able to assu re -
.

them from ocu l ar evide n ce that it had been little short

, ,

O f bli n di n g I b e came extreme l y popular and was dragged

, ,

O ff to the nearest dug out for a very welcome whisky -

a n d soda
-
.

Farther down i n Buffs Road w e met with one or two

, ,

d e l ays Tra ffi c was on the move here and my radiator

.
,

started to boi l again Somewhere abou t this time we .

c am e across Chaddock carrying a Lewis gun and h e l ping ,

o n e of his crew who had been hit by a shrapnel bullet i n

,

the leg H is tank it appeared was ditched n ear J uliet

.
, ,

Farm I took the wou n ded man and the gun on board
.
,

and deposited the former at a d ressi n g station lower down

the road Owing to these and other brief stoppages it
.
,

must have been nearly whe n w e drew near to the

canal . I ha l ted th e tank by M arengo Causeway whi l e
I went to report at G ordon Terrace At our headquarters .

I found the Co l onel and Adj uta n t with the M aj or al l i n a ,

very Christian frame of mind and full of fe l icitatio n s ,

messages h aving arrived from both i nfantry and ta n ks

r eporting th e capture of all obj ectives at a ridiculous l y

low cost The i n fantry casualties up to the date O f the

E .
,

l ast m e ssage total l ed a dozen wounded

B , I w a s b e ginning .

to rea l ise by now that between us we h ad accomplish e d

‘

something rather except ional that morni n g It transpire d .

,

h owever that our four leading tanks were ditched a n d no

, ,

f urth er news had com e through as to the fortunes or where

a bouts of th eir people .

I was told to proceed with G 4 7 to M urat Farm where a ,

fresh crew would take over the tank I rej oined the l atter .
,

a n d we began the last stage of our j ourney Al l my men .

 T HE C O C K C RO F T ;2 2 7

were thoroughly exhau sted and Waller in particu l ar as he

, ,

had been drivi n g for seven or eight hou rs But in view of .

my experiences durin g the latter part of our h omeward trek

from St J ulien wher e my second and third drivers had been
,

i n charge a l ternately I felt ob l iged to ask him to complete

,

t he ru n ( It was a m isfortune that at Ypres there were n o

.

facilities for driving pract ice for s e cond an d third drivers .

Ta n ks hard l y mov e d except when goin g i n to act ion The .

first drivers u sually were high l y skilled m en but between ,

them a n d th e others there often was a great gulf fixed which ,

we had n o opportun ity of reducing by a little regular training ) .

I took the brakes and with poor Wa ll er almost fa ll ing asleep

,

i n his seat we crossed the causeway a n d parked up

,

eventually u nder a hedge at M u rat Farm j u st after m idday .

O n e m inor contr etemps roun ded O ff the performa n ce We .

proce e ded as a matter of routine to camouflage th e tan k .

The little canvas tags sewn profusely over a camouflage

net are dyed i n some highly i n flammable green paint the ,

cause of inn um erable fires O ur engi n e having been ru n

.

n i n g continual l y for twelve hours th e whole machin e was ,

l ike an oven an d the exhaust pip e on the roof al l but red

,
-

hot ; and th e net in stant l y caught a l ight We had to use .

every pyre n e extinguisher we carried to keep th e flames

under b e fore we had pu shed th e last smouldering fragments
over the side I w a s standing on the roof stamping ou t a
.

few stray emb e rs and b l aspheming about war i n general to

Allerton of 2 0 Company who had j u st appeared when my
, , ,

n e rves received a fin a l shock The n aval gun on th e

.

other sid e of the hedge whose existenc e I had forgotten

, ,

fired with a frightful detonation and n early threw me O ff the

tank.

O ur tribulations were n ow however at an end It is , , .

true that I missed the lorry wh ich took my crew back t o

Lovie ; but after waiting for som e tim e at Essex Corn er on ,

th e main road bes id e th e cana l for any vehicle which would

,

take m e on my way I was picked up by M aj or Fernie in h is

,

car and arr i ved at the camp fast asleep at tea time
, ,
-
.
 2 28 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

Leaving for the next chapter a consideration of the

causes which gave to the Cockcroft operation a significa n ce
out of a l l proportion to its Scope I will describe briefly the ,

general r e su l t and the fortu n es of the other tanks The .

accou n ts hitherto published are i naccurate .

”
Coutts who gav e the star tur n of the perform ance
,
“
,

was redu ced as we have seen to tack l i n g the Cockcroft itself

single ha n ded with a fe m a l e tank
-
This fort was an .

extremely powerful a n d massive affair of co n crete erected ,

i n the ruins of som e farm buildings It held a garrison of .

somethi n g like 1 00 men with a nu mber of machine gu n s

,
-
,

and was further protected by wire and outlyin g posts The .

concrete O f the walls and roof would keep out any proj ectile
below a howitzer shel l bein g i n places eight feet thick
, .

A form idable stronghold of this nature bears as little resem

”
blance to the ordinary light pill box contain ing ha l f a “ -
,

dozen m e n as does a fi rs t class fortress to a sem i permanent

,
- -

redoubt and if he l d by a determined garrison in combina

,

t ion with similar forts could check a l arge force indefinitely

, ,

as indeed the Cockcroft and its fe ll ows had conc l usively

demon strated A 6 pou nder tank provided it could p l ace
.
-
,

itself against th e weak rear face of such a fort might ,

compel its surrender ; but a female ta n k mora l effect apart , ,

was in fact as h e l pless agai n st it as a platoon O f infa n try ,

although l ess vu l nerable its e l f N evertheless when Coutts .

, ,

by leavi n g th e road managed t o get within 5 0 yards of

,

the Cockcroft befor e becoming ditched the l arg e garrison ,

abandoned it after a brief defence As an instance of a .

tank s moral effect this was the more remarkable in that the
’

in fantry of the 3 3 rd B rigade confirmi n g all the tan k com

,

mander s previous misgivings failed signally in their duty

’

of supporting him NO attention was paid to his signals

.

annou nci n g the evacuation of the fort H is sergeant was .

sent with a message to the same effect but still the infantry ,
23 0 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N

escaping garrison of that place H avin g unditched h is .

tank after a while he returned to St J ulien by midday

,
.

Close had a variety of adve n tur e s includin g that of ,

being take n prisoner for a time H is tan k also was .

permane n tly ditched somewhere near V ancouver but its ,

influence seems to have been responsible for th e aba n don

m e n t of the stro n g point Close himself did not appear
-
.

again u n til the n e xt day .

Clau ghton whose tan k I had watched had no trouble

, ,

with H illock Farm whose garrison fled the moment he

,

ranged up alongside and O pened fire My own experience s .

with the gun pits I have already described at unpardonable

-

length I may add that my two right ha n d guns fired

.
-

1 2 00 rounds between them bu t I never heard evidence ,

a s to what damage if any th ey effected

, , .

All the four leading tanks cam e u nder excessively h e avy

machine gun fire from posts outs ide the strong poi n ts
- -
.

Morgan s machine wh ich was th e only on e we had the

’
,

opportunity of examining had large areas O f its armou r ,

p l astered a whitish grey with lead splashes an d the armour

-
,

piercing bullets were driven a l most th rough the defective

plates H e and his crew suffered a n umber of tiny wounds
.

i n thei r faces and hands from stee l sp l inters These .

counted as casualties a n d made up more than half o f ,

ou r very trifli n g list which totalled two men killed and

,

o n e O fficer and te n men wou nded Th e infant ry casu alties .

,

howev e r were even more remarkable for their i n s i gn i fi ca n ce

, .

The two Warwick battalions ( of the 4 8 th D ivision ) which

were working with every tank e xcept C outts s fo l lowed up ’

in an admirab l e manner throughout ; yet the whole opera

tion in which the equ ivalent of a brigade took part which
, ,

resu l ted in the capture within ninety minutes of six for m i d

ab l e stro n g points and a gain of 6 00 yards of ground on a
-

mile front and in which the enemy mu st have l ost several

,

hu n dr e d m e n kil l e d wounded and prison ers together with

, , ,

some fifty machi n e guns was carried out at a cost to the

-
,

i nfantry engaged of fifteen men wou nded !

 CHAPTER X II .

F RO M T HE C O C KC R O FT TO CA M BRAI .

IT is no exaggeration to say that even those O f us who had

played the most m o d est part on the 1 9th Augu st awoke th e
following mor n ing to find ourselves famous — a t least in the
not i n co n sid e rab l e world control l ed by the s th Army Th e .

astonishment and i n terest evoked by th is single little action

were a measure o f the perp l exities confronti n g the H ighe r
C omman d i n the S alient .In any series of operatio n s th e
casualty list may becom e a govern i n g feature as it must ,

a l w ays be an important on e Ther e are li mits to the pric e

.

which m ay be paid for any gain and there are limits to what
,

a ny troops wil l stand Th e most highly trained infantry sav e

.
-
,

i n exceptional circu m stances can not be expected to mai n

,

tain thei r offensive spirit after sustai n i n g a succession O f

crippling losses for no very appare n t resu l t In mid Au gus t .
-

our casualties at Ypres had not approached the frightful

total they were to reach before the end nor perhaps wer e ,

they as high proportionate l y as i n Oct ober or N ovember ;

but they were becoming very serious if on l y because t o t h e
,

subordi n ate ranks who were su ffering them they see med t o
, ,

lead nowhere and promise no cessation O n e murderous .

attack against wire a n d concrete if it gai n ed a little ground

, ,

m eant only i n creased misery for those who were left ,

followed the next day or the next week by anothe r

, ,

m urderous attack again st m or e wire and more concrete .

 232 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

O n e had only to look at the faces of infantry goi n g into the

l in e before an assault or even for ordinary trench duties to
, ,

realise how th e strai n was tellin g At this time our m ost .

precious assets th e j ournalists after wa l king through a

, ,

cava l ry camp thirty mil e s behind the front or watch ing a

brigade in rest going out with its bands for a route march -

were writi n g to their newspapers about the cheery faces of

ou r fighti n g men the grim de l ight they took in shells and
,

s l aughter an d th e pusil l an imity and ge n era l idiocy of the

,

e n e my . A ph rase which appeared i n som e j our n a l ( it

referred to Cambrai but wi l l serve i n this digressio n ) was
,

ba n di e d about our camp for a long ti me as bei n g character ,

i s ti c a l l y i mbeci l e Th e writer speaking of a u n it which

.
,

h a d receiv e d sudden orders to m ove remarked that the ,

“

m e n hurried from the baths fe arin g that they might

,
”
m iss the fight ! For weeks after any one seen moving ,

hurried l y was accused O f fearing to m iss the fight This sort .

of rubbish may conceivab l y have served some usefu l purpose

in Eng l and ; but it made extraord inary reading in F l anders ,

where after o n ly a few we e ks there was growing upon

, ,

every o n e the fe e l i n g that this offe n sive with its peculiar ,

horrors due t o weather a n d terrain was becoming another ,

a n d more dreadful Som me remorse l ess a n d e ver l asti n g

,
.

A n d i f the H igh e r Comma n d sti l l cherished bright e r hopes ,

t hey cannot hav e co n templated the future witho u t a n xiety .

They must have realised that V on Armin or whoever was ,

responsible for th e int e rm i n able series o f pill boxes an d -

concret ed farms had d e vised a method of defence which in

,

s uch a country an d i n combinatio n with the barriers th at

,

o u r own arti ll ery was augmenting dai l y des e rved at l east as ,

much cr e dit for our d i s c om fi tur e as that convenie n t public

scapegoat the rain
, With out any rain at all there would
.
,

s till have remai n ed the prob l em of h o w to surmount quag

m ire s and rei n forced concr e te bristling with machi n e guns -

.

An d the n had come what seemed a sudden a nd quite

startling gleam of light H ere was a group of these pesti l ent
.

fortifications which had held the 1 8 th Corps in check for

234 T HE TA N K IN A CT IO N

was a striking example of their moral effect And because .

it was a l l this it he l ped u n d oubtedly ( although to what

,

exact degree I cannot say ) to d e termine the who l e future of

the corps then hanging i n the ba l ance Doz e n s a n d scor e s
, .

of ta n ks were thrown away i n the Sa l ient after the Co ok

croft with no adequate return for th e sacrifice but there ,

was no more overt talk of abo l ition or even of r e d uc

tion It was n o t a mere coincidence that on 6 th October
.

an actual programme of expansion to 1 8 batta l ions ,

a l r e ady rej ected in J un e was confidently put forward,

agai n It was approved in a hurry immediate l y after

.

Cambrai in N ove mber ; an d indirectly the Cockcroft l ed

t o Cambrai .

While the first glad rapture lasted G Battalion basked ,

in a rare blaze of popularity To any one of a cy n ical .

turn O f mind — and I thi n k that prolonged experience of

th e Army induc e s that spirit in most people of moderat e
acu me n — the days immediately fol l owing the action m ust
have provid e d much qu iet amu sement The very mor n i n g .

after while those of u s who had been the innocent actors

,

i n the scene were making up for lost time i n bed the ,

camp was th ro n ged with exalted visitors A deluge of .

congratulatory telegrams descended upon the Co l o n e l .

M ost significant O f a ll perh aps M r B each Thomas of

, , ,
‘
the Daily M ail felt impe ll ed to leave the seclusion of
,
’

the T e r n oise V al l ey to gather copy amo n g our tents at

Lovie Th e actors however al l being i n b e d when h e
.
, ,

arrived he was captured very fortunately by 1 9 Company

, ,

who i mmur e d hi m i n their mess u ntil he had to l eave .

Th e ir only r e presentative i n the cast e through no fau l t of ,

his own had never got into action at a l l ; but this fact
,

was n o bar to their imaginations and they supp l ied the ,

j ourna l ist with what must have be e n a very highly coloured -

version of the facts Th e result to our great j oy appeared

.
, ,
 F RO M T HE C O C K C ROFT TO C A M BR A I 2 U7 5

a few days later i n the Times and the D ai l y Mail in ‘ ’ ‘

,
’

an account O f a most extraordinary and H omeric conflict

i n which the inevitab l e leviathans figured prominently
“
,

but in which od d l y enough those of u s who h ad been

, ,

there were unable t o recogni se a sing l e detail .

The most gratifyi n g tribute came i n the form O f a Special

Order by the 1 8 th Corps com mander G eneral M axse a d , ,

dressed t o G B attali on in wh ich he than k e d a ll ranks for

,

their efforts and frankly attributed the success his corps

,

had attained at such a trifling cost entirely to the ta n k s ‘

I regret having lost th e copy I made o f this lett e r which ,

was quite exceptional i n form and substance H ardly had .

we digested these u nu sual comp l im e n ts when it was inti

mated that th e Army com mander G eneral G ough wished , ,

t o see some of th e o fficers an d men who had been in

action on th e l gth Five of u s therefore paraded with
.
, ,

ou r crews the following morni n g near the O l d tank park

in Oosthoek Wood A curious but characteristic i n cident
.

marked this ceremo n y Coutts with his crew fa l len in

.
,

beh in d h im was on the right of ou r little l ine : I was

,

next to h i m As the G eneral approached hi s Staff quite

.
,

O bviously shepherded hi m past C outts and diverted hi m

on to me With his first questio n I realised the reason

.

for this m an oeuvre H e asked me i f the infantry had

.

supported me properly I was able to testify . quite ,

honestly that th ey had ; and M organ Close a n d Baker

, , , ,

who were the other three pr e sent cou ld give equal l y satis ,

factory answers Some ru mou r must have reached the Staff

.

about the trouble at the Cockcroft an d Coutts who might , ,

have m ade damagin g revelatio n s was given n o opportunity ,

t o speak It was a little thing but i n structive

.
, .

As a fi nal result of th e action so far as we were con ,

cer n ed Coutts Baker and M organ received an i mmediate

, , ,

award of the M ilitary Cross In the mea n time an attempt .

had be e n made to repeat our success on the principle of ,

t he conj uri n g trick O f the stron g points i n front O f th e

.
-

1 8 th C orps there still remained intact those along th e

236 T H E TAN K IN ACT I O N

eastern sid e of th e tria n g l e th e Zonnebeke Lang e marck ,

-

road There can be l itt l e doubt that we cou l d h ave a c

.

cou n ted for these places on th e l gth especially if the two ,

reserve ta n ks had been bro u ght i n The G ermans were .

then compl e tely surprised i n i gnorance of what actua ll y

,

was happ e ning ( on accou nt of the very e ffective smoke

barrage ) and for the time b e i n g thoroughly d e moralised
, , ,
.

They were even ru nni n g from their third line trench es as -

,

has been recorded If the origina l p l an of attack had

.

been al l ow e d to sta n d ther e was n othi n g barring accid e n ts

, , ,

to pr e ve n t Claughto n Chaddock a n d m e with the r e serve

, , ,

tan ks from pushing on from H i ll ock Farm a n d the gun

,

pits right roun d the triangle and capturi n g also Spri n g ,

fi e ld Win n ipeg and th e other forts near th e m — al l of

, ,

which l ay on the road The task however had been left

.
, ,

u nfin ished ; and on th e 2 2 n d a company of D Battalion ,

with the necessary infantry went in to comp l ete it The , .

attack was designed on th e lines of our O peration At th e .

sam e t ime tanks from th e z u d an d 3 r d Brigades advanced

with the 2 n d and 1 9 th Corps on the right against similar
forts a n d subsidiary works on their fron ts The result was .

n ot very encou ragi n g The G ermans thi s time were wide

.

awake and the stratagems which had proved so succ e ssful

,

in effecting a surprise on the 1 9th cou l d hardly be exp e cted

to deceive again so soon after In some cases also where .

ta n ks reached their obj ectives th e i nfantry was unable to ,

follow O n the right part of G l e n cors e Wood was carried

.
,

with the he l p of fou r tanks O n the 1 9th Corps front .

,

where even the road s had been a l most who ll y blown away ,

t h e tanks of the 3 r d B rigad e could do l ittle and the infantry

less O ne very remarkab l e feat however Wa s accomp l ished
. , ,

by a tank of F Battalion This machine on board of which

.
,

was the section commander Richardso n was detailed to a t , ,

tack a fi e l d fort called G allipo l i so uth east of St Julien The

-
,
-
.

infantry were to follow behind i n the now accepted fashion .

They did not follow ; and th e ta n k becam e ditched in what

virtually was NO Man s Land although the phrase had lost
’
,
238 T H E TA N K IN ACT I O N

made c l ear to our troops and their fire ceased Richardson

, .

was ab l e to evacuate a ll his wou n ded men without mishap .

The tank had been he l d for seventy two hours u nder th e se -

extraordinary circumsta n ces had kil l ed or wou n d e d a great

,

number of the enemy and had disorga n ised at the outset

,

severa l budding cou n ter attacks — a feat without para ll e l

-
,

and one wh ich well merit e d the specia l complimentary

order issued from Tank Corps H eadquarters Richardson .

rec e ived the and the ta n k comma n der th e M C . .

R e tur n ing to the op e ratio n s on the 2 2 n d we fi n d D ,

Batta l io n s tanks moving up by our O l d route through S t

’

Ju l ie n
. Th e road was n o l ong e r as qui e t however as it , ,

had bee n four days e ar l ier O n th e n ight of th e 2 0th i n

.
,

particu l ar it was shell e d heavi l y and four of the tanks were

, ,

hit a n d disab l ed duri n g th e approach march Four of ours -

.

from G h e nt Cottages bei n g th e nearest reserv e were se n t

, ,

up to replace the casua l ti e s a n d handed ov e r to D Battalion

crews The action which followed was m oderately success
.

fu l Win n ipeg a n d Spri n gfie l d bei n g carried ; but the losses

,

i n i n fantry a n d ta n k perso n n e l were heavy and a large pro ,

portion of the tanks wer e ditched and abandoned In a l l .

the attacks on the 2 2 n d every tank which l e ft the roads

,

became i n stantly be l li e d some sinking int o four or six fe e t of

,

water O ut of thi rty four m achi n es emp l oyed on the thr e e

.
-

corps fro n ts eighteen were lost from this cause and six
’
,

were hit by she l l fi re -

.

It wi l l be unnecessary to describe in any detail the further

operatio n s in the Salient in which tanks took part They .

provide the same dreary experiences were a l most uniform l y ,

u n successful and poss e ss n o novel tactical features for con

,

s ideration They should nev e r have been attempted By

. .

this time E Battalion had come out from England and

j oined the I s t Brigade having its ca m p at Lovie and its
,

ta n ks in O osthoek Wood and before lo n g it also was flun g

,

i n to the hopel e ss struggle with the el e ments After a series .

of minor affairs on 2 3 rd 2 6 th an d 2 7 th August in which a

, , ,

few tanks of the 2 n d Brigade were involved a nd inevitably

 FRO M T H E CO C K C RO FT T O CA M BR A I 2 39

lost without accomplishi n g anything at all a pause lasting

, ,

for nearly a month en sued in the ge n eral operatio n s We .

were still i n front of the origi nal G erman third l ine and ,

g uns had somehow to be got forward and arra n geme n ts

completed for an oth er form al assault The weather i m .

proved i n Septe mber but th i s made little differ e nc e to the

,

state of the grou n d which was broke n up by shel l fi re as

,
-

fast as it attempted to dry The attack took place on 2 0th

.

September extending from the extrem e right of the Salient

,

( where the 2 n d Army had n ow taken over a part of the s th

Army front ) to the n orth of Langemarck Tanks were to .

O p e rate as on 3 1 s t J uly fo l lowi n g up th e infa n try to deal

,

with the fortified farm s alon g th e second an d third

obj e ctives This was a reversion to the old bad man n e r
.
,

and in the event was almost a complete failure although ,

the tanks endeavoured t o keep to the roads Four mach in es .

s ent in by t h e 2 n d B rigade we n t to swe l l the crowd of

derelicts in the quagmire by th e M e n in road known as the ,

ta n ks cemetery
’
. O f n ineteen tanks from E B attalion ,

thirtee n were ditched a n d fou r hit ; while only three out of

fifteen from D e ver g ot n ear the fight at a l l The G erma n s .

had grasp e d very quickly some of the l esson s of t h is road

fighti n g and trees had been felled across the road s in such
,

a position as to offer the greatest O bstruction to tanks O n .

th e n ight of th e 2 2 n d 2 3 r d D and E Battalio n s tried to get

-

o n e tan k apiece into action by daw n and failed A fu rther .

attempt on the 2 6 th m et with the same fate In the mean .

t im e the infantry attack had succe e ded to th e extent that

our lin e was advanced everywhere to an average depth of
1 000 yards and m inor operations on the 1 8 th Corps front
,

d uring the last days of the month brou ght u s to the out
skirts of P oe l ca p el l e O n October 4 th this vi l lage was
.

c aptu red . By heroic exertion s some ta n ks of D Battalion

w e r e at last able to render substantial help forcing th e ,

s urrender O f G loucester a n d Terrier Farms a n d e ntering

P oel c a p e l l e itself with th e infantry O n the sam e day a

.

s ection from A Battalion was i n action farther south an d ,

240 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

Captain Robertson who was in com mand died and was , ,

awarded a posthum ous V C after what has been we l l .

described as o n e of the most patient l y courageous actions

”
of the war H is tanks had to cross a bridge over a stream
.

ca l led the Re ute l beek and drive the e n emy from position s ,

on the farther side For three days a n d nights Robertson .

a n d h is serva n t ( who won the went to and fro

over the grou n d recon n oitring and taping routes a l ways
, ,

u n der heavy fire They retur n ed from their last trip at

.

on the ev e ning O f the 3 r d a nd Robertso n at o n ce ,

b e gan to l ead th e tanks forward For seventy hours already .

he had been almost continua ll y u n der fire without rest of ,

a n y ki n d H e led h is section to the assemb l y point and

.
,

the weather being misty and the grou n d execrably bad we n t ,

o n again with it at zero stil l walking in front Amid , .

i ncreasingly heavy shellin g he gu ided his tanks down to the

bridge across it an d on toward a road which would take
, ,

them beyond a n y chance of error to their O bj ectives The

, , .

tanks now visib l e to the ene my and far ahead O f the follo w
,

ing infantry drew a furious h ail O f rifle and mach ine gu n

,
-

fire ; a n d Robertson havi n g brought them to the road an d ,

lau nched them to the attack was shot through the head , .

But the tanks went on and succeeded in their miss ion , .

The O bj ect for which Captain Robertson had so deliberate l y

”1
sacrificed h is life was achieved .

The attacks at P oel ca pe l l e and on th e Re utel b e e k on ,

the same m orning were the only successful tank actions i n

,

all th e dr e ary weeks since m id August The 2 n d a n d 3 r d -

.

Tank Brigades were n ow withdrawn to r e fit The Is t .

Brigad e was to make one m ore attempt and to suffer th e

most ca l amitou s fai l ure of all .

O n the 7 th O ctober ta n ks of D Battalion were to hav e ,

attack e d certain forts al o ng the P oe l c a p e ll e road beyond ,

the vi l lage O ne becam e ditched however blocking th e

.
, ,

road and before a way could be made round the derelict it

,

1 ‘
Th Ta k C r p e( Wi l l iam Ell i ) fr m which th wh l i nc i d t i para
n o s s- s , o e o e en s

phra dse .
 FRO M THE C O C K C RO F T TO CA M BR AI 24 1

was too late to go on Two nights later eight tanks of the

.

same battalion left St Julien ( where they had been lyi n g

concealed by reddish brown camouflage desig n ed to ble n d
-

with the ruin s ) to repeat the attempt Their starting poi n t .

-

was the R e tour cross roads south of P oel ca p el l e The

-

, .

main road it self that tragic thoroughfare was n ow i n a

, ,

cond ition baffling description It was shelled without .

ceasing day and night and its shattered su rface swimming

, ,

in liquid mud after thirty hours rain was littered with a ’

frightful w e lter of dis m embered m en and an imal s and

broken limbers Before the cross roads were reached on e
.
-

tan k slipped over the edge and was sub merged i nstant l y i n
several feet of water Th e rem ai nder arrived at Retour
.
,

and thence crawled on into P o e l c a p e l l e The n ight was .

as black as th e Pit : it was rain ing in t orrents ; and upon

the destroyed village was crashin g a m ore terrible rain of
shel l s At the point beyond the cemetery where two roads
.

converge upon the main street one from La n gem arck a n d ,

on e from the railway station on th e Ypres Staden line the -

,

leadi n g tank became bellied i n the mu d and rubble tried ,

to free herself with her u nd i tc h i n g beam broke that and , ,

re mained i mmovable J ust b ehind her the secon d tank was

.

hit almost si multaneously by a she l l an d disabled These .

two comp l etely blocked the road and as there was no way ,

round the others decid e d to return Bu t i n the m eantime

, .

the last tan k had foul e d D 4 4 th e mach ine abandoned on ,

th e road two nights earlier an d in the collision became ,

ditch ed herself thu s closing the way hom e The four tanks
,
.

in the midd l e were trapped O n e or two attempted to find

.

a way round but were bogged the instant they left th e

,

pcw é Those left on the road were hit again and again
.
,

and most of their people were killed or w o u nded .

In itse l f this was a lamentable disaster and its results ,

were peculiar l y un fortu nate ; for the six or seven burnt

and ruined tanks blocked completely the P oel ca p e l l e road ,

an artery upon wh ich t he troops i n front depended for all

supplies an d wh ich was esse ntial to any furth e r operations
, .

Q
24 2 THE TA N K IN A CT IO N

It rested with the Tank C orps to remove these obstruction s .

A party under the Chief Engineer of th e I s t Brigade began

the work at once It had to be done at night an d then
.
,

u nder co n ditions of extrem e danger for the G ermans knew

,

perfectly well what was happening a n d shelled the village

,

and the road ferociously O ne by on e the tanks filled not

.
,

only with their own dead but with the bodies of wounded
infantrymen who had crawled i n from that tormented street
to die were blow n up by heavy charges of gun cotton
,
-
.

Within a we e k th e ghastly road w a s c l e a r again except ,

for the huma n debris which accumulated always there

.
.

And in the noise and flame of thes e explosions the active

work of th e Tank Corps i n the Salient came a l so to an end .

Only the salvage branch returned after a s eason to gather

in that which remained .

G Batta l ion having born e the brunt in the early days

, ,

was so fortunate as to escape the horrors of this later

period It did not go into action agai n after the Cockcroft
.
,

although at the end of October every preparat ion was made ,

and th e approach march actual l y was begun for what

-

promised to be a grisly u ndertaking at Spriet between ,

P oel c a p el l e and Westroosebeke To the profound reli e f

.

of every one concerned th is affair was cance ll e d at the last

,

minute I was away at the ti m e at the Wormhoudt rest

.

camp ( actual l y a very p l easa n t house in the vi ll age) where ,

I had been se n t after b e com ing a victim to a sort of mild

dys e ntery wh ich swept through our unhea l thy qu a rters at
Lovie As I was supposed to be su ffering also from a
.

slightly strained heart due theoretically to exertions under

,

gone a t a specia l course on tan k repairs I returned to camp

,

about 2 0th October with instruction s to do only light duty

for a fortnight .

I had been away nearly three weeks Ev erythin g was

.
244 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

consequence t o be u navailable The old headquarters sec .

tions which had existed for a time at Wool would hav e

, ,

been inva l uable in the field to leave the fighting crews free ,

for their proper work The result of this multiplication o f

.

small dutie s with our inadequate personnel was that when

we received the usual sudden orders to leave the Salient ,

bag an d baggage and the camp had to be struck and the

,

tanks prepared for entrainment on the same day these ,

s imultan eou s tasks four miles apart had to be performed

, ,

in theory by the same men —which was absurd In my .

own case I foun d I had not a si n g l e member of my crew

,

at liberty to he l p me with my tank H alf were on guard .

somewhere and half were striking tents and packing up at

,

Lovie I was obliged to borrow a couple of workshops

.

men to drive th e m achine on to th e train .

Alden having reclaimed G 4 7 after the Cockcroft I had ,

been given my third tank by name G oliath —a very ,

proper translation from the variety stage to the Scriptures .

She had been recovered from the swamp where she had
been left on 3 1 s t J uly and after bein g furbished up she
,

was as good or better than new for she possessed the

, , ,

b est runn ing engine In the company and was notoriously

-
,

a fast machine She never le ft Oosthoek Wood however

.
, ,

after her return there u nt il we finally departed ; and as

,

it fell out I had only on e opportu nity of seeing what she

could do .

After the middle O f October our advanced tanks were

mov e d back to O osthoek from G hent Cottages preparatory ,

to what we supposed would be a withdrawal to refit follow ,

ing the example of th e 2 n d and 3 rd B rigades E an d D .

Batta l ions were also co l lected once more in the wood with ,

what mach ines remained to them Reinforcements how .

,

ever began to arriv e from C entral Workshops and as quite

, ~ ,

a number of salved tanks were u nder repair our nominal ,

establishments once more grew toward completion Th is .

seemed to po i nt to the fact that the I s t Brigade would not

be withdrawn to refit but was to be e mployed again before
,
 F RO M T HE C O C K C RO FT T o CA M BR AI 24 5

v ery lon g NO whisper escaped so far as I am aware of

.
, ,

w hat actually was intende d It was realised that no further .

w ork was expected of tanks in th e Salient where operations ,

h ad dwindled down to a final struggle for Passchendaele

v illage all attempt to reach Westroosebeke on the h ighest
, ,

part of the ridge having been abandoned ; but beyond that

,

w e knew noth ing N or i n ou r hand to mouth existence

.
,
- -
,

d i d we waste m uch tim e on speculation I believe there .

w a s some talk of a surprise attack i n the Lens area but ,

w hat interested u s m ost was the quest i on of leave which ,

was scandalously o v erdu e .

Late i n October came prelim i nary orders for a m ove to

o ur old drivin g grou nd at Wailly
-
near A rras for i n s tru c , ,

ti on a l purposes and train ing with in fantry — this last so

o bviously called for and so lon g demanded that it served

a s an excellent camouflage for the real obj ect and persuaded ,

m ost of u s who thought at all ab out the matter that nothing

further was intend e d We were i n the penultimate month
.

o f the year and j ud g ing as we naturally were inclin ed t o

, ,

do by th e weather and ground at Ypres train ing seemed

, ,

a l l that was left for tanks u ntil the followin g spring I have .

f orgotten the exact date when our fi nal m ovement orders

a rrived but it mu st have been about th e I s t or 2 n d of
,

N ovember We were to move at on ce but there was

.
,

n othing surprisin g i n this as all orders i n the Army are ,

d elivered on principle at th e last m oment and sometimes ,

a fter it Th ere ensued of cou rse a frightful scramb l e

.
, , .

The Tank Corps bein g a sedentary organisation which

,

requ ires huge facilities in tran sport an d rolling stock for -

a n y serious rem oval wherever it settles down gathers an

,

i mmen se amou nt of stores public and private We had ,

.

b een four months in th e Salient ; and apart altogeth er from

the spare tank equipment to which we were legitimate l y
e nt itled and could not part from if we wished the per
, ,

s onal baggage of G Battalion alone was l ittle short o f a

s candal We were goin g to train for th e winter in an
.

inhospitable region of chalk tren ches and barbed wire and -

,
24 6 T H E TAN K IN ACT I O N

very naturally we took what com forts we could H uts .

,

furniture souvenirs duckboards and other rubbish had to

, , ,

be carried by our long suffering tra n sport down t o O osthoek

-

and shipped on board tanks and trucks 2 1 Company had .

j ust erected an elaborate mess beautifully made by our ,

carpenters of timber wire netting and tarred felt with

,
-
, ,

line n windows and a canvas lining Th is also m ust be .

pu l led down and carried with us It was little wonder in .

,

short that there were few me n availab l e to l ook after such

,

tri fl e s as the ta n ks the mselves Final orders had come .

through on the m orning of a pouri n g wet day All three .

compa n ies were to leave from the O osth oek ramp thirty
six hours later After a frenzied evening spent in packing
.

and j ettison ing my personal belongi n gs I went down next ,

morning t o the wood to prepare th e tan k for th e move .

The weather was now fi ne but by this time the interior ,

of O osthoe k was filthy b eyond words The contin ual .

coming and goi n g of tanks during the past month s and ,

the i mmense downfal l of rain aggravated by the dripping ,

trees had re d uced th e ground to a swamp excelled only

,

i n the h eavily bombarded areas O n one occasion an entire .

engine weighing a ton or two having been removed from

, ,

a tank sank complete l y in the slough and was l ost and

,

forgotten being dis covered weeks later by some on e stub

,

bing his toe against it All unnecessary movement of tanks .

eventua l ly was forbidden i n the wood as they actually ,

”
becam e ditch ed there On three sides of G oliath as it .
“
,

happe n ed there was n ow a deep pool

, H aving no men .

to he l p me for reaso n s a l ready gi ve n I spent the morn

, ,

i n g splashing about in this water strugg l ing single handed ,

-

t o fo l d and stow away huge and sodden tarpaulin sheets -

a nd c a m ou fl a ge n ets u n bolti n g th e sponso n s and final l y

-
, ,

drivi n g the latter in board with a sledge —hammer H appily .

”
G oliath in spite of its name was a female tank M ale
, , .

sponsons even of the new type required several men with

, ,

crowbars and other implements to push them in After .

lunch in a small mess which 20 Company had rigged u p

24 8 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

stores and lumber The vast amount of the l atter produced

.

a bitter and thorough l y j ustifiable outcry from the exhausted

who had been dealing with tank trains for the last
three or four nights and was heartily tired of the sight
o f them It was approach ing m idnight before we had
.

fin ishe d u nloading this stuff and conveying most of it

across to the tanks and then after a meal of hot stew
,

on the platform it became a question of finding some

where to s l eep It was still fin e but colder than ever
.
, .

The men were sleeping in the tanks or under the tarpau l in

covers and to the o ffi cers fell the spacious but otherwise
,

negligible accom modation of the stat ion itself K essel an d .

some others burrowed into a big stack of fo d der by the side

of the line C haddock and I feelin g like Scott or Shackle
.
,

ton unstrapped our valises laid them out on the Arct ic

, ,

platform and tied ourselves up inside with Balaclava hel

,

mets over our heads An icy hurricane whistled through

.

the station all night a nd my expected chill already de

, ,

v e l opi n g was not defin itely improved by this rather foolish

,

arrangement .

The distance from Beau metz to th e training ground at -

Wailly is abou t fi ve m iles We moved off in the course .

of the m orning and my n ew machine showed her ca pa b i l i

,

ties by arriving three qu art ers of an hou r ahead of anybody

-

else An advance party travelling by lorry had begun

.
, ,

already to erect a camp i n the usual area which actual l y ,

was j ust outside the village o f R i v i e re The w hole country .

side swarmed with tanks all thr e e brigades being con een ,

tra te d here H a n d I Battalion s had followed E from

.

England making a total of nine battalions three t o a

, ,

brigade Altogether with gun carriers and supply tanks

.
,
- -
,

upwards of 4 00 machines were gathered at Wailly durin g

those early N ovember days And the moment one arrived .
, ,

one s eye was caught by a suggest ive n ovelty

’
Lying .

everywhere about the ground or lifted high on the cabs ,

of tanks were the i mmen se brushwood fascines designed

,

for the H i ndenburg line .

 F RO M THE C O C K C RO FT TO CA M BR AI 24 9

My own stay at Wailly however was brief uncomfort , , ,

a ble, and inglorious O n the second day after my arrival

.

I was i n bed in my tent w i th one of the innu merable

m aladies classed together by the Army u nder th e sym bol
P U O In other wor d s I had a high te mperature an d
. . .
,

s emi crippled legs

-
As the temperature i mproved the legs
.
,

got worse ; and after four or five days I was despatched

under protest to the n earest fi e l d ambulance at Ficheux -
.

Owing t o th i s u nfortu nate i llness ( a m i ld so r t of trench “

”
leg which crippled m e for a month ) I was not present ,

a t the battle of Cambrai M ost of the ground over wh ich .

it was fought is u nfamiliar t o me as although I t ook part , ,

i n th e operations wh ich led incidentally to the fall of

Cambrai itself in the following autumn ou r line of advance ,

then lay to the north of the O l d battlefield Only Bourlon .

a n d B ourlon Wood I know rather inti mately In any case .

,

however the battle has been described so often that its

,

general outline sh o uld be familiar t o most people ; and I

wish to fill i n that outline from the point of view of the
Tank Corps and to correct the inaccuracies and wilfu l
,

om ission s which abou nd i n m ost published narratives ,

rather than attempt i n detail t o relate the various phases

o f the battle The actual st o ry will be better left t o open
.

the second part of this book because C ambrai stands for ,

that great turn in the fortun es of the Tan k Corps t o wh i ch

such an action as the C ockcroft gave only a small initial
i mpulse ; but we can consider very briefly here the m eans
which brought about so startlin g an experiment .

Ever since its inception th e Tan k Corps had been ,

d emandin g a fair tri al It i s one thing to de mand and

.
,

another to receive It so happened that tan ks entered

.

the field at a t ime when certain new tactical theories were

being elaborated in practice There was the theory of th e .

limited obj ective and th e theory of the annihilating pre

,

l iminary bombardment B oth of t hese broke down i n the

.

end : the first becau se it often was the enemy and n ot

, ,

ourselves who decide d the limit o f the obj ective ; and th e

,
250 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

second because the preliminary bombardment was found

,

to defeat its own designs as at Ypr e s In an ad m irable and , .

most interesting book on the G a l lipo l i campaign recently ,

published G eneral C a l l w e l l poi n ts out repeated l y that the

,

most obvious means to some military end must be no less

obvious to the enemy u n l ess the latter be afflicted by ,

the G ods with j udicial blindness and upo n this i t is n ot ,

safe to count G iven two arm ies of approximately equal

.

strength and resou rces facing one another from lines of ,

trenches which can not be turned and excludi n g all miracles ,

and other improbable conting e n cies the normal expedients ,

adopted by one side wi l l have been foreseen by th e other .

W e thought it astonishing on the Som me that the G erman

machine gun posts remained in action after the most terrific
-

bombard m ent B ut they had been designed to that end

. ,

with profound dug outs that no bombardment could inj ure

- .

The army i n short that hopes to win speedily u nder these

, ,

conditions and does not count solely on that blessed but

,

”
two edged word attrition
-
m ust have some abnorma l
“
,

factor up its sleeve We possessed such a factor in the .

tanks The i nitial surprise e ffected by tanks on th e Som me

.

was n othing Their exceeding value lay in the fact that

.
,

properly u sed they could always e ffect a surprise They

,
.

cou l d take the place of all that preliminary bombardment

which an nounced to the enemy the approaching attack
days and weeks before it was to materialise There are .
,

of course two sorts of surprises in war There is the sort

, .

employed at Ypres where you r opponent knows you are ,

going to attack hi m but does not know when There is , .

the less com mon sort whe n he does not expect you t o ,

attack at all has made no preparation s for an attack an d

, ,

probably is asleep Tanks were valuable enough in the first

.

case but tanks alone now could bring about the seco n d
,
.

Wire and machine gu ns had forbidden a genuine surprise

-

to any combination of the other arms The G erman use .

of poison gas designed originally to e ff ect a surprise was

-
, ,

successful up to a point becau se it had not been foreseen ,

2 5 2 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

w here N o M an s Land often was 1 000 yards across with

’ ‘

the hostile trenches out of sight behind a hill the M ecca -

,

o f every wearied and decimated u n it withdrawn from the

S alient for a rest V irtua ll y untouched by war except

.
,

that the fields l ong u ntended gre w n othi n g but coarse

, ,

g rass and weeds it was an u ndulating hedge l ess cha l k

, , ,

c ountry dotted with frequent villages a few smal l C opses

, ,

a n d one or two m ore pretentious woods criss crossed by ,

-

s unken roads and watered by severa l insignificant streams

,

and two importa n t canals Athwart it from north west .

,
-

t o south east ran the irregu l ar trace of the H indenburg

-
,

Line eight mi l es from Cambrai at th e nearest point on the

,

Bapaume road This lin e was known to be weakly held

. .

The i m men se belts of wire and the innu merable machine

gu ns were trusted an d j ustifiably to fen d off any orthodox
, ,

attack by the very moderate forces u nder G eneral Byng .

The Tank C orps however alone among the various , ,

branches of the S ervice had looked for months upon th e ,

H indenburg Line as a lawfu l and easy prey The wire was .

n o obstacle at a l l and the trenches whispered of as though

, ,

they were Charon s seven streams were not worth e v en an

’

o bolus They had been crossed at Bullecourt and human

.
,

ingenuity was equal to devi sin g some means of bridging

t hose which might exceed a tank s allotted span Th e ’
.

country was all that could be desired — fi rm u nbroken by ,

shell fi re and well drained Every circu mstan ce had long

-
, .

p ointed to this region for an offensive carried out as the ,

Tank Corps maintained all offensives should be carried

o u t—led and determ ined by ta n ks and laun ched without , ,

an
y overt prelimi n aries as a genu ine surprise With these , .

i deas G enera l Elles had no di ffi culty in infecting the 3 r d

Army comma n der A genera l plan of attack on th is front
.

had been worked out some ti me before It was a l tered and .

t rimmed to suit the particular condition s now in view and ,

the completed scheme was sub mitted to th e C omman der

i n Chief
-
.

Three considerations one may supp o se helped especially , ,

 FRO M T HE , C O CKC RO FT T o CA M BR A I 25 3

to recommend it to Sir Douglas H aig Th e Ypres offensive .

,

h owever it m ight be disguised i n public was a lamentabl e ,

failure and needed som e corrective ; the R u ssian co ll aps e

,

was setting free the best G erman troops from the East ; and
within a few m onths it might be impossible to strike a blo w
anywhere with a reasonable hope of success It is likely .

a l so that some ru mours of the forthcom ing stroke on the

Italian front helped t o quicken a decision In any case .
,

the schem e was approved o n 2 0th October and was fixed for ,

a date exactly on e m onth later U nfortunately G H Q .

, . . .

had n ot the courage of its convictions — or of the conviction s

of others Probably in this case it had n o convictions of its
.

own It did not be l ieve th at tan ks even when working

.
,

u n der their own chosen conditions could perform all tha t ,

they claimed ability to perform A highly interestin g article .

by M Pau l P a i n l evé Fre n ch M inister O f War in March

.
,

1 91 7 , contain s an account of a visit to ou r G H Q in that . . .

m onth where he records the general opin ion was in favou r

, , ,
”
of having a smack at the enemy Th is characteristic
“
.

but rather primitive attitude u ndoubtedly governed th e

decision to carry out the Cambrai attack H aving lost .

upwards of a quarter of a million of m en at Ypres it was ,

”
as well t o h ave as cheap a smack at the enemy as “

possible The cond itions laid down manifested in every

.

art ic l e the spirit o f c om p r om i s e If the Tank C orps l iked .

t o sacrifice itsel f wholesale wel l a n d goo d but n o addi

, ,

t i on a l in fantry cou ld be provided The 3 r d Army mu st .

m ake th e most of its very s l ender resou rces in this respect .

( I t was stated o f
fi cially that any additional co n centration
of troops would have betrayed the coming attack to the
enemy But it i s di fficult to accept this reason in g
. On .

th e 8 th August 1 9 1 8 to name only on e insta n ce several

, ,

army corps were gathered beh ind the l ine in perfect

secrecy ) Finally the whole operation was to be com
.
,

p l e t e d within forty eigh t hours at

-
the most this being the ,

t ime it was calculated the enemy would require to bring

up reinforcements .
2 54 T H E TA N K IN A CT I O N

R estricted as it was the O pportunity was we l comed by

,

a ll co n cerned — i n especial by the Tank Corps which saw

,

at last a prospect of provi n g in the field those theories

it had advocated in and out of season for the past twelve
m onths . Preparatio n s a l ready begun were expedited
, , ,

a n d the concentration of the three bri gades at Wail l y was

put in ha n d.
 C H APT E R X III .

CA M BR AI .

T HE Tan k Corps had to acco mplish an i mmen se amou nt of

work i n a very short tim e before th e battle of Cambrai .

This preparation consisted of fi ve main features

.1 The arrangements for secrecy .

.2 The concentrating of th ree brigades O f tanks at

b

Wailly and their subsequent dispersal to detrain ing

,

centres behind the Cambrai front .

.
3 R ehearsals with the infantry of the plan of attack .

.
4 The construction of certain devices for crossing th e
wider trenches of the H indenburg Line for bring ,

ing up supplies and for clearin g t he wire for the

,

cavalry .

.
5 The establishment of petrol and ammun i tion du mps .

We will take these features in o rder .

The whole 3 rd Army was involved i n the qu estion of

secrecy . The bringing up of nu merous additional batteries
to positions close behind the front line the assemblin g of ,

several cavalry d ivision s and all the thousand an d one

,

preparations for an advance on a wide front had to be

completed without a suspicion reaching the enemy This .

was accomplish ed success fully The normal artillery a o

.

t i vi ty was mai ntain ed wh i le do z ens of n ew batteries were

,

brought up and camouflage d None of these were able to

.

register before the battle open ed The Tank C o rps mean

.
,

R
25 8 T H E TAN K IN ACT I O N

w hile had its own especial difficulties The withdrawal

,
.

o f one brigade from the Sa l ient and another from the Lens

front could not be whol l y concealed but the myth of winter ,

train ing deceived the en emy if h e heard of it as thoroughly , ,

as it deceived th e troops concerned ; and the activities of

one or two wireless tanks left at the front to send bogu s ,

messages easily i ntercepted to imaginary brigade head

, ,

q uarters fostered the belief that the latter had not moved
,
.

The forward H Q established with th e 3 rd Army at Albert

. .

was disguised as the Tank Corps Training O ffice In th e .

begin ning only four me mbers of G eneral El l es s staff knew ’

o f the forthcomin g attack The information was next .

revealed to batt al ion and company com manders and recon

naissance O fficers ; and last of al l only two or three days ,

before 2 0th N ovemb er zero day section and tank com , ,

manders were admitted to the secret R econnaissance was .

carried out with every p recaution distinctive badges bei n g ,

hidden or removed and sen ior o fficers visited the front,

d isguis e d in steel helmets and trench coats -

.

Thirty six tank trains were needed for the almost simul
-

t a n e ou s removal of the n ine battalions Our supp l y of .

K T trucks being insu ffi cient it was necessary to borrow

. .
,

a number of th e s m a l l e r Fren ch type A vast amount of

r

work was thrown on the rai l way s ta ff all the entraining ,

an d detraining being carri e d out at night In four or .

five n ights upwards of 4 5 0 machines were entrained at

Beau metz Twenty seve n train loads were concentrated at
.
- -

P l ateau Station near Albert by the 1 4 th N ove mber and

, , ,

dispersed to their final detrain ing poi n ts during the three

fo ll owing days th e remai n i n g nine trai n s reach ing Plateau
,

on the 1 s th O n l y the m ost careful management could have

.

succeeded in disposing of these slow and heavy trains amid ,

a l l th e normal traffic in so short a ti me without a hitch , .

The I s t B rigade detrained fin a ll y at Bertincourt and

Ruyaulcourt behind H avrin court Wood the 2 nd Brigade
, ,

at Sore l an d Ytres to the south and the 3 rd Brigade at , ,

H eudicourt near Epehy At all these railheads n ew ramps

, .
2 60 T HE TAN K IN A CT IO N

trench stops to block the trenches at various poi nts ;

an d trench supports to garrison the captured trench
and form an advance guard to the next echelon of
-

tanks and infantry passing through .

The who l e O peration was divided into three phases

the assembly the approach and the attack The first
, ,
.

was carried out at n ight time and was a parade dril l

-
,

the infantry fal l ing in behind the tanks on tape l ine s ,

connected with their starting points by taped routes -

.

The approach was slow and orderly th e i nfantry hold ,

ing themselves in readiness t o act on their own initia

tive The attack was regulated so as to economis e
.

tan k fascines and was carried out as fo l lows

,

“
The advance g uard tank went straight forward
-

through the enemy s wire and turni n g to the left with

’
, ,

out crossing th e trench in front of it opened right ,

sponson broadsides ; the i nfa ntry ta nk s then made for s

the sam e spot the left hand one crossing the wire
,
-
, ,

approached the trench and cast its fascine then crossed ,

over the fascine turned to the left and worked down

, ,

the fire trench ; the second in fantry tan k crossed over

the fascine of the first and made for the enemy s sup ’

port trench cast its fascine and crossing did likewise

, , .

Meanwh ile the advan ce guard tan k had swung rou nd

-
,

and crossing over the fasci n es of the two infantry tanks ,

moved forward with its own fascin e still in position

ready for the third trench line When the two infantry .

tanks met they assembled behind the advance guar d -

tank and awaited orders The leading wave of infantry

.

p l anted a red flag at the gaps in the wire .

In training the infantry the following exercises

“

w e re carried out
( 1 ) Assembly of infantry behind tanks .

( 2 ) Advance to attack beh ind tanks .

( 3 ) Passing through wire crushed down by tanks .

( 4 ) Clearing up a trench sector under protection of

tanks .
 CA M BR AI 26 I

To enable them to work quickly i n sect i on s i ngle

files and t o form these into section l ines a simple
p l atoon drill was i ssued an d i t i s interesting t o n o te
,

that th is drill was based on a very similar one descr i bed

‘
by X enophon i n his C yr op aed e i a and attr i buted t o ’

”
K ing Cyrus ( ci rca 5 00 E C )
The fascines abo v e mentio n ed were designed to assist th e
tanks o ver the wider tren che s of the H indenburg system .

S om e of these were kn own t o be 1 2 feet wi d e and o f great

depth th e actual width being i ncreased by the inward
,

slopes of a parapet and parados 2 feet 6 inches h i gh A .

M ark IV tan k could only cross a trench 1 0 1 1 feet wi d e

.
-
,

a fact of which the G ermans were well aware The real .

O bstacle was the depth o f the trench as when th e tank ,

was hal f way o v er but n ot yet balanced on the parados

-
, ,

the tail left the parapet and dropped to the trench floor ,

shifting the centre of gravity and lea v i n g th e machin e at

an angle so near th e vertical that the tracks could n ot
grip again st all the deadweight below The obj ect of the .

fascine there fore was n ot to fill t he trench and form a

, ,

bridge as see ms com monly to be supposed for this was

, ,

both i mpossible an d u nn ecessary bu t to keep the tail o f ,

the tank from dropping s o far th at the m ach ine was u nable
to recover These tan k fascines were made by binding
.

t ogether w i th chain s u nder great pressure seventy fi ve

, ,
-

ordinary brushwood bundles 1 0 feet lon g Each big fascin e .

was 4 feet 6 inches in diameter and weigh ed a ton and three

quarters Th is monstrosity was carried on the cab of t he
.

tank and was dropped into a tren ch over the n ose by

,

mean s of a release mechan ism from within It was an .

abomination to man handle fifteen t o twenty Ch i namen

-
,

being required to push each fascin e through the mud at

Erin ; an d during a t rain j ourney it had t o be lowered on
the truck and h oisted u p again before detrain ment But i n .

action th e fascines fulfilled their purpose adm irably The .

widest and deepest H indenburg tren ches pr o ved n o o bstacle

at all .
262 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

Fou r hundred of these fascines were made at Central

Workshops during the feverish three weeks before Cambrai .

Th i s in v olved the trimming to the correct length of

ordinary fascines and the welding of 20 00 fathoms of steel
,

chain . Eighteen tanks working in pairs pu l led on the , ,

chains in opposite direction s after they had been wound

several times rou nd the huge bundles In the same period .

were constructed 1 1 0 heavy t imber sledges t o be t owed ,

by tanks with loads of petrol and ammunition 1 2 7 tan ks .

were repaired and issued and a number were fitted with ,

large grapnels for wire clearing Owing to the necessity -

.

of secrecy the personnel at Erin were not informed of the

,

extreme urgency of these tasks ; yet duri ng these three

weeks the shops were working for 2 2 % hours out of every
2 4 without a break N or was this pressure confined to
.

the workshops Between the 1 0th and 2 5 th N ovember

.
,

2 8 lorries covered between them mi l es or 7 44 miles ,

per lorry and some small box cars averaged 1 2 00 mile s

,

apiece .

Three main supply dumps were established at the lying

up points of the three brigades H avrincourt Wood ,

Dess e rt Wood and V illers G uislain and G ouzeaucourt

,
-
.

Among the stores collected here were ga l lons of

petro l
, lbs of grease . rounds of ,

an d rou nds of 6 pounder shell The splendid -

.

system of light railways behind the 3 rd Ar my front alone

made this huge accu mulation possible in so sh o rt a time .

In the field stores we re to be carried fro m these dumps by

,

supply tanks and gun carrying tanks towing sledges

-
.

This brie f account will give some idea of the work

required before a full dress tank battle and of the sudden
-
,

problems with which the technical staff had to grapple at

short n otice It must be remembered that there was n o
.

precedent whatever for this operation Four times as many .

tanks as went i n on the first day at Ypres were to be

e mployed at Cambrai There had been little time for
.

pr e parat ion a n d less for reconnaissance The H in d enburg .

2 64 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

An exam ination of a layered map shows very clearly the

con formation of th e country between the H indenburg Lin e
and Cambra i The 3 r d Army lyin g south west of that
.
,
-

town was attacking n orth east

, The battl e field can be -
.

divided into two parts north an d south of a l ine drawn

,

westward from M arcoing through Flesqui e res along th e

Flesqui eres H avrincourt Ridge The southern part is a
-
.

triang l e bou nded to the north by this ridg e to the east by

, ,

the Cana l de L Es ca ut which zigzags southward from

’
,

C ambrai an d to the south west by the H inde n burg Line

,
-
,

wh ich almost touches the canal near Banteu x In this .

part of the field we sh ould be fightin g downh i ll t o the

canal v alley The northern part beyond the Flesqu i eres
.
,

R idge is lowish ground dominated by one prom inent land

,

mark Bourlon H ill and VVO O d and delim ited to the west
, ,

by the Canal d u N ord which th e H indenburg trenches ,

crossed im mediately north of H avrincourt Wood then ce ,

followin g its course northward to M oeu v res The Fles .

qui e res Rid ge itself is an important tactical feature run ning ,

from east to west again st the general lie of the cou ntry and
overlooking the who l e n orthern part of the battlefield ; and
where it was crossed by the G erman lin e west of Ha vr i n ,

court the latter made a pronounced sal i ent taking in a

, ,

portion of H avrincourt Wood This portion was held as .

a n advanced position in front of the trench system an d ,

farther south the hamlet o f La V ac querie and other posts

were strongly occu pied in a like m anner The H indenburg .

Lin e itse l f taking it correctly as the first line of trenches

, ,

was sited on reverse slopes hidden from our observation , ,

and covered i n front by a den se b e lt of wire nowhere less ,

than 5 0 yards deep The H indenburg wire was in fact a

.
, ,

remarkable sight You saw it winding away over the ridges

.

in three broad belts clean cut and separated by narrower

,

avenu es of grass ; miles upon miles of it with great patches ,

 CA M BR A I 26 5

red with rust after any rain and looking in the distance ,

where it climbed some fin al crest to the h orizon like zigzag

stripes of plough or trimmed and level vegetat i on B ehind .

the front system of t ren ches were three others th e Hi n d e n ,

burg Reserve wired almost as th ickly as the first line an d

, ,

two more These last were not so form idable The series
. .

varied in depth from thre e and a half to fou r and a half

miles The front line and reserve were pierced in ev e ry
.

bay by the shafts of deep dug outs altho u gh som e of thes e -

,

had n ot been finished In places they were j oined u p t o

.

form con siderable tun nels forty feet underground The

, .

cha l k of which the h igh e r land is formed although hard to ,

work is adm irable for such subterranean use The shaft s

, .

and dug outs were t i mbered walls and roof and when a
-
, , ,

year later I l ived in several of them were always dry

, , .

Th e whole system was knitted together by a maze of

com mu nication tren ches .

The third and fourth lines which in fact form ed on e ,

syste m called variously the Marquion Masni e res or Beau , ,

revoir Line crossed th e Can al de L Es ca ut south of

,
’

Cambrai and covered another important tactical feature ,

the N iergnies Sera n villers R idge east of the canal This

-
,
.

ridge like that of Flesqui e res overlooked all th e northern

, ,

part of the battlefield as far as B ourlon making any attack ,

on that height from th e south a matter of great di fficu l ty .

The N iergnies Ridge therefor e was to be carr ied i f possible

, ,

as soon as the canal crossings had been seized but this ,

effort proved beyon d our resources .

The infantry at the disposal of Sir J ul i en Byng for h is

main attack amounted only to six division s with two ,

cavalry divisions an d upwards of 1 000 guns for a front of

, ,

six miles from east of G on nelieu to a poi nt north of H e vri n

court Wood Subsidiary attacks to secure the flanks were
.

to be carried as far as B u l lecou rt t o the north and from ,

G onnelieu southward to V endhu i l e Th e whole O peration . ,

as we have seen was under a t ime l i mit of forty eight

,
-

hours wh ile the Comm ander i n Chief intended t o cal l a halt

,
- -
266 THE TA N K IN AC T IO N

before that period had expired if su fficient progress was not

m ade The first twenty four hours was expected to show
.
-
,

one way or another how much might be expected B ut , .

one rather startling factor resulted from the inadequate

means to be employed Every tank an d infantryman in .

the six divisions was to go forward at zero Ther e were .

n o reserves other than local ones ; nothi n g was l e ft for the

second day—except the cavalry The G uards and one or .

two other divisions were within a few marches of the battle

field but not near enough to come up i n t ime ; nor were
,

they intended to be used The plan i n fact was stamped .

