Graduate Course

Paper-V: Introduction to Comparative Government

and Politics
Contents
Pg. No.
Unit-1 : Understanding Comparative Politics Abhishek Choudhary 01
Unit-2 :
(b) : Approaches to Studying Comparative Politics
Political Culture Approach Kamal Kumar 14
Unit-3 : Historical Context of Modern Government
(a) : Capitalism: Meaning and Development: Globalization Dr. Robert Mizo 24
(c) : Colonialism and Decolonisation: Meaning, Context, Forms
of Colonialism; Anti-colonialism Struggles and Process
of Decolonisation J.S. Pathak 38
Unit-4 : Themes for Comparative Analysis
(i) : Comparative Study of Constitutional Developments
and Political Economy of Britain Sanjeev Kumar & Namreeta Kumari 47
(ii) : Comparative Study of Constitutional Development and
Political Economy in Brazil Baby Tabassum 55
(iii): Constitutional Developments and Political Economy
in Nigeria Dr. Robert Mizo 71

Edited by:
Prof. Tapan Biswal

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 Unit-1

Understanding Comparative Politics

Abhishek Choudhary

1. Introduction
The chapter has three-fold objective. First, it provides an overview of the sub-discipline of
comparative politics and seeks to examine its nature and scope. Second, it provides an
understanding about the rationale for comparing and unpacks the methods of comparison.
Finally, it addresses the problem of Eurocentrism and provides a way out of the trap.
Before examining these, it would be pertinent to understand what comparative politics
means. Scholars have understood comparative politics as one of the three main subfields of
political science, the other two being political theory and international relations. Comparative
politics has been defined in several ways. Some prominent definitions worth attention are as
follows:
Jean Blondel (1999) defines comparative politics as being concerned with “simultaneous
or successive examination of two or more political systems”. For Hague, Harrop and
McComrick (2016: 12), comparative politics is the “systematic study of government and
politics in different countries, designed to better understand them by drawing out their
contrasts and similarities.” However, comparative politics is more than just identifying
similarities and differences. Comparison allows one to go beyond “identifying similarities
and differences” to “ultimately study political phenomena in a larger framework of
relationships” (Mohanty 1975). This approach helps in deepening ones understanding of
given political phenomenon and therefore allows one to be in a position to have a better
explanation, it is felt, would help deepen our understanding and broaden the levels of
answering and explaining political phenomena.
2. Nature and Scope of Comparative Politics
A major definitional aspect relates to the question: what is to be compared? On one hand, if
two things are entirely different, there is no point of comparison. On the other hand, if two
things are entirely same, comparison would not be useful either. One important aspect is to
specify “functional equivalence” between concepts or indicators (Dogan and Pelassy 1990).
This aspect is based on two major ideas. First is the idea that “different structures may
perform the same function”. The second is that the same structure “may perform several
different functions” (Dogan and Pelassy 1990). By arguing in favour of functional
equivalence, it is asserted that instead of looking at institutional similarity, one can assess the
roles and functions performed by various institutions within and outside the politics. This
idea has been championed by scholars who fall under the category of ‘functionalists’. In
simple terms, it is the performance of ‘functions’ and the role played by different organs of
the society that matters. This may include non-political institutions as well. No institution can

1
be attributed to a single function exclusively. Similarly, no institution can be limited to a
single function too. For instance, the military may perform roles much more than that of
securing the borders in some states. Or, the function of the president may vary drastically in
two different countries.
2.2 Nature of Comparative Politics
Daniel Caramani (2011) seeks to provide answer to “what” is being compared in comparative
politics. He argues that “national political systems” are the main cases that are compared as
they happen to be the most important political units in world politics. However, they are “not
the only cases” that are analysed by comparative politics (Caramani 2011: 5). For instance,
comparative politics can analyse “sub-national regional political systems” like the states or
regions of India. Or, they can analyse “supranational units” like (a) regions (comprising more
than one country, like West Asia), (b) political systems of empires (like Roman, Ottoman,
Mughal, etc.), (c) international or regional organizations (like SAARC, EU, NATO, etc) and
(d) types of political systems (democratic versus authoritarian, etc.) (Caramani 2011: 5).
Comparative political analysis can also compare “single elements or components”. This may
include a comparison of party systems, electoral systems, structures of various instiututions,
policies, etc.
In general terms, comparative politics seeks to analyse and compare the political systems
operating in various societies. It also compares units within and beyond states. With its focus
on comparison and analysis, it takes into account political activity, political processes as well
as political power in various political systems.
The discipline of comparative politics has three traditions (Caramani 2011):
1. Oriented towards the study of single countries
2. Methodological
3. Analytical
The first tradition is oriented towards the study of single countries. It follows the initial
inclination of American comparativists who focussed on the study of political systems
outside of the US. This tradition reflects the Anglo-Saxon dominance over the subject and
studied foreign countries as ‘others’. This tradition often focusses on countries in isolation
without actually engaging in comparison. It is limited to providing detailed description of a
single case. Despite the criticism of this tradition, major contributions in the field of
comparative politics stem from detailed descriptive study of single countries.
The second tradition seeks to establish rules and standards for comparison. It focusses on
ways in which a better reservoir of comparative information, explanation and prediction can
be created. Understood in this sense, comparative method is a “method of discovering
empirical relationships among variables” (Lijphart 1971). Thus, ‘comparative method’ is one
of the traditions within comparative politics that is different from descriptive and analytical

2
traditions. By focussing on rules and standards, this tradition provides starting point for
analysis of countries or groups of countries.
The third tradition is analytical and provides a combination of empirical description with
method. Most of the work that nowadays are categorised as ‘works of comparative politics’
falls under this tradition. Comparative studies of political parties, regime types, social
movements, etc. in two or more countries are a few examples of this body of literature. The
works are mainly concerned with identifying and explaining “differences and similarities
between countries” and their “institutions, actors, and processes” by using the method of
“systematic comparison” of common phenomenon (Caramani 2011: 4).
2.2 Scope of Comparative Politics
The discipline of comparative politics has been criticised on different levels. It has been
considered as Eurocentric implying that the ‘western model’ is seen as better than the rest of
the world. This sort of parochialism leads to the perpetuation of the hegemonic nature of a
particular system. This further leads to the ‘self’ versus ‘other’ bias. Due to this, the ‘self’
gets defined in relation to the ‘other’. The first tradition mentioned above is subjected to this
criticism. Even the third tradition succumbs to this Eurocentric bias and the ‘non-west’ is
compared in a manner that presents the west as better and superior.
Roy C. Macridis (1955) in his seminal essay identified certain limitations of the
traditional approach. First, it has been called as ‘essentially noncomparative’ implying that
the reference point is the institutional structure of a given country. It has been alleged that
single case study is being passed as a comparative study. He further alleged that the
traditional approach is more descriptive and less analytical. This criticism stems from the fact
that the historical and legalistic approaches have their limitations. The historical approach
focusses on studying the “origins and growth” of certain institutions (Macridis 1955: 17). In
doing so, it does not make any effort towards evolving any analytical scheme. Thus, the focus
stays limited on the chronology of events within a country and the chosen institution of that
country. The legalistic approach focusses primarily on the study of powers of different
branches of the government. It does not try to analyse the factors that shape particular forms
of power in specific ways. Thus, they fail to provide any “general frame of reference” that
can be used in a truly comparative sense (Macridis 1955: 18).
Second, Macridis considers the traditional approach as ‘essentially parochial’. This
critique is related to the undue focus on institutions of Western European countries. Such a
focus significantly limited the scope of comparative politics and rendered other regime types
as less important. Third, Macridis called the approach as ‘essentially static’. This implied that
comparative politics ignored the ever changing factors that leads to change and growth.
Finally, he called the approach as ‘essentially monographic’ implying that the study remained
focussed on political institutions of a given system. It meant that focus of comparativists
remained on individual case studies. This critique is close to the critique that considers
comparative politics as descriptive and as lacking systematic formulation.

3
 Neera Chandoke (1996) builds up on Macridis’ critique and traces the crisis of
comparative politics. First, the disciple faced a general attack on grand theorization. It was
questioned for removing issues from contextual specificities. It further was accused of over
generalised regularities. The discipline was considered as reductionist. It was searching for
simple variables for the sake of comparison. It ‘reduced’ complex phenomenon of politics to
simple variables that could be compared with ease. The second indication of crisis stems
from the ethnocentric nature of the discipline and focus on studying the ‘other’ - other
societies, other regime types, other institutions. The third reason for the crisis of comparative
politics is the crisis of nation-state itself. The usual category of comparison, the state, faced
challenges due to external forces as well as internal autonomy movements.
A set of problems faced by comparative analysis relates to the methodological
dimension. There is often a criticism against any case study for having a “selection bias”
(Landman 2008). The choice of countries to do a comparative study might be based on the
bias of the comparativist. Another problem relates to the emphasis on a “behavioural
approach”. The behavioural approach in social science in general and comparative politics in
particular related to tendency to explain social phenomenon using scientific methods. It was
asserted by the behaviouralists that social reality can be observed, quantified and generalised.
Behaviouralists use methods of sampling, survey, interview, and statistical analysis to explain
social realities.
Example of these problems is the criticism levelled against the seminal work by Gabriel
Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations (1963). The study was called ethnocentric as it favoured consensual democracy as
the most stable form. It is further pointed out that political culture of Mexico was deliberately
pitted against the political culture of the United States to prove that liberal democracies (like
the US) are better than one-party systems (like Mexico during those years). The study was
also called an attempt of behaviouralists to quantify political orientations to categorize
countries, ignoring the dynamic nature and contextual specificities of socio-political relations.
3. Why Compare?
Comparing two or more things is a natural attribute of human behaviour. Whether one has to
choose the subject to study after schools, whether one has to buy clothes, phones or any other
thing, there are constantly involved in comparison. Politics is an even more important and an
ever evolving domain that requires comparison to equate, differentiate and assess various
phenomena.
Todd Landman (2008) has identified four reasons for comparison: contextual
description, classification, hypothesis-testing and prediction.
(i) Contextual description:
It allows political scientists to know what other countries are like (Landman 2008). This
has been the primary objective of comparative politics wherein the focus is on ‘describing the

4
political phenomena and events of a particular country, or group of countries’ (Landman
2008: 5). It is important as it provides an outside observer to make sense of a system not
entirely known to him/her. This aspect is closer to the first tradition and provides the
comparativists with detailed information about a political system. While some critics assert
that single-country studies cannot be truly considered comparative, there are benefits of
studying a particular country or a group of countries. For instance, a detailed analysis of
political system of United Kingdom provides us with the information about benefits and
limitations of parliamentary system. This can help us assess other cases where similar - or
opposite - systems exist.
(ii) Classification:
It implies simplifying and organizing information so that it can be easily observed and
categorized (Landman 2008: 5-6). Classification allows grouping of categories that are not
same but have some level of similarity. For example, let us assume two countries where one
has a Parliamentary system while the other has a Presidential system. Both have very
different set of rules. But both can be ‘classified’ as democracies. Thus, the world of politics
is made less complex through classification (Landman 2008: 4).
One of the earliest known comparativists, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), used the same logic
while classifying 158 city-states into six categories: monarchy, aristocracy, polity, tyranny,
oligarchy, and democracy. Based on the ‘number of those who rule’ and the forms as good or
corrupt, Aristotle’s classification can be summarised through the following table:
Those who rule
One Few Many
Good Monarchy Aristocracy Polity
(kingship)
Form of Rule
Corrupt Tyranny Oligarchy Democracy (mob rule)

Source: Todd Landman (2008), Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An

Introduction, New York: Routledge.

In similar way, one of the most prominent work on comparative social revolution, Theda
Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and
China (1979) provides a classificatory analysis of role of state structures, international forces,
and class relations. She uses this to explain and analyse the French Revolution, the Russian
Revolution and the Chinese Revolution.
(iii) Hypothesis-testing:
After describing and classifying information, the next logical step is to understand the
factors that explains what has been described and classified. This aspect has been called as
‘hypothesis testing’ and implies the search for factors so that better theories could be built.

5
This aspect is closer to the second tradition of comparative politics which is focussed on
analysis and seeks to establish relation among variables.
Comparative research is a focus on analytical relationships among variables validated by
social science, a focus that is modified by differences in the context in which we observe and
measure those variables. Arend Lijphart claims that comparison helps in testing
“hypothesized empirical relationships among variables” (Lijphart 1971). Comparative
analysis also leads to accumulation of more information that helps in having a better and
more complete explanatory theory. So, when comparing countries and testing hypothesis
allows the accumulation of a larger pool of information and improves ones knowledge about
the world.
(iv) Prediction
Comparison of countries and the generalizations based on such comparison allows one to
‘predict’ likely outcomes. The likely outcomes in other countries that are not included in the
original comparison can be made based on a robust theory. Also, prediction can be made
about outcomes in the future on the basis of certain factors and conditions. Predictability is an
excellent attribute of a good theory and it is asserted that a ‘good theory’ is able to predict
outcomes with better accuracy.
Other than these four reasons, comparison provides us perspective to understand the less
known political systems. It also helps to understand differences in outcome in different socio-
political settings. It also helps in understanding as to why countries develop the way they do
and why they are ruled the way they are.
Hague, Harrop and McComrick (2016) identify two major purposes of comparative
politics:
a) it broadens one’s understanding of the political world
b) it helps in predicting political outcomes.
Arguing on similar lines, Newton and Van Deth (2010) provide three important reasons for
studying comparative politics:
a) one cannot understand one’s own country without knowledge of others.
b) one cannot understand other countries without knowing the background,
institutions and history of other countries.
c) one cannot arrive at valid generalisations about government and politics without
the comparative method.
Thus, it can be argued that describing, analysing, predicting and generalizing are four major
attributes of comparative politics that makes it an important aspect of broader political
analysis.

6
4. Methods of Comparison
Kopstein and Lichbach (2005) have argued that focussing on ‘interests, identities, and
institutions’ are three ways that provide different paths of doing comparison. These variables
have an impact on how political systems operate.
(a) Focus on Interest
Some comparativists focus on interests. For them, the material interest of people is what
matter the most. People decide on the basis of rational calculations and organize politically in
order to maximize their interest. They support a regime type that ‘maximizes their life
chances’ (Kopstein and Lichbach 2005). For instance, a group of people may organize
against a regime type or support it purely based on rational calculations. The calculations are
interest based and therefore, it may be possible that a particular regime type is supported in a
particular society but the same may be opposed in another social setting. However, an undue
focus on interest may be misleading. The next two paths downplay the relevance of interests
and consider interest being shaped by identities or institutions.
(b) Focus on Identities
Some comparativists consider identity as the most important factor. They argue that there
are no objective interests and one’s interest is defined by one’s identity. Two most common
forms of identities are religion and ethnicity (Kopstein and Lichbach 2005). People or groups
of people define their interests in terms of their identity. A simple example could be religious
support to a theocratic regime. Another example could be the rise of caste based or religion
based parties in India where the support to a particular political party is based primarily on
identity. While some identities are based on birth and place, modern societies also generate
newer identities. For example, the organising for issues like gender and environment leads to
creation on newer identities. Recent US elections (2020) showed that how historical identities
and newer identities interact and shape people’s choices.
(c) Focus on Institutions
Yet another group of comparativists argue that neither material interests, nor identities
determine how the politics of a country works. For them, the rules and procedures embedded
in institutions dictate the way power operates and countries work (Kopstein and Lichbach
2005). Institutions shape the working of a country either directly or indirectly. In particular,
Democracies have a diverse and complex set of institutions that define how a country would
shape up. For example, the institutionalised electoral system of the United States is based on
a ‘first-past-the-post’ system. On the other hand, Germany has a ‘proportional representation’
electoral system. Both the countries are democratic but the political life and political culture
of both democracies vary - and one major factor for this variation in the difference in
institutions. Comparativists who tend to focus on institutions, try to explain variation in
outcomes on the basis of variation in institutions. The aspect of ‘functional equivalence’ is

7
relevant here as same institutions may perform different functions and different institutions
may perform same functions.
Comparativists have proceeded in their task by focussing on one or a mix of the three
ways mentioned above. While one of the ‘ways’ may have its limitation, a mix of more than
one provides a broader understanding of the issues.
A different way to approach the question “how to compare” has been answered by
political philosopher James Stuart Mill. He provides five strategies for undertaking
comparison (Finn 2011):
a) Method of agreement: Two or more instances of an event (effect) are compared to
see what they have in common. That commonality is identified as the cause.
b) Method of difference: Two or more instances of an event (effect) are compared to
see what they all do not have in common. If they have all but one thing in common,
that one thing is identified as the cause.
c) Joint method of agreement and difference: A combination of the methods of
agreement and difference, the joint method looks for a single commonality among
two or more instances of an event, and the joint method looks for a common absence
of that possible cause.
d) Method of residues: all known causes of a complex set of events are subtracted.
What is leftover is said to be the cause.
e) Method of concomitant variations: correlations between varying events are sought,
that is, correspondence in variations between two sets of objects, events, or data.
Of these, the ‘joint method of agreement and difference’ is relevant to comparative politics as
it combines the method of agreement and difference. It seeks to look for a single
commonality among two or more instances of an event and common absence of a possible
cause (Finn 2011). J.S. Mill’s ‘method of difference’ is also known as the “most similar
system design”. It is used in comparing similar cases having dependent variables. His
‘method of similarity’ is also known as the “most different systems design” (Black 1966). It
is employed to compare dissimilar cases having independent variables. However while
comparing, one should be careful about what to compare and how to compare. There is much
greater value in comparing events and institutions that are in situated in similar time frame
than those that are widely separated in time. The comparison of societies or smaller groups
that are concerned with reasonably similar problems is more likely to lead to satisfactory
conclusions than comparisons between societies existing many centuries apart (Black 1966).
Thus, comparative research designs can either focus on similarities or on differences
(Caramani 2011). Daniel Caramani (2011) argues that it would not be correct to say that
comparative politics relies on a specific method. This is because different methods could be
employed based on the differences in number of cases chosen, type of data analysis used and

8
time period under study. Thus, the research method would depend on question that the
researcher is asking.
Another reason is that there can be different dimension under comparison. Therefore, a
single method will not be useful. The comparison can be (a) spatial or cross-sectional,
meaning that two political systems are compared as a cross section. For example, comparison
of federal systems of India and Canada. It can be (b) longitudinal, meaning that institutions
and systems could be compared across time. For example, comparison of the phase of
congress system in India with the phase of coalitional politics. It can be (c) functional or
cross-organizational, meaning that the object of study is not territorially different but can be
within a given political system. For example, comparison of government policies relating to
expenditure on military and education.
5. Going beyond Eurocentrism
As discussed in the section 2.2 on ‘scope comparative politics’, the discipline faces the
charge of being parochial and Eurocentric. There are methodological problems and it has
been alleged that comparative politics focusses on the “how” but ignores the “what” of the
problem (Lijphart 1971). The Eurocentric nature of the discipline limited its focus on Great
Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union.
Macridis’s critique of the discipline as parochial and Eurocentric did challenge the
contours but the efforts to redefine the discipline was still based on a deeply entrenched bias.
Thus, by addressing the “first crisis of the discipline”, a “second crisis” was invited
(Chandhoke 1996). The efforts to expand the scope of the discipline led to limiting of the
focus on the American and Western political systems and institutions. It was based on the
same worldview that ignored the worldviews of the ‘others’. This was the Eurocentrism of
the discipline which either (a) focussed entirely on the West and ignored the rest of the world,
or (b) even when any part of the rest of the world was studied/compared, it was considered
‘less civilized’, ‘exotic’, ‘different’ and ‘inferior’ than the European and American models.
Eurocentrism implies this superiority and bias in favour of the civilization, culture and race of
the West.
A “third world perspective” began to emerge during 1940s and 1950s but it remained
limited mostly to the Latin American experience. One of the earliest proponents of this
approach was Paul Baran who spearheaded the critique of modernization theory from a Neo-
Marxist perspective. Broadly called the ‘dependency perspective’, the ideas represented
‘voices from the periphery’ that ‘challenged the intellectual hegemony of the American
modernization school’ (So 1990). Before going into the critique, it would be useful to look at
some major theories of growth and modernization.

9
 Major Theories of Growth and Modernization
Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) gave the theory of ‘big push’. He argued in favour of
industrial sector and advocated moving away from agricultural sector. He favoured the
industrial sector as it would generate greater levels of capital setting a self-perpetuating
motion of growth.

Ragnar Nurkse (1953) came up with the notion that is better known as the ‘trickle-down
effect’. He argued that poor do not save and therefore investment in industries was needed
to generate capital. Rich needed to grow, save and invest further and the fruits of capital
will eventually trickle-down to the poor sections as well.

Simon Kuznets (1955) argued that capitalist development would in fact lead to economic
inequality in short run. But it would eventually lead to a more equitable and prosperous
society. In Indian context, V.M. Dandekar and N. Rath (1971) argued that a higher rate of
growth was better than a lower rate of growth for all social groups, except for the poorest
10 percent. Thus, they challenged the effectiveness of the trickle-down effect and argued
for a ‘basic needs strategy’. They argued that from the viewpoint of the poor, fair
distribution of growth is more important than general growth.

W. Arthur Lewis (1954) began his argument by looking at a two-sector model - the
capitalist sector and the subsistence sector. While the capitalist sector has reproducible
capital and is more productive, the subsistence sector has low level of productivity. With
low rate of savings, the subsistence sector lacks accumulation of capital that can be
reproduced. Therefore, Lewis argued for emphasizing the capitalist sector for growth.

W.W. Rostow (1960) provided an ideological challenge to socialist models of development

by presenting his “Stages of Economic Growth”. Rostow divided the process of
development into five stages: (i) the traditional society; (ii) the establishment of the
preconditions for take-off; (iii) the take-off stage; (iv) the drive to maturity; and (v) the
epoque of high mass consumption. For the second stage, he emphasized the need to focus
on specific growth sectors that would function as engines for economic growth and lead to
establishment of such political, social and institutional frameworks that would utilize the
potential in modern sector.

For more details on theories of growth and modernization, See John Martinussen (1997),
Society, State and Market: A guide to competing theories of development, London: Zed
Books Ltd, chapter 5 and Alvin Y. So (1990), Social Change and Development:
Modernization, Dependency and World System Theories, Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Publications.

