DISTINGUISHED 

FORCIBLE ENTRY FROM UNLAWFUL DETAINER

The summary actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry may be distinguished from
each other, as follows:

1. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is unlawful from the very
beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth; while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but
it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property
under his contract with the plaintiff. 

  ● It is the nature of defendant's entry into the land which determines the cause of action,
whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which
may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

2. In forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to
vacate the premises; but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand,
which is jurisdictional in nature;

3. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of
the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant; in unlawful detainer, the
plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession; 

4. In forcible entry, the one-year period is generally counted from the date of actual entry
on the land. However, when the entry is by stealth, the period must be counted from the
demand to vacate upon learning of the stealth. In unlawful detainer, it is counted from the
date of last demand. (Sps. Munoz vs. Court of Appeals,  G.R. No. 102693. September 23,
1992)

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is
who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful
but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue
of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in
actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the defendant's
right to continue in possession.23

"The words 'by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth' shall include every situation or
condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude
another, who has had prior possession, therefrom." 24  "The foundation of the action is really
the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right." 25

"The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary." 26  The
employment of force, in this case, can be deduced from petitioners' allegation that
respondent took full control and possession of the subject property without their consent
and authority.

"'Stealth,' on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid
discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without
permission,"27 while strategy connotes the employment of machinations or artifices to gain
possession of the subject property. 28  The CA found that based on the petitioners'
allegations in their complaint, "respondent's entry on the land of the petitioners was by
stealth x x x."29  However, stealth as defined requires a clandestine character which is not
availing in the instant case as the entry of the respondent  into the property appears to be
with the knowledge of the petitioners as shown by petitioners' allegation in their complaint
that "[c]onsidering the personalities behind the defendant foundation and considering
further that it is plaintiff's nephew, then the vice-mayor, and now the Mayor of the City of
Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal or contractual right, who
transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities of the
foundation using their property."30  To this Court's mind, this allegation if true, also
illustrates strategy.

ACCION PUBLICIANA & ACCION REIVINDICATORIA

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which
should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more
than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession
of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint
more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or
defendant's possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry
or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an
action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding.

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is, thus, an action whereby the

plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full
possession. 11 It is a suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of
ownership. 12 The judgment in such a case determines the ownership of the property and
awards the possession of the property to the lawful owner. 13 It is different from accion
interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to
possess without claim of title. 14

On the basis of the above discussions, it is clear that the lower courts did not err in
ruling that the suits filed by petitioners are accion reivindicatoria, not accion publiciana, as
petitioners seek to recover possession of the subject lots on the basis of their ownership
thereof.

ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION VS. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION

[1] An ordinary civil action is one by which one party sues another, based on a cause of
action, to enforce or protect a right, or to prevent or redress a wrong, whereby the
defendant has performed an act or omitted to do an act in violation of the rights of the
plaintiff. The purpose is primarily compensatory.
[2] A special civil action is also one by which one party sues another to enforce or protect a
right, or to prevent or redress a wrong. However, such action, although governed by rules
for ordinary civil actions, is subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil
action.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

Rule 1 Sec 3(c). A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish
a status, a right, or a particular fact.

Rule 72 Sec 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special proceedings

are provided for in the following cases: (1) Settlement of estate of deceased persons (2)
Escheat (3) Guardianship and custody of children (4) Trustees (5) Adoption (6) Rescission
and revocation of adoption (7) Hospitalization of insane persons (8) Habeas corpus (9)
Change of name (10) Voluntary dissolution of corporations (11) Judicial approval of
voluntary recognition of minor natural children (12) Constitution of family home (13)
Declaration of absence and death (14) Cancellation of correction of entries in the civil
registry.

The list is not exclusive. There are special proceedings not included in this list but
they fall under the definition of a special proceeding (that is, the petition in court seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact).

In the absence of special provisions under the rules on special proceedings regarding
certain issues or processes, the rules provided for in ordinary actions are, as far as
practicable, applicable.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A special proceeding, on the
other hand, is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact (Sec. 1[a] and [c], Rule 1, RoC).

FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION VS. LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION

The first is raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, Sec. 1 (g) before a
responsive pleading is filed and can be determined only from the ALLEGATIONS of the
pleading and not from evidentiary matters. The second is raised in a demurrer to evidence
under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has rested his case and can be resolved only on the basis of
the EVIDENCE he has presented in support of his claim. (The Manila Banking Corp. vs.
University of Baguio, Inc., G.R. No. 159189, February 21, 2007)

When the motion for a demurrer to evidence is granted, the judgment of the court is
considered on the merits and so it has to comply with Rule 36, Section 1, regarding the
requirement that judgment should clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which
it is based. If the motion is denied, the order is merely interlocutory. (Nepomuceno vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 60601, December 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 472).

It does not mean that the plaintiff has no cause of action. It only means that the
plaintiff ‘s allegations are insufficient for the court to know that the rights of the plaintiff
were violated by the defendant. Thus, even if indeed the plaintiff suffered injury, if the same
is not set forth in the complaint, the pleading will state no cause of action even if in reality
the plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendant. In a motion to dismiss, a complaint
based on lack of cause of action (failure to state cause of action), the question submitted to
the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to
constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said
motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. The inquiry
is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and is not any other. The test of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint (Lucas vs. Lucas).

Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading. A

complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements:
a) a legal right of the plaintiff;
b) a correlative obligation of the defendant, and;
c) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right.

The infirmity in this case is not a failure to state a cause of action but a non-joinder
of an indispensable party. The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding or at such time as is just, parties
may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the court concerned. If the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the court
may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff‘s failure to comply with the order. Respondent‘s
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable and not a motion to dismiss.
Therefore, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not failure to state a cause of action
and the complaint should not have been dismissed by the trial court upon such ground
(Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian).

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from
each other. On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of
the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other
hand, lack of cause of action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the
cause of action alleged in the pleading.