EN BANC

[G.R. No. 45629. September 22, 1938.]

ATILANO G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO SANTOS,

Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, and IÑIGO S. DAZA,
Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga, respondents. ROSARIO BASA
DE LEON, ET AL., intervenors.

Claro M. Recto and Benigno S. Aquino, for petitioner.

Esperanza de la Cruz and Heracho Abistado, for respondents.
Sotto & Sotto, for intervenors.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS; CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE DUE EXECUTION OF A

PROBATED WILL. — Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure is explicit as
to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will. It provides:
"No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and
allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court;
and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be
conclusive as to its due execution."
2. ID.; ID. — The probate of a will by the probate court having
jurisdiction thereof is considered as conclusive as to its due execution and
validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing
mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under
duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and
not a forgery.
3. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDING "IN REM". — The probate of a will in this
jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by publication as a
prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding
upon everybody, even against the State.
4. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION. — Conclusive presumptions
are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will not allow them
to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong. The will in question
having been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any proof
to overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not a forgery.
5. ID.; ID.; CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST FORGER OF A DULY
PROBATED WILL. — Upon the facts stated in the opinion of the court, it was
held: That in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the
forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of
competent jurisdiction.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 6. CRIMINAL LAW; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; RIGHT TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL. — The prosecution of offenses is a matter of public interest
and it is the duty of the government or those acting in its behalf to
prosecute all cases to their termination without oppressive, capricious and
vexatious delay. The Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy
trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced
and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases
commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted
criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the
offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced. In any
event, even the actuations of the fiscal himself in this case is not entirely
free from criticism.
7. ID.; ID. — In Kalaw vs. Apostol (G. R. No. 45591, Oct. 15, 1937),
the Supreme Court observed that the prosecuting officer is in charge and has
under the direction and control all prosecutions for public offenses (sec.
1681 and 2465 of the Rev. Adm. Code), and that it is his duty to see that
criminal cases are heard without vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays
so that the courts of justice may dispose of them on the merits and
determine whether the accused is guilty or not. This is as clear an
admonition as could be made. An accused person is entitled to a trial at the
earliest opportunity. (Sutherland on the Constitution, 664; United States vs.
Fox, 3 Mont., 512.) He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement
of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial
are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed.
8. ID.; ID.; ID. — It is not to be supposed, of course, that the
Constitution intends to remove from the prosecution every reasonable
opportunity to prepare for trial. Impossibilities cannot be expected or
extraordinary efforts required on the part of the prosecutor or the court. As
stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, "The right of a speedy
trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the
rights of public justice." (Beavers vs. Haubert [1905], 198 U. S., 86; 25 S. Ct.,
573; 49 Law. ed., 950, 954.)

DECISION

LAUREL, J : p

On May 28, 1931, the petitioner herein filed in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased
wife, Ines Basa. Without any opposition, and upon the testimony of Benigno
F. Gabino, one of the attesting witnesses, the probate court, on June 27,
1931, admitted the will to probate. Almost three years later, on April 11,
1934, the five intervenors herein moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings,
alleging lack of jurisdiction of the court to probate the will and to close the
proceedings. Because filed ex parte, the motion was denied. The same
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 motion was filed a second time, but with notice to the adverse party. The
motion was nevertheless denied by the probate court on May 24, 1934. On
appeal to this court, the order of denial was affirmed on July 26, 1935. (Basa
vs. Mercado, 33 off. Gaz., 2521.)
It appears that on October 27, 1932, i. e., sixteen months after the
probate of the will of Ines Basa, intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed with
the justice of the peace court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint
against the petitioner herein, for falsification or forgery of the will probated
as above indicated. The petitioner was arrested. He put up a bond in the
sum of P4,000 and engaged the services of an attorney to undertake his
defense. Preliminary investigation of the case was continued twice upon
petition of the complainant. The complaint was finally dismissed, at the
instance of the complainant herself, in an order dated December 8, 1932.
