A SYLLABUS

of
PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OCTOBER 1946
 A SYLLABUS
of
PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE

PROPAGANDA BRANCH, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, WDGS

THE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
OCTOBER, 1946
 Cover I (lustration
The leaflet shown on the cover is an

instance of the 4
‘civilian action” type.
-

It was an appeal to Chinese villagers

to aid American airmen who might be

wounded, to conceal them from Japanese,

to facilitate their return to base. Another

leaflet in the same series is shown

in illustration number 8 on page 36.

 Note
Instructional and informational material concerning psy-
chological warfare has been requested in a considerable number
of inquiries addressed to Propaganda Branch, Intelligence Division.
This SYLLABUS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE has been pre-
pared to meet such inquiries until more basic documentation is
available. Psychological warfare, sometimes called military pro-
paganda, is a subject new to formal American military doctrine;
its definition in relation to other military topics will accordingly
take special time and care. A field manual, a technical manual,
ordnance and air studies and other appropriate documents are in
course of preparation, but until they are approved for publication,
no book or outline can be represented as expressing the official
views and policies of the War Department. This SYLLABUS is
designed to serve during the interim and it must be understood to
be provisional in character. It will be superseded when the more
formal publications become available.

This SYLLABUS is designed either for independent reading

or for course instruction. It has been prepared by Major Paul
M. A. Linebarger, AUS, who is in civilian life a professor at the
School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D. C.
Major Linebarger is also preparing a college-level textbook on
psychological warfare. He has worked in this field at the old
Psychological Warfare Branch, the O.W.I., the CBI and China
Theater propaganda facilities and this Branch.

The Psychological Warfare Division, G-2, Army Ground

Forces has closely cooperated in the preparation of this SYLLABUS
for publication. Propaganda Branch issues and endorses this
SYLLABUS only to the extent of making it available as an instruc-
tional aid.

DANA W. /OHNSTON
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Propaganda Branch
Intelligence Division, WDGS
 Contents

Page

I. Definitions 2

II. Psychological Warfare, 1914-1918 4

III. Experience of World War II 8

IV. Propaganda Analysis 16

V. Propaganda Intelligence 22

VI. Propaganda Technique 25

VII. Wartime Propaganda Administration 27

VIII. Combat Propaganda Operations 32

IX. Reading List 45

 I. Definitions

11. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. Psychological warfare has

been defined as warfare psychologically waged; that is, military opera-
tions carried out with close and studied reference to the politics, opinion,
and morale of the r nemy. It is not in this sense that the term has been
used in American practice during World War II. Psychological warfare
has been, more narrowly, defined as comprising the use of propaganda
against an enemy, together with such other operational measures of a
military nature as the effective use of propaganda may require.

If2. PROPAGANDA. Propaganda may be loosely described as

“organized non-violent persuasion/' More technically, it may be defined
for Army purposes as follows: Military propaganda consists of the planned
use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds and emotions
of a given enemy, neutral, or friendly foreign group for a specific strategic
or tactical purpose.

IF3. OVERT PROPAGANDA. Overt or “white” propaganda is

propaganda which is officially or otherwise plainly issued from a known
source. (See Illustrations #1, #4, or #5., as opposed to #9, which falsely im-
plies that it is of American origin.)

1F4. COVERT PROPAGANDA. Covert or “black” propaganda is

issued from a concealed or falsified source. (Illustration #9; or a radio
station which pretends to be a “freedom station” and is actually operated
by one of the belligerent’ powers.)

1F5. STRATEGIC PROPAGANDA. Strategic propaganda is directed

at enemy forces, enemy peoples or enemy-occupied areas in their entirety
and—in coordination with other strategically planned means—is designed
to effectuate results sought over a long period of time.

IF6. TACTICAL PROPAGANDA. Tactical propaganda (sometimes

called “combat propaganda”) is directed at specific audiences, and is pre-
pared and executed in support of combat operations.

IF7. CONSOLIDATION PROPAGANDA. Consolidation propaganda

is directed toward civil populations in areas occupied by a military force
and is designed to insure compliance with the commands promulgated by
the commander of the occupying force.

IF8.
COUNTERPROPAGANDA. Counterpropaganda is designed to
refute a specific point or theme of enemy propaganda.

2
 19. POLITICAL WARFARE. Political warfare (also called
“crisis diplomacy/' or “the war of nerves/' or the “diplomacy of
dramatic intimidation") consists of the framing of national policy in such
a way as to facilitate propaganda or military operations, whether with
respect to the direct political relations of governments to one another or
in relation to groups of persons possessing a political character.

110. MEDIA. The devices by means of which the communication

is conveyed. (In everyday life, the most common media are the living
voice, the telephone, print, and the typewriter. In war propaganda, the most
common media are voice radio, wireless in plain code, leaflets and pam-
phlets.)

3
 II. Psychological Warfare, 1914-1918

111. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR.

In the first World War, psychological warfare was employed chiefly by
means of political warfare and through combat propaganda which used air-
borne and artillery-fired leaflets. Radio was not available.

1112. POLITICAL WARFARE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS AND

THE ALLIES. The Central Powers used very old-fashioned political war-
fare. They were reactionary monarchies, legitimist in outlook, and were
unable to exploit the revolutionary, democratic or autonomist sentiments
of the time. Their chief political warfare exploits consisted of inducing
Turkey to proclaim a jihad against the Allies; since the Turkish sultan was
the titular caliph of all Islam, this seemed promising but was countered by
local measures (T. E. Lawrence and the Arab revolt against Turkey, for
example) in the Middle East, and of the assistance offered to Lenin and the
Bolshevik leaders by the German General Staff. The Germans gave Lenin,
a subject of the Czar, transit from Switzerland to Finland in the expecta-
tion that Lenin would enter Russia, commit high treason against the Czar,
and take Russia out of the war. He did so, but the ensuing wave of Communist
revolution contributed to the defeat of Germany as weH.