Paul Baran (1966) used Marxist theory of surplus and sought to focus on internal
conditions of backward economies. Baran identified four classes that had narrow self-interest
10
and had no interest in promoting industrialization. These four classes - the feudal aristocracy,
the moneylenders, the merchants and the foreign capitalists appropriated the surplus.
Therefore, it was necessary to have extensive state intervention to promote nationally-
controlled industrialization (Martinussen 1997: 87). It was Baran’s ideas that influenced later
dependency theorists like A.G. Frank, Samir Amin and Arghiri Emmanuel to provide a third
world perspective.
Andre Gunder Frank (1967) provided the idea of “Development of Underdevelopment”.
According to Frank, the Third World could never follow the path taken by the West because
of the differences in experience (So 1990: 96). The West did not experience colonialism
while most of the Third World countries are former colonies of the West. Thus, Frank
dismissed the ‘internal explanation’ of the modernization school and emphasizes the ‘external
explanation’. In simple words, the backwardness of the Third World was not due to feudalism
or aristocracy but was an outcome of the colonial experience and foreign domination.
A.G. Frank formulated a “metropolis-satellite model” to explain the underdevelopment
of the Third World. Colonialism created a link between the metropole (or the colonisers) and
the satellites (or the colony) in a way that to an unequal relation of trade. All the surplus was
appropriated by the metropole leaving the satellite poor. The local bourgeoise also
contributed to this underdevelopment by draining the surplus outside the satellite, not using it
for investment and development internally and keeping the international inequality in place.
Thus, what occurred was the development of underdevelopment due to the link with world
market. Only way out of this vicious cycle was to delink from the world market (So 1990).
Samir Amin (1976) provided the concept of ‘Centre and Periphery’. Unlike Frank, who
focussed on trade and exchange relations, Amin was more concerned with “conditions and
relations of production” (Martinussen 1997). Amin provided two ideal-type societal models -
the autocentric economy and the peripheral economy. The autocentric economy is self-reliant
but lack self-sufficiency. It relies on extensive international trade. The peripheral economy,
on the other hand, has an “overdeveloped export sector” producing goods for luxury
consumption (Martinussen 1997). One can see capitalism in circulation of capital but modes
of production remain pre-capitalist. The Centre is therefore able to extract resources and
cheap labour from the Periphery earning high profit. This relation of dependency is based on
unequal exchange and this asymmetric relationship leads to the continuation of dependency.
Dos Santos (1971) discussed three historical forms of dependency: (i) colonial
dependence, (ii) financial-industrial dependence, and (iii) technological-industrial
dependence (So 1990: 99). Santos identifies some limitations on the industrial development
of underdeveloped countries. The underdeveloped countries have to rely on foreign capital
leading to political dependence. They are in a monopolized market where raw materials are
cheap and industrial products are high. Therefore, the amount of capital leaving the
dependent country is much more than the amount entering. Also, the monopoly of imperial
centres over the technology makes the relation even more asymmetrical. The context of cheap
labour in combination with the presence of capital-intensive technology leads to differences
11
in the level of domestic wages. Thus, there is a “high rate of exploitation or
‘superexploitation’ of labour power” (So 1990). Thus the monopolistic control over foreign
capital, foreign finance and foreign technology leads to the economic backwardness and
internal social marginalization in the underdeveloped countries.
Other scholars like Arghiri Emmanuel (1972) and Geoffrey Kay (1975) also provided
somewhat similar theoretical understanding by looking at the unequal exchange and
exploitation of the peripheral economies. F.H. Cardoso (1974) posited the idea of
‘development in dependency’ and rejected the tendency of treating the peripheral countries as
single group of dependent economies. He focussed more on the internal conditions and
argued that external factors would have different results based “dissimilar internal
conditions” (Martinussen 1997). Due to such diagnosis, Cardoso was also against
recommending general set of strategies for all peripheral countries.
In general, the Third World perspective attempts at dismantling the Eurocentric bias of
comparative politics. It highlights the limitations of the ‘grand narratives’ and focuses on two
important aspects: the impact of colonialism and the cultural specificity of the non-West. It is
through such challenge that the discipline has been able to move beyond its Eurocentric
bubble.
Conclusion
Comparative politics is a broad sub-discipline that involves various traditions, methods and
approaches. It includes description, analysis, prediction and generalization of political
activity. Comparative politics has been accused of being Eurocentric, parochial, formalistic,
and excessively descriptive. Despite these limitations and problems, scholars have sought to
find solution and enhance the ambit of comparative politics. It is important to break the
ethnocentric nature and situate the political processes in context. In this regards, it is asserted
that one needs to situate analysis in historical, cultural and geographic contexts. It is
important to note that over-generalization is a problematic aspect of any theory. If one seeks
to explain a political activity in complete abstraction, it would be away from reality. If the
study is only looking at specific situations, it loses its relevance for broader context.
Therefore, a shift towards middle-level of grounded theory was advocated by scholars
(Blondel 1981). The narrowing of the scope of comparative political analysis also led to a
focus on case-oriented studies. Against the criticism that comparativists tend to universalize
concepts, there was a renewed focus on development of methods based on few cases.
However, this approach was also considered problematic as the hypothesis is not testable
when there are several factors at play. Despite these problems and narrowing of focus,
comparative political analysis remains a very important sub-discipline of political science. It
provides insight into contemporary national, regional and international politics by providing
descriptive, analytical and methodological frames of reference.

12
References
Black, C.E. (1966), The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History, New
York: Harper and Row.
Blondel, Jean (1981), The Discipline of Politics, Butterworths: London.
Blondel, Jean (1999), “Then and Now: Comparative Politics”, Political Studies, XLVII, pp.
152-160.
Caramani, Daniele (2011), “Introduction to comparative politics”, in Daniele Caramani (ed.)
Comparative Politics, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chandhoke, Neera (1996), “Limits of Comparative Political Analysis”, Economic and
Political Weekly, 31 (4): 2-8.
Dogan, Mattei and Dominique Pelassy (1990) How to Compare Nations: Strategies in
Comparative Politics, 2nd edition, Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
Finn, V.K. (2011), “J.S. Mill’s inductive methods in artificial intelligence systems. Part I”,
Scientific and Technical Information Processing, 38: 385-402.
Hague, Rod, Martin Harrop and John McComrick (2016), Comparative Government and
Politics: An Introduction, 10th edition, London: Palgrave.
Kopstein, J. and M. Lichbach, (eds.) (2005) Comparative Politics: Interests, Identities, and
Institutions in a Changing Global Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.1-5;
16-36; 253-290.
Landman, Todd (2008), Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction, New
York: Routledge.
Lijphart, Arend (1971), “Comparative Politics and Comparative Method”, The American
Political Science Review, 65 (3): 682-693.
Macridis, Roy C. (1955), “Major Characteristics of the Traditional Approach”, in The Study
of Comparative Politics, New York: Random House, pp. 7-14.
Martinussen, John (1997), Society, State and Market: A guide to competing theories of
development, London: Zed Books Ltd.
Mohanty, Manoranjan (1975), “Comparative Political Theory and Third World Sensitivity”,
Teaching Politics, 1&2.
Newton, Kenneth and Jan W. Van Deth (2010), Foundations of Comparative Politics,
Cambridge University Press, 2010.
So, Alvin Y. (1990), Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency and
World System Theories, London: Sage Publications.

13
 Unit-2

(b) Approaches to Studying Comparative Politics

Political Culture Approach
Kamal Kumar

Introduction
The present chapter attempts to analyse the political culture approach in the field of
comparative politics. Approaches and methods are significant, especially in the context of
social sciences including political science, not just in developing an understanding about the
socio-political phenomena, but also in enabling the researchers and political scientists to offer
a solution to certain complex problems in any given time and context. In particular,
approaches hold a very important place in the field of comparative politics as they help us to
systematically explain the different political processes, political events and institutional
activities as well as social behaviours in a comparative manner. At the same time, they
encourage the scholars (of comparative politics) to predict the social and political outcomes.
In the preceding chapters, the analysis on different key traditional and modern approaches has
been offered. This chapter seeks to evaluate one of the significant modern approaches, that is,
political culture to the study of comparative politics. It begins with the discussion on the
meaning of the term ‘political culture’ and overview of key conceptions offered by its
principal proponents, especially the conception of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. It will
be followed by its key limitations and criticisms.
Political Culture Approach
Society is an integral part of a political system including democratic system, and the study of
continuous interactions between the society and political system is the key concern of the
political culture approach. Scholarly interest in this modern approach is associated with the
emergence of behavioural science. As Andrew Bove (2002: 3) noted that “political culture
was brought in as ally of, and soon became a crucial term within, a behaviouralist science
whose basic mode is strict causal explanation, not interpretative description.” Instead of
emphasising upon the study of formal political institutions and processes, the behaviourist
political science—unlike the traditional approaches such as traditional institutional approach,
historical approach and philosophical approach among others—places the study of human
behaviour and interaction with natural world (political institutions and society in the context
of social sciences) at the centre of its analysis. With the increasing popularity of
behaviouralist methods and tools in social sciences, scholars began to attach more
significance to the sociological (cultural) aspects—in comparison to the structural and
historical aspects—in the studies of political science. Furthermore, it is observed that the
“political culture literature helped to provide political science itself with a sense of legitimacy
and authority after World War II” (Formisano, 2001: 397). In that sense, the political culture

14
marked the emergence of a new epoch in political science where sociological and behavioural
aspects gained the significance in the scholarly investigations.
The political culture approach attracted the attention of political scientists and researches
in the mid of twentieth century. Scholars though attribute its genesis to the writings of Johann
G. Herder, Alexis de Tocqueville and Montesquieu among others, but it was Gabriel Almond
whose ground-breaking work, entitled “Comparative Political Systems” (1956) credited to
popularise the concept in the field of political science during the modern times. For Almond,
“every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action”,
and he defined this pattern as “political culture” (cited in Formisano, 2001: 396). In that
sense, the latter concept is imperative to understand the people’s orientations (in terms of the
political actions) in any given political system.
The term political culture, in general, refers to the people’s behaviours, beliefs, attitudes,
opinions, and orientations towards the political system and its varied institutions as well
political processes and activities. In fact, in order to understand the “political tendencies in a
nation, one place to begin is with public attitudes toward politics and the citizen’s role in the
political system—what we call a nation’s political culture” (Powell, et al. 2015: 63). In this
regard, Alan A. Ball argues that the concept of “political culture is composed of the attitudes,
beliefs, emotions and values of society that relates to the political system and to apolitical
issues” (Ball, 1971: 56). In a similar vein, Almond and Verba (1963: 14) state that this term
denotes the “political orientations—attitudes towards the political system and its various
parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system.” Furthermore, Roy C. Macridis
interestingly offers a slightly different understanding of the concept of political culture, he
asserts that it “constitutes commonly shared goals and commonly accepted rules of individual
and groups interaction in terms of which authoritative decision and choice will be made by all
the ‘actors’ within a political system” (cited in Kim, 1964: 331). In other words, the study of
human interaction with the government and its different formal political institutions is the
central objective of the political culture approach.
It is important to note here that the different communities, groups and members of the
society may have their own individual political culture indicating their peculiar political
understanding and orientations. However, it does not refer to the people’s opinions and
viewpoints towards individual political actors like head of the government (president in the
context of US and the Prime Minster of India) and political party leader. While evaluating the
key components of the political culture, Samuel H. Beer argues that “values, beliefs and
emotional attitudes” are the principal components (Kim, 1964: 324). In other words, people’s
values, beliefs and attitudes, for Beer, toward the political system and governance is what that
implies their political culture. Moreover, the nature of political culture varies according to the
degree of civic engagement in the political system. Owing to different socio-political and
economic contexts, citizens in some political system or some part of the country are likely to
be more active in the politics than the other. For an example; the voter turnout in 2019 Kerala
assembly elections (77.68%) is considerably higher than 2020 Delhi assembly elections

15
(62.82%) according to the Election Commission of India. Hence, the political culture of
distinct groups and communities in a society can be varied according to the context and
socio-political milieu.
Almond and Verba’s Conception of Political Culture
Many scholars like Lucian Pye, Edward W. Lehman, Edmund Burke, Samuel H. Beer, Roy
C. Macridis and Ronald Inglehart among others defined the theoretical underpinnings of
political culture from different standpoints. The ground-breaking work on political cultural
that inspired generation of researchers and scholars, has been presented by Gabriel A.
Almond and Sidney Verba in their landmark study entitled, “The Civil Culture: Political
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations” (1963). They comprehensively defined and
explained the key elements of the political culture approach by following the comparative
methods and empirical tools. Almond and Verba’s analysis is based on the cross-national
survey and interviews carried out, during 1959-1960, on a large scale in five democratic
countries such as the United State, Italy, Britain, Mexico and West Germany. The primary
objective of their classic study was to identify the political culture that may help to sustain
and strengthen the liberal democracy. While explaining the rationale of their study in the
introductory chapter, Almond and Verba posed a question that “How can these subtleties and
these humane etiquettes [of liberal democracies] survive even among ourselves in a world
caught in the grip of a science and technology run wild, destructive of tradition and of
community and possibly of life itself?” (Almond and Verba, 1963: 7). In other words, they
had perceived a potential threat to the stability of democratic regimes in the cold war period,
and probably that was why, they were engaged in exploring the ways to consolidate the
institutions of liberal democracy.
While outlining the different types of political culture, Almond and Verba emphasised
upon the three types of political orientations (that primly exists among the individuals and
social groups) such as cognitive orientation, affective orientation and evaluational
orientation. The first orientation denotes the “knowledge of and belief about the political
system, its roles and the incumbents of these roles, its inputs and its outputs” (Almond and
Verba, 1963: 7). The affective orientation explains the “feeling about the political system, its
roles, personnel, and performance” (Ibid.). The third major orientation, evaluational
orientation, refers to the “judgements and opinions about political objects that typically
involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings” (Ibid.).
This three-fold classification of political orientation indicates the relationships between the
members of the society and the political system, and the degree of this relationship defines
the role of the people in politics that in turn, shapes their political culture, as discussed in the
following paras.
Based on their rigorous cross-national field-work and comparative research, Almond and
Verba classified the political cultures into following three main categories:

16
(i) Parochial Political Culture: This political culture refers to such societies where citizens
are neither aware of their political system nor interested in the political activities and
events. People, in parochial political culture, do not possess any expertise in the
political activities and processes that explicitly reflect in their political attitudes and
orientations. At the same time, people’s expectations from the politics are virtually none
and, therefore, they are not active in politics. For instance; the “political cultures of
African tribal societies and autonomous local communities” are perfect example of this
type of political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963: 14). It is also worth noting that
“parochial cultures have been rare in established democracies but elements can be
found in isolated rural communities” where the lives of common people appear
unaffected by the national politics (Rod and Martin, 2004: 89). In other words, citizens’
understanding of the political system, political processes and political leaderships is
very low or probably zero because of their complete ignorance about the political
system and its different affairs. Also, they are not eager to be part of the political
processes in order to influence the political outcomes rather occupied with their routine
lives.
(ii) Subject Political Culture: In this second type of political culture, citizens have a good
sense of the politics and government that governs them. People, however, are not much
interested in participating in the political activities since they consider themselves as the
“subject” of the political system rather than its active participant or agent. In this regard,
Almond and Verba state that the citizens here consider the governmental policies and
law as “something [they] obeys, not something [they] helps” shaping them (Almond
and Verba, 1963: 118). Subject political culture appears in tune with the character of
highly centralised and hierarchical political regimes like authoritarian regimes where
the people do have a good knowledge about the political system and activities, but they
are not often encouraged or legitimately allowed to participate in the politics (Rod and
Martin, 2004: 89). In other words, people unlike parochial political culture, are well
aware of the political system and government’s working as well as their political rights,
but they lack or have minimal opportunities to influence the political outcome and
decision-making process, and probably that is why, they are politically passive.
(iii) Participant Political Culture: The participant culture is one where the members of the
society, like subject culture, are highly informed of their country’s politics and the
political system. But unlike the subject culture, they are active participants of politics as
they as consider themselves as one of its significant stakeholders who cannot just
influence the political outcomes but can also shape the governmental policies and
decisions. In this regard, Almond and Verba (1963: 18) argue that the citizens “tend to
be oriented toward an ‘active’ role of the self in the polity…” Moreover, citizens as the
keen observers of politics have a very strong political opinion and view about the
politics and as a result, they do not hesitate to raise their voice against the government
while find any governmental decision and policy not in tune with the peoples’ demands.

17
 Participant cultures are seemingly most compatible to the democratic regimes because
of its vibrant nature.
While classifying the political cultures in above three categories, Almond and Verba
(1963: 19) state that their classification “does not imply homogeneity or uniformity of
political cultures. Thus political system with predominately participant cultures will, even in
the limiting case, include both subjects and parochials.” In that sense, all three political
cultures can be found coexisting in any given political system including democracy.
Civic Culture
In comparison to parochial and subject cultures, the participant culture undoubtedly appears
as the best suitable political culture for the stable liberal democracy where citizens are
encouraged to play an active and constructive role at the different levels of the government.
However, Almond and Verba rejected any of such propositions because, according to them,
the democracy would “prove most stable in societies blending different cultures in a
particular mix”, and they termed this mixture as the “civic culture” as illustrated in the figure
4.1 (Rod and Martin, 2004, 89). In other words, the mixed culture consisting of the elements
of all three major cultures—parochial, subject and participant cultures—appears ideal for the
stability of a democratic political system.
Figure 4.1 – Almond and Verba’s Analysis of the Civic Culture

In the civil culture, majority of the citizens are informed about the political system and
their political responsibilities, but it is “the passive minority, whether parochials, subjects or
both, [who] provide stability to the system” (Rod and Martin, 2004, 90). Furthermore, the
citizens (the participants) are not engaged in the politics to the extent that they refrain to
follow those governmental decisions and orders with which they do not agree and become the
source of chaos in a society. In other words, citizens in the civil culture are capable of

18
participating in the political activities and influencing political outcomes and decisions (like
they are in the participant political culture), but they often do not do so (like parochial and
subject political cultures). Therefore, the civil culture plays a significant role in maintaining a
balance “between popular control and effective governance” in a democratic system (Ibid). In
other words, the citizens have access to many platforms to influence the government’s
decisions and policy-making process on the one hand, and the political elites have flexibilities
to sometime take tough decisions on sensitive issues against the popular opinions on the other
hand. In their cross-national study of five democratic countries, Almond and Verba
concluded that the political culture in Britain and the United States—unlike of the Mexico,
Italy and West Germany—was in sync with norms of the civil culture, and thus, found best
suitable for stable democracy. Because in the both United States and Britain, the members of
the nation “felt they could influence the government but often chose not to do so, thus giving
the government its required agility” (Ibid).
Other Major Conceptions on Political Culture
Ronald Inglehart is one of principal proponents of the political culture approach. In his
popular work entitled “The Renaissance of Political Culture” (1988), he states that citizens in
different societies “are characterised by durable cultural orientations that have major political
and economic consequences” (Inglehart, 1988: 1203). In that sense, Inglehart—in contrast to
Almond and Verba—links the cultural factors (civic culture) with political stability as well as
economic development. He offers a somewhat fresh and interesting explanation of the term
‘civic culture’ and defines it as “a coherent syndrome of personal life satisfaction, political
satisfaction, interpersonal trust and support for the existing social order” (Ibid). For Inglehart,
the societies with a high degree of this syndrome have more probabilities than those with a
low, to be stable democracies. In other words, his cross-national analysis suggests that there
is a positive co-relation between personal and political satisfaction as well as interpersonal
trust and the stable democracy since these all factors constitute “a syndrome of positive
attitudes toward” the democratic institutions (Ibid., 1215). Hence, societies with a high
degree of such syndrome are to be expected to promote democratic ethos as well as
strengthen democratic institutions than those characterising by a low degree of such attitudes.
By the late 1980s, political culture approach had gained the prominence amongst the
historians. Most notably, two historians such as John L Brooke in his award-winning work
entitled “Society and Political Culture on Worcester County Massachusetts, 1773-1861”
(1989) and Daniel Walker Howe in “The Evangelical Movement and Political Culture in the
North during the Second Party System” (1991) followed this approach in their historical
inquiries. In fact, Howe extended the conceptual arena of political culture by including the
social movements and their struggle for political power. He emphasised that one had “to
define political culture to include all struggles over power, not just those decided by
elections” (Formisano, 2001: 416). For Howe, the people’s campaigns for gender justice,
environmental protection, racial justice and the rights of working class among others were
significant in the US politics, and their appropriate analysis was essential to develop a

19
comprehensive understanding about the locals’ political culture. In his way, Howe credited to
broaden the definition of ‘political culture’ as well as ‘politics’ by bringing the social
movements under its theoretical ambit.
Social Capital and Political Culture
In the latter decade of twentieth century, the political culture approach attracted more
popularity with the works of scholars like Robert Putnam. In his most prominent work
entitled “Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy” (1993), Putnam
studied the working of Italian regional governments by employing varied approaches and
empirical tools. David D. Laitin (1995) credited the latter work to mark a “stunning new
beginning for political culture research” (Formisano, 2001: 406). However, Putnam
employed the term ‘social capital’ to analyse the roots of people’s engagement in politics.
The term refers to “networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that
facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (Keeley, 2007: 103). According to Putnam,
social capital “may possibly be more important than physical or human capital” for stable
democracies and administrative efficiencies (Rotberg, 1999: 339). Since he hypothesised that
societies with a high degree of social capital encouraged people to participate in political
activities and processes that was considered significant for political stability and effective
governance. While analysing the interrelation between civic culture (Almond and Verba) and
social capital (Putnam), Robert I. Rotberg (1999: 341) argues that a “civic culture exists
because citizens have accumulated large amount of social capital… [In other words, the] high
levels of social capital contribute to the creation of political culture that is open, pluralistic,
deliberative, tolerant and democratic.” In this way, Putnam’s classic work encouraged the
researchers to further develop the concept of political culture approach. The positive co-
relation between the social capital and political culture is observed as the high degree of the
former is linked with the latter’s development. The next section sheds light on the major
criticisms and deficiencies of the political culture approach.
Political Culture and Ideology
During the 1960s and 1970s, scholarly work on political culture was primarily confined to the
behavioural aspects. However, neo-Marxist scholars like Louis Althusser offered an
alternative perspective (with emphasise on the concept of ‘ideology’) to analyse the role of
culture in politics. According to Althusser, the “state has two key components: repressive and
ideological state apparatuses” (Rosamond, 1997: 66). The repressive apparatuses include the
armed and law enforcement agencies like police and paramilitary forces (function via
coercion) while the latter include the family, educational institutions, religion, and culture
among others (operates ideologically). Interestingly, ideological apparatus becomes
significant to rule at times when the coercive ones could not function. From this standpoint,
“political culture becomes the prevailing value system and knowledge structure which is
dispersed throughout society by the dominant classes at any given time” (Ibid., 65). In other
words, political culture is not linked with the political attitude and orientation of the members

20
of the society, but it is a value system of dominant classes that favours the governing class to
maintain their political dominance (hegemony), thus stabilizing the political order.
Subcultures
Some of the scholarly writings on political culture highlighted the fact that the existence of
one political culture across the nation was nothing more than an idealistic assumption. It is
very likely that many “political cultures may co-exist within any given political system”
rather than a single national political culture (Rosamond, 1997: 67). To develop a
comprehensive understanding about the interconnection between the culture and political
system, it is important to investigate “the interaction of different subcultures and the impact
of that interaction upon the political system as a whole” (Ibid). The term ‘subculture’ refers to
distinctive identity of diverse social groups and communities in any given society. In the
context of political culture, it refers to the existence of different range of behaviours,
opinions, orientations and attitudes possess by the different communities and social groups
toward the political system. Dennis Kavanagh in his work entitled “Political Culture” (1972),
identifies “four distinct bases on which subcultures develop: elite versus mass culture,
cultural divisions within elites, generational subcultures and social structure” (Ibid). In this
way, these four bases produce different sets of sub-culture in a society that have different
social and political implications.
Limitation of Political Culture Approach
The political culture approach like any other approach of comparative politics has attracted a
stark criticism from the different political scientists. First and foremost, critics argue that the
proponents of this approach tend to depict a national political culture of a communities and
social groups in a given society. Rather, the scholars “should have focused more on
subcultures of race and class within the societies examined” (Rod and Martin, 2004: 90). For
an example, it may be possible that peoples within a community (based on race, class, caste,
religion and so on) may portray different political culture owing to their personal satisfactions
and way of lives. Furthermore, scholarly works on the political culture approach did not offer
a comprehensive account of its origin and evolution in social science, which in turn created
obstacles in a way of developing a historical understanding of the concept (Ibid). On the other
side, political culture as an analytical method and tool employed principally in the western
democracies, for many years, to study the individuals’ political beliefs and orientations
towards politics (Bove, 2002: 1). It did not only limit the scope of the political culture
studies, but also made its analysis western dominated.
Edward W. Lehman alleges that the political culture approach has a “tendency to
‘reduce’ cultural factors either to social system characteristics (especially to structure) or to
treat them as merely the statistical aggregation of the intrapsychic orientations of the
individual members of society” (Lehman, 1972: 362). This reductionist approach offers a
very narrow understanding of the cultural factors that shapes the national and local politics.
Furthermore, Lehman states that the cross-national survey method—employed by Almond

21
and Verba in their study of political culture in the five major liberal democracies as discussed
above—has inaccurately led us believe that “all the members of society have equal ‘leverage’
in determining the dominant cultural patterns or that all groups equally subscribe to them”
(Ibid). Studies like M. Mann (1970) have proven that people in a society act differently in a
political domain and at the same time, their individual capability to access the politics and its
different institutions varies.
On the other side, critics claim that political culture approach intended to maintain the
status-quo and thus favouring the interests of the ruling elites. Lowell Dittmer noted that “the
concept of political culture was too fixated on systemic stability, as if the absence of change
required explanation” (Dittmer, 1974: 577). In other words, critics found the approach
conservative in term of its political consequences and thus, rejecting the possibilities to bring
change in a society. At times, the change in social as well as political order is imperative to
promote democracy and its basic values like justice, fairness and equality etc. Nonetheless,
these critics do not undermine the significance of political culture approach in the study of
comparative politics. In recent years, scholars like Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel
(2003) have attempted to address these deficiencies and called for retaining this approach as a
significant comparative analytical tool in political science.
Concluding Observations
Political culture is one of the key modern approaches in field of comparative politics. It has
enabled the political scientists and researchers to empirically analyse the interactions between
the individual behaviours and political system on the one hand, and facilitated them in
exploring the significance of civic engagement in political stability and governmental
effectiveness on the other. It is also observed that the emergence of political culture approach
in modern comparative politics has supplemented the “behaviouralist analysis of individual
political decisions,” and thus offering realistic explanations about the political phenomenon
(Bove, 2002: 3). However, scholarly efforts are required to revise the components and scope
of political culture approach so that it stays relevant with time.
References
 Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sydney. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and
Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
 Ball, Alan R. 1971. Modern Politics and Government. London: Macmillan.
 Bove, Andrew. 2002. The Limits of Political Cultures: An Introduction to G.W.F. Hegel’s
Notion of Bildung. In: A Bove. eds. Questionable Returns. Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting
Fellows Conference, Vol. 12.
 Dittmer, Lowell. 1974. Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Toward a Theoretical
Synthesis. World Politics, XXIX, accessed on 21 November 2020, online available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2577258