Three months later, or on March 2, 1933, the same intervenor charged the
petition for the second time with the same offense, presenting the complaint
this time in the justice of the peace court of Mexico, Pampanga. The
petitioner was again arrested, again put up a bond in the sum of P4,000, and
engaged the services of counsel to defend him. This second complaint, after
investigation, was also dismissed, again at the instance of the complainant
herself who alleged that the petitioner was in poor health. That was on April
27, 1933. Some nine months later, on February 2, 1934, to be exact, the
same intervenor accused the same petitioner for the third time of the same
offense. The information was filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga in the
justice of the peace court of Mexico. The petitioner was again arrested, again
put up a bond of P4,000, and engaged the services of defense counsel. The
case was dismissed on April 24, 1934, after due investigation, on the ground
that the will alleged to have been falsified had already been probated and
there was no evidence that the petitioner had forged the signature of the
testatrix appearing thereon, but that, on the contrary, the evidence
satisfactorily established the authenticity of the signature aforesaid.
Dissatisfied with the result, the provincial fiscal, on May 9, 1934, moved in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for reinvestigation of the case. The
motion was granted on May 23, 1934, and, for the fourth time, the petitioner
was arrested, filed a bond and engaged the services of counsel to handle his
defense. The reinvestigation dragged on for almost a year until February 18,
1934, when the Court of First Instance ordered that the case be tried on the
merits. The petitioner interposed a demurrer on November 25, 1935, on the
ground that the will alleged to have been forged had already been probated.
This demurrer was overruled on December 24, 1935, whereupon an
exception was taken and a motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal
were filed. The motion for reconsideration and the proposed appeal were
denied on January 14, 1936. The case proceeded to trial, and forthwith
petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming again that the will alleged to
have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the order
probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution
thereof. The motion was overruled and the petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial
court from further proceedings in the matter. The injunction was issued and
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 thereafter, on June 19, 1937, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for
certiorari, and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. Three justices
dissented in a separate opinion. The case is now before this court for review
on certiorari.
Petitioner contends: (1) that the probate of the will of his deceased wife
is a bar to his criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will;
and, (2) that he has been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
1. Section 306 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides as to the
effect of judgment:
"SEC. 306. Effect of judgment. — The effect of a judgment or
final order in an action or special proceeding before a court or judge of
the Philippine Islands or of the United States, or of any State or
Territory of the United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or order, may be as follows:
"1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or
in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of
a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or relation of a particular person, the judgment or order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the
condition or relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will
or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie
evidence of the death of the testator or intestate:

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis ours.)
Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness
of the due execution of a probated will. It says:
"SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to
Execution. — No will shall pass either the real or personal estate,
unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by
appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will
of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution."
(Emphasis ours.)
In Manahan vs. Manahan (58 Phil., 448, 451), we held:
". . . The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due
execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds
authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent
action or proceeding. (Sec. 625, Code of Civil Procedure; Castaneda vs.
Alemany, 3 Phil., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Sahagun vs.
De Gorostiza, 7 Phil., 347; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil., 393;
Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil.,
156; Riera vs. Palmaron, 40 Phil., 105; Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil.,
180; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855; and Chiong Joc-soy vs. Vano, 8
Phil., 119."
In 28 R. C. L., p. 377, section 378, it is said:
"The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction
thereof is usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and
validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not
acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the
will is genuine and not a forgery." (Emphasis ours.)
As our law on wills, particularly section 625 of our Code of Civil
Procedure aforequoted, was taken almost bodily from the Statutes of
Vermont, the decisions of the Supreme Court of that State relative to the
effect of the probate of a will are of persuasive authority in this jurisdiction.
The Vermont statute as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a
probated will reads as follows:
"SEC. 2356. No will shall pass either real or personal estate,
unless it is proved and allowed in the probate court, or by appeal in the
country or supreme court; and the probate of a will of real or personal
estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution." (Vermont Statutes,
p. 451.)
Said the Supreme Court of Vermont in the case of Missionary Society
vs. Eelss (68 Vt., 497, 504): "The probate of a will by the probate court
having jurisdiction thereof, upon the due notice, is conclusive as to its due
execution against the whole world . (Vt. St., sec. 2336; Foster's Exrs. vs.
Dickerson, 64 Vt., 233.)"
The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceedingin rem. The
provision of notice by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will
is constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the
judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.
This court held in the case of Manalo vs. Paredes and Philippine Food Co. (47
Phil., 938):
"The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem (40 Cyc.,
1265), and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons
interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by section
630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered
therein is binding against all of them.
"Through the publication of the petition for the probate of the
will, the court acquires jurisdiction over all such persons as are
interested in said will; and any judgment that may be rendered after
said proceeding is binding against the world."