, ,

p l ainly with that spirit of compromise d u e to ignorance and

co n sequent mistrust of the capabi l ities of tanks It was n ot .

really believed that the latter could do all that they claime d .

S ix divisions therefore , were enough to risk on th e gamble

, .

O n t he other hand in cas e the unexpected should happen

, ,

a most ambitiou s programme was drawn up for which six ,

divisions were hopelessly inade q uate The last G erman .

positions beyond the Canal de L Es ca u t were to be carried

,
’
,

i n the fi rst phase of the attack after which cavalry was to ,

cross the cana l occupy Cambrai and villages to the north

,

a n d east a n d mov e forward with its right on V alenciennes

, .

In the mea n time the 4 th C orps on the right was to form

, , ,

a defensive flank u n ti l the cavalry had cut the V alenciennes

Douai line n in e or t en m i l es north of Cambrai ( an i n credible
supposition ) when the corps was to continue its advance in
,

a n orth easterly direction The second and third phases of

-
.

the battle were in the hands of the 3 rd Corps on the left ,

w h os e b u s i n es s it was to capture Bourlon and Inchy e n

'

Artois ( on the Ca n al d u N ord ) and then by crossing the , ,

Arras Cambrai road toward the marshes of the Sen sée to

-
,

cut off the enemy s troops in the angle which that river
’

formed with the Canal d u N ord Al l this with s ix .

,

divi sions reads like a dream as in fact it was Admitted

, ,
.

that it represents the utmost possible and includes all that

”
optimistic phase of exploitation which never throughou t
the war was reached i n any battle it remai n s an astonish ,
268 THE TAN K IN A CT I O N

ing enumerated these various adverse considerat ions there ,

remain s much that was encouraging to be put against them .

Th e divisions included some of the best in the army The .

2 9 th had won an almost fabulous reputation in G allipoli ,

although few of its origina l ran k and file were left The .

6 th was another formation with the traditions of regular

service beh in d it The s 1 s t H ighland Terr i torial Division
.

( with which G Battalion had been associated in the Salient )

had the d istinction of coming second on a G erman list of
those units most feared by the enemy Among the troops .

taki n g part in the subsidi a ry attacks to the north and like l y ,

to be invo l ved in the mai n battle if all went well were th e ,

3 r d Division which headed th e G erman list referred to

, ,

an d the 4 oth London and s 6 th U lster Division s O n the .

right flank where the 3 r d Army linked up with the French

, ,

a strong force of French infantry and c avalry was put at

our disposal Then there was the known fact that the
.

enemy s position held by V on der M a rw i tz s 2 nd Army

’
,
’
,

had been much depleted of troops and especially of guns , ,

while our own people must h ave gaine d con fidence from
t he marked efficiency of ou r preliminary arrangement s .

Everything had gone well ; every man so far as was pos ,

sible knew what he had to do Tanks a n d guns were in

, .

position ; and the G erman s in their deep trenches ha l f

a mile away undisturbed by any breath of doubt or rumou r
, ,

sti l l per formed mechanical l y the routin e duties of a qu iet

sector and reported th at we were s i m ilarly employed
, .

Th e three Tank Brigades were disposed as fo l lows : The

I s t Brigade of D E and G Battalions with 4 2 ta n ks
, , , ,

apiece lay hidden i n the western end of H avrincourt Wood

, ,

a l arge mass of timber of which th e G erman s actually held

.

t h e eastern extrem ity 3 000 yards away Colonel H ankey

,
.
,

of G Batta l ion had u nder his comma n d for the O perat i on

,

tanks from both the other units givi ng hi m a total of 6 0 ,

machines Th e 2 n d Brigade lay in D es s a rt Wood two

.
,

miles south of H avrincourt Wood It consisted for the .

t ime of only two Battalio n s B and H A Battalion bein g , ,

 C A M BR A I 26 9

attached to the 3 rd B rigade The tanks of the latter ( A C

.
, ,

F an d I Battali o ns) having n o conven ient wood in which

, ,

INCHY
2 BOURL

moeuvaes

NCOURTI

s ea A Nvu It as
r t rs omt aes
MARCO IN

HW RN C

HAV Rl

YTRES

couz e C ONNEUEU NTTUX

DESQ ART we 9
P INS
“

VENOHWLE

F z r s f Ba ttl e qf Ca m é m
'

z .

to hide were concealed u nder brick coloured camouflage

,
-

n etting in and about G ouzeaucourt and V illers G u islain -

.

The battalions o f the 2 nd an d 3 rd B rigades had als o

2 70 THE TAN K IN AC T IO N

42 tanks apiece Each u n it set aside a small nu mber

.

as a reserve to replace mechanical breakdowns In a d .

d ition t o the whole total of 3 7 8 fighting machines there ,

were 3 2 wire clearing tanks with grapnels to open passages

-

for the guns and cavalry ; 2 for carrying bridgin g material ;

1 with a telephone cab l e for the 3 rd Army signals ; 5 4
supp l y tanks some of them adapted gun carriers ; a n d 9
,
-

with wire l ess apparatus .

The 1 s t Brigade on the l e ft was O peratin g with the 6 2 n d

, ,

and s 1 s t D ivisions its first obj ectives being H avrincourt

,

vi l lage a n d Flesqui e res with subsequent exploitation to ,

ward G raincourt An neux Fo n tai n e N otre Dame a n d

, ,
- -
,

B ourlon .

The 2 nd Brigade in the ce n tre l e ading the 6 th D ivision , ,

was to carry the Blue and Brown lines and Rib e court ,

thence making for M arcoing on th e Canal de L Es c a ut ’

and the B ois d e s N eu fs further north .

The 3 rd Brigade on the right its 4 battalions worki n g ,

with the 2 9th 2 0 th a n d 1 2 th Division s had i n hand the

, , ,

capture of La V acquerie an d the Blu e and Brown lines

beyond then the bu l gi n g l ine of the canal from M arcoing
,

to M asni eres and th e crossings at th ose p l ace s and fina l ly ,

Cr e vecoeur on the east bank at the foot of the N iergnies

ridge .

Z e ro was fixed for A M on the 2 0th After dusk . . .

on the previous evening tank routes would be taped to the

a ssembly positions Before 6 o c l ock a l l the tanks were ’
.

to be ready i n one l ong line from Trescault to G onnelieu ,

in front of our trenches a n d withi n 5 00 1 000 yards of the -

”
G erman outposts ; the advance guard ta n ks 1 5 0 yards
“
-

a head ,a n d t h e m ain body dep l oyed at approximate i n

te r va l s of 1 00 yards At the whole mass would begin
.

to move forward followed by i nfantry in section colum n s

, .

At zero ten m inutes later a barrage of shrapnel H E and

, , , . .

sm oke she ll s from u pwards of 1 000 gu n s would fall on the

enemy s o ut post line l ifting after on e minute and moving
’
, ,

fo r w a rd in j u mps of 2 5 0 yar d s but remaining on certain ,

2 72 T HE TA N K IN ACTI O N

ow n characteristic phraseology for the same purpose in the

colu mns of a newspaper .

Befor e mid n ight th a t evening from H avrincourt Wood ,

and De s s a r t Wood from G ouzeaucourt and V illers G uis l ain

,
-

scores of tanks had u nca m oufl age d and moved out and were
a l ready on their way It was such a gathering of these
.

si n gular machines as never had been seen before and was ,

to b e seen o n l y once again —on 8 th August of the following

year Section after section company after company ( twenty
.
,

seven companies were there as against two on th e Som me ,

a year ear l ier) they crawled forward in long columns that

,

sp l it up after a wh i l e into smaller ones and then again into ,

t w os and threes u n til toward five o clock the whole were

,
’

d e ploying into a s ingle l ine six miles long— a t hreatening ,

silent curvin g line that faced and corresponded to the

,

larger salients and re entrants of th e H indenburg trenches

-
.

S o si l e n tly had th is approach been carried out that many of

the i n fantry assemb l i n g behind the gaps in our own wire
, ,

heard n o tanks at al l and inquired with some anxiety if

,

th ey had arrived A few had broken down and were

.
,

rep l aced at once from the mechanical reserve U pwards .

of 3 5 0 were i n position The night was very dark with a

.
,

d e nse grou nd mist but s o complete were all arrangeme nt s

,

that this cau sed no inconvenience while it helped to screen ,

the massing of this unparalleled armada A sudden burst .

of shel l ing and trench mortar fire from the G erman lines
-

about startled every one and provoked suspicions of a

premature discovery but it died away in half an hour From
, .

five O clock until zero the whole front was quiet At ten
’
.

m inutes past six tanks and infantry began to move ; and at

with the sky l ighten ing rapidly above the mist the ,

barrage exp l oded with a shattering crash of sound along

the G erman outpost line some 2 5 0 yards in fron t of the,

advance guard machines In the centre of the six m ile

-
.
-

line i n a tan k called the H ilda of H Battalion G eneral

, ,

Elles was leading into the most revolutionary battle of the

war th e corps which had made it possib l e and which he ,
 CA M BR AI 2 73

h ad contro ll e d almost from its infancy It was not th e .

ordinary post for the com mander of a l arge organisatio n ,

but this was not an ordinary occasion It was the con s u m .

m ation of two years of strugg l e an d disappoi n tment There .

can have bee n litt l e doubt i n his mind or in that of any ,

other m an in the 3 5 0 ta n ks as to what the result would b e

,

n ow that the adventure was fairly lau nched .

The i m mediate onset of the ta n ks inevitably was ove r

whelming The G erman outposts daze d or ann ihilated by
.
,

t h e sudd e n deluge of shells were O v e rru n i n an instant

,
.

Th e trip l e belts of wire were crossed as if they had been

beds of n ettl e s and 3 5 0 pathways were sheared throu gh
,

them for the i n fantry The defe nders of the front t ren ch
.
,

scrambling out of dug outs and she l ters to m eet the cras h
-

an d flame of the barrage saw the l e ading tanks almost upo n

,

them their appearance ma d e the more grotesque an d terrify

,
~

ing by the h u g e b l ack bu n dles they carri e d on their cab s .

As these tanks swun g left handed and fired down i n t o th e

-

trench others also surmou n t e d by these appal l ing obj e ct s

, , ,

appeared in mu l titudes behind them out of t he mist It i s .

small wonder that the front H indenburg Line that fabulou s ,

excavat ion which was to be the bulwark of G erma n y gave ,

l ittle troubl e T h e great fascines were loosed and ro l led

.

over the parapet to the trench floor ; and down the w hole
line tanks were dipping a n d reari n g up a n d clawi n g thei r
way across into the a l m ost unravaged country beyond Th e .

defe n ders of the li n e were ru n n ing pan ic stricken casti n g -

away arms and e quipm ent The H indenburg Reserve with

.
,

its own massive e n tangl e ments went th e way of th e firs t ,

trenches ; and so far ou r fol l owi n g i n fantry had foun d littl e

to do beyond firi n g on the fugitives an d rou nding u p gan gs
of half s tu p e fi e d prison e rs It was now broad day th e m ist
-
.
,

was thi n n i n g an d everywhere from H avrincourt to Banteux

,

on th e canal was rout and consternation Th e G ran d Ravin .

,

a gul l y which ru n s fro m H avri n court t o Marcoing was ,

ch oked with a n unarmed mob streaming eastward Th e .

garrison of H avrincourt had put u p a fight but tan ks close d ,

8
2 74 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

on it from the north and it was cleared by the 6 2 n d ,

D ivision 1
La V acquerie had gone in th e first on set ; and
.

n ow Rib e court was carried and tanks and infa n try were ,

approaching the vital cana l bridges at Marcoi n g a n d

M asni eres Over the whole southern half of the batt l efie l d
.
,

the tr i a ngl e I h ave described th e d e fe nce had co l lapsed ; ,

and this area was virtua l ly c l ear e d by midday On l y at .

o n e or two poi n ts had there be e n any serious resista n ce the ,

most n otab l e being La te a u Wood o n a hill top ove r looki n g ,

-

the ca n al where a nu mber o f b a tter i es were post e d Fighti n g

, .

co n tinu ed here during most of the mo r ni n g and i n cluded an ,

encounter b e tween a ta n k and a howitzer i n which the ,

tank for once was the victor The gun blew away the tank s .
’

right ha n d spo n son but failed to i nj ure the e n gi n e and was , ,

overrun before it could be r e l oaded Eventua ll y the wood .

was c l eared and the guns captured By two o c l ock M arcoing .

’

was in our hands and all but a portion of M asni eres At , .

the former place a ta n k of A B attalion arrived in t ime to

drive off the G erma n e n gi n e ers who were i n th e act of
destroying the bridg e which was on t he far sid e of the ,

vi l lage At Mas n i e res however the bridge was partia ll y

.
, ,

wrecked and a tank of F Batta l io n endeavouring to cross

, , ,

comp l e ted the de struction a n d fell with the wreckage i n to

the canal This accident helped to d e l ay our adva n ce at
.

t h is point upon Ru mil l y and the N iergn ies ridge In th e .

meantime a hitch had occurred i n the norther n po rtion of

M El y
1 ‘
f 9 C mpa y w
ro th,
D S O at H a v ri c urt i
o 1 r markab l
o n , on e . . . n o n e e

circum ta c s Th l adi g ta k
n es d i fa try had p a
. d thr ugh th v i ll ag
e e n n s an n n ss e o e e,

which w b l i v d t b cl ar d f th
as emy M El y machi
e e o f l e e e o e e ne .
‘
ro
’
s ne , o

l wi g b hi d c aught fi j u t ab ut
o n e n G rma app ar d r u d it fr m
,
re s as o 1 00 e ns e e o n o

v ari u hidi g pl ac
o s Tw f th c w jumpi g
n -
t f d r t c ap th
es . o o e re ,
n ou o on e oo o es e e

fl am w r ki ll d i ta t l y Th r mai d r xc pt th ta k c mma d r
es , e e e ns n . e e n e ,
e e e n o n e ,

s cramb l d t f th th r d r i t a h l l h l Th G rma b mb d th m
e ou o e o e oo n o s e ~
o e. e e ns o e e

an d ki ll d m e d th cam
on e d l k d d w i t tha n, a nh ll h l wh r en e an oo e o n n o e s e -
o e, e e

th ur v i v r pr t d d al t b d ad M El y i th m a tim had
e s o s e en e so o e e .
‘
ro ,
n e e n e, re

mai d i th ta k d xti gui h d th fi

ne n e H th n dr v ff th G rma
an e n s e e re . e en o e o e e ns

with machi g fi d k p t th m at bay f

ne -
ar l y h ur u ti l m i fa try
un re a n e e or n e an o n so e n n

arri v d A l l thi tim th r ta k cr w a f w hu dr d yard away w r wa l ki g

e . s e o e n e s, e n e s , e e n

ab ut ut id th ir machi
o o s u nc ci u f th l itt l batt l g i g
e e b hi d nes , on s o s o e e e o n on e n

th m e .
 2 76 T HE TA N K IN ACT I O N

were caught by the sam e batteries that were holding up

D and E M u irhead of 2 0 Company was killed here
.
, , ,

and fi ve or six machines were d isab l e d Chaddock who .

,

had his sectio n com mander Fearn l ey on board had an , , ,

extraordinary escap e A sh e l l came through the cab took .

,

off the driver s h e ad and flung it on th e k n ees of Fearn l ey

’

at the brakes killed or wounded the two right hand gunners

,
-

and passed out at the stern without exp l oding B ut th e .

maj ority of the ta n ks were covered by a spu r from the

view of the batteri e s and elsewher e ther e was no stoppi n g
,

this combinatio n of G a n d the 6 2 nd B oth the Hi n d e n .

burg mai n and reserve li n es were crossed in many p l aces

without the u se of fascines and ta n ks and i n fant ry rolled ,

swiftly down the s l ope t o G raincourt beyond which were ,

the double row of trees along the Route N ationa l e N o 2 9 .

,

the Bapaume Cambrai road and the heavy ma s s of Bourlon

-
,

Wood Eight 6 pounder tanks advanced in line direct upon

.
-

G rai n court firi n g every gu n they could bring to bear

,
Two .

G erman fi e l d pieces co n cea l ed near th e village were happi l y

-

spotted by Charl e s Baker from the dust thrown u p by the

b l ast of th e ir first discharge and a few 6 pounder rounds ,
-

drove away the gu n n ers By one o clock G raincourt was .

’

captured Sti ll pu shing on tanks a n d infantry entered

.
,

An n eux This vi ll age was not who ll y cleared that after

.

noon for the 6 2 n d wer e n ow exhausted They had m ade

,
.

the biggest advance of any divisio n — 4 % miles from their

original front ; but th e y would be the first to acknow l e d ge
that the ta n ks alone had made th is possib l e a n d had led ,

them throughout Some of G Batta l io n even had n ot

.

fi nish e d y e t Th e y crossed the Bapaume Cambrai road

.
-

and e n tered Bour l on Wood Ther e was litt l e or no op .

position : the gr e at woo d which was to be the centre of ,

such d e sperate fighting duri n g the n ext we e k appeared to ,

be empty of defenders It is certain that with a brigade of .

fresh infantry it cou l d have been occupied a n d consolidated

that eveni n g Th e possessio n of Bourlon Ridge
.
“
to -

quote S ir Douglas Ha i g s despatch — would enable our

‘
’ “
2 78 T HE TA N K IN ACTI O N

captured ; quartermasters stores field post O ffi ces canteens

’
,
-
, ,

cinema theatres hospitals — all these were among the m is

,

c e l l a n eo u s acquisition s of that day The surprise had been .

overwhe l mingly complete and the G erman infantry with , ,

fe w exception s had been routed with an ease that had

,

n o precedent in th e war because the correct u se of th e

,

determini n g factor had n o precedent either The panic .

spread far to the rear for i n Cambrai and b e yond all was
,

confu sion and dismay .

These great resu l ts had been gained at a relatively

t rifling cost to ours e l ves ; and it i s i mpossib l e to reflect
upon this begin n ing without deplori n g the inadequate t e
sou rces wh ich caused i t in the end to remain n o more
, ,

than a bril l iant but disappointing fragment There is n o .

need however to go into this subj ect again We have

, , .

seen already that t here were n o fresh reserves available ,

or no n e to speak of S ir J ulien Byng had in hand a few

.

brigades of infantry tired but h itherto not engaged a

, ,

couple of hundred tanks whose stipulated work was more

,

than accomplished and whose crews and supplies a l i ke

,

were exhausted and an entire cavalry corps which pra o

,

tically had don e noth i n g at a l l There should also p e r .

haps be included the Fren ch t roops on his right and the ,

division s e n gaged in the subsidiary attack at B ullecourt ,

wh ich had been highly successful ; but none of these were

in a position to r e i n force him t o a degree comparab l e t o his
O pportunities . With another three or four division s instead ,

of thre e or four brigad e s beh ind his main battle front there
, ,

would have been some chance even of th e optimistic

schemes of exp l oitation being rea l ised without any miracles
by th e cava l ry There were sti l l thirty six hours before the
.
-

enemy could h ope to col l ect his own rein forcements .

What in th e meantime of the cavalry wh o were to be

, , ,

galloping for the Sensée ! The great proportion of these

t roops whose ta l k ( in Amie n s or Boulogne ) was always
,

of speed and dash and initiative and for whose benefit , ,

that these qualities might be utilise d the special tanks ,

 C AM BR A I 2 79

had cleared wide passages in the wire had arrived upon ,

the field four hours late Any one wh o has seen cavalry .

on the march tryin g to find their way anywhere by the

u se of a map wi l l understan d readily how this occurred ;
an d i t is probable that these laggards eve n in such a ,
‘
d e ba cl e would very soon h ave ceased to be of u se as
’

mounted troops ; but they could have fought very usefu ll y

on foot as they wer e forced to d o when they did arrive
, .

One small un it a squadron of the Canadian Fort G arry

,

H orse less pedantic or more skilled i n map readin g than

,
-

i ts regular col l eagues pu shed early to the front managed

, ,

t o cross the C a n al de L Es ca ut by an extemporised bri d ge

’
,

rushed t he half fi n i s h e d Beau revoir M asni e res line on the

- -

slope beyo n d and disp e rsed some infantry and captured a

,

battery behind it This qui te exception al feat may be held

.

t o prove that cavalry are still the great winners of battles

that they were in the ti me of Turenne It remain s how .
,

ever an isolated performance ; a n d th e Canadians in th e

,

end met their inevitable fate All their horses were killed .

or wou nded and they were reduced to fighting like any

, ,

in fantrymen behind the ban k of a su n ken road

,
Their .

galla n try skill and good fortune only served to emphasis e

, ,

the case o f the nu merous regular regiment s wh o were unable

to ach ieve anything at a l l .

It is necessary to descend now from the sublime to the

ridiculou s and to co n sid e r briefly the cond ition of the n in e
,

tank battalio n s at the en d of this first day s fighting to th e ’

,

success of which they had m ainly contributed By 4 P M . . .

‘
on the 2 0th N ovember to quote Week l y Tank N otes , ,
’

“
on e of the most astonishing battles in all history had
been won and as far as the Ta n k C orps was concerned
, ,

tactica l ly finished for n o reserves existing it was not pos

, ,

sib l e to do more than rally the now very weary an d ex

h a u s te d crews select the fittest an d patch u p composite
, ,
”
companies to continu e the attack on th e m orrow I have .

pointed out before th e actual physical exhaustion due to ,

extreme heat cramped quarters j o l ting and other causes

, , , ,
280 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

e ntailed i n any pro l o n ged O perat ion i n a tank O f th e .

machin es which rallied on the even ing of N ovember 2 0th

n early all h ad been running for at least sixteen hours .

S ome had covered distances u ndreamt of in any previou s

t ank action All were out of petro l water and am mu
.
, ,

n i ti o n ,and many had m echanical t roubl e s that n eeded

attentio n Th e crews to a man were dog tired but before
.
-

they could thi n k of rest every remediab l e want had to be

satisfied Petrol and water tanks must be refi ll ed expe n ded
.
,

am mu nition r e placed and m inor repairs effected For th e

,
.

brigade a n d batta l ion staffs there was th e task O f cal

c u l a t i n g l osses and effectives and of arranging for the ,

f ormation of compos it e companies for the conti n u ation

o f the battle n ext day There was not an additio n al man .

or ta n k to be had : all had bee n in action ; and as the ,

quotation above poi n ts out t he battle of Cambrai tactically ,

was at a n end for the Tank Corps It had don e all and .

more than it had promised to do but there remained the ,

n ecessity of continuing to help the n o less exhausted i n

fa n try to rou n d off if possible the first day s victory The ’
.
, ,

losses i n personn e l had been considerable a n d in tanks , ,

from various causes very serious The I s t Brigade alone

, .

had nearly 4 0 tanks hit a n d disabl e d most l y o n the F l es ,

qui eres ridge It is doubtful if ha l f of the origi n a l 3 7 8 fi gh t

.

ing m achi n e s were now availab l e an d for i mm e diat e use ,

the proportion was far sma l ler N evertheless ear l y on the .

,

morni n g of the 2 1 5 t detachments from al l three brigades

,

were i n action again O n the right tanks of F Battalion

.
,

moved out from M arcoi n g agai n st th e Be aurevoir M asni e res -

line but the infa n try a fr e sh brigade unaccustomed to

, ,

tan ks fai l ed to c o op e rate and the attack was a failure

,
-

,
.

Twenty fi ve tanks of B a n d H Batta l io n s of th e 2 n d

-

B rigade with infantry of the 5 I s t Division rushed Can

, ,

tai n g N oyelles and Fontaine N otre Dame Cantai n g was

, ,
- -
.

carried by tanks alone and h anded over to the infa ntry ,

by n oon Fontaine which is virtua ll y an outlying subu rb

.
,

of Cambrai was occupied a fter severe fightin g later in the

,
28 2 T HE TAN K IN ACT I O N

eve r admirably followed by the 4 o th D ivision succeed e d

, ,

at last i n clearing Bourlon Wood and village in spite of ,

the fact that G Batta l ion s tanks were delayed till noon ’

by bad traffic control ho l di n g up their supplies There was .

very severe fighting i n the wood and village the ta n ks ,

expendi n g every round of 6 p d r shell and m ost of th e i r -

.
‘

SAA
. . The vi ll age itself cou l d not be held but the great
.
,

wood remai n ed in our possession Further to the west .

,

about M oeuvres on the Canal d u N ord progress was a l so

, ,

made .

The Tan k Corps was now fough t virtua l ly to a standstill .

Rest a n d recuperation were i mperative for offi cers men and , ,

machi n es or for what was left

, O n th e 2 5 th and 2 7 th .
“

N ovember further attacks were made by tanks and i nfantry

on B ourlon and Fontain e N otre Dame with varying su c - -

cesses but e ventually both these villages remained in the

,

ha n ds of th e enemy D uri n g th e attacks which had taken

.

plac e si n ce the 2 1 s t N o vember tank u nits had become ,

terribly disorganised and by the 2 7 th had been reduced

,

to such a state of exhau stion that it was determined to

withdraw the I s t and 2 nd Brigades This withdrawal .

was n earing completion when the great G erman cou nter

attack was l aunched early on the morning o f the 3 oth
N ovember It is an interesting poin t to rem ember
.

that in this battle th e attackin g infantry were assisted by

6 90 o ffi cers and 3 5 00 other ran ks of the Tan k Corps a little ,

over 4 000 men or the strength of a strong brigade an d that ,

these men rep l aced artil l ery wire cutting and rendered un -
,

necessary the old preliminary bombardment More than .

thi s by keeping close to the infantry they effected a much

,

higher c o operation than had ever befor e been attainab l e

-

with artillery When on the 2 1 s t N ovember the bells of

.

London pea l ed forth i n celebration of the victory of

C ambrai conscious l y or uncon sciously to their listeners
,

they to l l e d out an old tactics and rang in a n ew— Cambrai

had become the V almy of a new epoch in war the epoch ,
”1
of the mechanical engineer .

W k l y Ta k N t 1 ‘
ee n o es .
’
 D i s ab l ed T an k i n F on t ai n e Not re D am e ,
- - Nov e m b e r 1 917 .

G e r m an P h o t o )
( .

G Ba ttal i on T an k s a t th e h ooti g
S n -
Box Bou rl on W oo d, Nov e m b e r
,
1 9 7
1 .

er m an P h ot o
( G .
)
284 T HE TA N K IN A CT I O N

B atta l ion — were eventua l ly he l d up The tanks however .

, ,

did tremendous e xecution among th e enemy who was i n ,

great force a n d this spirited rej oinder stopped effective l y

,

any further attempts by th e G ermans to advance The .

rapidity with which these tank counter attacks were organ -

ised an d carried out with stripped and unready mach ines ,

a nd in circu msta n ces of peculiar di fficu l ty was i n itself ,

high l y creditab l e It provid e d also decisive eviden ce on .

a point hitherto doubted by sceptics —the value of tanks

i n such an emergency .

As a result of the G erman surprise the Cambrai Salie n t ,

was co n tract e d a n d Bour l on Wood abando n ed There .

was n o further fighti n g for the Tank Corps The I s t .

B rigade remained for a dr e ary fort n ight in a defensive

position at De s s a r t Wood passing the nights in t owing ,

heavy gu n s back from V i ll e rs P l ouich The other two .

brigades had withdrawn to Bray and the I s t followed to ,

M eau lte i n t he latter half of D ecember .

N0T E —Tw auth ritati v G rma c mm t n th batt l f C m b i h w h w

. o o e e n o en s o e e o a ra s o o

fu ll y th my r a l i d that h had b
e en e a v d fr m a gr at di a t r by l ack f
e se e een s e o e s s e ou r o

faith i a k H i d burg i h i M m ir writ

n t n s . n en f ll w ,By g l cti g
n s e o s,
’
es as o o s
“
ne e n

to e xp l it a bri ll ia t i itia l ucc th y had l t v i c t ry b atch d fr m th m

o n n s es s e e o e sn e o e ,

an d i d d by tr p whi c h w r f ar i f ri r t th ir w b th i
n ee oo s umb r d e e n e o o e o n o n n e s an

qua l ity . M r v r hi n l C mma d m d t ha v fai l d t c c trat

o eo e , s
‘
l o n s ee e o e e o on e n e

th r e urc r quir d t cur th x cuti

es o es e f th ir p l a
e o se d th ir xp l itati
e e e e on o e ns a n e e o on

i
n ca f uc c
se o Str g b di
s f ca v a l ry a
es s . mb l d b hi d th trium pha t
on o es o ss e e e n e n

l adi g i fa try di v i i fai l d v

e n n n thi cca i t v rc m th l a t l i
s ons e , e e n on s o s on , o o e o e e s ne

o f r i ta c
es s w ak th ugh it w whi c h barr d th way t th fla k d r ar f
n e, e o as , e e o e n an e o

th ir p p
e o t Th E g l i h ca v a l ry quadr
on e n s . w r e t ab l
n t c qu r th
s s ons e e no e o on e e

G rma d f c v with th h l p f th ir ta k
e n e e n e, e en d p r v d u qua l t d c e e o e n s, an o e ne o e o

rati g th ir ta dard with that v ict ry f which th y had tri v

n e s n s h urab l y o or e s en s o ono

an d ft
so o
”
en .

G ra l O tt
en e M r c mma di g th 4 th R r v C rp duri g th
o von os e ,
o n n e 1 es e e o s n e

batt l p i t t that th Briti h fa i l d b cau th y l ucki l y had t th d z

e, o n s ou e s
“
e e se e no e o en

or tw d z n di vi i
o o e at ha d t xp l it th u d iab l ucc
s ons f th n th o e o e n en e s es s o e 20

N v mb r
o e
”
e .
 C H A P T E R X IV .

M ISC ELL AN EO U S . G ER M AN S AND T HE TAN K

T HE

T HE F R EN C H ARTILL ER IE D ASSAUT
’
.

T HE battle of Cambrai h aving converted not only ourselves

but a lso the enemy to a be l ief in the tactical and moral
va l ue of the new arm it wi l l be convenie n t at this point
,

t o deal with the G erman attitude toward tanks and th e

measures adopted to cope with the latter .

It O ften is assumed that the G erman conversion was yet

more grudgin g than our own ; that u n til Cambrai they
refused to admit that tanks had a n y valu e whatever ; an d
that eve n after that battle they remained for some tim e
very sc e ptical about the new d octrin e s But I think thes e .

are only ha l f truths I thi n k t he G ermans realised far

-
.

sooner than we did the m oral influence of the attack by

armou r while faili n g perhaps t o appreciate until it wa s
,

too late the complete tactical revo l ution it wa s brin g

i n g about . In the end they became m ore bigoted con
verts t han any British soldier outside the Ta n k Corps
itself I spe n t six months with the Army of Occupation
.

in Cologn e and I fou n d everywhere the same bitter feeli n gs

,

about tan ks D eutsch es Tod they were called — the

.
“” ’

Death of G ermany In private conversation as wel l as in

.
,

pub l ic print they were coupled with the blockade as one of

,

the two chief factors in the down fall of th e cou ntry With .

that extraordinary but qu i te sincere inability to understan d

286 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

any point of view but their own the authors of the Belgian ,

atrocities the i n ventors of ch l orine gas the first peop l e t o

, ,

poison wel l s on e and a ll are incli n ed to r e gard th e use of

,

tanks as a b rutal and u nj ustifiab l e measure worthy o n l y of ,

savages A nation so i l logica l should be capab l e through

.
,

sheer thick headedness of goi n g very far

-
, .

The early appr e ciation by the G erma n s of the moral effect

of ta n ks is m anife st i n their repeated efforts to belittl e them .

The brave M icha e l was a l ways being assured in published

orders that these m achi n e s were worse than use l ess The .

i nfantry must not l e t itself be frighte n ed by tanks The .

fighti n g capacity of th e tank i s smal l owing t o the bad

visibility a n d th e shooting powers of the machine gun s
,
-

and gu n s cramp e d a n d i n accurate as th e resu l t of the

motion It has be e n proved that tank crews are nervous
.

and are inc l i n ed t o turn back or leave the ta n k Th e .

hostile i n fa n try fo ll ows ta n ks on l y half heartedly -

.

( Order issued to the 7 th Cava l ry D ivision 2 6 th Sep tember ,

T h e M ark II ta n ks captu r e d at Arras a n d the

.
,

M ark IV s l eft behind after the Cambrai withdrawal were

.
’

u sed t o demo n strate the inherent weak n esses of the i n

v e n ti o n and the extreme discomfort e n dured by the crews .

It was found h owever that with a l l this the H igher

, ,

Comma n d was unable to i n fect the G erman soldier with

its own l ofty contempt for tanks The brave M ichael per .

s isted in his d e l usions and was so wrong headed even as to

,
-

ask why the enemy was allowed a monopoly of these

e ngi n es of war It mu st be remembered that by the
.

autumn of 1 9 1 7 the French St Chamond and Sch n eider

machi n es had been used in som e nu mbers a n d with con
s i d e ra b l e success in Champag n e so that the G erman ,

infantryman saw himself threatened everywhere by the new

weapon ; and h e knew perfect l y well that as an individual
he was entire l y he l pless against it whatever m ight be the ,

general outcome of a batt l e in wh ich it was employed H e .

c ou l d n ot acqu ire the detached outlook of the G reat G eneral

Staff at Spa And it was in consequence of this feeling in

.

th e subordinate ranks that before the battle of Cambrai , ,

28 8 T HE TAN K IN A CT I O N

the rear four m ore machine guns The crew con sisted of an -
.

officer and n o fewer than fifteen or sixteen men who must ,

have crowded the n arrow quart ers i ntolerably ; and as t h ree

branches of the service —arti l lery in fantry and tech n ical , ,

—were represented each ignorant of the oth e r s duties

,
’
,

there was m uch friction between them The tan k was .

heavily armoured especia l ly in front where the platin g

, ,

”
was I f ! i n ches i n thickness and would keep out com mon ,

she ll from a fi e l d gu n at a moderate ran ge ; but th e roo f

-

was very thi n a n d the whole machine was so rough l y put

,

together that wide crevices aroun d the gu n ports made it -

u n p l easant l y vu l n e rab l e to th e sp l ash from machin e gu n -

bu ll ets Th ere was room in places for the bul l ets them
.

se l ves to e n t e r B ei n g bui l t on the ordi n ary tractor

.

pri n cip l e with a very low cleara n ce from the grou nd a n d a

,

l ong flat tread the ta n k could neither cross a considerable

,

tre n ch nor surm ount any serious obstac l e There was n o .

u n d i tc h i n g apparatus The on l y improv e me n t on ou r

.

design was the sprun g track which reduced wear and shock , ,

a n d in so po n derous a machine was a notabl e i nnovation .

O bservatio n was exceptio n al l y bad The officer and driver .

sat abov e the engine th e ir heads and shoulders i n a central

,

cab wh ich rose two feet above the roo f and as the l atter ,

proj ected for ward for ten feet it h id from them a l l th e ,

ground i mmediate l y i n front .

In every respect i n fact excepting th e Spru n g tracks

, , ,

the P a nz er km ftwagen was c l um sy and ine ffi cie n t to a

degree N otwithstandi n g its one man control the o fficers
.
-
,

of th e new u nit prefe rred to ha n dle th e British M ark IV s .

’

eve n during trials on l eve l ground ; a n d for a l l practical

purposes there was n o comparison betw e e n the two i n
ge n e ral uti l ity and handin e ss And whi l e the machin e itself
.

was mistrusted and with j ustice a n other and u n foreseen

, ,

d ifficulty was soon apparent The higher com mand had .

talked more clever l y than it knew It had belittled all tanks .

so persistently had made so strong an argu ment out of the

,

perils and discomforts of all tank warfare that the brave ,

 G e r m a n T a nk , A d al b er t .
( G e r m an P h ot o .
)

F re n c h H av y S h n
e c e i d er T a nk ,
i g
carry n .
75 field
gun
-
.
( G e rm an P h o t o .
)
2 90 T HE TA N K IN A CT IO N

These prisoners by the way appear t o have been u n

, ,

necessarily communicative The report after describing

.
,

the method of attack and the size and armament of tanks ,

continues
G erman defence and defensive measures were weak .

Losses on both sides scarcely worth mentioning

Pace ( of tanks ) three or four miles per hour They .

may surmount practically all obstacles On e tank in .

Fontaine climbed up a steep orchard broke the trees , ,

crossed two well built 5 feet high garden wa ll s and in

- - -
, ,

turning knocked down the corner of a house

,

Serious obstacles are con stituted by trenches at least

1 3 1 6 feet wide and 1 0 feet deep
-
Also by marshy .

ground Ploughed la n d is easily negotiated ; a l so

.

barricades The bui l di ng of obs ta cl es d oes not pay It i s

. .

better to a tta ck ta nks energeti ca l ly Tanks must be .

heavily fired at ( by artillery ) during their advance even ,

if there is no like l ihood of hitting them The main .

thing is to prevent the infantry from following the

tanks The infantry must be made to fear the area
.

where the tanks are In point of fact the British

.
,

i n fantry was soon on e to two m i l es behin d the tanks ,

and at Fontaine did n ot fol l ow them at a ll .

This is an interesting confirmation of a point already

referred to Th e report goes on to remark that
.

a s actua l a n ti ta n k defe n ce only special gun s

-

situated in the forward zone which put the tanks out of ,

action by fire over open sights are suitable Each , .

direct hit ki ll s part of the crew and often sets th e tan k ,

on fi r e D etachments situated further to the rear have

.

no knowledge of the situation a n d often arrive too ,

late .

“
Such guns must on principle be situated well
, ,

forward ; then the enemy will not succeed in a su rprise

attack .

The O i/c Defence Tr o ops must be made respon sible

.

for the siting of the anti tan k guns -

.
 T HE G ER M AN S A ND T HE TA N K 29 ]

G un s m ou n ted
‘

on lorr i es do excellen t work if th e

roads are good .

“
Infa ntry The front line mu st only make a gap t o
.

let through tanks not put out of action and take cover ; ,

they m ust n ot retire Ta n ks must be dealt with behi nd .

th e front Th e chief obj ect is th e r ep ul s e of the enemy

.

i nfa ntry The tan k captain said

. Ta nks ca n g a i n gr ound , ,

but ca n never h ol d i t a l on e Th is is a great point to .

’

remember when discu ssing them .

Isolated commands in rear should be deta i led for

“

anti tan k defen ce

-
.

M ea ns of D efence The chief one is the armou r .

piercin g bu l let It is feared by the tank crews because

.

it goes clean through the arm our plati n g causing a lon g -

,

flame a n d often setting fire to th e petrol tan k

,
-
.

“
The tank is best attacked from the rear H ouse .

to house fighting against tanks is very f av o u rable to

-

i nfantry The men take cover in the houses let th e

.
,

tank pass and then fire at it from the rear at close range
,

with rifles an d
The 4 6th I R accou nted for four tanks i n F o ntaine
. .

i n this way .

Ha nd Gr enades Are useless sin gly ; they only have .

effect if severa l are tied together an d thrown under the

tank but this is very di fficult
, .

Light T M s can be made effect i ve with flat . .

’

traj ectory fire U sed singly they have good results

. .

“
Anti tank defence mu st be discussed and pra o
ti s e d w hen the tanks lose their terror
, M en fought .

for four hours viole ntly against eight tanks which

penetrated into F onta i n e and of which only two were ,

able t o return ( fou r were accounted for by infantry a n d

two by artillery ) ; moreo v er ele v en derelict tanks are ,

lyin g j ust outside our lin es .

M U LL ER LO EBNITZ Maj -
, .
,

fo r 1

Ta k C p Int l l ig nc Summary
1
n or s e e e .
’
29 2 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N

It wi l l be seen that the G ermans continued to m agn i fy

the powers of the armour piercing bu l lets— a curiou s error -
,

as the captured tanks must have shown its comparative

i n e ffi ca cy against the plating on the Mark IV s Probab l y ’
. .

the captured personnel exaggerated the effect of Splinters

and the ordinary bul l et splash round th e gun ports It is -
.

interest ing also to note th e remarks about the petrol tank .

This was always considered by th e enemy to be the tan k s ’

weak spot a l though in fact n o more vulnerable in itself

,

than any other .

Soon after Cambrai th e G erman s were devoting thei r

who l e energies to preparation s for their ow n great offensive ,

which was launched i n the fol l owi n g Spri n g and defen sive ,

measures of all kinds wer e secondary consideration s for the

t ime being But when the three successive blows on the
.

Somme the Lys and the Aisne h ad come at length to an

, ,

e n d and were cou ntered with start l i n g rapidity and effe ct

, , ,

by the French and British attacks on 1 8 th July and 8 th

August 1 9 1 8 the e n emy was aroused very roughly to a
,

rea l isation of hi s pe r il and o f the power of the weapon

he had affected to despise The 8 th Au gust i n particu l ar .
, ,

was entire l y a tan k victory — a greater and more bril l iant

Cambrai ; and th e astonishing collapse of the defence
threw the G reat G eneral Staff i n to a panic from wh ich it
never was allowed to recover From this date to the en d .

a persist e nt refrain rising at len gth to a frantic crescendo

,

of war n ing and exhortation ru n s through all the orders ,

issued to the G erman armies and the burden of it is tanks , ,

ta n ks and again tanks

,
.

A few extracts taken at random from captured G erm an

, ,

orde rs prisoners statements a n d similar C hanne l s of i n

,
’
,

formation wi l l show very c l ear l y the d i s i l l u s i on m e nt a n d

’

alarm which spread through the armies after th e rout of

V on H utier and V on der Marwitz i n front of Amiens .

D uring the Arras operation s at the end of August for ,

example documents were secured which showed that

,

divisional anti tank o ffi cers had been created A similar

-
.
2 94 T HE TAN K IN A C TI O N

also settle with them M ore momentous for us is the ques

.

tion of tanks We are adequate l y armed against them

. .

Anti tank d e fence i s nowadays more a question of nerves

-

”
than of m aterial Soon after G eneral V on Wrisberg had
.

spoken the second battle of Cambrai began The tanks

, .

once more proved too much for the nerves of the G erman
i n fantry and prisoners p rovided the usual il l uminating con
,

fi r m a t i on of this It appeared that in spite of all exhorta

.

tions the G erman in fantry sti l l considers that as soon as

“

the tanks have broken through their line f urther resistance ,

i s u seless The o ffi cers gave as their opinion that tanks

.

were a bril l iant inve n tion and wished that the G ermans
‘
,
’

had more of t hem Lack of material however stood in the.

, ,

way . A nu m b e r ( Sergeant M aj ors -

and Sergeants ) st ated that tanks invariably had a

considerable m oral e ffect on infantry however often they ,

might be told that they had only to let th em through and

” 1
the artillery w o uld deal with them In the same mo n th .

a G erman Corps Order lays down that M ess ages concer ni ng

ta nks ha ve p r efer en ce over a l l other tel ep hone ca l l s i ncl udi ng ,
” 2
m ess ages r eg a r di ng a er op l a nes .

For some ti me past Ludendorff had been growing more

and more concerned over this new warfare In a report .

on the battle of 8 th August he gave as th e first reason ,

for the defeat the fact that the troops were surprised by
,
“

the massed attack of tanks and lost their heads when t he ,

tan ks suddenly appeared behind them under cover of natural

and artificial fog This of course was no more than the
.
, ,

truth ; but it was a no v el co nfessio n for the G reat G eneral

Staff to make a n d i ndicated th e grave apprehen sions which
,

t he disaster had arouse d for there could be no guarantee ,

against the troops losing their heads a second time or a ,

third . N erves p l ay an i n creasing part in O fficial G erman

c aj ol i ng s and extenuations fro m now to the end but this ,

obnoxious and unso l d ier like word was n ever used before -

the tan ks caused it to become a normal fe ature in every

1 ‘
Intel l ugence S ummary .
’ 2
bid
I .
 T HE G ER M AN S AND T HE TAN K 29 5

apologia Ludendorff once awake to the new danger took

.
, ,

vigorous although qu ite useless steps to combat it by p ra c

t ical measures i n the field These we will consider n e xt .
,

but before concluding this ske tchy select ion of docu mentary
evidence on e final and authoritative witness remain s to be
,

heard —the G reat G eneral Staff itself A short tim e ago .

,

C olonel Bauer who had been head of the Artillery Depart

,

m ent at headquarters and who is credited by G erman public

,

O pin ion with having been the special confidan t and political

i nspirer of Ludendorff issued a pamphlet professing to give ,

the G eneral Staff s version of the event s which led up t o

’

the Armistice Through out September and October i t

.
,

appears Ludendor ff made repeated demands for peace

,

while the armies were still intact pointin g out that it was ,

necessary to reckon on an increasing deterioration of th e

m ilitary situation At the end of September V on Hi nd en
.

burg agreed t o lay before th e n ew G overn men t j ust formed

u nder Prince Max of Baden a true statement of affairs O n .

2 n d October the representatives from G eneral H eadquarters

met the party leaders of the Reich stag an d presented t o ,

them the report It began with this striking passage

.

The chief army com m and h as been compelled to

take a terribly grave decision and declare that acc o rd , ,

ing to human probabilities there is n o longer any ,

prospect of forcin g peace on the enemy Above all .

,

two facts have been decis ive for thi s issue First th e .
,

tanks The enemy has employed the m i n u nexpected l y

.

large nu mbers Where after a very liberal cloudin g of

.
,

our position s with artificial m ist they effected a sur ,

prise our m en s nerves were often u nequal t o them

,
’
.

H ere they broke th rough our fi rst lin e opened a way ,

for their infantry appeared i n the rear created local , ,

panics and threw the contro l of the fighting i nto con

,

fusion When they had once been identified our tank

.

defence weapon s and our arti l lery quickly settled with

them Then however the misfortu ne had already
.
, ,

happene d and solely the s uccesses of the tanks

,
2 96 T HE T AN K IN A CT IO N

explain the large nu mbers of prisoners which so

painfully reduced our strengths and brought about a ,

more rapid consu mption of reserves than we had

h itherto been accustom ed to .

We were not i n a position to oppose to the enemy

equal masses of G erman tanks Their construction .

wou ld have exceeded the resources of our i ndustry ,

which was strained to the uttermost or other more ,

”
i mportant things wou l d have had to be neglected .

Daily Telegraph 2 1 s t J u l y ,
’

Th is confession com ing fro m such a quarter needs little

, ,

com ment It seem s to j ustify all the arguments by which I

.

h ave tried to Show how tanks when at length properly ,

employed determi n ed not only the duration but also to a

, ,

large extent the actual result of th e war Yet as I write

, .
, ,

there appears to be every probability that n o tank corps

will be i ncluded i n the post bellum army ! The cavalry -
,

useless and ine fficie n t is of course to rem ain at full

,

st rength ; infantry a n d art i ll ery are to be cut down to a .

m ini mum to provide m oney for ameliorating the lives of

coal m iners ; a n d the Tan k Corps as an unnecessary ,

extravagance i s in danger of total abolit ion Truly we

, .

are a remarkable people .

After the 8 th August the G erman s began feverishly to

devise anti tank measures of every ki n d It is doubtfu l if
-
.

the i mmense fronts which modern armies occupy c a n ever

be protect e d sat isfactori l y by artificia l means agai n st Wh ole
h earted tank attacks ; and in a n y case the G e rmans were
a l lowed no time to perfect such station ary defen ces Fie l d .

artillery remained to the end th e best anti ta n k weapon -

.

Sp e cial guns were now brought forward near the front li n e ,

t o re main silent u ntil the moment of attack when they ,

Al qu t d by G ra l Mauric Th La t F ur M nth ‘ ’
1 o o
so o e ene e, e s s.
298 T HE TAN K IN ACT I O N

ineffective served to impose caution on any tank com

,

mander who kne w of or suspected their existence They , , .

ge neral l y took the form of high exp l osive shells with light -

fuses buried in rows a few i nches below the surface of a

,

road or across som e other like l y defile and fitted with a ,

simple wooden device which the weight of a tan k pressed

down upon the nose cap so detonating the fuse O ne or
-
, .

two large mine fi e l d s wer e l aid in which a more elaborate

-
,

apparatu s was u sed Odd l y e n ough it was one of our own

.
,

min e fi el d s prepared before the March retreat and afterwards

-

forgotten which cau sed th e on l y serious disaster tan ks ever

,

suffered from thi s form of defence .

Two more u nusual types of obstacle came with in my own

experience Along the valley which runs between the first
.

and second H indenburg Lines from Pronville to In ch y e n o

Artois on the C anal d u N ord was the dried u p bed of a

, ,
-

s tream ca l led the H irondel l e Its banks were lined with .

stout wi l lows and where the gaps between these were wide
,

enough for a t an k to pass through the G ermans had p l anted ,

lengths of railway l ine upright but inclin ing forward the, ,

en ds embedded in concrete blocks sun k in the ground As .

this part of the line was taken i n reverse by the capture of

Q u é a n t tanks had n o opportun ity of testing this obstacle
,
.

I thin k the rails would have been pushed over with ease ,

but th e process might have held u p th e tanks for a few

dangerou s minutes in full vi ew of the second H indenburg
Line In the mai n street of Inchy itse l f were two massive
.

b l ocks of concrete 6 feet h igh with the usual narrow pas ,

sage between and each furnished with hal f a dozen of these

,

inclined iron rai l s which rose to the house tops This

,
-
.

barricade would h ave stopped any tan k M ore i n teresting .

than thi s defence scheme however was the elaborate but , ,

u nfinished stockade at Achiet l e G rand The Arras Bapaume - -

.
-

railway curves across most of this region on a high embank

ment This i n itself was not general l y u n surmountable
.
,

but t anks in the act of climbing over it would stand out

as magnificent targets for the G erman batteries which then ,
 T HE G E M A R NS AND T HE TA N K 299

were posted on the other side At one point j ust north .

,

of Achiet l e G rand station a rise of ground cau sed the em

- -

b a n km e n t to fall away to nothing for tw o or three hundred

yards and attacking tanks it was thought natura ll y wou l d
, , ,

make for th is crossing In fro n t of it therefore para ll el .

, ,

to the lin e t he G erman s began a really form i dable an ti

,

tank stockade It was made of len gths of railway line an d

.

stout telegraph poles three rails or two poles being lash ed ,

together fixed in ce ment bases and buried i n the ground

, , ,

above which they rose to a height of 4 feet Inclining .

for w ar d these stake s were planted 7 feet apart in s everal

,

rows each row covering the spaces of the one i n front It

, .

was found that tank s could force a passage through this

a ba tti s only by approaching it obliquely an d crushing down

o ne row of stakes at a tim e a Slow process which would ,

have exposed them helplessly to the batteries close beyon d .

In the attack on th is position on 2 1 s t August 1 9 1 8 when ,

a great numbe r of tanks were knocked out along th e rail

way the stockade was not attempted There was a Similar
, .

form of obstacle on the Bapau me Cambrai road and there -

,

may have been others .

Taken as a whole these various artificial impediment s ,

i nevitab l y proved a fai l ure There was no time for th e .

G erman s to cover every vulnerable point i n such a fashion ,

and isolated obstacles were useless against a tan k attack

on a wide front In any case the pri n ciple of passive
.
,

defence was bound to be fata l in the end ; and th e G ermans ,

realising th is were at work when the war fi n ished upon an

,

instru me n t which they hoped would replace a ll these make

”
shifts Th is i nstrument was the Tuf or Ta n k a nd F li eger
.
“

machine gun a huge M axi m firing armour piercin g bullet s

-
,
-

of 1 3 m m diameter This formidable weapon must have

. .

been deadly again st ou r Mark IV s and V s for its stream .

’
.
’
,

of heavy bullets would have gon e clean through the armou r .

Profound importance was attached to it s speedy production ,

in which sixty factories were e n gaged and it was given ,

priority over sub marines and aeroplanes (another testimony

3 00 T HE T AN K IN ACT I O N

t o th e G erman fear of tanks ) M aj or Williams Ellis in .

-
,
‘
The Tank Corps gives th e following interestin g details
,
’

o f the fate of this i n vention

N o less tha n 6 000 of these guns were to be i n the

field by April 1 9 1 9 and delivery was to begin early in
,

th e previous December—j u st a month too late H ow .

ever when the armistice was signed the firms were

,

already i n possession of th e greater part of the stores

and raw material for the manu facture O f the guns a ,

quant ity of which were by then well on the way to

completion Immediately after the signing of the
.

armistice all the factories without exception were , ,

instructed by telephone to continue manufacturing the

‘
Tuf and about 2 0th N ovember they r eceived con
,
’

fi r m a ti on i n writing of this order and were in structed ,

to keep on their workmen at all costs O ur occupa .

tion of the left bank of the Rhin e proved a serious

drawback to a continuation of the manufacture as it ,

comp l etely i n terrupted commu n ication between several

of the factories The P i a ff Works of K aiserslautern
.

( Palatinate ) and th e great Becker Steel Works of

,

Crefe l d which played an important part in the manu

,

facture of the gun s had to close down both bei n g

, ,

on the left ban k of the Rhine .

The M inister of War throughout the period of its,

manu facture asked for dai l y a n d m i n ute reports as to

,

the progress of the T uf But once more as ever

‘
.
’
,

in al l that concerned ta n ks the G erman s were sev e ral ,

m onths too late We were never desti n ed to face this

.

particular weapon with the M ark V The modern .

”
tank fears it not at a ll .
302 T HE TA N K IN ACTI O N

sequence worked under severe limitations Obstacles that .

were neg l igible to a B ritish tank they found impassable .

O n the other hand they carried a far heavier gun than our ,

machines the 7 5 mm fi e l d piece of famous memory In

,
.
-
.

a ppearan ce they were s mall edition s of th e G erman C opy ,

the P a nz erkr aftwagens Thei r l ight weapon was the .

H otchkiss automatic rifle carried on our Whippets an d ,

M ark V s .
’
.

Ten compan ies of 1 6 tanks each were formed i n April , ,

1 9 1 7 one company only consisting of St C h a m on d s

,
In .

variou s actions during th e year the Schneiders did e xcel ,

l ent work but th e St C h a m on d s proved to be a failure

,
.

In the meantime still working on very s im ilar lin es to our

,

own Colonel Estienne was e v olving an idea fo r a light

,

tank .The result was the remarkable little R e nau l t

machine of which no fewer than 3 5 00 were ordered in
,

J une 1 9 1 7 If we had designed th e better heavy t ank

.
,

the French m ade a leap ahead with the R e nault ; an d it i s

h ighly interesting to see how nat ional habits of thought
appear manifestly i n this connection O ur bias i n any .
,

sort of constructional work lean s towards the heavy , ,

durable and expensive article We have a horror of any

, .

thi n g cheap and fragile Th is i nclination together with .

,

the ingeniou s design of the large tank worked for good in ,

t h e case of the latter ; but when we cam e to build what we

c alled l ight machines our lim itation s were very apparen t , .

Th e Whippet was n early as conspicuous and as costly as

the M ark IV or V was far more vulnerable and intricate
. .
, ,

was in capable of surmounting any serious obstacle and ,

possessed only one m erit — superior speed It was absurd .

t o describe it as a light tank 1

Colone l Estienne and his .

c olleagues on the other hand determined to produce a

, ,

1
Whi pp t w s n ar l y a l ong s th e h ea vy tank Th ngi ne w as i n fr on t
Th e e a e s a . e e ,

u d r
n e arm our ed b on n t A ma ll cab p rch d i n r ar h el d three m en d
an e . s e e e an

tw o H otchki s machi n gu n s Th p d of the Whipp t w s ev n mi l es n

e- s. e s ee e a s e a

h our .
 T HE FR EN C H A R TILLERIE D A SSA UT ’
3 03

little simple inco n spicuous machi ne which could b e

, ,

manufactured rapidly at a small cost and wh ich was t o be ,

capable of performing under modern conditions the task , ,

of the French F a nta ss i n or skirmisher The R e naults i n

,
.
,

fact were to b e u sed i n clouds i n front of the infantry like

, ,

armoured light troops If 2 0 or 5 0 or 1 00 were destroyed

.
, , ,

they could easi l y be replaced Th e y were not expected t o .

cross wide trenches or climb vertical obstac l es this was the

preli minary task of the h eavy tank While the Whippet .

was a weak compromise between the two types th e ,

R e nault was definitely limited i n its function s It was .

experimental i n the sense that all tanks during the war

were experimental There was n o time i n which to play
.

about with variou s designs and in consequence the a c ,

c e p te d model had many faults but it was a strikingly ,

successful experiment on novel lines In appearance with .

,

its h unched up shoulders topped by a bell shaped cupola

- -
,

and its curving iron tail introduced t o p revent it from turn

ing on its back it looked like some fabulou s cross between
,

a grasshopper and a scorpion Compared with all previous .

tanks it was ridiculously small—a mere toy e v en beside a , ,

Whippet It carried two men a driver wh o sat on th e

.
,

floor and a gunner who swun g half uprigh t behind him i n

,
-

a sort of leather sling and fired a H otchkiss from the cupola ,

wh ich revolved It had a R e nault engin e o f only 1 7 h p

. . .
,

narrow sprung tracks passing o v er a big idle wheel i n,

front and a sma l l drivin g sprocket behind and could travel ,

o n good ground at a speed of six t o seven m i les an hour .

It was extraordinarily handy and by means of two levers ,

which threw the tracks out of gear it could be spun abou t

like a top Owing however t o its light weight and springy
.
, ,

m otion it must ha v e been extremely awkward to aim from

,

while on the move .

Aston ishing rapi d ity of production was on e of the chie f

merits o f the R e n ault After the victoriou s cou nter stroke
.
-

against the Chateau Thierry Salient i n which th ese little

-

,
 0
3 4 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

m achines played a decisiv e part whole battalions each of , ,

7 5 ta n ks became avai l able at the rate of on e a week !

,

This permitted of tired u n its being rep l aced speedi l y by

fresh o n es The French Tank Corps was established on
.

the norma l contine n tal infantry basis in regiments of three ,

batta l io n s ; and it was proposed to form in addition to the ,

regiments of Schn e ider and St Chamond heavies th irty ,

batta l ion s ( ten r e giments ) of R e naults By August 1 9 1 8 .

the personnel of th e Corps nu mbered already of al l

ranks During 1 9 1 8 3 9 8 8 individua l tank engagements
.
,

wer e fought to which nu mber the diminutive R e n aults

,

contributed 3 1 4 0 .

It is impossible here to give details of any of these tank

actions What is called the Battle of Soissons — the
.

brilliant series of O peratio n s from 1 8 th J uly onward which

i naugurated the combined allied O ffe nsive— was the C ambrai
of the French Ta n k Corps After that date tanks were .

e mployed wherever possib l e not o n l y on the mai n front , ,

but at St M ihie l and even i n Flanders where th e 6 th ,

Fre n ch Army was sent t o strengthen G e n eral Plumer and

the Be l gians ; and a company of R e naults went as far afi e l d
”
as Salo n ika Fina ll y to quote Weekly Tan k N otes
.
“ ‘
, ,
’

“
it may be stated that as there can be no doubt that the
1 8 th J u l y was the second greatest turning poi n t i n th e war -
,

the first being the Battle of the Marne in 1 9 1 4 so can there ,

be no doubt that the Battle of Soissons wou l d never have

bee n won had not the French possessed a powerfu l forc e of
tanks whereby to initiat e success The G e rma n G eneral .

Staff which shou l d be the b e st j udge of this question

, ,

candidly admit that th e Fre n ch victory was d u e to the

use of masses of ta n ks ; n either was the G e n eral Com
‘ ’

mandi n g i n Chief of the French Armies retice n t for on

- -
,

the 3 oth J uly he i ssued the fo ll owi n g Special order of the

day to the French Ta n k Corps

Voa z bi en m er i te d e l a P a tr i e,
’ ’
a vez
 C HAPTE R XV .