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 Formisano, Ronald P. 2001. The Concept of Political Culture. The Journal of
Interdisciplinary History, 31 (3), accessed on 04 November 2020, online available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/207089
 Hague, Rod and Harrop, Martin. 2004. Comparative Government and Politics: An
Introduction. 6th Ed. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
 Inglehart, Ronald. 1988. The Renaissance of Political Culture. The American Political
Science Review, 82 (4), accessed on 18 November 2020, online available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1961756
 Inglehart, Ronald and Welzel, Christian. eds. 2003. Political Culture and Democracy:
Analysing Cross-Level Linkage. Comparative Politics. 63 (1), accessed on 21 November
2020, online available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4150160
 Keeley, Brian. 2007. Human Capital: How What You Know Shapes Your Life. 1st Ed.,
OECD: Paris.
 Kim, Young C. 1964. The Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics. The
Journal of Politics, 26 (2), accessed on 04 November 2020, online available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2127599
 Lehman, Edward W. 1972. On the Concept of Political Culture: A Theoretical
Reassessment. Social Forces, 50 (3), accessed on 21 November 2020, online available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2577040
 Powell, G. Bingham, Dalton, Russell J. and Strøm, Kaare W. 2015. Comparative Politics
Today: A World View. 11 Ed. Harlow: Pearson.
 Pye, Lucien W. and Sydney, Verba. eds. 1965. Political Culture and Political
Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
 Rosamond, Ben. 1997. Political Culture. In: Barrie Axford. et al. Politics: An
Introduction, London: Routledge, pp. 57-81.
 Rotberg, Robert I. 1999. Social Capital and Political Culture in Africa, America,
Australasia and Europe. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 29 (3), accessed on 18
November 2020, online available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/207132

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 Unit-3 : Historical Context of Modern Government

(a) Capitalism: Meaning and Development: Globalization

Dr. Robert Mizo

Introduction
Capitalism is the key ordering institution of the economic and social life today. It has come to
encompass almost all countries, big or small, and societies. Capitalism is generally
understood as an economic system wherein the means of production are privately owned and
production is geared towards profit. However, it is much more than just an economic system.
It produces a social order of its own in which people are segregated into classes on the basis
of their relations to the forces of production. Therefore, the concept and practice of capitalism
needs an in-depth study in order to gain an understanding of its essence, origin and
expansion. That is what this chapter attempts to achieve. It opens by studying the varying
meanings of capitalism before moving on to an analysis of its origin and development. The
chapter then discusses the expansion of capitalism through various historical time frames.
The lesson delves into the relationship between capitalism and globalisation after discussing
the meaning and nature of globalisation. It finally engages with the various types of
capitalism and the challenges that lie on its path.
Definitions and Meanings
Capitalism is seen as an ideology and as an economic system depending on its usage. As an
ideology, capitalism encompasses principles of private property, self-interest and
meritocracy. It overlaps substantially with the ethos of classical liberalism (Heywood, 2013).
As an economic system, capitalism is a system of generalized commodity production solely
directed towards profit making. Sociologists see capitalism as a social system where social
structures, institutions and relations are woven around market. Just as capitalism means
different things to different people, the nature of capitalism in practice also differs. However,
it is possible to discern a few of its common intrinsic characteristics listed as follows.
- Private ownership of productive wealth.
- Economic life is organised through market principles such as the price mechanism,
demand and supply.
- Wage labour in place of bonded labour.
- Material self-interest and profit maximization provide the motivation for enterprise and
hard work.
- Freedom of enterprise as an inalienable right of all.
- Limited control or intervention of the government in the economic activities.
Various thinkers have offered different meanings of capitalism, each having their own
interpretation of its origin and nature. Maurice Dobb (1950) underlines three major
understandings of the meaning of capitalism. First, thinkers such as Warner Sombart and

24
Max Weber have found the essence of capitalism in its geist or spirit defined by calculation
and rationality coupled with the bourgeoise spirit of enterprise or adventure. Weber defines
the spirit of capitalism as the attitude which seeks profit rationally and systematically (Dobb
1950, p. 5). This spirit has inspired the whole epoch of capitalism just as different economic
attitudes reigned at different times.
The second understanding of capitalism refers to the practice of production for a distant
market. This idea was developed by the scholars of the German Historical School who argue
that capitalism embodies the distinction between the “natural economy” of the medieval
period and the “money economy” that succeeded it. Capitalism is contained in the process
where production and retail are separated in space and time by the intervention of a wholesale
merchant whose sole aim is the invest in purchase of the goods for resale at a profit. Bucher
sees the essential criterion of capitalism in the distance the goods travel in passing from
producer to consumer (Dobb, 1950). Nussbaum defines capitalism as a system of exchange
economy where people are differentiated into owners and property-less workers.
Thirdly, Marx sees capitalism as a “mode of production” – referring to the way in which
the means of production are owned in a society. It is an epoch or a historical phase wherein
human relations are determined by where they stand in relation to process of production. The
capitalist society is inevitably divided into two groups – the bourgeoise (owners of the means
of production) and the proletariat (property-less labour class). Capitalism is a system of
production where labour-power itself becomes a commodity, sold and bought on the market
while the sum total of productive forces and capital lies in the hands of the bourgeoise. While
liberals saw capitalism as the most efficient way of organising an economy and creating
wealth and prosperity, Marx and his philosophical followers saw it as inherently exploitative
and divisive. The economic system feeds on the exploitation of surplus value produced by the
labour class which becomes profit for the capitalist class. In fact, Marx argues that the value
of commodities is determined by the number of labour hours taken to produce them, or more
specifically, the number of labour hours deemed to be ‘socially necessary’ for their
production. Following his theory of class struggle, Marx argues that Capitalism contains the
seeds of its own destruction and would inevitably lead to a proletarian revolution which
would herald the onset of a socialist mode of production and ultimately leading to a classless
and stateless society – full communism.
Liberal Conception of Capitalism
Capitalism is rooted in the classical liberal ethos of individualism, enterprise and freedom. It
is an economic system that privileges private property, personal self-interest and meritocracy.
The liberal understanding of capitalism is most clearly elucidated in the works of Economist
Adam Smith who is widely known as the father of Economics. In his work An Inquiry into
the Nature and Causes of Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith explained how the free market
system, or the Laissez-Faire was the reason why some nations are wealthier than others. This
is a system founded on the principle on non-intervention of government in economic affairs.
The doctrine believes that the economy works most efficiently when left alone by
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government. It assumes that an unregulated market economy tends naturally towards
equilibrium through ‘perfect competition’ among free economic actors. 1 Adam Smith
believed that the invisible hand of the market tended towards the prosperity of the whole. The
Laissez-Faire system is opposed to any form of governmental intervention unless it is
restricted to actions that promote market competition such as checks on monopolies and the
maintenance of stable prices. In effect, the state is expected to play no bigger role in the
economy than that of a night-watchman, whose primary responsibility is to maintain law and
order, protect private property and ensure the smooth functioning of the market. David
Ricardo furthered Smith’s conception of free market internationally in his work On the
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. He argued that countries should seek
comparative advantage by focusing on trading goods they are most efficient at producing.
This will lead to mutual benefits for all trading partners.
Origin and Development Capitalism
Theorising the origin of capitalism depends on the different meanings ascribed to it. Thinkers
who attach capitalism to the acquisitive investment of money or the spirit of enterprise would
infer that some form of capitalism has been in existence nearly throughout all periods of
history. For instance, the use of money for exchange and the distinctive capitalist spirit of
entrepreneurship were recorded in classical Greece and Rome. However, understanding
capitalism as a historiography having a unique class system and socio-economic features is a
fairly modern conception. Of course, there are several stages of the development of
capitalism. We will study them briefly in the following passages.
Capitalism – A product of Modernity
Capitalism is an outcome of the period of Modernity that began in Europe after the medieval
ages. The period provided the philosophical and political background upon which capitalism
originated and developed. Some of these were seen in movements such as Renaissance or
Enlightenment, Reformation and the subsequent Industrial Revolution. Renaissance (which
means rebirth) spanning from 14th century to 17th century marked the beginning of the
modern period. This intellectual revolution was characterised by the emphasis on scientific
temperament and rationality, and the abhorrence towards religion, traditionality and
conformism. The enlightenment philosophy privileged empirical knowledge, the universality
of science and reason, individualism, secularism, equality of human beings, and opposition to
feudal and traditional constraints to individual freedoms. Enlightenment in essence presented
the unified change in the worldviews of Europeans towards God, the natural world and
human beings. The movement marked the mastery and control of humans over nature.
Similarly, the Reformation of Christianity which was a religious revolution in the 16 th
century Europe had wide ranging social, political and economic effects on the society. Led by
remarkable leaders such as Martin Luther and John Calvin, the movement gave rise to the

1
Perfect competition refers to a market system which is free and open, consumers have perfect knowledge and
no producer is large enough to affect the price of goods.
26
formation of Protestantism which challenged the traditional authority of the Church and the
Papacy and proclaimed that the only source of authority was the scriptures. Anyone can
achieve salvation by reading the Holy Bible on their own. The reformation movement made
individualism more prominent in the western European world. It further gave rise to the idea
of sovereignty of the individual upon which were placed various other values of capitalism
such as self-interest, egoism, and freedom. Weber explains the beginnings of capitalism in the
context of modernity and reformation in his seminal work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism. According to him, the Protestant ethic refers to the values of hard work, thrift,
and efficiency in one’s worldly calling which were deemed signs of god’s blessings or eternal
salvation. Being hardworking, thrifty and enterprising would lead to prosperity which was
considered to be a sign of heavenly affection. This ethic of Protestantism laid the foundation
for capitalism to develop and grow.
Further, the Scientific Revolution (1500-1700 centuries) was instrumental in the
emergence of modern science and technological advancement which helped capitalism grow
and expand. The seminal discoveries and advancements in sciences, technology and medicine
transformed the way knowledge was gained and applied. The period heralded a phenomenal
advancement in the way in which commodities were produced and transported – furthering
the reach of the budding capitalist economic system. The Industrial revolution which
followed in the late 18th and early 19th century had critical economic and policy implications
towards the development of capitalism. The radical transformation it brought about in the
structure and organisation of industry caused the industrial revolution to be regarded to be the
birth pangs of modern Capitalism (Dobb, 1950).
From Feudalism to Capitalism: Decline and Transition
Capitalism can be said to have emerged from the dismantled structures of feudalism.
Feudalism which is commonly understood as serfdom was an economic system characterised
by the division of the society into two major classes – the feudal lords and serfs, with the
latter bound by the obligation to produce for the fulfilment of the economic demands of the
former. Spanning over the 9th and the 15th centuries according to most historians, the feudal
society was an agrarian based system in which economic and political power were
manipulated by the landowning class. Feudalism declined for various reasons beginning in
England and giving way for the capitalist system of economic organisation to take root.
First, 11th century England witnessed an important change in the agricultural system
through the advancement from the two-field system of crop rotations to the three-field
system. This led to increased productivity and other socio-economic effects such as the
introduction of the enclosure system, growth of urban populations and towns consequently
leading to the rise of cities and urban centres. These metropolises became sites for markets
and trading centres. By the 13th century, England began witnessing the emergence of
capitalist economic organisation through the growth of the Kulak class – the class of
capitalist farmers who rented out their lands to landless peasants -, and the substitution of
labour renting by money renting. These developments brought about changes in the way
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agriculture was traditionally organised and, in its place, there emerged a ‘market feudalism’
(Suresh, 2010). The search for market and profit had become the guiding motive for
production. The newly emerging form of economic organisation let to rapid urbanisation as
swathes of landless labourers migrated from rural habitats for better livelihood opportunities.
These migrations were fuelled by the lack of accessibility to land due to new developments in
agrarian systems such as the ‘enclosure programme’. This legal process of enclosure of land
converted erstwhile common land into consolidated larger farms, the use of which became
restricted and available only to the owner. This caused a sudden increase in rural
unemployment and landless labourers who became attracted to move to urban centres where
manufacturing units in textile and minerals were developing. Further, as techniques in
agriculture advanced, leading to increased productivity per land unit, the value of land
decreased. On the other hand, the value of capital (other than land) increased as the nascent
industrial firms needed capital investment, thus making the capital owning class the most
powerful section of the population. Karl Marx saw in the emergence of cities the transition
from feudalism to capitalism; it signified the territorial shift in the concentration of capital
and means of production from rural to urban areas.
Secondly, the Black Death of 1348-1350 during which more than 100 million people
died in Europe due to varied plagues had also contributed to the decline of feudalism. The
Black Death resulted in a massive decline in the labour force in England which caused labour
to become a valuable commodity of production. This shortage of labour caused immense
exploitation of peasants which resulted in myriad peasant uprisings against feudal lords
across Europe from the late 14th to 16th centuries. Thirdly, the Hundred Year’s war between
France and England in 14th and 15th centuries inevitably strengthened the powers of the
monarchs and subsequently weakened the feudal lords. This centralisation of the King’s
powers, complete with his own standing army and robust economy, set the stage for the
development of a strong capitalistic state while enfeebling the feudal machinery. Thus, the
events leading to the decline of feudalism coincided with the rise of capitalism in England in
particular and Europe in general.
Expansion of Capitalism
The development of capitalism over the various stages of the modern period and through the
decline of feudalism reached its culmination in its establishment as a single capitalist world
order by the 19th century. The question as to how capitalism expanded and grew is of many
contending views. However, there are some most commonly accepted stages of capitalist
expansion which are discussed below.
Pre-competitive or Mercantile Phase of Expansion (1500-1800):
This phase of capitalist expansion is characterised by the scouring of Asia, Africa and South
America by European merchants for gold, spices, slaves and monopoly of existing trade
routes. Calling the practice nothing less than disguised looting and plundering, Paul Baran
argued that Europeans transferred the economic surplus of these regions to Europe to help

28
fund the industrial revolution (Hoogvelt, 2001). This drain of resources caused the overseas
economies to suffer arrested development and, in Walter Rodney’s words, a regressive
societal evolution.
Colonial Expansion (1800-1950):
Colonialism defined as the direct political control and administration of foreign territories by
another had led to the expansion of capitalism to regions outside Europe. The period saw the
spread of European rule to 85 per cent of the Earth’s surface area, primarily in Asia, Africa
and the Americas. This phase was marked by the internationalization of capital through
which billions of dollars were pumped into the colonial continents for building of railways,
ports, mines and factories (Hoogvelt, 2001). While these investments where justified under
the guise of development of the colonies, it was profit and the monopoly of capital which
were the actual imperial motives. Marxist thinker V.I. Lenin saw imperialism as the highest
stage of capitalism. Later Marxist scholars Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre Gunder Frank
point to imperial capitalist system for the underdevelopment of the colonial countries
(periphery and semi-periphery) because imperial powers (core) have exploited the wealth of
these countries for centuries and caused their impoverishment. This was achieved through the
imposition of unequal terms of trade, monopoly of overseas markets and transferring
economic resources. Thus, no matter how unfair the trade relations, colonialism was
instrumental in establishing the capitalist economic order in major parts of the world.
Neo-colonization or Late Monopoly Capitalism (1950-1970):
The decades after the Second World War was characterised by a wave of decolonisation
through which numerous European colonies in Asia and Africa gained independence. While
it marked the end of formal occupation and administration of colonies, this period heralded a
new phase of capitalist expansion known as neo-colonialism. It is the practice of exerting
indirect influence by the erstwhile colonial powers over the newly independent countries
through economic and cultural means. Neo-colonialism manifested in the continued
exploitation of developing countries through the combined efforts of the first world via
transnational corporations and global and multilateral institutions. Despite being independent
countries, the Third World remained dependent on their erstwhile colonial masters and
adopted the western conceptions of development and modernisation in their desire to catch up
with them. Neo-colonialism created a new form of extraction of surplus from the third world
known as technological rent. These are the lucrative profits western capitalists earn through
the sale of machines, equipment, and other patented knowledge to the technologically
backward third world markets (Hoogvelt, 2001).
Globalisation and Neo-Imperialism (1970 onwards):
The period from 1970 and beyond is characterised by the spread of this multi-dimensional
phenomenon known as globalisation. The period saw capitalism receive a new fillip to
become what James Fulcher called ‘remarketised capitalism’. Aside from the unparalleled
growth of market relations and multi-layered interconnections, the era of globalisation saw

29
the reinvigoration of the monetary capitalism especially in the US and the UK under the
respective leadership of Reagan and Thatcher. There was a definite rolling back of the state
as evident in the reduction of welfare activities and taxation. Neoliberal beliefs of free
market, competition and productivity came to be hailed again as the panacea against sluggish
economic performance of the past (Keynesianism). The state was under intense pressure to
facilitate the free market and be competitive by accelerating foreign investment, privatisation,
liberalisation and deregulation of their economies. They had to weaken labour and
environmental legislations and unions, and welfare policies in order to attract transnational
capital. This period also created a new system of transfer of economic surplus occurs through
debt patronage which was an undefined pledge to do service in repayment of the debt. It is
safe to say that the era of globalisation heralded a definitive phase in the development of
capitalism. We will discuss the relationship between capitalism and globalisation in detail in
the following sections.
Globalisation
Globalisation is the complex web of multi-dimensional interconnectedness that has come to
envelop the world especially in the post 1970s. It pertains to almost every sphere of human
experience such as the social, cultural, political, spiritual, technological, etc. Human
interconnection of the international kinds existed in centuries past, too, as evident in recorded
history, however, the extent, depth and complexity of the present-day globalisation is
unprecedented. Globalisation has been defined in different ways by many scholars. Anthony
Giddens defines globalization as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link
distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many
miles away and vice versa”. He speaks of it in terms of “time-space compression”. David
Held thinks of globalization as “a process (or a set of processes) which embodies a
transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transformations assessed in
terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental and
interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power”. These
complex processes are sometimes overlapping and interlocking, but also, at times,
contradictory and oppositional. Kenichi Ohmae (1989) sought to capture the essence of
globalisation in his idea of a ‘borderless world’ where in national borders have become
increasingly permeable, and divisions between people previously separated by time and
space, less significant and often entirely irrelevant.
Globalisation is multidimensional. The most significant ones are economic globalization,
cultural globalization, and political globalization. Economic globalisation is representative of
the capitalist global order where in no economy is an island but have been absorbed in an
interlocked global economy. It refers to the global economic system where production is
internationalised and there is a free flow of capital, finance, goods and services among
national economies. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc catalysed the
spread of economic globalisation in that many former communist states were absorbed into
the global capitalist system. Economic globalisation has resulted in the reduced capacity of

30
national governments to manage their economies and resist transnational forces attempting to
restructure them along free-market principles (Heywood, 2013).
Political globalisation implies the growing pre-eminence of multilateral institutions and
organisations. Such organisations emerged in the post 1945 era in the form of the United
Nations and its ancillary organs like the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade
Organisation, etc., the NATO, The European Union, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and many others. International organisations are
instituted to foster cooperation and concerted action among states without compromising
their sovereignty. However, such supranational bodies have the capability to impose their will
upon the nation-states (Heywood, 2013). Political globalisation has broken the exclusive link
between territory and political power. The international and transnational institutions
mentioned above have both linked sovereign states together and transformed sovereignty into
the shared exercise of power (Held and McGrew, 2002).
Cultural globalisation is perhaps the most visible aspect of globalisation. It is related to what
many have called ‘westernisation’ or ‘Americanisation’ of indigenous cultures. It is the
phenomenon whereby information, commodities and images produced in one part of the
world enter into a global flow that tends to homogenise cultural differences between nations,
regions and individuals. The scale, intensity, speed and volume of global cultural
communications today is unmatched, especially with the rise in the usage of social media.
Cultural globalization is fuelled by the ‘information revolution’, the spread of satellite
communication, telecommunications networks, information technology and the internet, and
global media corporations (Heywood, 2013). It is strengthened by the emergence of global
commodities of transnational companies. The English language which has become so
dominant, provides a linguistic infrastructure as powerful as any technological system for
transmitting ideas and cultures (Held and McGrew, 2002). It must however be noted that this
cultural globalisation is sometimes met with resistance in many parts of the globe by groups
keen to preserve and protect traditional ways of life.
Globalisation and the State
There is a general concern about the sovereignty of the state in the era of globalisation.
Globalists who support and believe in the idea of globalisation have argued that the state’s
power has seen a general decline due to globalisation while the sceptics of globalisation who
question and challenge globalisation argue that the state has managed to keep its power
intact. There are three discernible views on the issue of the state’s power in the era of
globalisation according to George Sorenson (2011).
First, the Retreat Scholars, who are essentially are globalists, believe that globalisation
has led to the erosion of state’s power in various ways. They argue that the growth of
international and transnational organizations such as the UN and its specialized agencies, and
international pressure groups and social movements have altered characters of both state and
civil society. The state has become a fragmented policy-making arena, permeated by

31
transnational networks and influence. Globalisation has broken the exclusive link between
territory and political power, resulting in what is known as the deterritorialization of power.
Kenichi Ohmae in his work the Borderless World argues that the nation state has become an
unnatural, even dysfunctional unit for organizing human activity and managing economic
endeavours. It represents no genuine shared community of economic interest; it defines no
meaningful flows of economic activity. Susan Strange in her work the Declining Authority of
the State points to the weakening authority of the state not only in the economic sphere but in
other spheres too. She writes, “the declining authority of states is reflected in a growing
diffusion of authority to other institutions and associations, and to local and regional bodies,
and in a growing asymmetry between the larger states with structural power and weaker ones
without it” (Strange, 2002). Further, scholars like John Naisbitt, go to the extent to argue that
modern states will break up into many tiny units as a consequence of new tribalism. All these
thinkers point to the retreat of the state in the era of globalisation.
Contradicting the claims of the globalists above, the State-Centric Scholars who are
sceptics of globalisation believe in the continued centrality and salience of the state’s power
and sovereignty even in this so-called globalisation era. These scholars are critical of the
hype that has been created around globalisation as they believe that there is hardly anything
unprecedented in economic integration and global trade. While these scholars agree that
states are to a certain extent influenced by international organisations and multilateral
processes, they still operate within the nation-states system. In this age of the nation-state, the
independence bestowed by sovereignty are still important to all states. Modern nation-states
are political communities which create the conditions for establishing national communities
and states are yet to be willing to give this up. The national political processes are still
actively practiced, political bargains can still be struck between governments and electorates,
and states continue to rule (Held and McGrew, 2002). Similarly, Robert Gilpin argues that
the nation- state remains the prominent actor in both domestic and international affairs, and
that the impacts of globalization are nothing more rather than consequences of technological
development.
David Held and Anthony McGrew represent the Transformationalist View of
globalisation. They tread the middle path in saying say that both the state centric and retreat
scholars are partly right in their own ways. They see globalization as a multi-causal
phenomenon which cannot be understood completely using only the economic logic. They
focus on the transformative character of globalisation as they believe that it transforms the
organization, distribution and exercise of power. Different epochs of globalisation have
transformed the exercise of power through specific patterns of global stratification.
Stratification, according to them has both a social (hierarchy) and a spatial (unevenness)
dimension. Social stratification of global units is hierarchical in nature whereas there is
unevenness in the spatial spread of globalisation. This is to say that there are asymmetries (or
inequalities) in the control of, access to and enmeshment in global networks and
infrastructures, while unevenness denotes the differential effects of globalization on the life
chances and well-being of peoples, classes, ethnic groupings and the sexes (Held and
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McGrew, 2002). Through its transformative process, globalisation may cause the states to
become powerful in some domains and lose authority in others.
Globalisation and Capitalism
Globalisation, its economic aspect in particular, is seen as the spread of neoliberalism which
in turn contains the crux of the capitalist order. Globalisation, thus, is essentially the process
of expansion and entrenchment of capitalism in the 20th century. The linkage between
economic globalisation and neoliberalism has several reasons according to Andrew Heywood
(2013). First, globalisation induced intense international competition for capital and markets
forcing countries to deregulate their economies and reduce tax levels to attract transnational
investment. Countries were further forced to adopt neoliberal policies of reducing public
spending on welfare programmes or maintenance of full employment while prioritising the
control of inflation. Such Neoliberal policies were adopted in most countries worldwide by
the 1990s that it appeared to be the dominant ideology of the ‘new’ world economy.
Secondly, the transformation of the global economic institutions such as the World Bank and
the IMF in the 1990s along the principles of the ‘Washington Consensus’ (namely, ‘stabilise,
privatise and liberalise’) further expanded the reach of neoliberal capitalism to countries
which were yet to be incorporated. This forced developing and ‘transition’ economies
(constituents of erstwhile USSR) to pursue neoliberal policies such as free trade,
liberalization of capital markets, flexible exchange rates, balanced budgets and so on.
Third, this neoliberal growth model has at its core the financial markets and the process
of ‘financialization’ made possible by the unparalleled expansion of the financial sector of
the economy. This process of economic globalisation transformed capitalism into what came
to be known as ‘turbo-capitalism’ fed by expanded monetary flows, increased investment and
higher consumption worldwide. Another key character in understanding the link between
capitalism and globalism is the strong faith in open markets and trade liberalisation
encouraged by the creation of the World Trade Organisation in 1995 and a shift in global
division of labour. Developed countries who monopolised manufacturing shifted to services,
exporting manufacturing processes to developing economies. These developments in
international trade relations in the post 1970 period explain how capitalism was fed,
strengthened and expanded by the process of globalisation.
Types of Capitalism
Capitalism is a complex economic system with variations not only in conception but also in
practice. Andrew Heywood pointed out that despite having several common characteristics,
different societies construct their own models of capitalism depending on their particular
economic and political circumstances, and their cultural and historical inheritance. The notion
of a ‘pure’ capitalist system was always an illusion (Heywood, 2013). Capitalism must be
seen not to constitute a single economic form but, rather, a variety of economic forms. He
identifies three types of capitalist systems in the modern world namely enterprise capitalism,
social capitalism, state capitalism.