Allied psychological warfare was based preeminently on the political

warfare developed by President Woodrow Wilson. The United States entered
the war in 1917 with a clear conscience, since the Kaiser's government was
plainly the aggressor. Immediately upon participation, the U. S. government
strove for the Fourteen Points. These assured both Allies and enemies that
the United States sought no new territory as a result of war, that we stood
for open diplomacy, that we believed in a “league to enforce peace" which
would make further war impossible. They also promised democratic self-
government to the hitherto-suppressed nationalities of the Baltic and Cen-
tral Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, etc.). This democratic po-
litical offensive was propagandized by official government action, but its
greatest effect was achieved when it was carried by ordinary news channels
all over the world.

British political warfare supplemented American effectively. In

special cases, the British accomplished even more striking results. Against
Turkey they rallied the Arab states, while rallying world-wide Jewish Zionist
help to their side by promising the Jews a national home in Palestine (Balfour
Declaration). India was quieted, in the face of German, Turkish, and revo-
lutionary propaganda, by the Montagu statement and Montagu-Chelmsford
reforms. Japanese political warfare during World War I was directed at her
co-Ally, China.

4
 At the end of the war, the Allies faced a serious problem in the
revolutionary propaganda of the Russian Communists, who had established
a Soviet communist form of state which denied the legitimacy of all other
states. The Soviet leaders expected revolution to break out throughout the
world. Communist revolts did occur in Hungary, Bavaria, Berlin and else-
where. The Allies countered these with military intervention on the side
of the Conservatives in Russia and with diplomatic and military aid to the
states around Russia (“cordon sanitaire”). The reciprocal bitterness and
suspicion which resulted from this clash between Allies and Bolsheviks
later provided a line of cleavage which Hitler utilized in preparing World
War II.

If 14. THE CREEL COMMITTEE. The national propaganda agency

of the United States government—the Committee on Public Information,
usually known by the name of its chairman, George Creel—was the “Creel
Committee/' This was actually an emergency wartime department of the
government. It was set up by order of the President and was financed out
of his special war funds, later supplemented by congressional appropria-
tions. The Creel Committee organized both domestic and foreign propa-
ganda. (There was no War Department or General Staff agency charged with
the military side of psychological warfare.) Coordination was effected by
Mr, Creel himself; he had close access to the President and to the appro-
priate cabinet members.

If 15. DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA. Internal propaganda within the

United States was more difficult than it was to be in World War H. The de-
cision to declare war had to be taken by the United States. The Germans had
been too clever to unite us, as did the Japanese with their psychological blun-
der at Pearl Harbor, by means of an overt attack on American territory. The
Creel Committee had the normal problems of wartime morale (slackers, profi-
teers, inert people); it also had well-organized groups of Irish-Americans
(Ireland then being anti-British), German-Americans and powerful isolationists
to counter. The Committee proceeded vigorously on the domestic front. Since
there was no radio, it organized “Four Minute Menstandardized public
speakers who carried war messages throughout the country. It served- the
press by systematizing government information policy. It used posters, ad-
vertising, cartoons, civic clubs, the theatre, movies, and women's organiza-
tions as outlets for its material. The political warfare—the extent of the
promises made for a democratic, war-free, prosperous post-war world—-
probably contributed to the post-1918 reaction against “propaganda" which
continued down to World War II; in retrospect, it appears excessive and
certain to have caused post-war disappointment and embarrassment to the
government.

IT 16. TACTICAL PROPAGANDA. Leaflets were the chief means of

battle-front propaganda on the Western front. The Germans threatened to

5
 take measures against British airplane pilots who dropped leaflets, so that
the British and Americans relied chiefly on mortars and balloons. In Gen-
eral Pershing’s headquarters, a section G-2 D was organized for “psycho-
logic” warfare, and tactical leaflets were showered on the German lines.
These included surrender passes; forms on which Germans could notify
their families(that they were safe, pictures of well-fed prisoners of war in
American hands; political attacks on Kaiserism and on Prussian control of
non-Prussian Germany; leaflets giving the German troops the correct news
of the war, when bad; and emphasis on the democratic aims of the Allies.
German profiteers and capitalists were attacked. Chief emphasis was on
food, however, since the Germans were starving, and on the fact that the
Americans had arrived in Europe in large numbers and that millions more
were coming. Post-1918 German commentators (including Ludendorff and
Hitler) blamed Germany’s defeat on Allied propaganda, and credited the
Allies with effective professional propaganda. Part of the German willing-
ness to admire Allied propaganda must be discounted, since the German
admiration was based in part on an unwillingness to admit loss of the war
by military means. Nevertheless, propaganda was a major ingredient of
Allied victory in World War I.

f 17. THE INTER-WAR PERIOD. The Communists used propa-

ganda as a major weapon for achieving and consolidating their rule in
Russia, and used propaganda for the attempted subversion of “capitalist
states”. This tended to identify propaganda as something which “Bolsheviks”
could use, but which established governments could not counter-employ.
In tactical psychological warfare, propaganda was the main feature of
Chiang Kai-shek's preliminary unification of China; he had studied Russian
irregular warfare and psychological warfare in Moscow.

6
 Illustration #1. American Combat Leaflet, World War I.
Although the leaflet uses the German form of the Feldpostkarte and copies
the make-up of the original German, it is not “black” propaganda, since
there is no attempt to conceal either source or intent. The postcard is to
be handed to the first American officer whom the prisoner sees after he
surrenders. By marking out appropriate entries, he can send the message
to his family that he is well, well-cared for and getting “beef, white bread,
beans, plums, genuine coffee-bean coffee, milk, butter, tobacco. .”--all
.

of them items unprocurable inside Germany.