T HE G ER MAN O FF EN SIV E . M EAU L TE , BO U V IG N Y ,

AND BET H UNE .

A F U RTH ER expans i on of the Tan k Corps as indicated ,

a l ready was the natural result of the Batt l e of Cambrai

, .

The rej ected proposal for an 1 8 batta l ion establishment -

was now almost obsequio us l y adopted A litt l e l ater .

,

i n deed the War Office ( dragging with it a reluctant

,

Treasury) rushed reckless l y in where it had feared to

tread before and sa n ctioned a still larger increase Before
,
.

a l l this had happened however an ou twa r d and visible

, ,

sign had testified to the dawn of a new era The tanks .

were formally ma n u mitted from the paper control of the

M achin e G un Corps and became in name what they had
,

a l ways been i n fact a separate organisatio n For reasons

, .

of simplicity and com mon sense I have written throughout

-

”
of th e Tank Corps where a pedantic conscience would
“
,

have imp e ll ed me to speak of the for this

change of n omenclature with all that it imp l ied was not
, ,

in force until late i n 1 9 1 7 .

Two new ta n k brigades the 4 th and s th were n ow to

, ,

be formed i m mediately i n France Pe n ding the completion.

of these arrangements as we ll as of those for the disposa l

,

of the various un its in the coming y e ar t he three o l d ,

brigades or what was left of them were concentrated for

, ,

the winter between Albert and Bray on the edge of th e ,

 T HE G E R M AN O F F EN SIV E 3 7
0

Som me battlefield There was m uch to be don e before .

any of the battalions would be fit for an other o ffensi v e

battle and it was suspected already that defensive rather
,

than o ffensive measures would be ou r portion for the next

few m on ths In the meantime Tank C orps H eadquarters
. , ,

faced with the dazzling prospect of a great and possibly

indefinite expansio n made a simple calculation and found ,

that it was in danger of exhau sti n g th e resources of th e

a l phabet Eighteen battalions de nominated alphabetically
. , ,

would leave only eight letters for future em ergencies ; while

to continue the illogical practice of numbering th e com
p a n i es consecutively throughout a growing corps promised
in the en d a surfeit of figures as well An d so another .

revolutionary translation came about Letters a n d fi gures .

chan ged places Our old battalion designations which had

.
,

acquired a s e ntim enta l significance were abolished at a ,

stroke so that A B attalio n Tank Corps became t he I s t

, , ,

Tank B atta l ion and what was m ore harrowing G became

, , ,

the 7 th This reform however necessary was painful to

.
, ,

the victims It m ight mean nothing t o th e new battalions

.

forming i n England but we in France felt that we had , , ,

lost our i n dividuality It was as if th e law without O b .

,

tai n ing my consent had decreed that I was to be called ,

S mith or J ones The o l d names however are n ot dead

.
, , .

In any gatheri n g of officers or men from the first three

brigades you will find th e battalions still spoken of as A
,

or B F or G and so on as the case m ay be

, , , .

At the same time that this nominal change took place ,

the numerical order of companies was abolished also The .

three compan ies of a battalio n were k n own i n futu re as

A B and C
, , .

I have explained h ow I came to be absen t at Cambrai .

J ust before Christ mas I was released from conva l esce n t

quarters ( cyn ically s o called ) at Bar l y n ear Avesnes l e -
,
-

Comte wh e re I h ad been living with other unfortunates

,

i n the co l d e st ch a teau i n France — a n outwardly imposin g

b ut actually gimcrack hou se like H ardwick H all more “
,
3 08 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N

glass than wall a n d short of coal into the bargain With

,
.

som e di fficulty ( for and other dignitaries whose

business it was t o know such things invariably were
ignorant of the whereabouts of tank un its ) I ran the I s t
Brigade to earth in a camp of huts outside M eaulte two ,

miles from A l bert I will not di l ate upon the arctic winter
.

we spent at this u nho l y spot beyond remarking that the ,

camp l ike a ll simi l ar military estab l ishm e nts was built on

, ,

the bleak n orthern slope of a hi l l Th e re was n o int e r .

v e n i n g shelter so far as I cou l d j udge between u s an d

, ,

the N orth Po l e We co n trived howev e r to exist cheer

.
, ,

fu ll y a n d i n d e ed for a fortnight after Christmas a l most too

,

cheerfu ll y The c e lebratio n s common t o that season a n d

.

t o t he N ew Year were i n vo l ved with others consequent

upon the an n ounceme n t of the Cam brai ho n ours and the ,

promotions and partings brought about by the expansion

of the corps These last affe cted the 7 th Battalion — as I
.

hate to ca ll i t— very materially Colonel H ankey to every .

,

on e s profound regret ( a feeling n ot so com mon as the

’

conventional accounts of such departures might lead th e

u nsophisticated to suppose ) left us to take over the n ew
,

4 th B rigade carrying with him severa l others

, M aj or .

F e rnie became Battalion Com mander and was succeeded ,

in A ( late 1 9) Co mpany by Winters M aj or Broome l eft .

C Company to command another battalion There were .

a nu mber of m inor promotion s due to these changes and ,

to casua l ties ; and H enriquez of A C om p a a y having becom e

, ,

battalion reconnaissance o fficer his vacant post as com ,

pa n y R O was offe red to m e

. . The work had a l ways .

appea l ed to me and I was the more pleased with the

,

O pportunity at the ti me because I be l i e ved then that most

of my old friends in C Compa n y were leavi n g the battalion

for more exa l ted posts e l sewhere .

Few incidents worth recording m arked our stay at

M eaulte H eavy snow fell which added in my O pinion
.
, , ,

to the general discomfort and the road up to the camp,

re mained for weeks a corrugated and painfu l slope of ice ,

3 10 T HE TA N K IN A CT IO N

It was known by now that a G erman offensive on a

large scale was i mmi n ent a n d might be directed at any
,

one point or at severa l simu l taneou sly on th e lo n g front

, ,

from B e thune to the Aisne The move northward of the .

I s t Ta n k Brigade was part of a defensive scheme for the

protection of the B ruay coal fi e l d s shou l d th e enemy mak e

-

a direct attack u pon them from th e Lens La Bass e e sector -

.

The fro n t al l otted to the Brigade extended from th e La

Bass e e Cana l to the Scarp e and was divided into three ,

parts — one t o each battalion These battalion fro n ts .

overlapped while each un it was suppos e d to have som e

,

knowledge of th e whol e brigade area The 1 2 th Batta l ion .

was responsible for that part lying between the La Bass e e

Canal and Loos the 7 th Battalion for that between V er
,

m e l les and V i my th e r 1 th for th e remai n der of the sector

,

to a point south of Arras where the 2 n d Tank Brigade ,

carried on th e defensive line It was assumed from the .

first t hat if tanks were employed at all it would be in a

counter attack the probab l e d irections of the enemy s
-
,
’

offensive being ( 1 ) agai n st the H ill 7 0 sector ( 2) a frontal ,

attack against the V i my Ri d ge a n d ( 3 ) a flanki n g movement ,

fr om the south H e occupied already so large a part of th e

.

coa l district that the r e pulse of any further attempt was

essential ; and i n th e event of his captu ri n g some vital point
in the defence line ( such as H i l l 7 0 itself) the tanks wou l d ,

be employed at o n ce to assist i n d rivi n g him out This .

being the general idea l ittle or n o t im e was to be spent

,

at first in collecting in formation about the grou n d beyond

ou r front line Recon naissance was confi n ed to the region
.

be tween the tank parks a n d the main zone o f resistance

-

known as the Black Line By the middle of the month

.

this reconnaissance was in fu l l swing Taken as a whole .

,

the country was n ot bad for tank operations ; but the wide
belt of shelled groun d and crumbling t renches which marked
 T HE G E R M AN O FF EN SIV E 3 1 1

the old front lin e before Lens the nu merous large mining ,

Vi ll ages which radiated ou t from that town and the V imy ,

Ridge itself so convulsed by high explosive that only three

,

possible tank crossings could be fou nd presented difficult ,

and dissimilar problems A tan k cou nter attack i n this .

-

u nique region must have been extremely interestin g .

H ad such an attack taken place almost the whole battle ,

field wou l d have been spread like a map below ou r camp I .

do not th ink there can h ave been i n France any point of

View quite so remarkable in the circu mstances as the , ,

everyday outlook from the 7 th B attalion s huts above ’

B ouvigny Boy effl e s This camp — i t was a si n gle row of

-
.

N iss ens occupied only by the offi ce rs —was situated half

,

way up th e bold ridg e which ends to the southward in the

fam ous Spur of N otre D am e d e Lorette overh anging the ,

rubbish heap that used to be So uchez

-
In front of u s .

t here was n othing but the i m mense flat plain of Lens and
D ouai . O n a clear day we h ad only to step out of our
huts and look over a hedge garn ished with a screen o f
camouflage n etting ; and before us across a stubble fi el d ,
-

and the roofs of Boye ffl es village there rolled away to ,

north and e ast an d south east the fruitless battlefields o f -

three and a h alf years — V imy and Li e vin Loos and ,

H ulluch La Bass e e and N euve Chapelle

, And for a .
,

backgrou n d this astonish i n g panorama took in M ont

,

Rouge and M on t N oir and K em mel H i l l thirty m iles ,

distant near Ypres the low ridge th at covered Li l le from

, ,

View the tow n s of Baill e ul Arment i e re s an d B e thu ne the

, , , ,

score of wretched suburbs about Le n s with m ore risi n g ,

grou nd ten m iles behind the n umberless cr a ss i er s and ,

towers of the coal fi e l d s th e smoke of trains on the Lil l e

-

Douai railway the huge bulk of D rocourt Fosse behind

,

wh ich " Douai itself was hidden With my glasses on .

,

many fi ne evenings before sunset while standing at the ,

back of my own hut I have distinguished the church an d ,

the individual houses of M on s en Pev e le a litt l e village on - -

,

a hill twenty three miles from where I stood and at least

-
,
3 1 2 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

fi fteen beyond the nearest point of the G erman lines .

N earer at hand in this crowded scene were other familiar

l andmarks — the churches of H arnes and Carvin behind ,

”
Lens the fallen Tower Bridge of Loos the white water
,
“
,

towers of Fosse 2 1 and 2 2 the huge red br i ck building w i th ,

-

its three st e el spires which had been the works of the

M e ta l l urgi qu e Company And everywhere far and near .
, ,

rose the black crass i ers — the slag heaps — O f the coal mi n es - -
.

Some of these were l ong and d w a r fi s h as you may see the m ,

i n Lancashire but those which took the eye were pyramidal

, ,

like colossal sable sugar cones Beside them were the -

.

skeletons of iron buildings each with its tower and whee l s ,

.

The foreground of all this was a j u mble of wh ite and red

white where patches of incongruou s chalk were turned up
along th e miles of trenches ol d and new from Li e vin to , ,

Loos and red with a millio n shattered houses i n the

,

m iners ci tes which clustered about Lens — St Pierre St

’
,

Au guste and St Laurent Calonne and Maroc Angres and , ,

Avion Lens itself lying on low ground by the Souchez

.
,

ri v er was hidden from our camp

, .

The men of the 7 th Battalion were bi l leted i n Bouvigny

Village c l ose to the offi ce rs huts
, Batta l ion HQ took ’
. .

over the principal house in Boye ffle s a few hundred yards ,

away at the foot of the ridge The tanks were e l aborately .

concealed on the very su mmit amid the trees of the Bois ,

de B ouvigny a straggling wood which ran along the crest

,

a lmost to the site of the demolished chapel of N otre Dame

de Lorette where the French line had run in the early days
,

of the war and where one still came across skeletons and
,

rusted rifles three years old N orth of us in the Bois .

,

d O l h a i n were the I s t Brigade headqu arters and the 1 2th

’

Battalion both i n huts The 1 1 th Battalion was at M ont

, .

St Eloi on our right The troops holding th is front were

, .

the Canadian Corps D uring the past year they had cap .

tu r e d H ill 7 0 Li e vin and a n umber of other suburbs of

, ,

Lens and their front l i ne now ran through the outskirts

,

of t hat dreadful town reeking of poison gas and corrup ,

-
3 14 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

handsome edi fi ce far in front —i t is not advisable to try to

reach i r— is the M e ta l l urgi q ue factory at Wi n gles I .

have never been so heartily wearied of any piece of country

as I became of the Lens coal fi e l d s I came to know by -
.

name and to loathe at sight every pithead every road , ,

every c l ump of derelict red brick houses And yet with -

.
,

a l l this repetit ion and monotony the work and the p l ace ,

had un usual points of i n ter e st It is the worst of a book .

on any set subj ect that the writer can n ot be as irre l evant
,

as h e wou l d wish for I should like to write now at som e

,

l ength about those two months I shou l d like to write of .

Bully G re n ay wh e re o ne could buy a l most anythi n g and

-
, ,

wher e chi l dren played about i n streets that sta n k of poison “

gas ; of Les Al ouettes where a woman ( apparently the sole

,

r e main ing inhabitant ) took in washi n g and kept a chicken

ru n amid a battery of 8 inch howitzers ; of th e family of -

Aix N oulette i n whos e house ( r e built larg e l y of biscuit

,

tins a n d brown paper ) I ate so m any ome l e ttes ; and of

that e xposed portio n of th e Souchez road where J ack
Brown and I were sniped by a at a moment when
my wretched bicycle r e fused to c l imb a gentle slop e on
anything higher tha n bottom speed But as these variou s .

adve n tures led to nothing i n the end space does not permit ,

of any further discursions Th e tanks for whom a l l tribu .

,

l a ti on s were undergo n e wer e never cal l ed u pon in this

,

sector although befor e we had fi nished we had extended

, , ,

our recon naissance southward until we knew Souchez an d

the whole V imy Ridge with its craters and its tunnels as
, ,

well as we knew Piccadilly or H yde Park — i n the case o f

some of us a good dea l better
, .

In the m eantime startling events were happe n ing else

,

whe re and from our sort of pen insula we watched with

,

i n creasing bewilderm ent and anxiety the great tide of the

G erman offe n sives sweeping past on both flanks O n the .

morning of M arch 2 1 every one heard the roar of a ,

heavy bombardment It was known next day that the

.

enemy was making rapid progress south of the Somme .

 T HE G E R M A N O FF EN SIV E 315

For nearly a week the news became dai l y more dish earten ing .

The four other Tan k Brigades involved i n the general

debacl e had lost n early a ll their tanks and were fighti n g ,

as machine gun u nit s -

And then on the 2 9th the.
, ,

G erman s lau n ched their expected attack again st the V imy

Ridge and the northern part of the 3 rd Army front It .

was a costly fai l ure — s o costly north of the Scarpe that

no further attempt was ma d e again st the ridge B ut wh ile .

the resu l t was in doubt detachments of th e 7 th and 1 2 th

,

Tan k Battalion s were h urried d own t o Rocli n cou rt i n ,

front of Arras with Lewis gun s a n d took up a defensive

, ,

position there Th is party was kno w n to u s as the Oppy

.

Expeditionary Force Full of warlike zea l but ignorant

.
,

of the situation and even of its own w hereabouts — for it

arrived in the middle o f the night and was pu shed i m ,

mediate l y into holes an d corners alo n g th e Roc l incourt

Ri d ge — i t passed severa l anxiou s h ou rs of darkness i n the
mistaken belief t hat a bloodthirsty and Victoriou s e n emy
was close at hand AS a m atter of fact h e was still fou r
.
,

miles away and n ever approached any near e r The strai n

, ,
.

was broken with th e daw n amid Shouts of laughter by , ,

the appearance of a D ecauville rai l way train wh ich puffed

deliberate l y across the front which the Lewis gunn ers were
h olding so tenaciou sly The attack havin g defi n itely col
.

lapsed th e detachment returned on th e 2 9 th

, .

Through out this exciti n g week fi ll ed with appalling ,

ru mours ou r reconnaissa n ce continued m ore bu sily than

,

ever Th e activities of the 7 th Battalion were n ow con

.

c e n tra te d on th e V i my Ri d ge which we explored from ,

end to end The l 1 th Batta l ion s ome of whose tan ks

.
,

were now i n Rocl incourt was extending its own reco n ,

naissanc e far to the south of Arras As th e 3 r d Army . ,

conforming t o the ret reat of the s th withdrew its right ,

and centre there seemed an increased likelihood that

,

the enemy would attempt th e third alternative ment ioned

earlier in this chapter — a flan king attack through Arras
against the rear of th e V imy Ridge H is reoccupation .
3 16 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N

of M onchy l e Preux and O range H il l i n consequence of ,

ou r withdrawal enabled him once more to overlook the

,

reverse slope of the ridge Arras was shelled daily an d .

,

n early all its inhabitants were removed ; and villages far

behind suffered from the G erman arti l lery On account .

of this threat and of the crippled state of the 2 nd an d

,

3 r d Tank B rigades with G eneral Byng the 1 2 th Batta l ion ,

was transferred ear l y in April from Olhain Wood to

Sim e ncourt north of the Arras Doullens road The tanks
,
-
.

trekked the whole way by roads and across cou ntry ,

a distance of n early twenty m i l es Concentration at .

Simencourt was comp l eted by the 1 oth April The 1 1 th .

Batta l ion with its H eadquarters and som e t anks still at

,

M ont St El oi was now i n the centre of our increas e d

,

brigade frontage The 7 th Battalion having become the

.
,

most northerly tank un it would be the first involved ,

in any developments i n the La B ass e e area ; and such

developments of a startlin g character were at hand
, , .

During the reconnaissa n ce of the V imy Ridge one had

been ab l e to fol l ow to some exte n t the progress of the
G erman adva n ce n o r th of the Som me From points abo u t .

t he southern end of the ridge near where th e road from ,

Arras to Len s passes the crest and drops abruptly toward

V i my village I watched through my glasses on successive
,

morni n gs th e dappled clouds of smoke pushing westward

like the trail of some great co nfla gra ti on V iewed thu s .

f rom a flank the new salient appeared even more pro

,

n o un c e d and ominous than it was in reality especially as

,

the G erman s w e re shel l ing busi l y m any places far i n our

rear An d wh e n one climbed to the su m mit of the ridge
.

and looked eastward over the wide flat plain south of Len s ,

everything was normal ; a few brown puffs of dust where

our occasional shel l s were bursting the distant smoke of ,

G erman trains th e black company of Slag heaps and far

,
-
, ,

away but often very clear the three spires of Douai It , .

was a singular contrast an d one felt like a privileged spec

,

t ator watching fro m a high gallery the two h al v es of some

, ,
3 8
1 T HE TAN K IN A CT IO N

for the purpose of infiltration It was thought now that

.

if they advanced from the direction of Loos a n d H ill 7 0

( the first alternative previously m entioned ) and succeeded ,

i n reaching the foot of t he Lorette and V imy Ridges they ,

would endeavour t o tur n both these obstacles by pene

t ra ti n g between them u p the Souchez V alley Sou chez . ,

where the French suffered so terribly in 1 9 1 5 blocks the ,

quite narrow gap th at separates the Lorette Spur from the

n orthern and high e st end of the V imy Ridge ; and through
it ra n severa l Vita l roads to Ab l ain St N azaire Carency , ,

a n d Arras Two sect ions of A Company ( 6 tanks ) were

.

therefore detai l ed to hold it at all costs The ta n ks were .

to be hidden c l ose t o the roads so that in the event of the

, ,

place being lost they could swing across them and be blown
,

up to form obstructions For several d ays I was explorin g

.

the cou ntry behind the Lorette Ridge for routes by which
the tanks could b e taken into Souchez H idi n g p l aces were .
-

s e lected about th e vi ll age ( which had been d e stroy e d with

quite e xc e ptiona l comp l eteness ) and a l so others for the
,

r e m ai n ing two sectio n s along th e road from Souchez to Aix

N ou l ette on the e astern face of the ridge B ut on the day
, .

when these pr e paratio n s were finished a n d nothi n g r e ,

mai n ed but t o move the tanks to their posts of s acrifice ,

a n other scene of our l ocal tableau opened with a shattering

crash ; and our eyes and thought s were d iverted in stantly
i n the opposite direction .

The 1 2th B atta l ion as we have seen mo v ed south from

, ,

the Bois d O l ha i n about th is time

’
Its last company.

trekked on th e 8 th April and the fo l lowin g day cam e the

,

new G er m a n b l ow a l o n g the Lys Th e attack was ex .

p e c te d
, and seems to have been launched i n moderate force ,

a n d with n o v e ry ambitiou s design s ; but that fatality or

(
fatuity ) which on severa l occasions duri n g this period
marked our dispositions had dictated that a Portuguese
,

d ivision should sti l l be holdi n g our line in front of Estaires .

T h e Portuguese infantry utterly worthless troops fled at

, ,

o nce casting away th e ir arms — except a few who retained

,
 T HE G E R M A N O F F EN SIV E 3 9
1

theirs long enough to shoot down some of our own people

who tried to stop them Th e artillery on the other hand
.
, ,

behave d better i n some cases keeping their g u n s i n action

,

to th e last The G erm ans i n th e m eant im e fou n d in front

.
, ,

of them a wide gap and pushed through it O ne battalion

, .

pe n etrated — m ost of the way in colum n of route — for three

or four m iles without firin g a shot when its com manding ,

O ffi cer suspiciou s of this extraordinary luck went on ahead

, ,

to recon noitre and was captured by the s 1 5 t D ivision ,

which was hurrying up from support It was said that .

we had been s o rash as t o rely on the Portugue se holdin g

out for an hour ; but they did not h old out for five m in utes .

An d from th is period also dates the ru mou r that the famous

”
Army O rder about ou r gallant allies had been formal l y
“

cancel l ed In any cas e the mistake was made and brought

.
,

o n it s heels a m ost disastrou s retribut ion In ten hours .

V on Quast s 6 th Army had pu n ched a hole 1 2 miles

’

wide and 5 deep in our defences ; and in fro n t of him

constern ation and chaos were rolling onward like a
flood .

From our huts on the s l ope above B ouvigny this n ew

battlefi e ld lay Visible i n its e n tirety It was twelve miles .

away but from our elevated site it was easy with good
,

bi n ocu l ars to fol l ow the course of the advance The .

country n orth of the La B ass e e Canal is utterly flat drained ,

by inn u merable small stream s and ditches a n d cov e red ,

with orchards and villages then fu l l of prosperou s people

,

and hardly touched by war It had been a quiet fron t since

.

N euve Chapelle Even Armenti e res two miles beh ind the
.
,

l ine was an inhabited town with shops and cafés open

, , ,

u n til the G ermans began to shell it in earnest short l y before

2 1 5 t M arch And now eve n ing after evening we used t o
.
, ,

gather with our maps and fi e l d g l asses behin d our row of -

huts and watch the great wedge of burning vi l lages pu shin g

farther and farther westward behin d B e thune Those even .

ings were exceptionally clear so that far across the smoking,

plai n the ch urch tower of Bailleul was visible against the

3 20 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

grey backgrou nd of Mont R ouge Bailleul was a charming .

l ittle town with a wonderful red brick belfry to its H otel

,
-

de V ille and one of the best offi c e rs clubs in France

,
’
.

Within a fortnight it was in ruins .

Certain dates I cannot remembe r and I have no diary or ,

oth er aid to memory b ut it must have been on the 1 1 th o r

,

1 2 th that an u r gent message came through demanding

Lewis gun detach men ts All the gun ners in the batta l ion
.
,

with a proportion of O fficers and 70 Lewis guns the who l e ,

u nder Major N orton the second in command with whom

, ,

was Wi n t e rs of A Com pa n y l eft that same eve n ing by ,

lorry By dawn n e xt day they were in the l in e at Robecq

.
,

in front of St V enant There were rumours that th e rest

.

of u s with the tanks would be moving somewhere by train

, , .

O n the even ing of the 1 3 th or 1 4 th those of us who were ,

left in A Company held a sort of guest night interrupted ,

—
by a bombin g raid th e last guest night I attended until
the war was over ; and the following m orning we receiv e d
ord e rs to trek after dark to H ersin station to entrai n for ,

the n orth The tanks at this tim e were in N ou l ette Wood

.
,

at the foot of the ridge having moved down from th e Bois

,

de Bouvigny on the crest in order to take part in various

training schemes with the Ca n adians A ll that afternoon .

J ack Brown and I were marki n g out with s mall meta l flags ,

painted white a route from N oulette Wood to H ersin It

, .

was after six when we return ed to camp and already grow ,

ing dark I was m et by the news that only B and C

.

Companies were entraining — the former for Li l lers and

the latter for Aire I had got to lead A C ompany by
.

road to a wood near V audricourt south of B e thune A , .

route was indicated roughly on th e map but no n e of u s ,

knew the country We were of course very short ha n ded

.
, ,
-
,

having about ha l f a dozen subaltern s an d our three drivers

per tan k ; and al l the tanks had their sponsons unbolted and
pushed in preparatory to entrain ing The M aj or being
, .

away at Robecq with the Lewis gu n detachment the ,

conduct of affairs fell to Moore th e second in command ,

3 22 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

took off our boots and had some breakfast O ur ultimate

, .

destin ation we knew to be Fou qui e res a vi l lage on the out ,

skirts of B e thu ne and it seemed the ob v i ous th ing now to

,

make one bite of the remaining cherry that evening and ,

pass V audricourt without stopping there It had been .

given us only as an approximate halting place After -

.

breakfast therefore Ru dd and I walked —or staggered to

, , ,

—
be correct on to Fou qui e res to find a lying up point for ,
-

the tanks and i f possible bil l ets for ou rselves There were
, .

a number of small woods and p l antations about the village ,

but all were occupied in force by transport and a m m un i

tion trains of the I s t Corps which he l d this part of the ,

l ine Billets seemed u nobtai n ab l e for the whole neighbour

.
,

hood was crowded with troops We fou nd a fair piece of .

cover for t he tanks under th e trees of a road which led

down t o a tributary of the Lawe river and then we ,

searched the Village for food coming to rest eventually ,

in a cottage where they gave u s omelettes and cheap

champagne We subsisted very largely upon this diet for
.

the n e xt three or four days .

The tanks moved on to Fouqu i e res that evening except ,

on e which broke down in th e main street of Douvrin an d

r emained there for some t ime to the endless j oy of the ,

inhabitants wh o had never seen these machines before

, .

At th e foot of the road where th e others parked up was a

large wh i te hou s e belonging to th e M a i re of Fouqui e res .

It was full of officers includin g th e headquarters of a

,

company of the 1 1 th Tank B attalion wh ich was i n the l ine

at G iven chy with Lewis gun s We man aged to fi nd fl oor .

Space here for the night i n a sort o f hall on the top floor ,

into wh ich opened i n numerable doors These were opening .

and shutting all n ight as the occupants of the rooms into

,

which they led came a n d w e n t ( and trod heavily upon u s in

transit ) on mysteriou s errands of their ow n H owever we .
,

s l ept after a fashion and as it fell out we remained in this

, , , ,

house for a fortnight .

The Maj or turned u p next day with our gunners from

 T HE G E R M AN O FF EN SIV E 3 23

Robecq Thrust into an attenu ated and a l most solvent

.

l i n e whose elements inc l uded every sort of m an who could

,

ho l d a rifle with litt l e artillery no trenches and th e

, , ,

vaguest idea of the general situatio n the detachment had ,

passed a very u npleasant three days and n ights and h ad ,

suffered a good ma n y casualties m ostly in B and C Com ,

p a n i e s
,
who lost three or four officers killed or missing .

The three companies were n ow concentrated again but ,

strun g out on a very wide front with C far away at Aire , ,

B at Lillers an d ourselves at B e thune Battalion head

,
.

q uarters b e in g very comfortable a t Boy effl e s remained

, ,

there far from u s all Th e reaso n of our sudden move t o

,
.

these three town s was the celebrated Delta schem e as “

, ,

for purposes of concealment it was ca l led I would not ,

.

inflict upon any reader the details of th is exasperating

proj ect for they were n ever the sam e for two days togeth er
, ,

and it cam e to n oth in g in the end The general idea ( if .

the words can be applied to so amorphou s a conceptio n )

was t o ease the com mu nication s of the troops i n th e
G ivenchy sector an d re l ieve the pressure on B e thun e from ,

which the G erman s were distant on l y a few kilometres to

the n orth a n d n orth west In the very beginning we got
-
.

as far as Y day : everything was ready : we had recon

-

n oi tre d hurri e dly that stran ge almost u ntou ched cou ntry,

beyond the La Bass e e Canal where a f ew stray cattle still ,

wandered i n orchards thick with b l ossom where the empty ,

hou ses still showed the litter an d co n fusion of their owners ’

sudd e n flight an d where n o one knew where the front li n e

,

lay : tan k routes were worked out bridges examined an d , ,

co n fere n ces held with corps and divisio n al pu ndits wh o

seemed to know nothing about anyth i n g ; and then t h e
whole thing was cance ll ed ( perhaps very wisely) and i n a l l , ,

its subseq u ent fluctu ations was never so advanced again

, .

For anoth e r m onth we wrest l e d with its kaleidoscopic

c hanges The proportion of tanks t o be employed rose
.

from one batta l io n to the who l e briga d e an d frontage s ,

a n d O bj ective s were shuffled l ike cou n ters After a while .

3 24 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

we felt that the whole thing h ad become a sort of confused

and acade m i c d ream and we ceased to take any interest ,

i n it .

Th i s period in many respects was very nove l and interest

ing It was our first experience o f what in fact was a
. , ,

phase of ope n warfare with all its alarms and hopes and ,

general uncertainty Th e G erman s were busy farthe r .

north about K emme l and Bailleul but at any moment

, ,

some new blo w migh t be st ruck at B e thune A few days .

a fter we reach ed F o uq u i er es in deed an attempt was made , ,

t o cross the canal on rafts opposite H inges an d w a s t e ,

pulsed B e thune by now of course was a d ead town its

.
, , ,

shops closed its inhabitants fled its houses crumbling

, ,

daily u nd er shell fi re At Ch oques the big railhead j ust

-
.
,

behind two tanks o f the 1 2th B attalion with three of the

, ,

new Whippets had been posted to ho l d the roads ag a inst

,

a raid by armoured cars H inges north of B e thune on .

, ,

the only hill i n that level country i n whose pleasant C h a teau ,

the r 1 th C o rps headquarters h ad rested somnolently fo r

upwards of two years was a mere collection of empty ru in s ,

on ou r front line by the canal The corps had fled hurriedly .

to R oquetoire behind Aire Our own post Fouqui e res

,
.
, ,

was left more or less at peace for a wh ile O nly a few high .

velocity shells fell about it at intervals It swarmed with .

people for scores of refugees from the lost area were still
,

living w i th the inhabitants And presently its turn cam e .

also As the shelling gre w more persistent its people were

.
,

evacuated ; and th ese un fortunates with their box mat ,

-

tresses and other cherished goods piled on waggons or

hand carts went to swell the great flood of fugitives that
-
,

streamed westward .

Everything we wished to learn abo u t th is country w e

had to find out for ourselves The maps were bad and .
,

no one knew anyth ing I remember trying t o obtain som e .

in formation and some better maps from the I s t Corps

Intelligence O fficer H e could give me neither . He .

admitted quite frankly that while he had masses of dat a

3 2 6 T HE TAN K IN A CT IO N

imagine ou r sh opkeepers carrying gratitude so far after th e ,

first altruistic burst of thankfulness as to restrict their ,

profits or even l imit them to reasonable bounds ! I cannot

picture this myself And on the other hand can any one.
, ,

i magine our people working as diligently and su ffering as

patiently as the French peasantry in t he war zone Again
I for one cannot
, An d these peasants or shopkeepers in
, .
, ,

the country districts were almost all women There were .

young boys with them and a few old men ; but men ,

between eightee n and fifty years of age you never saw at

all There were none of those sturdy and indispensable
.

farm hands who were exempted in droves in the En g l ish

counties And when som e great disaster came such as
.
,

this G erman advance o f which I am writing you saw thes e ,

homeless and ruined folk at their very best — patient ,

courageous and cou rteous even in their despair While

, .

in Engla n d prosperous tradesmen were selling goods at

1 00 per cent profit saying only i n extenuation It is the “
, ,

war th e sam e phrase was being uttered in an infinite l y

,

finer Spir i t by the refugees of France long broken to such ,

tragedie s You met so m e woman leaving her home push ,

ing before her a hand barrow loaded with her poor posses -

sion s ; and if you com mi serated there came the inevitable ,

answer accepting an inevitable occurrence with a resigna

,

tion that was far removed from apathy C est la guerre ’

,

monsieur I reme mber a l ittle incide nt of this time

.

which illustrates more clearly than pages of generalities

, ,

the spirit that one found in these peop l e When Fouqui e res .

was shelled and the inhabitants removed our own quarters ,

in the M a i r e s h ou s e b e c a m e so unpleasant that we depart e d

’

also tanks and al l to H esdig neul A day or two later I

, , .

rode over to the house to settle some business of a billeti n g

certificat e It had been raining heavily and the road
.
,

where our tanks had been lying churned up by their tracks , ,

was deep in mud As I was coming away the mud clogged

.
,

my rear wheel between th e tyre and the mud guard

,
-
,

stopping the bicycle j ust as I passed a little party of women

 THE GER M A N O FF EN SIV E 3 27

and children who were escaping from the M a i r e s farm with ’

a few household treasu res on their backs ( The M a i r e .

himself by the way unlike most o f his admirable class had

, , ,

abandoned h is flock long before ) O f the women in this

.

party one was very old and all were tired heavily laden
, , ,

and in tears B ut as soon as they saw me pokin g about

.

under the mud guard with a stick they dropped their

bundles seized each a piece of wood and ran up to help
, , .

Even the old woman was brandishing a twig and instruct

ing the rest with a torrent o f words B efore th e l i ttle j ob
.

was finished the tears were forgotten an d we were al l

,

chattering and laugh ing ; and when I thanked them and

rode away they were sti l l s miling and crying out as they
,

shouldered their pathetic bu ndles as if there were n o such

,

things as war and ruined homes .

 C H AP T E R XV I .

T HE G ER M AN O FF EN SIV E ( conti nued) .

ANN EQ U IN : AND T HE TAN K C O R P S IN R ET R EAT

’

H AV IN G left Fouqui e res for H esdigneul where our tanks ,

were parked up against the wall of the churchyard A ,

Compa n y headqu arters now occupied part of an immense

farm — a great quadrang l e of barns stables and living , ,

rooms with an attractive garde n and one of the most

,

magnificent kitch ens I have ever seen Two old ladies .

,

with their n iece (who had been educated in England ) ,

m anaged th e establish ment the men of the fam ily being ,

as a matter of course in the Army O ne of them i n fact .

, ,

had been killed They were cousins of the people who

.

owned our battal io n headquarters at Boyeffl es ; and the

niece was provoked to one of her rare Speeches when some
on e i n th e u sual English manner referred to her relatives
, ,
’

” ”
house as a ch a teau “
Ce n est pas un ch a teau ! she
.
’

said indignantly C est une maison seulement

.
“ ’

Before we came these kind people had suffered the infliction

of an R A F mess whose m embers as usual got drunk every
. . .
,

night and broke the furniture ; and it took us some days t o

persuade them that there were Eng l ishm en who knew how
t o be ha ve After that we were very good friends
. .

During our stay here which lasted for about thre e ,

weeks a variety of n ebulou s schemes ran through their

,

brief careers On e due to a sudden panic involved the

.
, ,
3 30 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

The first phase of the G erman offensive however had , ,

c ome virtually to an end The battle o f movement be l ow .

Arras was solidifying as it were in front of Am iens The

, ,
.

th ird phase abou t to open upon the Chem i n d es D a m es

, ,

would affect the mass of the B ritish forces only indirectly .

B ut the second phase begun on th e Lys as a distraction ,

and since exploited with vigour was not ( to our k n owledge ) ,

definitely finished It had extended northward to the .

Salient where we had lost a l l the ground won at such a

,

terrible cost in the previous autum n ; the G ermans were on

K em m el H i l l in the ruins of Bailleul and along th e out
, ,

skirts of the great wood of N ieppe ; and now developments

were expected i mm e d iately south of the La Bas s é e C ana l .

At th is time —about the middle of May—when the 7 th

Tank Battalion had been for five weeks extended fro m
Aire to B e thune the 1 2 th Battalion was still i n the neigh
,

b ou r h ood of S im encourt and the 1 1 th so far as I remember

, , ,

in its old quarters at Roclincourt and M ont S t Eloi Week l y

‘
.

Tank N otes wh ich erroneously p l aces th e 7 th at M oling

,
’

hem makes out the r 1 t h to have been between Bus n es and

,

R obecq but I think only the Reconnaissance Officers

, ,
”
working on the Delta sche me cam e up to this area , .

The fi nal stage of the Am iens battle had brought G e rman

tanks i n to th e fi eld for the first t ime There were only three .

of them but they did so much damage before they were

,

d riven off that a thorough tan k scare ran through the Army ,

and i maginary machines were detected in scores at every

point of danger It was n ow believed that the G erman s
.

i ntended to use them in an attack along the La Bass e e

road with the idea of reaching B e thune by tur n in g the
obstinate point of G ivenchy from the south An increased .

shelling of our back areas seemed to indicate that something

was in the air ; and the 7 th B attalion already in the neigh ,

b ou rh ood was ordered suddenly to concentrate farther east

, ,

bet w een Ca mbrin and V ermelles in readiness to repel any ,

attempt .

The day before these orders reached A Company at

 T HE GE R M A N O FF EN SIV E 33 1

H esdigneul the , G erman

artillery provided u s with a n e w
sensation The vi l lage had not been shelled since our
.

arrival ; but it housed in its enormous ch a teau the I s t

, ,

Corps H eadquarters and this I think must have been the

, , ,

attraction for the appropriately colossal gun which suddenly

disturbed ou r rustic peace We were h aving tea in the .

farm when the whole place was shaken by a shattering

crash from outside N o on e paid much attention at first
. ,

as it sounded like the deto nation of one of our own heavy

guns of which there were two or three on railway mou nt ings
,

i n the neighbourhood ; but the excitemen t in th e village

soon brought u s out to see what had happened It was .

then apparent t hat we were being She l led an d by something ,

of uncom mon size A great pa l l of black smoke was drift

.

ing away fro m a field close at hand where an observation ,

balloon had its quarters and I fou nd i m mediately afterward s

,

a steel splinter some eight i nches long in ou r courtyard

, ,
.

Several m ore of these alarm ing explosio n s followed during

that evenin g and the discovery o f the complet e base of a
,

shell proved th e offending weapon to be o f 1 7 inch calibre -

th e hea v iest long ran ge gu n then in u se by any army

-
.

The followi n g morning th ere cam e the orders for ou r

move We were to proceed that night to Sailly Labourse
.
-
,

on the B e thune Len s road near Annequin I h urried off

-
, .

on the bicycle ove r the very worst cobbles I have ever

,

encountered to find the 3 r d In fantry Brigade H eadquarters

,

at the Ch ateau des Prés outside th e village This j ou rney

,
.

was notable for two incidents : th e roads were so atrocious

that my engine shook loose causin g th e chain t o fall off ; ,

and as a consolation I discovered some tins of Su l livan s

, ,
’

cigarettes in a Church Army canteen in V erquigneul — corn

i n Egypt indeed with a vengeance The brigade staff in
, , .

the Ch a teau des Prés had h eard nothing about any tanks ,

but this was only to be expecte d There was a wide dry .

moat roun d the ch a teau garden where the machines could ,

be hidden durin g the night and on my way there and bac k ,

I mapped out the latter half of t he approach rou te which ,

3 3 2 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

M aelor J ones was reconnoitring from the H esdigneul end .

B e fore sunset the tanks were backing out fr o m the chu rch
y ard wall a n
,d hav i ng seen them started I pushed off once
more for the ch a teau to meet there som e l o rry loads of
,

petrol and other stores R ather than face agai n the .

medieval cobbles of th e m ore direct route I went r o un d ,

by B e thune and so throu gh Beuvry on the Lens r o ad .

B e thune i n those days was always rather eerie with its ,

d eserted streets and ruinou s shuttered h ouses and shops

i t called to mind the empty town of Semur in that charming
story of M rs Oliphant s A B eleaguered C ity ; and there
’ ’

were ti mes —during a bomb ardm ent for example—when it

,

was worse than eerie It was be i ng bombarded s pas m odi

.

cal l y that even i ng and I did not l inger to sent i mentalise

,
.

At the Ch a teau des P r es I foun d th at the brigade h a d at

length been formally notified of our coming This ch ateau .
,

u ntil the month b efore had been on e of the m o st eligible

,

h eadquarters for its advanced position i n all France It

, ,
.

was never shelled it had all its furniture and even all its
, ,

windo w g l ass But now th is U topian age w as no more ;

.

the grounds were pitted with shel l holes th e trees were -

,

lopped and splintered and all the windows were broken

,
.

The cellars had been sand bagged and e v ery other prepara
-
,

t io n made for an enforced reversion to underground life .

An d that eveni ng I received an unpleasant rem inder of

these altered circumstances for as I walke d down the ,

terrace steps about eight o clock on my way to meet th e ’

tanks a shell came whistling over the roo f and burst half
,

a dozen yards in front of m e on th e gravel path V ery .

fortunately for m e it burst forward and away from m e ,

s coring a sort of fan of smoking groo v es in th e g rass border .

It w as in fact an i ncendiary sh ell presu mab l y intended for

, , ,

th e village for a second b urst some distance away and the

, ,

th i rd fel l among the houses As I ran for shelter out of the

.

smoke of th e first explosion heads appeared at the ch a teau,

windows and a vo i ce in quired inevitably Where did that

, ,

on e go to !
3 34 THE TA N K IN A C T IO N

q uarters , the ch a teau contained a telephon e and a doctor ;

a n d i n a quarter of an hou r the two victims were in an a m
b ul a n ce on their way to the nearest dressing station .

Sai ll y Labourse was a litt l e over three miles from the

-

fro n t line A mile nearer to th e latter across an O pen

.
,

stretch of untended fields was Annequ i n vi l lage and fosse , ,

the former a straggling collection of houses j oi n ing on to

C ambrin on the La Bass e e road An nequin Fosse beneath .
,

which the Maj or and I were t o l ive like troglodytes for the
next three weeks resemb l ed n othing so m uch as a ches s
,

board and a d i s p rO p orti ona tel y large pawn side by side , .

The chessboard was a wa l led square filled with miners ’

c ottages in symmetrical rows the streets crossing at right ,

an gles B eside it on a flat b ase of slag was the pawn

.
, ,

o n e of those pyramidal crassiers I have spoken o f perhaps ,

1 5 0 feet high It was the nearest on e of its type to our

.

fro n t trenches ; and from the su mmit where Signallers fl as h ,

spotters and other details lived in holes dug out of the black
,

s l ag and reinforced with iron and sa n dbags one obtained ,

a n admirab l e bird s eye view not on l y over the G erman lines

’
-
,

d irectly in fron t but also right across the rear of the n ew

,

salient north of the canal Th is exceptional observ ation .

point so far forward m ust h ave been inval uable to us an d

, ,

a serious hindrance t o the enemy At the base of the .

pyramid practically invu l nerable beneath twenty feet of

,

grou nd and another twenty of coal refuse were the dug

, ,

o uts which hou sed the brigade holding the line The latter .
,

for a breadth of two or three m iles opposite An n equ in had ,

not changed since it crysta ll ised there at the end of 1 9 1 4

t h e on l y sector of our whole front possessing this distinctio n
and both An ne quin and Cambri n had been inhabited through
out u ntil the increased she l ling before the G erman offen
,

s i v e s drove th e people away As late as the m iddle of .

March when our fi e l d guns we r e firing ( and drawing fire )

,
-

from behind the wal l which enc l osed the m iners cottages ’

c h i l d ren were p l ayi n g i n the street s a few yards away .

The I s t Division th en holdin g this sector had the 2 n d

, ,
 T HE GE R M A N O FF EN SIV E 335

Infantry Brigade north of th e canal at G ivenchy les La - -

Bass e e ( not to be confused with the G ivenchy south of Lens) ,

a n d th e I s t B rigade south of the canal at Cambrin and

Annequ in The gr d Brigade was in suppor t abou t Sailly

.

Labourse H aving seen M aelor J ones an d S aul d espatched

.

i n the ambulance from th e Ch a teau des P r es the M aj or an d ,

I walked over to the Fosse t o ar r ange with the I s t Brigade

Staff the disposition of our tanks two sections of which were ,

to move to their fina l points of con cealment that night We .

found the brigade very sceptical about the suspected G er

man tanks and quite confident of repe l ling any ordi n
,

ary attack The z u d Brigade had j u st dealt i n an adequate

.

fashion with a ren ewed G erman attempt on G ivenchy It .

was agreed however that on e of ou r sections should be

, ,

hidden am ong the houses of Annequin and the other ,

among those of Cambrin Two sections rem ain ed i n .

reserve at the Ch a teau des P r es O n our right B and C .

Companies com ing by train from Lillers and Aire to the

,

railhead near F ouq ui eres were t o take up positions between

,

the Fosse and V ermel l es The M aj or and I were invited .

to live with the Brigade Staff in the dug out beneath th e -

slag heap
-
.

That night the two sections m oved quietly into th eir

new positions O f th e three tanks i n Cambrin on e was
.
,

s creened elaborately with branches i n the garden of th e

ho use u sed as the Support Battalion headqu arters wh ile ,

the other two lay u p i n the yard of the schoolhouse All .

were i n a posit ion to move out at a m oment s n otice and ’

b l ock the La B ass e e road which ran straight through the ,

vi l lage .In A n nequin the other three tanks were hidden

,

behi n d the miners cottages A litt l e later a third sectio n

’
.

was brought up in front of Annequin a n d camouflag e d ,

against the embankment of a railway which served the

mi ne .

We remained here for three weeks unti l the begi n ning ,

of June Our life was very idle n ot uncom fortabl e an d

.
, ,

in many ways u nusual l y interesting Every m orning the .

3 36 T HE TAN K IN A CT IO N

M aj or and I used to walk through Annequin to C ambrin

to vis i t the t anks and with that our dut ies usually were
,

finished for the day The brigade m ess in a baby N issen

.
,

hut protected by layers of slag at the base of the crassier

, ,

was an u ncommonly good one an d i ts members w e re ,

charming In similar huts lived some o f the officers includ

.
,

i n g the Colonel commanding an artillery brigade ; the G eneral

and the rest of the Staff with ourselves having ou r quarters
, ,

u ndergrou nd where the various offi ces also were situated

, .

The weather turned exceptional l y fin e with a blazing sun ; ,

a n d the shadeless neighbourhood of the great slag heap -

,

which radiate d heat like the rocks of Aden became so ,

i ntolerable at ti mes that we were driven below to the

cramped dug out which was always cool Lack of reading
-

, .

matter was a serious trial as the nearest inhabited towns , ,

such as N oeux les M ines and B arlin were only squalid

- -
,

m ining centres ; and as a shopping resort B ruay was little

better The last t ime I rode into Bruay the G ermans were
.

shelling it the shops were closing down and harassed

, ,

and m i litary police were endeavouring to expedite

the departure of some of the surplus i nhabitants .

O ur chief d iversion s at Annequin were climbing the slag

heap ( on top of which two old 1 5 pounder guns had n ow -

been hoisted ) visiting the tanks and bi l lets of B and C

,

C om panies runn ing over occasionally t o H esdigneul where

, ,

we kept up a rear headquarters at the farm and eating an d ,

sleeping a great deal It was so unusually hot for M ay that

.

we spent most of our time in shirt sleeves A less attractive .

featu re wa s the rather persi stent shellin g to which the

n e ighbourhood was subj ect ed The expected attack never .

materialised ; but the G erman artillery had frequent bursts

o f z e al A field battery i n camouflaged p i ts in the open a
.
, ,

couple of hundred yards from the Fosse came i n for a ,

great deal of atte ntion as did an other battery in Annequ in

,

village ; wh ile the railway embankment beyond was shelled

so heavily on one or two n ights that some tanks of B Com
pany which wer e hidden th ere we re withdrawn
, The , .
338 T HE T A N K IN A C T IO N

the cort e ge raised great clouds of dust a l o n g the roads .

One cannot he l p attributing what followed to this rath e r

C haracteristic neglect of precaution for the whole country , ,

bei n g absolu tely flat was under observation fro m hostile

,

balloons which as usu al were up

, B Company s head .
’

quarters w e re established i n a solitary and conspicuous

house on the main B e thu ne Lens road n ear N oye ll es -
, ,

immediate l y opposite the bu ildings of a sma l l pithead

call e d Puits N o 1 2 wher e two reserve section s of tank s
.
,

w e re co n ceal e d The Visitors cars drew up at th is house

.
’

a n d when the insp e ction was ove r drove off again at a ,

gr e at speed trai l i n g behi n d th e m c l ouds of dust which mu st

,

have be e n Visib l e for m iles One ca n n ot have al l one s .

’

hostages to fortune retur n ed i n tact — especia ll y when on e

has offered other p e op l e s The august party l e ft at ’
.

a n d b e fore fi v e o clock Puits N o 1 2 d e luged sud d en l y with

’
.
,

8 inch howitzer shel l s was blazin g merrily

-

,Two ta n ks .

were hit at o n ce s e t on fi r e and bu r nt out The oth e r

, , .

four by a combin atio n of extraordinary p l uck and sti l l

,

more extraordi n ary good fortune w e re started up and ,

d r iven away from th e flaming buildings and the rai n of

sh e ll s without i nj ury to a si n g l e o ffi c e r or m a n Wh e n th e .

a ffair start e d I was down in that apartm e n t of our dug out -

which th e M aj or a n d I sh ared with the Brigad e G a s Office r .

In terc e pti n g a frenzied telepho n e m essag e from B Com

pa n y I r a n up on deck ( as on e may call it ) with my glasses
, ,

a n d for t h e n ext ha l f hour watched th e sh e ll ing and the

-

on fl a gra t i o n which was only 1 000 yards away

, Within .

a n hour th e pith e ad bui l di n gs were m ere smoking C i n d e rs ,

the iron wh e el ga n try h ad co l lapsed a n d I cou l d disti n guish

-

amid th e g l owing wreckage the b l ackened Shapes of the

tw o burnt ou t tanks -
.

The l ast incident wort h noti n g of this inter l ude at An ne

quin was connect e d with the th ird G erman offensive on the ,

Aisne l au n ched o n 2 7 th M ay
, The fo ll owing eve n i n g .
,

during di n n er we w e re startled by a sudden terrific racket

,

of machine gu n a n d rifle fire Ru n n i n g out to see what

-
.
 T HE G E R M A N O FF EN SIV E 339

had happened we found a G erman aeroplane circlin g

,

impudently round th e peak of the crassier l ike some eagle ,

round Ben N evis while its pi l ot paying n o attention

, ,

whatever to our bullets was casti n g overboard sheafs of ,

pamphlets ! These productions annou n ced i n perfect ,

En g l ish the capture of thousands of prisoners and hundreds

,

of guns on the Chem in des Dames and were signed by ,

Ludendorff H aving delivered his load the G erman waved

.
,

his ha n d circled away and drove swiftly upward across the

, ,

lines and out of our s ight H e was a very plucky fellow .

,

and deserved our bad shooting .

We w e re now n eari n g th e e n d of these rather hu miliat ing

adventures The fi rst week in J une marked for u s the
.

b e gin ning of that period of transition from con stant a l arm s

and ever changin g schemes of de fence t o th e opposit e
-

tactics of attack which were to end only with the war

, .

Summoned sudden l y one even in g to battalio n headquarters ,

sti ll at Boy e ffl e s I was t old to recon noitre next day a route

,

by road to En gui n ega tte a villag e behind Aire whither , ,

it appeared A Compa n y was to tr e k at once to com mence

trai n ing with th e Ca n adian Corps I Spent that n ight in .

our o l d quarters at H esdigneul where the 1 7 inch gun still ,

-

Spasmodically active did its best to speed a parti n g gu est

,

by dropping on e of its huge shel l s so near that the g l ass of

my wi n dow was shattered and fell upon m e as I lay i n bed .

Wh e n I left n e xt morning after an imperfect rest the two , ,

old ladies and their n iece were also packing up The .

1 7 inch gu n
-
a n d severa l gas shells in t heir garden
, had -
,

persuaded them of th e propriety of a temporary removal .

En gu i n ega tte the scene ( at a less complicated period of

,

warfare ) of the fam ous battle of the Spurs lies almost at the ,

end of the longest and straightest Roman road to be foun d

even in France From Arras to Th e rouann e j u st beyond
.
,

our destinat ion there are nearly forty m iles of this a b om i n

,

ab l e highway straight as a die except for two modern an d

, ,

insignificant det ours to negotiat e precipitou s hills By the .

route the tanks had t o travel from An nequin striking this ,

34 0 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

road near Bruay the distance was thirty m iles and this , , ,

entire l y over roads was ruinous t o the machi n es Some , .

body estimated that th e j ourney cost £7 000 in damaged

tracks and rollers a l one for our one company ( B a n d C , .

Com pa n ies were returni n g to Bouvigny to train with other

Canadians there ) H owever w e arrived at Engui nega tte
.
,

eventually although n ot u nti l I was hearti l y t ired of the

,

Roman road up and down wh ich I was riding on my

, ,

bicycle or i n th e M aj or s car for the best part of three ’

,

days and n ights The vi ll age itse l f was charming unspoiled

.
,

by troops quiet and u n sophisticat e d and set amid a really

, ,

beautifu l country of ro l lin g hills woods a n d corn fi e l d s I , ,

-
.

had the most comfortable bi l let I ever secured i n France .

The weather thro u ghout was gorgeous ; an d if the rehearsal s

with successive battalion s of Canadians became for us some
what tedious i n the end we suffered i n a wholly admirable ,

cause which bore good fruit two m onth s later We were

, .

far away fro m any interfe re n ce a n d cou l d do very much as ,

we pleased A ten days inte r l ude at Le Tr e port camou

.
’
,

fl a ge d as a rest cure ca m reconnaissance course under

G ordo n where J ack Brown Ritch ie of B Company and
, , ,

I sat about on th e c l iffs above M irs and read trashy litera

t ure was a sort of gilding to the li l y Le Tr e port was
, .

rather amusing at this tim e because the camp was ful l of ,

”
“
Bolos dislodged at last from their limpet like grip at -

B ovington and n ow fighting tooth an d nail to secure fresh

,

posts as i n structors at the depot and elsewhere The rest .

of us of course were hopi n g to s e e them posted to fighting

, ,

un its so long as th e l atter w e re not ou r own

, This .
,

i ndeed was the who l e obj ect of the belated c l earance at

,

Bovi n gton ; but i n most cases I regret to say it was not , ,

ach ieved Only after th e Arm istic e did the majority o f

.

these people rush valiantly forward dema n di n g to be sent ,

t o Cologn e .

Altogether i n Spite of a few Slight internal dissen sion s in

,

our company at Engu i n e ga tte I look back upon that J une ,

as the most restful and p l easan t month I spent in France .

34 2 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

sible now to disentangle fro m the general obscurity The .

5 th Battalion havi n g fought at H ervilly Wood Roisel and

, , ,

Epehy among other p l aces on the 2 2 n d M arch rallied

, , ,

seventeen tanks at Cartigny that night a n d tried to withdraw ,

across th e Somme by the bridge at Brie The bridge was .

destroyed premature l y and fourteen machin e s being almost , ,

out of petrol and u nable to escape were blown up by their ,

crews The remain ing three got across at other points and
.
,

were lost in action next d ay The 5 th Battalion now .

,

without tanks was hasti l y reorga n ised into Lewis gu n

,

detachments The 4 th B atta l ion after managing to retain

.
,

some tanks a l ittle l o n ger was in the same stat e before the ,

end of th e m onth and th e I s t Batta l ion was reduc e d to half

,

a dozen worn out machines and some converted supp l y

-

tenders By th e 2 8 th the bri gade had 1 8 5 cr e ws ( inc l uding

.

the 1 3 th B attalion nuc l eus ) fighti n g in the lin e with Lewis

guns Eve r ything e l s e had bee n lost — tanks stores and
.
, ,

even the kit of th e ofli cer s and men ; and the casua l ties in
perso n n el had been heavy .

O n the 3 rd Army front the 2 n d Tank Brigad e was i n

action on th e aft e rnoon of the z 1 s t when tanks from the ,

8 th Battalion took part in a cou nter attack which recaptured -

D i ogn i e s but fai l ed to hold it

, Tw e nty fou r ho urs later .
-

farther to the l eft t w enty fi ve tanks of the 2 nd Batta l ion

,
-

c ounter attacked without i n fantry to check the G erman

-

advance on Beug ny and the Bapaume Cambrai road The -

.

ta n ks came u nder co n centrat e d arti l lery fi re as soon as they

crossed the road and several were knocked out at once , .

The remaind e r put a fi e l d battery out of action surpris e d -

,

the G erma n infantry m assi n g for an assault a n d drove ,

t hem back in confusion beyo n d V au l x V raucourt and -

Morchies which our troops reoccupied

, O n l y five tanks .

rallied h owever and 1 2 8 o fficers and men were l ost The

, ,
.

rest of the battalion person nel was formed as Lewis gun -

detachments a n d fe l l back upon Bray on the 2 4 th In the

,
.

meantime th e 8 th Battalion losing nearly a l l its tanks in

, ,

attempts t o cover the infantry withdrawal about Bus a n d

 T HE G ER M A N O FF EN SIV E 34 3

Barastre was also converted into a machine gun u n it

,
-
.

The remain in g batta l ion th e r oth fought a series of rear , ,

guard actions through Sapignies and Achiet l e G rand to - -

B ucquoy sacrificing most of its tanks

,
.

The 3 rd Tan k Brigade in G H Q R eserve at Bray and , . . .

Wai ll y was soon involved in the general m el e e O ut of the

, .

two battalio n s at Bray th e 3 r d and the 9th one composite, ,

battalion was form e d and equipped with forty eight Whippets -

th e r e m a i n d e r of the person nel becoming yet another Lewis

'

gun u nit The 6 th Battalion at Wailly seems to have had

.

a n easi e r ti me than m ost of the oth ers and t o have pre ,

served a l arge proportion of it s tan ks wh ich may be ,

explain ed by the fact that it remained behind th e left wing

of the 3 r d Army which was n ever serious l y shaken and
, ,

retreated on ly so far as was necessary to con form with th e

centre and right O n th e morn in g of l t M arch the 6 th
.

Battalion s camp was sh e l led heavi l y and the who l e of its

’

order l y room staff was kil l ed

-
The b attalio n withdrew t o .

La Cau chie on the 2 5 th a nd was transferred to th e 2 n d ,

B rigade a week l ater The 3 rd Batta l ion s Whippet s i n

.
’

the meantime h ad made their first appeara n ce i n action on

,

the 2 6 th about Serre and H e butern e routin g con sid e rable ,

nu mbers of the e n emy without suffering a ny l oss them selves

a n d they w e re fight i n g again at B ouzincourt on th e
31 5t .

They w e re foun d particu l arly useful for that kind of patrol

wo r k which the p eculiariti e s of the situation had thrust
upon su ch tanks as were left — closi n g tempo r ary gaps in the
line ho l d in g u p attacks a n d gain ing information doi n g
, , ,
-
,

i n fact thos e duties which in the old days were performed

,

by cava l ry .