In Everrett vs. Wing (103 Vt., 488, 492), the Supreme Court of Vermont
held:
"In this State the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, being in
form and substance upon the will itself to determine its validity. The
judgment determines the status of the instrument, whether it is or is
not the will of the testator. When the proper steps required by law have
been taken the judgment is binding upon everybody, and makes the
instrument as to all the world just what the judgment declares it to be.
(Woodruff vs. Taylor, 20 Vt., 65, 73; Burbeck vs. Little, 50 Vt., 713; 715;
Missionary Society vs. Eells, 68 Vt., 497, 504; 35 Atl. 463.) The
proceedings before the probate court are statutory and are not
governed by common-law rules as to parties or causes of action.
(Holdrige vs. Holdrige's Estate, 53 Vt., 546, 550; Purdy vs. Estate of
Purdy, 67 Vt. 50, 55; 30 Atl., 695.) No process is issued against anyone
in such proceedings, but all persons interest in determining the state
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 or conditions of the instrument are constructively notified by the
publication of notice as required by G. L. 3219. (Woodruff vs. Taylor,
supra; In re Warner's Estate 98 Vt., 254; 271; 127 Atl., 362.)"
Section 333, paragraph 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an
incontrovertible presumption in favor of judgments declared by it to be
conclusive:
"SEC. 333. Conclusive Presumptions. — The following
presumptions or deductions, which the law expressly directs to be
made from particular facts, are deemed conclusive:
"xxx xxx xxx
"4. The judgment or order of a court, when declared by this
code to be conclusive."
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so
peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary
proof however strong. (Brant vs. Morning Journal Ass'n., 80 N. Y. S., 1002,
1004; 81 App. Div., 183; see, also, Joslyn vs. Puloer, 59 Hun., 129, 140; 13 N.
Y. S., 311.) The will in question having been probated by a competent court,
the law will not admit any proof to overthrow the legal presumption that it is
genuine and not a forgery.
The majority decision of the Court of Appeals cites English decisions to
bolster up its conclusion that "the judgment admitting the will to probate is
binding upon the whole world as to the due execution and genuineness of
the will insofar as civil rights and liabilities are concerned, but not for the
purpose of punishment of a crime." The cases of Dominus Rex vs. Vincent,
93 English Reports, Full Reprint, 648 and Dominus Rex vs. Rodes, 93 English
Reports, Full Reprint, 795, the first case being decided in 1721, were cited to
illustrate the earlier English decisions to the effect that upon indictment for
forging a will, the probating of the same is conclusive evidence in the
defendant's favor of its genuine character. Reference is made, however, to
the cases of Rex vs. Gibson, 168 English Reports, Full Reprint, 836, footnote
(a), decided in 1802, and Rex vs. Buttery and Macnamarra, 168 English
Reports, Full Reprint, 836, decided in 1818, which establish a contrary rule.
Citing these later cases, we find the following quotation from Black on
Judgments, Vol. II, page 764:
"A judgment admitting a will to probate cannot be attacked
collaterally although the will was forged; and a payment to the
executor names therein of a debt due the decedent will discharge the
same, notwithstanding the spurious character of the instrument
probated. It has also been held that, upon an indictment for forging a
will, the probate of the paper in question is conclusive evidence in the
defendant's favor of its genuine character. But this particular point has
lately been ruled otherwise."
It was the case of Rex vs. Buttery, supra, which induced the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts in the case of Waters vs. Stickney (12 Allen 1; 90
Am. Dec., 122) also cited by the majority opinion, to hold that "according to
later and sounder decisions, the probate, though conclusive until set aside of
the disposition of the property, does not protect the forger from
punishment." This was reproduced in 28 R. C. L., p. 376, and quoted in Barry
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 vs. Walker 9103 Fla., 533; 137 So., 711, 715), and Thompson vs. Freeman
(149 So., 740, 742), also cited in support of the majority opinion of the Court
of Appeals. The dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals in the instant case
under review makes a cursory study of the statutes obtaining in England,
Massachusetts and Florida, and comes to the conclusion that the decisions
cited in the majority opinion do not appear to "have been promulgated in the
face of statutes similar to ours." The dissenting opinion cites Wharton's
Criminal Evidence (11th ed., sec. 831), to show that the probate of a will in
England is only prima facie proof of the validity of the will (Op. Cit. quoting
Marriot vs. Marriot, 93 English Reprint, 770); and 21 L. R. A. (pp. 686-689 and
note), to show that in Massachusetts there is no statute making the probate
of a will conclusive, and that in Florida the statute (sec. 1810, Revised
Statutes) makes the probate conclusive evidence as to the validity of the will
with regard to personal, and prima facie as to real estate. The cases decided
by the Supreme Court of Florida cited by the majority opinion, supra, refer to
wills of both personal and real estate.