7
 III. Experience of World War II

IT 18. THE NAZIS AS PROPAGANDISTS. In order to gain control

of Germany, the National Socialist German Workers' Party, as Hitler
called himself and his followers, had to use psychological warfare methods
in time of peace. This was made possible by the breach of faith between
Left and Right in Germany, each of which had become acutely conscious of
propaganda. (The Left, KPD, or German Communist Party, was so propa-
ganda-sensitive that all considerations of constitutionalism or internal
security had to be reviewed on the assumption that other parties were
propaganda-conscious and that every political move was filled with propa-
ganda value. This stultified their own effectiveness. The anti-Nazis never
united successfully.) The Nazis cynically tried to learn from Communist
experience and soon gained a mastery of mass media. They used posters,
rumor campaigns, personal intimidation, mass rallies, radio, and a
coordinated press. They learned strategic psychological warfare tech-
niques--simplicity, clarity, repetition, splitting the opponents, alternate
appeasement and intimidation of antagonists--on their way to power with-
in Germany. Once in power, they subordinated their politics to propaganda.

1119. EFFECTS OF OVER-EMPHASIZED PROPAGANDA. The

Nazis over-did propaganda to the extent that neither the Nazi party members
nor, even less, the German people could tell what they really wanted. They
could not even find out what Germany as a whole was doing or planning to
do. The government controlled all news, entertainment, radio, telegraphs;
the mails were not secret; publishing was under license. Opposition had to
be violent and illegal (“purges”). Secret police and internal espionage
used terror against the home population. This gave the Germans a united
country. They did not have to worry about cheap, insincere, or fatuous
opposition. They did not have to put up with foreign or private propaganda*
But they paid a terrible price for this false security, since they lost all
chance of finding out their own true economic, political or legal position.
By being too suspicious of outside propaganda, they made themselves the
utter, willing dupes of Hitlerite propaganda. Propaganda not only put
Hitler into power; it helped to keep him there after all other parties were
“unified” into the Nazi party or else suppressed, and after criticism and
opposition gave the Germans no further chance to check up on him or to
oppose him, except through high treason. The evils of the private press
were ended; the evils of a single-party system and a controlled press were
greater.

If20. THE CONQUEST OF AUSTRIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

After achieving power within Germany, Hitler began applying the same
tactics in his foreign affairs. He called the bluff of the Allies by re-

8
militarizing the Rhineland, by making it seem a mere matter of prestige.
He bullied Austria into submission; Nazi troops crossed the frontier with-
out opposition and reduced the whole country without having to fight. This
was accomplished by careful analysis of public opinion in the possible
enemy states and by the use of propaganda to scare the victim while assur-
ing all other prospective victims that the occasion in question was the last
aggression. Hitler used psychological warfare in the broad sense as well
as strategic and tactical propaganda. In 1938, with the Munich crisis, he
scored his greatest victory in psychological warfare. The Western democ-
racies (France, England) agreed to the partition of Czechoslovakia in a
conference with the Axis (Italy, Germany) while the Russians were excluded
from the bargaining. Hitler's propaganda emphasized German claims to
the Czech territory in question, and promised no more aggression. Using
the threat of force and the manipulation of anti-World War opinion in the
democracies themselves, Hitler's propaganda won. A few months later he
took the rest of Czechoslovakia and followed that by bullying Russia into a
neutrality agreement. The scene was ready for further aggression. Psy-
chological warfare had made the victims themselves agree to each single
aggression, had made them hope it was the last, and had kept them from
forming an alliance to meet the common danger.

1T21. MILITARY THREAT BEHIND THE PROPAGANDA OPERATION,

These successes could not have been won if suspicions between Communists
and democratic countries had not been high, if anti-war sentiment had not
been so strong, if Hitler had been more frank about his ultimate aims.
Furthermore, they could not have been won if psychological warfare had not
been backed up by a very real threat of armed force. Hitler did not begin his
major aggressions until he had a military edge on his opponents, and his propa-
ganda made his strength seem greater than it was. Whenever he was not
operating he let his army and Luftwaffe seem weak, and encouraged the idea
he was unready; but crises were underscored with the threat of real military
force. Unless the force had actually been there, the powers of Europe would
not have yielded. This demonstrates the axiqm that psychological warfare
cannot work purely by itself; it needs force or the very real threat of force
to make it effective. (The German General Staff after the war admitted that
Germany's bluff could have been called, but Hitler never left the opposition
(no way out). He always offered peace as the reward for non-interference
in his one particular demand of the time. He never forced all demands at
once, so that his enemies could look at the German armed forces, estimate
the situation, estimate the cost of war, and make a reasoned decision as to
whether beating the Germans or giving in were better.)

1(22. THE BLACK PROPAGANDA OF THE AXIS FIFTH COLUMN.

One of Franco's generals boasted as his forces invested Madrid; “I have
five columns. Four here. And a fifth column inside the city." From this

9
phrase there derived the term fifth column to designate active clandestine
operators. Unlike the espionage agent, the fifth columnist seeks to take an
active part in the war. He may perform sabotage, instigate rebellion, launch
whispering campaigns, prepare for an uprising. The spy has two main jobs:
to find fact; to communicate it. The fifth columnist has one job: to make
trouble. Whenever Hitler's war of nerves against the democracies struck
at morale, the morale was already readied for his blow. His agents sowed
dissension throughout Europe and—to a lesser degree—the rest of the world.
One of their main functions was black propaganda. This was not Nazi propa-
ganda except in the sense that the Nazis paid for it and expected to benefit
by it. It might be any kind of propaganda which heated up the controversies
in the anti-Nazi camps. It might take the form of anti-Nazism, provided it
did so in such a way as to defeat its purpose. Many of its instruments were
unconscious of its Nazi origin. In the early part of World War II, the situa-
tion was complicated by the fact that the Communist clandestine operatives
had the same short-range goals as the Nazis: discredit of the capitalist
democracies, denunciation of the imperialist war, and so forth. With the
entry of the Soviet Union into the war, the Communist propaganda line
shifted over to support of anti-Nazi military operations.

