NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Virtual Meeting of October 18, 2022

(Information subject to editing)

Capsizing of Liftboat SEACOR Power

Port Fourchon, Louisiana
April 13, 2021
DCA21MM024

This is a synopsis from the NTSB’s report and does not include the Board’s rationale for
the findings, probable cause, and safety recommendations. NTSB staff is currently
making final revisions to the report from which the attached findings and safety
recommendations have been extracted. The final report and pertinent safety
recommendation letters will be distributed to recommendation recipients as soon as
possible. The attached information is subject to further review and editing to reflect
changes adopted during the Board meeting.

Executive Summary

What Happened
On April 13, 2021, about 1537 local time, the US-flagged liftboat SEACOR Power
capsized about 7 miles off the coast of Port Fourchon, Louisiana, in a severe
thunderstorm. Eleven crew and eight offshore workers were aboard the liftboat. Vessel
operators in the area reported heavy rain, winds exceeding 80 knots, and 2- to 4-foot
seas at the time of the capsizing. Search and rescue efforts were hampered by 30- to
40-knot winds and seas that quickly built to 10 to 12 feet and persisted throughout the
evening and into the next day. Six personnel were rescued by the US Coast Guard and
Good Samaritan vessels, and the bodies of six fatally injured personnel were
recovered. Seven personnel were never found and are presumed dead. The vessel,
valued at $25 million, was a total constructive loss.
What We Found
We found that the captain’s decision to get underway on the day of the casualty was
reasonable and was not influenced by commercial pressure. However, weather
information that SEACOR Marine provided to the SEACOR Power’s crew was
insufficient for making weather-related decisions about the liftboat’s operation.
Additionally, due to a Coast Guard broadcasting station outage, the SEACOR Power
crew did not receive a National Weather Service Special Marine Warning notifying
mariners of a severe thunderstorm that was approaching.
Even if the SEACOR Power crew had received the Special Marine Warning, data gaps,
including a lack of low-altitude radar visibility over the Louisiana coastal areas,
prevented the National Weather Service office that issued the Special Marine Warning
from identifying and forecasting the surface wind magnitudes that impacted the
SEACOR Power. Lowering the angle of the lowest radar beam at select coastal weather
radar sites would improve low-altitude radar visibility over coastal waters.
The capsizing occurred when the SEACOR Power was struck by severe thunderstorm-
generated winds that exceeded the vessel’s operational wind speed limits, causing a
loss of stability. Other operational factors may have also played a role in the capsizing,
including the liftboat’s trim by the stern (the difference between a ship’s forward and
aft drafts), its turn to port and speed through the water, a cargo shift, and movement
of the vessel’s legs.
We found that due to the unpredictability of thunderstorm phenomena and the
vulnerability of restricted-service liftboats like the SEACOR Power, operating restricted-
service liftboats like the SEACOR Power in the afloat mode at any time when a Special
Marine Warning has been issued for the vessel’s planned route increases their risk of
capsizing. Further, increasing minimum stability criteria for liftboats in restricted service
would improve vessel survivability in severe thunderstorms.
The speed at which the SEACOR Power capsized and angle at which it came to rest
made egress difficult and likely contributed to the fatalities. Following the capsizing,
the Coast Guard Response Command Center did not effectively use available
information to verify the validity of the location of SEACOR Power’s emergency position
indicating radio beacon alerts, which led to a delay in dispatching search and rescue
units and notifying Good Samaritan vessels of the emergency. Additionally, SEACOR
Marine did not have adequate procedures nor did it provide its staff with training for
responding to the Coast Guard when contacted regarding emergency position
indicating radio beacon alerts, and inaccurate information about the SEACOR Power’s
location provided to the Coast Guard by a SEACOR Marine employee contributed to
the delayed response.
High winds and heavy seas, combined with underwater and overhead obstructions,
prevented both surface and air resources from getting close enough to the vessel to
rescue personnel directly from the wreck, which contributed to the loss of life. In the
future, a detailed procedure in Coast Guard mass rescue operations plans combined
with mutual aid agreements between the Coast Guard and air rescue providers would
improve and expand search and rescue capabilities.
In previous casualty investigations, we found that mariners have benefited from their
vessels or employers providing personal locator beacons; had the crewmembers of
the SEACOR Power been required to carry personal locator beacons, their chances of