The petitioner cites the case of State vs. McGlynn (20 Cal., 233,
decided in 1862), in which Justice Norton of the Supreme Court of California,
makes the following review of the nature of probate proceedings in England
with respect to wills personal and real property:
"In England, the probate of wills of personal estate belongs to the
Ecclesiastical Courts. No probate of a will relating to real estate is there
necessary. The real estate, upon the death of the party seized, passes
immediately to the devisee under the will if there be one; or if there be
no will, to the heir at law. The person who thus becomes entitled takes
possession. If one person claims to be the owner under a will, and
another denies the validity of the will and claims to be the owner as
heir at law, an action of ejectment is brought against the party who
may be in possession by the adverse claimant; and on the trial of such
an action, the validity of the will is contested, and evidence may be
given by the respective parties as to any fraud practiced upon him, or
as to the actual execution of it, or as to any other circumstance
affecting its character as a valid devise of the real estate in dispute.
The decision upon the validity of the will in such action becomes res
adjudicata, and is binding and conclusive upon the parties to that
action and upon any reason who may subsequently acquire the title
from either of those parties; but the decision has no effect upon other
parties, and does not settle what may be called the status or character
of the will, leaving it subject to be enforced as a valid will, or defeated
as invalid, whenever other parties may have a contest depending upon
it. A judicial determination of the character of the will itself. It does not
necessarily or ordinarily arise from any controversy between adverse
claimants, but is necessary in order to authorize a disposition of the
personal estate in pursuance of its provisions. In case of any
controversy between adverse claimants of the personal estate, the
probate is given in evidence and is binding upon the parties, who are
not at liberty to introduce any other evidence as to the validity of the
will."
The intervenors, on the other hand, attempt to show that the English
law on wills is different from that stated in the case of State vs. McGlynn,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 supra, citing the following statutes:
1. The Wills Act, 1837 (7 Will. 4 E 1 Vict. c. 26).
2. The Court of Probate Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 77).
3. The Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66).
The Wills Act of 1837 provides that probate may be granted of "every
instrument purporting to be testamentary and executed in accordance with
the statutory requirements . . . if it disposes of property, whether personal or
real." the Ecclesiastical Courts which took charge of testamentary causes
(Ewell's Blackstone [1910], p. 460), were determined by the Court of Probate
Act of 1857, and the Court of Probate in turn was, together with other courts,
incorporated into the Supreme Court of Judicature, and transformed into the
Probate Division thereof, by the Judicature Act of 1873. (Lord Halsbury, The
Laws of England [1910], pp. 151-156.) The intervenors overlook the fact,
however, that the case of Rex vs. Buttery and Macnamarra, supra, upon
which they rely in support of their theory that the probate of a forged will
does not protect the forger from punishment, was decided long before the
foregoing amendatory statutes to the English law on wills were enacted. The
case of State vs. McGlynn may be considered, therefore, as more or less
authoritative on the law of England at the time of the promulgation of the
decision in the case of Rex vs. Buttery and Macnamarra.
In the case of State vs. McGlynn, the Attorney-General of California
filed an information to set aside the probate of the will of one Broderick,
after the lapse of one year provided by the law of California for the review of
an order probating a will, in order that the estate may be escheated to the
State of California, on the ground that the probated will was forged and that
Broderick therefore died intestate, leaving no heirs, representatives or
devisees capable of inheriting his estate. Upon these facts, the Supreme
Court of California held:
"The fact that a will purporting to be the genuine will of
Broderick, devising his estate to a devisee capable of inheriting and
holding it, has been admitted to probate and established as a genuine
will by the decree of a Probate Court having jurisdiction of the case,
renders it necessary to decide whether that decree, and the will
established by it, or either of them, can be set aside and vacated by
the judgment of any other court. If it shall be found that the decree of
the Probate Court, not reversed by the appellate court, is final and
conclusive, and not liable to be vacated or questioned by any other
court, either incidentally or by any direct proceeding, for the purpose of
impeaching it, and that so long as the probate stands the will must be
recognized and admitted in all courts to be valid, then it will be
immaterial and useless to inquire whether the will in question was in
fact genuine or forged." (State vs. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec.,
118, 121.)
