EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS:

The Constitution guarantees that no person shall be denied equal protection of the laws.  The right to equal
protection of the laws guards "against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination
or the oppression of inequality."

Equal protection, however, was not intended to prohibit the legislature from enacting statutes that either tend to
create specific classes of persons or objects, or tend to affect only these specific classes of persons or
objects. Equal protection "does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced." 

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.  

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in
the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must
be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its
jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification
be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification
be made with mathematical nicety. Hence legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow
distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or
harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.

Thus, a statute that treats one class differently from another class will not violate the equal protection clause as long
as the classification is valid. In Samahan ng Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, this Court summarized the
three (3) tests to determine the reasonableness of a classification:

The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights,
including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes. The intermediate
scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires
heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Lastly, the rational basis test
applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.

A "suspect class" is defined as "a class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process."

Juridical entities enjoy certain advantages that natural persons do not, such as limited liability. A corporation has a
separate and distinct personality from its corporate officers or stockholders. It may incur its own liabilities and is
responsible for the payment of its debts. Thus, a corporate officer or a stockholder, as a general rule, is not
personally held liable for corporate debts.
The properties of juridical entities are also often used for commercial purposes. Corporations will give more attention
to assets that are income generating, and will also be equipped with greater resources for the protection of these
assets.  

In contrast, the properties of natural persons are more often used for residential purposes. They are also directly
responsible for the liabilities they incur and, often, are not equipped with the same resources that juridical entities
may have.

Juridical entities, thus, cannot be considered a "suspect class." The rational basis test may be applied to determine
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8971, Section 47.  

"The rational basis test requires only that there be a legitimate government interest and that there is a reasonable
connection between it and the means employed to achieve it." A longer period of redemption is given to natural
persons whose mortgaged properties are more often used for residential purposes. A shorter period of redemption is
given to juridical persons whose properties are more often used for commercial purposes. Goldenway
Merchandising explains that the shorter period is aimed to ensure the solvency and liquidity of banks. This helps
minimize the period of uncertainty in the ownership of commercial properties and enable mortgagee-banks to
dispose of these acquired assets quickly.

There is, thus, a legitimate government interest in the protection of the banking industry and a legitimate government
interest in the protection of foreclosed residential properties owned by natural persons. The shortened period of
redemption for juridical entities may be considered to be the reasonable means for the protection of both these
interests.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivor's benefits under a pension system.
However, statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married the employee for a certain period before
the employee's death to prevent sham marriages contracted for monetary gain. One example is the Illinois Pension
Code which restricts survivor's annuity benefits to a surviving spouse who was married to a state employee for at
least one year before the employee's death. The Illinois pension system classifies spouses into those married less
than one year before a member's death and those married one year or more. The classification seeks to prevent
conscious adverse risk selection of deathbed marriages where a terminally ill member of the pension system marries
another so that person becomes eligible for benefits. In Sneddon v. The State Employee's Retirement System of
Illinois,27 the Appellate Court of Illinois held that such classification was based on difference in situation and
circumstance, bore a rational relation to the purpose of the statute, and was therefore not in violation of constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection.

A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of
the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must
apply equally to all members of the same class.29 Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from
another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.

The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against the dependent
spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three years before the
pensioner's death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place
within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not
provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to prevent "deathbed
marriages," then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date the
pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on
substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years
before the pensioner qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to
avail of pension benefits.

Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason Congress deleted the
proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 ("RA 8291"), otherwise known as the "Government Service Insurance Act of 1997,"
the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse
who married the member immediately before the member's death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension
unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the benefit.

Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years before retirement or
death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present GSIS law does not
automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member
within three years before the member's retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the surviving
spouse contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer
prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the purpose
for which Congress enacted the social legislation.

Void classification

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class
as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free
a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is
only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged
with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court
can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its
exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique
skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner
into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made
in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from
the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free
exercise of his power of locomotion.

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of ones liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by
judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused. The term refers to the restraint on the personal
liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his own
pleasure and will. Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion
and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall
or any exterior barrier."

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individuals status in society. Prison
officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well
as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily,
both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights.

VOID CLASSIFICATION (Salary of foreign-hired and local-hired)

Thehool contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-
hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank,
the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human
experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he
receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated
against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform
25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which
they perform under similar working conditions.

Thehool cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary
rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.

"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly,
the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering
of services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission, we said that:

"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's business.
Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the
fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)

While we recognize the need of thehool to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the
prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the
same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also
cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting
foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires,
such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," "to afford labor full
protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These
relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective
bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are
contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent thehool to justify the distinction in the
salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between
the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of thehool of according higher salaries to foreign-
hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.

We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body
of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciproights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law." The factors in determining the
appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of
the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment
status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the
combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for
purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in thehool also shows that these groups were
always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-
hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded
certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes,
and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of
the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group
the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. (Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N. W., 209;
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S., 61; 55 Law. ed., 369; Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.,
660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation v. Vera and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz., 187.)

Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of
the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all
citizens of the state or to all of a class.