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being rescued would have been enhanced. The search and rescue transponder held
by the mate after he had been swept into the water from the wreck was not effective in
signaling vessels or aircraft.
Probable Cause
We determined that the probable cause of the capsizing of the liftboat SEACOR Power
was a loss of stability that occurred when the vessel was struck by severe thunderstorm
winds, which exceeded the vessel’s operational wind speed limits. Contributing to the
loss of life on the vessel were the speed at which the vessel capsized and the angle at
which it came to rest, which made egress difficult, and the high winds and seas in the
aftermath of the capsizing, which hampered rescue efforts.
What We Recommended
Because the localized weather could not be detected by nearby radars due to their
elevation angles (antenna angles relative to the horizon), we recommended that that
the National Weather Service, Federal Aviation Administration, and Air Force work
together to assess coastal weather radar sites to determine if it is safe and appropriate
to lower the radar angles, and then lower the angles of the lowest radar beams where
appropriate.
We also recommended that the Coast Guard develop procedures to inform mariners
in affected areas whenever there is an outage at a navigational telex broadcasting site,
modify restricted-service liftboat stability regulations to require greater stability for
newly constructed restricted-service liftboats, and develop procedures to integrate
commercial, municipal, and non-profit air rescue providers into Sectors’ and Districts’
mass rescue operations plans, when appropriate.
We reiterated a recommendation to the Coast Guard to require that all personnel
employed on vessels in coastal, Great Lakes, and ocean service be provided with a
personal locator beacon to enhance their chances of survival. Given the benefits of
personal locator beacons, we also recommended that the Offshore Marine Service
Association notify members of personal locator beacons’ availability and value.
Lastly, we recommended that SEACOR Marine review its fleet to ensure its vessels are
being operated strictly within the limits specified in operating manuals, stability
documentation, and other required guidance, and revise its liftboat safety
management system and operations manuals to include a policy requiring the vessel
to remain in port or lower its legs and cease afloat operations when a Special Marine
Warning has been issued for the vessel’s planned route. We similarly recommended
that the Offshore Marine Service Association inform their members of the
circumstances of this accident and the importance of remaining in port or jacking up
when a Special Marine Warning has been issued.

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Findings

1. None of the following were safety issues for the casualty voyage: (1)
mechanical and electrical systems, (2) watertight integrity, (3) crew
experience and qualifications, or (4) fatigue.

2. Commercial pressure was not a factor in the captain’s decision to get

underway.

3. The weather forecast SEACOR Marine provided to the SEACOR Power

crew on the morning of the capsizing was insufficient for making weather-
related decisions about the liftboat’s operation.

4. Given the conditions and the marine weather information available to the
captain at the time the liftboat left Port Fourchon, the captain’s decision to
get underway on the day of the casualty was reasonable; although the
captain was not aware of the severe thunderstorm watch, it likely would not
have changed his decision.

5. Because the Coast Guard’s New Orleans navigational telex site was not
operational on the afternoon of the capsizing, the SEACOR Power crew did
not receive the Special Marine Warning and was not aware of the severity
of thunderstorms that were approaching that afternoon.

6. Data gaps, including a lack of low-altitude radar visibility over the Louisiana
coastal areas, prevented the National Weather Service office that issued
the Special Marine Warning for the casualty site area around the casualty
time from identifying and forecasting the surface wind magnitudes that
impacted the SEACOR Power.

7. Lowering the angle of the lowest radar beam at selected coastal weather
radar sites would improve low-altitude radar visibility over coastal waters
and, therefore, improve forecasters’ ability to accurately monitor, forecast,
and notify the public of weather conditions.

8. As designed, the SEACOR Power met applicable intact stability criteria.

9. The SEACOR Power capsized when it was struck by severe thunderstorm

winds that exceeded the vessel’s operational wind speed limits and, when
combined with sea conditions, resulted in a loss of stability.

10. Although the SEACOR Power met stability criteria at the time of the
casualty, the vessel’s trim by the stern decreased the vessel’s ability to
resist capsizing.

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11. Operation of the SEACOR Power with trim by the stern that exceeded the
limit specified in the operating manual, stability documentation, and other
required guidance was an accepted practice by vessel crews.