Although in the foregoing case the information filed by the State was to
set aside the decree of probate on the ground that the will was forged, we
see no difference in principle between that case and the case at bar. A
subtle distinction could perhaps be drawn between setting aside a decree of
probate, and declaring a probated will to be a forgery. it is clear, however,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 that a duly probated will cannot be declared to be a forgery without
disturbing in a way the decree allowing said will to probate. It is at least
anomalous that a will should be regarded as genuine for one purpose and
spurious for another.
The American and English cases show a conflict of authorities on the
question as to whether or not the probate of a will bars criminal prosecution
of the alleged forger of the probated will. We have examined some
important cases and have come to the conclusion that no fixed standard may
be adopted or drawn therefrom, in view of the conflict no less than of
diversity of statutory provisions obtaining in different jurisdictions. It
behooves us, therefore, as the court of last resort, to choose that rule most
consistent with our statutory law, having in view the needed stability of
property rights and the public interest in general. To be sure, we have
seriously reflected upon the dangers of evasion from punishment of culprits
deserving of the severity of the law in cases where, as here, forgery is
discovered after the probate of the will and the prosecution is had before the
prescription of the offense. By and large, however, the balance seems
inclined in favor of the view that we have taken. Not only does the law
surround the execution of the will with the necessary formalities and require
probate to be made after an elaborate judicial proceeding, but section 113,
not to speak of section 513, of our Code of Civil Procedure provides for an
adequate remedy to any party who might have been adversely affected by
the probate of a forged will, much in the same way as other parties against
whom a judgment is rendered under the same or similar circumstances.
(Pecson vs. Coronel, 43 Phil., 358.) The aggrieved party may file an
application for relief with the proper court within a reasonable time, but in
no case exceeding six months after said court has rendered the judgment of
probate, on the ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect. An appeal lies to review the action of a court of first instance when
that court refuses to grant relief. (Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37
Phil., 921; Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, 47 Phil., 810; Samia vs.
Medina, 56 Phil., 613.) After a judgment allowing a will to be probated has
become final and unappelable, and after the period fixed by section 113 of
the Code of Civil Procedure has expired, the law as an expression of the
legislative wisdom goes no further and the case ends there.
". . . The court of chancery has no capacity, as the authorities
have settled, to judge or decide whether a will is or is not a forgery;
and hence there would be an incongruity in its assuming to set aside a
probate decree establishing a will, on the ground that the decree was
procured by fraud, when it can only arrive at the fact of such fraud by
first deciding that the will was a forgery. There seems, therefore, to be
a substantial reason, so long as a court of chancery is not allowed to
judge of the validity of a will, except as shown by the probate, for the
exception of probate decrees from the jurisdiction which courts of
chancery exercise in setting aside other judgments obtained by fraud.
But whether the exception be founded in good reason or otherwise, it
has become too firmly established to be disregarded. At the present
day, it would not be a greater assumption to deny the general rule that
courts of chancery may set aside judgments procured by fraud, than to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 deny the exception to that rule in the case of probate decrees. We
must acquiesce in the principle established by the authorities, if we are
unable to approve of the reason. Judge Story was a staunch advocate
for the most enlarged jurisdiction of courts of chancery, and was
reluctant to allow the exception in cases of wills, but was compelled to
yield to the weight of authority. He says: 'No other excepted case is
known to exist; and it is not easy to discover the grounds upon which
this exception stands, in point of reason or principle, although it is
clearly settled by authority.' (1 Story's Eq. Jur. sec. 440.)" (State vs.
McGlyn,, 20 Cl., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118, 129. See, also, Tracy vs. Muir,
121 American State Reports, 118, 125.).
We hold, therefore, that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333
and 625 of our Code of Civil Code Procedure, criminal action will not lie in
this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to
probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The resolution of the foregoing legal question is sufficient to dispose of
the case. However, the other legal question with reference to the denial to
the accused of his right to a speedy trial having been squarely raised and
submitted, we shall proceed to consider the same in the light of cases
already adjudicated by this court.