The result of ten days continued fighti n g an d retreat ’

was that the Ta n k Corps practically was without tanks ,

always excepting of course the I s t Brigade O f the per

, , .

s o n n e l of the other brigades 7 5 per cent h a d been in the l ine

as Lewis gu n detach ments About 2 00 t anks had been lost

-
. .

Th e big camp at Bray had been destroyed before evacua

t ion an d a number of Whippets lying there under repair had
,
344 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

t o be blown up Brigades and battalio n s like all other

.
,

un its i n the Army were in a state of complete d i s orga n i s a

,

tion and the casualties especia l ly those incu rred in the

, ,

Lewis gun units were a n added source of a n xiety to Tank

-
,

Corps H eadquarters owing to the few reinforcement s ,

avai l ab l e The first steps taken toward reorganisation

.

were hampered by the G e rma n attack on the Lys as the ,

4 t h Brigad e wh ich had, j ust been withdraw n to the Bermi

court area to refit was se n t n orth to t h e 2 n d Army front
,

with Lewis guns and remained fighting about M eteren and

,

Wytschaete u nti l the end of Apri l Then came the start l ing .

news that owing to the d i fficu l ty of finding sufficie n t i nfantry

drafts in En g l a n d the Ta n k Corps was t o be cut down from
,

six brigades t o four which would mean the disbanding of ,

the incomplete 5 th Brigade in France and of the 1 5 th 1 6 th , ,

1 7 th a n d 1 8 th B atta l ions at home

, H appily this dis .
,

astrous proposal was never carried ! out in its entirety Two .

battalions at Bovington were reduc e d for a tim e to cadres ,

and a third was equipped with armoured cars ; but the suc
cesses in Ju l y a n d August once more converted the harassed
weathercocks i n authority All was changed again Th e . .

six brigade establishment was not only revived but aug

-

m e n te d ; and while the cadres wer e made up to strength

and rushed out to France a n other six battalions were auth ,

or i s e d to be formed .

The i mmediate task of reorgan isation after the retreat

was further comp l icated by th e uncertainty as to whether
t h e retreat itse l f was fi nished The force of the initial .

G erman blow which h ad driven u s th irty mil e s backward

,

in a week expend e d itself in the first d ays of April but o n l y

, ,

from temporary exhaustion and difficulties of supp l y With .

Amiens a l most i n his grasp the en emy was certain t o ,

make an other effort as soon as he had found his second

wind It was necessary in consequence to maintain as
.
, ,

large a force of tan ks as possible with our ba ttered armies

and a hurried r es h uffli ng of u nits left skeleton s of the 2 n d ,

3 r d and s t h Brigades re equipped with o l d machines sent

, ,
-

up from Erin within call of t he threatened point Th e

, .
3 4 6 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

on to the C losely formed infantry Indescribable confusion

-
.

ensued as the Whipp e ts tore through the G erman ranks .

The enemy scattered i n all directio n s Some threw them .

selves on their knees before the machines shrieking for ,

mercy only to be run over and crushed to death

,
In a .

few minutes no less than 4 00 G ermans were ki ll ed or

wou nded The Whippets havi n g now completed th e ir
.

task — viz .
,
”
C learing up the situatio n retur n e d o n e , ,

machin e being put out of action by artillery fire on the

j our n ey home In al l o n l y five casualties amongst the
.

crews were suffered duri n g this action The two most .

remarkab l e features of this l ittle engagement are : firstly ,

the help l essness of som e 1 2 00 to 1 5 00 infantry against 7

tanks mann e d by 7 officers and 1 4 other r a nks ; and ,

second l y that the tanks left their starting point which

,
-
,

was three and a half miles from the scene of action at ,

A M. cov e red ten m iles of ground fought a battle

.
, , ,

and were back home agai n at P M

1
. .

It was reported at the t im e that when the Whippets

return e d their Sides and tracks were dripping with the
b l ood of the G ermans who had been run over— a pleasa n t
touch but not authenticat e d
, .

There were two other tank action s on this front on the

2 5 th and 2 8 th the l atter with the French M oroccan
,

Division at H a n gard Wood This last was a fai l ur e

.
,

largely because the barrage came down bey ond the G erman
line inst e ad of i n front of it A fi n al m inor engagement.

on M ay 2 n d marked the end of this sem i de fe n sive phase -

of the campaig n The Amiens fro n t settled down more

.

”
or less to what used to b e described as peac e time
warfar e : the G erman s turned their men and gu n s south
ward to the Aisne ; and the Tank Corps was engaged in
n o further operations with one exception until J uly when
, , ,

the whole spirit of ou r tactics was happily changed and ,

a series of smal l offe n sives preceded the great attack on

8 th August .

W k l y Ta k N t 1 ‘
ee n o es .
’
 CHAPTE R X V II .

H AM EL M O R EU IL
, , AND T HE T H IR D BA T T LE OF

T HE SO MM E .

O N the night of the 2 2 n d 2 3 rd J une a night raid of peculiar

-
,

interest was carried out against the vil l ag e of B ucquoy ,

n orth of the An cre Five p l atoons of infantry and five

.

fe mal e tanks of the 1 0th Battalion were emp l oy e d Th e .

notable features were th e u s e of tanks at n ight and the ,

remarkable skill and su ccess with which they were h idde n

for a fortnight within a few hu ndred yards of the G erman
outposts O ne section of fou r ta n ks was camouflaged right
.

i n the open the machin e s si d e by Side and covered by thei r

,

nets i n a s l ight depression n ot ha l f a mi l e fro m the village

, .

Another fou r ta n ks were driven i n to o l d gun pits by th e side -

of the B ucquoy He n n es ca m p road eve n nearer to the enemy

-
,
.

H ere the two sections remai n ed for n early fourteen d ays ,

waiting for a favourab l e opportun ity with the fu l l moon .

V ariou s causes postponed the en t e rprise but at length th e ,

condition s were considered propitiou s and the five tanks ,

required moved yet farther forward after dark i nto a sunken

road skirt ing the eastern garden s of Bucq u oy of w h os e main ,

street one side was he l d by our outposts an d th e other by

those of th e enemy B ut now th e moon fai l ed and again
.
,

the raid was cancelled Those responsib l e for it do not

.

seem even to have thought of the danger of l eavin g tanks

i ndefinitely on the edge of N o M an s Land For two more
’
.
34 8 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N

days and n ights the five machines actually remained in th is

preposterous position without bein g discovered M ovement .

by day was almost i mpossib l e and ext r eme care had t o be ,

exercised at night Fi n a l ly on the night of the 2 2 n d the

.
, ,

raid was carried out The infantry after all this hesitation
.
,

and consu l ting of omens were he l d up a l most at once by,

trench mortar and machine gu n fi r e and although r e

- -
,

i nforced got n o farther ; but the five tanks pushed on

,

right through the vi ll age passed their obj ectives killed a

, ,

nu mber of th e enemy and started a serious panic and r e ,

turned u ndamaged The darkness gave them litt l e troubl e

.
,

and on the other hand afforded them va l uable protection

, ,

from the t rench mortars Their experience and the careful

.
,

pre l iminary work carried out by the Recon naissance o ffi cers ,

were of great service to the 7 th Battalion when we attacked

over th e same ground two months later .

A more i mportant action was fought on 4 th J uly on th e

old V illers Bretonneux batt l e ground -
It was the first -
.

defin ite offen sive on ou r part since th e G erm an b l ow in

M arch and it a l so introduced the M ark V tank
, Thi s . .

machine identical in shape and armament with th e

,

Mark IV ( except that the H otchkiss light gu n rep l aced

.

the Lewis ) possessed great mechanical improvements

, ,

primarily in th e adoption of epicyclic gears which enabled ,

one man to drive and steer th e tan k and abolished the ,

dilatory bu siness of ge a rs m en and secondary le v ers Th ree .

rti en in fact were released for other work while the tan k s
’
, , ,

power of man oeuvre was greatly improved Fitted with a .

1 80 h p Ricardo engin e in place of the Daimler the

-
. .
, ,

M ark V had increased speed five to six mile s an hou r

.
, ,

and could be turned as easi l y as the Whippet Other .

modifications included a secon d cab for observation on

th e roof where the manhole was situated in the ear l ier
,

types The only serious fault was bad ventilation which

.
, ,

with the more powerful engine raised the heat inside to ,

a pitch that at times became u nbearable .

The obj ect of the attack on 4 th J uly was the recapture

350 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

guns were in our hands Our casu alties were u nder 7 00

,
.
,

most of them walking wounded and 5 tanks hit and dis ,

abled ; 5 7 tanks reach ed their fina l obj ectives and 5 5 had ,

ral l ied by 1 1 A M All the disabled machines were salved

. .

during the two following nights some of th e m bein g towed ,

9 00 0 yards so that
,
t h e enemy was without any know
l edge of the n ew type beyond what h e had discovered
in action ; and th is mu st have been the reverse o f e n
c ou ra gi n g The increased manoeuvring powers of the
.

M ark V astonished the G ermans as much as they delighted

.

the Au stralians A feature of the action was the nu mber

.

of mach ine gun emplacements overrun and flattened out

-

by tanks at the request of the i nfantry — a n entire l y

satisfactory process of elim i n ation The G erman machine .

gun n ers fought i n m any cases with extrem e bravery con ,

ti nu i n g to fire u nti l the very moment before their guns

and perhaps themselves — were cru shed into the earth by
the tanks ; but th e u nexpected rapidity of movement s hown
by the latter as compared with the deliberate action s of
,

the Mark IV conti n ua ll y took them by surprise The

.
, .

results of the attack i n short wer e that th e Australian s

, ,

w e re satisfi e d with th e ta n ks that the tan k crews were ,

satisfied with the Austra l ians wh ich was quite as i m ,

portant and that a sure foundation had been laid for the
,

greater partnership of the 8 th of August .

A fortnight later th e 9 th Tank Battalion temporarily ,

a ttached to the s th Brigade for the purpose took part at ,

very sh ort notice i n an operation south of Amiens with

the French 9 th C orps The th ird great G erman blow
.
,

between Soissons and Rh e ims had in its turn exhau sted it s ,

momentu m ; but to all the world it seemed still in th e

fu l l tide of victory when on 1 8 th July with a rapidity , ,

founded on exact calculatio n F o ch s cou n ter attack led

’
-
, ,

by hundreds of R e nau l t tanks fell on the flan k of the ,

n e w Sa l ient from the Aisn e to Ch a t e au Thierry and the ,

last phase of the war had b e gun The second battle of .

t h e Marne or the battle of Soissons whichever it is

, ,
 THE T H IRD BATT LE O F T HE SO M M E 35 1

called was th e first of that series of Allied o ffensives which

,

for the next four m onth s were to succeed one anoth er

without a pause up and down th e whole immense front
from the Woevre to the sea Five days after it bega n .
,

D e b e n ey s I s t French Army carried out a s ma ll attack

’

north of M ontdidier with the double O bj ect of occ upyi ng

,

th e G erman reserves in that region and of capturing the

heights which overlook th e r iver Avre at Aubvillers an d
Mail l y Rain eval It was for thi s operation th at the 9 th
-
.

Tank Battalion was le n t It proved a comp l ete success

.
,

although the casualties i n tan ks and personnel were rather

heavy and it was of inter e st ch iefly on two accou nts
,

firstly th e excellent way i n wh ich th e Fre n ch i n fantry

,

combin e d with the tanks although o n ly two or three days ,

of sketchy trai n ing handicapped by difficu lties of language

, ,

were possible b e foreha n d ; and s e cond l y for the speed with ,

wh ich the ta n ks shar e i n the batt l e was arranged and

’

carried out T h e proj ect was discussed for the first time
.

on 1 6 th J u l y at the 4 th Army H eadquarters An hour an d .

a half l ater G e n era l Elles and G eneral Courage ( com

,

ma n ding th e sth Brigade ) interviewed the Fren ch Army

commander G e n e ral Debe n ey and arranged with his Staff
, ,

th e genera l out l ines of the m ove and the action The next .

day the 9 th Ta n k Batta l io n far away near B us les Artois ,

-
-
,

received ord e rs to trek on the 1 8 th to Rose ] a dista n ce ,

of nearly te n miles across cou n try Entrai n ing at Rose ] .

,

i t detrained at Co n tay on the 1 9 th and that even i n g trekked ,

another two a n d a ha l f m i l es D uring the three fo l lowin g .

n ight s a farther d ista n ce of twe l ve m iles was covered i n

stages the final lap on the n ight of the 22 n d 2 3 r d bri n gi n g
, ,
-
,

th e battalion into actio n with thirty fi ve machin es out of -

forty two most of th e absentees bei n g o l d Mark IV

-
, .

supp l y tanks D uring this p e riod troops of the 3 r d Fre n ch

-
.

D ivision which was t o supp l y t h e in fa n try for th e attack

, ,

u n derwent a bri e f course of training with ta n ks at V aux

e n Am ienois whi l e the Reconnaissance O fficers of the 9 t h

-
,

Battalion hurriedly surveyed th e battlefield .

35 2 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N

A fter the action in which 1 5 tanks were disabled by

,

arti l lery fire and 5 4 officers and men were killed or

wou nded G eneral Debeney visited th e battalion and ex
,

pressed i n very warm terms h is appreciation of its services .

The 3 rd French Division conferred upon it a rare distinction

in the form of its own divisional badge which e v ery officer ,

and man of the 9th Battalion now wears on the left sleeve 1
.

Even be fore th e French counterstroke of 1 8 th J u l y the ,

first plan s for an attack by th e restored 4 th British Army

south of the Som me were u nder discussion Lim ited .

originally to the recaptu re of the old A miens defence line ,

th e scheme expanded u ntil it assumed the dimensions of

a fu l l dress battle — involving at least a dozen in fantry
-

divisions a cavalry corps and four brigades of tanks on

, ,

ou r part and on our right the I s t French Army and

, , ,

part of the 3 rd Our obj ective roughly was the i m

.
, ,

porta n t rai l way which ran southward from Peronne through

Chaulnes and Roye which meant an advance in places of
,

from twelve to fifteen m iles .

N otwithstanding the reinforcements which had bee n

poured into France i n the past two months so ambitious ,

a program me to be completed within three or four

,

days could m ean only one thing— another tank operation

,

on a large scale or in other words a second C ambrai

, , ,
.

Tanks were the only arm which could h O p e to produce

such a resu lt in so short a time And yet if we hunt .
,

through the o fficial account of the battle and its ante

cedents we find the determining factor hardly mentioned
, .

We read of the brill i ant and predominating part taken by

the Canadian and Australian C orps in this bat tle .

And again of the fine performance of the ca v alry

,
“
,

1
Thi s acti on app ar to b k now n offi cia ll y by u
e s e s as that of M oreui l . That
v i ll ag e h ow ever w not even one of the obj cti v
, , as e es .
354 THE TA N K IN AC T IO N

still refitting after its action with the Fre n ch and would ,

n ot be avai l able for several days This made a t ota l of .

nin e tan k battalions with a tenth in reserve all except

, ,

two being equipped with M ark V machines The two . .

exception s th e 1 st and 1 sth had for their s in s a still later

, ,

n ovelty known as the Mark V O ne Star This was a . .

thorough l y bad invent ion being merely a M ark V length , .

en ed by about six feet and desig n ed to carry infantry or ,

machine gunners as well as its crew these passengers bein g

-

deposited at suitab l e poi n t s in the e n emy s country It ’

.

offered an enorm ous target and i f its supernu meraries ,

survived the j ourney a n d were not shot i n getting out , ,

they were u sual l y incapab l e through sickness or coma ,

brought on by their pro l onged confinement inside of ,

doi n g any useful work .

In addition t o this total ther e remai n ed the 3 r d a n d 6 th ,

Battalions of the 3 r d Tan k Brigade Both these u nits were .

now equ ipped with Whippets and were attached to the ,

Cavalry Corps which was charg e d with the usual mag

,
~

n i fi ce n t schemes of exp l oitation as though machine gun s ,

-

a n d magazi n e rifl e s had n ever been h eard of There was .

also the 1 7 th Batta l ion of Armoured Cars attached to the ,

s th Tank Brigade but intended to work with the Whippets

,

and cavalry .

It wil l be seen that for th e purposes of this operation

the 2 n d Brigade had ceased temporari l y to exist its units ,

being distributed among the oth e rs The I s t Brigade was .

sti l l abs e n t from th e main theatre of w a r Its thr e e bat .

talions were at M erlimont practising gunnery hoping to , ,

draw M ark V s and preparing for the next offe n sive b e

.
’
,

tween Arras and the Ancre in which they were to have ,

th e ir fill of fightin g .

The n umber of tanks to be employed on the 8 th August

was 4 3 5 i n cluding 9 6 Whippets but excluding the armoured
, ,

cars Again as at C ambrai there was Virtu ally n o reserve

.
, ,

of tanks On th e second and subsequ ent days composite

.

detachments had to be organ i sed in the field The country .

 THE T H IR D BATT LE O F T HE SO M M E 35 5

i m med i ately in front was go o d and still covered in part

,

with growing corn but east of the lin e from Roye to Frise
, ,

on the Som me if they e v er got so far was the old shelled

, ,

area This however was easily n egotiable by heavy tanks

.
, ,

AM IENS

Th i r d Ba ttl e f
o th e Som m e .

in dry weather . The prelim inary arrangements were

modelled on those of Cambrai — profou n d secrecy recon ,

naissance carried out with every possib l e precaution and ,

n o artillery preparation or activity beyon d the n ormal until

the barrage fell at zero Th e Au stralian s had been tra i nin g
.
35 6 T HE T A N K IN ACT IO N

with tanks at V aux e n Amienois and the Canadians after

- -
, ,

t heir work with th e I s t Brigade at Bouvigny an d En gui n e

gatte at Cavi l lon with the 9 th Battalion
,
.

Considerable anxiety was caused by the capture on the ,

night of 4 th Au gust of an Australian outpost n ear the Roye

,

road as not o n l y would th is revea l to th e enemy the

,

extensio n of th e Austra l ian front over ground hith e rto

occupied by the Fre n ch but there a l so was a possibility ,

of damaging information being extracted from the priso n ers .

The latter however refused to disclose anyth ing beyon d

, ,

their n ames and u nits their demeanou r being held up as

,

an example of soldierly behaviour in the G erman reports

on their exam ination s O n the afternoon of the 7th Y day
.
,
-

another alarm occurred Eighteen supply ta n ks allotted .

-

to the 4 th and s th Austra l ia n Divisions were hidden in a ,

smal l p l antatio n north of V i l lers Breton neux A chance -

.

shell burst i n the midd l e of these machi n es which were ,

fu l ly loaded with food petrol and ammunition ; a fire was

, ,

started which drew upon the pla n tation a heavy bombard

,

ment ; and 1 5 of the tanks with a l l their stores were , ,

destroyed This calamity led naturally to a suspicion

.

that the tanks had been discovered but happily it proved ,

unfounded The G ermans believed t hat only an ordinary

.

dump had been exploded The coming attack remained .

entire l y unsuspected : the enemy i n deed was so m isled ,

by various a r ti fi ces behind the I s t and 2 n d Army fronts ,

including a n ear l y and co n spic uous concentration of tanks

n ear St Po l that h e m ad e e v e ry pr e paration against a
,

counter o ff ensive i n Flanders a n d on the Lys

-
.

During the night of the 7 8 th a heavy ground mist rose -

,

over the Somme battlefie l d a n d became so dense by day ,

break that tanks and infa n try completed their assemblage

a n d mo v ed into action by compass It aided the surprise .
,
358 T HE T AN K IN AC T IO N

Corps gives the following account of the cars

tra l i a n ,
’

experiences on the St Q uenti n road .

It has alr e ady been foreshadowed that the e xpe r i

“

e nc e s on that day of the contingent of fifteen armoured

motor cars u nder Lieut Colonel Carter would form

-
.
-

sen sational reading and the story of 8 th August would

,

not be complete without at least a br i e f reference t o

their exp l oits .

It was n early midnight when Carter with a staff

“
,

o fficer got back to Corps headquarters to render their

,

report They were scarcely recognisab l e covered as

.
,

they were from head to foot with grime and grease .

They had had a busy time The substance of what .

they had to tell was taken down at the time almost

verbatim an d reads as follows
,

G ot armoured cars through to Warfus e e Abancourt -

.

When we reached the other sid e of N o Man s Land we ’

found that the road was good but a number of trees ,

( l arge and small ) had been shot down and l ay right ,

across it in places Obstacles remo v ed by chopping

.

up the s maller trees and hauling off the big ones by

mean s of a tank P i oneers he l ped u s to clear th e road
.

all the way down We did not come up to our

.

advancing troops until they were almost near th e R ed

Line .

‘
When we got to Blue Line we detached three
section s to ru n down to Framerville When they got .

there they found all the Boche horse transport and m a n y -

lorr i es drawn up in the main road ready to move off .

H ead of colu mn tried to bolt in one direction and other

veh icles in another Complete con q Ion O ur men
. .

killed the lot ( usin g 3 000 rounds ) and left them there ; ,

four sta ff officers on horseback sh ot als o Th e cars .

t hen ran down to the east side of H arbonni e res on the ,

S E road to V auvillers and met there a nu mber of,

steam waggons ; fired into their boilers causing an ,

impassable block .
 T HE T H IR D BATT LE O F T HE SO M M E 359

Two other cars went to Proyart and found a lot

of troops billeted there having lunch in the houses ,
.

O ur cars shot through the win dows i nto the h ouses ,

killing quite a lot of the enemy Another section went .

towards Chuignolles an d found it full o f G erman

soldiers Ou r cars shot them Found rest billets and
. .

old trenches al so with troops i n them Engaged them

,
. .

H ad q u ite a battle there Extent of damage n ot .

known but consi d erab l e

, Cars then cam e back t o .

main road We were then well in advance of Blu e

.

Lin e .
’

“
The consternation an d disorganisation caused by
the sudden on slaught of these cars at places fully te n ,

miles behi n d the enemy s fr ont lin e of that morning ’

,

may be left to th e i magination It was a feat of .

daring and resolute performan ce wh ich deserves to be

” 1
rememb e red .

The Whipp e ts were greatly han dicapped by bein g attached

to the Cavalry Corps Th e l atter moving rapid l y forward .
,

i n the early morning toward the l ine complai n ed that the ,

tanks cou ld not keep up As soon as it cam e to fighting .

,

h owever the situation was reversed : it was the cava l ry

,

that cou l d not keep up with th e Whippets or indeed do ,

a nything at all By noon on the 8 th August great con

.
,

fu sion was deve l oping behind the enemy s lin es and by this ’

time the Whippets should have b e en O perating five to ten

miles i n advance of the i nfantry acce n tuati n g this d e m ora l ,

i s ati on
. As it was being tied down to support th e cavalry
, ,

they were a long way behin d the infa n try advan ce th e ,

reason bein g that as cavalry cannot make them selves ,

i nvisible on th e battlefiel d by throwing t hemselves flat on

the ground as infantry can they had to retire either to a ,

flank or to th e rear to avoi d being exterm inated by m ach in e

” 2
gun fi re . O n e sentence in this qu otat ion su m s up the
whole case against cavalry If the Whippets were id l e .

1
Si r M ona h Th e Au s tra l ia n V ict ori
J
. s ,
es in
2
Week l y Tank N ot es .
’
 6 0 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N
3

because bei n g t ied down to support th e cavalry th ey wer e

”
a l ong way behind the in fantry advan ce what in H eaven s , ,
’

nam e was the u se of the mounted arm ! The latter in

,

theory and if it was to j ustify its existence at all should

, ,

have been a lo n g way in front inst e ad of a lo n g way beh ind , .

Cava l ry behind an infantry attack a re m ere l y an annoying

encumbrance blocking up roads losi n g their way and
, , ,

b e havi n g at th e same time as if they alone are winni ng

, ,

the battl e Colo n el Bucha n tactfu l at th e e xpense of

.
,

accuracy permits himsel f to say that the who l e British

,
“

cavalry performed mirac l es advanci n g twenty three mi l es ,

-

”
from their points of co n c e ntration Th is is m e r e l y si ll y .
,

for the point s of concentration were far away to the west

of Amiens Sir J ohn M o n ash on the spot and speaking
.
, ,

from bitter experie n ce of the u selessness and presumptio n

of these archaic cohorts tries t o find excuses for them and
,

writes with great moderation but h is conclusion s tally with ,

those of every other unprej udiced observer H e says .

The C avalry Corps would appear i n the battle

“

area also with a ll preparations made for a rap i d

,

exp l oitation of any success ach ieved The utility of .

the cavalry in modern war at any rate in a European ,

theatre has been the subj ect of end l ess controversy

, .

It is on e into which I do not propose to enter Th ere .

is n o doubt that given suitable ground and an absen ce

,

of wire entang l ements cavalry can mov e rapid l y and , ,

u ndertake i mportant tu rn ing or enveloping movements .

Yet it has been argued that the rarity of such suitab l e

conditions negatives any j ustification for superimposing
so u nwieldy a burden as a large body of cavalry on ,

the bare chance that it m i ght be useful upon already ,

over populated areas billets wateri n g places and roads

-
, ,
-
, .

I m ay h owever anticipate the ev e nt by sayi n g

“
, ,

that the First Cavalry Brigade was duly allotted to

me and did its best to prove its utility ; but I am
,

bound to say that the results achieve d in what proved ,

to be very u nsuitable country beyond the range of the

3 6 2 T HE T AN K IN ACT IO N

enemy s con fusion One

’
M us ical Box
. o f the 6 th , ,

Battalion had an extraordinary career Passing through

, .

the advanced i nfantry line and a few cavalry patrols two

or three hours after zero it engaged a fi eld battery which ,

had already knocked out two Mark V tanks Sweeping . .

round beh ind the guns it drove off the crews and pursued ,

them killing or wounding nearly all Turning north toward

, .

the railway near G ui l l e a ucourt the ta n k the n busied itself ,

with various parties of fugitives moved on again after a ,

short h alt entered a G erman hutted camp wher e troops

,

were hurried l y packing up their kits and accounted for ,

about sixty of these ; continued in chase of fresh bodies of

in fantry retiring eastward shot the drivers of several motor ,

and horse vehicles and finally got among s ome horse and
,

transport lines near Rosi e res where an im men se amount of ,

damage was done The little tank being entirely alone

.
, ,

far ahead of its fellows and of the infantry was subj ected ,

to continual machine gun fire and petrol was pouring down-

,

the s ides and into the interior from riddled tins carr i ed on
the roof The petrol fu mes together with the intense h eat
.
, ,

obliged the crew to breath e through the mouthpieces of their

box respirators Eventually abou t three O clock in the
-

.
,
’

afternoon —for the M usical B ox was in action continu

ou s l y for n ine or ten hours — the tank was hit by a fi e l d gun -

and set on fire on the eastern side of the H arbonn i e res

Rosi e res road beyond ou r farthest o bj ective for that day
, .

The o ffi cer Lieutenant Arnold managed to dr a g out his

, ,

two men who were overcome with the smoke and fumes
, .

The clothin g of all three was on fire Endeavouring to .

escape after rollin g in the grass to extingu i sh the flames

, ,

the driver was killed and Arnold an d the sec o nd man were
,

captured and brutally ill used The full story o f this -

.

remarkable exploit was only known after Arnold s release ’

at the end of the war .

The heavy tanks had met with most trouble o n the two
wings On the left the enemy s stubborn defence of the
.
’

Chipilly Spur overlook i ng a lo o p of the S omme hel d up

, ,
 T HE T H IRD BATT LE O F T HE SO M M E 6
3 3

the 3 rd Corps u nti l the next day and the 5 th Tank Brigade ,

had forty mach ines knocked out mostly by e n fi l a d e artillery ,

fire from this flank Those wh ich pass ed this danger point
.
,

however did re markable work which in c l uded the captu re

, ,

of the s 1 s t G erman Corps headquarters with most of th e ,

staff near Framervi l le where the armoured cars helped

, ,
.

The M ark V Stars of the 1 s th Battalion i n many cases

.

deli v ered their u nhappy loads of machine gun ners on the -

fi nal obj ectives but the great size of these machines made
,

the m such excellent targets that a disproportionate nu mber

were knocked out their crews and passengers bein g too
,

often burnt to death in side them Th e survivors of th e .

i nfantry who were carried i n them were emphatic in their

determination to have nothing further to do with this
method of t ransport i n action .

The 4 th Tank Brigade workin g with the Canadians on ,

the right a l so suffered considerable losses in the ear l y part

,

of the d ay owing to D é b en ey s Frenchm en being held up

,
’

for a time a l ong th e Avre valley The l ittle stream of the .

Lu ce C lose beh ind ou r front lin e had to be crossed without

, ,

the enemy s knowledge and h ad caused much anxiety as

’

, ,

on account of it s position and the n ecessity for secrecy ,

adequate recon naissance o f it was impossible Al l th e .

tanks except two crossed in a dense mist without a hitch

, ,

and undiscovered by the G ermans Everything went with .

a rush at first and there were few casualties ; but i n the

,

sec o nd phase of the attack until the French broke through ,

the resistance about M oreuil and were able to bring their

left level with th e Canadians tanks an d i n fantry had a hard ,

t ime at Beaucourt and Le Quesnel where the enemy brought ,

fi el d gun s into close action with great boldness and success

-
.

O ne company of the I s t Tan k Battalion caught by a battery ,

in en fi l a d e near Le Q uesnel lost in a few m inutes nin e out,

of eleven M ark V Stars all of which were burnt out with

.
,

heavy casualties t o their crews and to th e hapless i nfantry

vo l unteers on board O ne tank commander swung h is
.

machin e round and steered straight for th e battery but this ,

 6
3 4 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

desperate and gallant act was u seless H e was killed with .

,

most of his crew and passengers .

Such incidents however were only local set backs in

, ,
-

what as a whole was a victory without paral l el O n a

, , .

twelve mile front we had advanced at one point to a depth

-

of seven mi l es Twenty four h ou rs after zero

.
-

prisoners and over 2 00 captured gun s had been counted .

Amiens and its rai l ways were freed and the enemy s chief ,
’

mean s of latera l com m unication in this sector the Chaulnes ,

~

Roye line already was within ra n g e of our fi e l d guns Only

,
-
.

at Chipi ll y on the left had there been any permanent check ;

, ,

and that flank was in its proper a l ignmen t the next day The .

greatest result of all however coming as it did upon th e

, ,

battle of Soisson s and V on Boe h n s retreat was the pro ’

fou n d moral e ffect wrought upon th e G erm an soldier In .

this respect the 8 th August stands pre eminent Ludendorff -

.

himself testifies that August 8 th was the black day of th e

G erman Army in the history of the war This was the .

worst experience I had to go th rough And i m .

mediately in pub l ic and secret documents he proceeded to

, ,

point the m ora l The ta n ks alone had done this thing ; and
.

t o combat tanks every nerve m ust be strained and every

effort dir e cted O n 1 1 th Au gust wh ile the batt l e was sti l l
.
,

in progress h e issued an u rgent and secret order

,

“
Troops allowed themselves to be surprised by a
mass attack of tanks and lost a l l cohesion when the ,

tanks suddenly appeared beh ind them having broken ,

th rough u n der cover of a m ist natural and artificial , .

The defensive organisation b oth of the first line and in ,

the rear was insufficie n t to permit of a systematic

,

defence As a weapon agai n st t anks the prepared

.

defen ce of the ground must play a larger part than ever ,

and the aversion of the men to th e pick and shovel

must be overcom e at all hazards Especially .
,

there must b e defences against tanks It was a b s o .

l ute l y inadmissib l e that the tanks having penetrated ,

into our advance li ne with o ut meeting with obstacles

 6 6 T HE T AN K IN ACT IO N
3

There are many vitally i mportant lessons to be

learned from their experiences These will I trust b e .
, ,

taken to heart by a l l concerned and made fu l l use ,

of when n ext the Tank Corps is called upon to go

into battle .

The part played by th e tanks and Whippets in the

“

battle of 8 th August was i n all respects a very fi ne

”
performa n ce .

About 1 00 tanks had been knocked out or otherwise

d isab l ed i n the first day s fighting In the next day s
’ ’
.

advance 1 4 5 took part mostly formed as composite com

,

a n i es the evil effects of the absence of any reserves being

p ,

felt once m ore The 1 0th Battalion helped the 3 rd Corps

.

to clear th e C hipil l y Spur and the difficult gul l ies which

abounded in that region wh ile the 4 th and s th Brigades
,

fought in Framerville and Rosi e res and Bouchoir A few .

Whippets cut loose from their leadi n g strings and pene -

t r a t e d as far as the devastated area of the old Som me

battlefield ; but most of these mach ines r e mained t ied to
the ineffective wand e rings of the cavalry wh o displayed ,

their usual p encha nt for collecting in va l leys where they were

certain t o b e sh elled Another 3 9 ta n ks were hit on this
.

day In the m eantime H u mbert s 3 r d French Army had

.
’

attacked south of M ontdidier O n the r oth Montdidier .

fe l l and we were on th e edge of Lihon s and within 3 000

,

yards of the railway station of C haulnes Sixty seven .

-

tanks were engaged in this fighting of which 3 0 were ,

disabled by shell fi r e Another 4 0 machines were in again

-
.

o n the 1 l th when Lihon s was captured in part and

,

H u m bert was on the edge of the much talked o f Lassigny - -

m a s s if familiar t o M r Be l l oc s n umerous readers ; and with

’
,

this the share of the Tank Corps in the battle of Amien s

ca m e t o an end Th e battle itself was Virtually over The
. .

o l d tactical ideas of hammering for weeks at one point

had vanished with the acceptance of the new doctrin es of
tank warfare The devastated area had now b e en reached
.

the obj ectives aimed at had been won ; an d with the

 T HE T H IRD BATT LE O F T HE SO M M E 367

enemy thorou gh ly awakened and obsessed with the danger

south of th e S omme the tim e had com e for another blow
,

in the new style in a diffe rent quarter .

Some idea of the wastage i n tanks involved in a battle

of this description and of the in finite advantages we might
,

have gained i f we had possessed an adequate supply of

these m achin e s may be gathered from the following figures
,

and dates In the four days fi ghting a total of 6 8 8 tanks

.
’
,

had been e n gaged NO fewer than 4 8 0 includin g supply

.
,

tanks had been handed over to salvage The few rem ain
,
.

ing fighting m achines n eeded a thorough overhaul before

they would be fit for another battle There were left the .

9 th Battalion with 2 7 ta n ks which had rej oined the 4 th

, ,

B rigade ; the 1 1 th B atta l ion with 4 2 which had been, ,

rushed down from th e 1 st Brigade to the S omme area ,

but had n ot been used ; th e 7 th and 1 2 th Battalions still ,

with Mark IV s ( 4 2 apiece ) and th e 1 6 th B attalion with

.
’

, ,

another 4 2 M ark V s j ust out from England With t he

.
’
, .

9th Battalion brought up to strength this would g ive 2 1 0

‘
,

tan ks as an u ntired reserve on 1 2 th Au gust Th e n ext .

offens i ve for which three whole brigades were n eeded at

,

the very start was due for the 2 1 s t of the month or in

, ,

little more than a week !

 C HAPTE R X V III .

T HE G R EAT AD AN C E :
V F RO M BU C Q U O Y T O BAP AU ME .

I C AN now take up again my own thread in the story and

fol l ow it through to the end .

In the first week of J uly I returned from Le Tr e port to

Engui n ega tte where as I have said I fou n d al l the com
, , ,

pany but a few headquarters details already gone back to ’

our old camp and billets at B ouvigny I followed the next .

day O ur tanks had trekked across country to Ce n tral

.

W orks h p s at Erin to be handed in B and C Companies .

,

in N oulette Wood were waiting to entrain for the same

,

purpose ; and then the whole person nel of the batta l ion was
going to M erlimont for H otchkiss and drivi ng cou rses pre
paratory to drawing its quota of M ark V s Th e r 1 th .
’
.

Battalion was a l ready there and the 1 ath which was to , ,

fo l low was to become a light battalion with Whippets

,
.

Such at least were the arrangements In practice how

, ,
.
,

ever things fell out very differently

, .

O n 1 8 th J uly I came home on leave Retu rning on I s t .

August I caught the influenza and a particularly unpleasant

,

bombing raid at Bou logne an d from there proceeded t o ,

Merlimont where I expected to find the battalion

,
I foun d .

however only A Company B an d C had drawn their old

,
.

tanks again and returned to N oulette Wood where they

, ,

were engaged in some mysterious bu si ness which turned out

to be part of a scheme to delude the enemy into the expecta
3 70 T HE TA N K IN A CT IO N

feeble min d ed V ery mercifully there were only a few of

-
.

these unfortunates l eft at the time mostly old men and ,

women with two or three nuns who looked after the estab
,

l i s h m e n t ; but I kno w of n o place more chilling and u n c om

for ta b l e as a residence W e were here for a week While . .

the Tank commanders and crews were away at Erin every

day rec e iving their Mark IV s and equipment there was
, .
’
,

little for me to do I took a few run n ers in map reading .

-

classes drew from the M T workshops at Auchy a new

,
. .

combinatio n Douglas and side car t o r e place my o l d on e -

,

which som e body had s mashed up i n my absence and paid ,

the usual visits t o H e sdin a charming litt l e town temporari l y ,

spoilt by th e B ritish Army in general and the Tank Corps

in particular I also visited once or twice the field of Agin
.

C ourt which l ies on the h ills abo v e th e T e rnoise The

,
.

country has changed very little so far as on e c a n j udge Since , ,

H e nry V S insignificant army crossed th e river near Eri n

.
’
,

c l imbed the steep ridge beyond and stood at bay on the tiny ,

battlefield The Villages of Azincourt ( as it is spelt ) and

.

Tramecourt between which the French knights were killed

,

in thou sands and that of M aisoncelles where H enry estab

, ,

l i s h e d his headquarters on the night before th e batt l e sti l l ,

lie invisible i n their trees j ust as they were hidden 5 00 years

ago Th e few fields which separate them are tilled now as
.

they were tilled then ; and only a road some iron paling s , ,

a n d a signpost need to be obliterated to r e endue that frag -

ment of landscape with the air and spirit of the fifteenth

century It was an odd contrast ( if one may acknowl e dge
.

s uch obvious reflections ) to the vast tormented battlefields

to wh ich we were return ing .

The workshops a t Er i n ( which would have startled H enry

«

V ) were now workin g full blast in con sequence of the

.

Som me battle Stray crews of almost every u nit in the

.

Ta n k Corps were there drawing new or repaired machines , .

A party of the 1 s th B attalion j ust blooded at Proyart ,

and Fra m erv i l le and s l igh tly above them selve s in con s e
,

q ue nce descended upon our effete heads in the madhouse

,
 T HE G REA T AD VA N C E 3 71

one eve n ing O ur own orders t o move couched in the

.
,

u sual c ryptic form reminiscent of a d ime novel reached ,

us on the a fternoon of 1 4 th August The messag e began .

i n words li ke t hese crows entrain B irmingham 2

RM . 1 s th detrain D ub l in 1 0 P M Decoded into . .

sense this meant that the company would leave Erin next
,

day for Sa ul ty Station on the Arras Dou l len s road I ,

-
.

had to find the I s t Brigade advanced headquart e rs at

Sarton n ear Dou l l ens an d l e arn there the dest ination of
, ,

th e tanks H aving seen the latter on th e ir trucks at Erin

.
,

I pushed off on my bicycle on the afternoon of the 1 s th

with Lish man the compa n y e qu ipment officer i n the side
, ,

car We ran the brigade t o earth in a dilapidated house

.

at Sarton abou t five o clock discovered that th e ta n ks ’

,

were t o lie that n ight in Ba z eq u e Wood two m iles from ,

Sa n l ty and went on i m m ediately to survey the route

,

between the two p l aces We found the wood full of dug .

outs which promised some shelter for the n ight and found
, ,

a l so a bra n ch of the i n valu abl e 6 th Corps Club in marquees

at Ba vincourt near by where I ordered dinner Owing
, ,
.

to various accidents however we were not free to atten d

, ,

this very necessary function u ntil and with th e tan k

train due in at t en we did not dare to leave the station
for so l o n g The train of course chose t o be abominably
.
, ,

late We sat and dozed and hungered in the

. office
until long after midn ight ; and it was daylight b e fore we had
all th e ta n ks camouflaged in the wood and could begin t o
think of sleep .

B and C Companies had already arrived at similar

hiding places in th e neighbourhood The followi n g night
-
. ,

that of the 1 6 th the whole battalion with 4 2 tanks moved

, , ,

on to Bienvillers a u B ois where there was a compa n y of

- -
,

the 3 r d Battalion s Whippets Battalion headquarters

’
.

j oined u s n ext day and too k over our most comfortable

bi l lets — which were very primitive at the best Bien .

vi ll ers was a half ruined an d whol l y deserted village about

-

fou r m iles from o ur fron t lin e at B ucquoy with which place ,

3 72 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

i t was connected by a d irect road through H annescamps

and Essarts It was su rrounded by orchards i n full leaf
.
,

i n which the tanks were hidden and where there were also ,

a nu mber of 6 o pounder guns instal l ed for the coming -

offensive Th e cou ntry to the eastward was good rolli n g

. , ,

cha l k land forming a series of l ow ridges between B ien

,

villers and Bapau me Before the G erman withdrawal to .

t he H indenbu rg Line in the spring of 1 9 1 7 th e front ,

trenches had r un between H a n nescamps and Essarts both ,

of which were e n tire l y rui n ed The prese n t front l i n e so . ,

far as it co n cer n e d u s now ran fro m north t o south as ,

follows : east of Ayette west of Ablainzevelle through , ,

Bucquoy east of Puisieux a u M ont and so to M iraumont

,
- -
,

on the Ancre th e e n emy having j ust abandoned ( on 1 sth

,

August ) the sma ll sa l ie n t h e had held in fro n t of Puisieux

and Serre V iewed from the high ground at Essarts the
.
,

la n dscape before us was divided with a curious exactness

i nto two kinds N orth of a l in e drawn between Bucquoy
.

and Puisieux although wasted desert and seamed with

, , ,

t renches it still bore some resemb l ance to a state of n atu re

,
.

Fragmentary houses wer e erect i n the villages and the trees ,

which i n variab l y surround the latter in north east France -

seemed at a dista n ce to be in fair preservat ion But south .

of the lin e the track of a hu rrica n e— the first battle of the

Somme had sheared everything away Trees houses the
-
.
, ,

very sites of Villages and farms had vanished in a who l esale ,

an n ihilation ; and the country westward to Bapaume and

southward to the Som me was one vast nondescript expa n se
of ruin broke n on l y by a few stumps or a cloud of dust
, .

This ob l iterated area determined so far as ta n ks were con ,

cerned th e front of the n ew attack interposing a wide gap

, ,

between the I s t 2 nd and 3 rd Ta n k Brigades working with

, , ,

the 3 r d Army t o the north and the 4 th and s th Brigades ,

which were to com e into action agai n with the 4 th Army a

day or two later The time was past wh en tanks were .

thrust i n wil l y mil l y over any kind of terr a i n

,
-

, .

The 3 r d Army s attack t o be lau nched o n 2 1 s t August

’

, ,
3 74 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

The Tan k Brigades had been thoroughly res h uffled before

the battle The 2 n d B rigade on the left of t he 3 rd Army
.
, ,

consisted now of the 1 2 th and 1 s th H eavy Battalions and

t he 6 th Light Battalion ( Whippets ) The 3 rd Brigade in . ,

reserve had the 9 th r 1 th and 1 4th H eavy Battalions

, , ,
.

The I s t Brigade in the centre was made up of the 7 th a n d

r oth H eavy Battalions the 3 rd Light Battalion and the
, ,

1 7 th Armoured Car B attalion In consequence of the “

.

enemy s new system of defence and the varying powers of

’

the thr e e marks of machines u sed by the I s t an d 2 n d

Ta n k Brigades tanks were disposed in echelon s as
,

follows
1 Two battalion s of Mark IV ta n ks ( 7 th an d 1 2th) to
. .

operate as far as th e second obj ective .

2 O ne battalion of Mark V and on e of Mark V Star

. . .

mach ines ( 1 oth and 1 s th ) to O perate against the

second obj ect ive and proceed as far as the Albert
Arras railways .

3 Two batta l ions of Wh ippets and one of armou red

.

” 1
cars to operate beyond th e railway .

AS no such advance as that of 8 th August was contem

plated the r a ilway being the fina l obj ective for the first
,

day this employm e n t of the Whippets and armoured cars

,

seems to have been a mistake There was little point i n .

their disorganising th e enemy s forces in an area over ’

wh ich we had n o intention of advancing u ntil the 2 3 r d

and on the other hand their appearance u nsupported
, , , ,

beyon d the railway wou l d put them at the mercy of the

,

G erman batteries by that tim e fully prepared

, And in fact .
, ,

a company of the 3 rd B attalion lost most of it s tanks

around Achiet l e Pet it ( together with a n umber of armoured
- -

cars ) before even the railway was reached .

There was very little time for reconnaissance before the

attack It was of cou rse t o be another surprise based
.
, , ,

on t anks but the battalion com manders of the latter were

,

only in formed of th e details on the 1 8 th The 6 th Corps .

W kl y Ta nk N t 1
ee o es .
’
 T HE G R EA T A D V AN C E 3 75

on t he left with the 2 nd Tank Brigade was t o captu re

, ,

M oyenneville and Cou rcelles and the lin e of the railway

beyond The 4 th Corps in the centre with th e 1 st Tan k
.
, ,

B rigade h ad to carry first th e vi l lages of Ablainzevelle and

,

B ucquoy then Loge as t Wood and the G erman s e co n d li n e

,

t o Ach iet l e Petit and thirdly Ach iet l e G rand and th e

- -

, ,
- -

railway Th e s th Corps on the right was advancing

.
, ,

without ta n ks along th e edge of the obliterated area against

the Dove Cot at Beauregard and th e village of B eaucou rt .

The 7 th Battalion was primarily interested i n B ucquoy

and Ablainzevelle B and C Companies were to capture .

the former A Company th e latter after which on e section

, ,

fr om each com pany was to push on with th e Mark V s .

’

of th e 1 0th Battalion as far as Logea s t Wood and Achiet

l e Petit
-
Bucquoy was a l arge v illage shaped like a badly
.

drawn cross on e stroke of which ran u p the Ayette road

, ,

parallel t o ou r fro n t while the other crossed it at right ,

angles along the road from Bienvil l ers and H annescamps

to Achiet l e Petit The O pposing outposts were both in the
- -
.

vi l lage Ablainzevelle a more compact and much sm aller

.
,

place lay 1 000 yards to the north east j ust beyond the
,
-

Ayette road Th e i nfantry w i th whom we were c o

.

O perating in this first phase were two brigades of th e 3 7 th

D ivision in which I had served in th e ranks i n the

,

early days of th e war By a coincidence my old un it the .

, ,

r oth Royal Fusi l iers which I had n ot seen since J une ,

1 91 5
, was to take Ablainzevelle with A Company s tanks ’
.

In Spite of th e fact that th e new G erman tactics of de

fence i n depth presupposed th e holding of both these
villages very lightly the infantry were extremely n ervous ,

about them The r 1 1 th Brigade would have it that .

Ablainzevelle was a warren of dug outs an d tun nels and -

full of men Personally I do n ot believe there wer e fifty

.
,

G ermans in the place In case however i t proved to be a .

, ,

second Fles qui e res s i x tan ks ( all we could get into it ,

com fortably ) were to rush it from three side s the other ,

eight mach i nes of th e company devoting themselves t o th e

3 76 T HE T AN K IN AC T IO N

trenches and a l leged strong points to the north and south .

I Spent a part of the 1 8 th a nd 1 9 th recon noitring Abl a i n z e

ve ll e from our forward lines alo n g the Ayette road and on ,

the first day the M aj or a n d I having passed in fro n t of ou r ,

outposts by m istake fou n d ours e lves in the ditch beside

,

the road wh ich l ed into th e vi l lage from Bucquoy and ,

within 1 00 yards of th e nearest house We could see .

straight u p the road i n to th e m iddle of the vi l lage which ,

appear e d to be as deserted and peacefu l as any o n e cou l d

wish There w e re G ermans hidden som e where in the ruin s
.
,

but I am sure that i f it had be e n desirable our peop l e could

have wa l k e d ov e r any tim e afte r dark and take n the place
with very l itt l e trouble The same applied to Bucquoy and
.

all simi l ar advanced posts u nder the new G erman schem e

of d e fence .

During the days before th e attack the weather he l d

gloriou sly fine with h ot su n ny days and moon l it nights ,

and the front was very qu iet i n deed O n the evening of .

the 1 9th about dusk we bega n to get the tanks O f A Com

, ,

pa n y out of their orchard By midnight all were wel l on .

their way to the lying u p points we had selecte d These

-
.

were i n the shallow va l ley which runs north and south

between Bucquoy and the high ground about Essarts and ,

on the average were less than 2 000 yards behind the fro n t
line Wright s section the farthest forward of all was
.
’
, ,

t o lie up i n a su n ken road which ran into the northern end

of B ucquoy M C h l e ry s behind a ban k alongsid e the road
‘
,
’

from Essarts t o Ayette and C us ta n ce s u nder a row of ,

’

t rees near Quesnoy Farm behind M C hl e ry Except for ,

‘
.

C u s ta n ce s row of trees there was no real cover whatever

’

i n this n eighbourhood beyond a few banks and sunken

roads From Essarts to Bucquoy the ground was a trough
.

of grass land where once fields had been Besides ou r

-
.

compa ny B and C were also to collect in the val l ey s o

, ,

that forty two tanks would be l ying in the O pen a m ile

-

from the G erman outposts throughout Y day Behind us -

.
,

over the Essarts Ridge was the r oth Battalion whose , ,

 T HE G R EAT AD VA N C E 3 77

Mark V s would move up at z ero The 1 2 th and 1 5 th

.
’
.

Battalion s on ou r l e ft had the exte n sive shade of Adinfer

Wood for concealment Tanks however i f hidden from .
, ,

direct observation a n d proper l y camouflaged are as safe , ,

or safer i n the open than in some conspicuou s mass of

,

timber They are invi sible from the air an d extraordinarily

.

difficu l t to locat e even from close quarters on the grou nd ,

as was proved when the brigade In te l ligence O fficer wh o ,

knew th e approximate positions of all ou r section s could ,

only find eight ta n ks out of the forty two By 2 A M -

. . .

our three section s were dispos e d of i n thei r hidi n g places -

without any disturbance from the enemy or t roubl e from

the tanks H aving seen the m camouflaged and the crews
.

prepari n g to turn i n for the rest of the night the M aj or and ,

I wa l ked back to his car which was waiting b e h ind Essarts

, ,

and return e d to B i e nvillers for our own few hours sleep ’

.

The r e st of that day th e 2 0th we were busy about m any

, ,

things We went out to the ta n ks agai n after breakfast

.
,

and found everythin g we l l and the G erman arti ll ery as

quiet as before Th e section and tank com manders were
.

going out for a final r e connaissance that afternoon I .

spent it i n studying m aps and photograph s in th e R O s . .

’

offic e at B ienvi ll ers drawing u p O peration orders with the

,

Maj or an d making a few preparatio n s for my personal

,

com fort duri n g the battl e After an early dinn e r we set off .

again about for Essarts As darkness fel l the whole .

,

cou ntryside which had been so empty o f life the night

,

before became fi l led with quiet n oises— the tramp of hoofs

, ,

the rattle of wheels the voices of m en p assing orders or

,

war n ings Dozens of field batteries were movin g forward

.

to take u p their positions in front of H an nescamps for the

O peni n g barrage and the assaulting infantry wer e on th e
,

way to their assembly trenches The moo n which was .

,

almost ful l rose i ntensely bright — too bright for my likin g

, .

Zero was at A M and before m idnight a l l the tanks

. .
,

of the battalion were unca m ou fl a ge d and ready to m ove .

The three sections of A Company were to be formed u p

3 78 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

i n line beyond our front trench — V ery Tren ch —a t

To be on the safe side th e route of each section was to
be taped to this point a task which normally falls to the ,

Recon n aissance O fficer ; but as I could not be i n three

p l aces at once it was decid e d that th e tapi n g should be left
,

to the section com manders and to J ukes my assistant R O ,

. .
,

who had taken M aelor J ones s place I wandered round -

’
.

with the Maj or visitin g each sect ion i n turn O n e startling

,
.

i ncident disturbed th e se prelimi n aries We were with .

Wright s section i n the sunke n road about m idn ight H e had

’
.

n o more than 1 5 0 0 yards to cover and th ere was no poi n t ,

i n his starting at that hou r ; but som e l imbers appeared in

the road with ammunition wh ich had to be taken farther
forward and as the tanks block e d th e way we started to
,

get them up the ban k to on e side The first tank reached .

the top with some difficulty for there was n o room t o

, ,

s w ing i n the road and the ban k was 1 2 feet high a n d very
,

s teep The moon was n ow blazing like an arc light upon

.
-

everything and the tank was silhouetted on a rise half a

,

mi l e from B ucquoy the trees of which Vi ll age as we l l as

, ,

those along the Ayette road w e re clearly visible Every , .

thing was s o brilliant i n fact that we ordered men to ho l d

, ,

up the ca n vas horn covers to hide the flashi n g of the tracks

in the moonlight as the m achin e moved along above th e
cutting I was down the road again watching th e second
.

tan k e ndeavouring to climb out when there came the ,

whistle of a she ll an d the leading one on top was hidden

,

in s moke Several more shells followed all o f which burst

.
,

round the tan k and th e crew came flying out and down
,

into the road The shooting was so extraordinari l y

.

close that we felt certai n that the tank had been seen .

Yet after about a dozen rounds none of which actually h it

, ,

her the gun or guns stopped firing Apparently the shelling

, .

was meant for the road wh ich the G ermans must have ,

known to be used for transport at n ight for after this a ,

'

machine gun opened on i t at long range and b ul l e ts cam e

-
,

zip zipping i nto the grass of the bank With this epilogue
-
. ,
3 80 THE TA N K IN AC T IO N

as that capricious m ist wh i ch covered th e whole battlefield

during the early m orni n g of the 2 1 s t The road i n wh ich .

Wright s tanks had been concealed cut through Top

’

Tre n ch close to where we were standing and presently ,

the l ast section of C Company detailed for the second ,

obj ective came ro ll i n g along it out of the g l oom It was

, .

n ow fu l l day a n d we could see perhaps a quarter of a

,

mile at the m ost Bucquoy was still entirely hidden A

. .

br i gade sta ff of the 6 3 r d N aval Division which was to ,

pass through the 3 7 th to attack the rai l way had come ,

up to the neighbourhood o f Top Trench a n d its members ,

w e re standi n g about flapping maps sendi n g and receivi n g ,

telephone mes sages and cursing th e fog ,Runners and .

d e spatch riders were com ing and going busily in our vague
-

radius of vision There was a constant bustle about the

.

mouth of the dug out where the 1 1 1 th Brigade was -

,

rec e iving reports every minute by telephone from the

headquarters of its battalions ; and inquiries here con
firmed the i mpression that the first obj ectives had been
carried with ease i n spite of the m ist Th e latter was
, .

at l ast thinning as the su n rose and at le n gth the trees ,

of Bucquoy 1 000 yards away b ecam e faint l y visible like

, , ,

ghostly and tattered scarecrows It was n ow I suppose .

, ,

about seven o clock and the Maj or and I b e gan to make

’
,

our way toward Ablainzeve ll e A few walking wounded .

were stragg l ing rearwards and the e n d l ess torrent of ,

shells was wailing ov e rhead ; but there w a s nothing else

to be seen or h eard of the battle The n orthern end of .

Bucquoy through wh ich we passed reeked of gases and

, ,

corruption but the on e or two dead bodies visible had

,

on l y too pa l pably been lying t here for days The Ayette .

road was more forlorn than ever and l ittered with a new ,

l ayer of bricks and branches The appearance behind us .

of some cavalry who rode int o the village with a great

,

clatter and parade indicated that th e attack so far had

,

progressed sat isfactorily A little way up the Ab l a i nz e .

velle road we met the first tank return ing foll o wed by ,
 THE G R EAT AD V A NC E

several more As I had suspected would be t he case

.
,

there had bee n l ittle or no fighting in the village The .

fog had caused far more troub l e than the G erman s of ,

whom hardly any had been seen O n e machi n e gun had .

-

kept firi n g from a ru ined hou se u ntil a tan k drove over

it one or two others had loosed a few bursts before t h eir
,

crews fled and then proceed i ngs had degenerated into a

,

hunt for souvenirs There were plenty of these for the

.
,

attack had com e as a complete surpr ise -

c f on d un t o J O O
l
r
YA R DS ! ! l

A tta ck on A ug us t 2 1 , 1 91 8 .

We returned with these tanks to the rallyin g point near -

Durham Trench behind the northern gard e ns of Bucquoy

, .

Al l the machin es detailed for Ablainzevel l e were accou n ted

for . On e had broken a track near the vi ll age and its ,

commander slightly wou nded i n an unrom antic part of

,

his person by a stray bullet was the only casualty to ,

date During the morni n g all the remai n ing tanks ro ll ed

.

i n except th e three of Wright s sectio n which had pushed ’

,

on t o Achiet l e Petit N o one so far had met with a ny

- -
.
, ,
382 T HE TAN K IN A CT IO N

serious opposit i o n but all had d i fficulties on accou nt of

,

th e mist On e tank commander at the request of the

.
,

N aval D ivision had entered Logea s t Wo o d and demolished

,

some m achine gu n posts there -

.

The re was a little shelling of our neighbourhood and of ,

Bucquoy i n general toward midday an d J ukes and I very

, ,

nearly had our promising careers cut short by a large pro

j e ctil e which landed i n a road along which we were wa l ki n g
in search of news or food—I fo rget which Jukes s water .
’

bottl e was the only victim After a scrappy lunch havin g .

,

l ear n t that W right s section had returned from Achiet l e

’
-

Petit a n d rallied in a small C opse between that p l ace and

Bucquoy I set out to find Battalion headquarters which
, ,

was to have establish ed itself by this hour in a trench

east of the latt e r villag e The mist had now cleared at .
,

an awkward mome n t as it turned out for the r oth Bat ,

ta l ion and the Wh ippets The day was brilliant l y fine .

a n d even uncomfortab l y hot and as I reached the far Side ,

of B ucquoy I could see very p l ai n ly th e battle in progress

,

along the l ine of the railway Achiet l e Petit hidden i n .

- -
,

trees had been taken by tanks an d was firmly held but

, ,

to the left smoke was bi ll owi n g in c l ouds about Achiet

l e G rand and the eastern en d of L oge a s t Wood
-
I found .

t h e Co l onel H enriquez and S mith the Adj utan t sheltering

, , , ,

from the su n u nder some corrugated iron at the appointed

Spot , where their trench — which was in fact the G erman
front line there having been only advanced posts in
,

B ucqu oy — was cut by the road from that vi l lage to

Achiet l e Petit I got a little news from them B and C
- -
. .

Companies it appeared had taken Bucquoy as easily as

, ,

w e had take n Ab l ainzevel l e ; but the second G erman line ,

and in particu l ar Loge a s t Wood and Achiet l e Petit had - -

,

given more trouble The M ark V s and Whippets passing

. .
’
,

through our tanks had been caught bunched together n ear

,

the railway as the fog lifted at ten O clock and had been ’
,

knocked abou t badly by the G erman gun s Th e N aval .

