Cabral vs FACTS:

Bracamonte,
G.R. No. 233174 Respondent Bracamonte and Petitioner Cabral executed a MOA for purchase of
shares of stocks of 2 corporations. Simultaneous with the signing of the MOA,
Territorial Bracamonte issued a post-dated check to Cabral. When the check was
Jurisdiction presented for payment, however, the drawee bank in Makati City dishonored the
same for lack of sufficient funds. Consequently, for failure to settle the obligation,
Cabral instituted a complaint for estafa against Bracamonte in Parañaque City.
Finding probable cause, the prosecutor filed with the RTC of Parañaque City an
Information charging respondent Bracamonte with the crime of estafa.

Bracamonte moved to quash the Information contending that the venue was
improperly laid in Parañaque City, because the post-dated ·check was delivered
and dishonored in Makati City. RTC denied the Motion to Quash explaining that it
has jurisdiction over the case because Bracamonte employed fraudulent acts
against Cabral in Parañaque City prior to the issuance of the post-dated check.
However, the CA set aside the RTC Order and dismissed the Information against
Bracamonte. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC OF PARAÑAQUE CITY HAS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION TO TRY THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST BRACAMONTE.

HELD:
The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case. The Petition is denied.

The SC held that "territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the
court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense
was committed or where any one of the essential ingredients took place."

Otherwise stated, the place where the crime was committed determines not only
the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction
to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

Thus, a court cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of its limited territory. In this relation, moreover, it
has been held that the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information. Once it is so shown, the court
may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced
during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

Here, the crime allegedly committed by Bracamonte is estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of such crime consists
of the following: (1) the offender has post-dated or issued a check-in payment of
an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time
of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or
the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3)
the payee has been defrauded. Thus, in this form of estafa, it is not the non-
payment of a debt which is made punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in
the issuance of a check.

Similarly, in the instant case, it was merely stated in the Information, and alleged
by Cabral in his complaint affidavit, that the crime of estafa was committed in
Parañaque City because it was there that he was convinced to sell the subject
shares of stock. Apart from said allegation, however, he did not present any
 evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would support or corroborate the
assertion. Equally guilty of the same failure to substantiate is the trial court which
relied merely on Cabral's complaint affidavit in connecting the alleged offense
within its territorial jurisdiction.

A perusal of said Order, however, would show the RTC's failure to cite any
evidence upon which it based its conclusions. On the contrary, and as the
appellate court pointed out, what were actually proven by the evidence on record
are the following: (1) Cabral and Bracamonte executed a MOA in Makati City; (2)
Bracamonte issued and delivered a post-dated check in Makati City simultaneous
to the signing of the agreement; (3) the check was presented for payment and
was subsequently dishonored in Makati City. As such, the Court does not see
why Cabral did not file the complaint before the Makati City trial court. Not only
were the MOA and subject check executed, delivered, and dishonored in Makati
City, it was even expressly stipulated in their agreement that the parties chose
Makati City as venue for any action arising from the MOA because that was
where it was executed. It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the element
of deceit took place in Makati City where the worthless check was issued and
delivered, while the damage was inflicted also in Makati City where the check
was dishonored by the drawee bank.

To repeat, case law provides that in this form of estafa, it is not the non-payment
of a debt which is made punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the
issuance of a check. Thus, while Cabral is not wrong in saying that the crime of
estafa is a continuing or transitory offense and may be prosecuted at the place
where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place, the pieces of
evidence on record point only to one place: Makati City.

Thus, since the evidence adduced during the trial showed that the offense
allegedly committed by Bracamonte was committed somewhere else, the trial
court should have dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction.
Garcia vs.
Sandiganbayan This is a case of two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by
G.R. No. 170122 petitioner Clarita D. Garcia, with application for injunctive relief. Both petitions
Voluntary seeks to nullify and set aside an order and a resolution issued by the
Appearance Sandiganbayan regarding a suit for forfeiture involving the same parties but
different properties.

Facts:

To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos
F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and
Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had allegedly amassed and acquired, the
Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to Republic Act
No. (RA) 1379, filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 and July
5, 2005 respectively a petition for the forfeiture of those properties.

After the filing of the first forfeiture suit, corresponding summons were issued
and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention. Per the Sheriff's
Return dated November 2, 2005, the summons were duly served on respondent
Garcias. Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the SB's lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture.
The OMB countered with a motion to expunge and to declare the Garcias in
default.