2. The Constitution of the Philippines provides that "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused . . . shall enjoy the right . . . to have a speedy . . .
trial . . . (Art. III, sec, 1, par. 17. See, also G. O. No. 58 sec. 15, NO. 7.) Similar
provisions are to be found in the President's Instructions to the Second
Philippine Commission (par. 11), the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 (sec. 5,
par. 2) and the Jones Act of August 29, 1916 (sec. 3, par. 2). The provision in
the foregoing organic acts appear to have been taken from similar provisions
in the Constitution of the United States (6th Amendment) and those of the
various states of the American Union. A similar injunction is contained in the
Malolos Constitution ( art. 8, Title IV), not to speak of other constitutions.
More than once this court had occasion to set aside the proceedings in
criminal cases to give effect to the constitutional injunction of speedy trial.
(Conde vs. Judge of First Instance and Fiscal of Tayabas [1923], 45 Phil., 173;
Conde vs. Rivera and Unson [1924], 45 Phil., 650; People vs. Castañeda and
Fernandez [1936]), 35 Off. GAz., 1269; Kalaw vs. Apostol, Oct. 15, 1937, G.
R. No. 45591; Esguerra vs. De la Costa, Aug. 30, 1938, G. R. NO. 46039.)
In Conde vs. Rivera and Unson, supra, decided before the adoption of
our Constitution, we said:
"Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a
speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right
to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has
been deprived of that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her
humble position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts while
investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent,
is palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By
the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have settled
upon the appropriate information, could have settled upon the
appropriate information, could have attended to the formal preliminary
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial free from
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays."
In People vs. Castañeda and Fernandez, supra, this court found that the
accused had not been given a fair and impartial trial. The case was to have
been remanded to the court a quo for a new trial before an impartial judge.
This step, however, was found unnecessary. A review of the evidence
convinced this court that a judgment of conviction for theft, as changed,
could not be sustained and, having in view the right to a speedy trial
guaranteed by the Constitution to every person accused of crime, entered a
judgment acquitting the accused, with costs de oficio. We said:
". . . The Constitution, Article III, section 1, paragraph 17,
guarantees to every accused person the right to a speedy trial. This
criminal proceeding has been dragging on for almost five years now.
The accused have twice appealed to this court for redress from the
wrong that they have suffered at the hands of the trial court. At least
one of them, namely Pedro Fernandez alias Piro, had been confined in
prison from July 20, 1932 to November 27, 1934, for inability to post
the required bond of P3,000 which was finally reduced to P300. The
Government should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal
obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings against the
accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from
the custody of the law. (Conde vs. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil., 651.)"
In Kalaw vs. Apostol, supra, the petitioner invoked and this court
applied and gave effect to the doctrines stated in the second Conde case,
supra. In granting the writs prayed for, this court, after referring to the
constitutional and statutory provisions guaranteeing to persons accused of
crime the right to a speedy trial, said:
"Se infiere de los preceptos legales transcritos que todo acusado
en causa criminal tiene derecho a ser juzgado pronta y publicamente.
Juicio rapido significa un juicio que se celebra de acuerdo con la ley de
procedimiento criminal y los reglamentos, libre de dilaciones
vejatorias, caprichosas y opresivas (Burnett vs. State, 76 Ark., 295; 88
S. W., 956; 113 AMSR, 94; Stewart vs. State, 13 Ark., 720; Peo. vs.
Shufelt, 61 Mich, 237; 28 N. W., 79; Nixon vs. State, 10 Miss., 497; 41
AMD., 601; State vs. Cole, 4 Okl., Cr., 25; 109 P., 736; State vs.
Caruthers, 1 Okl. Cr., 428; 98 P., 474; State vs. Keefe, 17 Wyo., 227, 98
p., 122; 22 IRANS, 896; 17 Ann. Cas., 161). Segun los hechos admitidos
resulta que al recurrente se le concedio vista parcial del asunto, en el
Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Samar, solo despues de haber
transcurrido ya mas de un año y medio desde la presentacion de la
primera querella y desde la recepcion de la causa en dicho Juzgado, y
despues de haberse transferido dos veces la vista del asunto sin su
consentimiento. A esto debe añadirse que la primera transferencia de
vista era claramente injustificada porque el motivo que se alego
consistio unicamente en la conveniencia personal del ofendido y su
abogado, no habiendose probado suficientemente la alegacion del
primero de que se hallaba enfermo. Es cierto que el recurrente habia
pedido que, en vez de seialarse a vista el asunto para el mayo de
1936, lo fuera para el noviembre del mismo año; pero, aparte de que la
razon que alego era bastante fuerte porque su abogado se oponia a
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 comparecer por compromisos urgentes contraidos con anterioridad y
en tal circunstancia hubiera quedado indefenso si hubiese sido
obligado a entrar en juicio, aparece que la vista se pospuso por el
Juzgado a motu proprio, por haber cancelado todo el calendario judicial
preparado por el Escribano para el mes de junio. Declaramos, con visto
de estos hechos, que al recurrente se le privo de su derecho
fundamental de ser juzgado prontamente."