The fifth column is considered to have made a major contribution

to the fall of France. In Norway, a minority of ultra-patriotic fanatics
under Vidkun Quisling helped the Germans occupy the country. The tactics
of the fifth column cannot be summarized: they involved cutting communi-
cations, telephoning false orders, destruction of bridges, calling of strikes,
and anything else which would work certain mischief. (Popular writers,
since the invention of the atomic bomb, have predicted that a major duty of
future fifth columns will be the concealment of atomic bombs in enemy terri-
tory. If these were radio-sensitive, one dash on the right wavelength would
send the enemy cities white-hot into the stratosphere.)

H23. POLITICAL WARFARE. Political warfare in World War II

was more obvious and less effective than in World War I. Many countries
had two governments (India, France, Holland, the Philippines); some even
had three (Jugoslavia, Poland). Appeals for support of these governments
were made by every available propaganda means. The United Nations some-
times had the government-in-exile (Norway, Holland, Luxembourg); sometimes
the Axis had it (Provisional Government of Free India). The three-cornered
character of political warfare arose from the presence of rival democratic
and Communist governments, both on the United Nations side. The chief
lesson learned by all participants was the fact that when a country is occu-
pied, a certain percentage of the population, however small, is going to
show improper private ambition and volunteer to serve the enemy; the con-
querors, far from having to prepare quisling governments in advance, were
almost universally embarrassed by the different cliques of traitors who
volunteered to serve the occupying powers.

10
Parce que il* ont compris que cette guerre n'est pat un simple 'conflit
enlre nations, mais bien le heart de deux ideologies. D’un
cdte, un peuple qui vient d’accomplir to revolution sociale et
de I'autre, ('Internationale Judeo-capitaliste qui, non tans
angoisse, voit te lever I'aube d'un renouveau qui n'est pat
sans danger pour nos intents.
Parce que Ms vomissent notre race, la race iuive, et qu'ils veulent la
matt re, une fait pour toutes, dans 1'impossibilitd de pourtuivre
son oeuvre de corruption et de desegregation.
Parce que ~
ils veulent eiiminer ddfinitivement let ploutocrates et autres
parasites qui vivent de la sueur du peuple.
Parce que ce sont des homines virilt, taint et dynamiquet qui meprisent
let dxozouse qui sont le produit d'une societe en pleine
decomposition.
Parce que Ms ont vu le bolchevitme chez lui et parce qu'ils ne le veulent
pas en France; parce qu’ils connaissent la bestialite et
’ effroyable osservissqment de ceux qui vivent sous notre
despotisme.
Parce que Ns veulent pour leurt travoilleurs le respect ouquol ils ont
droit, en mime tempt que ('assurance definitive d'une
EXISTENCE OIGNE.
Parce que ~
Ms veulent une Europe unie qui ne t'dpuitera plus tout let
25 ant dans une tuerie atroce pour les betoint de notre
coffre-fort.
Parce que ~ ils veulent pour cette Patrie, 6 laquelle ils ont voud leur vie,
une place ac choix dans (‘Europe de demain.
Parce que ~
nous sommes des destructeurs et qu'ils appartiennent 6 la race
des constructeurs.
Parce que tiers de leurt traditions et d'un past* glorieux, ils veulent
balayer tout ce qui causa leur mddiocntd et CONSTRUIRE
LEUR AVENIR.
Parce que ~
leur foL est indbranlable et parce qu'ils ne ddposeront pat les
armet avant le triomphe final.

Parce que ce sont des soldats hdroTquet, austi humaint dans la paix
qu’ils sont courageux au combat.
VOILA POURQUOI J'ACCUSE LES HOMMES DE LA WAFFEN-SS.

ENGAGEMENTS -

RENSEIGNEMENTS
ErMtikommando Pronkrtich dar Woffun-SS
24, Avanua du Ractaur-Rolncor* Park-16*
•

Automation n-

Illustration #2. German leaflet attempting

counterpropaganda to Allied radio broadcasts
beamed at France.

11
 If24. RADIO PROPAGANDA. In Europe, especially, the widespread
possession of radio sets made it possible for the belligerents to use standard-
wave radio broadcasting as a regular means of getting propaganda into enemy
territory. The following, in approximate order of importance, were the
materials transmitted:

a. Official speeches by government leaders.

b. Official communiques.

c. News of the world, most of it true, but so arranged as

to favor one side or the other.

d. Special features (regular lectures, debates, “educational

programs”).

e. Regularly scheduled commentators (either white or

black).

f. Ostensibly private or independent speakers.

g. Black stations (British-sponsored “Gustav Siegfried

Bins”; German “Lord Haw Haw”; American Operation Annie”).
“

h. Planted or falsified news quoted from its ostensible source

by official radio, while the official radio disclaimed responsibility.

i. “Ghost” voices or programs, cut in on an enemy wave-

length either while enemy radio was on the air or when enemy
stations went off because of air raids.

Jamming was not found to be successful except as an interference; it never

interdicted all listening to the jammed stations. More feasible anti-radio
measures were those taken to prevent use of materials heard over the air;
listeners were punished or kiHed in Axis Europe. Since radio propagandists
on both sides counted on the indirect audience (people who were told what
the radio had said), restriction of propaganda to the direct audience (people
who actually heard the broadcast) amounted to a definite control.

1125. COUNTERPROPAGANDA AGAINST RADIO. On-the-ground

counterpropaganda was attempted. Newspapers on each side were given
materials with which to confute radio claims of the enemy. The strength
of the democracies showed in that the British and Americans could talk
the matter through in their domestic propaganda media, while the Germans
and Italians, having made all domestic publishing into propaganda, had no

12
impartial-looking agency to which to carry an appeal against propaganda.
The anti-radio measures included poster and leaflet operations. Illus-
tration #2 shows a German attempt to refute Allied claims that the Waffen-
SS (militarized Hitlerite elite guard) was a gang of thugs and murderers;
the German leaflet shows the enemy broadcaster as a Jew saying, “I accuse
the men of the Waffen-SSI”--of such things as believing in the future, want-
ing to help France, preventing recurrent world wars, being heroic soldiers.