In a Resolution dated January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss;

declared the same motion as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the
period to answer. The same resolution declared the Garcias in default.

With respect to second forfeiture suit, the following events and proceedings
occurred or were taken after the petition for Forfeiture II was filed:

(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his
return of July 13, 2005, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to
the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to
Gen. Garcia. The general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those
pertaining to the other respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the
same, but with the following qualifying note: "I'm receiving the copies of Clarita,
Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy - but these copies will not guarantee it being
served to the above-named (sic)."

(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of
counsel, filed a motion to dismiss and/or to quash the second forfeiture suit
primarily for lack of jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject matter
thereof which is now covered by the plunder case.

ISSUE: WON Jurisdiction was acquired by the SANDIGANBAYAN 4 TH DIV

over petitioner and her children by their voluntary appearance.

Ruling:

The petitions are partly meritorious.

Petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and that
of her children due to a defective substituted service of summons. There is merit
in petitioner's contention.

It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be
bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode
authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court
acquires jurisdiction over a person.

On the other hand, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other grounds raised
therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the
rule on voluntary appearance-- means is that the voluntary appearance of the
defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have
waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service
of summons.

The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not
show that she voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the
following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for
reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration;
(d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to
dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss
and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.

The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by

petitioner solely for special appearance with the purpose of challenging the
jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her three children.
Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and
of her three children for lack of valid service of summons through improvident
substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance
the petitioner never abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration,
even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim
for damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her
 stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of
summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14
of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not
voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of
summons.

Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared
before the SB to cure the defective substituted services of summons.
Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of summons made, the
SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children.
And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner
and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Palana vs. People On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. On
G.R. No. 149995 January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioner's non-apprehension
despite the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. On June 27, 1995, the warrant of
Subsequent arrest was recalled and set aside after petitioner posted the... required bail. He
legislation affecting was arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he pleaded not guilty to the offense
criminal jurisdiction charged.

Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September 1987,

petitioner and his wife borrowed money from him in the amount of P590,000.00.
To secure the payment of the loan, petitioner issued a postdated check for the
same amount in favor of the complainant. However, when the check was
presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank for insufficiency of funds.
Subsequent demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make good the said
dishonored check.

Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an
investment by the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the subject
check was not issued in September 1987 to guarantee the payment of a loan
since his checking account was opened only on December 1, 1987. He claimed
that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his favor allegedly to be
shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership with the necessary
raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was issued sometime in
February 1988, complainant knew that the same was not funded.

The Regional Trial Court found petitioner guilty for violation of BP 22. Petitioner
appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial
court's decision in toto. Hence this petition.

Issue:
WON the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling:
Petitioner's argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the Regional
Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without
merit.

It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by

the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and not during the
arraignment of the accused. The Information charging petitioner with violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At that time, the governing law
determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 129, which provides that the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTCS and the Sandiganbayan, the MeTCs, MTCs, and
MTCCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not
more than 400,000…

Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days
 but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double
the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the Regional Trial
Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. The Metropolitan Trial Court
could not acquire jurisdiction over the... criminal action because its jurisdiction is
only for offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00.

The subsequent amendment of BP 129 by RA No. 7691 cannot divest the RTC of
jurisdiction over petitioner’s case. Where a court has already obtained and is
exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final
determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction
over such proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute expressly provides,
or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending
before its enactment.

Antiporda vs Facts:
Garchitorena
G.R. No. 133289 The petitioners Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor Gascon, and
others were charged with the crime of kidnapping Elmer Ramos. It was filed
Elements of criminal with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan comprised of the respondents
jurisdiction Honorable Francis E. Garchitorena, Edilberto E. Sandoval, and Catalino
Castañeda, Jr.

The Court issued an order giving the prosecution to submit amendments to

the Information. The prosecution submitted amendments which includes that
Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., took advantage of his position as mayor of Buguey,
Cagayan to order the kidnapping of Elmer Ramos and that the victim was
brought and detained at the residence of the accused mayor.

The accused filed an urgent omnibus motion praying for reinvestigation and
the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred. But this was denied.
Thereafter, accused filed a Motion for New Preliminary Investigation and to
Hold in Abeyance and/or Recall Warrant of Arrest Issued. Again, this was
denied.

Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash the Amended Information

for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. The SandiganBayan ignored
the motion. It ruled that the Amended Information makes an adequate
description of the position of the accused, thus vesting the Court with the
office related character of the offense of the accused.