33
Enterprise capitalism also known as the ‘American business model’ is widely seen as ‘pure’
capitalism. This strand of capitalism is based on the ideas of classical economists such as
Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and modern theorists such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich
von Hayek. At its core lies unflinching faith in free market competition based on the belief
that the market is a self-regulating mechanism in line with the principle of laissez-faire.
Enterprise capitalism keeps public ownership to a minimum and ensure that welfare provision
operates as a mere safety net. Businesses are essentially driven by the profit motive with
emphasis on high productivity and labour flexibility while trade unions are usually weak
(Heywood, 2013). The spread of economic globalisation since the 1980s has resulted in the
expansion of enterprise capitalism to other parts of the world.
Social Capitalism has drawn from economists like Friedrich List who, despite being a liberal,
believed in state intervention to protect small industries from the difficulties of foreign
competition. Central to this model is an attempt to marry the disciplines of market
competition with the need for social cohesion and solidarity. This idea gives rise to the
concept of the social market as opposed to the free market. A social market is one that is
driven by market principles and is largely free from government interference, operating
alongside a comprehensive welfare system and effective public services geared towards
social cohesion. The market is not an end in itself so much as a means of generating wealth in
order to achieve broader social ends (Heywood, 2013). This model of capitalism originated in
Germany and is evident in many central and western parts of Europe.
State Capitalism refers to capitalist economies in which the state plays a crucial directive
role. It first emerged in Japan after 1945 and was adopted by the East Asian tigers and China.
Also called collective capitalism, this model emphasises on cooperative, long-term
relationships among market players. Here, the economy to be directed not by an impersonal
price mechanism, but through what have been called ‘relational markets’ – a complex web of
close relationships between economic sectors such as finance and industry. Workers in
collective capitalism commit their loyalty and hard work to their employers and are in turn
rewarded with lifetime employment, pension and social protection. Teamwork and collective
identity building are emphasised and fostered through relatively narrow income disparities
between managers and workers. The state plays an important role in directing investment,
research and trading decisions (Heywood, 2013).
Capitalism has been classified differently by other thinkers, but they mostly correspond to the
above types. In their work, ‘Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism’, Baumol, Litan, and Schramm
identify four varieties of capitalism namely entrepreneurial Capitalism (USA), big-firm
capitalism (Europe and Japan), state-directed capitalism (China), and oligarchic capitalism
(Russia). Similarly, political economists Hall and Soskice (2001) in their book Varieties of
Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage identify two major
types of capitalist economies, the liberal market economies (LME) and the coordinated
market economies (CME). Examples of LMEs include US, UK, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, Ireland while CMEs are seen primarily in Northern European countries such as

34
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland.
They position these two models at the poles of a spectrum, along which many nations can be
placed and warn that there exist significant variations even within these two types.
Challenges and Criticisms of Capitalism
Even as capitalism has emerged as the dominant economic system in the 20th century, there
are many inherent shortcomings which have invited scathing criticisms from thinkers of
various persuasions. Many have challenged its so-called triumph over rival modes of
production (socialism in particular) as was popularly proclaimed in the End of History thesis
propounded by Francis Fukuyama. One of the most prominent and original challenge to
capitalism was offered by Marx and the subsequent Marxist thinkers who see the system as
predominantly based on the exploitation of labour and appropriation of surplus value by the
capitalist class. Capitalism entails the commodification of labour which is bought and sold in
the market. Marx opines that the true value of commodities is determined by the number of
labour house required and taken to produce them. Labour is living capital and is the true
source of surplus value which the capitalists accrue as ‘profit’. This is nothing but systemic
exploitation, forming the basis of capitalism itself. In Marx’s words, “Capital is dead labour,
which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour
it sucks”. Marx argues that capitalism leads to alienation of the worker from the production
process in four ways – alienation from their product, from the act of production, from their
fellow workers and eventually, the self.
Lenin was another staunch critic of capitalism. In his work “Imperialism, the Highest
Stage of Capitalism” Lenin argues that imperialism was the outcome of the capitalists’ search
for profits outside their countries. This was extremely exploitative and unfair, leading to the
impoverishment of colonised societies outside of Europe, and the eventual creation of an
international proletariat class.
Dependency thinkers such as Paul Baran and Andre Gunder Frank locate the reasons for
the underdevelopment of third world countries (particularly Latin America) in the dynamic
and contradictory growth of the world capitalist system. The dependency theory contends that
the penetration of colonial capital in these countries had created distorted structure of
economy and society which resulted in their perpetual economic stagnation and
impoverishment. Similarly, Immanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory posits the
division of the world into a three-level hierarchy: core, periphery, and semi-periphery where
the semi-periphery and the periphery are locked in an unequal and exploitative systemic
relation with the core – the centre of capital accumulation.
The neoliberal capitalist resurgence in the post 1970s drew intense criticism, too. Critics
see neoliberalism struggle to maintain legitimacy as an economic doctrine because of its
association with increasing inequality and social breakdown. They argue that the rolling back
of the state while promoting market centric policies driven by self-interest has caused these
harmful social outcomes. Further, Robert Cox (1987) argued that ‘hyper-liberal globalizing

35
capitalism’ is rooted in major contradictions and struggles and has predicted that its
dominance is destined to be challenged and, eventually, overthrown. According to Cox,
contradictions are represented in the form of the ‘democratic deficit’ suffered by the states
that compels them to respond to the dictates of the global economy rather than domestic
public opinion, the growing pressure to protect the environment from the destructions caused
by relentless economic growth, and the surrender of state authority to corporate financial and
economic interests (Heywood 2013).
Conclusion
If we were to understand capitalism as the usage of money for exchange or profit, capitalism
may be said to have existed even in the ancient period. However, capitalism as an economic
system giving rise to specific class structures in relation to the forces of production is a
development that took shape in the modern era as feudalism declined. Several moments in the
period of the modern age have contributed to its development such as the enlightenment,
renaissance, reformation and the scientific and industrial revolution. The march of capitalism
gained momentum with the establishment of imperialism and the colonial period. Capitalism
took newer forms after decolonisation of the world through neo-imperial designs and
globalisation.
Capitalism varies in practice forming a spectrum from pure capitalism to state centric or
managed capitalism. Capitalism and economic globalisation go hand in hand to promote
neoliberal economic principles throughout the world, especially in the post-cold-war era.
Today, capitalism is seen too be the dominant economic system which has come to govern
economic organisation in all countries except a handful. However, capitalism faces staunch
resistance and challenge from sections within societies who see it is the major cause of global
injustice, social inequality, and ecological degradation. The challenge for capitalism today is
to find ways to humanise itself in order to be truly the path to prosperity for all as its
advocates ardently believed.
References
 Baumol, J. William, Robert E. Litan and Carl J. Schramm (2009) Good Capitalism,
Bad Capitalism, and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity, Yale University Press,
Yale.
 Dobb, Maurice (2007) Studies in the Development of Capitalism, Kessinger
Publishing, Montana.
 Fulcher, James (2004) Capitalism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University
Press, London.
 Hall, P and Soskice, D. Eds. (2001) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford University Press, London.

36
 Held, D., & McGrew, A. G. (2003) The Global Transformations Reader: An
introduction to the globalization debate (2nd ed.). Cambridge, UK : Malden, MA
USA: Polity Press ; Distributed in the USA by Blackwell Pub.
 Heywood, Andrew (2007) Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, New Delhi.
 Hoogvelt, Ankie (2001) Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New Political
Economy of Development, Johns Hopkins University Press, USA.
 Sorenson, George (2011) “Globalization and the Nation-State” in Daniele Caramani
(ed.) Comparative Politics, Oxford University Press, London.
 Strange, Susan (2003) “The Declining Authority of the State” in Held, D., &
McGrew, A. G (eds) The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the
Globalization Debate (2nd ed.). Cambridge, UK : Malden, MA USA: Polity Press ;
Distributed in the USA by Blackwell Pub.
 Wallerstein, Immanuel (2011) Historical Capitalism with Capitalist Civilization,
Verso Press, London.
 Wood, Ellen Meiksins (2002) The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View, Verso Press,
London.

37
 Unit-3

(c) Colonialism and Decolonisation: Meaning, Context, Forms of

Colonialism; Anti-colonialism Struggles and Process of Decolonisation
J.S. Pathak

Introduction
Colonialism and decolonisation have impacted the history of the world in numerous ways
than we can imagine. It has shaped the current social, political and economic conditions of
states which have been a part of the process either partially or directly, for both the coloniser
and the colonised.
The objective of this chapter is to understand colonialism, its context and the different
forms of colonialism. This chapter would briefly explain what is meant by colonialism, its
different forms, stages and characteristics. As we try to understand these concepts, we will
also engage with concepts such as imperialism, new imperialism and neo-colonialism.
Followed by a discussion on what we understand by decolonisation, discuss its historical
context and then engage with the implications of both colonialism and decolonisation.
Colonialism and decolonisation have to be understood in the context of the growth of
industrialism in the eighteen century Europe. As Europe began to industrialise, there was an
urge to ensure a steady supply of raw materials and a market to sell the manufactured goods.
The need for raw materials and markets led to colonial expansion, therefore leading to a
scramble for territories between the European powers to ensure a protected market. The
European colonial powers divided Asia, Africa and South America amongst themselves,
which was achieved through either military conquest or political dominance. The competition
for colonies led to great power rivalry in the international system, in which the powerful
European states competed amongst themselves in their quest to expand their empire. The
struggle for colonies was influenced by events at the international level and certain
developments at the domestic level which had implications for both the colonised and the
coloniser. For instance, in India, the fight for territory led a series of battles between the
British and French. The course of British and French rivalry in India was shaped by events
outside India. Events such as the outbreak of Seven Years War in Europe in 1756 between
the French and British forces, had an impact on the Carnatic Wars in India. The rivalry
between these countries, however, culminated into the consolidation of the British empire in
India. Similarly, there was a scramble for territorial possession between the European powers
in the Middle East, Africa and South-East Asia through a series of battles and diplomatic
negotiations.
Colonialism: Context and Forms
The term colonialism refers to a large-scale political and economic system that allows one
geopolitical entity (such as a nation-state or city-state) to establish controls beyond its

38
traditional geographic borders in the service of increased profit or power (Ahuja 2014:237)
Specific to the character of colonisation is the nature of the unequal relationship between
coloniser and the colonised. Such a relationship is based on disproportionate economic and
political rights, often solely to the advantage of the coloniser. In history, we have seen
examples when countries would occupy colonies to fulfil their economic requirements at the
cost of the host country.
The term imperialism refers to a process whereby a country occupies another country’s
territory and has complete control not just over the economic aspects of the colony but also
cultural, social and political aspects of life. Also, colonialism is constructed on the notion of
white man’s burden, which is based on the assumption that it was the alleged duty of the
European colonial powers to manage the affairs, culture and civilisation of the colonised
population since the coloniser had a superior sense of governance and civilisation as opposed
to the indigenous cultures of the colonies. Such a discourse had set the pace for racism,
exploitation and domination of the indigenous communities in the occupied territories. The
very fact that there is an obsession with fair skin in many post-colonial societies, for like in
the Indian scenario with a blooming industry for fair skin products, could be attributed to
colonialism along with other factors. Colonialism has influenced our world view of what we
consider as the ideal and of the highest standard. Therefore, with the onset of the
decolonisation process, post-colonial studies have made an attempt to critically reflect upon
the implications of colonial rule on the colonised territories.
New Imperialism, on the other hand, refers to the period when new colonial powers
started their colonial expansion by the late nineteenth and twentieth century. It is
characterized by the domination of Western European powers, the United States, Russia and
Japan as new colonial powers for territorial expansion, especially in Africa and Asia.
In historical context, scholars have tried to categorize different forms of colonialism, by
identifying a certain pattern for each of the forms. However, these forms may overlap
depending upon the social, economic and political condition of the coloniser and the
colonised. Nature of colonialism may vary from being exploitative, settler, surrogate, internal
colonialism and neo-colonialism. In settler colonialism, large scale immigrant takes place for
economic and social benefits. Scholars identify such patterns of colonialism in Australia and
the United States. In exploitative colonialism, a few people would occupy and settle in
another country with a motive for acquiring vast economic gains either through the
exploitation of natural resources or using the labour of the native population. In surrogate
colonialism, a colonial power may support projects for the settlement of a population in
another country. Internal colonialism refers to an unequal economic and political relationship
between the centre (the metropolis) and the periphery. In the context above, metropolis refers
to the developed state and periphery refers to the less developed satellite states of the imperial
powers.

39
Neo-Colonialism
Neo-colonialism is a form of colonialism in which a country seeks to influence the economic
and political conditions of a country through conditional aid and financial support. The term
was used by Jean-Paul Sartre in 1956 while it was used by Kwame Nkrumah, who was a
former president of Ghana (1960-66) to describe the decolonisation process in African
countries in the 1960s. It was in the context of the cold war that the superpowers from the
two opposing blocs, would make interventions in the many de-colonised states in Asia and
Africa, and used these states as a base to wage proxy wars.
It is different from the earlier forms of colonialism as unlike the earlier form of
colonialism where political control and military control were the most common methods to
acquire dominance over the occupied territory, however, neo-colonialism thrives on politics
of globalisation and financial aid, which is conditional in nature and as a result of which there
is an unequal relationship of dependence and debt obligations towards the donor country. In
the current situation, foreign capital, either in the form of developmental aid and support is
used to extract economic benefits by the colonising country. Huge aid either in the form of
developmental aid, infrastructure projects and through setting up multinational corporations
are new forms of economic and political domination through which states like the United
States and China have been expanding their clout in the Asian and African countries.
Features of Colonialism
One of the major features of colonialism is that it is based on unequal economic relations,
despite the exposure of the colonised territories to the world market system. Although
colonialism has led to the integration of many societies with the world capitalist market
system, such an integration has encouraged exploitation rather than the development of the
colonial states. The proponents of the dependency school argue that the objective of
integrating the colonial states with the world capitalist system was aimed at serving the
interest of the imperial states, or the metropolis at the cost of periphery states. For instance,
the Indian state although integrated with the world capitalist market during the British rule, it
suffered immense economic stagnation due to the exploitative character of the British rule.
The colonial period led to the systematic destruction of the indigenous industries and as a
result India faced economic stagnation. The objective of the colonial rule in India was to turn
the country into a captive market for sourcing raw materials and selling foreign goods, which
would serve the interest of the British colonial rule.
The systematic drain of wealth from the colonial states was another feature of
colonialism. A lot of economic resources and surplus was drained out the country either in
the form of salaries and other administrative expenditure to maintain the colonial empires,
which was taken out of the country. For instance, the high salaries to maintain civil servants
was taken out by the country by the European officers. The early moderates made an
economic critic of the colonial rule in the nineteenth century and it was one of the most
significant contributions to the Indian nationalist struggle. (Chandra et. al 1989). Also, one of

40
the earliest commentator’s like Dada Bhai Naoroji in 1867 had systematically analysed the
nature of the colonial rule and its adverse impact on Indian state and economic, in his famous
‘Drain of Wealth’ in his book 'Poverty and Un-British Rule in India.
Political domination and hegemony of foreign rule is another fundamental characteristic
of colonialism. Colonialism was characterised by unequal political relations, in which the
imperial powers maintained a position of political dominance over the occupied territories.
Imperial dominance was maintained either through direct military intervention or political
intervention. For instance, we could see that the British rule in India was entrenched through
a series of battles, administrative and political interventions as well.
Many colonial territories had undergone modernisation projects such as the development
of transportation and infrastructure, with a view to enhance the extractive apparatus of the
imperial administration. It was not just infrastructure projects, but the colonial administration
would introduce many taxation policies and new forms of land use patterns to enhance the
extractive capacity of the colonial administration. For instance, railways were introduced in
India to reach the remote parts of the country to extract resource from the frontiers in the
fastest means possible rather than guided by the motive to introduce an even developmental
process in the country.
Identification of the people of the occupied territories as subordinate and less humane.
Ideas of cultural and racial superiority had formed one of the most striking features of the
colonialism. For instance, most of the European colonial powers treated the colonial subjects
as the dehumanised other, who were not capable of governing themselves. Such assumptions
were often backed by science that justified the racial inferiority of the subjects. The education
system and public culture were used to project the western civilisation as the superior one as
opposed to the civilisation and culture of the colonial subjects. For instance, for the longest
time, the cultures of many African countries were looked down by the imperial powers as
opposed to the culture of the white people.
Also, colonialism is characterised in stages, scholars have identified mostly three stages
of colonialism. The first stage is identified as the period of monopoly, trade and plunder. This
stage was characterised by the monopoly of trade as the foremost objective of the traders.
Making profit was the main objective of the traders. In the process, the local and markets and
also the competing powers for the markets were kept out through carefully planned military
and diplomatic interventions. The monopoly of trade led to drain of wealth, as was in the
Indian case as elucidated by many Indian commentators, some of them being Dadabhai
Naoroji in 1867 and further analysed and developed by R.P. Dutt, and M.G. Ranade.
The second stage is characterised by an era of free trade: In this stage, the bourgeoisie
industrialist encouraged political, administrative, social and cultural changes of the colonies
so to retain and enhance the extractive potential of the colonies. Since the metropolis viewed
the colony as an important source of raw material and place to sell the manufactured, it
became important to introduce modernisation and development in the colonies. The colonies

41
were to be integrated with the world capitalist system and trade was to be used in a way
which would ensure the appropriation of wealth from the colonies. The idea behind the
introduction of modernisation was to ensure that the source of raw material and market for
manufactured goods does not collapse due to stagnation. Exports were to be maintained from
the colonies so that they retain their economies to buy manufactured goods from the imperial
powers and also so that their source for buying raw material do not vanish.
The third stage is referred to as the era of finance capital. This stage was marked by an
intense struggle for power and competition amongst the colonial powers to maintain their
colonies for raw materials and sell the manufactured goods. Investments for the
modernisation and development of the colonies became major means to retain the colonies.
However, the colonies could not respond to the modernisation and developmental process
positively, as overexploitation of the economy in the earlier stages had already hindered the
economies of the colonies adversely, therefore underdevelopment became a major feature of
this stage, however, many scholars are of the few the third stage could not take off.
Then several strands of scholarship, for instance, the proponents of dependency theorists,
have highlighted the role of capitalism, as a world system, have impacted colonialism. They
argue that the unequal relationship between the metropolis and the periphery, have been
greatly responsible for the backwardness and underdevelopment of the colonised territories.
Also, the role of various struggles for self-determination and independence in many occupied
colonies is fundamental to our understanding of how colonialism, was challenged. However,
when we speak of decolonisation it is important to note how we want to identify with the
process of decolonisation. Do we define decolonisation as a process in which the colonial
powers wilfully gave up their colonial possession or was it a result of various struggles for
independence which was actively fought by the people of the occupied colonies (Kennedy
2016).
Decolonisation: Context and Forms
Decolonisation has been widely referred to as a process in the latter half of the twentieth
century when colonialism was receiving a setback, as a result of which the colonial powers
had to withdraw from their occupied territories. It denotes a period, especially in the context
of Asian, African and South American states started gaining independence from the European
and western powers. The term decolonisation has two different connotations. Decolonisation
is referred to a process in which the colonial powers gave up their control over their
territories, often wilfully at a moment when they deemed that their colonial subjects had
finally arrived at a position for responsible self-governance. The other connotation of the
term, decolonisation refers to a process when the occupied territories could achieve autonomy
for self-rule from their colonial rulers, through struggles which finally led to their
independence. The second definition refers to a process, mostly in the form of mass
movements that was responsible was overthrowing colonialism in the occupied colonies.

42
 However, the term decolonisation was used by the German economist Moritz Julius
Bonn in the 1930s to describe the process through which colonies had attained self –
governance (Reinhard 2001). One of the core features of the decolonisation is right to self-
determination and it is one of the fundamental rights identified by the United Nations. Also,
the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization has stated that there cannot be any
other alternative for the coloniser but to agree to a process of self-determination. The United
Nations General assembly declared 1900-2000 as the International Decade for the
Eradication of Colonialism the United Nations along with a specific plan of action. Then, in
2001, a Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism was declared too,
while period 2011–2020 the Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism
(The United Nations).
Decolonisation during Various Stages
The process of decolonisation and colonial has been closely linked, and as the history of the
world suggest that process of decolonisation have not been even or smooth for all countries.
There have been various forms and processes through which different colonies have achieved
decolonisation. Decolonisation signifies a process through which the colonial empires
transformed into nation-states, through different political, economic, social and cultural
trajectories.
The classic phase of decolonisation is usually associated with the late twentieth century
when the colonies of the European powers began to assert their right to self-determination.
Factors such as the high cost of great power rivalry and the world wars led to economic and
political hardships for the colonial powers to maintain their faraway territories or to even
suppress the revolts against the foreign rule. The economic burden of maintaining the
colonies, the struggle for independence and mass movements for self-determination have
been instrumental in accelerating the process of decolonisation in several Asian, African and
American states in the course of history.
Decolonisation as a process could be traced to a period when the colonies of the
European empire had started demanding right for political autonomy in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth century in North and South America around 1776 and 1826 in context of
the Atlantic revolutions. The early American struggles were creole revolutions for
independence, which emerged amongst the descendants of European settlers in America. As a
consequence, the European colonies in America had reduced drastically after this after the
culmination of the Treaty of Paris of 1783. Then another wave of decolonisation began in
Britain’s white dominion’s, which was around 1840–1931 (Reinhard 2001). The British
settler colonies started demanding political autonomy in Canada, New Zealand and South
Africa.
The period between the first and second world wars are considered another significant
phase for decolonisation since the wars had induced several economic and political
ramifications for both the coloniser and the colonised territories. Therefore, the

43
decolonisation process and breaking of empires began with 1914 and around 1940' and 1950's
massive phase of decolonisation began with the end of second world war. For instance, India
gained independence in 1947 from the British, Philippines in 1946 from the United States, the
French gave up Vietnam in 1954. By the 1960's many African colonies started gaining
independence. Events such as the end of the Portuguese colonies in 1974–1970’s, especially
in Africa and the end of white minority rule in South Africa, the disintegration of the Soviet
empire in 1975 to 1991, were significant developments in the decolonisation process.
Decolonisation and Its Types
The process of decolonisation has been peaceful and gradual for some colonies while for
some it has been violent. In history, different events have facilitated the decolonisation
process in Asia, and Africa. Some decolonisation process has been non-violent while some
have been violent or a combination of different strategies to achieve self-determination. For
instance, India achieved independence through a national mass movement which was
fundamentally based on non-violent methods of resistance under the leadership of Mohandas
Karmachand Gandhi. While there were leaders who also spoke of self-determination through
revolutions. Frantz Fannon (1925-1961), spoke in revolutionary terms in his work The
Wretched of the Earth. Also, the colonisers often used a language to portray the struggles of
decolonisation as illegitimate and passed draconian laws to curb them, often citing these acts
of resistance as terrorism or rebellion while the leaders' tried to resists suppression by giving
it the name of a revolution, for instance (Klose 2014) . While during other instances,
decolonisation has been achieved through external interventions, for instance, the
involvement of foreign powers or super big powers in the international system and the United
Nations has been instrumental in facilitating the decolonisation process. The United
Nations Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, or
the Special Committee on Decolonization (C-24), is a committee of the United
Nations General Assembly that was established in 1961 and is exclusively devoted to the
issue of decolonization (The United Nations).