1T26. TYPES OF CIVILIAN AUDIENCES. Civilian audiences for

both radio and leaflet propaganda were often divided into five categories:

a. The home audience;

b. Allies;
c. Friendly or impartial neutrals;
d. Enemy satellites and hostile neutrals;
e. The enemy audience.

Different programs had to be worked out in each case.

1127. THE PROPAGANDA OUTPOST. For home, allied, and

neutral audience, it was possible for the propagandists to move into the
city with the audience, to rent an office, go talk to local newspapermen,
make arrangements with local theaters, and carry on through the normal
procedures of publicity. The picture exhibit and the “cultural enterprise
77

were among the major undertakings. (Things which were not entertaining
enough to be called recreation were frequently listed as “culture”—special-
ized lectures, exchange of professors, etc.) The propaganda outpost pos-
sessed the inestimable advantage of direct contact. When the outpost was in
a neutral country, it provided a channel through which material could be
given to visiting enemies; or the neutral press, circulating in enemy terri-
tory, could be primed with items calculated to do psychological harm to
the enemy.

H28. NEWS LEAFLETS. For both civilian and military enemies,

news was one of the main forms of United Nations propaganda against the
Axis and enemy-occupied countries. The free nations had a more open
news policy, so that the Germans could not use news as freely in reprisal.
For civilian audiences, this took the form of miniature airborne newspapers
dropped over the enemy by plane. When the military situation became static,
such newspapers were dropped on enemy troops as well (see Illustrations
#6 and #10). When great events occurred, it usually was found more im-
pressive to get out a special news leaflet summarizing the event. Often
these were prepared in advance (D-Day; Russo-Japanese war; fall of Paris);
sometimes they had to be worked out at top speed (Roosevelt's death;
atomic bomb; Japanese offer to surrender).

13
 *29. CIVILIAN ACTION LEAFLETS. Leaflets sometimes
quested the civilians to perform a specific function. Leaflets like those
shown in Illustration #8 were dropped over Occupied China to deny the
Japanese the use of Chinese labor in maintaining his line of communica-
tions. Since much of the Japanese logistics depended on local help, this
was a major undertaking. The propaganda leaflets from the OWI-CBI,
distributed by the 14th Air Force, called for the Chinese to stay away from
railroads and the texts told the Chinese that their American friends did not
desire to bomb them. This was perfectly true. Coolie transport columns
sometimes disappeared overnight after being peppered with such leaflets,
leaving the Japanese sitting in the middle of nowhere with more gear than
they could carry. The cover illustration is another action leaflet, calling
for help to be given downed American flyers.

*30. CIVILIAN MORALE LEAFLETS. Leaflets which had

neither news nor special action calls often aimed at enemy morale as a
whole, to run it downwards, or at allied morale, to keep it up. Morale
leaflets, when effective, most commonly exploited some definite enemy
weakness, such as lowered rations, the execution of hostages, denial of
furloughs to enlisted fathers.

*31. BLACK LEAFLETS. Often an enemy situation would arise

in which black leaflets could be used. If the enemy issued a complicated
new ration card, the dropping of a few million forgeries was certain to
embarrass his rationing. Official-looking imitations of enemy documents
were dropped, giving “secret” orders to do something highly distasteful
to the enemy population. Sometimes an enemy newspaper would be dupli-
cated. Handbooks for malingerers were used by both sides. Soviet propa-
ganda developed some exceedingly handsome “militarist German” attacks
on Hitler and his gang as not being Junker enough.

*32. COMBAT PROPAGANDA. Comparable leaflets were used

for strategic propaganda to troops. News and morale leaflets were of the
same general types; sometimes the same leaflet was used for both audien-
ces. Action leaflets, however, were not in most instances applicable to
military personnel and civilians both. The commonest action leaflet for
troops was, of course, the surrender pass or surrender leaflet. The most
famous and effective of these is the Passierschein issued from SHAEF
(see Illustration #11). Combat propaganda also made use of loudspeakers.

*33. GIFTS AND NOVELTIES. A sensational but minor field of

experiment concerned the dropping of matches, chocolate, needles,,salt
and other gifts by an air force. Countermeasures to this sometimes con-
sisted in dropping duplicates of the enemy gift, but fixing the duplicates so
as to make the receivers suspicious of all such gifts (poisoned chocolate,
nauseous salt, etc.).

14
 IT34. TERROR DEVICES. A still less important range of ex-
periment concerned the creation of terror devices—whistles attached to
shells, weapon drops to imaginary undergrounds, etc. Though often in-
teresting, these played no appreciable part in the war as a whole. The
German attacks on Holland, Belgium and France made very liberal use of
such methods. This field overlaps in part with orthodox military deception
procedures, such as were illustrated in the post-war press photographs of
dummy tanks, jeeps, etc., which were made of rubber and could be inflated.

H35. SYSTEMATIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. The

major development of psychological warfare during World War II may per-
haps be summed up in terms of its systematization. The war brought forth
few wholly new devices, outside of the use of radio. The novelty consisted
of the close integration of psychological warfare with national policy on the
one hand and with military operations on the other. All major participants,
to a greater or less degree, utilized military propaganda units as aids to
field operations. The increased use of air power made possible the dissemi-
nation of leaflets, pamphlets and occasional books on a tremendous scale.
Fitting all these operations to the national governments, the theater or field
army headquarters, all appropriate military echelons, and then coordinating
propaganda operations one with the other was a task which could not have
been accomplished without the plentiful use of the radio and the duplicating
machine. World War n made psychological warfare a continuous, systematic,
and purposeful part of the general conduct of war. (See Paragraph 58J

f 36. CONSOLIDATION PROPAGANDA. The value of psychological

warfare did not end with the cessation of hostilities. Consolidation propa-
ganda, carried out under the authority of the military headquarters in charge
of occupation, proved invaluable in conveying commands of the occupying
power to the populace concerned. By the use of propaganda, cooperation
was ensured much more swiftly; greater public interest was aroused; and
persons friendly to the occupying power were given a chance to step forward
and to assist the occupation. In the case of friendly or dubious areas, con-
solidation facilities put local publishing and broadcasting back on schedule
and assured the military of a means of getting help from the people.

