In RE JUDGE MARCOS
In RE JUDGE MARCOS
In RE JUDGE MARCOS
FACTS
COMPLAINANT STATED THAT HE IS THE ACCUSED IN A CERTAIN CRIMIANL CASE. HE WENT TO MCTC OF
TARLAC TO SECURE CLEARANCE BUT WAS INFORMED THAT HE HAD ALREADY BEEN CONVICTED IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE PENDING BEFORE THE SAID COURT. THEN THE RESPONDENT CLERK SUMMONED HIM
TO CHAMBERS OF RESPONDENT JUDGE, AND WHILE INSIDE, THE RESPONDENTS ALLEGELY TRIED TO
EXTORT MONEY FROM HIM FOR THE REASON OF “THERE WILL BE SOME CHANGES IN TE DECISION
BEFORE IT WILL BE PROMULGATED.
COMPLAINANT FAILED TO APPEAR IN PROMULGATION OF THE DECISION, ACCG TO HIM, HE DID NOT
RECEIVE ANY NOTICE OF SAID HEARING, THEN WARRANT OF ARREST ISSUED AGAINST HIM.
AT THE HEARING RESPONDEMT CLERK ASK HIM TO POST A BOND FOR THE AMOUNT OF 1000 FOR
PROVISIONAL LIBERTY DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS ARRESTED TO SERVED HIS SENTENCE. OUT OF
CONFUSION, HE EVEN STATED THAT REGARDELSS OF THE CASH BOND HE POSTED, HE STILL SERVED HIS
SENTENCE FOR 15DAYS AT GERONA MUNICIPAL JAIL . HE EVEN STATED THE RUMORS BETWEEN THE
ILLICIT LOVE AFFAIR BETWEEN THE RESPONDENTS WHICH IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE TO MUNICIPAL
AND COURT PERSONNEL AS WELL AS TO THE PEOPLE OF GERONA.
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMENT DENIED ALL THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINANT F OR LACKEF OF
FACTUAL AND GELEGAL BASIS. THAT, HE MISINTERPRETED THE CASH BOND AND DAMAGES ADJUDGED
AGAINST HIM THAT HE PAID AS A BRIBE. THE RESPNDENT JUDGE EVEN STATED THAT THE
COMPLAINANT VOLUNTARILY POSTED A BOND FOR HIS PROVIDIONAL LIBERTY AFTER MANIFESTING
THAT HE WAS APPLAYING FOR PROBATION BUT LATER ON WITHDERW HIS APLICATION AND
VOLUNTARILY RETURNED TO THE JAIL AND SERVED HIS SENTENCE AND PAID DAMAGES. WITH REGARD
TO AN ILLICITE RELATIONSHIP WITH MS SHIRLEY, HE CLAIMED THAT HIS HECTIC SCHEDULE HARDLY
ALLOWED HIM TO ENTER IN AN ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP.
AS TO CLERK RESPONDENT, SHE DENIED AS WELL BOTH THE ALLEGATION AND ADOPTED THE
COMMENT OF THE RESPONDENT JUDGE. SHE SUBMITTED SWORN STATEMENT OF HER CO-EMPLOYEES
FOR HER INTEGRITY AND UPRIGHTNESS AND OR ISSUED TO COMPLAINANT FOR THE CASH BOND
POSTED.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS JUDGE VIOLATES THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND THE
RESPONDENT CLERK BE HELD LIABLE ADMINISTRATIVELY.
RULING:
YES. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE UNQUESTIONABLY VIOLATED THE CANON 1 AND 2 OF THE CODE OF
JUDICILAL CONDUCT. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a magistrate "should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities"; and "should be the embodiment of
30
competence, integrity and independence." Since appearance and reality fuse in the performance of
31
judicial functions, the judge -- like Caesar's wife -- must not only be pure, but also be beyond
suspicion
ROMEO T. ZACARIAS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MARTONINO R. MARCOS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tarlac City; and
SHIRLEY M. VISAYA, Clerk of Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Gerona,
Tarlac, Respondents.