Different Approaches
There are different approaches towards understanding the history of decolonisation. The
process of decolonisation cannot be attributed to just one factor but a combination of multiple
factors. Factors such as contradictions within the imperial powers, the rise of struggles for
independence in the colonies or the Nationalist approach, and international developments
within the international structure have led to the culmination of factors which prompted the
de-colonisation process around the world during different phases. The Nationalist approach
states that the anti-imperial struggles against the colonial rule was a fundamental factor for
decolonisation and not a direct implication of colonial rule. The international approach states
that developments in the international system such as the world wars and the rise of new
powers challenged the old imperial system. The world wars depleted the economic might of

44
the European colonial powers while rising powers like the United States did not have an
interest in sustaining the old system of imperialism. Then a third approach the domestic
constraint approach suggests that the maintain the colonies had become a burden for the
colonial powers. However, there was also debates around this argument, whether it was
constraints of the colonial powers or the resistance offered by the colonial territories which
made imperialism difficult.
Colonialism and Decolonisation: Implications
Colonialism has disrupted the economies of the colonies therefore with the process of
decolonisation the colonies had to revive and build an economic system that would bring
them out of underdevelopment. However, a weak economy and other challenges in the these
newly gained independence states, made these states dependent on the western powers for
economic assistance, often taking the course of neo-colonialism, even after a formal end to
colonialism.
Apart from economic challenges, political and state-building challenges was a task for
the post-colonial states. Many of these states in Asia and Africa are still grappling with
challenges which have been a result of policies implemented during the colonial rule, for
instance, border disputes, communal tensions.
However, factors such as the introduction of modern education, infrastructure and certain
social reforms did introduce a few reforms in these states. For instance, the banning of Sati
1829 by the then Governor-General Lord William Bentinck in India was a progressive step
for social reform in India.
Summary
In this chapter, we have learnt about the definitions and meanings of various concepts such as
colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and decolonisation. We could see how these
processes are interlinked with each other and have shaped the history of world history in
various ways. The history of colonialism reflects how the European and western civilisation
based on the edifice of industrialisation and capitalism has impacted the history of the world
in many ways, especially the Asian, African and South American States. However, the
internal contradictions of colonial rule had instrumental in accelerating the decolonisation
process. We could see how various colonies in Asia and Africa started asserting their right to
self-determination often guided by the educated middle-class elite, for instance in India it was
guided by the educated middle-class elites who had received western education.
Even today, many African and Asian states continue to grapple with the challenges
which had surfaced as a result of the colonial rule, for instance, border disputes, economic
underdevelopment, state-building and communalism. It has not only impacted the economy
but also the politics, social and cultural aspects of the colonies. On the other hand,
decolonisation has been instrumental in breaking certain assumptions about racial superiority
and white supremacy by the western powers and also challenging other assumptions on what

45
the European hegemony has been sustained on, for instance, the European often justified their
rule over their colonies based on a superior sense of governance while the colonies' were
regarded as the uncivilised barbaric other incapable of self –governance. It also reflects a
discourse of resisting the western worldview which often made the colonised feel inferior
about their culture, identity or way of life.
However, even today after the formal end of colonial rule in many countries, new forms
of economic and political dominance have emerged, often entrenching such influence through
the politics of aid and development. Therefore, such developments also reflect how the
history of the world is often influenced by the role of the powerful states and in different
phases of history, while the history of colonialism and decolonisation also demonstrates there
are always instances of resistance to counter dominance by powerful states in the
international system shaped by both internal and external conditions of a state.
References
Ahuja, Neel (2014), ‘Colonialism’, URL: https://cpb-us-
e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.ucsc.edu/dist/f/396/files/2014/11/Ahuja-Colonialism.pdf
Chandra, Bipin et.al (1989), ‘India's Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947’, Penguin Books.
Kennedy, Dane (2016), ‘Decolonization: A Very Short Introduction’, Oxford
University Press
Klose, Fabian (2014), Decolonization and Revolution, European History Online, URL:
http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/europe-and-the-world/european-overseas-rule/fabian-klose-
decolonization-and-revolution
Reinhard,W. (2001), ‘ Colonization and Colonialism’ International Encyclopedia of the Social
& Behavioral Sciences, 2240-2245.
Thomas, Martin and Andrew S. Thompson (2018), ‘Rethinking Decolonization: A New
Research Agenda for the Twenty First Century’, The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire
United Nations, ‘Decolonisation’, URL: https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-
depth/decolonization.

46
 Unit-4

(i) Comparative Study of Constitutional Developments and

Political Economy of Britain
Sanjeev Kumar & Namreeta Kumari
Introduction
The United Kingdom is made up of four distinct countries: England, Wales and Northern
Ireland. However, ‘Great Britain consists of three regions i.e. England Wales and Scotland.
England and Scotland were united in 1707 and Wales came in the union to form Great Britain
much later. Ireland became part of the union in 1801 and Ireland in 1920. “There are several
levels of government in Great Britain. The supreme legislative body is Parliament, which
meets in Westminster (London). Headed by the Sovereign, it has two chambers: the upper
chamber, or House of Lords, and the lower chamber, the House of Commons. Currently,
around 790 members are eligible to take part in debates in the House of Lords; the majority
of these are life peers. Although there are over 800 hereditary peers, since 1999, only 92 have
been eligible to sit in the House of Lords. No peers are currently directly elected, although
House of Lords reform has been on the political agenda since the late 1990s. All 650
members of House of Commons (which includes representatives from Northern Ireland) are
directly elected” (Catto, Davie and Perfect 2015).
Catto and others further note that “while subject to the British Parliament, Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland also have their separate parliaments or assemblies. The Scottish
Parliament was restored in 1999 after nearly three centuries, while the National Assembly for
Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly were set up in 1998. All three bodies have elected
members. The Scottish Parliament is responsible for ‘devolved matters’, including education
and training, health and social services and local government; and the UK Parliament in
Westminster holds responsibility for “reserved matters” such as defence, foreign policy and
employment. There is a similar distinction in Wales between ‘devolved’ and ‘reserved’
powers, although more powers are reserved to Westminster in the National Assembly for
Wales than in the Scottish Parliament. In September 2014, a referendum on whether Scotland
should become an independent country was conducted; 45 per cent voted in favour and 55
per cent against, thus Northern Ireland is excluded from the remaining discussion, first
because it is not part of Great Britain, but also because it has its own very complicated
history, resulting in a particular political and legal situation. The role of religion is crucial in
Northern Ireland but is utterly different from that in Great Britain. There are other significant
differences between England and Wales, on the one hand, and Scotland, on the other.
Scotland has a separate system of education, and a distinctive legal system which is partly
codified; England and Wales, in contrast, are subject to a common law system based on
judicial precedents. Important differences also exist in terms of religious establishment as
discussed below. To avoid confusion, the rest of this article focuses on the situation in

47
England and Wales, unless otherwise stated (Catto, Davie and Perfect 2015). Thus, the
parliamentary and constitutional development of Great Britain has a unique history.
Bogdanor highlights that “the fundamental feature of British constitutional development,
then, is the long tradition of continuous and undivided parliamentary sovereignty, which has
no parallel on the Continent” (Bogdanor 2016: 164). The chapter traces a history of
constitutional development and the political economy of Britain.
Constitutional Development in Britain
The study of any country’s constitutional development and political economy is rooted in its
history of political traditions and legacies. Over the centuries the model of Britain political
system is of political stability. All the political institutions and structures of Britain are
related or connected with its political traditions. There are five sources which are resulted on
the constitutional development of Britain which are Great Charters, Statues, Conventions,
Common law, Judicial decisions and Legal Commentaries.
To understand the constitutional development of Britain it is fundamental, to begin with,
the basic foundation of Kingship in Britain. In the second half of the 5th century, the Roman
Empire rule came to an end in England. Anglo-Saxon was a period when the roots of the
monarchy were being laid in Britain. Anglo Saxons were not autocrat completely and the
king was advised by a council of elders known as Witagenmot, in the conduct of
administration. Therefore it is apt to say that kingship is a tradition of England.
The most important date in English history is 1066 when “the invading army of Norman
army of William the Conqueror defeated the Anglo-Saxon forces of King Harold at the Battle
of Hastings. Britain has not been invaded since 1066. The Spanish Armada was repulsed in
1588, as were Hitler’s forces in 1940. The Britons are proud of having preserved their
sovereignty against foreign invasion for more than 900 years” (Rutland 2005, p.42). Despite
being autocrat Normans couldn’t be faced difficulty conducting administration in the absence
of an advisory council. In such a context it necessitated the birth of Magnum Concilium and
Curia Regis which was an advanced version of Witagenmot. Magnum Concilium was a great
council and 3-4 meetings were convened by the king every year. Due to the large size of
Magnum Concilium, a smaller council was formed which was Known as Curia Regis to
seeking advice for effective administration.
A feudal democracy was established in England during the Norman period. During the
regime of King John, not only the public but the feudal lords also turned against him. The
rebellion of barons arose due to taking away the traditional rights of the barons, taxes were
imposed which created difficulty for heirs of barons. The barons led rebellion forced King
John to sign a Charter of Demands on 12th June 1215 which is known as Magna Carta and a
source of constitutional development in Britain. The charter of demands was an agreement
between the king and the feudal lords but many of the clauses dealt with the rights of the
barons as the charter of demands is a detailed document with 63 articles accepting the feudal

48
rights of the feudal lords. This charter is the basis of modern democracy in England. It was
the first step towards limited monarchy and constitutional government in Britain.
The parliamentary system started evolving in the late 12th and early 13th century in
Britain. Simon de Monkford has to be credited for his effort for making British parliament
more representative as in 1265 he convened the parliament and called for two representatives
from 20 main cities. In 1295 when the Parliament was convened under the leadership of
Edward I, it was called Model Parliament as two members each from the Shire, Borough and
City were called to attend it. For some of the members an election procedure was followed
and for the first time principle of representation was adopted in the British Parliament. In this
Parliament three types of representative were called to attend it- Barons, Bishops and
Commoners. The members of Parliament were representatives from three different interests
but the Parliament was divided into two parts and became two houses of Parliament later
known as The House of Lords and House of Commons.
After the establishment Parliament in Britain, there was a conflict between the
Parliament and King which came in open when there was a struggle between Stuart kings and
the parliament which eventually resulted in Civil war. The theory of Divine Rights of the
king was asserted by Stuart kings followed by James I. This theory was also supported by
Charles I which was rejected by Parliament. All his efforts failed to establish his supremacy
over the Parliament and as a result imposed taxes and collected money from the people
without the approval parliament. He eventually had to sign, The Petition of Rights in 1628
but did not follow it and as result, he dissolved the Parliament. The Petition of Rights was a
landmark development in Britain’s political tradition after Magna Carta. No session of
Parliament was held for the next 11 years. Charles, I was awarded the death sentence in 1649
and was succeeded by James II. James II regime witnessed the Glorious Revolution of 1688
which was revolution according to primary importance to the Parliament followed by the
king. “William of Orange deposed the Catholic King James II and took office as a
constitutional monarch who accepted that ultimate sovereignty rested with the Parliament”
(Rutland p.40). The Bill of Rights 1689 was the foundation to establish a parliamentary
government in Britain and the constitutional or limited monarchy was accepted. The
parliament was made the central point and its approval for all the decisions including law-
making was made central. The Bill of Rights 1689 is called the Great Charters as it
regulated the relationship between the King and the Parliament. It proclaimed the supremacy
of the parliament and demarcated the spheres in which the monarch could exercise his/her
power. It marked the beginning of constitutional monarchy with sole sovereignty with
Queen-in-Parliament. Since the sovereignty was given to the parliament the monarch could
not reject any laws passed by the parliament. The taxes couldn’t be levied on people without
the approval of the Parliament which protected the Civil rights of people of Britain. The
parliament should be an elected body and members of Parliament had full freedom of speech
and expression.

49
 The charters are an agreement between the people and the king for protection of the
rights of the people. The charters were integral to the development of constitution in Britain
and the oldest among them comprises Magna Carta of 1215, Petition Rights of 1629, and the
Bill of Rights 1689 which played an important role in the development of British
constitution.
The British constitution is an unwritten constitution but important developments which
have resulted in constitutional development in Britain are the Statues. This is the second
source of the constitution of Britain. Since Parliament is supreme in Britain the law enacted
by the parliament is called statues which accommodate laws pertaining to constitutional
structure and ordinary laws. The statues are those laws which are of important laws like laws
related to the extension of the franchise, age of franchise, election system, rights and liberties
of people, etc. There were statues which were the sources of the constitution of Britain, The
Reform Act 1832 and 1867, 1884, 1918, 1928 and 1969 as these laws were related to the
extension of franchise and right to franchise.
The British constitution is unwritten is based on constitutional conventions.
Conventions are unwritten customs and practised which are accepted due support of the
strong public opinion. These conventions don’t have sanctions of laws behind them.
The constitutional convention which receives sanctity of courts becomes a Common
Law, which is an unwritten law of the constitution. Common law is validation given to
conventions which are recognized by the courts in Britain.
Judicial decisions and Legal commentaries on the constitution also had an essential
role in the development of the constitution of Britain. The judiciary by giving interpretations
to constitutional laws of the country fixes its direction. It also defines the limits of the
charters and the statues which influence constitutional practice. The commentaries of eminent
legal jurist are an important source of the constitution as these are often the clear
interpretation of the laws. These commentaries are also used by the courts for deciding
complicated cases.
Features of the Constitution
The evolution of the British constitution cannot be caged into one single source and has a
long history which is also an evolving constitution. The powers of different bodies are
defined and the rights of the citizens are protected through the constitution of Britain. The
following features of the British constitution which explain how the British constitution is
unique.
1. Evolved Constitution, Unwritten Constitution and Flexible Constitution
The British constitution is evolved as it is a result of evolution as there is no system in
the British constitution which does not has its root in the ancient systems and legacies.
It was never promulgated by a King nor enacted by a constituent assembly on a
definite date. Britain’s constitution is the oldest in the world is neither written nor
enacted. It contains well-thought laws, statues, decisions, precedents, usages and
50
 traditions. The parliament is supreme in Britain and can enact or amend ordinary and
constitutional laws and the Supreme Court doesn’t have any power to declare the laws
null or void. There are no special procedures for the amendment of laws. The ordinary
laws and constitutional laws can be amended with a simple majority of parliament.
2. The British Constitution is a Child of Accident and Design
The evolution of the British constitution was not planned as it gradually evolved
according to the circumstances and accordingly the principles and systems developed
and that’s why it’s often referred to as ‘child of an accident’. Since the constitution is
premised on unwritten conventions it doesn’t mean that all the laws and systems
developed accidentally. A part of the constitution is premised on laws which were
framed a planned manner, for instance, various parliamentary acts, the Acts of 1911
and 1949.
3. Supremacy of Parliament
Parliament is supreme in Britain as it has unlimited authority and is omnipotent. It not
only makes laws-constitutional, financial and ordinary but the executive is also
answerable to House of Commons. The parliament is sovereign in all spheres and its
decisions can’t be questioned as the courts doesn’t have the authority of judicial
review whatever is legal is constitutional. Parliament is not bound and cannot be
restrained by the Acts of earlier parliaments similarly it cannot restrain the actions of
future Parliament.
4. Gap Between Theory and Practice
There is a gap between the theory and practice of the British Constitution. They have
maintained their traditions even though they might have changed according to the
circumstances. That’s why even after a change in the procedure of working, nature
and aims of many systems and institutions the form remains the same. King is
powerful in all spheres legally but in reality, all the functions of the king are
performed by his ministers who are representatives of the people and respond to them
through parliament.
Political Economy of Britain
The discourse of political economy in England can be understood largely emerging from the
17th century when the kingdom was involved within wars with various European nations such
as France, Spain and their allies. It was the time when the promotion of trade and
manufacturing was considered as the way to increase national prosperity. Such an
understanding encouraged support for Naval fleet, naval power and merchants. It was also the
time when the state patronages for domestic production, foreign trade got an early boost and
such acts were termed as ‘Mercantilism’ by Adam Smith.
In the eighteenth century, the doctrine of free-trade had become prominent and the policy
of British protectionism had taken place. Under such development, the British government
abolished the Navigation Acts and Corn Laws to promote its protectionist policy. In the
nineteenth century, Britain adopted imperialism as the most important tool to raise its

51
political-economy. The focus of Britain was pointed towards forcing colonies and defeated
powers to open their markets for free trade. The policy of free trade remained the central
economic policy during the 19th century as well, Tucker argues that, by such policy of free
trade, the richer countries such as Britain managed to stay ahead and poorer colonies
remained poorer. Bagchi notes that “this policy was often backed by actual military
intervention or the threat of such intervention” (Bagchi 2014: 553). The rationale of such
policies has been explained by Tucker that, “(a) the richer country, with better implements,
infrastructure, a more extended trading network and more productive agriculture, would be
more productive overall; (b) it would be able to spend more on further improvements, and (c)
the larger markets of the richer country would provide scope for greater division of labour
and a greater variety of products.
Furthermore, “Tucker also pointed to the advantages a richer country would enjoy in
terms of human resources and the generation of knowledge: (a) it would attract the abler and
more knowledgeable people because of higher incomes and opportunities; (b) it would be
better endowed with information and capacity for producing new knowledge; and (c) a
greater degree of competitiveness gained through higher endowments of capital, knowledge,
ability to acquire more knowledge and capital and the energy of people with more capital and
ability to generate more capital and knowledge in the richer country would make products
cheaper. Finally, the larger capital resources of the richer country would lower interest rates
and render investable funds cheaper.” (Bagchi 2014: 553).
Thus, there have been various interpretations related to British political economy, but
largely the economic policy of Britain had started taking various shifts from 17 th century in
the wake of the industrial revolution and the emergence of liberal thought in the sphere of
economy and polity. In other words, the major developmental shift of political economy of
Britain can be largely traced back to the phenomena of industrial development.
The industrial revolution in Britain dates back to the 18th century which resulted in the
creation of two classes- the business middle class and the labourers which were left out of
from the parliamentary system. It was the first country to witness the industrial revolution
and became “the workshop of the world, selling its manufactured goods throughout its global
trading network” (Putland ). Later the tradition of gradualism resulted in broadening of the
franchise through different acts of parliament. The effort to accommodate working-class in
enfranchisement resulted in the creation of the Labour party in 1906 which was a party of
the working class people whereas the Conservative Party. The conservative party drew most
of its members from the middle-class merchants and businessmen. There were demands
because made by the working class to a stable political system. In the reign of liberal party
government (1906-1914) elements of the welfare state were introduced like public health,
school meals, and public pensions. World War I was a major challenge for the British state to
maintain its integrity. It was only US intervention which saved the British state otherwise it
would have lost the war and the British economy suffered a lot.

52
 World War II brought much more damages unlike the world war I. “Although the
economic aid by the United States-sponsored Marshall Plan eventually aided the economic
recovery in Britain, an important price that the country paid was the loss of many of its
colonies in Africa and Asia” (Wood p.109) and lost its status as an imperialist power. World
War II marked the collapse of the imperialist order. After these wars, the economy was
completely broken and the British state played an interventionist role to revamp the economy.
The British state followed the Keynesian welfare state formulated by British economist John
Maynard Keynes.
After the war, the collective consensus both parties consensus over establishing a
welfare state continued until 1960. The Beveridge Report of 1942 was accepted by both the
parties before the war ended “promising full employment and state-provided health care,
insurance, and pensions” (Rutland p.65). There was a change in government as the voters
turned down Churchill as a prime minister in 1945 as this much was not enough to satisfy the
voters.
In 1960’s the efforts of the government to reduce inflation in the country and increase
economic growth resulted in economic crises in 1970 and labour party losing its membership
in Britain and was succeeded by Conservatives with Margaret Thatcher as their leader in
1979. She was influenced by writings of Friedrich Hayek and monetarist Milton Friedman
Thatcher privatized business and industry and set the stage for neoliberalism by promoting a
market economy in Britain. She rejected the Keynesian model and minimized state
interference in the economy. She began by controlling the trade unions and breaking their
power. “Tax rates were cut: The top personal income tax rate fell from 90 per cent to 40 per
cent. Workers were encouraged to opt-out of the state pension system and invest some of
their payroll taxes in a private retirement account” (Rutland p.68). In 1988 she introduced
“New Steps Program” which focused on the way services were delivered by the state. This
was a reformative program which outsourced public services to private agencies and firm so
that the costs are reduced. The Thatcherism (1979-1990) period saw a rise in a GDP but the
gap between the rich and poor increased. Thatcher resigned and was replaced by John Mayor
who followed her policies.
The conservative party lost to the Labour party in 1997 election with Tony Blair as its
leader. It was a new Labour party which offered a “Third way” which was different from the
old labour party and the conservative party which was a “centrist way”. “Tony Blair
described New Labour as a “pro-business, pro-enterprise” party, albeit one with a
compassionate face. He stressed the values of community and moral responsibility in contrast
with Thatcher’s brazen individualism” (Putland p.71). Blair was succeeded by Gordon Brown
in 2007. By 2010 the third way of labour party was faced by challenges and the conservative
party and liberal democrats headed the coalition government with David Cameroon as its
Prime Minister. The conservative party gained back its majority in 2015.

53
 Thus, the analysis of British political economy highlights that a country’s economic
system is also dependent on the kind of ideology of the political party ruling the government
and according to the economic policies of the state are framed.
References
Bagchi, A. K. (2014). Contextual political economy, not Whig economics. Cambridge
Journal of Economics, 38(3), 545–562.
Bogdanor, V. (2016). Britain and Europe. Zeitschrift Für Staats- Und Europawissenschaften,
14(2), 157–165.
Catto, Rebecca. Davie Grace and Perfect David. 2015. State and Religion in Great Britain:
Constitutional Foundations, Religious Minorities, the Laws and Education. Insight
Turkey, Winter 2015, Vol. 17 No. 1 Religion and State in Europe Secularism,
European Law, Education, Islamophobia, 79-96.
Dudley, C. (2013). Party politics, political economy, and economic development in early
eighteenth-century Britain: Political Economy and Economic Development. The
Economic History Review.
Edlin, D. E. (2016). The Rule of Recognition and the Rule of Law: Departmentalism and
Constitutional Development in the United States and the United Kingdom. American
Journal of Comparative Law, 64(2), 371–418.
Flinders, M. (2009). Constitutional Anomie: Patterns of Democracy and ‘The Governance of
Britain.’ Government and Opposition, 44(4), 385–411.
Gambles, A. (2000). Free Trade and State Formation: The Political Economy of Fisheries
Policy in Britain and the United Kingdom circa 1780–1850. Journal of British
Studies, 39(3), 288–316.
Myers, B. L. (2016). How Did Britain Develop? Adaptive Social Systems and the
Development of Nations. Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic
Mission Studies, 33(2), 136–147.
Rutland, Peter. (2005). “Britain.” In Comparative Politics: Interests, Identities, and
Institutions in A Changing Global Order, edited by Jefferey Kopstein and March
Lichbach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Weill, R. (2006). Evolution vs. Revolution: Dueling Models of Dualism. The American
Journal of Comparative Law, 54(2), 429–479
Wood, Ethel. (2015). Comparative Government and Politics: An Essential Course Book.
New York: Wood Yard Publications.