15
 IV. Propaganda Analysis

IT37. COLLECTION. Propaganda analysis is valuable to the

non-propagandist as a source of news and intelligence. The news or in-
telligence is in turn valuable for two unrelated purposes: first, for the
indication of national or military policy which the attempted mission of
the propaganda itself either forecasts or indicates; secondly, for the in-
cidental content of factual material which is used to make up the propa-
ganda. In order to analyze propaganda lines and to glean the valuable
fact out of the propaganda material, it is necessary to collect the propa-
ganda. This depends, in difficulty, on the remoteness of the area covered,
and on the controls involved. In peacetime, a great deal of propaganda can
be acquired by the process of subscribing or even asking for it. In wartime
propaganda collection must be undertaken along with ordinary military in-
telligence collection from the enemy home area; from neutral areas, it can
be gotten by ordinary means; in one's own territory, the only problem is
that of definition. Radio materials can be collected by having a living
monitor listen to the programs, writing them down or summarizing them,
or by making recordings of appropriate material and processing them at
leisure.

If38. MONITORING. Since even the non-propagandist cannot use

propaganda analysis unless it deals with up-to-date (sometimes up-to-the-
minute) materials, good monitoring is essential. Signal Corps receivers
require no modification unless recordings are to be made. Monitoring of
radio.material simply consists of putting it down in convenient form.

If39. SPOT ANALYSIS. The psychological warfare operator takes

the most current propaganda materials and prepares a brief summary of
the news content and of the probable motive of the enemy for- using that
particular propaganda at that time. (See Paragraph 45.) He is then in a
position to develop his own propaganda with reference to the propaganda
situation as seen by the enemy. Slavish submission to enemy initiative is
a bad idea in propaganda. Normally, the sound operative uses the spot
analysis for his own information, but he does not necessarily try to confute
enemy propaganda point by point. He tries to counter with strong, inde-
pendent propaganda lines of his own.

If40. AREA ANALYSIS. More systematic propaganda analysis

requires the collection of all available propaganda materials from a given
area for a specific period of time. These materials are then broken down
in terms of media which they employ, and each is searched for the probable

16
motive of the issuer. In a large, free country like the United States, this
is a very difficult and complicated task. In a nation which has a dictato-
rial or one-party government controlling all media of communication, or
in a small nation, it is possible to work out an analysis of the major propa-
ganda pressures operating within the country.

When a whole nation is too large an area, the area of analysis can
be cut down by procurement of materials from a single city, province, or
zone. The important point about area analysis consists of getting a repre-
sentative sampling (such as all the newspapers published in Rome or
Munich or Shanghai on a given day).

IT41. TIME OR DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS. In order to find

out what a single propaganda source is doing, the source should be covered
day by day, week by week, or month by month. The content of the source
can be broken down into percentages (of time, for radio; of columns or
square inches, for printed material). The emphasis will become plain as
Soon as the different percentages are noted on ordinary graph paper.
Further study will show what the source is trying to accomplish with each
emphasis.

H42. STRATEGIC PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS. For generaliza-

tions about the over-all opinion of a given national group, it is necessary
to count as propaganda everything to which the persons concerned have
access. For these purposes, it does not matter whether movies have a
propaganda slant or not; the fact that 69 percent may have no propaganda
slant will itself be a propaganda factor of prime importance. The propa-
ganda presentation consists of all public information to which the persons
concerned have access. The propaganda operator must consider the propa-
ganda presentation—that is, his own materials and all other public communi-
cations, whatever the kind—before he can even guess the success of a given
technique. National morale (before, during, and after war) cannot be gauged
by a single propaganda .-source, but must include a scheduled appraisal of
all the contributing factors to the public opinion of the nation concerned.

H43. PROPAGANDA IDENTIFICATION. The propaganda analyst

will find that there is no magic formula by means of which he can un-
failingly identify propaganda. Human beings are highly communicative and
almost all two billion of them talk a great deal of their waking time. Propa-
ganda is distinguished from conversation, education, private quarrels,
recreation, romance, ordinary monologues, etc., by the fact that it is
communicated intentionally. It is not the content of the communication,
but the motive which impels it, which distinguishes propaganda from non-
propaganda. This is like saying that propaganda is propaganda when it is
propaganda; to a certain extent this unsatisfactory definition is correct.

17
However, few communications come from completely unknown sources;
when they are, they are often mistrusted. The propaganda analyst must
therefore take into account the source, whether ostensible or real, the
timing, the people to whom the communication is addressed, and the
probable effect which that communication will have on those people at
that particular time before he can find the source, if the source is hidden.
If the source is not hidden, the whole process is out in the open. (See
Paragraph 45.) Thus, even with a hidden source, it is feasible to work
back to the probable source by analyzing the probable effect.

K44. PROPAGANDA VERSUS TRUTH. Good propaganda does

not make use of lies. Good propaganda is truthful, except in very extra-
ordinary circumstances. Good propaganda uses the truth selectively. It
directs to the audience those truths which will accomplish the results
which the propagandist seeks, and withholds those truths which accomplish
no particular purpose. To test for propaganda by looking for lies is there-
fore impractical and unprofitable. The test for propaganda is a dynamic
test. It must consider not only the information, but the life-history of the
communication. Where does it come from? To whom is it going? Why
now? What for? The statement, “People who work get paid/' can be
propaganda or not, depending on who says it to whom, when, why and on
whose behalf. (The reader might try to develop this statement into anti-
Russian propaganda by Germans, anti-American propaganda by Germans,
anti-German propaganda by Russians, and anti-German propaganda by
Americans. The timing, the persons to whom it is addressed, the way it
is said, what is said with it—these make it propaganda or not.) There is
no conflict between propaganda and truth. Good propaganda uses truth.
But the highest truth, in a free civilization, not under totalitarian or
ideological control, is deemed to be the truth uttered by disinterested per-
sons who have no ulterior motive in communicating it.