D ivision losing its d irection had wandered t o o far t o th e

, ,
 T HE G R EAT AD V AN CE 383

right even across the Ach iet l e Petit road w i th th e result

,
- -
,

that Ach iet l e G rand which it should have carried was sti l l
- -
, ,

holding o ut Apart from this accident everything so far

. ,

had gone well I was told now to bring A Company s

.
’

tanks through B ucquoy to som e point east of the village .

One of our old camps of N issen huts most l y i n ruin s lay i m , ,

mediately i n front and havin g noted this as a suitab le place

,

to camouflage the m achines I retu rned to lead them to it , .

B e fore three o clock we had the two section s h idden in

’

t he huts which we k n ocked down and then built up again

,

over th e ta n ks We estab l ished ourselves in the trench

.

behind The accompanying photograph taken five days

.
,

before the attack shows very clearly this region behin d ,

B ucquoy Our trench ran from the fi ve s i d e d e n cl os ur e

.
-
‘

on the left to the first e lbow i n th e main road where t he ,

trees are Beyond are the N issen hut s

. B eyond them .

again is a small copse beside th e road where Wright s , ,

’

section h a d r a l l i e d after taking Achiet l e Petit The l atter - -

.

vi ll age is seen at the en d of the road having on its left the ,

li n e of trees along the road t o Achiet l e G rand In the - -

.

foreground is B ucquoy the distance between the two

;

villages being about a mile and a half C Company had .

concentrated their tanks in the fi ve sided enclosure on our -

left whi l e those of B Company were under some trees at

,

the south end of the vi l lage .

We were left here in peace during the rest of the day ,

only a few heavy she l ls whining overhead at interva l s i n to

Bucquoy B attalion headquarters had return ed t o B ien
.

villers . It was blazing hot and we were plagued by ,

in nu merable flies Our only protection fro m the su n w a s

.

a few s mall shelters in the trench wall —the dug outs of -

,

which there were a good nu mber being filled to s uffoc a ,

tion by the infantry of th e 3 7 th D ivision now holdi n g ,

this line as a support to the general advance When we were .

not tryi n g to sleep our chie f occupation was watchin g th e ,

struggle still raging i n front of Achiet l e G rand We looked - -

.

straight up a shallow depression to Achiet J u nction which ,

384 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

stood ou rising ground so that although it was two miles , ,

dista n t we witnessed the whole attack like spectators at

,

a p l ay The infantry had carried the li n e of the railway

.

to north and south but the G ermans still held out tena ,

c i ou s l y in a little salient that j utted out westward arou n d

the station the brickworks and a n umber of huts erect e d

, ,

there Throughou t th e after n oon I saw at i ntervals with

.

my g l asses l ines of minute figures pressing forward u p the

s l ope into the smoke clouds that rose and eddied over -

Achiet ; but they a l w ays came back a n d in s maller numbers , .

The station was still uncaptur e d at nightfa ll .

It was extreme l y co l d that n ight for August J ukes and .

I were huddled together in a bay of the t ren ch whe n the

M aj or roused us at 3 A M H e had become anxiou s about . .

Wright s forward section in the copse beside th e road and

’
,

wished Jukes to walk across an d bring th e tanks in to th e

N issen huts with the others before dawn As I was too
, , .

cold to s l eep I accompanied J ukes across t o the copse

, .

It was bri l liant moonlight again with none of the m ist of ,

the previous night There was very little arti ll ery fire in
.

progress and o n l y the occasiona l mutter of a machine gun

,
-

alo n g the railway The copse when we got to it proved

.
, ,

to be n o more than a triangle of tattered hedge enclosing

ha l f a dozen sma l l trees There were n ow in it six tanks .

three of A Company s ( W a d es on s Clegg s and anoth er) ’ ’

,
’
, ,

one each from B and C and a supp l y tender We found , .

B and C s machi n es already under orders to withdraw and

’
,

in the act of u n c a m oufla gi n g and having woken up ou r own

peop l e we hurried the m on with the same business for the
, ,

eastern sky was brightening and it takes some time to ,

u n c a m ou fl a ge a tank stow everything away and start up

, ,

a cold engine The crews were sleepy and chil l ed and

.
,

ha l f an hour had passed before the first tank was under

way This was C Compa n y s machine Then two of ours
.
’
.
,

Clegg s and one commanded by an

’
, went off with
J ukes fo ll owed by Borr i s ow of B Company The tender
,
.

was remaining behind and ou r last tank ( W a d es on s ) re ,

’
386 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

about hal f blinded by blood from a wound i n hi s head I

,
-
.

took h is arm and ran him down the road to the trench ,

and j u d ged from the brisk way he stepped out that he was
not very badly hurt H urryi n g back I cal l ed in the crews
.
,
.

It was not the mom ent t o keep the m out in the O pen
c a m ou fl a gi n g the tanks which could b e done later
, As it .

was I was too l ate Poor Clegg having after all come
, .
,

safely through th e j ourn e y was th e first in and was stand

, ,

i n g behi n d his tan k he l ping his crew t o cover it with

corrugated iro n from a hut when a she l l burst at his feet ,

a n d ki ll ed h i m i n sta n t l y .

The whole thing was a striking example of bad l uck .

The t anks cou l d not have bee n seen i n that half light and -

the bombardment was a m e re speculation aim e d I imagine , , ,

at the trenches we occupi e d east of Bucquoy It cost th e .

7 th Batta l ion a heavier casua l ty list in o ffi cers than any

action it ever fought For whi l e in A Company C l egg was
.

ki l led a n d Wright wou n ded a l most at the same tim e a ,

Shell landed amo n g B Company s ta n ks in Bucquoy itself

’
,

kil l ing a tank commander M Le a n and a gun n er a n d ,

‘
, ,

wou n ding anoth e r o fficer and several men M Le a n a .

‘
,

Canadian was one of the best fe ll ows I have ever m et an d

, ,

one who hated war almost as much as I did Throughout .

the series of O peration s which began at B ucqu oy and ended

beyond Cambrai the 7 th Battalion always comparatively
, ,

fortu n ate i n casua l ties to personne l had fou r o fficers ki l led , ,

of whom two lost th e ir lives in this brie f and purposeless

shelling on the morning of 2 2n d August .

A Company s trench was not actually b i t during the

’

bombardme n t but all who were in it were much p e rturbed

,

by our predicament as well as by their own As the three .

returning tanks were hidde n entirely for a while by the

s moke most of us were given up for lost The she l lin g
, .
 T HE G R EA T AD VAN CE 38 7

died down after about hal f an hour when parties went out ,

to bring in Clegg s body and to complete the concealment

’

of th e tanks .

The rest of the day passed quiet l y enough s o far as we ,

were co n cerned u n til the eveni n g The 3 rd Army was

,
.

pausing w hile the 4 th Army came into line between the

,

Ancre and the Som me O n our front Achiet l e G rand was

.
- -

carried in the cou rs e of th e mornin g and the infantry was ,

the n established along the whole l in e of the railway A .

l ittle information reached u s concer n i n g the previous day s ’

events on our left The 1 2 th Tank B attalion in t heir first

.

batt l e h ad done all and m ore than was asked of them ,

capturi n g M oyennevil l e and pushing on to the railway .

The Mark V Stars of the 1 s th Battalion which shou l d

.
,

have pass e d through the 1 2 th lost all directio n i n t he mist , ,

and for the most part wandered aimlessly about n orth of

L oge as t Wood without achieving anything As however .
, ,

the battalion ( by one of those dispensations peculiar to the

Army ) collected so mething like a dozen military crosses for
an ineffective performance which did not merit on e it had ,

every reason to be satisfied with its day s work It was for ’

.

t u n a te p erhaps i n that its tanks did not contrive to get very

, ,

far forward for the 1 0th Battalion which played the sam e
, ,

r é l e on the right passing through our Mark IV s to attack

’
.
,

the railway about Achiet l e G rand met with wholesale - -

disaster O f th e company which went in every ta n k except

.
,

on e I b el i eve was knocked out on or n ear the railway by

, ,

t h e G erman batteries beyond eleven out of twelve officers ,

being killed or wounded Th e 3 rd Battalion s Whippets .

’
,

endeavouring to pass through the Mark V s were caught in .

’
,

line ahead on th e Achiet l e Petit road when the m ist lifted

- -

sudde n ly about ten o clock in the morning and m ost of

’

them suffe red th e same fate Two got through Achiet l e .

-

Petit and were h it and burnt out beyond The armoured .

cars had a l so paid the penalty of other people s convictions ’

i n the same n eighbourhood An area a m i l e square around .

the t wo Ach i e ts and the curve o f rai l way between them was
388 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

i n fact littered with dere l ict Mark V s Whippets and .

’
, ,

armoured cars ; and the result of this as the l oth Battalion ,

was very short of tan ks to b e gin with was that the 7 th now ,

remained the only heavy un it approximate l y u p to strength

i n the I s t Brigade .

Some of our mach ine s howe v er were in n eed of an, ,

overhaul and as it was impossib l e to work on those of A

,

Company in th e ir exposed position east of Bucquoy we ,

were ordered to withdraw after dark to ou r original ra ll ying

point near D urham Trench west of the vi l lage These ,
.

orders had j ust come through at about seven o c l ock in ,

’

the even i n g of the 2 2 nd when th e enemy chos e to repeat

,

his di splay of the early morning by b ombarding our trench

with 5 9 s H e was very accurate on this occasion the first
.
’
.
,

she l l la n ding full in the trench and all the others being ,

unpleasant l y n e ar As the dug outs were full of i n fa ntry m e n

.
-
,

we had to sit hop e ful l y on the tre n ch floor and trust to luck .

For a quarter of an hour this sh e llin g was very heavy and ,

cau sed a n u mber of casu a l ties among those of the i n fantry

who were crow d ed out of the dug outs and also in C -
,

Compa n y i n their hedged e n closu re to our left The tre n ch .

was beaten flat i n several p l aces Aft e r a while a s thi s .

,

i n fliction might hera l d a counter attack the Maj or and I -

spri n ted vigorous l y up the t rench t o a dug out where a -

brigade headquarters of the N aval D ivision was estab l ished ,

hoping to get som e news there We were met o n the way .

by a pan ic strick e n rabble of signallers and other oddments

-
,

who declared with what little breath they had left that the
, ,

G ermans were i n fact advancing a n d had recaptur e d L ogea s t

Wood This did not sound probable ; and on pe n e trating at
.

length to the brigade head quarters wrapped in ideal ca l m a n d ,

silence twenty feet below the ground we found the G eneral ,

havin g dinner amid an assortment o f telephones and every ,

one perfect l y happy G uy an d Chaddock of C Company

.
, ,

were also th ere on the same e rrand of inqu iry as ourselves .

We sat on the dug out stairs for some time dri n ki n g

-
,

whiskies and s o das while telephone reports cam e through

,
3 90 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

Whippets of the 6 th Battalion were engaged in very severe

fighti n g around Sapignies Behag n i e s and Ervi l lers on the , ,

Arras Bapau me road

-
Ervillers was carried but the two .
,

other vi ll ages he l d out u ntil the 2 5 th when the 7 th ,

Batta l ion assisted at their capture .

About five o clock in the afternoon orders arrived at’

D urham Tre n ch for a move by the who l e battalion at dusk

t o the railway emba n kment east of Achiet l e Petit A - -
.

Compa n y l e d C fo l lowing on behind as we passed again

,

through Bucquoy B Company took their own route from .

the south e n d of the vi l lage Owi n g to various breakdow n s .

,

due to the age and ge n eral disrepair of som e of our M ark

IV s the batta l ion now mustered little more than thirty
’
.
,

tanks It proceeded alon g the east side of the Achiet l e

.
-

Pet it road The Maj or and I went on ahead in th e car to

.

a conference at the headquarters of a N ew Zealand Brigade

n ear Achiet which we reached j ust before dark The Ne w
, .

Zeala n ders were attacking Biefvil l ers G r e villers and Lou , ,

part Wood the next morn ing and wanted two sections of ,

heavy tanks and som e Whippets C us ta n ce s section of .

’

A Company with one from B were detailed from our

, ,

batta l ion t he whol e being u nder the orders of Rossi

,

Ashton comman d ing B Company for the operatio n

, As , .

there was n othing for the M aj or and myself to do we were ,

ordered to return to Bienvi l lers to get a good night s rest ’

while we had the c h ance ; and havin g seen the tanks on

their way round the north s ide of Achiet l e Petit we - -
,

returned to the car and drove away We passed the .

Whippets comin g up and behind Bucquoy alo n g the road , , ,

which two d ays b e fore had been d e serted ra n i n to masses ,

of transport fina ll y ditch ing the car in a sh e l l hole n ear

,
-

H annescamps so that it was a fter m idnight when we

,

reach e d Bie n villers .

A n ight i n a camp bed followed by a bath and a com -

,

forta bl e breakfast in our tarpaulin covered mess worked -

,

wo n ders and we were on our way back by eleven o clock

,
’

next morning O ne could see very plainly by day the

.
 T HE G R EAT A D V ANC E

changes wrought i n t hese back areas by ou r advance The .

B ucqu oy road was choked with cars lorries ambulances , , ,

and horse tran sport m oving under a cloud of dust There

-
, .

was a canteen estab l ished in the ruins of Essart ,

and we saw actually an A P M endeavouring to co n trol

. . .

th e tra ffi c i n that place We were able to take th e car

.

through Achiet l e Pet it itself over indescribable roads

- -
, ,

and so down into the va l ley beyond where our tanks ,

IN METRES YA a os

The A dva n ce bey on d th e A f r a y A l ber t R a i l w ay , A ug u s t

-
2 3 - 29 .

were lyi n g alongside th e railway emban kment Arou nd .

Achiet were many relics of the tank attack of the 2 1 s t in ,

the shape of burn t out Whippets armoured cars an d

-
, ,

M ark V s South east of the Village th e ground fa l ls v e ry

.
’
.
-

steeply and then rises to the railway whi l e th e embank ,

ment over which th e latter runs i s at this point quit e thirty

feet high and c l othed with bushes ; and in t he r e gular
gulley thus formed there was n ow accu mulated an aston
i s hi n g mass of men animals and materia l
, Against the
,
.

bushes of th e e mban kmen t were camouflaged th e thirty

3 9 2 THE TA N K IN A CT IO N

odd tan ks of our battalion a few M ark V s from the , .

’

1 0t h , and several Whippets A battery of howitzers .

was firing with an intolerable nois e straight over our

machines from a distance of twenty yards whi l e on the ,

Slope behind which rose like a g l a ci s up to Achiet were three

, ,

or four field batteries i n action Long l ines of l i m b e rs and .

h orses filled the lower end of the vall ey and the men of ,

an i n fantry battalion in reserve were lying in the grass

higher up beside our tanks Two i n fa n try brigade h e ad .

quarters were estab l ished i n t he ope n here so that there ,

was a great coming a n d goi n g of despatch riders an d -

or d e r l ies Al l this activity was crowded i n to a ho l low 1 000

.

yards long by 2 00 or 3 00 yards wide — a magnific e nt

opportunity for the G erman artillery Th e day was fine .
,

an d a hostile aeropla n e could have seen everythi n g from a

great height Th e possibi l ities of the place seem however
.
, ,

t o have been overlooked during the earlier part of the

day when the e n emy was busy with the lev e l crossi n g a
,

mi l e h igher up at Achiet l e G rand which was Violent l y - -

Sh e l led .

That m orn ing s attack had been e n tirely successful

’

Biefvil l ers G r e vil l ers an d Loup a r t W ood being taken

, ,

after severe fighting i n wh ich thr e e of our tanks a n d a

,

Whippet were k n ocked out Armoured cars h ad e n .

d ea vour e d to exploit the success by pushing along t he

road fro m B iefvil l ers into B apau me but had found the ,

she l l fi r e too heavy

-
O ur casua l ties had bee n slight a n d
.
,

Custance and most of h is people were back again with

the company covered with dirt and g l ory The batta l ion
, .

was supplying another three sections ( twelve tanks ) th e

fo ll owing morni n g— the 2 5 th — for two separate operation s .

‘
M C h l e ry s section of A Company was to help the 3 7 th
’

D ivision complete its u nfinished task at Sapignies and

Behag n ies ; wh ile two section s of C with seven Mark V s , .
’

( a l l that the 1 0th Batta l ion had left ) were working with ,

the 6 3 rd Division i m mediately to the south agai n st Favreu i l ,

Avesnes les Bapau me and Ligny Thilloy

- -
Avesn e s was a
,
-
.
3 94 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

from the railway these machi n es were still there with

, ,

t heir crews worki n g on them N everthe l e ss for reasons

.
,

which I never discovere d the N ew Zea l anders had with

-

dra w n agai n from the ent ire Wood and were ca ll ing for ,

yet more ta n ks to deal with som e alleged ( and I be l ieve

wholly i magi n ary) G erma n machine guns re established - -

there Sta n di n g o n the crest of the hill above the rai l way
. ,

I l ook e d do w n at this j u n cture upon all the disp o sitions

for a p i tch e d battle — with nobody Lou p ar t Wood lay .

dark a n d quiet on the G r e vi ll ers spur whi l e withi n it ,

our two ta n k crews worked on quite peacefu ll y e n tire l y ,

ignora n t of their d esertion and of a l l this pother In .

front of the Wood in extended order on th e grou nd were

, ,

some N ew Zealand infantry and a battalion of th e

borro w ed from the s th D ivision to help i n
this crisis B ehind the infantry a field battery had com e
.

i nto position its limbers in rear a n d a squadron of dis

, ,

mounted cavalry were standing by th e ir horses i n a hollow

c l ose by while from a crossi n g over th e rail w ay to my left
,

t w o more ta n ks of C Company were advancing to th e

r e scu e . It was a very pr e tty a n d ga l lant sight a nd ,

remi n ded on e i n its forma l ity and comp l eteness of those

, ,

mimic batt l es one used to e nj oy at the M ilitary Tourname n t .

O n ly the stock pontoon bridge was missing N ot a shot .

was bei n g fired except by one rifle which cracked occasio n

,

ally far away to the right of th e Wood This belonged I .

,

heard afterwards to a solitary G erman sniper who seems

,

to have repr e se n ted i n h is own person th e entire e n emy

against which this force of all arm s was arrayed What .

m ade th e whole affai r eve n more absurd and unrea l was

the fact that 1 000 yards to the left infantry were march
, ,

i ng i n fou rs along the road i n to G r e vi ll ers As I looked

on in some aston ish ment dev e l opments e n sued along the
, ,

orthodox lines laid down at Olympia and the Agricultural

H all. A cava l ry patrol of about a dozen m en greatly ,

dari n g mounted their horses an d trotted off toward the

,

Wood A few hu ndred yards from it the men dismount e d

.
 T HE G R EAT A D VA N C E 3 95

again left two or three i n charge of th e anima l s a n d

, ,

wa l ked forward in extended order Ev e ry other i n dividual .

pr e se n t ( I hope ) he l d h is breath as these ga ll ant fe ll ows dis

appeared among the trees Even on my hill top I seemed
.
-

to fe e l the atmosphere of su spense which e manated fro m

that si l ent battl e fie l d disturbed only by the si n gle shots of
,

the indefatigable sniper in the distan ce In the Wood .

,

of course n oth in g happened for t here was n othing to

, ,

happe n But I sh ould like t o h ave witnessed the m eet

.

ing between the anxiou s pat ro l scouting warily among the ,

trees an d ou r two perspirin g and irritabl e tan k crews toil

,

i n g at their tracks and engines After a whi l e the infantry

.
,

reassured got upon their feet and i n th e ir turn bega n

, ,

cautiously t o advance : th e Wood was reoccupied ; and the

blood l ess battl e was handsomely won .

My study of its concluding phase was distu rbed by th e

appeara n ce of a squadron of G erman aeroplanes There .

were about a dozen of th e m and th ey drove down sud ,

d en l y from a great height upon th e va l ley behind m e ,

coming so low as th ey cleared the crest on which I

was standing that the n earest machi n e was not 2 00
feet overhead I saw quite clearly its observer stand
.

up in his cockpit and begi n t o fidd l e about with his

machi n e gu n ; and r e a l ising sud d e n l y that I was a solitary
-

a n d fairly conspicuous figure on the h ill top I ran rather -

,

hurried l y t o a trench close at hand From here I saw th e .

aeroplanes swoop down across th e railway a n d rise steeply

beyo n d and heard the rattle of their machine guns The
,
-
.

bu ll ets as I heard afterwards fl e w a ll round our tanks

, , ,

although n o one was hit The G ermans mu st have

.

realised what a mag n ific e n t target the crowded little

va l ley offe r e d to their h eavy gun s a n d all of u s expected ,

the place t o be shelled furiously withi n hal f an hour ; but

n othi n g of the sort happe n ed as the enemy s artil l ery ,
’

was a l ready in the act of withdrawi n g to position s farther

,

back .

While I was i n the trench I was j oin ed by a doctor

3 96 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N

belo n gi n g to the s th D ivision The l atter was j ust back .

from Ita ly and the M O was very cau stic on the subj ect
, . .

of the Italian Army After talking to hi m for a while I

.

wa l ked down to our valley again by way of the nearer rail

way crossing and there overtook the two tanks of C Com
,

pany on their way home from the 3 rd battle of Lou p a rt

Wood Coutts a n d Chaddock were with them both very
.
,

angry at having been ca ll e d out on such a fool s errand ’

.

It was seve n o clock w hen I rej oined the company by the

’

emba n kme n t and our servants there were preparing some

,

di n n er the m en u i n cludi n g three tinned ch ickens which I

,

had brought from Bienvi ll ers that morn ing I h ad to eat .

my share cold however on a hu n k of bread for as I arrived

, , ,

th e company received orders to move after dark to a point

i n dicat e d on the m a p as a G erman camp a n d h ospital at
G 2 3 b 5 6 ; and J ukes and I had to set off at once to i n
,

v es ti ga te the place It was 3 000 yards away on the high

.
,

grou n d near Bihucourt We fou n d it to consist of a coup l e

.

of im mense sheds presumably the hospita l wards a n eat

, ,

doub l e row of N issen s either sunk i n the grou n d or pro

,

t e c te d by breastworks agai n st aeroplane bombing and a ,

scattered co ll ectio n of oth e r huts a l l rou n d th e whole ex ,

te n di n g on eith e r side of the B ihucourt G r e villers road -

.

Im mediate l y to the north of th e camp ra n the th ird G e r

m a n tr e n ch li n e thick l y wired ; 3 00 yards beyo n d that was
,

t h e railway from Achiet l e G ra n d J u n ction to B apau me ;

- -

and across th e railway were B ihucourt and B iefvillers a ,

mi l e apart and almost equ idistant from th e huts Bapau me

,
.

its e lf l ess than two mi l es away was sti ll hidden by the

, ,

fi n al ridge on top of which a derelict Whippet ma d e a

,

co n spicuous landmark The whole of this cou n try was .

e l evat e d a n d ro ll i n g grass la n d very litt l e sh e l l e d and

-
, ,

cov e red with old camps which we had lost i n the March
retreat .

As we returned to th e valley there were ominous signs

of a ch ange i n the weather C l ouds were ro ll i n g up and .
,

a premature twi l ight was fading rapidly We found the .

398 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

roads we were cheered by the discovery of some lights that

,

seemed to be shining out of the ground and fou nd that , ,

mor e by l uck than j udgment we h a d v e ry l iterally stumble d

,

u pon our destination The brigade headquarters was

.

estab l ished in some huts su nk i n what appeared to be a

quarry a n d practically invisible even in daytime until one
,

fel l over the edge H avi n g groped our way i n to the

.

B r igade Maj or s office and introduced ourselves the

’

Brigadier pr e s e ntly appeared from some subterranean

quarters and exp l ained what he wa n ted u s to do H e .

propos e d t o capture some huts and rai l way sidings b e twee n

B apau m e and Favreui l i n the course of the fo ll owing morn
i n g a n d wished for two ta n k s to mop up after his infantry
, .

T h e t ime of the O peratio n had not been fixed but it wou l d ,

take p l ace i n day l ight as a subsidiary development of the

,

mai n attack which the 6 3 rd D ivision with C Company s ’

tanks was carrying out at dawn from Favreuil to Thi l loy .

The scheme did not com mend itself to u s in the very l e ast .

It showed th e common m isappreh e n sion o f the correct use

of ta n ks a n d violat e d all our tactical princip l es based on
, ,

bitter expe r ience There were on l y two tanks to be used

.
,

which left no margin for accidents ; th e y were to be em

ployed wrong l y to m op up after the infantry instead of ,

preceding the latter ; the attack was to b e gi n in broad

daylight ; and th e approach march necessarily led over the -

bare a n d prom ine n t ridge in front of Bapau m e where the ,

machi n es would certai n l y be detected b e fore they got into

actio n at a ll It was this last consideration which i m
.

pr e ss e d the B rigadier most forcib l y I do not th ink h e .

cared ov e r much about what happened to the tanks but ,

he was very anxious that his attack should not be dis

covered premature l y In the end nothing was sett l ed
.
,

defin ite l y W e agreed to hav e th e two tanks ready to move

.

if r e q u ired The brigade headquarters itself was movi n g

.

forward i n the early mor n i n g to some dug outs in the -

G erman trenches i n front of our huts and we were to ,

report there at nine o clock for further orders ’

.
 T HE G R EAT A D VA N C E 3 99

This proposed attack which came to n othi n g so far as

,

we were concerned illustrates on e of the di fficu lties tank

,

units continually met with during this fin al stage of the

war The infa n try naturally wanted ta n ks whenever they
.

could get th em and brigade and divisional commanders

,

were always demanding two here or th ree there for u se

in some wastefu l and impracticable man ner in minor oper
a ti on s
. Apart from the faulty tactics ( from the point of
View of tank warfare ) which thes e h ur r ied little schemes
usually i nvo l ved tanks were getti n g very scarce in France
, ,

a n d such as were availab l e need e d to be conserved as m uch

as possible for attacks o n a large scale .

H avi n g left thi n gs i n this n ebulous state the M aj or a n d

,

I p l unged once more into the darkness and rain a n d con ,

t r i ve d t o find ou r way back to our n ew camp where we ,

settled down in a hut about 2 A M . .

 C H A P T E R X IX .

T HE F IG H TIN G F O R BE U GN Y , AND T HE AD V AN C E TO

T HE C AN A L DU NO RD .

T HE storm b l ew itself out in the night and the m orn ing of ,

2 5 th August was again sunny and clear with that braci n g ,

fresh n ess that fo l lows after h eavy su mmer rain At nine .

o clock I walked over with the M aj or t o see the Ne w

’

Zealanders We found them now immured in an u n com

.

for ta b l e a n d as I thought highly da n g e rous dug out n ear

, ,
-

the crest of the ridge wh e re the dere l ict Whipp et was

standing The dug out was mere l y a cramped unfinished
.
-
, ,

and untimbered ga ll ery cut in a cru mbli n g soil wh ich

appeared to be in imminent peril of falling in O ne .

entra n c e i ndeed was hal f choked with detritus shaken

, ,
-

dow n by concussion O ur intervie w settled the question

.

about t he tanks After some discussion the B rigadier

.
,

decided against their use to our considerable relief and

, ,

I was no l ess p l eased to get out of that untrustworthy

tunne l into the fresh air .

I wa l ked down to the rai l w ay embankment after this to

hear how M C h l ery s section and C Company had pros
‘ ’

pered in that morning s attack A C ompany s four tanks

’
.
’
,

it appear e d had led the i n fantry into Sapign ies and

,

Behagnies but these villages were only cleared after severe

,

fighting O ne tank was knocked out by shel l fi r e in

.
-

Behagnies its commander Charnock being wounded

, , , .
4 0 2 T HE TAN K IN AC T IO N

of ou r ta n ks into one of the big h ospital sheds and camou ,

fl a ged the others behin d it there be i n g now eight fit ,

machines left in the company A certain amount of r e .

organisation was n ecessary throughout the battalion ; but

everything was turned upside down by a most extraordinary
development on the 2 8 th It had been known for some .

time that a proportion of the o fficers and men of the Tank

Corps in France were to be sent home to provide an e xp er i
e n ce d nucleus for n ew u nits formi n g at Bovington the ,

establishment of the corps having been raised again from

eighte e n to twenty fi ve battalion s -
N ow that we were .

i nvo l ved i n a general offensive however it naturally was , ,

supposed that these cha n ges would be postponed for a time .

That the o ffe nsive would end o n l y with the war was not
then suspected of course by any one least of a l l by Ta n k
, , ,

Corps H Q in London which now took an entirely un ex

. . ,

p e c t e d step The
. personnel selected for England was
called f or at a few hours n otice In the m iddle of a battle
’
.
,

some un its i ncluding the 7 th Battalio n foun d themselves

, ,

deprived at a blow of 3 0 per ce n t of their already reduced

comp l em ents Th e first intimation we of A Company
.

received at Bihucourt was a message which arrived during

th e afternoon of the 2 8 th ord e ri n g all o ffi cers and men
detailed for B ovington to prepare to leave that evening .

This sudde n and wholesale removal a ffected ou r company

more serious l y than either B or C for the party to go i n ,

clu ded the M aj or the second in command two section

, ,

com manders out of three Jukes the Assistant R O seve , ,

. .
,

ral tan k com manders th e orderly room corpora l and a

,
-
,

nu mber of our best a nd m en The company .

,
‘
i n fact lost a l l its senior o fficers M C hl ery the j un ior
,
.
,

section com mander as the only remaini n g Captain foun d

, ,

h imself in charge pending the arriva l of a n ew O C . .

t o be posted to u s from the 1 1 th Battalion B and C .

C ompan ies whi l e less hard hit sent away two section
, ,

commanders apiece ( M erchant being among them ) with a ,

proportion of s ubaltern s and men AS for battalion head .

 THE F IG H T IN G F O R BE U GN Y 4 03

quarters i t virtually disappeared

, The Colonel left to .
,

command a n ew u n it and took with hi m the Adj utant , ,

H enriquez th e R O and most of the orderly room staff

. .
,
-
,

who ru mour had it were all promoted sergeants in th e

, ,

train All this happened as I say i n two or three hours

.
, , .

Lorri es arrived at Bihucourt to t ake away our conting e n t

im mediately after we received the order The Colonel .

rushed up i n h is car to say good bye and t o introduce his -

successor M aj or Thorp to the bewildered residue of A

, ,

Company ; and t hen M C hl ery M El roy and I th e only ‘

,
‘
, ,

survivors present of th e original o ffi cers and i n con sequence ,

responsible between u s for the imm ediate prosecution of the

G reat War retired in a dazed condition to ou r b ut to
,

have a much n eeded drin k before grappling with the new

-

s ituation .

In the meantime while the 3 rd Army paused in front of

,

Bapau me the general offensive was extended n orthward

, ,

where the I s t Army stru ck out from Arras The 3 r d Ta n k .

Brigade som e of whose u nits trekked twenty m iles during

,

the 2 4 th a n d 2 5 th August advanced with the Canadian s ,

against Wancourt G u e mappe and M onchy l e Preux on th e

, ,
- -
,

2 6 th .These places were take n and on the 2 7 th Roeux ,

an d G avrelle north of th e S carpe fe l l also Far t o t h e

, , .

south the 4 th Army an d the French were advancing again ,

an d on our front the G erm an s evacu ated Bapaume o n the

2 8 th .O ur line i n the 3 rd Army sector now ran from n orth ,

to south east of St Leger east of M ory east of Beug n a tre

, , ,

( beyond Favreui l ) across the Cambrai road between,

B apau me an d Fremicou rt an d east of Th il l oy , .

The G erman armies bewildered by th is s e ries of blows , ,

were preparin g to r e treat to th e Si e gfried Lin e and the

Ca n al d u N ord B ut t o give time for their heavy gun s and
.

supplies to escape they held out st iffly dur i n g th e last day s

,

of the m onth along the whole front The 3 rd Army a t .

,
4 04 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

tempting to advance from Bapaume up the Cambrai road ,

was checked before Fremicourt and Be ugny ; and a series of

assaults on the latter village ended in sanguinary failures .

In two of these the 7 th Tan k Batta l ion took part .

O n the morning of the 2 9th while the battalion was in ,

the throes of reorganisation after th e start l ing disappearance

of a third of its o fficers it was ordered to provide eight ,

tanks for an attack with the sth D ivision on Beugny the

fo l lowing morning O ne section of A Company and one o f
.

B were detailed according l y M aj or Rossi Ashton of B ,

-

Company being in command M El r oy a n d I were now

‘
.

running affairs i n the camp near B ihucourt M C h l ery ‘

,

having left us to wrestle with return s and other horrible

matters at B ienvillers where our rear headquarters was
,

still situated Ear l y in the afternoon we received i n s truc

.

tions to move four tanks to the val l ey beyond Biefvillers .

This valley was a wide and shallow depression ru n ning

north and south between the village and the Arras Bapau me -

road We got our tan ks here by about four o clock park

.
’
,

ing them up under a ban k beside a battery of howitzers ,

whose people were very annoyed at our arrival Behind .

us the who l e of C Compa n y s tanks appeared from th e ’

railway at Ach iet l e Petit and hid t hemselves among some

- -

huts on the west side of t he valley An hour later we .

moved again fol l owing th e valley northward and then

,

north east across the Arras Bapau me road to a point almost

- -

north of Favreuil where under another high bank we

, , ,

j oined the four tanks of B Company which were to c o

operate with ours in the attack I will try to make clear .

the features of the count ry that now l ay before us .

Bapaume 3 000 yards due south of our lying up point

,
-
,

stands on a m oderate elevation about 4 5 0 feet above sea

level The grou nd fal l s away from it in a series of spurs
.

to th e north and north east There radiate out from the-

.

t own like t he fingers of a hand and alternate l y along the

,

Spurs and in the v a l leys between four roads the most , ,

wester l y the main h ighway to Arras run ning west of north ; ,

 T HE F IG H T IN G FO R BEU G N Y 4 05

next a road through Fa v reuil running north ; next again ,

one through B eugn a tre ru nn ing north east ; and finally ,

-

the highway through Fremicourt and B eu gny t o Cambrai ,

running north of east All these divergi n g roads except.

the last named were n ow behind our front which had

-
,

reached a point two or three hundred yards east o f

Beugn atre whence i t tren d ed a little west of south crossed
, ,

the Cambrai road between Bapau me and Frem icourt and ,

then continued east of Thilloy The who l e of this country .

was bare rolling grass land of a u niform appearance al l -

, ,

traces of cultivation and even of th e boundaries of fields

having vanished It was dotted with a large number of
.

hutted camps most l y old ones of our own and the only
, ,

cover apart from these was to be found in th e trees

, ,

arou nd the various vi l lages The roads were su nken i n .

p l aces and there was a general rese mblance to parts of

,

Salisbury Plai n except that the undulations were less

,

pronoun ced .

Our two sections of tan ks were to lead the 1 3 th In fantry

Brigade into B eugny This Vi llage lay on the Bapau m e .

Cambrai road a mile east o f Frem icourt It was sur .

rounde d by wire and entrench ment s and was further ,

protected by one of our old defence system s converted by

the G ermans two lines of trenches and e ntanglements
,

running obliquely into our front n orth of Beugn a tre O n .

our le ft the 2 n d Tank Brigade with infantry of the 3 rd ,

Division was t o carry Ecoust Lon ga tte and t he N oreuil

, , ,

Switch while on our right the N ew Zea l anders with a few

, ,

M ark V s were to move straight forward from Bapaume

.
’

upon Frem icourt and B ancou rt Zero was at 5 A M on . . .

th e 3 oth .

The valley in which we were lying preparatory to the

attack was a thoroughly unpleasant place It curled round .

to the north of the spur on which stood Favreu il and

M onument Wood There h ad been a good d e al of fighting
.

here and a nu mber of dead men and horses i n varying

, ,

degrees of decomposition were lyin g about O ur tanks ,

.
4 06 T HE TAN K IN A CT IO N

were drawn up u nder a high bank topped by a row of trees

on the south s ide of the va l ley O n the n orth side a little .

gu ll y lined with rough hutment s that were full of old straw

, ,

dirt smells and flies led up t o the main Arras road at

, , ,

Sapign ies Eastward at the foot of the valley field

.
, ,

batteries were in action ; and beyond them one could see

the lin e of trees a l ong th e road from Beugn a tre to Ecou st
St M ein which m arked approximately our front H aving
, .

found B eale the Reconnaissance O fficer of B Company

, ,

with his tanks I wa l ked forward with him past Favreu il to

,

som e risi n g ground near Beugn a tre We wished to see .

something of the cou ntry before u s whi l e the light held but ,

a l though the even i n g was fine a mist had risen and the ,

s moke of shells bu rsting around the village helped further

to hide the landscape beyond We sat for some t ime in a .

tr e nch memorising as much as we could verify on the map

, .

Camps of N issen huts were clus tered about Beug n a tre and ,

others seemed t o extend far over the monotonous plain

behind toward Beugny It was agreed between us that our .

sections should move together by the track we had j ust

followed to within a few hundred yards of Beugn a tre when ,

Beale would lead h is tanks south of the Village whi l e I took

mine roun d by th e n orth O nce over the front line where .
,

our duties would end the two section s would have each an
,

unmistakable guide to direct them on to Beugny M El r oy s

‘
.
’

tanks wou l d strik e sooner or later th e old converted trench

system of which I have spoken and which it was their ,

first task to clear It would lead them down to t he village

.

from the n orth B Company s tanks on the right had for

.
’

, ,

a guide the Bapau me Cambrai rai l way run ning north of

-
,

the main Cambrai road and roughly para l lel to the latter
until it crossed it between Fre micourt and Beugny In .

an attack over such monotonous coun try shrouded in ,

smoke and the m ist s of early morning it is very easy t o ,

lose on e s direction in a t ank an d as even a temporary

’

delay may provoke serious trouble any obvious means of ,

guidance is an inest imable boon In this case we were .

4 08 THE TA N K IN A CT IO N

n o moon n ow and the night was very dark with a slight

, ,

m ist The distance to our front line beyond Beugn a tre

.

was only 3 000 yards but part of the route was unknown
,

to us and we had to m ove at the slowest speed to prevent

,

noise The two section s separated at the point Beale and

.

I had chosen an d he led his fou r tanks away to the south

,

of Beugn a tre while M El roy an d I held straight on to pas s

‘
,

the n orth end of the Villag e S o far there had been n o .

b i tch ; but now I cou l d not find the track I had noted
earlier in the eve n i n g a n d was forced to feel my way
,

wi thout this Slight he l p There was n o danger of our.

l osing ou r way here for the trees of B eugn a tre and the
,

huts about it w e r e qu ite visib l e but there was always the ,

chance of coming upon some obstacle which the track natu i -

ra ll y wou l d have avoided We ploughed forward through .

l ong grass M El roy and I in front feeling about with sticks

‘
,

for wire or holes and were passi n g to the n orth of the

,

Vil l age which made a vague mass of trees and rui n s on

,

our right whe n she l ls bega n to burst i n front of us There

,
.

ensued a very disturbing quarter of an hour A regular .

barrage fe ll directly i n our path between u s and the ,

Beugn a tre Ecoust road the flashes of the shells comin g

-
,

and goi n g in rapid succ e ssion W e had no time to waste .

i n halting until this was over and indeed we were almost ,

i n it at th e start and havi ng ordered our runners and every

on e e l se who was walking to get into the tanks we m oved ,

on through the barrage M El roy and I continued to wa l k

‘
.

in front as it was necessary for me to act as a guide and

, ,

he i n sisted on staying with me For a fe w m inutes we .

were hoppi n g nimbly about to take shelter on one side or

the other o f the leading tank as th e shells were crashi n g ,

and sparkli n g unp l easant l y near With that good fortun e .

which always seems so extraordinary in the retrospect we ,

passed through without damage to the tanks or ourselves .

The barrage was sti l l falling behind us when the trees along
t he Beugn a tre road appeared out of the darkness We were .

n ow among th e huts of a ca mp and having missed the ,

 T HE F IG H T IN G FO R BE U GN Y 4 09

track I had a i med for we struck th e road at a poin t

,

where it was deeply sunken The first tank crossed without.

di fficulty but the other two experienced some trouble i n

,

mounting the farther bank I pushed on with the leader .

,

leaving M El roy to bring on the others We had come so

‘
.

slowly that the few minutes delay caused by the barrage ’

and our wanderings amon g t he huts threatened to make

us late B eyond the Ecoust road a second one run s out
.
,

of Beugn a tre to the north leading to V au l x V raucourt and

,
-
,

immediately beyond this was ou r front line The tank I was .

leading commanded by Sergeant D ud d r i d ge ( we were so

,

short of officers that two out of the three machines were

in charge of was n ow several hu n dred yards
ahead of the others The sky was already brighteni n g i n
.

the east zero was due in a few minutes and as soon as

, ,

we crossed the second road I began to peer about for the

front lin e So far I had not seen a single infantryman
.

since we started In the sem i O pen warfare i n wh ich we

.
-

w e re en gaged front lines were always indeterminat e features

,

di fficu l t to recognise and liable to frequent flu ctuat ion s ; an d

on this occasion all I ever discovered was a group of thr e e
men crouch ing in a she l l hole who told m e they were in
-
,

support A hundred yards farth er on a blaze an d a crash

.

behind me signified th e open ing of ou r barrage at zero .

I hauled myself up on to th e front of th e tank yelled to ,

S ergeant D ud d r i d ge to get into fou rth speed and pu sh ahead ,

a n d then ran back to look for the others I rem ember .

n othi n g more u ntil I found myself sitting on the ground ,

with my head spinn ing like the proverbial top and a general
feelin g of having been hit all over with som e violence ,

watching the two rear tanks goi n g by As they w e re a .

long way behind the leader several m i n utes must have ,

elapsed There was a hideous noise everywhere and heavy

.
,

shells were thudding all round The G ermans expectin g .

,

an attack had dropped their barrage a few seconds after

,

ours along our front li n e and I m ust have been knocked

,

over ( and temporarily out) by the explosion o f a shel l close

4 10 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

astern o f D ud d r i d ge s tank I got on to my feet with some

’
.

di ffi culty and l ooked for M El roy but he was nowhere to

,
‘
,

be seen The two tanks were already past me and rolli n g

.
,

on i n great style and as my head still appeared to be doing

,

several h undred revolutions a minute I decided t o get out ,

of this in ferno for a whi l e i f I could find some sheltered ,

spot in which to recuperate It was growing light although .

,

the mist and smoke were very thick a n d j ust behind me ,

was a row of old N issen huts protected by earthen ba n ks ,

against bombing raids There w e re n o trenches in sight .

,

and I ran therefore rather unsteadily into one of these

, , ,

huts and found at the end of it a sort of miniature dug out -

,

where I sat for some time trying to induce my head to

behave i n a normal ma n ner It was perfect l y evident that .

the G erman counter barrage was uncom monly heavy as -

wel l as very prompt for the whole gimcrack place shook

,

continuous l y with concussion s close outside .

I mu st have remained here for ha l f a n hour for it was ,

quite light wh e n I cam e out again N oth i n g could be seen .

for smoke and the she ll s were fal l ing as thick l y as ever I
, .

had now to make my way back to the headquart e rs of the

1 3 th In fantry Brigade near Beugn a tre to report that the , ,

tanks had started at zero Still somewhat fogged as I sup .

,

pose I pushed off in the wrong direction altogether toward

, ,

the battle instead of away from it I met a wou nded .

i n fa n tryman looki n g for a dressing station and with th e ,

best intentions took him with me After wandering about .

for some time amo n g huts dodging shells I realised that , ,

we were going wrong by the l ie of the ground wh ich was ,

steadi l y downhi ll and we turned about and groped our

,

way back again through the smoke The brigade head .

quarters where I guessed there would also be a dressi n g

,

station occupied some dug outs in our part of the old

,
-

defence trenches j ust west of the Ecoust road We r eached

, .

it at length after variou s vicissitudes to find every one

, ,

driven u nderground by the shelling The latter i n fact .

, ,

was something quite out of the ordinary The enemy .

,
4 1 2 T HE TAN K IN AC T IO N

place was smoki n g like a furnace It was i mpossible to .

see anything a n d i t would have been suicidal to have gone

,

gropi n g about in the murk for problematical tanks It .

was quite possible that all had been knocked out long
before this The whol e battlefield was extraordinari l y de
.

s e r te d In my two j ou rneys I h a d met only a couple of

.

artillery o ffi cers reconnoitrin g for battery positions two ,

or three wa l king wou n ded and the prisoners whom I saw ,

destroyed Every on e who could find some cover from

.

the ferocious shel l i n g had taken it .

After a fina l hu n t about B eugn a tre I decided to walk ,

back to ou r starting point behind Favreuil And there -

.
,

about m idday I found som e of the o ffi cers and men of the

,

two section s who had been in an hour or two already

, .

C l ose of B Compa n y was having a n umber o f small wounds

, ,

attended to Bea l e hit slightly in the leg by th e same

.
,

shell was there also

, Two out of th e three tanks of .

A Company it appeared had bee n knocked out and two

, , ,

out of the four from B a ll on the dangerous ridge looking ,

down i n to Beugny The surviving ta n ks return ing to the.

,

ra ll ying point aft e r it was p l ain that the infantry could

-

not get n ear the Villag e had found the Fremicourt V alley , ,

as I suspected too hot to hold them —s o hot indeed that

, , ,

it was considered inadvisab l e even to attempt to get them

back through it into safety They were driven against the .

rai l way e mbankment at the head of the valley which ,

a fforded some Slig ht protection an d there temporarily ,

abandoned u ntil the u n precedented shel l ing shou l d have

s l ackened The crews h ad taken refuge in culvert s and
.

other holes and corners where they still remained , .

Al most everywhere the attack had been a failure A .

slight advance had been made and the N ew Zealanders ,

and Mark V s on the right had captured Fremicourt and

.
’

Bancourt ; but the backbone of the position was untouched .

O n our left four tanks of the 1 2 th Battalion misled by an

, ,

infantry guide arrived late and the 3 rd Division attacking

, , ,

Ecoust and Lon ga tte without them could make no pro ,

 T HE F IG H T IN G F O R BE U GN Y 4 3 1

gress Two other tanks which advanced against the

.

trenches called the N oreu il Switch becam e d itched before

they could effect anyth ing Th e assau l t on Beugny itself .
,

as I have indicate d was hardly m ore successful O f , .

M El r oy s three tanks which had C l e ared without much

‘ ’

trouble the o l d trench li n e as far as the spur i n front of the

vil l age two were knock e d out by gun fi re the moment they
,
-

appeared ov e r the high grou nd The third tan k reached .

Beugny but found that the i nfantry could not follow

, .

B Company s section moving along th e railway had a

’
, ,

similar experience — two tanks disab l ed and th e others u n

ab l e to m ake any permanent impression on the vil l age for
l ack of infantry support In addition to Close whose i n .
,

j uries se n t h im to hospita l we had two officers wou n ded , .

S ergean t D ud d ri d ge whos e tank was o n e of those hit on ,

t h e ridge performed extraordi n ari l y fi n e work

, G etti n g .

out his Lewis gu n s he took his crew forward t o j oi n th e ,

i nfantry and ra l lied parties of the latter who h ad lost their

,

o ffi cers and were retiri n g H aving used a ll the ammunition .

of his own gu n he returned alon e to his tank for mor e a n d

, ,

remained inside for some tim e firing 6 poun d er she l ls into -

Beugny H e sent his crew back eventual l y but stayed in

.
,

the firing line himself th roughout th e day turni n g up at ,

Favreui l as p l acid a n d ch e e rfu l as ever late in the evening

, , .

H e won the D C M for this performa n ce . . . .

T h e 3 r d and s th D ivision s seemed ba d ly shaken by this

affair i n which they suffered heavily fro m th e terrific
,

shelling The latter continued on into the after n oon s o

.
,

that it was two o c l ock before the crews of ou r three s ur

’

v i v i n g tanks ( which by a miracle were untou ched ) could, ,

issue from their hidin g p l aces and driv e the m ach ines back -

to Favreuil A semi humorou s element in an otherwise

.
-

nerve wracki n g morning was provided by an o ffic e r of the

-

American Ta n k Corps one of three attached to u s for a ,

few days experience H e had o n l y been i n France a w e ek

’
. ,

and had hard l y see n a gun fired u n til h e rash l y vo l u n t e e red

to go forward with Beale and th e M aj or to th e r a llying
 1
4 4 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

point where he found himself in the middle of as ferocious

,

a bombardment as any one there had ever experie n ced I .

m et hi m afterwards wh en I returned to Favreuil from my

,

wanderings in search of the tanks H e was an extremely .

n ice fe l low an d quite ingenuous in his obviou s delight and

,

surprise at findi n g himself sti l l alive I think his ideas of .

modern war had been drawn from the su rprising j ournals

of his native l and on which our own newspapers are so
,

successfull y modelled ; and u n doubted l y that morning s ’

ordea l had b e en on e of the shocks of h is l ife H e was .

bur n i n g to u se his n e w found know l edge i n confuti n g som e

-

of his fi r e eati n g col l eagues who had been proclaiming

-

( from a distance ) their fondness for battles and gore .

The fighting on the 3 r d Army front from 3 oth Au gust

to 3 r d September was practica ll y a rearguard action on a
very large scale V on Be l ow s 1 7 th G erma n Army its right
.
’
,

threatened by the adva n ce from Arras still clung d e sper ,

ate l y to its position from Ecoust southward O ur fi rst .

attempt to hustle it i n to a pr e mature retreat having fai l ed ,

the attack was renewed the n ext morni n g 3 r s t August , .

The hard hit and somewhat shaken 3 rd D ivision was rein

-

forced by u n its from the 5 6 th a n d 6 2 n d Divisions and nin e ,

tanks of the 1 2 th Batta l ion l e d this in fantry in an other

attack on Ecoust Lo n ga tte a n d the N oreui l Switch which
, , ,

were carried i n spite of a very stubborn defe n ce The pai r .

of tanks respo n sible for the switch and other trenches

between Lon ga tte a n d V aulx V raucourt provided two of -

the most n otab l e i n cide n ts of the morni n g described as ,

follows i n th e 1 2 th Battalion H istory

‘ “

“‘
Lorrai n e ( Lieut Staub ) after working down
’
.
,

V rau court tr e nch to within a thousand yards of V r a u

court itself turned n orth agai n at the request of the
,

infantry to deal with som e m achine guns near V ra u -

416 T HE TA NK IN A CT IO N

which followed u p the army on the heels of the h eavy guns ,

had now moved its branch from Bavincourt t o our village ,

and one was able to enj oy some of the sw e ets of civilisation

i n the form of comfortabl e chairs and passable wine .

Within a day or two this enterprising club had O pened

an other branch at G omiecourt and a third actually i n ,

Behagnies while th e latter was still odorous with dead

,

horses and other uncleared refu se o f the battle .

Returni n g to Bihucourt on the afternoon of the 3 r s t we ,

heard th e first rumours of a possib l e G erman counter attack -

with tanks Two of A C ompany s few remaining machines

.
’

were ordered to stand by to assist the N ew Zealanders in

the event of these ru mours materialising into facts N o one .

believed in them ; but on the following day the enemy did

counter attack at Thi l loy with a couple of his massive
-

P a nz er kr aftwagen and six tanks from our three companies

,

moved toward B apau m e to be at hand if wanted They .

were not wanted although the right hand pair from B ,

-
,

C ompany did a little vo l u ntary work among some huts

,

south of the tow n The counter attack was a failure and .

-

the G erman tanks did n ot get into action at all Their .

half hearted crews drove them ( apparent l y on purpose ) i n to

-

a sunken road and abandoned them there They were .

afterwards towed into Bapaume where they lay in the ,

station yard for ma n y weeks .

Preparations were in hand for a heavy blow to be struck

by both the I s t and 3 rd Arm ies on 2 n d September The .

Canadian s of the I s t Army astride the Arras Cambrai road -

,

and in touch north of Ecoust wi t h the left of our 1 7 th

, ,

Corps were now in front of the famou s D rocourt Qu e ant

,
-

switch line supposed to be stronger than the main B inden

-

burg system Al l the available tanks of the 3 r d Brigade

.

( 9 th 1 l th and 1 4 th Batta l ions ) were to lead the 4 th

, ,

Division and the I s t and 4 th Canadian s against these

formidab l e trenches To the remn ants of the 2 nd Tank .

Brigade the 1 2 th and 6 th ( Light ) Battalions was a l lotted

, ,

th e capture of Lag n icourt and M orch ies n orth east of ,

-
 T HE F IG H T IN G F O R BE U GN Y 4 1 7

Beugny with the infantry of the 6 th Corps For ou r part

,
.
,

we were to supply twelve ta n ks for a renewed attempt with

the s th D ivision on Beugny and for a further operation south ,

of Bapaume again st V il l ers a u Flos beyond Th illoy Fou r - -

, .

tanks of C Company were detailed for each of these

obj ectives a section of B Company following up i n
,

reserve.

As everybody knows the attack of th e Is t Army on the ,

Drocou rt Qu e ant Switch was a brilliant success To quot e

-
.

Colonel B uchan It went clean th rough all th e line of on e

,
“

of the stro n gest position s in th e West and took six miles ,

of the switch the vi l lages of Etai n g Dury ( with th e

, ,

i mportant H ill of Du ry ) V i l lers l es Cagnicourt and N oreuil ,

- -

and 8 000 prisoners ”

The Switch i n e ffect had fallen as
.
, ,

th e H indenbu rg Line fell at Cambrai instant l y and this , ,

t ime irrevocably But Co l on e l Buchan does n ot explain

.

how it was carried so swift l y and easily H e does not .

men tion tanks and leaves it to b e assu med that the in fantry
,

unaided fought their way i n an hour or so through triple

trenches and belts of wire It wi l l be well therefore t o .
, ,

point out that once more the assau l t was led by ta n ks of ,

which fi fty seven ( al l the 3 r d Brigade could muster ) were

-

e mployed Fifty three got into action On l y the most

.
-
.

strenuou s exertion s got th e depleted and disorganised tank

units ready and in position for the battle The 1 1 th .

Battalio n wh ich had recaptured the debris of M onchy l e

,
-

Preux on the 2 5 th had to trek across the whole front of the

,

Canad ian Corps often withi n 1 000 yards of the line to

, ,

reach the 4 th D ivision with which it was attackin g Etaing , ,

i n the m arshes of the Se n s é e It i s possible that the enemy .

heard this approach as he sent up S O S signals three , . . .

m inutes before zero The tanks carried the massive tre n ches
.

of the Switch but had to make so wide a detour farther on

,

to avoid the marshes that they could not reach Etaing with
the i nfant ry In the centre twenty three out of twenty four
.
,
- -

machines of the 9 th Battalion reached their final obj ectives ,

which included Dury where th e Town M aj or was taken ,

2 D
4 18 T HE T AN K IN AC T IO N

prisoner The 1 4 th B attalion on the right was n o less

.
, ,

successful but had seven tanks knocked out beyond the

,

Switch It is estimated that in this attack one company

.
“

o f tan ks alon e destroyed over seventy hostile machine gun s -

,

the G erman gu n ners surren dering to the tanks as they

” 1
approached South of th e Canadians the 1 7 th Corps of
.
,

the 3 rd Army clos e d on the great k n uckle of forti fi cations

about Qu e ant where the Switch j oined the main Hi nd e n
,

burg Li n e Qu e ant was a l most surrounded by nightfal l

. .

The 6 th Corps in th e meantime had not fared so well and

, ,

two compa n ies of the 1 2 th Tank Batta l io n were sacrificed

by the fai l u r e of the infantry to arrive at the t im e they
themselves had arranged and by th e ir i n ability to get for ,

ward when a t length they did reach th e point of attack .

Z e ro for some reason was fix e d for

, half an hour late r
,

than was the case with the corps on th e left so that the ,

enemy s retaliation there overlappi n g the 6 th Corps front

’

,
’
,

fell about the tan ks of on e compa n y of the 1 2 th and th e y ,

w e re moved forward i nto N o M a n s La n d to escape it O ur ’

.

barrage cam e down at but t he assau l ting infa n try had

not arriv e d ; and it bei n g considered equally dangerous to
keep the tanks statio n ary or to attempt to withdraw th e m ,

they were se n t forward alone in the hope that they cou l d ,

keep down th e G erman machine gun fire while th e belat e d -

infantry go t into position and advanced Th e l atter were .

forty minutes lat e and then made no advan ce at a l l The

, .

tanks cruised about destroying machine gun posts arou n d

,
-

N oreu il until they came und e r the fire of field batteri e s ,

when most of them were knocked out O n l y two out of .

nine retur n ed The company on the right with eight

.
,

tanks receive d little better support in its attack on V au l x

,

Wood and M orchies and suffered a l most as heavi l y The

, .

battalion left twe l v e machines out of seventeen on the field ,

a n d lost eight o fficers and fi fty six other ranks The 3 rd -

.

Division which was responsible for the disastrous fiasco

,

on the left had shown a progressive deteriorat i on in quality

,

W k l y Ta k N t 1
ee n o es.
’
4 20 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N

Company three of whose tanks subsequent l y broke down

,

east of the village while on their way home and had tem ,

p ora r i l y to be abando n ed The fighting was severe the .

,

G erman machine gunners ho l ding out to the last with that

-

conspicuous bravery which they displayed in almost all

these actio n s ; and th e fourth tank com manded by Sergeant ,

Penny having done sp l endid work in the village returned

, ,

plastered grey wi th l ead and stuck all over with armour

piercing bu l lets The other section in the meantime
.
, ,

working agai n with the sth D ivision had again found ,

Beug n y u n co n querable The p l ace was a veritab l e fortress

.
,

e n trenched a nd wired and he l d by a larg e garrison with fi e l d

gu n s ; and although our infantry as a result of the first attack , ,

were close to th e outskirts they were checked at th e start ,

by i n tense machine gun fire and fai l ed to make any progress

-
,

beyond a slight advan ce to the north of the vi ll age The .

ta n ks could do nothing alone and the affair was another ,

expensive failure It cost us th e life among others of

.
, ,

Ad n ey a boy who j oined the batta l ion before Cambrai

, ,

wh e re he got the M ilitary C ross a n d who was now killed ,

in rather extraordinary and still obscure circu mstances H e .

had with h im two of my old crew Corporal M itchell and ,

Taylor H is tank having pushed on alo n e in default of

.
,

i n fa n try support cruised along the north side of Beugny

, ,

firi n g i n to it an d then started to return It was h it a p

, .
,

p a r e n tl y somewhere in front by a Shell which wounded

, ,

Tay l or ( who was driving ) a n d filled the inside with smoke .

Ad n ey and the rest of the crew believi ng th e machine to ,

be d isab l ed as it had stopped scrambled out but findi n g

, , ,

themse l ves isolated among groups of G ermans ran back ,

and got inside again with th e exception of Corporal ,

M itchell who was captured

, The tank on examination .
, ,

proved to be still i n running order Sh e was therefore .

started up and driven to w ard our l ines She was now hit .

a second time in the petrol tank and fi nally disabled and

, , ,

simultaneously it appears Adney was killed by a bullet

, ,

which came through his O pen flap Presumab l y i t was .

 T HE F IG H T IN G F O R BE U GN Y 421

fired by one of our own infantry The latter making a .

slight advance at this point the rest of the crew escaped , ,

carrying Taylor with them an d shortly after Corporal ,

Mitche l l was rescu ed from a dug out where h is captors -

had left him I happened to be in C Company s huts in

.
’

the Favreuil V alley talking to Coutts and A l d e n who had

, ,

j ust returned from the action when M itche ll who was , ,

supposed to be killed made a dramatic reappearance He

, .

had lost his watch and everythin g else in his pockets ,

but otherwise was non e th e wors e for h is fi fte e n m inutes -

’

captivity .