54
 Unit-4

(ii) Comparative Study of Constitutional Development

and Political Economy in Brazil
Baby Tabassum

Introduction
Brazil is a country of continental size with a long history of building a national state and, in
recent decades, a more democratic system of government. The transition to democracy,
however, coincided with an explosion of civil society activism and mobilization. “The
expansion of voting rights and the involvement of gender and ethnic groups, urban social
movements, and environmental and religious organizations in Brazilian politics have greatly
expanded the range of political participation”.1 Just the same, political institutions have failed
to harmonize the demands of conflicting forces.
On 5 October 1988, Brazil enacted a new constitution containing a total of 315 articles.
“In Brazilian politics this was the result of twenty months of discussion and debate of 559
members of the Constituent Assembly. It is the eighth Constitution of Brazil since
independence in 1822. As it replaces the 1967 Constitution, it is again amended in 1969,
which was imposed by the military regime that governed between 1964 and 1985. However
Brazilian political commentators call it a Keystone for the country’s democratic
consolidation”.2 Brazil has emerged as an inward-oriented industrialized country in the world
over the last three decades due to its new competitive position. Its huge economy is now
more interconnected with other markets in this globalized world than at any other time in the
country’s history.
The Brazilian state adjusted to changes in the distribution of power; the rise of new,
politically active social classes; and the requirements of development. Power shifted regularly
between the central and subnational governments. These swings between centralizing periods
and decentralizing ones punctuated critical junctures of Brazilian politics.
“Brazil’s economic history is characterized by significant economic volatility in the
world until 1994. Between the return to democracy in 1985 and 1994, the critical economy
eventually underwent through spells of hyperinflation, recessions and brief intervals of
relative stability under ultimately unsuccessful economic plans. Inflation peaked at 2950

1
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and Changing
Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, Sixth edition (United State of
America : Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013),414.
2
Bruneau, Thomas C. “Constitutions and Democratic Consolidation Brazil in Comparative Perspective”.
(California : Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 1989), 1. Accessed October 12, 2020,
https://www.apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a208224.pdf.
55
percent in 1990”.3 Macro-economic turbulence gave rise to a strong short-term focus of
economic agents. This situation was most detrimental to the poor section, who were not able
to protect themselves against inflation. This only changed with the 1994 Real plan, which
established a crawling currency peg, limited public spending and undid much of the existing
inflation indexation. Brazil entered the 2008 global crisis with significant buffers to enact
countercyclical policies and initially showed strong resilience, with economic growth
rebounding strongly in 2010.
Historical Background : An Overview
The Brazilian Empire (1822-1889) : Critical Junctures
Brazil survived a violent wars of independence as a Portuguese colony. Brazilian
independence was declared peacefully by the Crown’s own agent in the colony in 1822. “To
control its dispersed territory, the Brazilian centralized authority in the emperor, which
functioned as a moderating power, mediating conflicts among the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government and powerful landowning oligarchy”.4 This centralization
contrasted with other postcolonial Latin American states, which suffered numerous conflicts
among territorially dispersed strongmen (caudillos).
The Brazilian country reflects many characteristics of representative democracy: regular
elections, alternation of parties in power, and scrupulous compliance with the constitution.
“Liberal institutions, however, only regulated political competition among the rural,
oligarchical elites, leaving out the mass of the Brazilian population who were neither
enfranchised nor politically organized”.5
The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (1964-1985)
“The military government installed what the Argentine political sociologist Guillermo
O’Donnell termed bureaucratic authoritarianism (BA)”.6 Such a type of regimes can only
deal with severe economic crises and are led by the armed forces and key civilian allies,
especially seen by professional economists, engineers, and administrators.
The military government first planned a quick return to civilian rule and even allowed
limited democratic institutions to continue. After being purged in 1964 of the BA’s
opponents, the national congress continued to function, and direct elections for federal
legislators and most mayors (but not the president or state governors) took place at regular
intervals. “In November 1965, the military replaced all existing political parties to establish

3
“OECD Economic Surveys : Brazil”, OECD (2018):8, Accessed October 18, 2020,
https://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Brazil-2018-OECD-economic-survey-.
4
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and Changing
Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, Sixth edition (United State of
America : Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013),388.
5
Alfred P., “Brazil”, 388.
6
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and Changing
Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, 8th edition (United State of America
: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013),376.
56
the National Renovation Alliance (ARENA) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement
(MDB)”.7 The ARENA was the party of military government’s, while MDB was the
“official” party of the opposition. Former members of the three major parties joined one of
the two new parties.
The military reinforced the previous pattern of state interventionism in economic
policies. “The government promoted state-led economic development by adopting a strategy
of building hundreds of state corporations and investing enormous huge sums in established
public firms. By adopting such strategies Brazil implemented one of the most successful
economic development programs among newly industrialized countries”.8 Often called the
“Brazilian miracle”, these programs demonstrated that, like France, Germany and Japan in
earlier periods, a developing country could create its own economic miracle.
The Making of the Modern Brazilian State
The Transition to Democracy and the First Civilian Governments (1974-2001)
After the oil crisis of 1973 set off a wave of inflation around the world, the economy began to
falter. Increasing criticism from Brazilian business led the last two ruling generals, Geisel and
Figueiredo, to begin a gradual process of democratization. In their early stages, these leaders
envisioned only a liberalizing, or opening, of the regime to allow civilian politicians to
compete for political office. As was later the case with Gorbachev’s “glasnost” in the Soviet
Union, however, control over the process of liberalization gradually slipped from military
hands and was captured by organizations within civil society. “At the same time in 1974, the
opposition party, the MDB, stunned the military government by increasing its representation
in the Senate from 18 to 30 percent and in the Chamber of Deputies from 22 to 44 percent”.9
The party did not have a majority, but it did capture a majority in both chambers of the state
legislatures in the most important industrialized southern and southeastern states.
In later years, the military wanted to retain as much control over the succession process
as possible and expressed its consent to elect the next president through a restricted electoral
college. But mass mobilization campaigns demanded the right to elect the next president
directly. The Diretas Ja! (“Direct Elections Now!”) movement, includes a comprising an
array of social movements, opposition politicians and labor unions, which have expanded
substantially in their size and influence in 1984. Their rallies exerted tremendous presuure on
the military at a moment when it was not clear who would succeed General Figueiredo. “The
military’s fight to keep the 1984 elections indirect alienated civilian supporters of the
generals. Many former supporters broke with the regime and backed an alliance (the liberal

7
Alfred P., “Brazil”, 376.
8
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and Changing
Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, Sixth edition (United State of
America : Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013),392.
9
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and Changing
Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, 8th edition (United State of America
: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013), 377.
57
front) with Tancredo Neves, the candidate of the opposition PMDB, the Party of the MDB”.10
Neves’s victory in 1984, however, was marred by his sudden death on the eve of the
inauguration. Vice President Jose Sarney became the first civilian president of brazil since
1964.
A chance for fundamental change appeared in 1987 when the national Constituent
Assembly met to draft a new constitution. Given the earlier success of the opposition
governors in 1982, state political machines became important players in the game of
constitution writing. The state governments petitioned for the devolution of new authority to
tax and spend. Labor groups also exerted influence through their lobbying organizations.
Workers demanded constitutional protection of the right to strike and called for extending
this right to public employees. The constitution also granted workers the right to create their
own unions without authorization from the Ministry of Labor.
Soon after sarney’s rise to power, annual rates of inflation began to skyrocket.The
government sponsored several stabilization plans, but without success. By 1989, the first
direct presidential elections since the 1960s, Brazilian society was calling for a political
leader to remedy runaway inflation and remove corrupt and authoritarian politicians.
“Fernando Collor de Mello, became president after a gruelling campaign against Lula da
Silva, the popular left wing labor leader and head of the workers party (Partido dos
Trabalhadores, or PT)”.11 To counteract Lula’s following, Collor’s rhetoric appealed to the
poor, known as the descamisados (“shirtless ones”), with his attacks against politicians and
social problems caused by bureaucratic inefficiency.
In July 1994, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, his minister of finance implemented the “Real
Plan”, which created a new currency, the real. Cardoso rode the success of the Real Plan to
the presidency, beating out Lula and the PT in 1994 and again in 1998. He proved adept at
keeping inflation low and consolidating some of the structural reforms of the economy.
Brazil after September 11, 2001 Scenario
The incident of 11 September of the same year and the collapse of the argentine economy
produced a fundamental crisis of confidence in Brazil. In particular, the realization of the
Argentina’s crisis was threatening instability on real. Meanwhile, Washington’s war on terror
led to a situation threatened to displace social and economic priorities in Brazil’s relations
with the United States.
The election of Lula da Silva as president in October 2002 reflected how far Brazilian
democracy had come. “He passed major social security reforms in 2003 and 2004, but similar
to his predecessor’s difficulties, his reforms became stalled in congress during the run-up to
municipal elections in late 2004. PT leaders surrounding Lula were implicated in a second

10
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and Changing
Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, Sixth edition (United State of
America : Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013), 393.
11
Alfred P. “Brazil”, 393.
58
scandal involving the purchase of votes in the congress for reform legislation”.12 However,
Lula won reelection in 2006 anyway and he continued to garner high presidential approval
ratings well into his second term. Lula’s successor in 2010 was his chief of staff, Dilma
Rousseff became Brazil’s first women president. As much as Rousseff’s government sought
to build on the successes of Lula, neither the economy nor political institutions proved so
accommodating.
In the post 9/11 world, Brazil’s politics are less affected by the themes of the war on
terror or the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, than other countries that emphasize security. In
Brazil, development and democracy continue to dominate the agenda of domestic and
international policy.
Constitutional Development : A Historical Perspective
The Constitutional Founding of Brazil : Transition or Revolution?
In the mid-1980s, Brazilians were unsure about their political future. “A dictatorship was
declining – even the leaders of the authoritarian regime recognized as much – but what would
take its place remained unclear. Some believed politics would return to its old course, with
traditional civilian elites reclaiming their rule over a de-politicized majority of citizens; the
military leaders themselves hoped to see reestablishment of this scenario”.13 But this was a
minority view.
For the most part, “people understood that deep structural changes were undergoing
Brazilian society. Under twenty years of military rule, Brazil had moved from 55% rural to
74% urban”.14 New political elites saw a possibility, never before as concrete, to seize power
from those who had ruled the country for our entire republican history. “Old political elites
understood that they would have to reinvent themselves if they wished to reclaim power.
Political leaders in the opposition carefully crafted the connection between congressional and
popular struggles for the return of democracy, and mobilized the population in the largest
social movement in Brazilian history: the Diretas Já15, or the movement for direct elections,
which took millions to the streets.”
“In a newly established political tradition, popular mobilization tipped the scales,
severely undermined the legitimacy of the executive, which began to cave to popular appeals
for a new, democratic Constitution. General political analysis of the composition of the

12
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and Changing
Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, 8th edition (United State of America
: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013), 379.
13
Cavalcanti, Ana Beatriz Vanzoff Robalinho. “Brazil in Comparative Perspective : the Legacy of the Founding
and the Future of Constitutional Development”. Journal of SciELO 6, no.1(2019):15, Accessed October 12,
2020, https://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2359-56392019000100011.
14
Data available at the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). See -
https://seriesestatissticas.ibge.gov.br/.
15
Cavalcanti, Ana Beatriz Vanzoff Robalinho. “Brazil in Comparative Perspective : the Legacy of the Founding
and the Future of Constitutional Development”. Journal of SciELO 6, no.1(2019):15-16, Accessed October 12,
2020, https://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2359-56392019000100011.
59
Brazilian Constituent Assembly reveals that the majority of its members held conservative
and elitist views, detached from the appeals of the general public”.16 Meanwhile, “the
military government sought to minimize damages by exerting pressure in strategic points of
the debate within the Assembly, most famously in forcing the approval of a presidential form
of government, when a clear majority was in favor of a parliamentary system”.17 The
paradoxical features of our founding have crowded constitutional theory and practice in
Brazil with diverging conceptions of the true identity of our system, with profound
consequences for the legitimation of constitutional evolution. The dominant traditional
narrative has been one of elite dominated continuity, but popular influence and rupture have
been increasingly featured in narratives about the founding.
Constitutional Narrative and Constitutional Development
A Constitution is defined by its narrative. “The narrative informs the animus that holds it
upward and pushes it forward. In describing the importance of narrative, Robert Cover
claimed that every version of the constitutional framing creates a new text”.18 Thus, the
narrative has the upper hand, the text needs to be changed to adapt to it and not the other way
around. The idea of narrative is rich because it embodies more than a story about how the
Constitution came to be, sometimes fifty, sometimes two hundred years in the past. It
informs, moreover, a compromise, a project, that extends over time. It tells us why we
committed ourselves to something – and not just what we committed ourselves to – thus
helping to justify why we stick to it.
A constitutional narrative is therefore part of the constitutional culture, a set of
extrajudicial beliefs that provides guidance and constraints upon constitutional law.19 It
constrains because it provides for a certain way to do things, built upon experience extending
sometimes for decades, sometimes centuries. In this sense, narrative and culture relate deeply
to the patterns of constitutional legitimacy. Frank Michelman defined “legitimacy as respect-
worthiness and asserted that in a constitutional system, people experience pressure to support
laws they do not agree with”.20 The varying layers of narrative provided by the different
efforts at rationalizing constitutionalism on a world level, therefore, have far greater
consequences that mere reclassification on the comparative sphere. “Some constitutional
systems, by virtue of factors that escape the traditional boundaries of geography, common
culture or language, are more compatible with one another because they are informed by a

16
Hagopian, Frances. “ Democracy by Undemocrtic Means? Elites, Political Pacts and Regime Transition in
Brazil”, Comparative Political Studies 23, no.2(1990):147-170.
17
J. Linz, Juan and Stepan Alfred. “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America and Post-Communist Europe”. (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 170.
18
Cover, Robert M. “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword : Nomos and Narrative”. Yale Law School
Legal Scholarship Repository 1, no.1 (1983):4, Accessed October 19, 2020,
https://www.depauw.edu/site/humanimalia/issue%2017/pdfs/The%20Supre.
19
Post, Robert C. “Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law”. Harvard Law Review,
vol. 117(2003):4.
20
Michelman, Frank I. “Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy”. Review of Constitutional Studies, vol. 8
(2003):128.
60
similar legitimating logic”.21 That is the problem Ackerman identified in Europe, where a
novel exercise at cross-continental constitutionalism must overcome the incompatible
constitutional heritages that spring from histories of the different nations seeking to be united
under one constitutional system.
Furthermore, the consequences of narrative re-telling are also deep within the national
sphere. “The way a country understands its own Constitution will have profoundeffects on
the way it will struggle to maintain the system’s legitimacy over time. It will affect the way
legal arguments are made, the way the Constitution can be altered, the substance of
constitutional developments”.22 As new stories are told about the Constitution as a project,
new goals will be set.
Both aspects of this analysis influence Brazil’s constitutionalism.“The ambiguous nature
of our constitutional founding allows no easy categorization to be sketched regarding our
place in a worldwide constitutional order. To make matters worse, our two chief
constitutional fathers – the systems from which we draw heavier influences – are modeling
opposites in the discussed scenario: Germany is a clear elite construction case, while the
United States is a paradigmatic contender of revolutionary constitutionalism”.23
Within our own constitutional history, we can hardly grasp what is our precedent for
constitutional evolution and development. “Are we a classic elite construction model, built on
the sensibility of elites and in the absence of popular mobilization? Or is our unconventional
model of non-partisan popular mobilization an expression of revolutionary
constitutionalism?”24 As we go forward and face the political turmoil that threatens our
young democracy, it becomes paramount to grasp what kind of constitutional practice or
process we are likely to embrace in a new moment of crisis.
Brazil could be such a case. Our founding document is filled with promises for
democracy, progress, equality and social justice that can be inspired into reality or read as
dead letter. These achievements lie in the text and in the spirit of the Constitution – rightly
understood – and await an interpretative attitude compatible with the task of realizing them.
The judiciary in the last decade, the general trend continues to point towards containing the
effects of the constitutionalizing revolution of law that have resulted from the combination of
the abstract comprehensiveness (and progressive character) of the Constitution and the rise of
the judiciary to the center of political consequence.
Until we can reconcile the ongoing exercise of responsiveness the Constitution must
undertake in a democratic setting with our true sources of founding legitimacy, our

21
Cavalcanti, Ana Beatriz Vanzoff Robalinho. “Brazil in Comparative Perspective : the Legacy of the Founding
and the Future of Constitutional Development”. Journal of SciELO 6, no.1(2019):27, Accessed October 12,
2020, https://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2359-56392019000100011.
22
Robalinho. “Brazil in Comparative Perspective”, 27-28.
23
Robalinho. “Brazil in Comparative Perspective”, 28.
24
Robalinho. “Brazil in Comparative Perspective”, 28.

61
constitutional development will continue to fall short in both theory and practice. “If the last
thirty years of constitutional development are faced with an eye on the binding precedents
and ideals of previous regimes, we will continue to be unable to justify the direction and
scope of our constitutional evolution”.25 But if we can understand 1988 as an enterprise that
tried (and partially succeeded) in breaking with the past, we may learn to interpret and apply
our Constitution in ways that redeem the revolutionary commitments of the Brazilian
founding.
Constitutions and Democratic Consolidation Brazil in Comparative Perspective
The Brazilian experience in drafting a new constitution has been more extreme than the
Portuguese. As the transition controlled from above went out of control, so did the
Constituent Assembly. On the other hand, the Constitution itself is not a political issue in
spain, except for some of the Basques. This continues in Porttugal and substantial political
instability continued until a majority government was elected in 1987. “Brazil is not too
worried about politicization of the 1988 constitution; rather, it can be considered irrelevant
due to its tenure and not being fit between the economic, political reality and context of the
country it purports to guide”.26
The 1988 docoment provides something to all citizens with the exception of Brazil’s
millions of poverty stricken landless peasants. Earlier Brazilian constitutions were not fully,
implemented nor, for that matter, were sections of the Portuguese constitution of 1976.
Brazil’s transition from a military to civilian regime is unique in that the role of the armed
forces has diminished minimally, if at all. Article 142 stipulates, in part, “Their (the armed
forces) purpose is to defend the fatherland, guarantee the constitutionally established power
and – upon the initiative of any of said power – law and order”.27 “The armed forces in Brazil
came into the country through the transition unscathed and began a modernization program
with the inception of the civilian regime”. “They lobbied effectively in the Constituent
Assembly and their prominence and prestige increased as President Sarney, with little
political base of his own, relied upon them for support”.28 Thus in reality remain at the center
of power in fact and in terms of the constitution.
The Brazillian Constitutional Problem and the Constitutional Reform Agenda
“Constitutional changes is not always a sign of the structural transformation of the polity, but
might be a mere outcome of constitutionalized policies”.29 The Brazilian Charter of 1988 is

25
Robalinho. “Brazil in Comparative Perspective”, 29.
26
Bruneau, Thomas C. “Constitutions and Democratic Consolidation Brazil in Comparative Perspective”.
(California : Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 1989), 31-32. Accessed October 12, 2020,
https://www.apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a208224.pdf.
27
Thomas C. “Constitutions and Democratic”, 27.
28
Thomas C. “Constitutions and Democratic”, 27.
29
Couto, Claudio G and Rogerio B. Arantes. “ Constitution, Government and Democracy in Brazil”. World
Political Science Review 4, no.2(2008):30, Accessed October 21, 2020,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/250148031_Constitution_Government_and_Democracy_in_Brazil.

62
characterized for having formally constitutionalized several provisions that actually exhibit
characteristics of government policies, with strong implications for the functioning of the
Brazilian political system. In the first place, “the constitutionalization of public policies poses
the need for succeeding governments to modify the constitutional framework to be able to
implement part of their government platforms. In the second place, building sweeping
legislative majorities becomes the basic condition to overcome the restraints to which the
government agenda was submitted by the constituent delegate, something particularly
difficult in the constitutional context of a federative State and a multiparty and bicameral
presidential regime as is the Brazilian”.30 Last but not least, this special type of Constitution
tends to cause significant impact on the functioning of the justice system, to the extent that
the Judiciary, and especially its higher body – the Supreme Federal Court –, is increasingly
urged to rule on the constitutionality of laws and other normative acts, not always related to
fundamental constitutional principles, yet again frequently related to public policies.
Melo’s analysis is revealing in itself of a fundamental aspect of that which we are calling
the Brazilian constitutional problem. After all, why should the success or failure of a process
of constitutional revision be contingent upon the interests of “government”, the presence or
absence of policy advocates, the negative effect (“devastating”) of “contextual” factors, by
the political “juncture” and by the “electoral calendar”, if not for the fact that such
Constitution is itself a Charter than encases many typically governmental provisions? “That
is, the factors identified by Melo to explain the failure of the 1993/94 constitutional revision
are the very confirmation of our argument that the Constitution created a modus operandi for
the production of laws that ties the conjunctural interests, of government and policy
advocates, to the constitutional framework”.31 It is for that reason that the Brazilian political
agenda continued to be a constituent assembly agenda in the post-1988.
Throughout the twenty years in 2008 that the 1988 Constitution has been in force, a total
of 62 constitutional amendments were passed, six during the aforementioned revision process
(1993-1994) –Constitutional Revision Amendments– and another 56 as common
Constitutional Amendments. Of the latter, 35 were approved during the Fernando Henrique
Cardoso government (between the years of 1995 and 2002) and 17 during the Lula
government. They were, mostly, proposals by initiative of the Executive Branch, focusing
predominantly on matters that composed a typical government agenda, yet not necessarily
constitutional, in the most rigorous sense the expression may contain.
Political Economy and Development
Brazil’s politics like other developing countries, has always been shaped by the pursuit of
economic and social development. Globalization has made the Brazilian economy highly
dependent on the country’s strategic position in world markets. Without the state-led

30
Arantes. “ Constitution, Government”, 4-5.
31
Arantes. “ Constitution, Government”, 8.
63
development that guided Brazil during the last half century, the country faces a crossroads in
its model of economic growth.
Moved from Import-Substitution to Market-Oriented Reform
State and Economy
Before the formation of new state, Brazil’s economic development prior to depended on
export-led growth, that is, on the export of agricultural products. Whereas, during the Old
Republic, international demand for Brazilian coffee gave Brazil a virtual global monopoly.
The decline in international demand for coffee during the 1930s made the state more
interventionist. As exports declined, imports of manufactured goods also fell drastically.
These forces prompted a model of import substitution industrialization (ISI) development in
Brazil, which promoted domestic production of previously imported manufactured goods.
“At first, Brazil did not need large doses of state intervention. During the 1950s Brazil was a
prime example of ECLA-style developmentalism, the ideology and practice of state-
sponsored growth.32 To cope with this economic instability, the state promoted private
investment by extracting and distributing raw materials for domestic industries at prices well
below the international market. Other firms that were associated with the sectors of the
economy receiving these supports would benefit in a chain reaction.
The failures of ISI model during the 1960s prompted many Brazilian academics to adopt
the view, that recently popularized as the “dependency school,” that underdeveloped or
“peripheral” countries could not achieve sustained levels of industrialization and growth in a
world dominated by “core” economies in North America and Western Europe. “ISI’s failures,
it was argued, were due to the ill-fated attempt to adjust marginally the inherently
exploitative structure of world markets”.33 In order to confront this situation, the dependency
school advocated delinking Brazil from the world economy. While this view was widely
popular among leftist economists in Brazil and elsewhere, it did not become a basis for
policy.
Partially due to the slowing down of ISI and the accumulation of debt and higher
inflation, the democratic governments after 1985 turned to a more market-oriented or market-
friendly approach, dubbed neoliberal policies. Liberalization of markets in this globalized and
liberalized world opened up Brazilian industry to increased foreign competition, as a result
the competitiveness of domestic firms emerged as a core problem. “These involved reducing
tariffs on imports, deregulating parts of the economy, and privatizing some large companies
in sectors such as steel, telecommunications, and transport. As export prices for commodities
such as soy, oil, and iron ore increased during the 2000”.34 The end of this commodity boom

32
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and Changing
Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, 8th edition (United State of America
: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013), 382.
33
Alfred P. “Brazil”, 383.
34
Alfred P. “Brazil”, 383.
64
after 2011 coincided with low growth and corruption investigations involving many of the
private and public firms that benefited the most during the boom period.
The Fiscal System
The Brazilian economy became more complex after the 1960s, in such circumstances new
opportunities for evading taxation were emerged. “The new constitution of 1988 allowed
states and municipalities to expand their collection of taxes and to receive larger transfers of
funds from Brasília. Significant gaps then emerged in tax collection responsibilities and
public spending. Although the central state spent less than it collected in taxes between 1960
and 1994, Brazil’s 5,564 municipal governments spent several times more than they
collected”.35 Subnational governments also gained more discretion over spending, since the
destination of most funds was not predetermined by the federal government. The governors
also used public banks held by the state governments to finance expenditures, thus expanding
their debt.
The Collor administration began to reverse some of the adverse effects. But the Cardoso
administration’s efforts to recover federal tax revenues and reduce the fi scal distortions of
Brazil’s federal structure made the greatest difference. “The Fiscal Responsibility Law of
2000 set strict limits on federal, state, and municipal expenditures, but its enforcement is still
in doubt. With large civil service payrolls, governments are hardpressed to implement the
law. Despite these problems, improved tax collection and economic growth have reduced the
public debt from 60 percent of GDP in 2002 to 43 percent in 2010”.36
The Welfare System
In a country of startling social inequalities, welfare policy plays a remarkably small role.
Although welfare and education expenditures constitute about 11 percent of the GDP, among
the highest levels in the world, the money has not improved Brazil’s mediocre welfare state.
The Cardoso administration laid some of the groundwork for reversing poverty and
inequality.
The Lula administration focused even more on social reform. In the fall of 2003, the
government passed a social security reform that raised the minimum retirement age, placed
stricter limits on benefit ceilings, reduced survivor benefits, and taxed pensions and benefits.
Issues including the taxation of social security benefits for judges and military officers and
the reduction of survivor benefits for the latter group became stumbling blocks in cross-party
negotiations. The government made concessions on these and other issues, but the total
annual savings were less than half of the original target.