A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
The petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case because the original information did not allege that
one of the petitioners, Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., took advantage of his position
as mayor of Buguey, Cagayan to order the kidnapping of Elmer Ramos. They
likewise assert that lacking jurisdiction a court cannot order the amendment
of the information.

Issue: WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

Ruling: NO, but the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of
the SB.

The Sandiganbayan exercises not only civil but also criminal jurisdiction.
Criminal jurisdiction is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular
offense and impose the punishment for it.

The case of Arula vs. Espino enumerates the requirements wherein a court

 acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case, to wit: (1) the offense is one which
the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of, (2) the offense must
have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction, and (3) the person
charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial,
forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court. It
is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over the
case.

The petitioners are correct when they contended that when they filed a
motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Court's
authority. In Layosa vs. Rodriguez, the voluntary appearance of the accused
at the pre-suspension hearing amounted to his submission to the court’s
jurisdiction even if no warrant of arrest has yet been issued.

The original Information did not mention that the offense committed by the
accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the
prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted
therein. However, the SC held that the petitioners are estopped from assailing
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to
motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation filed with the same court, it was
they who challenged the jurisdiction of the RTC over the case and clearly
stated in their MR that the said crime is work connected.

It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to

secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

People vs Doctrine: The offended party can initiate a prosecution for rape even if she is a minor
Yparraguirre unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority.
G.R. No. 124391 The complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding is not the complaint that confers
jurisdiction in the court to try the case. The court’s jurisdiction is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered analogous to an attempt to
Rationale for crimes
compromise, which offer of compromise by the appellant may be received in evidence as
that cannot be an implied admission of guilt under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.
prosecuted de oficio
Facts:
Accused Elmer Yparraguirre alias "Lalo" entered complainant Charmelita D. Ruina's
room, which was not locked because her mother had gone to her elder sister's store, on
March 24, 1994, at approximately 11:00 p.m., while she was on her bed in her mother's
store at the Public Market in Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, where she and her mother lived.

He took off his clothes and approached the Complainant, who seemed to be awake. He
stroked her breasts and licked them. She screamed for help, but no one came to her aid,
possibly because it was late in the dark and her voice was not loud enough to be heard
from a distance of only three to five meters. When she put up some feeble protest,
Accused urged her to remain quiet and boxed her. He then took off her panty, climbed on
top of her, and inserted his manhood into her most private area. She was experiencing
discomfort. He exited the room after raping her.

Sanselas Leongas Ruina, her mother, arrived. The incident was reported to her. The
accused returned to the store the next morning, apologized for his actions, and pledged
not to repeat them. But his pleadings were ineffective in persuading Sanselas to change
his mind. She took the complaint to the District Hospital of Madrid (Surigao del Sur) for a
physical examination. The findings were documented in a Medical Certificate issued by
Dr. Carlo P. Altrecha on March 26, 1994.

Issue: WON the trial court never had jurisdiction over the case because the complaint
was signed and filed by the chief of police rather than the complainant.

Ruling:
The contention has no merit.

Under the Section 5, Rule 110, the offended party can initiate a prosecution for rape even
if she is a minor unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other
 than her minority. Although the victim, in this case, is no longer a minor, it is undisputed
that she is a mental retardate and suffering from physical deformity. No woman would
come out in the open, inform the authorities of the injustice done to her, make a
statement of what had happened unless her purpose is to redress the wrong done
against her honor. Once the violation of the law becomes known through direct original
participation initiated by the victim, the requirements of Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), to the effect that the offense of rape "shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents," are satisfied. The said provision is
not determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over the private offenses because the same
is governed by the Judiciary law, not the Revised Penal Code which deals with the
definition of felonies and their punishment.

In other words, the complaint required in Article 344 is but a condition precedent to the
exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. Such
condition was imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who
might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a
public trial. The complaint simply starts the prosecutory proceeding but does not confer
jurisdiction on the court to try the case because the overriding consideration in
determining whether the condition precedent in Article 344 has been complied with is the
intent of the aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront committed.

Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefitting the accused. When it is
said that the requirement in Article 344 (that there should be a complaint of the offended
party or her relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts
the prosecutory proceeding. It is not the complaint that confers jurisdiction in the court to
try the case. The court’s jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.

Cariño vs De Castro Facts:

G.R. No. 176084 Petitioner Carino filed a complaint-affidavit for violation of BP No. 22 against
Role of the Office of respondent de Castro before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. After
the SolGen in conducting preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Sta. Cruz issued a
criminal Case Reso finding prima facie evidence and recommending respondent’s indictment.