If45. THE FORMULA FOR A SINGLE ITEM. In large-scope

propaganda analysis, it is desirable to proceed quantitatively. Only highly
experienced personnel should attempt to weight different parts of a given
output in order to guess the weighting given by the source. (The Americans
may consider the 1000-hours news program the best item off Radio Nirgends;
the Nirgenders themselves may not have thought of that program as their
best. Hence, qualitative weighting, unless source itself gives very plain
7
clues, such as using a front page or picking a popular listeners hour, is
dangerous for effective analysis.) When a single item is to be broken down,
a careful propaganda analysis formula could be developed on the basis of
the following outline;

18
 COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF A SINGLE PROPAGANDA ITEM

a. Source T: .swen irigiBTiry;

(1) True source (“where does it really come from?”)
(a) Release channel (“how did it come out?”) if different from true
source without concealing true source
(b) Person or institution in whose name material originates
(c) Transmitting channel (“who got it to us?”), person or institution
effecting known transmission--omitting, of course, analyst's own
procurement facilities
(2) Ostensible source (“where does it pretend to come from?”)
(a) Release channel (“who is supposed to be passing it along?”)
(3) First-use and second-use source (first use, “who is said to have
used this first?”; second use, “who pretends to be quoting someone
else?”)
(a) Connection between second-use source and first-use source,
usually in the form of attributed or unacknowledged quotation;
more rarely, plagiarism . noiaal M

(b) Modification between use by first-use and second-use sources,

when both a*re, known
(i) Deletions
(ii) Changes in text >g5©w
(iii) Enclosure within editorial matter of transmitter
(iv) Falsification which appears deliberate ,
;
0
(v) Effects of translation from one language to another

b. Time
(1) Time of events or utterance to which subject-matter refers
(2) Time of transmission (publishing, broadcasting, etc.)
(3) Timing of repetitions
(4) Reasons, if any are evident, for peculiarities of timing

c. Audience u i0 sqyi alfii io sniliuo he <i9V9Wpii

JT) Intended direct audience (“in English to North America”; “a paper
for New York restaurant operators”) .fnsmnisvc
(2) Intended indirect audience (program beamed “in English to North
America” but actually reaching Hongkong and Singapore by deliber-
ate plan of the sender; “a paper for New York restaurant operators”
being faked and sent to Southeast Europe in fact)
(3) Unintended audience (a Guadalcanal native studying Esquire; your
aunt reading the Infantry Journal; a Chinese reading American
wartime speeches against the “yellow devils” of Japan)
(4) Ostensibly-unintended direct audience (such as an appeal to strikers
in very abusive-sounding language, sent to businessmen to build up
opinion against the strikers, or Hitler's use of the fake Protocols
of the Elders of Zion)

19
d. Subject (“what does it say?' )
7

(1) Content listed under any convenient heading as though it were

straight news or intelligence
(2) Content "epitomized as deomonstrating new propaganda technique
(such as, “now they're trying to get us out of Tientsin by appeals
to our isolationists I”)
(3) Content which may be useful in counterpropaganda (such as, “they
said that the Greeks are our witless puppets, so let's pass that
along to the Greeks")
(4) Significance of content for intelligence analysis (example: when the
Japanese boasted about their large fish catch, it was an indication
their fishing fleet was short of gasoline again, and that the fish
catch was actually small; when the Nazis accused the Jews of
sedition, it meant that rations were short and that the Nazi govern-
ment was going to appease the populace by denying the Jews their
scanty rations by way of contrast)

e. Mission
XT) Haiion, group, or person attacked
(2) Relation to previous items with the same or related missions
(3) Particular psychological approach used in this instance (such as
wedge-driving between groups, or between people and leaders, or
between armed services; or demoralization of audience in general;
or decrease of listeners’ faith in the news)
(4) Known or probable connection with originator's propaganda plan or
strategy

This outline may be remembered by the initials of the key words—-

the five main headings in order--as the STASM formula. The outline is not
final or authoritative, and propaganda analysis performed for governmental
or military establishments should, of course, conform to the schedule pre-
scribed in the agency concerned. Used in conjunction with a quantitative
graph, however, an outline of this type will in the course of use provide a
reasonably complete index to the operations of any person, party, group,or
government.

IF46. PROPANAL AND FOREIGN OR ENEMY MORALE. Propa-

ganda analysis is sometimes called propanal for short as an administrative
convenience; propanal can be used as an intelligence tool of prime impor-
tance. A person desiring to spy out just what sickness an ill man had could
do so by waiting at the pharmacist's and seeing just what prescriptions were
being taken to the patient; similarly, conditions in a foreign (in wartime,
even an enemy) country can be*systematically guessed, with a high proba-
bility factor in favor of the analyst, if the domestic propaganda of the govern-
ment concerned is analyzed. The home government of any country uses

20
propaganda—whatever it may be called for courtesy's sake—as a tool of
government. Careful scrutiny of what the propaganda is designed to do
will give indications of what is wrong inside the country concerned. Few
nations, for example, are capable of waging aggressive war without get-
ting their own people ready for war. If a foreign country accused the United
States to its own people of being power-mad, imperialistic, meddlesome,
threatening and aggressive, while broadcasting to us nothing but fairly calm
news materials, it might indicate that:

a. The country was preparing to launch a surprise attack on the

United States, the leaders using our alleged aggressiveness
as preparation for the statement, “The Americans shot first 1",
while not exciting us any more than possible, before the attack; or

b. Conditions in the country concerned were so bad that the leaders

tried to calm internal discontent by provoking the U.S. into a mud-
slinging contest, which would fill the front pages of the papers and
would rally the people behind their government.