W e had not yet finished with B eugny Toward dusk on .

2 n d September I was waiti n g about i n our camp at B ihu

court for th e M aj or wh o was taki ng m e back to B ie n vi l lers

,

i n his car Word had come through that the I s t Tank

.

Brigade was to be withdrawn int o Army Reserve t o refit an d ,

those of u s who had nothing particular to do were return

ing to our old headquarters that night I was especially .

glad of this release as the symptom s of a n oth e r attack of

,

influ e nza (or some kindred variant of were beginning

to affect m e and I was lo n gin g for bed At this ti me
, .

battalion headquarters had established an advanced base

at B ihucourt in on e of the huts and the Ma jor was now ,

co n ferring there with the Colonel who had j ust arrived ,

.

U nconscious of my doom like on e of the i n fa n ts i n the

,

poem I was standing about outside when th e M aj or a p

,

p e a r e d to summon me as I supposed to the car

, H is , .

first words dissipated th is natural delusion .

”
Th ere s another dog fi gh t on t o night he said
’
-
They ,
.

want two of our tanks for Beugny again .

Beugny was becoming a perfect curse to the battalio n a ,

sort of K ing Charles s head or O l d M an of the Sea This

’
,
.

was the third time in fi ve days that we had been called upo n
to tackle it and it was A Company s s econd turn in the
,
’
4 22 THE TAN K IN A C T IO N

pleasant round We were I think i nclined to feel that

.
, ,

the s th D ivision might ha v e done their own work on this

occasion without dragging u s int o it again as we had ,

given them two O pportunities wh i ch they had failed to seize .

H owever the thi n g had t o be done

, We were working .

once m ore with our old acquaintances the 1 3 th Infantry

Brigade who had attacked the place with us on the 3 oth
,
.

O ur on l y fit ta n ks three or four and none of them in good

, ,

condition were sti ll in t he valley by Favreuil We had n o

,
.

o fficers available as tank comma n d e rs and two sergeants ,

were sent off to prepare the most l ikely machines for action .

M El roy wh o was once more to share with me the respons i

‘
,

bi l i ti e s of o ffi ce was already aw a y at B ienvi l lers no doubt

, ,

luxuriating in a bath a n d the prospect of several days of

peace ; and a car was despatched to bring h im back to these
u np l easa n t realities After a hu rried meal with the Colone l
.
,

the M aj or and I departed in h is V auxha l l for the 1 3 th

Brigade H eadqu arters still in the dug out n ear Beug ,
-

n atr e . A s it was n ow quite dark we were ab l e to drive ,

most of th e way to th e village We found the Brigadier .

and h is B rigade M aj or in th e dug out and obtained from -

,

them the p l an of attack and the r é l e the two tanks w e re

expected to p l ay Beugny it appeared was t o be dea l t.
, ,

with faith fu l ly at last S ix field batteries and on e battery .

of 6 inch howitzers were to pound it for half an hou r

~

before the i n fa n try advanced The tanks were required .

only to clear a tren ch which ran immediately behind the

vil l age It appeared rather obvious that if the l atter was
.

carried the fall of the trench wou l d be only a matter of

,

time and that i f the artillery preparation was suffi ciently

,

thorough an d accurate both village and trench ( together ,

a sma l l and compact target ) wou l d be rendered so u n ten

able that tanks would not be need e d for their capture .

One cannot argue with brigadiers however We promised , .

that the tanks Should arrive if we could get them there I , .

remember this interv iew held in a candle lit compartment ,

-

of the dug out with peculiar C learness -

, I had seen the .
4 24 T HE TA N K IN A CT IO N

they had been throughout the evening and it was di fficult ,

t o accou n t otherwise for these sudden glar e s on the horizon .

In the m eantime the tank we had left in the sunken road

,

had not overtake n us and our remaining machine was ,

giving trouble O ne or two delays due to engi n e defects

. , ,

wasted a l ot of valuable time Zero was at and it was .

four o clock befor e at length we struck th e railway at a

’

point marked by two stacks of fodder an d an overturned

Whippet This machin e incidentally had been the cau se
.
, ,

of a very ga ll ant actio n a few days b e fore One of a .

s e ction of the 3 r d Batta l ion sent i n to c l ear up the situ

”
atio n ( whatever that euphemistic phrase m a y mea n ) on
2 9 th August the Whippet had turned comp l etely over i n a
,

sh e l l —hole catching fire at the sam e time The door of the

,
.

cab was j ammed in the earth and the crew of three was ,

i mprisoned upside dow n in burning oil The comma n der of .

anoth e r Whippet Li e utenan t Sewel l got out under inte n se

, ,

machine gun fire at close ra n ge and with a Shov e l dug out

-
,

and forced open the door of the inverted tank H e l iberated .

the crew but was shot i n severa l places and killed together
, ,

with h is driver while e n d e avouri n g to return t o his own

,

machine A posthumous V C was awarded h im

. . . .

H aving found the rai l way we pushed along beside it at ,

a good speed The fires in the east were growi n g brighter

.
,

and th e extreme quietness of the n igh t confirmed me in my

belief that the expecte d retreat of the enemy actually was
b e gun When we reached the head o f the v alley which had
.

been our i nauspicious selection as a ral l ying point for the -

3 oth the tank deve l oped further eccentricities and e v e n tu

, ,

a ll y refu sed to move at all The e n gine stopped and n o .

,

coaxing wou l d start it up again Th ere was n o sign of the .

second tank At a quarter past five as we were st i l l 1 000

.
,

yards from our front line M El r oy and I decided that

‘
,

n othing more could be done We told the crew to take .

refuge in a culvert which ran through the railway embank

,

me n t close at hand if the tank was d iscovered and shelled

,

at dawn and then we began to make our way back to t h e

,
 T HE F IG H T IN G F O R BE U GN Y 4 25

1 3 th
Brigade H eadquarters to report our fai l ure We were .

nearing the Beug n a tre road as the barrage fell upo n Beugny
at zero Dawn was breaking and as deafe n ed by the
.
, ,

throbbing c l am our of the batteries a ll round u s we l ooked ,

back eastward from the rising ground we saw fresh fires ,

blazing and clouds of white s moke rolli n g away from a

dozen points far beyon d the range of our sh e l ls There .

could be hard l y any doubt about it n ow : the G erman

retreat had begun At the brigad e headquarters we fou n d
.

nobody but a few signal officers an d other d e tails staring

at these distant co n fl a gra ti on s and t hey had no n ews t o ,

give us ; but trampi n g on to B iefvillers we met the M aj or

in h is car and learnt fro m hi m that the enemy had i ndeed
,

van ished in the n ight Beugny pulverised for half an h our

.
,

by high exp l osives was empty of al l livi n g th ings Only

,
.

a fe w m achine gun n ers were l e ft amid the debris of th e

-

retreat between u s an d the C anal d u N ord .

O n 4 th September the whole Tank Corps was withdrawn

into G H Q Reserve to refit an d reorganise Si n ce the
. . . .

2 1 8 1 August 5 1 1 tanks had bee n in action

, and had been ,

large ly responsib l e for a succession of victories in which we

had captured prisoners an d 4 7 0 gu ns The I s t 2 n d .
, ,

and 3 r d Tank Brigades were now so crippled that they

could n ot have m ustered fifty fit machi n es between them .

The 4 th and 5 th B rigades having suffered h e avily on ,

8 th August and after had l ess work to do in th e course of

,

the 4 th Army s subsequent advance sout h of the S om me for

’
,

which reason I have not atte mpted amid so m uch other ,

matter t o follow their action s during th is fort n ight ; but

,

they were hardly less reduced and i n need of rest than th e

three northern brigades .

Strikes and th e vacillating policy of the author i ties i n

,

respect of tan ks had left the corps with n o reserve from

,
4 26 T HE TA N K IN A CTIO N

which casualties and worn out mach i n es could be replaced -

.

The ratio of wastage i n any series of tank actions from ,

m echan ical causes alone was very large in creasing pro , ,

p or ti o n a te l y as machi n es were u sed again and again with

n o opportunity between times for a thorough overhaul O n .

the other hand th e maj ority of repairs needed were only of

,

a mi n or character ; and after a week s rest a battalion which ’

had been reduced perhaps to half a dozen serviceable tanks

could put twenty or thirty into th e field aga i n Cases of .

disablement by gu n fi r e of course fe l l i nto a di fferent

-
, ,

category Such machines as cou l d be sa l ved on the spot

.

and were worth repairing were despatched t o Centra l Work

shops whose personnel a t this tim e was working day and
,

n ight bu t the replacement of shattered armour plate was

,
-

a longer j ob than a change of t rack plates or rollers In -

.

any case n othing could make up for th e lack of an adequate

,

reserv e of new tanks The batches of Mark V s which . .

’

came out fro m England replaced only a smal l port io n of

the casu alties in the doze n battalions which used that type ,

and the 1 2 th B attalion and ourse l ves carried on to the end

with M ark IV s most of which wer e n early two years old
.
’

,
.

The period of r e organisation after 4 th September i n

cluded the in evitabl e r e s h u ffl i n g of battalions among th e
five brigades It wi l l be enough to state here th at the
.

1 s t Brigade was made up once more of its old u nits the ,

7 th 1 1 th and 1 2 th B atta l ions

, , The 3 o r st American Ta n k .

Battalion was attached for a short t im e and came with

some M ark V s to B ihucourt where the 7 th remained
.
’
, .

The fever which I had fe lt to be impendin g before ou r

,

last abortive atte mpt to reach Beugny took a good grip of ,

m e i mmediate l y afterwards and I spent three or four days ,

in b ed at B ienvi ll ers at first in my tumble down bi l let in

,
-
,

a ro o m that swarmed with flies and reeked of chloride of

l ime and then when I could stand this n o longer under
, , ,

a tarpaulin in an orchard When I visited the camp at .

Bihu c o urt again after a lapse of a week it was a scene of

, ,

v iolent activity due largely to the Americans Why these

, .
4 28 T HE T AN K IN AC T IO N

this little matter by a condescending and casual man n ered -

N C O or private full of familiar tal k and audibly chewing

. . .
,

g u m .The meal was then consumed from the pan n ikin , ,

wherever the o fficer happened to be Thi s was n ot in .

some tre n ch before an attack but in camp at B ihucourt , ,

now eight or ten miles behind the lin e The whole .

”
American Army of course was dry in theory and , ,
“
,

seemed to sub sist large l y on beans and bacon Poor .

J ack B rown who was attached t o the 3 O I St for a few

,

days when that batta l ion l eft u s for th e H avrincourt

region co m p l ained bitterly that he was ha l f starv e d whi l e
,

he was with th e m as the officers d e pendent upon the men s , ,

’

cook house had n o meal after tea an d nothi n g alcoholic to

-

, ,

drink at any time These peculiarities trifling i n them .

,

s e l ves were symptomat ic o f that puerile e l ement in the

,

Am e rican character which seem s so incongruou s in an

otherwise preternatural l y acute peop l e The whole force .

was a stra n ge compou nd of zeal intellig e nce fads and , , ,

co n ceit Th e m e n fought well enough as did every one

.
,

e l se except the Portuguese Being the fi rst contingents .

drawn from a vast population they were physical l y and ,

menta ll y of the best type They w e re keen to a d e gree .

,

and honest l y anxious i n their own peculiar way to learn , ,

e verything But they had learnt n o more than the rud i

.

ments of their j ob when the war ended Their staff work .

broke down hopeless l y u nder any strain The army i n .

,

Short wanted a n other year or so of hard experience

, After .

the Armistice in America I understa n d people wore i n

, , ,

th e ir button holes l ittle discs o n which were inscribed

-
,
”
the words We went to do it and we ve done it
,
“
In ,
’
.

th e same spirit the Prussian s and the Belgians claimed

to have w on the batt l e of Waterloo .

This peaceful inter l ude at B ihucourt lasted for a fort

n ight The battalion was busy overhauling tanks resting
.
, ,

washing and r e equipping perso n nel and preparing in

,
-

g e neral for the forthcomi n g attack on the reputably form i d

ab l e position to which the G ermans had retired The .
 T HE F IG H T IN G F O R BE U GN Y 4 29

weather cha n ging with t he fortun es of th e war after a

, ,

few rain storms in the beginning o f the month had settled

-
,

down to another spe ll of sunny days which mad e even ,

th e obliterated landscape arou n d Bapau me seem compara

t i ve l y attractiv e For amus e ments we had a veritable
.
,

museu m of battle re l ics at Achiet l e G rand wh ere i n addi - -

, ,

tion t o a h ost of d isabled tanks awaiting trai n s for Eri n ,

there was the a n ti tank stockad e and a m isce ll aneou s

-

assortment of captured G erman guns which a we e k or ,

two earlier had m ade ou r lives a burden ; while we were

surrounded by a congeries of offi ce r s clubs that rem i n ded ’

o n e of St J ames s Street aft e r a social upheaval and an

’

e arth quake The after many m onths e n forced ’

.

absence from the Prom ised La n d had erected once more ,

its huge marqu ees at Achi e t l e G rand itself the 6 th Corps - -

had its clubs at G om iecourt an d Behagnies and i n B ihu ,

court th ere was a N ew Zeala n d O ffi ce rs C l ub with a fi r s t ’

rat e library — man n a from heaven i n such a wi l d erness .

For one who lives o n books it i s difficult to speak with

ca l mness of the Spirit a n d enterpri se which in spired this
l iterary mission NO British club or i nstitutio n that I
.

ever discovered fi n France troubled about books at al l i f ,

we except the dog s eared cheap edition s i n the ’

-

ca n teen s The Canadians had a sma ll library of i n s tr uc

.

ti on a l works ( horrible thi n gs ) which fo ll owed them about ;

but it was left t o the N ew Zealand D ivisio n to establish ,

in a ru i n ed hou se i n B ihucourt am ong other places a , ,

genuine library of volumes i n good edition s— she l ves of

verse history geography books of reference fiction and
, , , , ,

so on labelled and well kept and obviou sly in dema n d

, , .

Among the many miracles of th is war I cou n t this dis ,

c ove r y amon g the m ost noteworthy U n fortunate l y for .

me I came upon it too late although it was at my very

, ,

door O ne does not look for pearls among the refuse of

.

a battle a n d I only heard of the library by accid e n t Two

,
.

days later we h ad left the place a n d did not meet the N ew ,

Zealand D ivision again B ut i f any on e from that D ominion

.
4 30 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

should read this book I hope h e will accept the than ks of

,

one ( I have n o doubt among many ) who received ben e fits

from this exceptional enterprise .

O n the morning of 1 8 th September the battalion received

orders to trek to M orchies n orth — , east of Beugny of e v il
,

m emory The Co l onel and the company com manders went

.

ahead in cars to prospect for a camp a n d retu rned e n th us i

,

asti o about some mysteriously empty huts ( another G erman

hospita l ) which they had discovered Early in the after .

n oon i n bri l lia n t sunshi n e the eight tan ks that A Company

, ,

had n ow got fit again for actio n were trekking across the

ro l ling grass l and of our old battlefie l d ; B Compa n y from
-

the va l ley behind us a n d C from Favreuil had j oined in the

, , ,

procession and before dusk we were unpacking and settling

ourselves down in ou r new quarters .
43 2 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

of seven miles by the t rees of Bourlon Wood I began to

, .

fee l sure that these apparently e l igible quarters had their

disadva n tages which had proved t oo much for previous
,

t e na n ts ; a n d i n fact on the following mornin g j u st after ,

the crews had marched away to their tanks heavy She l ls ,

b ega n to fall am ong th e huts A cook and a water cart .

-

driver were ki l le d a n d several oth er men badly wounded

, ,

and it became painfully obvious that the hospital was n o

place for us B ivou acs were forme d at once i n the valley
.
,

and the men tra n sferred to th e m that n ight The o ffi cers .

remai n ed for a n other day i n their ow n hu ts nearer the

vi ll age but eve n tually were drive n out by persistent she l l
,

i n g and on l y one large bu i l ding was retained as a Recon

,

naissanc e O ffice Bea l e ( who was now Batta l ion R O in

. . .

p l ace of H e n riquez ) J ack Brown and I were fortunate i n

, ,

discovering the only empty dug out i n the n e ighbourhood -

a cosy littl e place of two rooms part l y excavated from th e

Side of a sunken road where we lived in gr e at com fort for
,

the remainder of our stay Every o n e e l se moved into .

te n ts i n the va l ley In t e rmittent shelling of the high

.

ground continued every day .

We were v e ry bu sy duri n g th is tim e with preliminaries

for the forthcomi n g ren ewal of the general offensive The .

G erma n s had fa ll e n back t o their last prepared position i n

the West and this was to be attacked by the 1 s t 3 r d a n d
, , ,

4 th Armies o n a fro n t of over thirty m i l es from the Sensée

to St Quentin The I s t and 3 r d Armies were to deliver the
.

in itial b l ow toward Bourlon and Cambrai on 2 7 th Septem

ber Op e rations in this sector were complicated and to
.
,

som e extent awkwardly cramped by a water obstacle which

comp l ete l y protected Cambrai to the n orth and north west -
.

The marshes of th e Sensée runn ing from east to west cross

, ,

the line of the Agache and the Canal d u N ord runn ing from ,

n orth t o south near Ecourt St Q uenti n the two systems

, ,

formin g an i m passabl e angle of water and marsh which

lim ited the share of the I s t Army in th e attack to its right
wing the Canadi an Corps south of the Arras Cambrai
, ,
-
 THE C A N AL DU N ORD A ND BO U R LO N 433

road In addition to th e m arshes of th e Agach e the Canal

.
,

d u N ord a l though u nfin ished was full of water as far as

, ,

S ain s les M arquion five miles south of its crossing o f the

- -
,

Sensée For another fou r m i l es t o a point south of the

.

Bapaume Cambrai road where we were now east of the

-
,

canal at H avrin court Wood i t was dry forming an i m , ,

mense ditch 5 0 feet wide an d 1 5 feet deep with steep ba n ks ,

of brick At the vi l lage of M oeuvres 3 000 yards be l ow

.
,

Sains les M arquion it was crossed by th e original Hi n d e n

- -
,

burg or Siegfried Line which trended away to the south ,

east until i t reached the Canal de L Es ca ut at Bantouze ll e ’

.

West of M oe uvre s th is li n e was in our possession and oper

a ti on s since th e G erma n withdrawa l and known as the ,

battles of H avrincourt and Epehy had carried the 3 r d a n d ,

4 th Armies across th e canal south of M oeuvre s t o with in

striking distance of the eastern or G erman section of the
fam ous tre n ches Tanks of the 4 th an d s th B rigades had
.

help ed the 4 th Army in th ese operatio n s on th e 1 8 th 2 1 s t , ,

and 2 4 th September From north to south our li n e on th e .

2 6 th ran from Ecourt S t Que n ti n n ear th e Sen sée w e st ,

of the C anal d u N ord t o below M oeuvres thence across th e ,

ca n al and through H avrin court G ouzeaucourt and Epehy , ,

in face of the S i e gfried Line Th e mai n battle was t o open .

on the 2 7 th when the Canadians and th e 3 r d Army w e re

,

t o carry the line of the ca n a l and the H inde n bu rg trenches 1

as far as G ouzeaucou rt the 4 th Army carrying on the ,

offe n sive to the south on the 2 9 th .

The impossibility of crossi n g th e Canal d u N ord above

M arqu ion had l e d t o a redistribution of the I s t Ta n k
Brigade The 7 th Battalion having become well acqua i n ted
.

with the Canadians i n the course of severa l weeks traini n g ’

was attached to the m for their attack b e tween M arquion

an d M oeuvres Th e 1 s th Battalion with M ark V s was
.
, .
’
,

borrowed from th e 2 n d Brigade t o help th e 1 7 th Corps of

1
Th eH i d burg L i it may b t d w a g ric t rm u d by t
n en n e, e no e , as ene e se us o

c v r th wh l ri f d f nc y t m ca ll d by th G rma th Si g fri d
o e e o e se es o e e e s s e s e e e ns e e e ,

H u di g W ta Li
n n , & o n n es , c.
4 34 THE T AN K IN A CT IO N

the 3 r d Army south o f M oeuvres The 1 1 th Battalion also .

,

with M ark V s h aving moved down from our left was

.
’

, ,

allotted to the 4 th Corps for the front between Trescault an d

G ouzeaucourt .The 1 2 th Battalion remained in reserve .

It is n ecessary to give here a more detailed description of

the canal and th e country on either side of it I have .

spoken of a valley trendi n g north eastward from M orchies -

to Qu e ant . If on e walked along the high ground from ou r

camp to the right of this va l ley one cam e presently to a n
other depression which fell away to Pro n vi ll e a mi l e east ,

of Qu e a n t From Pronville a third va ll ey led at an obtuse

.

ang l e due east to Inchy e n Artois a n d the cana l

- -
D own its .

centr e curled the dry bed of the H irond e l le stream lined by ,

willows poplars a n d the anti tank a ba tti s of railway iron ;

, ,
-

and a l o n g the ridges which enclosed it to n orth and south

were sited the deep tre n ches and trip l e belts of wire of those
portion s of the H indenburg Front a n d Support Lines already
i n ou r possession The southern ridge rose to a co n sider
.

able height — some 3 5 0 feet— and on approach i n g the canal

inclined northward in a final Spur which sank to the level s
of the Agache near Sai n s l e M arquion The village of Inchy
- -
.

stood on the tip of this spur raised slightly ab ove the levels
,

and within 1 000 yards of the canal M oeuvres a mile to th e .

,

south and a l most on the canal bank was at the foot of th e ,

higher e n d of the spur The eastern slope of the latter fell

.

gently li ke a gl a ci s to our front l ine and through scattered ,

trees beyond one could see the white chalk embankment of

th e cana l about Lock 4 O ur line took in both the villages
.
,

but there was fighti n g in M oeuvres a day or two before the

big attack and the fron t here was rather vague and was
,

give n incorrect l y on our m aps On one occasion when J ack .

,

B rown had driven me al most into Inchy in his s ide car -

,

we wa l ked casua ll y alo n g behind th e vi l lage until we found

ourselves in a ditch full of Stokes guns and peop l e crawling
about in furtive attitudes and l earnt to our astonishment
,

that we were i n our outpost line Our subsequent attempts .

to see somethin g from the outer hou ses o f Inchy itself ,

43 6 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

to differ considerably in detai l and th e drawings them ,

s e lves were of u ncertain v a l ue Time and shell fi re h a d .

-

changed the profi le of the canal ba n ks in many p l aces ,

whi l e the G erman s were reported to have been at work on

th e u nfinished portions for some pu r p ose o f their own 1
A .

nu mber of indication s pointed to the fact that they con

s i d e r e d the can al to be an i n superab l e obstacle to tanks ,

except at the causeways they had cut through its ba n ks .

Th ese it was a l most certai n would be m i n ed The su m .

of our discoveries obtained from th e se sources and from

,

aeroplane photographs and more or less d istant obs e rva

tion through bi n oculars can be set out as follows It , .

refers only to that portion which the 7 th Tank Battalion

had to n egotiate .

N orth east of Inchy was a broken iron girder b ri d ge

-
.

From this point to another bridge also destroyed at , ,

M oeuvres the canal r a n i n a dead straight l i n e pointin g

,

a l ittle to the east of south The embankments on their .

outer sides were 6 t o 1 0 feet i n height They were 2 0 .

feet broad The in n er faces fel l to the canal bed i n two

.

stages : first there was an almost sheer drop partially

, ,

bricked of about 9 feet then a step or p l atform 8 feet

, ,

wide and fi n a l ly a slope of 1 i n 2 which descended for

,

another 5 feet to th e cana l bed The latter was 3 6 feet .

across M idway between Inchy and M oeuvres there was

.

an unfin ished concrete lock numbered 4 Im mediately ,

.

south of the Inchy bridge the banks had been cut and a
causeway constructed out of the debris across the canal
bed Two similar causeways existed between Lock 4 and
.

M oeuvres All these were required for ou r arti l lery It

. .

was suspected that they were mined ; and as they would be

complete l y b l ocked by a n y tanks which happ e ned to be d i s
abled whi l e crossing we were a l lowed t o u se on l y on e that
, ,

nearest to M oeuvres .

1
f u d that f v ra l hu dr d yard b tw M u v r
It was o n , or s e e d I chy th n e s e e en oe es a n n , e

G rma had cut i th a t r ba k a v rti c a l wa ll i f t d p v id t l y

e ns n e e s e n n e n ne ee ee , e en as

ana ti ta k b tac l Ta k f th 1 5 th Batta l i ucc d d i c l imbi ng thi

n -
n o s e. n s o e on s ee e n s.
 T HE C A N AL DU NORD A ND BO U R LO N 437

A and C Companies each with eight tanks in two sec ,

tions were detai l ed for the O peration B Company remain

, ,

ing i n reserve C crossing near the In chy bri d ge had a

.
, ,

comparative l y easy task The canal at th is poi n t was on l y

.

half fi n i s h e d and the bank s were low and d ilapidated A

-

, .

Compa n y on the right was faced by a far m ore serious prob

lem We had it is true the use of a causeway but thi s
.
, , ,

was a doubtful privi l ege If as every one b elieved ( and as.

,

the event proved ) it was m ined the leadin g tank probably ,

would be disabled and would block the passage One .

section however was detailed to attempt th is hazard It

, , .

remained to fi nd some crossing place for the other section -

over the embankm ent itself The latter was known t o be .

almost fi nished in this portion and appeared to be little ,

damaged ; and wh ile it might prove easy enough for tan ks to

slide down on to the canal be d ( although the first drop of
9 feet was n ot an attractive feature ) to climb the other side ,

was a very di fferent m atter As th e brickwork was i n com .

p l e te we could only h ope that t he earth on top after fou r ,

years exposure t o rain and a recent pounding by shell fi re

’
-
,

had crumbled a n d fallen over the steep upper lip to form a

possible slope The di fficulties were thought to be so great
.
,

however that a very wild expedient to overcome them was

,

proposed and actual l y adopted Three u nfit M ark IV . .

t anks were to be brought up driven into the canal at zero , ,

an d there manoeuvred i nto position side by s ide across the

bed to form a bridge for the others This was all very .

characteristic of theoretical staff o fficers wh o had never

driven a tank the mselves and had n o conception of th e
di fficulties involved in such a scheme With u nfit M ark .

IV S at least hal f an hou r would have been taken in

’
.
,

getting them into position if everythin g else went well , .

If one was hit by the barrage which was almost certain to

fa ll on the canal the whole enterprise would be ruined at
,

the start Fin ally assu ming th e bridge to be made it is

.
, ,

very doubtful if it would have stood the weight of the fi gh t

ing machin es as they crossed over Tanks are n ot con .
4 38 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

structed to support thirty ton s i n movement on their roofs .

1

In the end however the experiment never reached the

, ,

point of test The only m achines available were some o f

.

the 7 th Battalion s derelicts still lying under repair far

’

behind at Bucquoy in the hands of salvage crews Three .

were put more or less in order and started on their long

trek several days before the battle but the effort was too ,

much for them They broke down repeatedly and on the

.
,

ev e n in g of the 2 6th were sti l l some miles from Pronvil l e .

The on l y result of this fantastic scheme was to put an

added strain upon already overworked salvage personnel .

In the meantime we had not t roubled much about it .

We continued to work on more normal and practical

lines seeking some point on th e canal bank where tan ks
,

might cr oss unaided From the H indenburg trenches near

.

Tadpole Copse after a careful scrutiny through my glasses

, ,

I discovered what seemed to be a likely place immediate l y

south of Lock 4 B oth banks were somewhat dilapidated
.

an d fallen in through shell fi r e at this point and the nearer -

,

one was pierced by a com m u n ication trench called H obar t

Street which ran down from th e front lines H ere if any
, .
,

where a tank could cli mb out from the bed It was decided
, .

that the left hand section -

should follow H obart
Street and attempt this crossing The right hand section .
-

( Paul s) was to u se th e causeway 7 00 yards to the south

’
.

Beyond the canal the grou nd rose gently again to B ourlon

Ridge A trench system heavily wired known as the
.
, ,

Canal d u N ord Line ran parallel to the farther bank , .

Behind this 1 2 00 yards from Lock 4 was Quarry Wood a

, , ,

T shaped enclosu re of meagre timber From the Canal

'

-
.

d u N ord Line communication trenches zigzagged up the

slope on either side of the wood t o the M arquion Line the ,

last defensive work i n front of B ourlon This line was still .

unfinished and as we found when we reached it was very

, , ,

Tria l s at Eri n nd l s w h e re h d p roved t h at a ta k wi ll s u p p ort a noth er on

1
a e e a n

i t r oof but th e xp rim ent s w r e mad e i n c onditi ons d ifle i ng gr eat l y fr om

'

s es e e e r

th os e w h ich obtai n i n action .

 T HE CA N AL DU NORD AND BO U R LO N 4 39

i mperfectly wired there being wide gaps where only the

,

stakes had been planted Bourlon Vil l age and wood

.
,

u pwards of 3 000 yards east o f the canal were protected ,

b y a final series of trenches and entanglements nowhere ,

very formidable The Canadian s ultimate obj ectives for

.
’

the first day included B ourlon and H aynecourt t o the

north with the u sual arrangements for further exploitation
,

i f circumstances perm itted .

A Company s eight tanks were t o leave the front line at

’

zero with the i nfantry in th e norm al manner The 4 th .

Canadian D i vision however with whom we were work i ng

, , ,

expected the tanks t o be delayed considerab l y by the canal ,

and framed its plan of attack on the supposition that they

would not overtake the infantry again u ntil the latter was
approaching its second obj ective the M arquion Line Thi s,
.

supposition as it happened proved erron eou s As soon as

, , .

the Marquion Li n e was carried and the barrage lifted again ,

the two s ections were to converge on B ourlon vi l lage Th e .

great wood was reserved for a novel treatm ent We had .

proved by b itter experience in the first C ambrai battle that

gas hung sluggishly about it s hollows and undergrowth .

O n this occasion it wa s t o be deluged with gas shells for -

two days and nights before th e attack N o frontal assau l t .

again st it was t o be mad e on th e 2 7 th but such of its ,

defenders as survived the poison were to be capt ured or

driven out by envelopment from the n orth and sou th .

C C ompany working on our left with th e I s t Canadian

,

Division had in hand th e capture of Sain s les Marquion

,
- -
,

with a su bsequent adva n c e again st the n orthern part of th e

Marquion Lin e The D ivisional Staff was u nnecessari l y
.

anxious about the tanks being heard i f they approach e d

the front l ine before zero and accordin gly insisted on their
,

starting 1 000 yards behind the in fantry The attack on this .

flank was cramped in its early stage by the water obstacle

of the Agache and the canal the latter being flooded as,

far south as Lock 3 above Inchy Sain s les Marquion and

, .
- -

M arquion itself would therefore ha v e t o be carr i ed by a

4 40 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

pivotal move ment from the south an d east after th e canal ,

had b een crossed l ower down ; and this swing to the left o n
the part of the tanks a n d i n fantry produced amo n g other ,

things a high l y complicat e d barrage table the barrage

, ,

turn ing back upon itself through half a circl e In practice .

this di fficult evolution was performed without a hitch as ,

indeed w e re a l l the other arrangements made by the

Canadia n s whose prelimi n ary work was thorough and
,

int e ll ige n t to a degree which u n fortu nately was none too

, ,

common It was a pleasure to be associated with most o f

.

t he divisiona l and brigad e staffs They were anxious to do

.

al l they cou l d for u s they understood our di fficulties and

, ,

th e y appreciated our h e l p The Canadian infa n try was at

.

th is tim e i n the best of condition The whole corps had .

be e n withdrawn for the first pro l onged rest it had k n own

some time before the gen eral offe nsive began ; and by the
breaking up o f the new sth D ivision i n Engla n d the four
old o n es in France were brou ght up to a strength which n o
British u nit cou l d ever approach The brigades we trained
.

with at En gu i n ega tte had forty fi ve officers and eleven -

h u n dred m e n p e r batta l ion H aving broken triumphantly

.

through the Drocourt Qu e ant Line in th e first days of Sept

-

e m ber the corps was sti ll fresh and but l ittle reduced i n
,

n umbers I never met the South Africa n s whom many

.
,

peop l e declare to have been th e best of the Colonial troops ;

but of the others speaking from my own experience and on
,

ge n eral grounds I should put the N ew Zealand D ivision

,

fi rst an d the Canadian s a close second Th e Australian s .

,

gifted with one essential m ilitary quality— a n aptitude for

fi gh ti n g— were i n many other respects an u nmitigated
“

nuisance .

O n the even ing of the 2 5 th we moved a l l three com

p a n i e s of tanks from M orchies to th e neighbourhood of
Pron vil l e Each tank was n ow provided with the latest
.
44 2 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

was worth ) a few s ma l l unoccupied dug outs i n the front -

H indenburg trench They were still empty and in one of .

,

them an L shaped u nti mbered excavation abou t the size

,
-

of a large cupboard accessible by th e usual breakneck ,

flight of steps th e Maj or M C hl ery M El roy and I settled

‘
,
‘
, , ,

ourse l ves dow n about 1 A M ate a little food dran k a little . .

, ,

wh isky and chlorinated water and composed ou rselves for ,

a little folding of the hands in sle e p .

The fo l lo w ing morning ( the 2 6 th or Y day) was again -

brilliant l y fine I walked out once more t o the high ground

.

above M oeuvres and m ade a final examination of the distant

cana l and the bare slope toward B ourlon In the afternoon .

I intended t o take M El r oy an d Pau l the two section com

‘
,

m and e rs over the route to Inchy an d as far beyond as

,

seemed advisable It was very simple going for tanks along

.

the floor of the valley however dark the n ight might be for , ,

the trees of the H ironde l le formed a guide which it was

impossible to miss ; but n o on e except myself had walked
over this final stretch and i n case of accidents it was ,

advisabl e for the section commanders t o know it U n .

pleasa n t developments however su pervened t o spoil our , ,

excursion As we were having lunch the G erman gu n s

.

became active and we could hear an d see th e Shells crashing

,

i n the valley toward Inchy When we set out about two .

,

o clock we were obliged to keep t o th e high ground along

’

t he fron t H indenburg trench so as t o have a shelter ,

to j ump into in em ergency We could follow the route .

of our approach march almost equally we l l from h e re but

-
,

wh en we got to the spur between Inchy a n d Tadpole

Copse with the i ntentio n of seein g what we could of th e
,

forward slope down t o the canal it began to rain she l ls ,

.

We spent an anxiou s hou r dodging amon g half finished

t renches an d sheltering in dug out s about the head of -

H obart Street already mentioned where there was a nasty

, ,

little gulley which for no apparent reason was receiving

marked attention A small dump of 1 8 pounder shells was
.
-

h it and exploded an d the camouflage net wh i ch covered

,
 T HE C A N A L D U N O RD AND BO U R LO N 443

it having caught fire the smoke d r ew a heavier burst of

,

she l ling ; and as the very indifferen t trenches in th is n eigh

b ou rh ood were packed with in fantry and gunners now ,

tumbling over one another to get away from the da n gerou s

area there were a good ma n y casualties When we man
, .

aged to get clear and retu rn to Pronville about five o clock ’

we were exceedingly hot an d thirsty and very l ittle wiser ,

for our pains .

The Pro n ville valley was now filling up i n a discreet ,

way with troops and gun s The H inden burg trenche s

, .

were crowded with men of the 6 3 rd ( Nava l ) Division wh ich ,

was attacking on the right O f the 4 th Canadians In every .

little gulley which offered concea l ment there were heavy

howitzers fou r huge 9 inch weapons being packed tog e ther
,
-

by a cemetery close to B Company s tanks Zero was at ’

.

A M the next morning and we decided to pull ou t our

. .
,

tanks half an hou r after midnight As luck would have it .

,

heavy clouds drove up after dusk and the n ight fell extra ,

ordinarily black u n til the m oon rose I had some difficulty .

in this intense darkness i n finding even the road through

the H indenburg wire only 2 00 yards from where our tanks
,

were parked up By on e o clock h owever we had them

.
’
, ,

i n line at the head of the Inchy valley with th e u s e ful ,

t rees of the H irondelle on our left C company was ah e ad .

of u s Th e only u ntoward incident in th is early stage was

.

the fall of on e of the huge cribs from the cab of a tank ,

which crushed a man s leg Soon after we started a drizzle

’
.

of rain set in increasing after a while to a heavy down

,

pou r ; but the full moon having risen enough light filtered ,

through the clouds to enable u S to see our way A few .

shel l s wh istled over and burst in the valley bu t on the ,

whole the G erman artil l ery after its act i vity earl ier i n th e
,

day was commendably qu iet

, .

Crawling alon g at a snail s pace it was three o clock ’

,
’

when we reached Inchy C Company had already turn ed

.

off to th e left across the H irondel l e to fol l ow the valley

roun d the back of the Village We had still so much ti me .

444 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N

to spare being now withi n 1 5 00 yards of the front line

, ,

that we halted the tanks for n e ar l y an hour on a sort of ,

terrace cut out of the s p u r withi n a stone s throw of the ’

-

ru i n ed wa l l an d trees of In chy Ch a teau Before we moved .

on again th e M aj or left us to return to the r oth Canadian

Brigade H Q i n the H i n denburg Support Line across th e
. .

va ll ey The Co l o n e l had i n sisted on this very sensib l e

.

arrangement wh e r e by compa n y a n d s e ction commanders

, ,

in stead of wa n d e ri n g rath e r aim l ess l y about after their

ta n ks had go n e i n to actio n were under definite orders to ,

attach the mse l ves respectiv e l y to the headquarters of th e

i n fantry bri gades and batta l io n s co n cerned where they ,

wer e better able to keep in touch with events and where ,

they cou l d easi l y be fou n d .

Shortly before four o clock whil e M El roy and Paul got

‘ ’

the ta n ks started up agai n I we n t ahead with a runner , ,

o n e Corpora l D eu c a r s t o exami n e the forward slope of

,

the spur it having b e en i mpossib l e to reconnoitre th is

,

thorough l y i n day l ight A road l ined by tatt e red tre e s

.
, ,

ran from Inchy u p th e spur a n d over the main ridg e to

the B apau me Cambrai highway near Doignies The trees
-
.
,

and a conspicuous ruined factory by the roadside a quarter ,

of a m i l e from the Village stood up very prominently on the ,

crest and it was inadvisable to show one s self on th is

,
’

road in the daytime as it was i n full View from th e G erman

,

lines A second road or rather lane left the eastern side

.
, ,

of Inchy descended the s l ope and Sp l it in tw o almost on

, ,

our front l i n e one fork l eading southward to M oeuvres an d

,

the other ho l di n g straight on to the canal bank by Lock 4 .

It was my i n te n tio n to lead the tanks round th e Village

unti l we struck this lane which would take the left hand ,
-

section direct t o its crossing place The right hand section -

.
-

would have to h ead south east after zero to m ake the cause -

way but there were several small landmarks including a

, ,

ditch lined by willows to serve as guides Dawn m ore , .

,

over would be breaking as the tanks moved off O ur front

, .

l i n e for once was clearly defined between M oeuvres a n d

4 4 6 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

we had brought originally from Bovington During the .

past week i n addition t o reconnaissance I had coached

, ,

them as thoroughly as possible on the map helped by some ,

of the best aeroplane photographs I have ever see n ; and I

had little doubt of their ability if th ey were ab l e to cross ,

the canal without undue delay to accomplish all that was ,

expected of them .

After fi ve m i n utes ta l k th ey returned to their ta n ks and

’
,

we w atched th e l i n e of d ark machines file very slow l y down

the slop e beside the trees of the lane There was nothing .

more that M El r oy Pau l or I cou l d do The ta n ks would

‘
, ,
.

fo ll ow the l ane unti l th ey cam e to the l igh t rai l way wher e ,

they wou l d wait during the few fina l mi n u tes before zero .

H aving watch ed them disappear in the shadows we turned ,

back accordingly to a commun icat ion trench called Wart

burg which led uphil l to the main H inde n burg Line near
,

Tadpole Copse as we had n ow to find the battle head

,

quarters o f the two Ca n adian batta l ions formi n g the first

infantry wave i n this sector of the attack The m orn ing .

was still very dark its utter quietness broke n only by the
,

rare wh ine a n d crash of a G erm an she l l Th e re is some .

thing very i mpressive and eeri e in th is si l ent hour before a n

attack at daw n T r oops and guns are crowded everywhere
.
,

in trenches and pits and ho l lows b e hind th e front line but , ,

one can see a n d h e ar n othing ; and one wonders how much

the enemy l istening nervously ( as h e has listened perhaps
,

for a week or more ) only a few hundred yards away fears ,

or suspects As we stumbled uphi l l alo n g the convolution s

.

of the tre n ch picking our way among the waiting i n fantry

,

whose equipment ratt l ed fai n tly as they moved the east ,

began to l ighten rath e r sudde n l y Th e c l ouds which had .

blacke n ed the n ight were c l earing away And ten m inutes .

,

perhaps after we had left the tanks t he whole crest of the

, ,

spur b e h ind us blazed instantaneously with stabbing flames ,

and we were deafened and stunned by the intolerable crash

of the opening barrage .
 THE CA N AL DU N O RD A ND BO U R LO N 44 7

Wartbu rg trench curled up through the little gulley

wher e we had been caught by the G erman bombardmen t
th e previou s afternoon This gulley was now a n est of
.

fi e ld batteries all firing furiously Scor e s of other batteries

,
.

were i n action higher up the slope and along the crest and ,

from th e Pronville va ll ey came a b ow l i n g t orre n t of shells

from the heavier howitzers In the cup of ground up wh ich .

we were cli mbing the n oise was abom inab l e an d my whole ,

head throbbed and ached with it It is always worse t o .

h ear concentrated g un fi re from close in front than from

-

close behi n d The Canadia n s had brought their fi e l d gun s

.
-

very far forward in the n ight a n d as the light increased I ,

witnessed a spectacle which spoke both for their supreme

confidence and for t h e altered aspect of th e war O ne or .

two batteries in the hol l ow did not fi r e at a l l but limbered ,

up at zero and went rolling and j olting down the slope after
,

the advancing i n fantry I heard afterwards of an artil l ery

.

Maj or who rode forward on his horse with the first wave
of the attack to select n ew gu n position s u nder the canal
bank .

After m uch climbi n g about t ortuous and misleadin g

trenches on the big hill we fou n d the h eadquarters of on e
,

of our infantry battalions Fro m here we pushed on to the.

second headquarters These were established i n a fairly

.

capacious dug out on the sum mit 1 00 feet above Moeuvres

-
, .

It was now about six o clock ; but the whole country below
’

was so shrouded in m ist and sm oke that we could see

n othin g H aving in formed the battalion com mander that
.

the tanks had started we sat about in the welcom e peace

,

of the dug out for some ti me listening to reports as they

-
,

came through on the telephon e and having a com forting ,

breakfast of bacon and tea ( In cidental l y at whateve r hour

.
,

of the day or night you i n terviewed Canadians they were ,

always drinking tea — without prej udice t o the ordinary

448 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N

a l coholic beverages which of cou rse were there as well ) , , .

From the fragmentary news which reached u s the attack

s eemed to be going like clockwork but we cou l d get n o ,

informatio n about the tanks The bogey of the ca n al was .

a l ways in our minds and I began to be afraid that they had

,

failed to c ross it At seven o clock we scrambled to the

.
’

su rface agai n to find the m orn ing bright a n d sun n y and

,

the trenches on the h ill top li n ed with i nterested spectators

-

of the battle G roups of signa l lers were working helio

.

graphs from the parap e ts a n d a few heavy G erma n shells ,

thudded on the slope below ; but when I j oi n e d the

audience I found that there was still little or nothing to be
seen Sheets of white vapour out of which rose the dark
. ,

trees of B ou r l o n Wood covered the who l e battlefield , .

M El roy a n d Paul decided to remain here u ntil it was time

‘

for them to go forward to th e sun ken road between the ,

canal and Quarry Wood wh ich had been selected as a ,

ra l lying point for the ta n ks ; and I l eft them soon after to

-

make my own way back to the M aj or at the infantry brigade

headquarters on the opposite ridge above In chy .

By th e t im e I had got down i n to the vall e y n ow fu l l of ,

roari n g gu n s and moving in fantry and tra n sport and had ,

cli mbed the farther slope to the H indenburg Support

tre n ches the su n was growing powerful and I was b e co m
,

i n g uncomfortab l y hot I wa s wearing a trench coat and

.
-

other warm garments which had been welcome enough in the

co l d and rai n of the n ight and I was of cours e hung all ,

over with the ghastly impedim e nta that civilised officers are
i m pe ll ed t o carry with them into battle ( or near i t) —g l asses ,

water bottle box respirator revolver map case compasses

-
,
-
, ,
-

, ,

and so on all depending from an infuriati n g har n ess of

,

separate little straps I can n ot i magi n e why o ffi cers are

.

n ot provided with a u n iform combinatio n equipment for

these articles It wou l d be easy to design on e The Sam

. .

Brown e belt is a useless anachronis m i n action and the ,

private soldier s webbi n g or l e ather equipment whi l e ex

’

cel l e n t for his own re quirements was worthless for ours , .

450 T HE TA N K IN A C
T IO N

diversified by the forms of fou r or five disabled tanks pre ,

s u m a b l y Mark V s of the 1 5 th Battalion On e of them was

’
. .

on fire and a second was emitting volu mes of white smoke

,

from a pat ent contrivance fitted for this purpose on the

roof ( A ta n k i n M El roy s section was equipped with this
.
‘ ’

novelty and used it very effect ively in front of Bourlon )

,
.

An d presently out of the thin haze which still hun g i n

,

d rifts over the Sl ope b e yond the canal appeared on e of our ,

ow n machi n es hom e ward bound ; and at that the M aj or

and I b e gan to walk down i n to th e va ll ey on our way to

the ra ll yi n g poi n t T h e tim e must have been about ten
-
.

o c l ock in the morni n g fi ve hours si n ce the battle opened

’

, .

We followed the rou te the tanks had t aken round the ,

southern garde n s of Inchy a n d SO on to the lane which l e d ,

to Lock 4 There is a l ways a peculiar interest attached

.

to on e s first entry i n to grou nd occupied only a few hours

’

previously by the en e my It is l ike a j ourney into a foreign .

country — which after al l is exactly what it is A hundred

, , .

little contrasts even am id the leve ll i n g condition s of moder n

,

war differentiat e on e side of th e line fro m the other

, .

Either combata n t betrays his persona l ity in such common

tasks as digging tre n ches or building cook houses and there -
,

seems t o supervene a different atmosphere a sort of a l ie n ,

loca l co l our as one passes from N o M an s Land into n ew l y

,
’

captured territory This may be l argely my personal fancy

.

certainly the grass is the same co l our and the sh e l l holes -

are very similar ; and it is true t hat superficia ll y there was

l ittle to sh ow which side of th e light railway at Inchy
e n Artois had been
-
B ritish a n d which G erman grou nd .

Betw e en the rusty metals and the canal ban k were a few
groups of our dead— m ostly I th ink casualties suffe red by , ,

the l ater waves of infantry u nder th e cou nter barrage I -

.

d id not see any G e rma n s among the m and it was e vident ,

that this first stag e had been carried at a rush with little
or no trouble Probably the scattered outposts had sur
.

rendered on the spot The canal itself the first so l id .

,

obstacle capable of defence did not appear to ha v e been ,

 T HE C A N AL DU N O RD AND BO U R LO N 45 1

held with any approach to determination O ne G erman .

in fantryman lying dead on his back an d already stripped

,

of every article that would m ake a port able souvenir was ,

the only piece of jetsam i n the wake of the attack near

Lock 4 Yet as a si n gu l ar exampl e of the contrasts and
.
,

u ncertainties of war at the very t ime I was scramblin g ,

down i n to the canal bed with th e M aj or six hours after

-
,

the O pen i n g of the batt l e a grou p of plucky G erman ,

machi n e gu nners was st ill holding out n ear M oeuvres three

-

m iles behind our n ew front .

The canal which we examined with the keenest i nterest

, ,

bore very littl e rese mblance to th e engineers drawings ’

.

The sides were far steeper tha n represented and the ,

”
st e p where it existed was higher u p The photograph
, ,
.

reproduced i n this book will Show more c l e ar l y than a n y

description what sort of an obstacle it was that our wo r n
out and obsolete M ark IV tanks had surmounted with .

su ch ease and speed The farther wal l near Lock 4 where

.
,

M El r oy s four machin es had crossed was so n early vertica l

‘ ’

that o n l y the layer of fallen earth com bi n ed with exception ,

ally skilful drivin g m ade its ascension possible The two

,
.

surviving tanks of Paul s section baulked at the causeway ’

, ,

scrambled i n some miraculou s m a n ner over the brickwork

close by H is lead ing tank as we have se e n was disabled
.
, ,

by a mine on the cau seway itself The explosion broke the .

tracks blew i n th e floor and sh attered a man s legs The

, ,
’
.

N C O in com man d very sen sibly ra n at once down the

. . .

canal to M oeuvres where some of the 1 5 th B attalion s tanks

,
’

were crossing and managed to induce on e of them to turn

,

back an d tow the dere l ict off the causeway where it was ,

holdi n g up our artil l ery Th e first drivers of all the six .

tan ks which crossed were very proper l y recom mended for

the M i l itary M edal for this feat alon e and on e or two of ,

them received it .

As we walked on from the canal we met our first tanks

return ing to it They had been shelled persistently on th e ir
.

way back from Bourlon to th e rallying point th e G erma n -

,
45 2 T HE TAN K IN AC T IO N

gun s apparently being kept on to the movi n g targets by an

observation ba l loon which still hung insolently beh ind th e
-

wood unmolested by our aerop l anes ( It was an in structive

,
.

fact that when we ran up a ba l loon the next day from a

si milar position on our side of the wood a G erman aero ,

plane had i t down within an hour ) The ground at the .

ra l lying point being entire l y open it was n o place for th e

-
,

tanks under this malignant scrutiny and they were return ,

i ng accordingly to the can a l itse l f for Shelter We led them .

through the m iddle causeway a n d parked them up against

th e eastern wal l The photograph Shows the first three
.

i mm ediat e l y after their arrival The figure i n th e trench .

coat fluttering a map is I believe myself , , .

In almost every case the tasks allotted t o the tanks had

been easily and rapid l y accomplished They were out of .

the cana l as soon as th e in fantry and in consequence were ,

able to lend th e latter u nexpected he l p at the Ca n al d u

N ord Li n e an d Quarry Woo d where they led the attack , ,

crushed the wire and disposed of nu merou s mach i n e gu n

,
-

posts Sti l l leadin g the whole six charged the Marquion

.
,

Lion which was carried very quickly One tank broke

,
.

down here and was n ot ready to move again u ntil the others
were returning for good These in the meantime patrolled
.
, ,

b e yond the Marquion Line while it was being consolidated

u nd e r cover of a stationary barrage and as soon as the ,

l atter l i fted once more pu shed on for B ourlon Two, .

e ntered by the main street and a third from the north ,

the remaini n g pair working along the trenches roun d the

vil l age The resistance was spasmodic and as soon as t he
.
,

t anks had crushed down the barricades in the streets an d

s i l é n ce d a few mach i n e gun s which held out i n the houses
-

the place was rapidly overrun a n d c l eared by the fo ll owing

i nfantry O ne ta n k fired on by fi e l d guns i n the outskirts
.
,
-
,

scre e ned itself very skilfully in smoke from the experimenta l

apparatus fixed on the roof and passed into the Village ,

u n hu rt b ehi n d this curtain Another machine after Bourlon

.
,

had been carried p ushed on at the request of the Canadian s

,
 T HE C A N AL DU N O RD AND BO U R LO N 453

t o the railway which ran past the eastern end of Bourlon

Wood to Sauchy Lestr e e silenced some mach ine gu ns on
-
,
-

the emban km ent and enabled the infantry to seize and

,

consolidate the latter In four or five hou rs the whole

.

act ion was over s o far as th e tanks were concerned

, .

There were n o casualties to personnel or m achines except ,

i n the case of the m ined tank on th e causeway All the .

other six ral l ied The attack had been a m odel of com
.

p l ete n es s and e ffi ciency an d was backed up through out

,

i n th e most intelligent and whole h earted manner by the -

infantry .

C Company had been equally successful although i t had ,

not escaped so lightly S a ins les M arqu ion was carried

.
- -

with very little effort and th e tan ks spent the rest of the
,

m orni n g cruising about beyond the M arquion Line mopping ,

up machine gun nests and enj oying som e good shooting at

-

par t ies of fugitive G ermans Two tanks however were hit .

, ,

and burnt out by fi e l d guns near Deligny M ill on th e spu r

-

north of Quarry Wood After the act ion the C ompany .

rallied behin d the canal i n th e gulley below Tadpole

Copse .

While our tanks were parking up i n th e canal bed I met

the brigade com mander and th e Colonel with Beale and on e
or two other people an d after a little talk was sent back t o
,

Pronville to arrange for s ome lorries to be in readiness to

carry all the tank crews of both companies less the meces ,

sary guards to Bullecourt wh ere a camp h ad been erected

, , .

O n my way I met the tanks of B C ompany movin g u p to

th e canal At Pronville where I arrived very hot and dusty
.
,

a n d i n credibly thirsty about one o clock I was stopped ’

, ,

within 1 00 yards of our headquarters i n the trench by a

buco l ic and extreme l y uni ntel l igent private of the Battle
Polic e who poked h i s bayonet at me and demanded to
,

know where I was going As it n ever occurred to me that

.
454 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

I could be mistaken for a deserter I thought th e man was ,

drunk and was on th e point of putting h im under arrest

,
.

R e alising in t ime that h e was on ly de n se l y stupid a n d per

forming what h e conceived to be his duty I burst out ,

laughing at his absurd face and manner a n d l eft him there ,

gaping after me and wondering possibly if he shou l d h ave

, , ,

fa ll en upon me or run m e through .

By four o clock that afternoo n the tired crews had marched

’
-

back to Pro n vi ll e and were packi n g th e mselves in l orries ,

while M El roy Paul a n d I g l owi n g with a se n se of Virtue

‘
, , ,

rewarded were bumping over the vi l e roads to Bullecourt in

,

the car Every road and track was roari n g with a flood of
.

transport rolling eastward All the guns about Pronvil l e .

had gone forward except the howitzers and H olt tractors ,

were standing by thes e u n wieldy weapons i n readiness to

tow them also away A long naval gu n had come u p o n the
.

railway near Qu e ant and was firin g from its truck There
, .

was always something fr e sh and exh ilarating t o m e in thi s

u n iversal surge onward which came i n the wake of any big
advance — perhaps because we were not yet h abituated to
big adva n ces The t ide had now set in with a vengeance
.
,

and we were to become w e l l accu stomed t o this healthy

symptom of its progress be fore the end .

At B ullecourt where our tents had been set u p amid the

,

ann ihilation of on e of the most murderou s and contested

battlefields of the war we spent that night and most of ,

the next day We were I suppose very fortunate to

.
, ,

possess the transport which alone m ade these brie f i n

te r l u d e s of rest a n d recuperation possible They were .

certai n l y well worth the trouble they i n volved After .

twenty four hours spent in moderate comfort with rational

-
,

meals bath s of a sort and a change of clothes o ffi cers and

, , ,

men return ed to the forwa rd area refreshed and ready for

another spell of work that in our case became increasing l y , ,

ard uous the longer ou r old m achines were denied their own
turn of renovation .

M El roy left us i n the morning to go on le ave

‘
H e had .
45 6 T HE TA N K IN A CT IO N

ordinari l y well Ten th ou sand prisoners and 2 00 guns had

.

been captured by the two armies ; and on the eveni n g of th e

2 7 th our line from north to south had been advanced to
, ,

east of O isy l e V erger ( in the angle between the Sens é e and

- -

the cana l ) east of Epinoy H aynecourt and Bourlon Wood

, , , ,

through Fontaine N otre Dame and east of Rib e court and

- -
,

B e auca m p Another five mi l es of the Siegfried Line from

.
,

M oeuvres to Rib e court had been carried ; and from Bourlo n

,

Ridge we looked down upon the roofs and Spires of Cambrai ,

less than three m i l es away .

O n the morning of the 2 8 th eight ta n ks of B Company , ,

wh ich we saw moving up to the canal led the infantry of ,

t he 3 rd Canadian D ivision i n an attack on Raillencourt and

St Olle on the Arras Cambrai road Both these Villages
,
-
.

were carried after severe fighting several of the G erman ,

mach ine gun crews continuing to resist u nti l they were

-

crushed to death by the ta n ks All the latter ra l lied . .

S t Ol l e was a suburb of Cambrai and the Canadian s ,

were now on the outskirts of that town but still faced ,

by the formidab l e obstacle of the Canal de L Es ca ut ’

.

That evening the person ne l of A a n d C Companies ,

havi n g spent exactly twenty four hours at B ullecourt -

,

returned by lorry to their tanks i n or n ear the Canal d u

N ord B oth companies were to trek forward that night to
.

the neighbourhood of Bourlon and the M aj or and I went ,

straight to that village i n the car t o decide where we

would put our mach ines As we passed through Inchy we .

found that the indefatigable had already estab

l i s h e d a canteen there and were u sing one of our abandoned
,

cribs as a background for their triangular Sign The d ay .

had been fin e and hot and the country everywhere was ,

full of pungent smells The Canadians had a bad habit .

of leaving their dead horses and mules for weeks without

burial even alongside the roads and some of these carcases
, ,

had by now attained an appalling stage of decomposition .

At Bourlon we fixed on the huge chateau wa l l riddled with ,

i mmense holes but still erect as a good shelter for th e ,

 T HE C A N AL DU N O RD AND BO U R LO N 457

tanks ; and ha v ing sent the car off walked back across ,

country to the canal to survey an approximate route The .

Maj or then left to interview the 4 th Canadian Division I .

waited about for two or three hours while a number of

small irritating defects were put to rights ; an d toward
ten o clock the n ight being starlit but very dark we
’

, ,

managed t o get away We had now six tanks left out .

of the fourteen with which we had started from B ienvillers

five weeks before W a d e s on j ust back from leave was in
.
, ,

charge in M El r oy s absence
‘ ’
.

The begi n nin g of the j ourney was u npropitious O ur .

exit from the canal bed by way of the m iddle causeway , ,

coincided with th e arrival i mmed iat e ly above u s of a

bombin g squadron of G erman aerop l an es which pro ,

ce e d e d to drop their cargoes libera l ly all rou n d I .

pushed everybody inside the tan ks and walked on hope

fully in front The bombs were thudding and flashing in
.

large numbers in the direction of Moeuvres and some fell ,

much n earer than was pleasant ; and presently one of the

raiders released a magnesiu m flare attached to a sm all
parach ute or balloon which hung for a lo n g time a few
,

hundred feet overhead and seemed to light u p the whole,

country for m iles The illu m ination was so bright t hat I

.

thought of halting the tanks u ntil it expired but reflected ,

that these lights are always much less efli c i e n t from t he ,

poin t of View of the observer up above than they appear ,

from the ground The flare dwindled out after a while

.
,

the hu m m ing of the aeroplan e engines and th e cra s h of

the bombs receded behind us as the raiders swept ov e r
the canal and we pursued our j ourney without further
,

interruption .