In an Order dated August 30, 2004, the MeTC dismissed the petition, finding no
probable cause against the accused for violation of BP22.
Petitioner appealed to the RTC. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC.
Petitioner filed a MR but it was denied by the RTC. Thereafter, petitioner, through
counsel and with the conformity of Assistant Prosecutor, filed a petition for review
before the CA. The CA, however, dismissed the petition because it was filed only
by the private prosecutor and not by the OSG as mandated by law. Petitioner
filed a MR but it was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the petitioner has authority to file the petition

for review before the CA

Ruling: No.

In criminal proceedings on appeal in the CA or in the SC, the authority to

represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under PD No. 478,
among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to “represent the
government in the SC and the CA in all criminal proceedings.” This provision has
been carried over to the Revised Administrative Code. Without doubt, the OSG is
the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.
Although the petition for review before the CA was filed with the conformity of the
Assistant City Prosecutor, such conformity is insufficient, as the rules and
jurisprudence mandate that the same should be filed by the Solicitor General.

While a private prosecutor may be allowed to intervene in criminal proceedings

on appeal in the CA or the SC, his participation is subordinate to the interest of
the People, hence, he cannot be permitted to adopt a position contrary to that of
the SolGen. To do so would be tantamount to giving the private prosecutor the
direction and control of the criminal proceeding, contrary to the provisions of law.
 In the instant case, the SolGen opined that petitioner had no legal standing to file
the petition for review and that the CA correctly dismissed the petition. As such,
the Assistant City Prosecutor or the private prosecutor cannot take a contrary
view.

Only the Office of the SolGen can bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic or represent the People or state in criminal proceedings pending in the
SC or CA.

People vs Delfin Facts:

G.R. No. 201572
Date of the On the night of September 27, 2000, Emilio - a 51 y/o fisherman - was killed after
Commission of the being gunned down at a store just across his home. On Mar 31, 2000, the
offense; exceptions appellant was formally charged with the murder of Emilio before the RTC. In the
information, it was alleged that on or about 27 Nov 2000, Emilio was killed with a
gun and he was hit on his chest afterwards.

Joan, the live-in partner of the victim stated in her testimony that she heard a gun
shot on the evening of September 27, 2000 and she saw Emilio shot in the head
and sprawled on the ground, She saw the appellant holding a gun, firing another
shot at Emilio.

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
murder under Article 248(1) of the RPC. Appellant was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay civil indemnity of P50,000 and another
P50,000 as consequential damages.

Appellant appealed the RTC decision with the CA. The CA affirmed the
conviction of the appellant but it deleted the award of consequential damages
and replaced it with an award of moral damages.

In his appeal with the SC, appellant assails the validity of the information under
which he was tried and convicted, specifically the alleged discrepancy between
the date of the commission of the murder as alleged in the information i.e., “on or
about the 27th day of November 2000” and the one actually established during
the trial i.e., 27 Sept. 2000. Appellant now alleges that the failure of the
information to accurately allege the date of the commission of the murder violated
his right to be properly informed of the charge agaisnt him and consequently
impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent defense thereon.

Issue: WON the variance in the date of the commission of the murder as
alleged in the Information and as Established furing the trial invalidate the
Informatiomn

Ruling: No.

The SC held that in crimes where the date of commission is not a material
element, like murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute
specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for
the sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of commission be
approximated. Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with
exactitude, the allegation in an information of a date of commission different from
the one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered
an error fatal to prosecution. In such cases, the erroneous allegation in the
information is just deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial
or may even be corrected by a formal amendment of the information.

In the case of People vs. Opemia, variance in the date of commission of the
offense as alleged in the information and as established in the evidence becomes
 fatal when such discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception that the
information and the evidence are no longer pertaining to one and the same
offense. In this event, the defective allegation in the information is not deemed
supplanted by the evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck down for
being violative of the right of the accused to be informed of the specific charge
against him.

In the instant case, despite their disparity as to the date of the alleged murder, we
believe that there is no mistaking that both the information and the evidence of
the prosecution but pertain to one and the same offense i.e., the murder of
Emilio. The SC explained that the inaccurate allegation in the information is
simply the product of a mere clerical error since all its supporting documents
point to the murder as having been committed on the 27th of Sept 2000. The
information’s mistake is limited only to the month when the crime was committed.

The SC sustained the information for murder, under which the appellant was tried
and convicted.