Esguerra vs. De la Costa, supra, was a petition for mandamus to
compel the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal to dismiss
the complaint filed in a criminal case against the petitioner, to cancel the
bond put up by the said petitioner and to declare the costs de oficio. In
accepting the contention that the petitioner had been denied speedy trial,
this court said:
"Consta que en menos de un año el recurrente fue procesado
criminalmente por el ageldao delito de abusos deshonestos, en el
Juzgado de Paz del Municipio de Cainta, Rizal. Como consecuencia de
las denuncias que contra el se presentaron fue arrestado tres veces y
para gozar de libertad provisional, en espera de los juicios, se vio
obligado a prestar tres fianzas por la suma de P1,000 cada una. Si no
se da fin al proceso que ultimamente se ha incoado contra el
recurrente la incertidumbre continuara cerniendose sobre el y las
consiguientes molestias y preocupaciones continuaran igualmente
abrumandole. El Titulo III, articulo 1, No. 17, de la Constitucio
preceptua que en todo proceso criminal el acusado tiene derecho de
ser juzgado pronta y publicamente. El Articulo 15, No. 7, de la Orden
General No. 58 dispone asimismo que en las causas criminales el
acusado tendra derecho a ser juzgado pronta y publicamente. Si el
recurrente era realmente culpable del delito que se le imputo, tenia de
todos modos derechos a que fuera juzgado pronta y publicamente y
sin dilaciones arbitrarias y vejatorias. Hemos declarado reiteradamente
que existe un remedio positivo para los casos en que se viola el
derecho constitucional del acusado de ser juzgado prontamente. El
acusado que es privado de su derecho fundamental de ser enjuiciado
rapidamente tiene derecho a pedir que se le ponga en libertad, si
estuviese detenido, o a que la causa que pende contra el sea
sobreseida definitivamente. (Conde contra Rivera y Unson, 45 Jur. Fil.,
682; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U. S. vs. Fox [1880], 3
Mont., 512; Kalaw contra Apostol, R. G. No. 45591, Oct. 15, 1937;
Pueblo contra Castañeda y Fernandez, 35 Gac. Of., 1357.)"
We are again called upon to vindicate the fundamental right to a
speedy trial. The facts of the present case may be at variance with those of
the cases hereinabove referred to. Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that,
under the circumstances, we should consider the substance of the right
instead of indulging in more or less academic or undue factual
differentiations. The petitioner herein has been arrested four times, has put
up a bond in the sum of P4,000 and has engaged the services of counsel to
undertake his defense an equal number of times. The first arrest was made
upon a complaint filed by one of the intervenors herein for alleged
falsification of a will which, sixteen months before, had been probated in
court. This complaint, after investigation, was dismissed at the complaint's
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 own request. The second arrest was made upon a complaint charging the
same offense and this complaint, too, was dismissed at the behest of the
complainant herself who alleged the quite startling ground that the
petitioner was in poor health. The third arrest was made following the filing
of an information by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga, which information
was dismissed, after due investigation, because of insufficiency of the
evidence. The fourth arrest was made when the provincial fiscal secured a
reinvestigation of the case against the petitioner on the pretext that he had
additional evidence to present, although such evidence does not appear to
have ever been presented.