On arriving after some struggles i n trenches and wire

, ,

at Bourlon Ch ateau we found that our wall bounded a

,

n arrow lane in which was situated an artillery brigade

headquarters As our tanks would have blocked th e lane

.

and interfered with tra ffic that might include the cars of
i nfuriated G enerals we decided to pu sh th e machin es
,
458 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

through the holes i n the wall int o the tang l ed garden

beyo n d The fact that th is was possible will co n vey some
.

idea of the size of the holes (which did not reach even to
the top of the wall i n m ost cases ) and of the immense
,

height and solidity of the structure After much backing

.

and swingi n g a n d dislodging of bricks the man oeuvre

,

was accomplish e d and a ll six tan ks were safely inserted

,

u n der th e tre e s inside. It was now m idnigh t or after

, ,

and we proceeded to mak e ours elves comfortable u nder

a coup l e of tarpau l i n s stretched over a t r e n ch where
, ,

packed like sardines we had some sort of a meal an d

,

went to sleep .
 6
4 0 THE T AN K IN A CT IO N

forward from Rons oy they ran into a m ine fi e l d wh ich we ,

-

had l aid down before the M arch retreat It consisted of .

rows of buried trench mortar bombs each loaded with -

5 0 l b of am mona l
. In a fe w minutes ten tanks were .

b l own up their bottoms being torn out and most of their

,

crews killed by the terrific explosions The remainder of .

the battalion shaken tho ugh it must have been by thi s

,

appal l ing stroke of misfortune got into action a n d suffered ,

heavi l y there on ly 1 1 tanks rallyi n g out of 3 4 O n

, .

subsequent days units of a ll three brigades were he l ping

to widen the i n itial pe n etration of th e Siegfried trenches
at variou s poi n ts as many as 4 0 tanks going i n on 3 rd
,

O ctober when we broke through the northern part of

,

the B e aur e voir F on s o m m e Li n e five miles beyond the

-

canal tunn el and saw i n front of us at last ope n and

,

cultivated country Th es e events led up to the final phase

.

of the battle which began on 8 th October

, .

In the meanti me the Canadian s with the 2 2 n d an d 1 7 th

, ,

Corps respective l y on their left an d right had a week of ,

very severe and costly fighting around C ambrai in the ,

course of which the 7 th Tank Battalion fought its last

action After th e surprise a n d co l lapse on 2 7 th Septem
.

ber the G erman r e sistance stiffened appreciably every day

,

as it had stiffened a month ear l ier at Bapaum e ; and San

court Abanc o urt and other villag e s played the same r é l e
, ,

which had fallen before to Ecoust and Beugny O ur .

advance was still hampered by the obstacle o f the Sensée

M arshes and the floods to the north of them This vast .

area of water cut across our front at right angles with the ,

r e su l t that as we penetrated eastward toward Cambrai we

developed a long flank facing du e north ; and the G erman
guns south of Douai e nfi l a d i ng this salient caused much , ,

annoyance The re formed and very weak 5 th Army facing

.
-

Len s and Douai was u nable to help active l y until th e

O peratio n s on its flanks were further advanced .

The morning o f 2 9th September found the three Com

p a n i e s of the 7 th Tank Battalion disposed as follows
 T HE F IG H T IN G RO U N D CA M BR A I : SA N C O U RT 46 1

A Company as we have seen was at B ourlon C Company

, , .

had moved overn ight from its rallyin g point near Tadpo l e -

Copse t o the top of B our l on Ridge n orth of the vi ll age ,

where its tanks were camouflaged i n the open in a sha l low

basin of ground B Compa n y after its fighti n g i n Ra i l l e n
.
,

court and St O l l e had ral l ied at the former Vi ll age and sti ll
,

remai n ed there its mach i n es hidden u nde r the trees of the

,

Arras Cambrai road with in 3 000 yards of th e front l ine

-
.

Early in th e morning a despatch rider reached u s at -

Bourlon with orders for the company to j oin C on th e

ridge ; and after breakfast we backed the tan ks out of the
chateau gard e n t hrou gh the holes in the wall and t rekked
northward rou nd the village We m ade a considerab l e .

gambit to avoid appearing on the crest where a few shel l s ,

were falli n g as we approached and c l imbed eventual l y to ,

ou r d estination u n der a bridge stil l intact wh ich carried , ,

the railway from Cambrai to Sauchy Lestr e e We camou -

.

fl a ge d ou r tanks in th e open a fe w hu n dred yards from those

of C Compa n y one of whose officers had j ust been wounded
,

by the she l ling We were scree n ed here from direct oh

.

servation by th e final rise the groun d ascendi n g very ,

gradua l ly fro m our basin to the Arras Cambrai road on l y -

5 00 yards away The double line of tree s along the road

.

r a n ob l iquely across our front a n d dropped down the ridge

behind u s to M arqu ion and the Agache flats Standi n g on .

the highway on e saw straight ahead the clu ster of vi ll ages

,

on the spurs wh ich fell to the Se n sée north and north west -

of Cambrai — H ay n ecourt and Epi n oy west of the Douai ,

road a n d now i n our possession and beyond the trees about

, , , ,

Sancourt Bl é court Abancourt and others still he l d by th e

, , ,

G erman s To the north extended th e lo n g hostile flan k

.

beyon d th e Sens é e with such p l aces as B ug n icou rt and

,

Fressain easily dist inguishable The morning being m isty .

,

although bri ll iantly fine visibility was lim ited but it was
, ,

easy to see how vitally i mporta n t was this ridge and how ,

o n a clear day one cou l d have overlooked Douai and all the

enemy s communications across the plain Cambrai three

’
.
,
462 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

m iles to the south east and l ying l ow was h idden from this
-

, ,

point by the tre e s of Raillencourt and Sailly The sha ll ow .

depression in which we lay l ike all the rest of th e country ,

around was bare grass la n d crossed by a multitude of dusty

,
-

tracks a lan e l eading from Bour l on to the main road and a

, ,

li n e or two of ha l f fi n i s h e d trench There was a big d u g

-
.

out a n old G erman headquarters of some ki n d close to th e

, ,

railway bridge at our back To our right stood a solitary .

ha l f ru i n e d bui l ding cal l e d Pilgrim s R e st which poked

-
’
,

a b l acke n e d gab l e above som e shrubs ; and a few small

copses beyond l ed the eye up to Bour l on Wood toweri n g ,

above a sudden litt l e hi l l wh ich was superimposed as it ,

were o n top of th e ri d ge itself It was this steep acc l ivity

,
.

wh ich caus e d the wood to be visible from so great a dista n ce

( from the tow e rs of M o n t St El oi behi n d Arras for , ,

example ) a n d to dominate so effectiv e ly a ll the va ll eys

,

leadi n g toward it from th e west D uring ou r reco n nais .

sa n ces befor e the 2 7 th this si n ister mass of trees seemed t o

ov e rlook e very moveme n t B ut n ow its l adders and its .

l ofty obs e rvation platforms had had their fi n al day a n d ,

curious wanderers w e re pe e rin g and poking among the

g l ades a n d thickets b l e ach e d with gas a n d scarred by she l ls ,

where some of its lat e r Victims sti ll l ay rotti n g i n th e under

growth and where there rested sm ashed an d stripped and
, ,

rust eaten the she ll s of ta n ks we h ad lost there nearly a

-
,

year before Two faced l ike J a n us th e wood had now

.
-
, ,

turned a m e n acing Visage eastward and lowered over ,

Cambrai A new activity flowed beneath its shadow

. .

K haki had rep l aced fi e l d grey i n the dismembered vil l age ;

-

a n d over the dusty p l ain t o the canal alo n g the reverse ,

Sl ope of the ridge a n d even in the l ittle hollow by P i lgrim s

’
,

Rest were scattered infantry bivouacs and end l ess horse

,

lines and the massed l imbers of ammunit ion trai n s The .

countryside was a l ive with movement a n d n ear Bour l on a ,

Canadian band was playing its i n struments g l itteri n g i n ,

the su n .

When we had camouflaged the tanks in pairs we set ,

 6
4 4 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

culate line of the Le Cateau road its double row of trees,

i n ful l leaf rising an d dipping over a succession of ridges

increasing in height as they receded and t opped by vil l ages
,

and small towns u ntouched by actual hostilities since the

first month of the war— Awoingt j ust outside Cambrai , ,

Beauvois Caudry Bethencourt and yet another Inchy I

, , , .

had no suspicion then that I was t o know all these places

well enough a fe w weeks later Le Cateau itse l f lying i n
.
,

a deep va ll ey was hidden from u s ; but we could fo l low

,

many of the roads leadin g eastward from the main highway ,

and th e se were b l ack with G erman transport pouring to

the rear before the blast of the 4 th Army s attack along ’

the Cana l de St Q uentin that m orning Another cheering .

porte n t was th e fact that the enemy s lin e of observation ’

bal l oons was withdrawn w e ll t o the east of the Le Cateau

road It was while we were standing here that one of our
.

ba l loons ru n up an hour before by the side of Bourlon

,

Wood was shot down by a G erman aeroplane which

,

escaped with th e u sual ease N either at this time n or

.

before nor after during t he whole advance did I see a

G erman balloon brought down .

A very disgusting feature of this neighbourhood was the

n umber of ghou l ish pil ferers of the dead wh o i n fested it .

These noxiou s creatures are common enough i n the wake

of any battle : indeed the ordinary decent s oldier is ca ll ou s
to a degree in the way he will handle some mang l ed body
in his search for what he ca l ls souvenirs ; but the C olon ial
troops always su pplied an excessive proportion of the de
liberate l ooters A case wh ich filled m e with p e cu l iar
.

horror because I had k n own and l iked the man whose

,

corpse was s o merciless l y stripped and rifled had occurred ,

in the Canadian Corps a short time before t his An o ffi cer .

i n ou r battalion who j oined it as a Captain i n the Salient ,

and afterwards sh ared a cubicle with m e at M eaulte went ,

to the 1 1 th Battalion as a company commande r H e was .

killed by a she l l duri n g an approach m arch in the : course -

of the attack on the Drocourt Qu e ant Lin e H is body was

-
.
 T HE F IG H T IN G R OUND CA M BR A I : SA N C O U RT 465

left for a quarter of an hou r whi l e two men ran to a dress

i n g station c l ose at h and for a stretcher When they r e .

turned they fou nd that the Canadia n s i n this short i n terva l , ,

had stripped the body of ev e ryth i n g worth taki n g — tu n ic ,

be l t gl asses an d even fi el d boots I do not know if I

, ,
-
.

am pecu l iar but th is practice which was redu ced t o

, ,

a science fi ll ed me with l oathing And arou nd B our l on

,
.

Wood where in p l aces the dead lay thickly there were

, ,

a nu mber of men prowl i n g furtive l y about turnin g ,

over bodies peering into ho l es and tre n ches carryi n g out

, ,

systematica l ly their search for money or such pitiful small

valuables as a m an will carry even i n to action Thes e .

scoundre l s Sheered O ff when any officer approached a n d ,

i f su mm oned a n d i n t e rrogate d explai n ed of course that ,

they were looki n g for the b ody of a frien d .

At five o clock that evening (t he 2 9 th) the u su al harbinger

’

of evi l arrived at ou r tr e n ch i n the shape of a despatch

rider with an u rgent m essage to the M aj or to report at once
,

to the headquarters of th e 1 2 th Can adian Infantry B rigade .

This headq uarters was quite n e ar us in som e du g out s j ust ,

-

o ff th e Arras B apaum e road by a bu ildi n g ca ll ed Lilac

-
,

Farm I accompani e d the M aj or in his car which we took

.
,

t o save ti me As we arrived on th e highroad several

.

heavy shel l s crashed about Li l ac Farm a n d we l eft it for ,

t h e dug outs with some hast e

-
We had a bri e f interview .

with the Ca n adian Brigadier in which h e propounded a ,

rather ambitious scheme for the next m or n ing and ask e d ,

for three ta n ks C C ompa n y was worki n g on our right

.

with another brigade The situation on the front of the .

1 2 th Briga d e was as follows

B eyo n d th e Arras Cambrai road was the road to Dou ai

-
,

which trended a little t o the w e st of north toward Auben

cheul e u Bac where it crossed the Sensée
- -

, O n a line . .

2 G
4 6 6 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N

drawn north east from the Pilgrim s Rest these roads were
-
’

about 4 000 yards apart and m idway between them was the ,

village of H ay n ecourt Beyond the D ouai road again was

.
, ,

the main Cambrai Douai railway -

Road and railway ran .

side by Side out of C ambrai for two m iles when th e line ,

c urved eastward before return ing to a para l lel crossing at

Aube n cheu l a u Bac
- -
Where it tur n ed away from the road
.

it passed b e tw e e n the vil l ages of Sa n court and Bl é cou r t ,

the former b e i n g half a mil e east of the road and a fe w

hundred yards sh ort of th e railway on which at thi s ,

point there was a ha l te or s mall station A road from .

Sa n court crossed the rail w ay in a n orth easter l y directio n -

a n d desce n ded a narrow and st e epish va ll ey ca ll ed the

R a vi n d e Ba nti gny through Bl é c ou r t and Bantig n y itself 8 00
, ,

a n d 2 5 00 yards respective l y from the l evel crossing A m ile -

.

and a half south of Bl é c ourt j u st b e yond the railway was , ,

Til l oy .

The Canadian lin e as give n to us ran almost due north

, ,

from the Arras road at St Olle crossed the Douai road ,

3 000 yards out of Cambrai an d continue d j ust to the west ,

of the railway pas sing between Sancourt a n d the ha l te

, .

The rai l way was a serious obstacle and already had h eld ,

up the advance for two days It ran a l ternately over .

e mbankment s and through deep cutti n gs wh ich were lined ,

thickly with machine guns ; and the G erm an s were fighti n g

-

desperately to retain it and so prevent Cambrai being out ,

fl a n k e d from the n orth There is n o need to go at length

.

into the p l an of attack proposed by th e Ca n adians for the

3 oth because ha l f of it was a signa l failure
, It will be .

enough to say that one brigad e on the right with three ,

tanks of C Company was to carry the railway west of ,

Ti l loy and the n seize that Vi ll ag e whi l e the 1 2 th Brigade , ,

with our three tanks on the left was to cross the li n e on

, ,

either side of th e S ancourt ha l te capture the high grou nd ,

enc l osing the R a vi n d e Ba n ti gny and then perform a compli ,

c a t e d swing to the left which was intended to cut off the ,

G erman forces holding th e curve of the railway n orthward .

4 68 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

com e i n to the G erma n line fresh batteries h ad accu mu lated ,

behind it and m achine gu ns were sown everywh e re l ike

,
-

dragon s t e eth The situatio n was sim i l ar to that wh ich had

’
.

deve l oped around Bapaume at th e e n d of August with the ,

ad d itional incentive to the enemy that he was now fighti n g

i n his l ast organised position ; and San court as it turned ,

out was to prove for A C ompany a second a n d more tragic

,

Beugny The Maj or and I came away from the brigade

.

headquarters fee l ing a l ready rather dubious about the who l e

affair We did not suspect however after our rece n t e xp e
.
, ,

r i e n c e of the usua l e ffi cie n cy of Canadian methods that the ,

attack was to be doomed to failure before it began through

inexcusable blunders by the brigade staff Zero h ou r had .

not been fixed at this conference We were to ret urn l ater .

for detailed orders The G eneral had stated however that

.
, ,

he wished ou r tanks to be l i n ed up before dawn in a sunken

road which ran southward fro m H aynecourt where h e pro ,

posed a l so to estab l ish his h eadquarters for the action By .

this time we had o n l y fou r machi n e s out of ou r six fit for

action at short n otice C Company was eve n worse off It
. .

could supp l y o n ly two tanks and borrowed our fourth to ,

make up t h e deficiency It was about six o c l ock when we

.
’

retur n ed to Pilgrim s Rest and already growing dusk as the

’

, ,

Sky had c l ouded over While the tanks were un c a m oufl a ged
.

a n d overhauled I studied the map and took compass bear

,

i n gs t o help us in the approach march Toward seven the .

,

Maj or and I start e d off to wa l k over this route and on ou r ,

way ca ll ed at th e brigade headquarters for our further orders

but there were n one forthcomin g Zero we were to l d .
, ,

probably wou l d be at 1 0 A M The G e n eral and hi s staff . .

wou l d be at the sunken road at five when everything was ,

to be arra n g e d a n d the be l ated orders issued to us In the .

meantime w e were to get our tan ks there We set off .

according l y on our walk feeling more dubiou s than ever , .

The day l ight attack a l one was against all ou r instincts and
precepts and was the m ore puzz l ing because J ack B rown
,

had told me that the zero hour for C Company and its
 THE F IG H T IN G R O U N D CA M BR A I : SA N C O U RT 469

infantry was six o clock j ust after dawn ’

There might , .

be method h owever i n this apparent madness : attacks

, ,

w e re sometimes carried out i n th is fash ion i n echelon at ‘

, ,

differe n t hours In any case we were definite l y u nder the

.
,

orders of th e 1 2 th Brigade and had to do as we were to l d ,

.

The trouble was that s o far we had been told so l ittle .

We foun d the sunken road without much di fficulty a l ,

though it was now very dark i ndeed A perfect m aze of .

l ight rail w ays radiating out from Cambrai and linking up

,

a nu mber of big dumps with th e original G erman positio n s

b e hi n d th e C anal d u N ord covered a l l this country and , ,

being mark e d on our exce ll ent maps were i nvaluable guides ,

at night The road midway betwee n th e divergi n g Arras

.
,

and D ouai h ighways connected H ay n ecourt with the out ,

skirts of Rail l encou rt and St O lle to th e south It ran .

parallel to the D ou a i road at a n average distance of 1 2 00

yards Toward its northern end at H aynecourt its banks
.

were 1 0 to 1 2 feet high formi n g perfect cover for the tanks, ,

and we selected a hidi n g p l ac e for the latter 1 000 yards -

from the Vi ll age near where th e road was crossed by on e

,

of the l ight rai l ways which wou l d lead u s directly to it .

In the weste rn ban k were the black shafts of several dug

outs in which th e brigade headquarters was to tak e u p its
abode A few dead lay in the roadway and infa n try i n
.
,

support were m oving about i n the shelter of the banks .

The front was very quiet at this t ime but V ery lights were ,

rising and flaring from th e outpost l i n e It struck me at .

on ce that they were much nearer to us than they should

have been if that line coincided with the on e give n u s by
the brigade sta ff They seemed to rise fro m the D ouai road
.

i tse l f whose mangled avenue of trees was visible intermit

,

t e n tl y i n the cold illu mination According to the brigade .

( whose information I had set down at the tim e on a map

that lies b e fore me now ) our line at San court toward which ,

w e were looking took i n the village and ran close to the

,

railway nearly 1 000 yards beyond the road It was i m

, .

possible to decide t his point either way with certainty and ,

4 70 T HE TA N K IN A CT IO N

some in fantrymen whom I questioned were characteristically

vague . An outpost lin e i n sem i open warfare i s a l ways -

n ebulous and variabl e but if appearances were correct and ,

our information wrong it might make a serious differe n ce , ,

as it wou l d mean that Sa n court was not as stat e d i n our , ,

poss e ssion I never u nderstood th e real facts of the case

. .

As l ate as eight o c l ock next morn ing Sancourt undoubted l y

’

was full of G erman machi n e gu ns but whether this was due -

,

to a te mporary fluctu ation of the line or wheth e r we had ,

n e ver rea l ly h eld it I do not know O ur origina l informa

, .

tion proved in all respects so erron eou s that I inc l i n e to the

l atter opi n ion The Canadian s gai n ed it defi n itely in the
.

course of this attack but as we shall see this was all they
, , ,

were able to accomplish on the 1 2 th Brigade front .

The M aj or and I were a little careless on ou r return

j ourney and overrun n i n g th e particu l ar branch of the
,

l ight railwa y wh ich we Shou l d have followed wandered ,

for some time aroun d H ay n ecourt It was n early mid .

n ight when we reached the Arras road again both of us ,

rather leg weary as we h ad been stu mb l ing about in the

-
,

d ark for five hours ; but there was n o r e st for u s yet .

We fou n d the three tanks with W a d e s on who was in , ,

command waiting at the side of the road by a farm

,

called M ont N euve westward from Lilac Farm , Al l .

three were commanded by am ong them Sergea n t

D ud d r i d ge whom we have met at Beug n y and who was to
, ,

be one of t h e Victi ms of the deplorable muddle t h e 1 2th

Canadian Brigade made of this attack W e started off .

again at once leadi n g the tanks past M ont N euve to the

,

l ittle railway line wh ich led straight to ou r sunk e n road .

The distanc e followi n g this railway was j ust two miles but
, , ,

we had ample time and took it very slowly Soon after we

,
.

s tarted I saw C Company s tanks three black shapes out ’

,

l ined momentarily agai n st a distant glare crawling away to ,

our right The j ourney was accompl ished with out i ncident
.
,

except that toward the end I became seriously alarmed by

the noises proceeding from our worn out machines They -
.
4 72 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

signa l lers and oth e r vagrants of no apparent occupation

,

who a l ways infest headquarter dug outs a n d endeavoured -

t o s l eep It was very co l d outside and th e warmth below

.
, ,

i f a trifle poisonous was comforti n g W a d e s on found i t

, .

excessiv e after a while and climbed upstairs agai n The, .

M aj or and I dozed off during the i n t e rvals wh e n n o one

w a s treading on u s I was arou sed fina ll y by a great dea l
.

o f tramp l i n g and e xcitement and heard at o n ce muffled by , ,

t w e n ty fe e t of earth the u n mista k ab l e throbbing of conce m

,

t r a te d g u n fi r e overhead It was six o clock ; and although

’
-
.

I thought for a moment that this might be mere l y coverin g

fi r e for the attack on the right we soon discovered that ou r ,

own i n fantry had gone forward — or attem pted to do so .

There were no orders for us and no sign s of the G eneral ,

a n d his staff wh o should have arrived an hour before

, The .

Intel l igence Officer remai n ed the sole representative of the

brigade headquarters H e was hangi n g on to the tele
.

phon e receivin g messages from the battalion s in the line

, ,

a n d seemed very harassed by h is r e sponsibilities ; and he

Could give u s no satisfactory advice O ur position was .

extraordi n ary a n d very u npleasa n t We had been told by .

the B rigadier himself that zero wou l d be at ten o clock or ’

thereabout a n d that we should receive ou r orders from hi m

,

on the spot B eyond th is a nd an incomplete out l ine of

.
,

the proposed attack we had been given n o instruction s

, ,

verbal or otherwise The attack had now started four

.

h our s befor e the sp ecifi ed ti me O ur tanks camouflaged and .

,

u nready for i mm e diate action were sti ll in the sunken ,

road some 1 5 00 yards behin d the original front ; and the

,

in fantry if successful must a l ready b e o n the railway or

, ,

beyo n d The M aj or and I scrambled up t he stairs of the

.

dug out now packed to suffocation with earnest he l pers

-
,

who very natura l ly preferred l ife below ground to life

above at this j uncture ; and when w e had fought ou r way
through them and e m erged agai n in the road we found a ,

dr e ary dawn j ust br e aking Close behind u s massed bat .

t e r i e s of 1 8 pounders were be ll owing

-
The G ermans w e re .
 THE F IG H T IN G RO U N D CA M BR A I : SA N C O U RT 4 73

rep l ying with vigour and with heavier metal The i nevi .

table 5 9 s were bursting freely on both s ides of the road

.
’
,

in which there was now a crowd of infantry a l l packed ,

agains t the farther ban k digging them selves ho l es in it with

,

e n trenching tools W a d es on and his crews w e re standi n g

.

by their tanks as perplex e d as ours e lves by the situatio n

,

arise n out of this precipitate m uddle It was still t oo .

dark to see much whe n we climbed the ban k and looked

over the top The m our n ful trees a l ong the Douai road
.

stood up like spectres ou t of the smoke an d m ist th e dark ,

shape of the little wood at Sa n court was j ust visible b e

yond and here a n d there in the level foregrou nd the heavy
,

sh e ll bursts sprayed upward their fountain s of black soil

-
.

O ne Shell missed our tanks by a few fe e t an d exploded in

t h e opposite bank of the road .

We got the machines un ca m ou fl a ged as a preliminary

measure and after waiting by them for a littl e wh ile
, , ,

d e scended again to t he dug out to attempt to commu n i -

cate with the Brigadier by telephone N othing came of .

th is : the cable I believe was cut Te l egraphic m e ssages

, , .
,

however were still coming through from the headquarters

,

of the battalions in front and thes e provided a n other i n ,

exp l icab l e instance o f that m orning s confusion I was

’
.

sta n di n g by th e i nstru ment with the M aj or and the

In te l ligence Officer an d I followed on th e map th e
,

apparent progress of the attack as th e signal l er at the

board decoded th e i rregular bursts of Morse The hostile .

machine gun fire was very heavy

-
Colone l So and s o .
- -

h ad be e n kil l e d M aj or SO and s o was wou n ded - -

M any casualties Advance held up i n places but else ,

where progressing And then came a quite d e fin ite state

.

men t from on e of the battalions O ur infa n try had reached .

the road in Square S 9 c N ow S 9 c was on the high .

ground south of Bl é cou rt and the roa d indicated was 1 000

,

yards b eyond th e Sancourt ha l te This meant good pro .

gress. Some little t ime had pass ed while we had been

listening to these messages but it was not ye t seven ; and ,
4 74 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

after a further fruitless attempt to get in touch with the

brigade th e Maj or decided to send th e t a n ks forward
,
.

They m ight have to cove r anything from one to two

mi l es before they overtook the i n fantry assuming this ,

rec e nt information to be correct ; but there was a chance

of their being use fu l if on l y for m opping u p purposes It
,
-
.

was about when they climbed the bank and headed

across th e l e vel field toward Sancourt W a d e s on walked .

with them inte n di n g to see the m as far as the D ouai

,

road The m orn i n g was du l l and beyond the trees of

.
,

Sa n court itself one could see n othing for smoke She l ls .

were stil l crash ing fast on both Sides of the sunken road ,

but it was never actual l y h it — a fortun ate circu mstance ,

as by now it was crowded with th e best part of a

battalion of i nfantry the person nel of two
,

d ressing station s a nu mber of wa l ki n g wou n ded and a

,

few stretch er cases a n d an assortment of mach ine ,

gunners e n gineers a n d other people

, A sh e l l or two
, .

square betwe e n the banks wou l d have made a fearful

sha m bles of it At its n orthern end in a l an e wh ich
.
,

ran across to the Douai road from H ay n ecourt I saw ,

some of the armed l orri e s of Br uti n e l s Brigade waiting ’

”
“
to seize an ope n i n g for Vigorous exp l oitation They .

did not wait long A G erman aerop l a n e came over flying

.
,

l ow circled above the batteries behind us mach i n e

, ,

gu n ning the m and discovered the lorries

, Soon after .

wards the H ay n ecourt la n e was plastered with Shells and ,

Br uti n e l s Brigade withdrew i n a hurry O f ou r own

’
.

aeroplanes two squadron s of wh ich ( the 8 th and 7 3 r d )

,

were supposed t o be co operating i n the attack I did not -

,

see a si n g l e one th r oughout the mor n in g They may have .

been s omewhere on the scene doing good by stea l th ; or as ,

is quite probab l e the breakdown of the Canadian staff work

,

may have affected their m ovement s as it affect e d ours .

We waited for nearly two hours before any n ews of our

tanks reached u s In our ignorance we pictured them
.

striving to overtake the advancin g infantry W a d es on .

4 76 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N

scopes D ud d r i d ge havi n g scrambled out of the only

.
,

spo n so n door wh ich cou l d be u sed fou n d himself under ,

machine gun fire at close range and dropped into the pit
-
,

for she l ter Two m en who tried t o fo l low him were shot
.

insta n tly and the others remained i nside the overtur n ed

,

ta n k A fter crouching i n the pit b e s ide it for a wh ile

. ,

D u d d r i d ge saw the other tank r e turni n g from Bl é c ou r t ,

a n d contrived to craw l on his stomach through a heavy

fi re u ntil he cou l d hai l it wh e n h e was taken on board

,
.

H e wished to divert this ta n k to the rescu e of his crew ,

but it was i n n o condition for a n y extra work being in ,

fact on the v e rge o f a co m p l e t e breakdo wn an d only i n ,

d u ce d to move by co n ti n ued ha n d fe e di n g with pet ro l -

.

Every man i nside was i nj ured abou t the face and hands
by splinters and bullet —sp l ash It co n trived to crawl back
.

across the rai l way t o th e su n ken road pursued by the hail ,

of bu ll ets to the last D udd r i d ge s crew was left imprisoned

.
’

i n t h e pit In the mea n tim e th e seco n d of t h e survivin g

.
,

tanks had pushed up on to th e ridge south of Bl é c ou r t meet ,

ing everywh ere the same terrific fire and having established
th e fact that the r e were n o Canadians east of the rai l way ,

sti l l less in Square S 9 C where they had reported them

,

se l ves to be a n hour befor e it turned back a l so and arrived

,

at the su nken road c l ose behind the others The N C O . . . .

and several of the crew w e re inj ured by bu ll et splash -

.

Both tanks were simp l y coated in places with a deposit of

lead as a meme n to of t h e ordeal they had been through .

The urge n t n eed r e mai n i ng was to rescue the men i m

priso n ed in the overtur n ed ta n k if it were possible D ud d , .

ridge who was d e sp e rat e l y co n cerned for them begged to

, ,

be a l lowed to go back himself to see what h e could do ”

B ut we had sti ll on e ta n k capab l e of moving and its crew , ,

wounded and exhausted as they were at o n ce volu n teered ,

to return i n it to the ha l te It seemed possib l e that by

.

n o w the i n fantry would at least have got a hold on the

railway from wh ere they could co m mand th e lev e l groun d

,

around the pit ( which was only 3 00 yards farther on ) and , ,

4 78 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

the tan k and its right sponson d oors wide open to the sky
, .

Th e y h ad j ust l ooked inside a n d rea l is e d that the crew was ,

gon e when a nu mber of m achine guns opene d on them at

,
-

c l ose range Except for the pit itse l f i n which they would
.
,

m ere l y have been trapped the nearest sort of cov e r was a ,

sma ll m ound of earth fifty yards away toward th e rai l way ,

t h e grou nd everywhere e l se i n this neighbourhood being

abso l ute l y flat They ran for the m ou nd pursued by con
.
,

v e rgi n g streams o f bu ll e ts H ilton was ki ll ed almost at .

o n c e D ud d r i d ge was shot appare n t l y through the body

.
, ,

within a fe w yards of th e e xiguous she l ter W a d e s o n a l one .

reached th e l atter u n h u rt and flu n g himse l f down behi n d it .

H e m ade repeated attempts to crawl out agai n to D ud d r i d ge ,

who was dying befor e his eye s and almost within reach ,

but every tim e h e show e d h is head the bu l lets whipped u p

th e earth all rou n d it H e m ust have l ain here for some
.

time At le n gth seei n g that poor D ud d r i d ge was dead he

.
, ,

b e gan the hazardous task of cr e e pin g back to the rai l way .

He accomplished this succ e ssfu ll y although und e r h e avy ,

fire ; but on the way a gas She l l burst imm e diate l y i n front
-

of him and h e inhaled the fu m e s before he rea l ised what

,

had happened .

III .

So ended as far as the 7 th Tank Batta l ion was con

,

c e rned n ot on l y t his mis e rab l e and inexcusable fiasco at

,

S ancourt but a l so a l l direct participation in th e war The

, .

battalion was n ot again emp l oyed in action although we ,

se n t a few ta n ks to Es ca d oeuvr e s a week later ; for ex ,

c e p ti n g one or t w o in B Compa n y it n o l o n ger had any ,

machi n es fit to fight Whi l e we had been suffe ri n g for

.

other p e op l e s b l u n d e rs on the morning of the 3 oth C C om

’

pa n y had m e t with b e tter fortune but had lost two thirds ,

-

of their l ittle section The ta n k borrowed from u s brok e

.

it s tracks wh i l e crossi n g th e rai l way between Sancourt and

Ti l loy T h e crew of a s e co n d machine had a positiv e l y
.
 T HE F IG H T IN G RO U N D CA M BR A I : SA N C O U RT 4 79

miraculous escape A came through the roof and burst

.

inside and yet n o one was touched except the t ank com
,

ma n der C ol l in s who sustained a scratched finger The

, , .

third tan k reached Tilloy he l ped the Canadians t o est ab ,

lish them selves there and then rallied , .

I have said e n ough perhaps about the staff work of th e

, ,

1 2 th Canadia n B rigade As however the Canadia n Corps

.
, ,

took up the cudg e l s on behalf of their u n it and complained ,

of our a ll e ged m isdeeds I will recapitu lat e the evidence

, .

Apart from the circu mstan ces that we r e ceived n o defin it e

O peratio n orders whatever verbal or written and that zero , ,

was fixed ( a n d put forward four hours) without any n oti

fi ca ti on bei n g sent to us the B rigadier havin g told u s to
, ,

meet hi m in the sun ken road at 5 A M did not in fact . .

,

arrive there u n til 1 1 N or d id a n y respo n sib l e member

.

of his staff : durin g this period with the action a l ready i n ,

progress th e only brigade represe n tative at advanced head

,

quarters was the Intelligence O fficer a suba l tern wh o did , ,

not even k n ow that ta n ks were c o operating The in itia l -

.

error about the position of th e front l i n e ( which was n ever

mor e than a few yards beyo n d the Douai road and a l m ost ,

certainly did not include S ancourt ) may have been ex cus

able i n the uncertain conditions of sem i open warfare ; bu t -

the fables which came through on the fi e l d te l egraph after -

the action had begun are more than I can exp l ai n Bad .

map reading may have had something t o do with them

-
.

Even t h e artil l ery was afflicted by the general malady to ,

j udge from the fact that Bl é c ourt was found by our tank
to be almost u ntouched at a tim e when it was supposed to
,

be smothered by concentrated sh ell —fi r e This accu mula .

tion of b l unders co n victs the 1 2th Brigade of m isma n ag e

ment not u n fortu n ately too u n com mon i n ou r huge army
, , ,

as a who l e but quite exceptiona l in the Canadian Corps

, .

Before this dat e ta n ks had often suffe red from oth e r ,

quarters i n a simi l ar manner The attack on Monc h y

,
.

l e Preux on 1 1 th Apri l 1 9 1 7 is a cas e in point

-
, ,
.

The general s ituation at the end of the m orn ing in s o far ,

4 80 T HE TAN K IN A C T IO N

as it was susceptible of defi n ition appears to have been that ,

the 1 2 th Brigade had at l ength a permanent grip of San

court a n d a more u ncertain one of t he railway beyo n d .

N othing more h ad bee n accomp l ished The ambitious .

plan of exploitation on the left never of course got so far , ,

as a beginning The brigade suffered very heavy casual

.

ties The other brigade on the right seems to have made

.

adequate arrangements and in conse que n ce carried most,

o f its obj ectives in c l uding Ti l loy an importa n t outwork

, ,

of Cambrai a l though o n l y a si n g l e ta n k was i n at the

,

finish Before C ambrai itse l f fel l howev e r the Canadian s

.
, ,

were to have se v era l hard days of fighting in front of them .

In this ou r fi n al action on e ofli cer ( W a d e s o n ) and

, ,

twenty fi ve -
and men of A Company were engaged .

Of this litt l e total two at least were killed seven were

, ,

captured of whom two were known t o be seriously wounded

, ,

a n d twelve were s l ight l y i nj ured in various ways — twenty

on e in all On the fo ll owing day we received notification

.

of the award of a D C M to poor D ud d r i d ge for his exploit

. . .

at B eugny For h is two attempts to rescue his crew at

.

Sancourt a recommendation for a posthumous V C was . .

sent i n but I do not thi n k anythin g more was heard of it

, .

W a d es on received the M ilitary Cross .

Th e affair at San cou rt besides closing the active career

,

of th e 7 th Tank Batta l io n happe n s to provide also an ,

appropriate peg on which to hang a few general remarks

which I have been storing up against such an opportunity .

They may n ot appear to be esse n tial t o the subj ect of this

book but th ey wi l l be all the better for an airing
,
.

Loca l O peration s of the Sancourt type recurri n g daily , ,

naturally attracted little attention amid the larger features

of th e gen e ra l offe n sive Th e y w e re insi gnifica n t episodes
.

in the who l e e ve n when they employed as ma n y troops

,
4 8 2 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

things of good and b a d we find the details keyed up to

,

a universal and artificia l tone and SO altered beyo n d r e ,

cognition to suit th e b l azi n g colours of the general design

, .

A l l is for the best in the best of a ll possible armi e s .

U nmerited m isfortune occasiona l ly i n trudes but it is n ever ,

admitted that a n y one has m ade a m istake A l l G en e ra l s .

are in fa ll ible an d a ll so l diers heroic I am n ot speaking .

,

of course of that class of history which deals on l y with

,

larg e strategical and tactical featur e s and from which the ,

perso n a l eq u atio n and the sma ll u n d e rcurrents of batt l e ,

pu ll i n g this way and that necessari l y are om itted H istories

, .

of this kind usua ll y are writt e n by so l diers and the genera l ,

pub l ic does not read them : it l ikes stronger and simp l e r

fare ; and we have i n consequence vo l umes which attempt
to give a detai l ed picture of events as they affected u nits
and eve n i ndividuals These apparent l y are t o be writte n
.
, ,

by n ovelists Th e ordinary n ov e l ist is at hi s worst wh e n

.

he tries to keep to facts H e mistak e s a profuse harv e st

.

of n ames and nu m bers for a n accurate statement H e .

depends for the most part on officia l documents which are

sure to be more or less unconsciou s perversion s of th e
truth And so it is that we are threatened with e l aborate
.

histories wh ich are n ot histories at a ll books in which an ,

appearance of a l most pedantic veracity i s built up out of

a mas s of inaccurate a n d m isleading details .

I have be e n provoked especia l ly to this discursion by an

accid ent Whi l e I was writi n g my account of the action
.

at Sanco u rt as I saw it I found in a library the final

, ,

volume of Sir Arthur Conan Doy l e s British Campaigns

‘ ’

i n France a n d Flanders With some difficulty owing to

’
.
,

the p e culiar arrangement of the narrative I discovered his ,

brief reference to the fiasco on 3 oth September It is a .

typical example of the faci l e j ou rn a l istic style wh ich con

c e a l s while it affects candour By in the mor n ing “
.
,

he writes the 1 2 th Canadian Brigade had taken Sa n court

,
“

and had entered Bl é c our t wh e r e som e fi e rce bludgeo n wo r k

,

was goin g on For a mome n t the 1 2 th Ca n adi a n

.
 T HE F IG H T IN G RO U ND CA M BR A I : SA N C O U RT 483

B rigade was staggered by a heavy counter which broke

upon it bu t the ran ks soon rallied and th e ground was
,

regai n ed There appears to be no particular point her e

.

to wh ich one can take exception apart from that char ,

a cte r i s ti c touch about bludgeon work at Bl é cour t ; and

“

yet the general impression deliberately given to the reader

is ent ire l y opposed to the facts There lies the m isch i e f .

of this ill —i n formed type of n arrative especia l ly when it is ,

in spired by a determ in ation t o fin d n o fault with any one .

Even as a stat e ment of events th e accou nt is typica ll y ,

”
vague . G rou n d we are told was regain ed
, What ,
“
.

groun d ! N o place is specified Th e reader very wis e ly .

is l eft i n doubt as to what happen e d in Bl é c ou rt after the

”
bludgeon work but h e is at liberty t o assu me on his own
, ,

respo n sibility that it was that villag e which was regained

,
.

N othing of course i s said about any breakdown in the

, ,

arrangements b e cause Sir Arthur having depended upon

, ,

o fficial C anadian sources of information probab l y was quite ,

ignorant that such a breakdown ever occurred Th ese .

incidents are not m entioned in o ffi cial docu ments H e .

seems to realise however th at everythin g had n ot gon e

, ,

according t o plan and true to h is brief conceals the , , ,

suspicion in vagu e phraseology It mu st n ever be admitted .

that things go wrong if it can possibly b e avoided My .

ch ief contention is that in the c ircum stances it would have

been far bett e r if h e had left the matter ( and th e book )
altogether alo n e .

This wil l seem a n impertinent f uss about nothing and i n ,

any cas e an u nfair meth od of criticism An isolated a n d .

triv i al instance of i n accuracy is n o proof that th e disease is

chronic B ut unfortunat e l y we have a multitude of proofs
.
, ,

that it is I could q uote a dozen or a score of simi l ar

.

insta n ces within my own experienc e ou t of this one

, ,

vo l ume to say nothi n g of th e ear l ier ones which I have read

,

and forgotten N ow th is book probably has a ve ry large

.

circulation It was trum peted everywh e re as the first

.

authentic history of ou r s hare in the war Yet as a .

,
4 84 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

history while desperately conscientiou s in its own way

, ,

it is thoroughly bad S o me u nhappy person or persons

.

m ust have spent mo n ths wh ich might have been far better
,

emp l oyed in collecti n g and verifying the names of batta l ions

,

and individua l s which clog its pages N ot only is i t i m .

possible t o see the wood for the trees ; one cannot s ee even
the trees because of the u ndergrowth V erisimilitude which .
,

i s infinite l y more importa n t than l iteral accuracy is n ot to ,

be obtained by recitin g a stri n g of n ouns and numerals still ,

less by concea l i n g ev e ry fact which does n ot agre e with

the thesis of p e rfe ction conquering adversity There is no .

att e mpt at any broad treat ment of events nor any compre ,

h e n s i b l e e xp l anation of the sudden reversa l of fortune

wh ich ensued after the three great G erma n offensives had
shot their bolt in 1 9 1 8 The most revolutionary feature of
.

t h e war ( t o r e introduce our K i n g Charles s head ) is hard l y

’

n oticed . The author seem s t o be u n aware of the comp l ete

cha n ge of tactics initiated at Cambrai a n d d e termining
e very subseque n t O peratio n w e u n dertook ; or at least if he , ,

is aware of it he has not troub l ed to co n vey it inte ll igibly

,

t o h is readers It is enough to point out that in a vo l ume

.

deali n g with the who l e of our fina l o ffensive from H amel ,

a n d t h e great tank Victory o n 8 th August up to the Armis

tice an d professing especia ll y to deal with the for t u n es of

,
”
every divisio n brigade and battalion the word ta n k does
, , ,

n ot eve n appear i n th e index From the few cursory refe r

e n c e s to tanks in the text the r e ader might i magine t hat
,

th e se machi nes co n tro ll ed themse l ves rather i n differently ,

and in a comic man n er a n d fired automatica l ly th e ir own

,

guns H e is left to discover by the l ight of nature that

.
, ,

th e r e existed su ch a n orga n isatio n as the Tan k Corps with ,

six brigades vast workshops a n u merou s p e rson n el dis

, ,

tributed in eightee n batta l io n s n ove l tactics and prob l ems

,

of its own a n d a predomi n a n t influ e n ce upo n the fate of the

,

”
war . We read of dou r Yorkshireme n of hatchet
“
,
“

”
faced Co l onia l s of the inevitable grim determined faces
, ,

of every one of iron division s and even of infantry who

,
“
,
 C H A P T E R X X II .

F RO M N IER G N IES TO T HE AR M ISTIC E : CO NC L U SIO N .

IN his recent book The Last Four M onths the En d of the

,
‘
,

War in the West G eneral Sir Frederick M aurice describes

,
’

how M arshal Foch when asked by the stat e smen at V er

,

sai l les for h is p l an of cou ntering the final G erman offensive ,

answered by striking out three rapid blows with h is right ,

with his left and again with his right fo l lowing these by
, ,

lau nch in g out a vigorou s kick .

The preliminary punches begun on 1 8 th J u l y on the ,

O urcq a n d ending with the American capture of the St

,

M ihiel Salient i n mid September were uniform l y successful

-
,

— successful indeed to a degree which even th e Marshal

, ,

hi mself can hard l y have anticipated The British armies .

,

having lost men and 1 000 guns with immense ,

accu mulation s of material within four or five weeks a c c om

, ,

p l i s h e d the most extraordinary recovery in history and ,

p l ayed th e l eading r é l e in this cou nter offensive I do not -

.

know what effect the tremendous disasters of M arch and

April had upon O pinion in England but I know that they ,

abated in no way the illogical conviction of the ordinary

Englishman in France that we were bound to win the war,

in th e long run ; and this self confi d e n ce based neither on

- -
,

reason nor on knowledge inn ate matter o f fact and often , ,

- -
,

very irritating in prosperity was an unrecogn ised inspira

‘

tion of our resistance and reaction It took extraordinary .

form at times I remember how when three British armies

.
,
 F RO M N IER G N IES T o T HE A R M IST IC E 487

out of fou r were in full retreat or fightin g for their lives and ,

when people in Calai s a n d B ou l og n e were packing u p for

flight on e ru shed to th e n ewspapers to follow n ot th e
, ,

progress of the war but the case of M r Pe mberton B i l ling

,

and the Ou r b e lief i n ou rselves is so u nconscious

a n d irrationa l that it must a l ways be incomprehe n sible to

such a people as the G erma n s who hate the casua l and ,

have a conscious sort of arrogan ce which is a very diffe rent

thi n g ; and no doubt it has its dan gers B ut it served its .

purpose once m ore in 1 9 1 8 We went forward agai n as .

,

a matter of course when th e tide turned without a n y

, ,

particular exa l tation or parade still less any surprise at ,

ou r own pow e rs an d with hardly a thought ( s o far as the

,

great m ass of u s was concerned ) of the genius which was

directing all our movements as w e ll as those of three other
,

n ation al arm ies B ut I thin k that toward th e e n d of th e

.

preliminary stage when F o c h s successive pu n ches carried

,
’
,

j ust so far as was necessary a n d n o farther had exhausted ,

and demora l i sed t he enemy a n d driv e n hi m once m ore t o

t he fallacious shelter of th e H inde n burg Line we bega n t o ,

u nderstand that som eth ing m ore t han luck and confidence
lay behind this transformation For th e first tim e si n ce the .

war began every m a n i n th e Army fe lt an i n terest and a pride

i n th e combi n ed strategy in which so obviously he was p l ay
i n g a part The pecu l iarly En glish a n a l ogy of the ski ll ed
.

boxer was patent a n d appealed to all An d from now t o

,
.

t he e n d i n spite of losses and exhau stion a n e w spirit o f

, ,

enthusias m u rged u s on and was manifest in many ways

,
.

With its growth not on ly i n ou r ranks but i n those of

,

the French Be l gians and Am ericans coincided a notable

, , ,

decline in the G erma n m or a l The resistance to our a d .

vance became spasmodic an d liab l e to sudden collapses .

And before the end of September— far earlier than at on e

time any one can have hoped —the hou r was ripe for the
big kick . This was lau n ched on a scale and on broad ,

principles of ca l culated O pportunism beside wh ich th e ,

isolated G erman b l ows ear l ier in the year seem ed m e ch a n i

488 T HE T AN K IN A C T IO N

cal and clumsy O n 2 6th September the American I s t and

.

French 4 th Arm ies opened the ba l l on a front of forty miles

astride the Argon ne : on th e 2 7 th came ou r assau l t on the
C anal d u N ord : on th e 2 8 th Belgians Fre n ch and British
, , ,

were sweeping over the lost desolatio n of Flanders and the ,

5 th and l oth French Armies w e re c l imbing once more the

S lopes beyond the Aisne ; and on the 29 th the remai n ing

fraction of the battered G erman fro n t the Siegfrie d Lin e ,

from V e n dhu ile to St Q u e n ti n began to slide into rui n ,

before G e n era l Rawlinson s 4 th Army A compound O pera

’
.

tio n of this magnitude reaching its climax in four days

, ,

exte n ding over 2 5 0 miles of cou n try a n d i n volving twe n ty

four separate armies or from four to five mi ll ion men with
, ,

gun s is almost beyond th e capacity of the hu man

,

b rai n t o i magi n e as a whole It is like contemplati n g .

infinity Some o n e has called it I be l ieve the Battle

.
, ,

of Europe a n d this seems i ndeed the only name by which

,

it can be described .

Everywhere along this im men se front tanks were helpin g

to complete the overthrow they had done s o much to bring
about . The French used their light R e nau l ts i n clouds
before every attack O ur own Tank Corps with no re
.
,

serves had l ost i n two month s continuou s offensive action

,
’

three fourth s of its mach in es an d a third of its personnel

-
,

but it played a con spicuous part as I have tried to show , ,

o n 2 7 th September and after S ixty six tanks were i n.

-

action on the first day and another 1 7 0 on the 2 9th

,
.

Everlasting reorganisation and re s h uffl i n g of un its was one

of the trials of this period and indeed the man ner in which
,

b atta l ions were sh ifted from one brigade to an other before

al most every attack caused more worry and labour tha n
the attacks themselves The rapidity with which these
.
“

cha n ges were made would have bewildered both the Ta n k

C orps H e adquarters Staff and the brigade and batta l ion
commanders themselves a fe w months back : now the knack
of rapid movement had been mastered and though great ,

e nergy had to be exerted durin g such reorgan isation s they ,

4 90 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

seventeen battalion s with the armies had left a similar trail

b e hind swallowing u p men for guards and other duties it
, ,

wil l be realised that the c o ordination of th ese scattered

-

fragments i n the event of any res h uffli ng and th e ordinary

,

routin e of keeping in touch with the m and feeding them ,

were complicated problems which entailed an i mmense

amount of work for the staff and the transport N or was .

this all There were in the field as we l l seven tank

.

supply compa n ies ( two of which worked with infantry and

arti l lery ) e ach with twenty four machines a n u mber of
,
-
,

field ( or salvage) compan ies and an advanced stores

,

attached to each brigade All these v arious units whether

.
,

combatant or administrative moved forward with the

,

arm ies and all drew their maintenance supplies in the

,

last resort from th e Central Workshops at Erin It was .

a tremendous orga n isation that had sprung from th e two

companies which fought on t he Som me in 1 9 1 6 ; and n ot
the least of its achievements was the adaptability and e n
e r gy displayed in keeping the batta l ions supplied with their

manifold requirements during the final rapid advance Th e .

deplorable shortage of tanks themselves was the fau l t of

n o on e i n the Tank Corps In the fighting units duri n g
.

these days perhaps the busiest men were the battalion a n d

company engineers and equipment officers who toil e d ,

like slaves to keep the dwi ndling residue of m achines fit

for service .

I have carried the story of the 7 th Battalion up to its

last fight o n 3 0 th September I will ru n very briefly
.

through the remainder of its h istory a n d through that of

,

th e C orps as a wh ole up to th e Armistice .

O n the day after Sancourt I return ed fro m Pilgri m s ’

R est t o Pro n ville wh e re battalion headquarters had arrived

,

from Bullecourt and where our t e n ts were now erected .

Our few remain i n g tan ks ( th e re were no more than six fit

for action i n th e three companies ) were still at Pi l grim s ’
 FRO M N IER G N IES T o T HE A R M IST ICE 49 1

Rest and Raillen court For over a wee k we we re left i n .

peace O n ou r front the Canadians were pu shi n g s l owly

.

for w ard in the teeth of a most d e term ined resistanc e by

,

fr e sh G erman divisions toward the line of the Canal de ,

L Es ca ut n orth of Cambrai being ha m p e r e d by that town

’

on t heir right and by t he Se n sé e marshes on their l e ft .

But farther south the G erman s were bein g pressed back

upon the Beaurevoir F o n s om m e Lin e and the big kick -
, ,

with m ore room for its swing was preparing to demo l ish ,

these last defences St Quent i n had fallen a n d every .

,

where south of Cambrai we were across the canal by 6 th

October while the Canadians were approachin g Rami ll ies
,

and Eswars O n 8 th October the storm burst The

. .

B e aurevoir F on s om m e Li n e M a l i n cou rt Esnes and Ni e r g

-
, , ,

nies with all the high ground south of Cambrai were in ou r

, ,

hands by the eve n ing Cambrai was ent e red that n ight a n d .
,

the G ermans were retreating to the S e l le i n great co n fusion ,

having lost prisoners 2 00 gun s an d mu ch m a ter i el 1

, ,
’
.

Th e I s t 3 rd and 4 th Tan k Brigades h ad a conspicu ous

, ,

shar e i n this Victory alth ough the six batta l io n s en gag e d ,

mustered between th e m o n l y 8 2 tan ks O f these 2 0 were .

,

furnished by the 1 2 th Battalion wh ich h ad n ot been i n ,

action si n ce 3 r d S e ptember It sig n alised its r e entry by .

-

becomin g involved i n the second ta n k tank battle of th e

war It was worki n g single handed with th e left and ce n tre
.
-

of the 3 r d Army its companies being attach e d to the ,

4 th 6 th a n d 1 7 th Corps
, , B Compa n y on the right with .
, ,

seve n tanks having he l ped ou r old friends th e N ew Zea

,

landers a n d th e 3 7 th Division about Lesdain an d Esnes ,

ra l lied without further i n cid e nt O n e machine had been .

disabled by a shel l which kil l ed four of the crew C and A .

Companies attacki n g Seranvillers and N iergnies with the

,

infantry of the 6 th and 1 7 th Corps saw the latter estab ,

l i s h e d on the h igh ground east of th e villages and w e re ,

returning to the rallying poi n t when th e G erma n s made a -

1
O n th e w h l e h ow ev r th G rma n r tr eat w c onduct d with gr at s ki l l
o , e , e e e as e e

to th e v ry end Th r w o g n ra l d m oral i s ati on nd on w v y f w

e . e e as n e e e ,
a e sa er e

pris on e r e xc pt a ft r
s e t attack s o a l arg
e cal
se n e s e.
492 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

cou n ter attack l ed by seven captured M ark IV tanks Th e

-
. .

G ermans had fitted their ow n c m gun s with very .

,

c l u msy mounti n gs i n to the male machines but retained

, ,

the Lewis gu n s i n the others For the i n teresti n g episode .

which ensued I will quote th e 1 2 th Battalion H istory b e

,
‘
,
’

gi n ning with A Company s experien ces ’

“
Owing t o the smoke an d imperfect light these ! th e ,

G e rman ta n ks ] were at first take n to be s ome of our own ,

both by our i n fantry and tan k crews the l atter supposing ,

the stra n gers to be l ong to C Compa n y L 1 6 Captain .

,

Roe was n ear the farm of M o n t N euve east of N iergni e s

, , ,

wh e n these tanks appeared i n sight a n d the forem ost was ,

within fifty yards befo r e that officer realised that it was an

e nemy O ne 6 pou n der round was then fired at it a p
.
-
,

p a r e n tl y disabling it but almost S im ultaneous

, l y L 1 6 r e

c e i ve d t w o direct hits o n e of which came through th e cab

, ,

wound e d Captain Roe and killed his driver Roe b el i ev , .

,

ing his tan k to be disab l ed as the en gin e had stopped got , ,

his cre w out w e n t to L 9 whi ch was n e ar at hand and l e d

, , ,

it back toward the G erman tanks L 9 had a l ready had five .

m e n wounded had b e e n on fire and having n o gun ners left

, , , ,

cou l d n ot use its 6 pou nders ; but its com ma n der 2 n d Lieut
-

,
.

W a rs a p engaged the enemy with his Lewis gun unti l his

,

ta n k received a direct h it setti n g it on fire a second time ,

.

H e was now forced to evacu ate it and as the counter ,

attack appeared to be successful he blew the machine up ,

to prevent it falling into the enemy s hands L 1 2 another ’

.
,

6 pou nder tank was h it twice and disabled before its

-
,

commander had discovered that the strange tanks did not

belong t o C Company There remained L 8 2 n d Lieut .
,
.

A R M artell but this tank had a leaking radiator and was

. .
,

a l most out of water Lieut M artel ! therefore sent his

. .

crew back and went hi mself with an artillery o ffi cer to a

captured G erman fi el d gun wh ich th e two turned round -
,

and u sed against the enemy s tanks knocking one out ’

,
.

The tank which L 1 6 had engaged was crippled either by ,

the 6 pou nder shell or by a captured anti tank rifle and the
- -
,
4 94 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

his infantry heavy l osses The int e n se gratitude of th e

.

in fa n try thems e lves ( for what but for the s moke wou l d , ,

have been a simple business as we had several more ma l e ,

ta n ks tha n the G ermans) was an ear n est of the severe fright

they had suffe red and shou l d have b r ough t h om e t o their
,
'

sup e riors in a trenchant fashion the moral value of the

weapon which they wer e so fort unate as to have almost
exclusive l y at their disposal A few hu n dred G e rman .

ta n ks i n st e ad of a doz e n or so would have made our

, ,

progress even at this l at e hour a much s l ower and more

, ,

difficu l t matter So far as th e Ta n k Corps was co n cerned

.
,

the o n l y l e sson to b e drawn from th e e n cou n ter at N ierg n i e s

was o n e a l ready l earnt at V i ll ers Br e ton n eux — name l y the -

advisability in Vie w of furth e r simi l ar m e e t ings of fitti n g

, ,

ev e ry ta n k with a 6 pou n d e r gu n -
It was as a r e sult of .

these t w o actions that a n umber of M ark V and V Star . .

”
femal e s were convert e d i nt o co mposite or h e rmaphrodite
machi n es with a 6 pound e r sponson on one side The
,
-
.

occasion for which they were designed however did n ot , ,

recu r Although the G e rmans u sed on e or two tanks i n

.

subsequent cou nter attacks our m achines did not meet

-
,

them agai n .

O n October 1 0th when the Canadian line was s everal

,

m iles beyo n d Cam brai the 7 th Batta l ion sent a composite

,

detachme n t of four fighting ta n ks and a wire l ess machi n e ,

which I accompa n ied to Es ca d oeuvr e s a suburb o f the

, ,

town to the north east on the road to Iwuy -

This
, .

involved crossing the Ca n al de L Es ca u t and two para ll e l ’

streams by a series of n arrow bridges ( two of them tem

p ora r y structur e s ) between M orenchies and Ramillies .

Es ca d oeuvre s was a working c l ass suburb and its sma l l -

houses many of which were shattered were littered with

, ,

th e poor belongings of its inhabitants who had n ot been ,

evacuated ma n y days The G ermans befor e they left had

.
, ,
 F RO M NIER G N IES T o T HE A R M IST IC E 495

flu n g everything about in a final hu nt for loot or in sheer ,

destructiveness and thorough to the last i n sma l l d etai l s

, , ,

had put a bul l et through every mirror clock and pi an o , ,

which was not a l ready broken The ta n ks were here for .

two days and nights the o fficers occupyin g a ti n y h ou se

,

of on e room and a cellar which had been used by th e

G erman O r tz Kom m a nd a n t
-
As th e e n emy was sti l l h o l d
.

i n g on t o the D ouai front the I s t Army n ow had a l e ft ,

flank twe l ve or fifte e n mi l es long exte n d i n g fro m Thun ,

Lev eque on the canal to somewhere near Etai n g at a ,

right angle t o th e rest of th e line ; a n d i n Es ca d oeuv re s

we were shelled persistent l y by a high velocity gun wh ich -

fired from a point we l l b e h ind u s across the Sensée This .

was an annoyance but a gr e ater trag e dy to m e was the loss

,

of my va l ise which was cut off from the back of the Maj or s
,
’

car as he was bringi n g it at n ight through the packed tra ffic

in Cambrai My servant had of cours e filled it with thi n gs
.

I did not want at Es ca d oeu vr e s and could not rep l ace — old
cherished gar m ents and oth er oddments such as one feels a
positive affection for .