35
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and Changing
Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, Sixth edition (United State of
America : Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013),399.
36
National Development Bank of Brazil, Searchable Database of Documents on Brazilian Economy and
Development, https:\\www.bndes.gov.br/siteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/.
65
Agrarian Reform
Landownership remains in the hands of only 1 percent of the landowning class. The landless
poor have swelled the rings of poverty around Brazil’s major cities. “During the 1950s and
1960s, the growth of industry in the south and southeast enticed millions to migrate in the
hopes of finding new economic opportunities”.37 By 2015, 86 percent of Brazil’s population
was living in urban areas.
The federal government subsidized communication and transportation in the poorer
regions and created new state agencies to run regional developmental projects. The poor
regions increased their share of GDP. The economic gap between regions narrowed, but
social and income disparities within the underdeveloped regions increased. Industrialization
in the poorer regions was capital intensive and therefore labor saving, but it did not create
jobs. Only the most skilled workers in these regions benefited from these changes. Poor
agricultural management, ecological destruction, the murder of native Brazilians in order to
expropriate land for mining and agriculture, and corruption all weakened the distributive
effect of these policies. The northern and northeastern regions remain much poorer today than
those in the south and southeast.
Brazil in the Global Economy
Brazil has maintained strategic relations with the global market. Unlike the other large Latin
American countries, Brazil initially rejected the reform agenda proposed by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Although the Collor and Cardoso governments implemented some of
this agenda by reducing tariffs and privatizing some state companies, Brazil’s economy
retained much of its autonomy in the global market.
Nevertheless, Brazil’s commitment to the international free-trade system will likely
expand with the continued importance of its export sector. “Maintaining a healthy trade
surplus will continue to be a major component in the country’s formula for growth, especially
as commodity prices for soy, oranges, wheat, coffee, and other products recover. At the same
time, Brazil cannot depend on the occasional “commodity boom” to sustain growth”. 38 It is
becoming one of the major manufacturing and agrindustry nodes in the globalized system of
production and consumption with ties to East Asia becoming more important as a target
market for exports and also outward-oriented Brazilian companies such as the airplane
manufacturer, Embraer.

37
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and Changing
Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, Sixth edition (United State of
America : Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013),403.
38
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and Changing
Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, 8th edition (United State of America
: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013),389.
66
Recent Development and Ongoing Reform Initiatives
Brazil reformed its insolvency law in 2005. The reform aimed at providing creditors with a
more rapid liquidation of distressed firms and allocated higher priority for secured creditors
vis-à-vis workers and tax authorities. It resulted in credit expansion and business investment
growth, especially in high productivity firms (Arnold and Flach, 2018). However, “Brazil’s
insolvency procedures continue to be less efficient and more costly than those found in
OECD and in peer Latin America countries (Figure 1). A typical bankruptcy resolution takes
4 years in Brazil, compared to 2.9 years in LAC countries and 1.7 years in OECD
countries”.39 Since assets of distressed companies tend to lose value quickly, “it is not
surprising that Brazil’s recovery rate on debt with insolvent companies is only 15.8 cents on
the dollar, while it is 31 cents in Latin America and Caribbean and 73 cents in OECD high-
income countries”.40

Figure 1. Insolvencies are slow and recovery rates low

Source: World Bank (2017), Uma ajuste justo - Analise da eficiencia e equidade do gasto
public no Brasil, Volume I: Sintese November 2017. StatLink –
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933656042.
Since 2016, the following reforms have been implemented:
 An expenditure rule requires a freeze of real federal primary expenditure growth over
the next 20 years.

39
Raising Investment and Improving Infrastructure, UN iLibrary, Accessed October 18, 2020, https://www.un-
ilibrary.org/sites/eco_surveys-bra-2018-4-en/index.html?itemld=/conted/component/eco_surveys-bra-2018-4-
en#wrapper.
40
“Raising Investment and Improving Infrastructure”.
67
  A financial market reform will align directed lending rates with market rates within at
most 5 years.
 An education reform was passed in 2016.
The reform has reduced the number of mandatory subjects, providing more options and more
room for tailoring teaching content to less academically inclined students. This is likely to
help reducing drop-out rates.
 A new immigration law was passed in 2017.
The new law streamlines work visa application processes and enables workers already in the
country to switch jobs without applying for another visa.
 A labour market reform has removed obstacles to stronger formal employment
growth.
“The reform has allowed firm-level agreements to take prevalence over the law, which
provides a legal basis for long-standing practice and reduces legal uncertainties”.41 At the
same time, essential employee rights have remained non-negotiable.
Concluding Remark
Improving Governance and Reducing Corruption
During the Brazilian winter (the North American summer) of 2016, as the world became
transfixed on the Olympic Summer Games, the Senate was preparing to convict President
Dilma Rousseff of “crimes of responsibility” for her mismanagement of the federal budget.
The uncovering of massive corruption in Brazilian politics by constitutionally-protected
investigatory and prosecutorial bodies is reshaping the country’s democracy. To illustrate
how fundamental these revelations are, the press dubbed the release of the testimony of 77
Odebrecht executives in 2017 as simply “The End of the World.”42 The lack of accountability
and democratic responsiveness that the corruption scandals and Rousseff’s impeachment
reveal, map onto the larger socio-economic inequalities that are evident in Brazil.
The Brazilian state is a mixture of professionalism and clientelism, and both of these
dimensions have persisted even as the country has democratized and developed. Brazilian
democracy has strengthened law enforcement as the prosecutorial, oversight, and
investigative functions of the state have become more adept at detecting corruption. “If the
Temer government is able to survive corruption investigations, it may succeed in keeping the
political system governable before the next presidential election in 2018”.43 As globalization
and democratization have made Brazilian politics less predictable, older questions about what

41
“OECD Economic Surveys : Brazil”, OECD (2018):10-11, Accessed October 18, 2020,
https://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Brazil-2018-OECD-economic-survey-.
42
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and Changing
Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, 8th edition (United State of America
: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013),407.
43
Alfred P. “Brazil”, 413.
68
it means to be Brazilian have reemerged. Brazil highlights the point made in the Introduction
that political identities are often reshaped in changed circumstances.
“Brazil now enters the 21st century as one of the main emerging powers in the world”.44
“One way Brazil has gotten involved internationally is through joining many organisations
such as BRICS, G-15, G-20, G-24, G-5, G-77 international groups. Its economy has risen to
be in the top ten internationally and Brazil has started to make a name for itself on the
international stage”.45
Reference
Bruneau, Thomas C. “Constitutions and Democratic Consolidation Brazil in Comparative
Perspective”. (California : Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 1989), Accessed October
12, 2020, https://www.apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a208224.pdf.
Cavalcanti, Ana Beatriz Vanzoff Robalinho. “Brazil in Comparative Perspective : the Legacy
of the Founding and the Future of Constitutional Development”. Journal of SciELO 6,
no.1(2019), Accessed October 12, 2020,
https://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2359- 56392019000100011.
Cover, Robert M. “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword : Nomos and Narrative”. Yale
Law School Legal Scholarship Repository 1, no.1 (1983), Accessed October 19, 2020,
https://www.depauw.edu/site/humanimalia/issue%2017/pdfs/The%20Supre.
Couto, Claudio G and Rogerio B. Arantes. “ Constitution, Government and Democracy in
Brazil”. World Political Science Review 4, no.2(2008), Accessed October 21, 2020,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/250148031_Constitution_Government_and
Democracy_in_Brazil.
Centracchio, DI Francesca. “Brazil’s Soft Power as a Tool For World Power Emerging
Process”. Centro Studi Internazionali 18, (2016), Accessed November 3, 2020,
https://www.cesi-italia.org/en/articoli/506/brazils-soft-power-as-a-tool-for-world- power-
emerging-process.
Data available at the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). See -
https://seriesestatissticas.ibge.gov.br/.
Hagopian, Frances. “ Democracy by Undemocrtic Means? Elites, Political Pacts and Regime
Transition in Brazil”, Comparative Political Studies 23, no.2(1990).

44
Rodrigues, Gabriel. “Putting the B in the BRIC : Brazil’s Rise as a Major Emerging Power”. Cornell
International Affairs Review 3, no.1, (2009), Accessed November 3, 2020,
https://www.journals.library.cornell.edu/index.php/ciar/article/view/379.
45
Centracchio, DI Francesca. “Brazil’s Soft Power as a Tool For World Power Emerging Process”. Centro Studi
Internazionali 18, (2016), Accessed November 3, 2020, https://www.cesi-italia.org/en/articoli/506/brazils-soft-
power-as-a-tool-for-world-power-emerging-process.
69
J. Linz, Juan and Stepan Alfred. “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe”. (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1996).
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and
Changing Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, Sixth
edition (United State of America : Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013). Michelman, Frank
I. “Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy”. Review of Constitutional Studies,
vol. 8 (2003).
Montero, Alfred P. “Brazil”. In Introduction to Comparative Politics : Politics Challenges and
Changing Agendas, edited by Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William A. Joseph, 8th
edition (United State of America : Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013).
National Development Bank of Brazil, Searchable Database of Documents on Brazilian
Economy and Development, https:\\www.bndes.gov.br/siteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/.
“OECD Economic Surveys : Brazil”, OECD (2018):8, Accessed October 18, 2020,
https://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Brazil-2018-OECD-economic-survey-.
Post, Robert C. “Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law”. Harvard Law
Review, vol. 117(2003).
Raising Investment and Improving Infrastructure, UN iLibrary, Accessed October 18, 2020,
https://www.un-ilibrary.org/sites/eco_surveys-bra-2018-4-
en/index.html?itemld=/conted/component/eco_surveys-bra-2018-4-en#wrapper.
Rodrigues, Gabriel. “Putting the B in the BRIC : Brazil’s Rise as a Major Emerging Power”.
Cornell International Affairs Review 3, no.1, (2009), Accessed November 3, 2020,
https://www.journals.library.cornell.edu/index.php/ciar/article/view/379.
World Bank (2017), Uma ajuste justo - Analise da eficiencia e equidade do gasto public no
Brasil, Volume I: Sintese November 2017. StatLink –
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933656042.

70
 Unit-4

(iii) Constitutional Developments and Political Economy in Nigeria

Dr. Robert Mizo

Introduction
Nigeria, the largest country of Africa, is an ideal one to include in the study of comparative
politics because it embodies many of the typical problems of a post-colonial state. Is a
relatively young country trying to develop a unified national identity despite the multifarious
ethnic and religious divisions. These demographic differences have affected its political
development and leading to the oscillation of power between civilian and military
governments which have ranged from authoritarian to progressive. Nigeria has witnessed the
transition of power from colonial to the postcolonial civilian government and long years of
military dictatorships. There have been three civilian governments and five successful,
mostly bloody, military coups and several attempted failed ones. It was under the military
regime for a total of 30 years since its independence in 1960. Nigeria since 1999 is
experiencing its longest period of uninterrupted civilian government. Economically, Nigeria
has had a chequered history from being a promising oil-rich economy to one that has
completely failed to industrialise. The malady lies in its over reliance on oil, the prices of
which are determined by the global market forces.
Nigeria is ethnically and religiously plural as mentioned above. The three biggest ethnic
groups are the Hausa-Fulani in the north who make up 30 per cent of the total population, the
Yorubas in the southwest who form about 20 per cent of the total population and the Igbo in
the southeast forming about 17 per cent of Nigerians. Attempts to make these disparate
groups to think beyond ethnic lines and as Nigerians instead have failed. Wole Soyinka, the
Nigerian novelist and Nobel laureate therefore dismissed the idea of the Nigerian nation as a
“farcical illusion”. Additionally, Nigeria is comprised of different religious groups – more
than fifty per cent of Nigerians are Muslims who dominate the northern regions mostly, while
Christians who dominate the south make up 30 per cent and the rest follow traditional
religions. The north aspire to see the introduction of the sharia law over the region and have
witnessed religious tensions repeatedly escalating into violence. Nigeria is also regionally
differently endowed. The north is dry and poor with savanna or semi-desert type terrain while
the south is richer in resources and infrastructural conditions. Oil reserves are concentrated in
the southeast or off the coast of Nigeria in the south and yet the profits have gone to the
political elites of other regions (McCormick, 2010). This inherent inequality of resources has
been a point of distrust and enmity among the ethnic groups of Nigeria.
This chapter presents an analysis of the political and economic development of Nigeria.
It begins by tracing its political history from the pre-colonial period to the present fourth
republic through the years of military regimes. Following this, the chapter analyses the
constitutional developments of the Nigerian state. The chapter then seeks to understand the

71
nature of political culture that defines the citizenry of Nigeria from which we proceed to
study the role of ethnicity in Nigerian politics. The chapter closes with an analysis of
Nigeria’s political economy which is undoubtedly an important part of understanding the
country.
Political Development
The long turbulent process of Nigeria’s political development could be attributed to its
colonial history. Apart from the colonial spoils the British accumulated, they also left behind
a fractured political system. In more than 60 years of independence, Nigeria has remained a
troubled state with corrupt state apparatuses and has failed to tap into its rich natural and
human resources. However, it is unwise to put the blame of underdevelopment squarely on its
colonial legacy without inquiring within the multicultural narratives. Nigeria’s political
development from its pre-colonial period to the present is best studied in historical phases
such as Precolonial Era (900 B.C.–A.D. 1851), the Colonial Era (1861–1960); Independence
and the First Republic (1960–1966) Military Government I (1966–1979); the Second
Republic (1979–1983) and Military Government II (1983–1999) and finally, the Fourth
Republic (1999–date).
Pre-colonial Nigeria – 900 BC – 1851 AD
Nigeria was under the occupation of the Nok from 900 BC to AD 200. They built a rich and
advanced culture having discovered the process of smelting iron. The Nok civilisation
disappeared by the 2nd AD heralding what is known as the ‘silent millennium’ in Nigeria’s
history because very little information is available from the period. The first half of the 2nd
century AD saw the emergence of several rich and powerful independent kingdoms with
unique political structures, culture and social traditions (Philips 2004, 30-32). By about the
700 BC, Muslim traders had arrived in the region. The two most important ethnic groups of
Nigeria the Hausa-Fulani emerged in northern Nigeria between 1000-1200 AD when the
Hausas initially formed city states and gradually the Fulanis began intertwining with them.
By the 14th century, the region of Nigeria came to be dominated by the kingdoms of Mali,
Ghana and Kanem-Bornu. Nigeria became came well connected by trade routes up to Europe
and the Middle East. What is now the northwest part of Nigeria became part of the Songhai
empire by the 16th century, and the southern Nigeria came under the influence of the rich
Benin culture (McCormick 2010, 438).
The city of Lagos was founded in the 15th century by the Portuguese who were the first
European colonialists to explore the region. They introduced an expansive slave trade in
cooperation with Benin, shipping slaves to the Americas for labour in mines and sugar
plantations. Other European trading companies from France, Britain and the Netherlands
arrived in Nigeria by the 17th century, each building up trading centres and garrisons to
protect their respective business interests. The British eventually became the biggest slave
traders in the area. When slave trade was banned in Britain in 1807, they Queen’s Navy was
deployed in Nigeria to enforce the ban thereby signalling the beginning of formal

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colonialism. Slave traders turned their interests to ivory and palm oil while explorers forayed
deeper into the interior regions of the region. This was followed by the arrival of Christian
missionaries (McCormick 2010, 439).
The Colonial Era – 1861-1960
Britain’s colonial interest in Nigeria in part sprang from the imperial competition among the
Europeans which had come to be known as the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the 19th century.
Concerned with the French expansion of colonial influence across the Sahel and North
Africa, Britain annexed Lagos in 1861 and then occupied rest of today’s Nigeria. They ruled
over Nigeria as two divided colonies – north and south – with different administrative
systems. In the north, they ruled indirectly through the traditional Muslim emirates which
were hierarchical, authoritarian, and bureaucratic, whereas in the south, they established a
direct rule through an advisory Legislative Council (McCormick 2010, 439). This divide and
rule tactic of the British further deepened when in 1939, Nigeria was split into three
provinces based on different cash crops: peanuts in the north, cocoa in the west and palm oil
in the East. These divisions coincided with the major ethnic groups, prompting Nigerians to
think in regional rather than national terms (ibid.). These colonial administrative
arrangements had far reaching consequences for state and nation building in Nigeria.
The origins of Nigeria’s demand for independence from the British can be seen in the
formation of the National Congress of British West Africa in 1920 with the aim to demand
for greater political participation for Nigerians. The heralded the formation of political parties
such as the Nigerian National Democratic Party led by Herbert Macaulay, popularly known
as the father of Nigerian Nationalism. In 1944, Dr. Nnami Azikiwe helped set up the National
Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. This was followed by the establishment of several
ethnically based political parties by the Hausas, Yorubas and the Igbos. The aftermath of the
second world war and its consequences on Britain’s economy let Britain to make way for
Nigeria’s independence. In 1954, the Lyttleton Constitution was published creating the
Nigerian Federation. It established a federal parliament with half the seats allocated to the
North. There were regional elections wherein several regionally based political parties
contested. The national elections were held in 1959, electing the first national government of
Nigeria. On October 1, 1960, Nigeria was declared independent under Prime Ministership of
Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who was a Muslim Hausa-Fulani (McCormick 2010,
439).
The First Republic (1960–1966)
Independent Nigeria adopted a parliamentary democracy mirroring the Westminster system.
Although independent, it was yet to be a republic; the Queen remained the head of state until
1963 when the post of the president was created. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was the first president
of republic Nigeria. Regardless, ever since independence, the legislative power was vested in
a bicameral parliament, the prime minister and his cabinet held the executive power while
judicial authority was exercised by a Federal Supreme Court. The newly instituted

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governmental structure in Nigeria was quickly confronted with ethnic and religious conflicts
which the young state was unable to resolve. The Hausa-Faluni led Northern People’s
Congress of the northern Nigeria dominated the new parliament and were accused of
promoting a policy of ‘northernisation’ of resources and infrastructure. Groups and parties of
other regions such as the Igbos’ led National Convention of Nigerian Citizens in the east and
the Action Group controlled by Yorubas in the south were vehemently opposed to this
development. This inequal regional representation was because of the allocation of
parliamentary seats to each region on the basis of population drawn by the census. No later
than a few years into independence, Nigeria witnessed the outbreak of inter-party squabbles
reflecting ethnic and religious tensions. These were compounded by a general economic
dissatisfaction of workers and allegations of political corruption. Both the national elections
in 1964 and the regional elections in the west in 1965 were conducted under intense civil
unrest. The growing failure of the civilian government to control the political and economic
developments in the country caused immense concern and frustration to the increasingly
advancing and Africanised military.
Military Government I (1966–1979)
The inefficient and crippled civilian government was overthrown by the military through a
coup on 15th January 1966 – a first of the many to happen. This coup was carried out by a
group of Igbo officers led by Major Jhonson Aguiyi Ironsi. The bloody coup involved the
suspension of the constitution, the federal structure and the killings of senior national and
regional political leaders including Prime Minister Balewa. Even under military rule,
regionalism and ethnic politics still remained core determinants of Nigeria’s politics. In the
north, the Hausa-Faluni groups feared the political domination of the Igbos and retaliated
through beatings and killings of northern Igbos. Divisive as the Igbo led military regime was,
it was toppled by yet another countercoup in July 1966, staged by Northern military officers
under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon (a Christian from Nigeria’s
Middle Belt). In this coup, Major Ironsi was murdered along with other officers. The new
regime restored the federal structure and promised to return to civilian rule once a new
constitution was agreed upon by all parties.
The dissatisfaction of the Igbos against the Nigerian state and the northerners reached its
heights when in 1967, the Igbo dominated Eastern region declared a new independent state of
Biafra. This secessionist expression led by Lieutenant Colonel Odemegwu Ojukwu resulted
in the outbreak of a civil war. The Biafrans were convinced that the Northern Muslims were
determined to exterminate them and hence fought tenaciously throughout the civil war which
lasted till 1970. While Biafra received some international assistance from sympathisers such
as France, Spain, South Africa and Israel, it could not sustain the fight upon being subjected
to a naval blockade. After 27 months of fighting and approximately 2 million deaths, Biafrans
were practically starved into submission and their leader Ojukwu went into exile. Nigeria was
once again reunited, however was far from being healed despite efforts undertaken by
Gowan. As part of the national reconciliation policy, Gowon divided the three regions of

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Nigeria into twelve states and also strengthened the military by more than two folds from its
capacity in 1966.
By the early 1970’s, Gowon’s tardiness in returning to democracy and inability to affect
economic stability was becoming evident. He failed to control inflation, economic
maladministration including the oil proceeds. These weaknesses let to another coup, a
bloodless one for a change, by reform-oriented officers. Gowon was succeeded by Brigadier
Murtala Muhammed who was a Hausa-Fulani. Muhammed announced the return to civilian
government in four years and undertook a cleansing operation within the military, dismissing
those charged with corruption. Muhammed made enemies through his reform actions and was
assassinated in a countercoup by Gowon’s followers trying to regain power. However, the
coup ended in a failure for the Gowon camp and Muhammed was succeeded by Lieutenant
Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo becoming the first head of state of Nigeria from the Yoruba
ethnic group. He upheld Muhammed’s timeline for returning to civilian government and
ceded power to one in 1979.
The Second Republic (1979-1983)
Despite myriad allegations of electoral malpractices and intimidation, the elections held in
1979 produced a new civilian government in Nigeria. The new constitution came into force
which adopted the US presidential system in place of its older parliamentary system. It had a
directedly elected executive in the President, a bicameral National Assembly – the Senate and
the House of Representatives, and a separate and independent Judiciary. The constitution
provided for a system check and balances and clear division of powers among the three
organs of government. The Supreme Court had the power of judicial review as well. The new
civilian government was headed by Shehu Shagari and his National Party of Nigeria, who
won the elections by a clean majority. Shagari’s political support base was mainly drawn
from the northern parts of the country. Shagari announced the shifting of the capital from
Lagos to Abuja located in the geographical centre of the country. He was praised for
pardoning previous leaders Ojukwu and Gowon and allowing them to return from exile
signalling efforts to ameliorate ethnic differences. However, mistrust, ethnic antagonism
continued to prevail under his regime. In the economic sphere, Shagari was unable to
maintain control when global oil process dropped in the early 1980s. Elections were held in
1983 as scheduled in which Shagari won a second presidential term. However, allegations of
ballot-rigging and outright clashes among party supporters marred the elections. Shagari’s
second term was heralded by the breakdown of parties along ethnic and regional lines.
Military Government II (1983-1999)
The weaknesses of the Shagari government gave way to yet another military coup in Nigeria
on December 31, 1983 in which he was ousted. Led by Major General Muhammadu Buhari, a
northern Muslim, this military regime however quickly lost admiration when it refused to
pledge a quick return to democracy and failed to revive the economy. Buhari’s
authoritarianism and ineffectiveness let to his ouster by yet another coup in August 1985.