It is true that provincial fiscal did not intervene in the case until
February 2, 1934, when he presented an information charging the petitioner,
for the third time, of the offense of falsification. This, however, does not
matter. The prosecution of offenses is a matter of public interest and it is the
duty of the government or those acting in its behalf to prosecute all cases to
their termination without oppressive, capricious and vexatious delay. The
Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of
only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the
fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private
individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a
speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which
it is authorized to be commenced. In any event, even the actuations of the
fiscal himself in this case is not entirely free from criticism. From October 27,
1932, when the first complaint was filed in the justice of the peace court of
San Fernando, to February 2, 1934, when the provincial fiscal filed his
information with the justice of the peace of Mexico, one year, three months
and six days transpired; and from April 27, 1933, when the second criminal
complaint was dismissed by the justice of the peace of Mexico, to February
2, 1934, nine months and six days elapsed. The investigation following the
fourth arrest, made after the fiscal had secured a reinvestigation of the case,
appears also to have dragged on for about a year. There obviously has been
a delay, and considering the antecedent facts and circumstances within the
knowledge of the fiscal, the delay may not at all be regarded as permissible.
In Kalaw vs. Apostol, supra, we observed that the prosecuting officer is in
charge of and has under his direction and control all prosecutions for public
offenses (secs. 1681 and 2465 of the Rev. Adm. Code), and that it is his duty
to see that criminal cases are heard without vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays so that the courts of justice may dispose of them on the
merits and determine whether the accused is guilty or not. This is as clear an
admonition as could be made. an accused person is entitled to a trial at the
earliest opportunity. (Sutherland on the Constitution, p. 664; United States
vs. Fox, 3 Mont., 512.) He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the
proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed.
It is not to be supposed, of course, that the Constitution intends to remove
from the prosecution every reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial.
Impossibilities cannot be expected or extraordinary efforts required on the
part of the prosecutor or the court. As stated by the Supreme Court of the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 United States, "The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to
a defendant. It does preclude the rights of public justice." (Beavers vs.
Haubert [1905], 198 U. S. 86; 25 S. Ct., 573; 49 Law. ed., 950, 954.)
It may be true, as seems admitted by counsel for the intervenors, in
paragraph 8, page 3 of his brief, that the delay was due to "the efforts
towards reaching an amicable extrajudicial compromise," but this fact, we
think, casts doubt instead upon the motive which led the intervenors to bring
criminal action against the petitioner. The petitioner claims that the intention
of the intervenors was to press upon settlement, with the continuous threat
of criminal prosecution, notwithstanding the probate of the will alleged to
have been falsified. Argument of counsel for the petitioner in this regard is
not without justification. Thus after the filing of the second complaint with
the justice of the peace court of Mexico, complainant herself, as we have
seen, asked for dismissal of the complaint, on the ground that " el acusado
tenia la salud bastante delicada," and, apparently because of failure to arrive
at any settlement, she decided to renew her complaint.
Counsel for the intervenors contend — and the contention is sustained
by the Court of Appeals — that the petitioner did not complain heretofore of
the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. This is a mistake. When
the petitioner, for the fourth time, was ordered arrested by the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, he moved for reconsideration of the order of arrest,
alleging, among other things, "Que por estas continuas acusaciones e
investigaciones, el acusado compareciente no obsdtante su mal estado de
salud desde el año 1932 en que tuvo que ser operado por padecer de
tuberculosis ha tenido que sostener litigios y ha sufrido la mar de
humiliaciones y zozobras y ha incurrido en enormes gastos y molestias y ha
desatendido su quebrantada salud ." The foregoing allegation was inserted
on page 6 of the amended petition for certiorari presented to the Court of
Appeals. The constitutional issue also appears to have been actually raised
and considered in the Court of Appeals. In the majority opinion of that court,
it is stated:
"Upon the foregoing facts, counsel for the petitioner submits for
the consideration of this court the following questions of law: First, that
the respondent court acted arbitrarily and with abuse of its authority,
with serious damage and prejudice to the rights and interests of the
petitioner, in allowing that the latter be prosecuted and arrested for the
fourth time, and that he be subjected, also for the fourth time, to a
preliminary investigation for the same offense, thereby converting the
court into an instrument of oppression and vengeance on the pat of the
alleged offended parties, Rosario Basa et al.;. . .."
And in the dissenting opinion, we find the following opening paragraph:
"We cannot join in a decision declining to stop a prosecution that
has dragged for about five years and caused the arrest on four
different occasions of a law abiding citizen for the alleged offense of
falsifying a will that years before, had been declared genuine and valid
by a court of competent jurisdiction."
From the view we take of the instant case, the petitioner is entitled to
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 have the criminal proceedings against him quashed. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, without pronouncement regarding
costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com