In Re: Complaint against JUDGE MARTONINO MARCOS and Clerk of Court SHIRLEY VISAYA,
Municipal Trial Court, Gerona, Tarlac.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The actions of judges and judicial personnel must not only be proper at all times, but also appear to
be so. This axiom is necessary, because the image of the judiciary is mirrored in the conduct, official
or otherwise, of the men and women who compose it. Failure to adhere steadfastly to this strict
standard of conduct is a ground for administrative sanctions.
This administrative matter arose from a Complaint filed by Romeo T. Zacarias and an undated
1
charged Judge Martonino R. Marcos (Formerly of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
Tarlac City) and Clerk of Court Shirley M. Visaya (of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Gerona,
Tarlac) with immoral conduct and illegal solicitation from litigants.
The Complaint of Zacarias was referred by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to Executive
Judge Arsenio P. Adriano of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63, for discreet
investigation; and subsequently for formal investigation, report and recommendation.
3 4
The anonymous Complaint was likewise referred to Executive Judge Adriano for discreet
investigation on March 13, 2001. After conducting the investigation, he stated in his April 16, 2001
5
Report to the OCA that a court insider had confirmed the illicit relationship of respondents. He then
recommended the filing of formal charges against them.
Upon the recommendation of the OCA, the matter was re-assigned to Judge Adriano, this time for
6
formal investigation, report and recommendation. The two administrative Complaints were
consolidated on September 23, 2002, upon respondents' motion.
7 8
In view, however, of the appointment/promotion of respondent judge as the presiding judge of the
RTC of Tarlac City (Branch 64), the Court, pursuant to its Resolution in AM No. 01-8-10-
SC, thereafter referred the matter to Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga of the Court of
9
"Complainant confirmed that he was not able to attend the promulgation of the decision in the
criminal case against him but stressed that he did not receive any notice of said hearing.
Consequently, a warrant of arrest was issued against him 'to serve sentence.' At the hearing, he was
surprised [when] the respondent clerk x x x asked him to post a cash bond in the amount of one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for his provisional liberty despite the fact th[at] he was arrested
specifically to serve his sentence. Beleaguered, complainant posted the cash bond and an Order of
Release signed by the respondent Judge was issued in his favor. Complainant claimed that the
respondent clerk again asked for money, which he, however, declined to give. The complainant
further aired his confusion since regardless of the cash bond that he posted, he still served his
sentence for fifteen (15) days at the Gerona Municipal Jail.
"Complainant further alleged that upon some inquiries, he was informed that the respondent Judge
does not approve bailbonds without bribe money and that the respondents are engaged in an illicit
love affair which is x x x common knowledge to municipal and court personnel and as well as to the
people of Gerona." 11
In his Comment dated May 25, 2001, respondent judge averred that the allegations of complainant
12
lacked factual and legal basis. He claimed that the Complaint had been filed merely to harass him.
He denied having ever demanded money from complainant, who had allegedly approached him for
advice in the latter's criminal case.
According to the above-mentioned Comment, complainant might have misinterpreted as bribe the
amounts he had paid for his cash bond and for the damages adjudged against him. Supposedly, he
voluntarily posted on September 28, 2000, a cash bond for his provisional liberty after manifesting
that he was applying for probation. Thereafter, he allegedly backtracked on his plans for probation,
withdrew his application therefore, voluntarily returned to jail to serve his sentence, and at the same
time paid the damages.
As to the charge of immorality, respondent judge averred that his hectic schedule hardly allowed him
to indulge in illicit relations. He emphasized that on top of his duties as judge, he was also a lay
minister and president of the Parish Pastoral Council of Ramos, Tarlac, as well as an active member
of the freemasonry and the cursillo movements.