Pendoy vs CA Facts
G.R. No. 228223
Petitioner Roel Pendoy y Posadas (Pendoy) seeks to reverse and set aside the
Two offenses in one Decision of the Court of Appeals finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
information the crimes of simple rape and rape by sexual assault committed against AAA via
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to enjoin said appellate
court from enforcing the assailed judgment.

Pendoy was indicted for the crime of Rape in an Information filed before the
Regional Trial Court.

Accusatory portion: That

The RTC convicted Pendoy of the crime of Qualified Seduction. Still aggrieved,
Pendoy appealed the RTC Decision before the CA.

In his Appellant's Brief, Pendoy argued that his conviction of the crime of
qualified seduction was erroneous because the recital of facts in the Information
does not constitute said crime. He claimed that he is entitled to an acquittal
inasmuch as his conviction violated his constitutional right to due process,
particularly his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

The OSG, in the Appellee's Brief, concurred with Pendoy's observation and
conceded that the RTC wrongly convicted him of qualified seduction. It, however,
submitted that Pendoy should be held criminally liable for rape and for rape by
sexual assault contending that the elements of these two crimes were sufficiently
alleged in the Information and were duly proven during trial. According to the
OSG, although these two offenses were charged in the same criminal information
that would have merited its quashal, the defect was never objected to by Pendoy
before trial and, thus, he can be convicted of both offenses which were
adequately alleged in the Information and established by the prosecution
evidence.

The CA rendered its assailed Decision setting aside the Decision of the RTC and
convicted Pendoy of simple rape and rape by sexual assault. Pendoy filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA.

Issue: WON Pendoy can be properly convicted of as many offenses as were

charged and proven without violating the Rule on Duplicity of Offenses.
Ruling:
The SC sustained the conviction of Pendoy. The appeal is devoid of merit.

The Court observes that albeit Information designated the offense charged as
one of Rape under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the RPC, a perusal of the allegations
therein would clearly show that Pendoy was actually charged with two offenses.
Petitioner was charged with having carnal knowledge of AAA, employing force or
intimidation, under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A. The Information also charged
Pendoy with committing sexual assault by inserting his finger into the private part
of AAA under the second paragraph of Article 266-A.

The Information, read as a whole, has sufficiently informed Pendoy that he is

being charged with these two offenses. It is true that Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure requires that "a complaint or information
must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single
punishment for various offenses." Failure to comply with this rule is a ground for
quashing the duplicitous complaint or information and the accused may raise the
same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is
deemed waived. In this connection, Section 3, Rule 120, as well as settled
jurisprudence, states that "when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court
may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved, and impose on
him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and
law in each offense."

In the case at bench, the evidence bears out that what was proven by the People
beyond reasonable doubt in the Criminal Case was the felonious coitus
committed by Pendoy against AAA on January 24, 2006. Likewise borne by
records is the insertion of petitioner's finger into AAA's vagina. AAA testified that
before Pendoy mounted on her and inserted his penis into her private part, he
first inserted his finger into her genital. Inasmuch as Pendoy failed to object and
file a motion to quash anchored on the ground that more than one offense is
charged in the Information before he pleads to the same, the effect is that he is
deemed to have waived such defect and he can be convicted of the crimes of
rape and rape as an act of sexual assault.

In the recent case People v. Salvador Tulagan,[26] the Court prescribes the

following guidelines in the proper designation or nomenclature of acts constituting
sexual assault and the imposable penalty depending on the age of the victim,
thus:

We hold that if the acts constituting sexual assault are committed against a victim
under 12 years of age or is demented, the nomenclature of the offense should
now be "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation
to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" and no longer "Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," because
sexual assault as a form of acts of lasciviousness is no longer covered by Article
336 but by Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353.

Whereas if the victim is 12 years old and under 18 years old, or 18 years old and
above under special circumstances, the nomenclature of the crime should be
"Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.  It is only when the
victim of the sexual assault is 18 years old and above, and not demented, that
the crime should be called as "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A
of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision mayor.

In line with the foregoing pronouncement, the June 24, 2016 Decision of the CA
should be modified by convicting Pendoy of the crime of Lascivious Conduct
under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, instead of rape by sexual assault.
Viray vs People Facts:
G.R. No. 205180 An Information for qualified theft with grave abuse of confidence was filed
against petitioner Ryan Viray before the RTC, which reads:
Qualifying and
Aggravating That on or about 19 October 2006, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the
Circumstances Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, then being employed as a helper of ZENAIDA VEDUA y SOSA
with intent to gain and with grave abuse of confidence.