12. The SEACOR Power’s trim by the stern, its turn to port and speed through
the water, a cargo shift, and movement of the vessel’s legs may have
contributed to the vessel’s capsizing.

13. Due to the unpredictability of localized thunderstorm phenomena and the

vulnerability of restricted-service liftboats in these storms, operating a
restricted-service liftboat in the afloat mode at any time when a Special
Marine Warning has been issued for the vessel’s planned route increases
its risk of capsizing.

14. Increasing minimum stability criteria for liftboats in restricted service would
improve vessel survivability in severe thunderstorms.

15. The speed at which the vessel capsized and angle at which it came to rest
made egress difficult and likely contributed to the fatalities.

16. The Coast Guard Rescue Coordination Center did not effectively use
available information to verify the validity of the location of
SEACOR Power’s emergency position indicating radio beacon alerts, which
led to a delay in dispatching search and rescue units and notifying Good
Samaritan vessels of the emergency.

17. Inaccurate information about the SEACOR Power’s location provided to the
Coast Guard by a SEACOR Marine employee when contacted regarding
the vessel’s emergency position indicating radio beacon alert contributed
to the delayed response.

18. SEACOR Marine did not have adequate procedures nor did it provide its
staff with training for responding to the Coast Guard when contacted
regarding emergency position indicating radio beacon alerts.

19. A detailed procedure in Coast Guard mass rescue operations plans

combined with mutual aid agreements between the Coast Guard and air
rescue providers would improve and expand search and rescue
capabilities for future casualties.

20. High winds and heavy seas, combined with underwater and overhead
obstructions, prevented both surface and air resources from getting close
enough to the vessel to rescue personnel directly from the wreck, which
contributed to the loss of life.

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 21. Mariners have benefited from their employers voluntarily providing
personal locator beacons or satellite emergency notification devices.

22. Had the crewmembers of the SEACOR Power been required to carry
personal locator beacons on board, as recommended in Safety
Recommendation M-17-45, and had they been activated when
abandoning the vessel, search and rescue crews would have had
continuously updated and correct coordinates of individual crewmembers’
locations, enhancing their chances of being rescued.

23. Although not causal to the fatalities and despite functioning as designed,
the search and rescue transponder held by the mate in the water was not
effective in signaling vessels or aircraft due to high seas, no means to hold
the device high enough above the water, and lack of rescuer training.

Recommendations

To the US Coast Guard:

1. Develop procedures to inform mariners in affected areas whenever there is an

outage at a navigational telex broadcasting site.

2. Modify restricted-service liftboat stability regulations to require greater stability

for newly constructed restricted-service liftboats.

3. Develop procedures to integrate commercial, municipal, and non-profit air

rescue providers into Sectors’ and Districts’ mass rescue operations plans,
when appropriate.

To the National Weather Service:

4. In collaboration with the Federal Aviation Administration and the US Air Force,
determine if it is appropriate to lower the radar angle for coastal weather radar
sites without compromising aviation safety or other products, and lower the
radar angle at those sites where it is appropriate.

To the Federal Aviation Administration and the US Air Force:

5. Work with the National Weather Service to determine if it is appropriate to

lower the radar angle for coastal weather radar sites without compromising
aviation safety or other products, and lower the radar angle at those sites
where it is appropriate.

To the Offshore Marine Service Association:

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 6. Inform your members of the circumstances of this capsizing and encourage
them to implement policies to stop afloat operations for restricted-service
liftboats when a Special Marine Warning has been issued for the vessel’s
planned route.

7. Notify your members of the availability and benefits of personal locator

beacons.

To SEACOR Marine:

8. Ensure your vessel crews receive timely and accurate weather forecasts
tailored to each vessel’s location, including applicable National Weather
Service watch and warning products when they are issued.

9. Conduct a comprehensive review of your active fleet to ensure your vessels are
being operated strictly within the limits specified in operating manuals, stability
documentation, and other required guidance.

10. Revise your restricted-service liftboat safety management systems and

operations manuals to require the vessel to remain in port or jack up when a
Special Marine Warning has been issued for the vessel’s planned route.

Previously Issued Recommendations Reiterated in This Report

The National Transportation Safety Board reiterates the following safety

recommendation.
To the US Coast Guard:

11. Require that all personnel employed on vessels in coastal, Great Lakes, and
ocean service be provided with a personal locator beacon to enhance their
chances of survival.