Finally, to prove his innocence, he submitted copies of the Warrant of Arrest against complainant
13
dated September 21, 2000; the Release Order dated September 28, 2000; the Legal Fees
14
Form showing the posting of the cash bond and the Undertaking attendant thereto; the
15 16
Order dated October 12, 2000, ordering the release of the cash bond to complainant; and the
17
In her Comment, on the other hand, respondent clerk denied having demanded money from
19
complainant as a consideration for changing the court's Decision. She affirmed that he had taken up
the case with respondent judge who, however, asked him to seek the advice of counsel. She
vehemently denied having illicit relations with respondent judge, whom she described as kind,
considerate and morally upright. In support of her defense, she adopted his Comment as well as the
exhibits therein. She also submitted a Sworn Statement executed by her co-employees, who
20
vouched therein for her integrity and uprightness. Finally, she presented a certified true copy of the
Official Receipt that she had issued to complainant for the cash bond posted by him on September
21
28, 2000.
In her Report, Justice Guevara-Salonga held that while complainant had failed to present any direct
22
and positive evidence of his charges of graft and corruption against respondents, the records of the
criminal case validated and confirmed his accusations. By and large, the following facts were
established by the records: 1) he did not apply for probation; 2) although he had been arrested to
serve his sentence, he posted a cash bond and was subsequently ordered released by respondent
judge; 3) the Release Order of September 28, 2000, as well as the Undertaking attendant thereto,
did not state that the posting of the bond was incident to complainant's application for probation; and
4) complainant fully served his sentence from September 27 to October 12, 2000. According to her,
these matters of record attested to the fact that the cash bond had been arbitrarily required by
respondents and unduly posted by complainant when all that he needed to do was serve his
sentence.
Further, the investigating justice held that the inconsistencies in the statements of respondents in
their Comments and testimonies during the clarificatory hearing belied their claim that complainant
had voluntarily posted the bond. In particular, continued the Report, respondent judge initially
asserted in his Comment that complainant had posted the cash bond without being told to do so,
23
only to admit later during the hearing that the former had required him to post bail. It will be recalled
24
that respondent clerk admitted that she had unilaterally required the bond.
25
Moreover, the investigating justice observed that nowhere in the records was it shown that
complainant had applied for probation and withdrawn it. Assuming that he had done so, respondents
should have immediately released the cash bond, because he had already served his sentence
anyway. According to her, this fact was known to respondent judge, as shown by his October 12,
2000 Order acknowledging the Certification from the Gerona Police Station that complainant had
26 27
served his sentence from September 27 to October 12, 2000. She held that the failure of respondent
judge to issue a commitment order further militated against his claim that complainant had been
released after posting bond.
The investigating justice concluded that the foregoing were telling proofs that the acts of
respondents had been irregular, unlawful, anomalous and totally inconsistent with any claim of good
faith in the performance of their judicial functions. As to the charge of immorality, she recommended
that it be dismissed, as it was based only on vicious rumors and unverified reports.
Accordingly, she recommended that respondents be penalized with severe reprimand and
suspension from office for a period of one (1) month for grave misconduct.
We affirm the findings of the investigating justice with some modifications, by increasing the penalty
of respondents consistent with Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and Civil Service Rules.
Administrative Liability
Exacting standards of rectitude and propriety are demanded of respondent judge. As the epitome of
integrity and justice, he should comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official
or otherwise, can bear searching public scrutiny. Such is the high price for the honor bestowed upon
28
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a magistrate "should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities"; and "should be the embodiment of competence, integrity
30
and independence." Since appearance and reality fuse in the performance of judicial functions, the
31
judge -- like Caesar's wife -- must not only be pure, but also be beyond suspicion. 32
In this case, respondent judge's September 28, 2000 Order releasing complainant after he had
33
been arrested "to serve sentence" finds no support in the records. It must be noted that Section 4 of
34
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court grants bail, as a matter of right, to all persons in custody even after
35
conviction by the municipal trial court. Section 7 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, on the other
hand, provides that "[a] judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the
accused has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal, or the accused has applied for
probation."