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Major General Ibrahim Babangida, a Middle Belt Muslim, became the new leader and
announced transition to democracy under the constitution of the Third Republic. Political
parties were re-legalised in 1989, state and national legislative elections were held between
1990-92 while a presidential election was held in June 1993. The presidential election was
apparently won by Chief Moshood Abiola of the Social Democratic Party. However, driven
by the desire to perpetuate his power, Babangida annulled the election on alleged grounds of
election-rigging and refused to declare its results. The major public outcry that followed
forced Babangida to resign from office in August and passed on power to an interim civilian
government led by Ernest Shonekan. This potential third republic was quickly ousted on 17
November 1993 by Brigadier Sani Abacha, the defence minister. Observing the unfolding
political high drama, Abiola, the legitimate president-elect defiantly proclaimed himself as
president only to be jailed, and his wife murdered.
Sani Abacha began his reign with a promise to quickly restore civilian government but
continued to rule till his death. Abacha sentenced Olusegun Obasanjo in 1995 to life
imprisonment on charges of collusion to a coup. The Abacha regime was characterised by
continuing political instability and blatant disregard for human rights which was evident in
the execution of political activists including Ken Saro-Wiwa (McCormick, 2010, 443). This
is far reaching international repercussions on Nigeria including its suspension from the
British Commonwealth. Abacha’s political ploys to ensure his own victory in the impending
elections were cut short by his untimely death due to a heart attack in June 1998. Mehsood
Aboila, the president in the wings, also lost his life to a heart attack a month later. General
Abdulsalam Abubakar thus took charge and worked promptly towards the reestablishment of
a civilian government, making way for the fourth republic.
The Fourth Republic (1999 onwards)
The elections held in 1998-99 established a civilian government in Nigeria after 16 years of
uninterrupted military rule. Olusegun Obsanjo, the erstwhile military ruler won the
presidential election on the platform of the centrist People’s Democratic Party. Beginning
with promises of working towards democracy, ethnic reconciliation, economic prosperity and
elimination of corruption, Obsanjo rule was chequered at best. Economically, Obsanjo south
to renegotiate Nigeria’s debt repayment schedule and mend relations with its trading partners
and loan providers. Locally, fatal ethnic strives continued to trouble Obsanjo’s government as
people of different communities fought over resources such as land and job opportunities. On
the political front, Obsanjo was faced with the same governance problems that crippled
governments before him. He had to undertake some tough measures to break the power of
elites and clamp down on the corruption among the powerful and flourishing bribe culture.
On the issue of the relationship between the centre and the local governments given in the
new constitution, critics called for a looser association and weaker central government
(McCormick 2010, 444). Obsanjo was respected for his military leadership during which he
proved to be the least corrupt

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Civilian and Military Leaders of Nigeria
Date Head of Government Ethnicity/ Religion Type of Reason for
Region Government Leaving
Office
1960 Sir Alhaji Abubakar Hausa-Fulani Muslim Civilian Killed in coup
Tafawa Balewa
1966 (Jan) Johnson Aguyi- Igbo Christian Military Killed in coup
Ironsi
1966 (July) Yakubu Gowon Middle Belt Christian Military —
Coup
1975 Murtala Muhammed Hausa-Fulani Muslim Military Killed in coup
1976 Olusegun Obasanjo Yoruba Christian Military Retired
1979 Shehu Shagari Hausa-Fulani Muslim Civilian —
1983 Shehu Shagari Hausa-Fulani Muslim Civilian Coup
1984 Muhammadu Buhari Hausa-Fulani Muslim Military Coup
1985 Ibrahim Babangida Middle Belt Muslim Military “Retired”
1993 (Aug) Ernest Shonekan Yoruba Christian Interim “Resigned”
1993 (Nov) Sani Abacha Northerner Muslim Military Died in office
1998 Abdulsalam Abubakar Northerner Muslim Interim
1999 Olusegun Obasanjo Yoruba Christian Civilian —
2003 Olusegun Obasanjo Yoruba Christian Civilian End of term
2007 Umaru Yar’Adua Fulani Muslim Civilian Died in office
2010 Goodluck Johnathan Ijaw Christian Civilian End of term
2015 Muhammadu Buhari Hausa-Fulani Muslim Civilian Incumbent

Adapted from McCormick, 2010

Who actually fulfilled the promise of returning to civilian government. But his first term as a
civilian president was a failure given the continuing economic problems, widespread
corruption, heightened ethnic and religious violence and urban crime. Despite this, Obsanjo
won the elections held in 2003 beating Muhammadu Buhari, and continued to rule a second
term till 2007.
The year 2007 marked the first successful transition of power from one civilian
government to another in Nigeria when Umaru Yar’Adua from the northern state of Katsina
won the presidential election. President Obsanjo’s attempts at extending his presidency by
altering the constitution had been defeated in the Senate in 2006. Like most other elections of
the past, the 2007 election was also marred by violence and irregularities including the
murder of voters and candidates. Yar’Adua’s nomination was called into question as he was
seen to be a proxy candidate of the outgoing president Obsanjo who forced all other
candidates to withraw from the race a day before the election. Opposition parties called this
election a façade and demanded it to be annulled. Despite its controversial beginning,
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Yar’Adua’s presidency was genuinely civilian in style and outlook. He upheld and enforced
judicial rulings unlike his predecessors. After his demise in office in 2010, Yar’adua was
succeeded by Goodluck Jonathan through yet another peaceful civilian transition. By the first
decade of the new millennium, Nigeria seemed to be moving along the path to democracy.
This fact was further strengthened by yet another relatively peaceful election in 2015 when
Muhammadu Buhari was elected president. The fourth republic produced the most enduring
constitution and political stability that independent Nigeria has experienced.
Constitutional Development
Nigeria has had seven constitution of which three were under the British rule named the
Richard’s Constitution of 1947, the Macpherson constitution of 1951, and the Lyttleton
constitution of 1954. While the first two were flawed due to lack of involvement of Nigerians
in their creation and the entrenchment of regionalism, the third was an improvement in that it
included the inputs of Nigerians, created a federal system and paved the way for self-
government. The independence constitution of Nigeria 1960 was amended in 1963 when
Nigeria declared itself a republic, instituting a Nigerian head of state in place of the British
Queen. The Fifth constitution under the second republic in 1979 was built on the American
model which was suspended with the arrival of the military rule 1983. The constitution for
the third republic promulgated in 1989 under Babangida could not be enforced because
another military regime by Abacha took over even before the third republic could be
established. The establishment of the fourth republic in 1999 unveiled the new constitution
which is functional till today.
Political System under the Fourth Republic
Nigeria’s new constitution is a product of all its predecessors. The Nigerian constitution is a
long and detailed written one with 320 articles, several schedules and lengthy lists
demarcating powers between the levels of government. The length and detailing were a
deliberate effort by its framers to avoid misinterpretation and ambiguity of its provisions. The
new constitution pledges to promote a national unity of Nigeria which it describes as
“indivisible and indissoluble”. It entrusts the state with the responsibility to foster a feeling of
belonging so that loyalty to the nation overrides all sectional loyalties. In order to avoid the
domination of the national government by one organ or ethnic group, the new constitution
has mandated that the president must win at least 25 per cent of the vote in two thirds of
Nigeria’s 36 states, and the federal government must draw its cabinet ministers equally from
all the states (McCormick 2010, p. 449).
Presidential System: Under the fourth republic constitution, Nigeria follows a presidential
system with federal division of powers between the centre and its states (McCormick, 2010,
448). The chief executive, the president, is elected through a direct election for a four-year
term and is eligible for re-election for a second term. The president’s cabinet, appointed by
him, must include at least one member each from the 36 states.

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Bicameral legislature: It has a bicameral national legislature with the senate and a house of
representatives. The senate has 109 seats allocated equally among its 36 states (3 each) and
one for the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. The senators are elected from single member
constituencies for a period of four-year terms. The house of representatives has 360 seats and
similar to the senate, its members are elected from single member constituencies for a four-
year term.
Independent Judiciary: The highest court of the land is the Supreme Court consisting a Chief
Justice and 15 judges. The judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President on the
recommendation of the National Judicial Council which is a 23-member independent body of
federal and state judicial officials. The appointments are subject to confirmation by the senate
and serve until the age of 70. The legal system in Nigeria is governed by a mix of the English
common law, traditional law and Islamic law in the 12 northern states (CIA World Factbook,
2018). The judiciary in Nigeria is gaining independence under the fourth republic as evident
in the landmark decisions it took regarding, for instance, the overrule of the 2001 election law
which effectively prohibited new parties from contesting general elections.
Rights of the citizens: The Nigerian constitution under the fourth republic lays down thirteen
articles outlining the fundamental rights of its citizens including the right to life, expression,
right to privacy in communications and homes, freedom of thought and religion, right to
assemble and form associations, right to own property and the right to a fair trial. The
constitution protects the rights of citizens from torture, slavery and inhuman treatment while
also promoting equality among ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, gender and disability.
In return, citizens have a set of responsibilities towards the state as spelled out in the
constitution. Given the tumultuous history of ethnic and religious conflicts in the country, the
pronouncements of these rights and their implementation is crucial, although difficult, for the
political stability and maturity of the state in Nigeria.
Federal structure: In an attempt to placate ethnic tensions, Nigeria has adopted a federal
structure which gives rise to a three-tiered governance system comprising the centre, the
states and the local governing units. The constitution lays down designated lists demarcating
the respective areas of jurisdiction between the centre and states. The federating units have
the prerogative to make laws on matters contained in the state list, albeit within the
limitations posed by the constitution and federal laws. The practice of federalism in Nigeria
however has been severely crippled by years of misgovernance and military authoritarianism.
There has been a tendency for the centre to appropriate power from the states who are
typically weak both politically and economically.
Political Culture
The multicultural nature of the Nigerian society and its troubled historical political
development makes it difficult to identify the indigenous political culture from those adopted
from its colonial masters. Nigeria’s history of slavery and colonialism has given rise to a
culture of corruption, violence, and mistrust. Despite these unfortunate elements in

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characterising the nature of Nigerian politics, there are some common themes which can be
identified as part of its national political culture (McCormick 2010, p. 444) as discussed
below.
Democracy: Democratic institutions such as a republican government, free press and political
representation through parties and civil organisations have been among the ideals upheld and
aspired for in Nigeria. Despite the multiple failures of civilian governments and their
interruptions by military rules, democracy has always been sought after. This is evident in the
fact that almost all military leaders who came to power would promise a quick return to
democracy. Those who failed to fulfil this promise eventually found themselves in trouble as
were in the cases of Gowon, Babangida, or Abacha. Democracy is therefore an integral part
of the modern political culture of Nigeria and the country is making notable efforts to
strengthen it under the fourth republic.
Multiethnicity: Nigeria is prominently characterised by its multiethnicity which has
determined the nature of its politics significantly. Traditionally, Nigerians belonged to
separate ethnic groups and regions from where they drew their sense of identity and
belonging. The colonial enterprise of nation-state has failed as people view the state with
suspicion and mistrust while preferring to look to their communities for stability and order.
There is a strong sense of ethnonationalism among the people of Nigeria which plays an
important role in the domestic politics.
Corruption: Nigeria has come to develop a culture of institutionalised corruption and
nepotism so palpable that its locals call it “the Nigerian factor”. This is primarily because of
the heavy centralisation of power and the lack of healthy democratic institutions to check the
excesses committed by the rulers. Nigeria has routinely found itself among the bottom
countries on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index – it stood at 146
out of 198 countries in 2019, while it was at the bottom in 2000 (Transparency International,
2020).
The Dominance of the State: The state plays a very important role in Nigeria despite it being
utterly mismanaged and corrupt. Because control over the instruments of the state guarantees
economic and political security, the fight for the state’s power has been a so crucial for the
Nigerian political elite. Those competing for it use every method available to win the state’s
power and perpetuate themselves. This trend has continued till the beginning of the 21 st
century but the country seems to be seeing a more orderly competition for power in the recent
years.
Ethnicity and Politics in Nigeria
Ethnicity has influenced and defined political developments in Nigeria ever since it became a
unified entity under the British colonial rule. Nigeria was originally a land of disparate
groups of people who drew a sense of identity from their unique ethnicities. They had lived
autonomously on the basis of a workable balance and relatively free from outside
interference. The creation of Nigeria was a colonial design which forced ethnically self-

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governing groups to live together under a common system of administration and shared
political power. There emerged a state of mutual hostility among the groups at they were
pitted against one another in the competition for power and resources while having to
preserve their identities (McCormick 2010, p. 446). It is therefore evident how this colonial
invention was the root of ethnic insecurity in modern Nigeria.
Ethnicity is a slippery concept which revolves around symbols, cultural moorings and
values, customs, and historical experiences (McCormick, 2010, p. 446). All these elements
serve as foundations of identity and community for societies. Nigerians have always
perceived themselves as either Yorubas, Hausas, Fulanis, Igbos, etc. before they consider
themselves as Nigerians. It may be said that Nigeria is a nation of nationalities- multicultural
and plural. This plurality of identity affiliations has rendered very difficult the establishment
of stable modern nation-state and a strong economy despite many post-colonial attempts.
These ethnic differences have been at the cause of all political enmity which has led to
multiple regime changes and military coups. As seen in the preceding sections, civilian
governments have been brought down and replaced by military regimes primarily due to
ethnic interests and the fear of being subjugated by another ethnic community. The same
reasons have prompted counter coups leading to forcible regime changes from one military
rule to another. Those who seize power seek to perpetuate dominance of the state
mechanisms for their ethnic group threatening the others into reactionary politics. Nigeria has
thus seen numerous ethnic conflagrations and unrest throughout its independent history.
In addition to ethnic tensions, Nigeria has witnessed the rise of terrorism since 2009
when the Boko Haram group retaliated to government’s efforts to clamp them down. The
group, whose members actually prefer to be known by their Arabic name – Jama’atu Ahlis
Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad – meaning ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad’, has become a source of major insecurity in Nigeria (Adibe,
2013). They have carried out several attacks and suicide bombings since 2010 onwards. The
threat posed by the Boko Haram came to international limelight with the kidnapping of over
two hundred girls from their school in April 2014. It also highlighted the government’s
inability to control the organisation. Following negotiations between Boko Haram and the
Nigerian government, brokered by the International Committee for the Red Cross, 103 girls
have since been released. Again, in February 2018, more than one hundred students were
kidnapped by a faction of Boko Haram known as the Islamic State West Africa (Global
Conflict Tracker, 2020). Many scholars have sought to understand the motivations behind the
development and growth of terrorism in Nigeria especially the case of the Noko Haram
networks. Some scholars of state theories and post-colonial studies understand the group as a
symptom of Nigeria’s failing state. Sociologists and social anthropologists attribute its rise to
poverty. Politicians of the southern states blame Northerners’ domination of the state.
Counterterrorism and security experts focus on the international linkages of the group and the
threat that poses to the stability of Western Africa (Mantzikos, 2013).

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 One of the major challenges before the Nigerian state is to formulate a universally
acceptable notion of the Nigerian nation above all ethnic identities. The constitution under the
fourth republic lays down the endeavour of nation building as one of its major goals. It places
the responsibility on the state to foster a feeling of belonging among the people so that loyalty
to the nation overrides sectional loyalties. Nigeria has a long way to go in order to arrive at a
workable solution to the ethnic problem which seems to be deepening with the rise of
terrorism. It will require a conscious political determination and moral courage by all groups
and the willingness to adopt a pan-Nigerian identity over and above narrow albeit authentic
ethnic loyalties.

Case study: SARS: An abuse of power

The year 2020 witnessed thousands of internet posts originating from Nigeria carrying
the hashtag #endsars. This was a cry of the civil society and youth for help and protection
from the excesses and brutality of a branch of the Nigerian police called the Special Anti-
Robbery Squad or SARS. Created in 1992 with the intention of controlling the incidence
of crime and robberies in the cities of southern Nigeria, especially Lagos, the Squad has
come to usurp its powers and became a source of fear and terror for the citizens. By 2002,
the organisation spread to all 36 states of the federation as well as the Federal Capital
Territory, Abuja. It came to be counted as one of the 14 units under the Nigerian Police
Force Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Department. The mandate for SARS
included arrest, investigation and prosecution of suspected armed robbers, murderers,
kidnappers, hired assassins and other suspected violent criminals. This legitimisation
emboldened the SARS force and began moving beyond their covert functions to setting
up road blockades and outright extortion of money from the citizens. Their non-
uniformed officers started carrying arms in public. The unit became involved in
widespread human rights abuses, extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrests, and
unlawful detention. SARS officials would routinely arrest young men for alleged
cybercrime or internet fraud, simply on the evidence of their owning a laptop or
smartphone, and then demand excessive bail fees to let them go. A 2016 report of the
Amnesty International about its visit to one of the SARS detention centres found 130
detainees living in overcrowded cells and being regularly subjected to methods of torture
including hanging, starvations, beatings, shootings and mock executions (Al Jazeera
2020).

The protests have forced the Nigerian to promise the disbanding of SARS. However, the
youth are still dissatisfied and are suspicious of the government’s commitment as this
was the fourth time it has promised to do so. This is a case of the blatant disregard of the
state’s machinery to respect the laws of the land and the fundamental rights of the
citizens enshrined in the constitution of the fourth republic.

Political Economy
Nigeria’s economy at its independence held promises of self-sufficiency and growth. It was a
major producer and exporter of food items and rich in natural resources. The country had a
well-connected railway and road networks and harbours built by the colonial British. Major
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reserves of low-sulphur oil were discovered in the 1950s setting Nigeria to become one of the
major exporters of oil to the international market (McCormick 2010, p. 470). Nigeria
however failed miserably to capitalise its oil resources for the prosperity of the general
populace. The corrupt nature of governance and divisive ethnic relations had resulted in the
concentration of wealth in the hands of a small elite while the majority of the society
remained mired in poverty. The oil price surge of the 1970s led to an exponential increase in
Nigerian oil export and revenue totalling $26 billion in by 1980.
Nigeria’s dependence on oil proved to be a major hindrance towards its political
development. The oil reserves are concentrated in the eastern region of the Niger delta
representing about 8 per cent of the geographical area. This proved to present a classic case
of distributive justice. The indigenous inhabitants of the Niger delta saw no logic in sharing
their resources and wealth with the rest of Nigeria given that sectional loyalties mattered
more than national belonging. The political elite in return failed to recognise their claims or
shared the proceeds to them proportionately, and the region remained poor despite being
endowed in resource. The fight for monopoly over oil let to secessionist movement of the
Biafrans and the resultant civil war. Oil also proved to have incentivised power capturing by
the military and corruption among the ruling elites. Further, the 70s saw Nigeria investing
huge sums of money in large-scale industrial development projects and oil fields while
agriculture and manufacturing sectors were ignored. This prevented the diversification of the
economy and proved fatal when the global oil prices plummeted in the 1980s. Nigeria’s
experience with oil and the politics surrounding it have made analysts to see it as suffering
from ‘resource curse’. The inability to manage the proceeds of the resource and distribute
them equitably among its people caused innumerable problems and stunted Nigeria’s political
development. It has remained a poor country despite being rich in resource.
The oil crisis of the 1980s caused alarming inflation and a widespread economic
recession forcing the Nigerian state to seek monetary assistance from international agencies
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. International intervention came
with structural adjustment programmes requiring Babangida’s Nigeria to adopt austerity
measures, privatization of government owned firms, and reduction in governmental subsidies.
These measures aimed at restructuring the economy had deep impact on the general
population as they lost their social safety nets. These structural adjustment measures failed to
revitalise the economy.
The fourth republic brought some hopes of economic revival in Nigeria with the
unveiling of the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) by
the new leader Obsanjo. This was a medium-term planning strategy aimed at wealth creation,
employment generation, poverty eradication and value reorientation. The provinces also
developed economic strategies on similar lines called State Economic Empowerment and
Development Strategies (SEEDS). However, despite its promising character, NEEDS was not
very different from earlier economic strategies under the long-term plans in practice and was
largely in line with the desired economic restructuring plans of the international bodies

83
representing developed capitalist economies (Dhanda, 2019, 160). Nigeria today suffers from
weak manufacturing sector and low levels of international investment which are key to
growth for any economy within the capitalist global structures.
Nigeria’s failure to industrialise throughout its years of independence may be rooted in
its neopatrimonialism (Kohli, 2004). It refers to a typically clientelist, inefficient, and corrupt
method of economic management where the leadership chooses to prioritise personal and
sectarian goals above public interest at large. The state’s policies and decisions failed to
percolate down to the masses who remained largely disconnected from the elites.
Neopatrimonialism has come to occupy a more important place in Nigeria’s political-
economic governance instead of a sound ideological foundation. Additionally, there has been
an urban bias in Nigeria as a result of the state’s neglect over agriculture. In an attempt to
satisfy the needs for cheap food prices of the urban populace, the Nigerian state held down
prices of farm produce thereby making agriculture an unattractive avenue of livelihood
(Mundt and Aborisade, 2000). This has led to the lure of the cities enhancing the urban crises
as a result.

Conclusion
Nigeria’s political development through its pre-colonial to post-colonial states shows the
long-lasting colonial imprint it carries. From being a land of disparate autonomous ethnic
groups to a struggling modern-nation state, Nigeria’s is a story of colonial manipulations that
have endured. The colonial empire of Great Britain unified the region to serve their colonial
interest and created Nigeria, leaving behind in its wake, a legacy of ethnic separatism and
intensified social cleavages. While it is argued that Nigeria has a lot to blame itself for its
failure as a state, one cannot obliterate the fact that colonialism’s excesses had damaging role
to play in shaping its future.
Post-colonial Nigeria inherited an intensely fractured sense of nationalism, inefficient
leadership, and a stunted economy. This was the foundation upon which the parliamentary
form of modern government was established. This was not to hold for long given the myriad
ethnonational differences and corruption that came to grip the country. The political system
quickly shifted through a series of military regimes most of whom were ethnically charged.
Return to the second civilian rule did not last long as the state descended to military regimes
again. It was no earlier than 1999 when Nigeria saw the reestablishment of a civilian
government one which would endure till today. However, the fourth republic still faces the
continuing challenges of ethnic division and the relatively new but vicious terrorism.
It is not surprising, given the dramatic nature of the transitions of power between military
and civilian regimes that Nigeria has had seven constitutions till date. The latest one
established under the fourth republic is an attempt at constitutional engineering – a deliberate
effort to change Nigeria’s political and social behaviour though rules and goals contained in
the constitution. The constitution guarantees fundamental rights to its citizens and underlines

84
the importance of fostering a sense of belonging to Nigeria over and above sectional
loyalties.
The economic development of Nigeria has been as unfortunate and mismanaged as its
politics. It has failed to transform the lives of its people despite being an oil rich country. It
had neglected its agricultural sector which must have been the foundation of its economy. It
is still weak in terms of manufacturing and infrastructure even as the state is attempting to
make advances in these sectors today. Nigeria’s weak economic growth trajectory is
explained through its neo-patrimonial leadership and ethnic mistrust among regional groups.
Nigeria still has the potential to be an influential country in Africa and also at the global
stage. However, it must settle a few glaring issues before it. First, it must find a durable
solution to the ethnicity problem. The people of Nigeria must learn to see themselves as
Nigerians first before anything else. However, this is easier said than done. The state and
people’s representatives have a humungous task in this regard. Secondly, Nigeria must
overcome its malady of corruption. Good governance and accountability need to be
strengthened at every level of governance for this to be realised. Third, in the economic
sector, Nigeria needs to step out of its outdated economic management style and policies. It
must diversify its economy, strengthen its agriculture, and encourage innovation and
entrepreneurship among the youth. Nigeria must build its image as a country that is stable and
well managed to attract international investment and market relations in this globalised
world. A strong and stable Nigeria is vital not only for its people but also for the rest of
Africa.
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