The accused pleaded “not guilty.” At the pre-trial, the defense proposed the
stipulation, and the prosecution admitted that the accused was employed as a
dog caretaker of private complainant ZenaidaVedua (Vedua) and was never
allowed to enter the house and he worked daily from 5:00 to 9:00 in the
morning.5

The trial court found that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude
that Viray was the one responsible for the taking of valuables belonging to
Vedua.18 Hence, the RTC found petitioner Viray guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of robbery.

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.

The appellate court found that the Information filed against Viray shows that the
prosecution failed to allege one of the essential elements of the crime of robbery,
which is “the use of force upon things.” Thus, to convict him of robbery, a crime
not necessarily included in a case of qualified theft, would violate the
constitutional mandate that an accused must be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.

Nonetheless, the CA held that a conviction of the accused for qualified theft is
warranted considering that Viray enjoyed Vedua’s confidence, being the
caretaker of the latter’s pets. Viray committed a grave abuse of this confidence
when, having access to the outside premises of private complainant’s house, he
forced open the doors of the same house and stole the latter’s personal
belongings.21 In its assailed Decision, the appellate court, thus, modified the
ruling of the trial court holding that the accused is liable for the crime of qualified
theft.

ISSUE: WON Viray was properly convicted of the crime of Qualified Theft

RULING:

The SC found Viray guilty only for Simple Theft.

While the CA modified the decision of the trial court by convicting petitioner of
qualified theft rather than robbery, the facts as found by the court a quo were the
same facts used by the CA in holding that all the elements of qualified theft
through grave abuse of confidence were present.

The RTC found that the taking committed by petitioner was not qualified by grave
abuse of confidence, rather it was qualified by the use of force upon things. The
trial court held that there was no confidence reposed by the private complainant
on Viray that the latter could have abused. In fact, Vedua made sure that she
locked the door before leaving. Hence, Viray was compelled to use force to gain
entry into Vedua’s house thereby committing the crime of robbery, not theft.

The CA, on the other hand, opined that the breaking of the screen and the door
could not be appreciated to qualify petitioner’s crime to robbery as such use of
force was not alleged in the Information. Rather, this breaking of the door, the CA
added, is an indication of petitioner’s abuse of the confidence given by private
complainant. The CA held that “[Viray] enjoyed the confidence of the private
complainant, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets.

The SC is inclined to agree with the CA that the taking committed by petitioner
cannot be qualified by the breaking of the door, as it was not alleged in the
Information. However, the SC disagrees from its finding that the same breaking
of the door constitutes the qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence to
sentence petitioner Viray to suffer the penalty for qualified theft. Instead, the SC
is one with the RTC that private complainant did not repose on Viray “confidence”
that the latter could have abused to commit qualified theft.

The very fact that petitioner “forced open” the main door and screen because he
was denied access to private complainant’s house negates the presence of such
confidence in him by private complainant. Without ready access to the interior of
the house and the properties that were the subject of the taking, it cannot be said
that private complaint had a “firm trust” on petitioner or that she “relied on his
discretion”36 and that the same trust reposed on him facilitated Viray’s taking of
the personal properties justifying his conviction of qualified theft.

To warrant the conviction and, hence, imposition of the penalty for

qualified theft, there must be an allegation in the information and proof that
there existed between the offended party and the accused such high
degree of confidence or that the stolen goods have been entrusted to the
custody or vigilance of the accused. In other words, where the accused had
never been vested physical access to, or material possession of, the stolen
goods, it may not be said that he or she exploited such access or material
possession thereby committing such grave abuse of confidence in taking
the property.

The allegation in the information that the offender is a laborer of the offended
party does not by itself, without more, create the relation of confidence and
intimacy required by law for the imposition of the penalty prescribed for qualified
theft. Hence, the conclusion reached by the appellate court that petitioner
committed qualified theft because he “enjoyed the confidence of the private
complainant, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets” is without legal basis. The
offended party’s very own admission that the accused was never allowed to enter
the house where the stolen properties were kept refutes the existence of the high
degree of confidence that the offender could have allegedly abused by “forcing
open the doors of the same house.”43

Without the circumstance of a grave abuse of confidence and considering that

the use of force in breaking the door was not alleged in the Information, petitioner
can only be held accountable for the crime of simple theft under Art. 308 in
relation to Art. 309 of the RPC.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner Ryan Viray is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt

of SIMPLE THEFT .