T h e detach ment was withdrawn from Es ca d oe uvr e s on the

1 2 th as the cou ntry in front seamed with sma ll rivers was
, , ,

uns u itable for s e riou s tank O perations and a few days la ter ,

the batta l ion was placed in G H Q Reserve and concentrated . . .

at Fontaine N otre Dame This was preparatory to a return

- -
.
,

when rai l way exigen cies perm itted to the Berm icourt area , ,

for a complete refit with M ark V s Another party of .

’
.

officers an d m en had left to stiffen the n e w battalion s in

En gland and I was ex pecti n g t o fo l low i n a few days
, On .

1 6 th October however I learnt that I had been posted as

, ,

Batta l io n Reco n n aissance O fficer to th e 1 2 th Batta l ion Th e .

next day I said good bye to the 7 th with which I had worked
-

and fought for two years a n d j oined my new u nit at Cat

,

teni e res south of th e Cambrai Le Cateau road

,
-
.

O n this front the enemy had fallen back everywhere to

the Selle river Douai at last had be e n aba n don e d a n d
.
,

the s th Army was approach i n g Li l le We had now entered .

4 96 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

a new type of cou n try wh ich to those accustomed to four

,

years of fighti n g backwards and forwar d s over the devas

t a te d area seemed a l most unnatural During one s visits to ’
.

Eng l an d on l eave the first sight from the train of th e

,

K entish orchards and hop fi e l d s always left a stra n ge -

i ll usion as of som e th ing lacki n g which was caus e d i n

, ,

fact by the abse n ce of she ll h o l e s ; and the country -

beyond Cambrai affected o n e at first in a si mi l ar manner .

It was so un l ike war as we had known it Every inch of .

the land was u n d e r cultivation Im m e nse fi e lds of cabbage .

and be e t u n brok e n by any h edg e ro w s ro ll e d onward for

, ,

mi l es ; the vil l ages and farms wer e of great size a n d oft e n

untouched and with the little tow n s such as Caudry Le
, , , ,

Cateau and So l es m es comp l eted a picture that proclaimed

, ,

i n every artic l e a previou s state of com fort an d prosperity .

Before the war this region must have b e en one of th e most

flourishing in France And except that for th e mom e nt it
.
,

was deserte d it was flourishing sti l l The G ermans had

, .

seen to th at a n d had taken the profits It was i n deed

,
.

a nove l ty to e n ter house after house where roofs wi n dows , ,

a n d fur n iture r e main e d untouched and where o n ly a d a y , ,

or two before civilia n s had be e n l ivi n g A l itt l e l ater an d

, .
,

w e had moved forward again to p l ac e s where half starved -

women dressed tidi l y in b l ack who had lived without

, ,

m e at for upwards of four years and without hope for

a l most as long sti ll cowered i n cellars whi l e the fighti n g
,

passed by overhead and who when they were rescued a n d

, ,

moved out of the gas a n d shelling to safer quarters could ,

yet fi n d time ( as I saw mys e l f) to l ay flowers on those of

our dead that wer e l yi n g i n their stre e ts This was in St .

Python a little suburb of S o l esmes ; and Solesmes itself by

, ,

way of co n trast provided a stupefyi n g sid e l ight upon the

,

mi n ds of the m ost extraordi n ary p e ople that ever i n h a b

i te d this e arth for it was gay with n e w tricolour flags
, ,

manufactured imported an d sold to t h e i n habitants by

, ,

the G erman s th e ms e lves i n readiness for their d e feat .

In many respects these last weeks were the most i n

4 98 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

Beaurain a sma l l vil l age on very high grou nd a couple of

,

m iles due east of Solesmes where the G ermans continued ,

to hold out for two days after th e rest of their line had
been forced back t o the H arpies Our tanks havi n g been .

got across the S e lle at St Python a n d Briastre B Company ,

was detailed to assist the s th Division in the capture of

Beaurain on the 2 3 r d Owing to accidents on l y two ta n ks
.
,

were available and neither of these was mecha n ica l ly fit

,
.

O ne h ad a cracked s l eeve and could only travel at low ,

speed The little action wh ich ensued possesses on e or

.

two points of interest .

From the S e lle V al l ey at B riastre the ground ro s e steep l y

in a series of ridges each slight l y higher than the last t o
, ,

Beaurain w hich was on the su mmit O ur outpost line was

, .

j ust east of th e farm a n d road j u n ction at Marou 2 000 -

,

yards in front of the village Between the two places was .

a spu r of ground called the G rand Champ Ridge where th e ,

G ermans had a great number of machine gu ns in pits -

.

The two tan ks were to clear th is ridge which was th e ,

enemy s main l i n e of resista n ce and then proceed to mop

’

up i n Beaurain i f r e quired They reached the valley i n .

front of Marou at 1 0 P M on the 2 2 n d zero being at

. .
,

in the morning At 1 o c l ock the enemy put down a heavy

.
’

barrage alo n g our front l ine and the assaulting infantry ,

suffered several hu ndred casualties and were thrown into

great confusion Expecting an attack they sent up S O S
.
,
. . .

signals while the tanks prepared for actio n

, N othi n g .

came of th is bombardment however and it died down after , ,

half an h our to the n ormal intermittent shel l ing ; but th e

i nfantry was so shaken that only the presence of the tanks
induced them to go forward at zero The G ermans fought .

with desperate courage on the G rand Champ Ridge where ,

the machine gu nners fired u nt i l th e y were r un over and

-
,

where the engine of L 1 3 (the tank with the cracked sleeve )

stopped a n d could not be restarted for forty fi ve minutes -
.

O ur infantry be ing some way behind the enemy swarmed ,

round the tan k one o fficer bringi n g a machine gu n into the

,
-
 F R O M N IER GN IES T o THE A R M IST ICE 4 99

road within a few yards of it The other tank L 2 3 was .

, ,

havin g an equally hard task on th e ridge finding it very ,

di ffi cult in the m ist and twilight t o locate the hostile

machine gun s ; and th e two were fighting alone for a
-

quarter of an hour before th e infantry at length cam e

up h avi n g collected on the way some fifty prisoners wh o
,

had surrendered to th e tanks The latter had broken the .

back of th e enemy s resistan ce on th e ridge and the a d

’
,

vance now went forward rapidly Beaurain was cleared .

with l ittle trou ble n either o f the tanks being required

, ,

which was j u st as well as on e was broken down and the

,

second pullin g very badly The officer and on e man i n

.

L 2 3 were wounded and th e crew of L 1 3 was bad l y

,

gassed s o that the company com mander wa l king forward

, ,

from the rallying point t o meet the m achines found it

-
,

crawling homeward out of control th e tan k com mander ,

and driver being u nconsciou s Considering that both tanks

.

went into action labouring under mechan ical defects their ,

performance would have been highly creditable in any

circu mstances ; and it fel l out that in addition they alon e
carried th e operation through as the infantry concerned ,

fully recognised Th e latter disorgan ised and bad l y

.
,

shaken by the barrage wh ich caught them before zero ,

and by a second which fell among them in th e fi rst m inutes

of the advance would have made n o progress against the
,

nest s of mach ine gu ns on the G ran d Champ Ridge i f th e

-

tanks had not been there t o take the lead and draw th e
enemy s attention to the mse lves
’
.

B Company was now left without any tanks fi t to m ove .

A Company with four mach ines was at H aussy on t he Selle

, , ,

north of Solesmes and remained there C Company alon e

,
.
,

with three tanks continued for two or three days to follow

,

the G u ards Division in its advance It had been pointed .

out that the decrepit condition of these tanks added to ,

the series of obstruction s formed by the rivers made their ,

chances of affordin g practical he l p very remote ; but th e

G uard s ins i sted on their following u p as far as possible ,
5 00 T HE TA N K IN A CT IO N

on accou nt of the great moral effect the mere knowledge

of their presence had on the m en i O n the 2 4 th therefore , ,

C Company had reached Cape ll e at the j unctio n of the ,

Ecaillon and St G eorges our l ine being then with in a mile ,

of Le Quesnoy O n the following day orders came through

.

from Tan k C orps H eadquarters for the withdrawal of the

batta l ion Al l compan ies having patched up their ma
.
,

chines began the long trek back to the entraining rail

,

head a t M arcoin g on the Canal de L Es ca ut a tedious ’

,

process as som e of th e tanks had to be towed most of

,

the way O n I s t N ovember I went on ahead t o take over

.

ou r winter q uarters a h utted camp in the devastated area

,

at Ecurie near Arras H ere we remained for six months

, . ,

i n extreme discomfort ; a n d then made up to strength from ,

disbanded u nits of the corps and provided with 24 M ark ,

V s entrained for Cologne

’
.
.
,

The last tan k battles of the war were fought on the 4 th ,

s th 6 th and 7 th N ovember j ust before the Armistice arou nd

, , , ,

the Forest of M ormal An idea of the lamentable state to .

which the corps was reduced will b e gathered from the

n umber of tanks and units employed on the first day The .

6 th 9 th 1 0th and 1 4 th B atta l ions were engaged

, , , At full .

strength they would have mustered between them 1 68 tanks ,

they could now ra i s e on l y 3 7 An interesting feature of the .

day s fighting was that three supply tanks armed with one
’
-
,

H otchkiss gu n apiece and carrying bridging m aterial for the

2 5 th D ivision came into action near Landrecies
, Our .

infantry was h e ld up on the west ba n k of the Sambre Canal ,

and the o fficer i n charge of the supp l y tenders decided to

see what he cou ld do to h e lp them O ne tank was knocked .

out Th e other two followed by the infantry as if they

.
,

had been fi ghtin g tanks forced the G erman machine ,

gu nners to surrender During the next day eight Whippets .

of the 6 th Battalion helped the 3 rd G uards Brigade i n the

di ffi cult enclosed country north o f the Forest ; and with two
further actions on the M aroilles Avesnes road the Tank -
,

C orps active share in the war came to an end

’
.
 F RO M N IER G N IES TO T HE A R M IST ICE 501

N inety six days of almost continuou s battle had n ow

-

taken place since the great tan k attack at Amien s was

launched by the 4 th A rmy on the 8 th August since when ,

many o ffi cers an d m en of th e Tank Corps had been in

action as many as 1 5 and 1 6 t imes D uring this period .

n o less than 1 993 tanks and tan k armoured cars had -

been en gaged on 3 9 days i n all 8 8 7 m ach ines had been ,

handed over to salvage 3 1 3 of these being sen t to th e ,

Central Workshops an d 2 04 havin g been repaired and

,

reissued to battalion s O f the above 8 8 7 tan ks only 1 5

.
,

had been struck off the strength as un salvable Casualt i es .

against establish ment had been heavy 5 9 8 offi cers and ,

2 8 2 6 other ranks being counted amongst killed wounded , ,

m issin g and pri soners ; but when it is considered that th e

,

t otal strength of the Tan k Corps on th e 7 th August ( 9 5 00

of a l l ranks in France) was considerably u nder that of an
i nfantry division an d that in the old days of th e artillery
,

b attles such as the first battle of the Somm e an i nfant ry

,
'
,

d ivision fre q uen tl y s us ta i n e d 4 000 casualties in twelve

hours fighting th e tan k casu alties were extraordinar i ly
’

light From thi s we m ay deduce our final and outstandin g

.

lesson from all th ese battles— namely that iron m e ch a ni ,

cally m oved is an economiser o f bl o od th at the tan k i s ,

an econ om iser of life .

In the first days of N ovember when the Tank C orps was ,

endeavouring to withdraw all its crippled battalions for a

reorgan isation an d refit pressu re was put upon it to main ,

tain som e un its in th e field The Army in fact discovered .

, ,

that it could not go o n without tanks in sp ite of the de ,

moralisation which pla i nly was spreading among the enemy .

The cavalry prov i ded at last with all th e conditions m ost

,

favourable to th eir u se were as helpless as ever and the

, ,

W k l y Ta k N t 1
ee n o es .
’
5 0 2 T HE TA N K IN A CT IO N

infantry stil l needed the moral support which the presence

of tanks afforded even if the latter were hardly ever used
, .

It was decided therefore that each tank brigad e Should

, ,

send forward one com posite battalion Orders to this effect .

had j ust reach ed u s at Ecurie ( the whole of the I s t Brigade

being now concentrated in this area ) when the Armistice ,

was signed .

For some time after 1 1 th N ovember how e ver th e Tank , ,

Corps in common with every other branch of the service

, ,

was sti l l busy preparing for further eve n tua l ities The .

composite battalions were no lo n ger im mediately required ,

and only the armoured cars went forward into G e rmany ;

-

but at Bermicourt and Erin there was no relaxation of

effort until the occupat ion of th e Rhine bridge heads and -
,

the enemy s surre n der of his fleet and arti l lery rendered
’

any serious resumption of hostilities impossib l e At the .

sam e time the criminal outcry for instant demobilisatio n

,

which dis graced still further ( if that was possible ) our u n

scrupulou s press hit the corps i n France especially hard
,
.

NO sooner had the battalions been brought again t o some

thing like fu ll strength by drafts of conscripted m iners ,

strikers and professional footballers wh o might in time

, ,

have been knocked i nto shape than all these arrivals who , ,

had been only a few months in th e Army were re l eased ,

again — a business which caused very natural discontent

among the original rank and fi l e who had done all th e
fighting and who were st i ll retained .

In the meantim e during the last m onth of the war

, ,

further developments in the composition of the corps had

been authorised and carried i nto effect The 6 th Tank .

Brigade was formed i n October consisting nominally of ,

the 1 6 th 1 8 th and 3 O I St ( American ) Battalion s The 1 8 th

, , .

Battalion had j ust come out from England This brigade .

was never in action as a whole There were now for m i Ii g .

at B ovington the 1 9th 2 0th 2 1 5 t 2 2 nd 2 3 r d 2 4 th an d

, , , , , ,

2 s th Battal i ons but none of these would be available before

,

th e early Spring o f 1 9 1 9 By that date however eight

.
, ,
5 04 THE TA N K IN A CT IO N

In the matter of the groups it is possible of course that

,

it was n o t intended to increase the number of brigades but ,

mer e ly to add battalions to them I have no i nformation .

about this but it does not appear very probable In any

,
.

case as the tank fighting un it is still the company tank

, ,

battalion s being the administrative equivalents of infantry

brigades it would seem that the obj ect aimed at would
,

h ave been better attained by increasing the strength of

battalio n s and abolishing altogether the intermediate tank
brigades The French system of form ing their tan k u nits
.

into regiments of three battalions on the Continental ,

i n fa n try basis is yet more practic a l All these plans may

, .

appear to be b ut variations of the same theory ; but in fact

there is a great gulf fixed between the regime n tal outlook
and that of a higher form ation and one of the curses of ,

the British Army is the way i n which staffs tend to spring

u p like mushroo ms on the slightest provocation .

Thi s discussion however is now become academ ic

, , .

G roups and brigades a l ike have van ishe d for the presen t
into the l imbo of lost hopes a n d what is left of the Tank
,

Corps hangs in a state of su spended animation consciou s of ,

a gr e at past and a very u ncertain future After innu merable .

tentative schem es for a post bellu m establishment as part

-

of the regu lar Army the corps was fixed definitely a few
,

m onths ago at on e brigade of five regular battalion s .

G eneral Elles remained as Brigadier and five lieutenant ,

colonels were selected by seniority from the original group

and brigade com manders Although five battalions was
.

an inadequate force it appeared as if the war had taught

,

us something if not overmuch R emembering what had

, .

happened during host ilities on e really had expected to find

,

o fficers from the Camel Corps or th e Life G uards appointed

to com mand tank units in a peace establishment But .

when it ca m e to the j u nior com missioned ranks the old ,

Adam reappeared with a ven g eance A large number of .

subaltern s temporarily com mis sioned into the O l d Tan k

Corps wished t o stay on in the n ew one as professional ,
 F RO M N IER G N IES T O THE A R M IST IC E 5 05

soldiers ; and as many o f them h ad one or two years ’

experience of tank warfare the retention of the most ,

su itable wou l d see m to be to a reasonable being a matter

, ,

of course settin g aside all arguments of decency or pro

,

p r i e ty
. But this would have been carryin g com mon sen se -

too far Th e War O fli ce as usu al h ad a trump up its

.
, ,

slee v e It had granted regular com missions in th e i n fantry

.

and other arms ( but n ever in the Tan k C orps itself) o n such
a prodigal scale during th e war that the red uction of the
Army left somethin g like 7000 of th ese o fficers surplus t o
establish ment B i l lets must be fou nd for them an d it
.
,

occurred to s ome one that the new Tank Corps would

accom m odate several hundred Th e old tan k officers .
,

therefore havin g at first been encouraged to apply for

,

regular comm issions were now told that they were not
,

wanted Sandhurst and th e surplu s must be considered

.

before su itability .

This was the state of affairs at the end of 1 9 1 9 What .

has happen ed since or what the en d of it will be I do not

, ,

kn ow at th e time o f writi n g There was a ru m our j ust when

.
,

I was leaving the Army that everythin g was to be changed

,

once more that all tan k battalion s were t o be abolished

, ,

an d that only a sma l l training and experimenta l depot

was to be maintai ned at B ovington or Wareham Every .

in fantry o ffic e r on the other hand was t o pass through a

, ,

tan k course Whatever the basis of truth i n this

circumstantial report ( an d it has received con fi rmation in
recent n ewspaper paragraphs ) so perniciou s a schem e is ,

beyond com ment In the meantim e the n ew regular

.
,

brigade has com e into being an d so far continues to exist ; ,

and since the authorities have discovered the valu e of t anks

during industrial disturban ces an d in Ireland they may ,

harde n their hearts against the Treasu ry and the Tan k ,

Corps m ay tide over thi s bad hou r with the he l p of Trade

U n ion s and Sinn Fein It will be the first time that e ither
i n stitution h as served a useful purpose .

In the lo n g run of course we sha l l have to equ ip our

-
, ,
5 0 6 T HE TA N K IN AC T IO N

selves with a large Tank Corps again Everything depends .

upon wh e ther we do so b e fore the next war or i n th e midd l e

of it O ther n ations wi ll have tanks and in large nu mbers
.
,
.

The Fre n ch are providing for a corps of men and ,

the America n s ( who designed a ta n k of their own during

the war ) have also I believe taken u p t he quest ion in , ,

ear n est J ust as the origins of modern warfare at sea an d

.
,

of all the scientific methods by which it is carried on are to ,

be found in th e Gl oi r e and the little M oni tor of the early

’
sixties so it is n o l e ss certain that future warfare on land
,

will be domi n ated by the successors of the M ark I tank .

which stru ggled through the mud of the Som me battle

fields For once this country has taken the lead i n m ilitary
.

i nvention ; and it has now at its disposal a preponderant

body of experience i n this new method It remains to be .

seen whether the advantage will be m aintai n ed or whether ,

it will be l ost by the diversio n to political schemes of even

the comparat ively small an n ua l outlay of money wh i ch is
essential for adequate experiment 1
.

What form tank deve l opment will take is a subj ect

beyond the scope of this book and one on which I am not ,

competent to speak We are sti l l on the threshold of t he .

n ew enterprise and there seem to be n o limits at present to ,

what may be achieved We have a l ready a tan k which will .

float a n d s p e ed s of twenty and t w enty fi ve m iles an hour

’

-
,

i c e writi g th e ab ov a M m ora ndum h s b n i s u d ( z 3 d F b 1 920) by

1
Sn n e, e a ee s e r e .

th e S cr tary f Stat fo War d a l i ng with th Army E timat

e e o e It c o tai ns th
r e e s es . n e

followi ng r f r nc e to th Tank Corp which h ow that ou w r t appr eh n ions

e e e e s, s s r o s e s

a re c on fi rm d It h b n d cid d that th r e W l l b o parat Ta k Corp

e as ee e e e l e n se e n s

fo th pr
r e t d that th ough non c ommi i o d offic r nd m wi ll b
es e n , an ,
-
ss ne e s a en e

p o t d p rma nt l y to ta k u it
s e e ne a nu cl u offi c r wi ll b e cond d i t ead of
n n s as e s, e s se e ns

b i ng tra f rr d t th u it fo tat d p ri od Th mai n di ffi cu l ty which

e ns e e o es e n s r s e e s. e

c o fr on t r rgani ati on i th d arth of r gu l ar offi c r with k now l dg of ta nk

n s eo s s e e e e s e e s.

To om e xt n t thi may b
s e ov e rc m
e by gra nti ng r gu l ar c ommi i o to
s e o e e ss ns

t m p orary offi c rs C on id rab l e p r ogr h b

e e . mad with th d ign f
s e es s as ee n e e es o

ta k duri ng 1 9 1 9 a new machi n ha v i g b e n pr oduc ed with a s p d of ov r

n s , e n e ee e

tw ty mi l n h our nd which h m cha i c a ll y a l ong l i f I a tria l un f

en es a , a as e n e. n r o

1 000 mi l practica l l y no w ar h r e u l t d Thi typ i b i g furth r d v el op d

es e as s e . s e s e n e e e .

Tw o oth r machi s ha v b e d p atch d to Ind i a fo th purpos of xp erim nt

ne e ee n es e r e e e e

u nd r tr opica l c o d i ti
e n on s
5 08 T HE TA N K IN A C T IO N

tanks before the events of 1 9 1 8 taught h i m wisdom in this

”
respect . We then com e to a considerat i on of the means
the Allies had at their disposal for their cou nter offensive -

in the sum mer of that year Speaking of Sir D ouglas .

Ha i g s plans and resources G eneral M aurice points out

’

that in particular the great impro v ements which had been

“

made in the tanks since their first appearance in battle and

the quantities of them available gave him j ust th e mean s ,

h e needed for carrying through his sch eme Cambrai had .

proved that tanks cou l d replace the long bombardment an d

”
obvia te all the s l ow preparation which it i nvolved .

The action at H amel is then described : With th i s for “

tu n a te experi ment faith in the tanks Spread Th e com .

m anders already believed in them and now that belief in ,

‘ ”
their power t o make good spread to the ranks ( Some .

of the commanders it must be added dissembled their

, ,

be l i e f very successfully unt il after H amel ! ) G eneral

M aurice continues : Tanks made surprise that greatest
“
,

weapon of genera l ship much easier than it had been : they

,

saved life and eco n omised troops and therefore that , , ,

quick succession of punches for which Foch was seeking h is

O pportunity became possible Th e artist had his materia l s
.

to ha n d H onour to h im that h e knew how to use them

. .

Of th e great tank attack on 8 th August we read that ,

the tanks did invaluable service i n cutting th e G erman

tel e graph and telephone com mun i cations Th e work .

begun at H amel was completed and the moral ascendancy ,

established by tanks artil l ery and infantry working i n

, , ,

combinatio n affected both private and G eneral in the

,

”
G erman Army .

Later in the book G eneral M aurice sums up th e in .

fl uen ces which together broke down the G erman m or a l ,

and again h e insists upon the predominant part played by

the tanks .

The tanks had proved their effi cacy in the preparati o n s

for Armageddon now they were t o take their part in the
,

cu l min ation toward w hich Foch had been working and ,

 F RO M N IER G N IES TO THE A R M IST IC E 5 09

few th ings helped u s more i n the decisive struggle than the

moral ascendancy which the success of the tanks in the
prelim inary battles had given u s over th e G ermans .

Captured G erman orders and other docu ments bear testi

mony to the dread w ith which the enemy regarded ta n ks
at th i s ti me H ere follows an e xtract from one such
.

o rder a l ready quoted i n an earlier chapter of th is book

,
.

G eneral M aurice cont inues : This is th e type of order “

which i s the refuge o f authority when caught napping .

The G erman leaders had delayed too long t o study the

possibilities of tanks a n d the most e ffective m eans of m e et
ing them The cou nter measures presented in this order
.
-
’

might have availed again st tanks alon e They were use .

less against tanks artil l ery and i nfantry working in co m

, ,

bination Th ey were i n fact worse than useless they

.
, , ,

were harmful for they served to demo n strate to the G erman

,

soldier who was already i n mortal fear of tanks and pre

,

pared to make their appearance an excuse for surrender ,

that his chiefs were as frighten ed of them as h e was and ,

that they had n o e ffective reply ready .

And finally the author makes this definite assertion

,

It is certain that neither Foch s skilful preparation for the

’

great battle nor the valour of the infantry would have

, ,

brou ght u s victory if we had had to rely upon bom

b a r d m e n t alone i n order to batter down the G erm an
defences .

These extracts read like a literal if more sober repeti , ,

tion of the theses at wh ich I have been ham merin g in and ,

out of season throu ghout this history ; and they are uttered
,

with an authority to wh i ch I have n o pretence It wou l d .

have been di ffi cu lt to find confirmatory evidence m ore apt

and decisive than chance threw i n my way a fortnight ,

before these lin es were written whe n I picked up G eneral ,

M aur i ce s little volume I would commend it to Sir Arthur

’
.

C o nan Doyle amon g other people The tan k i n on e

, .
,

sense needs no advertisem ent now any more than the first
, ,

success f ul steam engine or aeropla n e needed on e : eve r

-
5 10 THE TA N K IN A CT IO N

since Cambrai at the latest all who had ade q uate acquaint
, ,

ance with the facts realised that it had come not only t o ,

stay but to predominate It is one thing however to be

, .
, ,

convinced an d quite another to admit it even to oneself

, , .

In a professional army wh ich ( like any other close cor ,

p o ra ti o n ) is a body made up of cliques conservatism and , ,

personal j ealousy held together by interest n o gratitude

, ,

is fe l t for innovations once the im mediate occasion for their

u sefu l ness is past G eneral o ffi cers who called for tanks at
.

a l l hours in the fi e l d because they could n ot rely upo n their

,

infantry going forward unless tanks were there to lead them ,

l ost a l l i n terest in these auxiliaries the moment the Armistice

was signed An d further recognition which cannot be
.
,

denied to some instru men t is often withheld from th e hand

which directs it It is for these reasons that u nbiassed
.

acknowledgment of the services rendered by the Tan k

Corps i s peculiarly valuable at this time People t alk .

about tanks and read more or l ess worthless books in

,

which these mach ines figure occasion ally as comic and

sem i an imate mo n sters moving capriciousl y here and there
-

without method or principle ; but whi l e it i s dimly recog

n i s e d that they influe n ced powerfully th e course of the war ,

it is hardly suspected that th ey are governed like any ,

other m i l itary arm by tactical con siderations that they

, ,

are not irrespo n sible units but parts of an organised whole ,

and t hat every action they have fought has been plann ed
as careful l y as any infantry assault or artillery barrage .

Stil l less attention is paid to th e m en who fought in them ,

and whose skill and gal l antry displayed often amid circum ,

stances of horror pecu l iar even in this c o nflict forged i n ,

three years from i n sig n ificant and dishearteni n g beginnings

, ,

so vast an d e ffi cien t a weapon as th e Tan k Corps event u

ally became It i s these aspects of the case am ong others
.
, ,

that I have tried especially to set out i n this book .

 5 1 2 IND

Be l l ic urt tu l
o nne , 4 5 9 .

l w G ra l
Be o , ene vo n , 4 1 4 .

Be rmic urt
o , 5 1 , 8 9, 98 .

rti c u t
Be n o r , 2 5 8 .

Bé th un e . 3 1 9 . 3 22 . 3 2 4 . 3 3 0. 3 3 7 .

ug atr
Be n e, 4 03 , 4 05 , 4 06 .

ug y
Be n , 3 4 2 fi r t atta c k
s on, 4 04 4 1 3 -

c d attack
s e on , 4 1 7, 4 20 4 2 1 ; h r -
t id
attack , 4 2 1 4 25 -
.

i fv i ll r
Be e s , 390
3 92 , .

B en e s a u BO IS,
i v i ll r 7 1 , 3 72
3
- -
.

Big W i ll i
e,
”
1 3, 1 4 .

Bihu c urt
o , 3 8 9 , 3 96 , 4 29 .

Bi ng i am , Maj r th e Hon J D V ,
1 8é
o . . . .

Bi l y 2 4 2 5
s e , , .

Bl a ngy T r noi 3 69
-
s ur - e s e, .

Bl é c ourt, 4 6 6 .

ch a t l
Bo e C s e, 1 1 5 , 1 3 1 , 1 5 9 .

i gh
Boes n e , 1 0 1 , 1 1 8 1 4 0 , .

i
Bo s d e Bo u v ig y n , 312 .

i
Bo s d e l A b b é , 3 4 5
’
.

i
Bo s d O l h a i n, 3 1 2
’
.

Bo s d es N e u fs , 2 70
i .

Bo mbardm t p r l imi ary ff ct

en , e n , e e s o f,
mm
6 , 1 6 ; on th e So at rra
e, 3 3 ; A s,

59 ; at prY es , 1 0 3 , 1 3 2 1 3 3 , 1 5 5 , -

1 5 9 1 60 -
2 1 7 21 8 ,
-
.

Bo mbi g h ti l
n , os e, 1 20, 1 3 5 1 3 6 , 4 5 7 -
.

Bo u c h ir
o , 3 66 .

Bo n u dary adR o , 1 60, 200 .

ur l
Bo on , 2 8 2 , 4 3 8 4 39 , 4 4 9 4 5 2 4 5 6 , -
, ,

457
Bo onur l oo , W d
2 64 , 2 76 , 2 77, 28 2 ,

4 3 9 . 4 4 9 . 4 62
Bo u v ig y
n Boy e tfi e s , 3 1 1
-
.

Bov i gt o 5 0
n n, .

Brad l y Col n l
e , o e , 24 , 2 8 .

Bray 2 8 3 3 4 3
. .

Bria tr 4 9 8
s e, .

Bridg F ur 1 1 4
e o , .

Bri l n 1 09 1 1 7
e e , , , 1 1 8 .

Br i quett er i e , th e , 3 2 .

r m Maj r
B oo e , o , 1 9 5 , 3 08 .

Bo r ugh l l
, C
o on e , 2 8 .

B ruay c a l
o d f c
fi e l d s , e en e o f, 3 1 0
-
.

Br uti n el s Brigad ’
e , 4 6 3 , 4 74 .

B u c ha l l
n , Co one
J , 3 6 , 5 8 , 6 1 , 6 4 , 94 , .

3 6 0. 3 6 1 . 4 1 7 .

3 4 7 3 4 8 . 3 7 1 . 3 7 2 . 3 75 .
-

3 3 °

B ffs R o , 1 78 , 200
u ad .

u ll c urt
B e o , 6 1 6 4 , 6 9, 26 5 , 2 78 , 4 3 1 , -

454
B u lk l y
h
e e Jo n s on , en e , 65 G ra l .

-
rt i
Bus l es A o s , 3 4 2 , 3 5 1
-
.

y g G ra l
B n , en e Si r J , 2 5 1 , 26 5 , 2 78 . .

C ach y , th e Whi ppet s at , 3 4 5 34 6 -

.
 IN D EX 5 13

D i v i s i ons , B riti h Infa ntrys Engui nega tte 3 3 9 3 4 0 ,

-
.

Guard s, 1 4 0, 2 66 , 28 1 , 28 3 , 3 89, Ep eh y , 2 5 8 , 3 4 2 batt l e o f, 433 .

4 99 . 5 00 Eri n c en tra l s t or es a nd
, w ork h ops at s ,

I s t. 1 8 6 . 3 2 5 . 3 3 4 51 52 .

3 rd . 2 6 8 . 3 8 9. 4 05 . 4 1 2 . 4 1 3 . 4 1 4 . Er vi ll e r s 3 90 , .

418 4 19 -
. Es ca d oeu vres 4 9 4 4 95 ,
-
.

417 Es s art s 3 7 2 , 3 76 , .

W . 3 94 . 4 04 . 4 05 . 4 1 3 . 4 1 5 . 4 1 7 . Es nes , 4 9 1 .

4 20 . 4 2 2 . 4 98 . 4 9 9 Es ti enn e Col o nel , 3 0 1 , 3 05 , .

Oth , 2 6 8 , 2 70 . Etai ng , 4 1 7 .

I I th , 1 9 8 ,
I z th , 2 70 . F a y Farm 93
nn
’
s ,
.

z oth , 2 70 .
F a v r ui l 3 93 4 0
e , , 1 .

2 1 5 t, 3 6 3 8 -
. F uchy C ha p l 6 5 66
e e , ,
.

2 5 th , 5 00 . Fi ns , 2 83 .

2 9 th , 2 68 , 2 70 , 2 8 3 . Fl amm w r f r 9 en e e , .

3 6 th , 9 2 , 2 6 8 . Fl r 3 1 3 4
e s, , .

s 7th . 3 7 5 . 3 8 0. Fl qui er 64 2 7 2 75 2 77 4 5 5
es es , 2 ,
0, , , .

3 g1 h , 1 3 1 . F tai N tr D am 2 70 28 0 28 1
on n e- o e- e, , , .

4 0th , 2 6 8 , 2 8 2 . F r yth Maj r Maj r 0 A 76

o s -
o , o . .
, .

4 2 nd , 4 1 9 . F rt Garry H r
o 79 o s e, 2 .

4 8 1h , 1 9 8 , 206, 2 3 0 . F rward C ttag 1 1 3 1 5 1 1 5 4

o o e, , , .

5 1 5 1 , 1 3 1 , 2 6 8 , 2 70, 2 75 , 2 80, 2 8 1 . F uquier 3 2 3 2 7

o es , 2 -
.

5 2 0 0. 73 7 5 . . 76 79. 8 3 8 7
- -
F t r M r 1 4 25
os e , es s s , , .

5 3 r d ) 73 a F t r tract r tria l by 1 2
os e o , s , .

s4 th : 73 : 7 5 1 76 : 8 0: F ram r v i ll 3 5 8 3 63 3 6 6
e e, , , .

56 , 4 14 th . F r mic urt 4 04 4 5 4 1
e o , , 0 ,
2 .

6 z ud i 2 70 1 2 74 7 4 14" F ra cati F arm 1 09 1 1 3 1 3 6 1 4 7 1 4 9

s , , , ,
-
,

6 3 r d , 4 0, 3 8 0 , 3 8 2 3 8 3 , 3 9 3 , 4 0 1 , -

4 4 3. 4 9 3 F r ch G ra l Si J 1 2 1 3
en , ene r .
, , .

74 th . 73 F yb g C l
re l 40
er , o on e , .

D s ons , A s
ivi i n See A s ra n u tra l ia . u t l ia Fr z b g 1 1 1 1 8
e en er , , 2 .

Co s rp . F u ll r C l l ] C F 5 07
e , o on e . . .

Di i s i ons , C n i n
v a ad a
1 5 1 4 1 6 , 4 39
, . G as , p i 9 o s on , .

3 rd . 4 5 6 Ga v r ll 4 3 e e, 0 .

4 th . 4 1 6 . 4 3 9 Ga z a 73 ; fi r t batt l f 73 ; s c nd
, s e o , e o

s th , 4 4 0 An d s e e C n . n Co s a ad i a rp . batt l f 74 8 0 third batt l f 8 2 8 8

e o ,
-
eo ,
-
.

D s ons , New Ze nd , 3 4 , 9 2 , 390,

ivi i al a G d
eu t 3 1 35 36 38
e c ou r , , ,
-
.

3 98 . 4 0 5 . 4 1 2 . 4 2 9 . 4 9 1 Gh t C ttag 1 9 1 1 98
en o es , , .

D o n i es , 3 4 2
ig . Gilb 72
an, .

D o e, Si r A C on n , 4 8 2 4 8 5
yl . a -
. Gird Tr ch 3 6 3 8 en ,
-
.

D no e , 9 1
ra utr . Gi v ch y l L a Ba e 3 22 3 3 0 3 35
en -
es - -
ss e, , , .

D o o r Q ué ant S
r c ut -
, 63, 68 , 4 1 6, witch G l a g w G ra l W 5 7
s o , en e .
, .

4 17 418 -
. Gl encors e W d 2 36 oo , .

D ud d ri d ge, Se ea n , n of, 4 1 3 , rg t ga ll a try G mi ec urt 3 8 9 4 2 9

o o , , .

4 7 5 4 78 -
G onn e l i u 26 5 8 3 e , , 2 .

D , 417
ury . G ugh G ra l Si H 3 1 1 03 2 3 5
o , e ne r .
, , , .

G u z au c urt 2 62 69 2 8 3 4 3 3
o e o , ,
2 , , .

Ecai ll on ri v e r 4 9 7 , . Grai c urt 70 2 76 4 4 9 4 5 5

n o , 2 , , , .

Ec o u s t 4 05 4 1 2 4 1 4
, , , . Gr ev i ll r 3 90 3 9 393 e s, ,
2, .

Ecuri e 5 9 5 00 , 5 02
, , . Gu emapp 4 3 e, 0 .

El A ri s h 7 1 ( not e ) 7 3
, , . G ui l l eaucourt, 3 6 1 , 3 6 2 .

E1 A ri s h R ed oubt 73 , 76 78 ,
-
.
”
G unp i ts , Th e, 207, 2 1 8 -
22 1 .
Ell es , C ol one l H J , 1 4 , 4 6 . .
, 4 7 48,
-

5 1 Brigadi e r G en e ra , 8 9 , -
l 1 08 , 2 5 1 , H aig Fi l d M r ha l Si D 25 3 2 8 1
, e -
a s r .
, , .

27 1 . 2 7 2 2 73 . 3 5 1 . 5 04
-
; Maj or H a lf way H u 1 1 3 1 3 7 1 4 3 1 44 o s e, , ,
-
,

G n ra l
e e , 48 . 1 93 .

Eng l i h Tr s e es , 1 1 5 . H am l act i n at 3 4 9 3 5 0
e , o ,
-
.
5 14 I N D EX

H am l i c urt 3 8 9
e n o , . Kitch ener s W ood , 1 09 , 1 1 5 , 1 3 1 , 1 3 3,
H amm d C r r 5 on
’

s o ne , 1 0, 200 . I S7 . 1 5 9
H amp hir Farm 0 1 3 2 1 5 5
s e ,
1 1 , ,
. Kr es s e ns t ei n G e n e ra l v on 73 , ,
.

H a gard W d 3 4 6
n oo , . Ku l tur F arm 1 3 1 1 5 7 , , .

H a k y C l l E B 4 9 08 2 6 8
n e , o one . .
, 1 , 2 , ,
Kurd H i ll 7 6 79 , .

3 8 ; Brigadi r G
0 ral 3 09 e en e , .

H a camp 3 4 7 3 7
n n es s, , 2 . L a Ba e C a al 3 3 3 3 5
ss e n , 0, .

H arb i r onn e e s , L a Briqu 9 4 6 78 e, 1 0 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 .

H ar p th 6 1 , e, . La Cau c hi 3 4 3 e, .

H arpi ri v r 4 97 es e , . L a F l i Farm 6
o e ,
0 .

H at fi l d tria l at 1 4
e , s ,
. L a V acqu ri 64 74 e e, 2 , 2 .

H au y 4 99ss , . L ag ic urt 4 6
n o ,
1 .

H av ri c urt 2 7 73 batt l f 4 3 3
n o , 0, 2 e o , . L a dr ci 5
n e es , 00 .

H a v ri c urt W d 64 26 8
n o oo , 2 , . L d h i p C mmitt
an s 13 4s o ee, , 1 .

H ay c urt 4 3 9 4 66
ne o , , . L a g marck 7 5 94
n e , 10 , 1 1 , 1 .

H i l 68 38 9
e n ne , , . Lat a W d 74
e n oo , 2 .

H r ra 7 3 74 8 2
e e , , ,
. L Qu
e l 3 6 3 63
es n e ,
1, .

H ri 3
e s n, 20 . Le Q u es n oy 5 00 , .

H r vi ll y W d 3 4
e oo ,
2 . Le Trep rt Ta k o ,
n Co rp D p ot ats e , 5 2,
H dig u l 3 5 3 8 3 3 1
es ne , 2 , 2 , .
340 .

H di 3 70
es n, . Le s Boe uf 3 1 3 3 s, , .

H th m gt
e er Maj r 1 1 2 on , o ,
0, . Les o Tr i T ur 1 3 2 s o s, , 1 38 .

H d c urt 6 3
en e o , . L H i ll 76 79
ee s ,
-
.

H i ll 70 3 1 0 3 1 2 , , . L 3 3 3
e ns , 1 1 -
1 .

H i ll 1 4 5 6 , 0 . Lih ons ,3 66 .

H i ll ck Farm 7 2
o 3 , 20 ,
20 , 2 0 . L i ll r 3
e s, 20 .

H i ll T p F arm 1 4 9 o , . L itt l Wi ll i 1 3 1 6
e e, , .

H i nd burg Li 5 8 6 6 3 25 1 2 5 2
en ne, ,
1 -

, ,
L l yd C l l H d
o , o one 54 ar re s s , .

61
2 64 2 6 5 4 3 3
, 2 , . Loge a s t W d
oo , 3 7 5 , 3 8 2 , 3 8 8 .

H i d burg Mar ha l
n en 95 ,
s v on , 2 . Longa tte, 4 05 , 4 1 2 , 4 1 4 4 1 5 -
.

Hi g 3 4
n es , 2 . L Tr
on e ee, 1 1 5 , 1 5 7 .

H ir d ll ri v r 298 4 34
on e e e , , . L p
oo , th e , 3 2 .

H l t tract r tria l f 1
o o ,
s o , 2 . L batt l
oos , e of, 9 , 1 5 .

H g 111
oo e , . Loupa rt W d oo . 3 90. 3 9 2 . 3 9 3 3 95 -

H g l d 1 39
oo e e, . L v i hat au
o e C e ,
1 0 1 , 1 02 , 1 1 9 1 20 -
.

H th l t F r t 9 0 1 1
ou ou s o es , ,
1 . L u c ri v r
e e 363 ,
.

H pita l F arm 1 1 3 2 5 1 3 8
os , ,
1 , . L ud d r f Mar ha l
en o f , s von, 2 94 29 5 , 3 6 4 , -

H tb l k Captai 3 4 0
o ac ,
n, 0, .
3 65 .

H uti r G ra l
e , 9 35 7 en e v on , 2 2, . L u l w rth
o 50 , .

Lys , th e, batt l e of, 3 1 8 3 1 9 -

.

Im p eria l D ef nce e Co mmitt ee of, 1 0,

1 1
,
Machi e G n C orp H av y S cti o
n u s, e e n,

In
.

chy n Art oi e 443 s,

format i on of 2 4 ; d p artur fo ,
e e r
F ra nc 2 7 ; f Pa l es t i e 7 1 ;
- -
.

Infa ntry o op rati l ack of 29 70 c e on ,

e, or n , ex ~
r econ titut d s
-
.
, ,

Infan try tra i ni ng with 6 ; i n Pa l es p ns i on

a 47 57 ; ,
-
s e a
,

t i n 8 4 b for C ambrai 2 5 9 2 6 1 ;
,
Tan k C orp 3 06 origi na l com s,
e,
with Ca adian 3 20 3 3 9 3 4 0 ; with n
e

s,
e ,

p a ni es
—A a nd B, 2 6 , 2 7, C a nd 53 ;
, ,
E. 2 7 . 5 0. 5 3 .
A u tra l i a 3 4 9 with F r en ch 3 5 1
s ns , .
D. 2 6 . 2 7. 53
,

gb L ord 2 5
Ivea 7l 3 F. 2 7. 5 0, 5 3 , 1 27
Mai s on d H ib ou 1 9 7 20 7 2 08 2 29
.
, ,
u , , , ,
.

Man ura R d g 74 75 78 8 2
Joi n t C ommitt ee 1 3
s 1 e, , , ,
,
.

Marc l cav 3 5 7
Jour n a l i s t s mi s r ep r es en tati ons by e e, .

, , 4 2, Marc oi ng 2 6 4 2 70 2 74 5 00
, , , , .

Farm Mar go Cau way 1 09 1 1 3 1 4 5 1 4 6

en se
Joy e
-
, , , ,
, 93 .

1 99 .

Marqui n 4 3 3 o ,
.

Ke mm el 90 33 0 , , . Marqui on Sai n l e 4 33 , s- s , 4 3 9, 4 5 3 .

Kah n Y u n u s 7 3 , . Marti npui ch 3 1 , .

Khirb et Sihan 8 0 ,
. Marwit z G n ra l on d ,
e e v er, 2 6 8 , 2 92 .
5 16 I N D EX

S arton , 3 7 1 . M ora l ef e f ct of, 34 35 , -

1 8 3, 2 33
Sa nl ty, 3 7 1 . 2 34 .

S a v ag abbit 3 1 7
e R ,
”
. Orig i n of 8 1 1 ,
-
.

Se arch l i ght m obi l opp ortu niti es

s, e, for, Tank F r nch 3 0 1 3 03
s, e ,
-
.

15 1 -
152 Tank s G rman 2 8 7 2 8 9
, e ,
-
.

ll ri v r
Se e e , 4 9 1 , 4 95 , 4 9 7 . Ta k C ommitt 1 4
n ee, .

Sen s é e ri v r
e , 2 7 7, 4 3 2 , 4 6 0 . Ta nk C orp A m rican 4 2 7s, e , .

Ser na v i ll r
e s, 49 1 . Ta k C rp Briti h ( a l Machi ne
n o s, s s ee so
rr
Se e , 4 0, 3 4 3 . G u n C o rp H a v y S cti o ) s, e e n
S w ll L i ut a t ga l l a try f 4 2 4
e e , e en n ,
n o , . A dmi n i trati n 5 7 5 03 5 04
s o , , .

Sh kh Abba 74 7 5 8 2
e1 s, , , . A n tag on i m to 4 7 5 0 1 8 5 3 5 2 3 5 3
s ,
-
, ,
-
.

Sh ik h Aj l i n 76 8
e 83 87 , , 2, , . A uxi l i ary b anch A d van c r es e
Sh ikh H a a
e 7 3 76 8 5 8 7 ss n, , ,
-
. St or 4 90 ; es , E gi n r d n ee an
Sh ikh N bh
e 8 e a n, 0 . Equipm t 5 3 ; C tra l St o r es en , en

Sh ll a l 8
e , 2 . d W rk h op
an 5 1 5 2 262 o s s, -
,

Si g fri d L i
e 4 03 4 33 (
e t ) n e, ,
no e . G n C arryi ng Ta k
u -

5 5 ; Re n s,

Si m c urt 3 6
en o , 1 . c ai a c Bra ch 30 4 0 5 3
o nn ss n e n , , ,

S i
o s s ons , batt l f 3 4 3 5 0 e o , 0 , . Sa lv ag Sig a ll i ng d Sup pl y
e, n , an

S l m
o es 4 96 es , . C ompa i 5 4 5 6 4 90 W ork n es , -
,

S mm
o th fi r t batt l f 30 4 1
e, e, s e o ,
-
h op C ompani 5 3
s es , .

l es s ons o f 4 45 56 ; c d batt l , 2, s e on e Ear l y di ffi cu l ti of 2 9 4 5 4 6 es , ,

-
.

o f 3 4 1 3 44 ; th i rd batt l
,
-
f 35 2 e o , Expa n i n of s o 2 34 3 06 , ,

36 7 .
3 0 72 3 4 4 3 4 0 2 ,
S r l
o e 58 , 2 . OF f rmati
fiC i a l o on of, 3 06 .

Spri t e 4 , 2 2. P r l 4
e s onn e ,
2 .

Spri g fi l d 1 8 0 3 8
n e , , 2 . Trai i g 2 4 8 n n ,
-
2 , 50 .

St G rg eo ri v r 4 9 7 es e , . Brigad es

St J a e n, 216 . I s t. 6 9. 1 00 . 1 07. 1 94 . 23 8.
St Ju l i 1 08 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 8 1 1 9 3 1 9 5
en, , , , , , , 2 4 0, 2 5 8 , 2 6 8 , 2 70, 2 8 0, 28 1 ,
215 216 -
. 28 4 .3 09 3 1 0. 3 2 9. 3 4 1 . 3 5 4 . .

St Mihi l 7 3 04 4 8 6 e , , , .
3 6 7. 3 6 9 . 3 72 . 3 74 . 3 75 . 3 8 8 .
St O ll 4 5 6 4 66 e, , .
4 2 5 . 4 2 6 . 4 3 3 . 4 8 9. 4 9 1 . 5 02
St P i rr D i v i
e 40
e on, . 2 nd , 5 4 , 9 1 , 1 02 , 1 1 1 , 1 8 1 , 2 3 6 ,
St P yt h 4 96 4 98 on , , . 2 3 8 . 2 3 9 . 2 4 0. 2 5 8 . 2 68 . 2 70.
Steen b ee k , th e , 1 08 , 1 1 0, 1 3 1 , 207, 2 8 0, 2 8 1 , 2 8 3 , 3 1 0 , 3 2 9, 3 4 1 ,
2 1 5 , 2 2 3 2 25 -
.
3 4 2 : 3 4 4 , 3 5 4 2 3 72 1 3 74 : 3 75 :
t r l l
S e n, C o one Si r A , 5 6 . .
4 05 . 4 1 6 . 4 2 5
S umm r Maj r
e s, o , 32 .
3 rd , 5 4 , 1 02 , 1 07, 1 1 1 , 1 8 1 , 2 3 6 ,
wa ag
S n e, 5 1 . 2 4 0, 2 5 8 , 2 6 9 , 2 70, 2 8 0, 2 8 1 ,
wi t l l
S n on, C o one E D , 1 0, 1 2, 1 3 , . .
3 2 9 . 3 4 1 . 3 4 3 . 3 4 4 . 35 4 . 3 6 5 .
M m ra um
1 4 , 24 ; e o Tactic
nd on s, 3 8 9 . 4 03 . 4 1 6 . 4 1 7.
t r m val
2 9 3 0 ( no e ) ; hi s e o , 4 9 ; s ug 4 2 5 . 4 5 9. 4 8 9. 4 9 1
g t ta k
es s us e o f gy p t
n s in E t , 7 1 ( no e) .
4 th . 3 06 . 3 29. 3 4 1 . 3 4 2 .
3 44 . 3 5 3 . 3 6 3 . 3 6 5 . 3 66 . 3 6 7 .
Tadp ol C p 4 3 5 e o s e, .
3 72 . 4 5 9 . 4 6 9 . 4 8 9.
Tank Br i ti h s, s 4 9 1 . 4 97
Ad v r critici m of 1 8 3 1 8 4
e se s ,
-
.
sth . 3 06. 3 29. 3 4 1 . 3 4 4 . 3 4 9. 3 5 0.
Ear l y xp rim n t 1 2 1 4 e e e s, -
.
3 5 3 . 3 6 3 . 3 6 5 . 3 66 . 3 72 . 4 2 5 .
Equipm t g n ra l 1 2 8 fa c i n s
en , e e , s e 4 3 3 . 4 5 9. 4 8 9
nd crib a 26 1 4 4 0 4 4 1 ; s p on on s, ,
-
s 6 th , 5 02 .

troll y 1 8 1 9 ; truck 2 3 ; nu
e s, -
s, Batta li ons
ditchi ng b oom 4 4 1 2 7 1 2 8 s, ,
-
. Is t ( A) , 5 3 . 9 1 94 . 1 8 2. 2 3 9. 26 9. -

G rman op i i on of 28 5 28 7 292 2 4 , 2 8 3 : 3 4 2 1 3 4 5 , 35 4 , 3 632

5
e n ,
-
,

296 .
Mark I IV armam nt ca p abi l iti es
s -
, e , , 21 31 53 1 l 8 23 2 68 : 2 8 03
d ig n d i m ns i on m oti v e p ow r
es , e s, e ,

p d & 1 5 2 3 ; Mark V 1 5
s ee , c. ,
-
, , 3 rd ( C ) , 5 3 , 5 97 6 0, 1 04 7

3 4 8 M k V Sta r 3 5 4 ; Whi pp t ar , e , 1 8 2 . 26 9. 3 4 3 . 3 4 5 . 3 5 4 . 3 5 9

3 02 .
3 6 1 . 3 74 . 3 8 7. 4 24 . 4 8 9
 l ND EX 5 1 7

Tank Corp s Br i ti h — o s c n f i rm ed i ll y
T o l es M otfl a i nes , 6 1
- -
.

Batta l i on —
, .

tm s con u ea .
’
rt i H i ll
To o s e , 86 .

4 th ( D) 5 3 ; >
1 00 1 1 077 1 08 : r c au l t
T es , 2 70 .

2 36 . 2 3 8 . 2 39. 2 4 0. 24 4 . 2 4 7. T i g l Farm
r an e ,
2 07 , 2 2 9 .

2 6 8 . 2 75 . 28 1 . 3 09. 3 4 2 . 35 3 . T i tt
r on , Si r W , 1 3 , 1 4 . .

4 89 . Ti é nes W doo , 3 2 .

s th ( E) . 2 3 8 . 2 3 9 . 2 4 4 . 2 4 7. 2 6 8 . Tu ll ch apt
o , C T J , 1 0, . . . 12 .

3 09 . 3 4 2. 35 3 . 4 8 9
27 5 .
F
6 th ( ) , 8 9, 1 0 7, 1 1 3 , 1 8 2 , 2 3 6 , U mbr ll a 8 3 85
e -
.

2 6 9 . 2 74 . 2 8 0 . 3 4 3 . 3 5 4 . 3 5 9

3 6 2 . 3 74 . 3 90 . 4 1 6 . 4 8 9 . 5 00 V air W d 3 4 9
e oo , .

7 th ( G ) . 8 9 . 9 3 9 9 . 1 00, 1 04 1 08 .
- -
V a c uv r 7 9
n o e , 20 , 22 .

1 3 9 . 1 4 2 1 8 0. 1 8 1 . x9 3 .
- -
V an h l F arm 77
eu e 4 , 1 , 21 .

I9 S 2 3 0 -
2 4 2 24 8 . 26 8 .
.
- V audr i c urt 3 0 o ,
2 .

2 7 5 2 76 , 2 8 1 , 2 8 2 , 3 0 8 , 3 1 1 3 4 1 ,
- -
V au l x V rauc urt 34 4 4
-
o , 2, 1 .

3 6 7. 3 6 8 3 7 1 . 3 74 4 03 . 4 04 4 1 3 .
- - -
V au v ll r 35 8
i e s, .

4 7,1 V aux A mi i 3 4 9 3 5 6
-
en - en o s , ,
.

4 6 0 4 6 3 . 4 6 5 4 94 . 4 94 . 4 9 5
- -
V dhui l 6 5
en e, 2 .

H
8 th ( ) , 2 4 8 , 2 6 8 , 2 7 2 , 2 8 0, 28 3, V i l y 4 97
es ,
.

V i ll r Fl 4 7 4 9 4
e s - au -
os , 1 , 1 -
20 .

9th ( I) . 2 4 8 . 2 6 9 . 3 4 3 . 3 5 0. 3 5 3 . V i ll r Br t
e s- ux G rma ta k e onn e , e n n s a t,

3 6 7. 3 74 . 3 8 9. 4 1 6 . 4 x7. 4 8 9 . 89 34 5
2 .

V i ll r G
.

5 00 . e s-l i 6 69 ui s a n s , 2 2, 2 .

l oth (J) . 3 5 3 . 3 66 . 3 74 . V i ll r P l uich 8 4

e s- o , 2 .

3 7 6 . 3 8 7 . 3 8 9. 3 9 3 . 4 8 9 . 5 9 0 V imy R i dg 5 8 6 3 3 5 3 7 3 e, -
0, 1 0, 1 -
1 , 18 .

m h ( K) . 3 09 . 3 1 0. 3 1 2. 3 1 5 . 3 1 6 . V l am rti gh e 3 n e, 101, 1 2 .

3 22 . 3 3 0. 3 6 7. 3 74 . 3 8 9 . 4 1 6 . V on W rd r H u 6 e6 4 1 66 e o s e, 1 2, 1 , .

4 x7 . 4 2 6 . 4 3 4 . 4 5 5 . 4 8 9 . 4 9 7
I z th ( L) . 3 09. 3 1 0 . 3 1 2 . 3 1 5 . 3 1 6 . Wadi l Nukh bi 7 5 7 9e a r, , .

3 3 0. 3 6 7 . 3 6 9. 3 74 . 3 7 7 . 3 8 9 . Wadi Ghu zz 74 75 76 79 8 2 e, , , , , .

4 1 2 . 4 1 4 4 1 5 . 4 1 6. 4 1 8 . 4 2 6 . -
Wai ll y 5 9 8 2 4 5 2 4 8 2 6 3
,
2, , , ,
.

4 341 4 95 , Wamb k th 9 3 94 ee , e, -
.

Is th. 34 1 . 34 9. 3 5 3 . 4 8 9
W a c ourt 6 8 4 03
n , , .

I4 th . 3 5 3 . 3 74 . 4 1 6 . 4 1 8 . 4 8 9. War ham 5 1e , .

5 00 . W ar fu A ba n c ourt 35 8
s ee -
'

, .

3 4 4 . 3 5 3 . 3 5 4 . 3 6 3 . 3 74 . Wat o Maj or W H L 6 2
s n, . . .
, .

3 7 7 . 3 8 7. 4 3 3 . 4 5 5 . 4 8 9 . W s tr oo b k e 2 4 5
e se e , .

1 6 th . 3 4 4 . 5 02 W i l n Maj r W G 1 3
so o . .
, .

1 7 111 . 3 4 4 . 3 5 4 . 3 5 7 3 5 9 . 3 74 . 3 8 7. -
Wi l on P t 1 1 4 1 1 5
s 5 os ,
-
.

42 39 Wi ll i am Ell i Maj or C 1 4 1 8 3
s -
s, .
, , , 1 90 ,
I8 th , 3 4 4 , 5 02 . 2 4 0, 2 9 7 3 3 00 '

roth , z oth , 2 1 5 1 , 2 2 nd , 2 3 r d , 2 4 th , W i nn ip eg , 1 96 , 2 3 8 .

2 5 th , 5 02 . W ool 5 0 , .

3 o rs ( A e t n) , m rica
4 26 4 28 , 4 5 9
-
Wormh oudt 1 9 2 24 2 , , .

4 60. 4 8 9 . 5 02 \V i b g G n ra l on
r s ur , e e v , 2 9 3 - 2 94 .

Tank rp F r ch
Co s , en , 3
0 1 3 05 -
. Wyt cha t 90 92 1 1 8
s e e, , , , 344 .

Ta nk rp G rma
Co s, e n, 28 7 .

Tank Gr up 5 03 o s, . Yper l e e , 206 .

T l graph H i l l 6 1 64 6 8
e e , , , . Y e s S en , e s
pr al i t d cripti
on of, 1 0 1 -
1 04 ,
T rnoi ri v r 5 1
e se e , . 1 1 8 1 1 9 ; un fi tn es s for
-
n ta k war far e,
Th t ford training t 2 5 2 7
e , a ,
-
.
96 , 1 03 1 04 , 1 3 2 1 3 3 , 1 6 1 , 1 8 3 ,
- -
1 93
Thi ll oy Ligny 393 4 0 1
, , G rman
e 1 95 . 2 3 8 239 -

tank s t 4 1 6 a , . Y es , 2 5 8
tr .

Ti ll oy 4 66 4 79
, , . Y en , 2 8
v r ch .
RETURN C IRC ULATIO N DEPARTM ENT

ALLBO O KS M AY BERECALLED A FTER7 DAYS

Av ‘
J t -

II I I\ ~J I
’
i “ A n ‘

RENEW A LS C A LL ( 8. mi ) ou J -
o

DUEAS STAM PED BELO W

UNIV ERSITY O F CALIFO RNIA BERKELEY ,

/83 BERKELEY CA 9 4 7 20 ,