On September 28, 2000, the reglementary period for filing an appeal of a judgment of conviction
36
had not yet lapsed. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that complainant commenced serving
his sentence when he was arrested and confined on September 27. Where the one accused has not
voluntarily and knowingly commenced the service of one's sentence, but has been confined merely
by order of the court after the promulgation of judgment, such sentence cannot be considered final
or the service thereof commenced. 37
Complainant could have very well applied for probation, therefore, on September 28. Under Section
4 of the Probation Law, such application must be filed by a qualified defendant, like complainant,
38
Be that as it may, there is regrettably nothing in the records to show that an application for probation
was filed by complainant. Neither did the Release Order indicate that he had been discharged upon
39
Moreover, when complainant returned to jail to serve his sentence, respondent judge failed to
substantiate the latter's alleged issuance of a Commitment Order. Observed the investigating justice:
"x x x. Furthermore, respondent Judge's omission in issuing a Commitment Order poses severe
implications against their stance of innocence and compliant performance of duties. Surely, if we are
to be impressed that the complainant was released and thereafter voluntarily returned to jail, the
respondent Judge should have issued a Commitment Order to the jail warden. But then, the
certification that complainant started to serve the sentence on 27 September 2000 is a clear
indication that he was not released at all after his arrest." 40
Indeed, the actions of respondent judge were not free from all appearances of impropriety. His
conduct lacked the meticulous care expected of one ever mindful of the image of the judiciary that
one portrays. It is the kind of behavior for which he must be administratively dealt with, as it erodes
public confidence in the judicial system. 41
As to respondent clerk, we find that she was equally remiss in the performance of her duties. By her
1âwphi1
own admission, she required complainant to post the cash bond, even though she had not been
instructed to do so by respondent judge. She thereby arrogated judicial power unto herself. The
determination of whether to require a cash bond, like the approval of bail or the release of the
accused, is purely a judicial function. It was certainly not among the mandated duties of respondent
42
clerk.43
Her reported oversight in declaring the cash bond as part of the JDF, rather than of the Fiduciary
Fund, also showed her negligence. Following this Court's Circulars, the cash bond should have
44
been declared as court fiduciary fund and held in trust for the litigants in a savings account with the
authorized depository bank. Her attempt to pass the buck to her subordinates cannot be
countenanced. As the court's administrative officer, she had control and supervision over all court
records, exhibits, documents, properties and supplies. Furthermore, she had to see to it that her
subordinates performed their functions well. Respondent judge claims that the records of the
45
application of complainant for probation were withdrawn by the latter from the court during the
46
clarificatory hearing. This allegation certainly does not speak well of respondent clerk's management
and safekeeping of court records.
It has been stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone charged with the dispensation of
justice is circumscribed by the trust and confidence reposed in a public office. The image of a court
47
of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who
work therein, from the judge to the lowliest clerk. 48
Clerks of court are key figures in the judicial system. For this reason, they must be assiduous in
49
performing their official duties and in supervising and managing court dockets and records. They
cannot slacken in their jobs under one pretext or another. 50
The laxity of respondent clerk in the supervision of court personnel was repugnant to her role as an
adjudicative and administrative officer of the court. Hence, she is subject to disciplinary action.
While the investigating justice merely recommended that respondents be suspended for one (1)
month, we believe that the nature of their infraction calls for a heavier sanction. Although the charge
of undue solicitation against respondent judge was not sufficiently proven, he had unquestionably
violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. This violation carries with it a penalty of
51 52
dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000. 53
Undue solicitation by respondent clerk was not sufficiently established. While she admitted to having
acted on her own in directing complainant to post the cash bond -- thereby arrogating judicial
authority unto herself --there is no ample evidence that, in so doing, she had been propelled by a
less than laudable motive, a clear intent to violate the law, or a flagrant disregard of an established
rule. Hence, her action constituted simple misconduct. Under Section 52 (B) (2) of the Revised
54 55
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple misconduct is punishable with
56
suspension from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.
She is also found guilty of inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of her official duties, a
grave offense that is punishable with suspension from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year. This being the more serious infraction, we deem it proper to impose the minimum penalty of
57
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, after considering her 27 years of service in the
government.
WHEREFORE, Judge Martonino R. Marcos is hereby found GUILTY of violating the Code of Judicial
Conduct and is SUSPENDED without pay for four months. Clerk of Court Shirley M. Visaya, on the
other hand, is found GUILTY of simple misconduct as well as inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, for which she is SUSPENDED without pay for six (6) months and one
(1) day. Both are sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.