The utterances of a controlled press or controlled radio in an unfree nation

always mean something; nothing is done spontaneously or privately for
private enjoyment. Government control is directed at given purposes. Prop-
anal can uncover most of those purposes.

IT 47. PROP ANAL AND MILITARY INFORMATION. Military in-

formation can be derived from the tone, timing, emphasis, and purpose of
enemy broadcasts. The Germans predicted a new, secret Weapon before
they used the V-l; the German predictions dropped off when the launching
''amps on the French coast were bombed; when the ramps were repaired,
the predictions went up in number. This helped to confirm the supposition
that the ramps had an organic connection with the secret weapon which
Goebbels and Hitler had promised. General enemy intentions and commit-
ments can be measured against propaganda; propanal becomes a useful
auxiliary source when the propaganda habits of the source are well known.

21
 V. Propaganda Intelligence

IT48. THE PECULIAR RESPONSIBILITY OF PROPAGANDA. Propa

ganda must compete with hostile or private news facilities, but (in the case of
“white”) must at the same time be issued on the responsibility of the govern-
ment or army concerned. Propaganda must be checked not merely for its
correctness as news, and its usefulness on the immediate propaganda sched-
ule, but for its effect on the issuing government. Propaganda must not offend
domestic persons, groups, interests, or minorities of any kind; propaganda
must not offend one audience for the sake of winning a point with another;
propaganda makes the issuing government accountable to world opinion.
Therefore, propaganda cannot be operated the way that a newspaper is oper-
ated. or a radio news program; it must be checked for;

a. Factual correctness;
b. Propaganda effect on the occasion of use;
c. Propaganda effect to other audiences or groups not addressed;
d. Relation to the actual policy of the issuing government on the
topic concerned;
e. Effect if used in hostile programs and quoted against its source;
f. Coordination with military security, where applicable;
g. Ownership of the material, if copyrighted or borrowed from a
private source;
h. Relationship to future propaganda, political, or military plans.

Propaganda is therefore difficult to execute, when it is good. It is one of

the most complicated of governmental processes. (The more private the
propagandist is, the more satisfaction he can allow himself by being in-
ventive, and the less he has to worry about clearances, authority, permission,
and so on. That he is also less effective, goes without saying.)

1149. THE RAW MATERIAL OF PROPAGANDA. Propaganda re-

quires two kinds of material: news or background materials, out of which
to build the propaganda; and guidances or plans, with which to steer it.
Propaganda must reach an audience; to reach the audience it must interest
them and hold their attention; to hold their attention, it must say something;
to say something, it must have something to talk about. (This was not al-
ways understood in World War H, with the result that some propagandists
broadcast longwinded, tedious political arguments while all over the world
click, click, click, their listeners cut off the current.) Propaganda content
must reach the audience, but in so doing it must not give away secrets,
make fools of the propagandists, or involve the government in difficulty.

22
The controls must go along with the raw materials. The actual propaganda
operator should be given the news as fast as possible; he should be given
such background information as he may need to make his presentation
sound; but he cannot be trusted, because of the strain of his job, which
keeps him in touch with the enemy, with information of high security value.
How to control the propagandist without spoiling him at his creative job—-
how to guide him without interfering unnecessarily in his work—how to
watch him without slowing down the actual output—how to observe t all con-
trols and regulations while staying up-to-the-minute on schedule: such
problems are not readily solved. Yet they must be solved, if the propa-
ganda is to work. Without intelligence materials and guidances, propa-
ganda becomes an expensive and ephemeral kind of literature, giving neither
credit nor profit to its authors, and maintaining no particular advantage to
the government which pays for it.

If50. AUDIENCE INTELLIGENCE. Propaganda must be’directed

at specific goals. It must be conducted with reference to a known audience,
taking the characteristics of the audience into account. It must meet the
current opinion of the audience addressed. Therefore, all intelligence con-
cerning audience opinions, reactions, fads, slang, rumors, new interests,
etc., must be relayed to the propagandist if he is to do his job well. (The
Japanese in World War n occasionally showed their lack, of such intelligence
materials by referring to things which were hopelessly out of date. More
frequently they missed their cue by failing to understand actual conditions
in wartime America. All they knew was pre-war America.)

IF 51. OPINION ANALYSIS. The interrogation of prisoners and,

under ideal conditions, the interrogation of enemy home opinion will give
indications of enemy morale and of the fluctuations of opinion in the target
country. Opinion can also be found negatively by watching the antagonistic
propaganda and seeing what things it seeks to oppose or to correct; those
very things can thereupon be reinforced by appropriate propaganda measures.

23
 Illustration #3. Domestic Japanese wartime propaganda
cartoon directed against Britain and the United States. Such ma
terial gave American leaflet-writers models for their leaflets
prepared for Japanese audiences.

24
 VI. Propaganda Technique

f 52. PROPAGANDA DISCIPLINE. Basic to all psychological

warfare is the discipline of the operative. The participant, military or
civilian, who says what he himself wants to say should obviously be
thrown out of a propaganda outfit and transferred to some enterprise
where he can talk to his heart’s content. The whole purpose of propaganda
rests upon saying things which the enemy wishes to hear but which, when
heard, will damage the enemy war effort. requires the propagandist
to keep his own emotions and opinions under strict discipline. All the rest
of his government or army can hate the enemy all they wish; wartime is
the season for lawful hatred; there is no reason why they should not hate
the enemy. The propagandist has the job of persuading the enemy not to
fight. To do so, he must remain sympathetic to the enemy. Jeering, name-
calling, reproaching, criticizing without purpose—these should never de-
pend on what the propagandist thinks the enemy deserves to have said to
him, but on what the propagandist thinks will affect the enemy's thinking,
feeling, and action. The propagandist can denounce the enemy—when the
propaganda plan calls for it. He can express his hatred and contempt—if
hatred or contempt are on the schedule. Normally these are not. Most of
the time, he must play the role of being the sympathetic enemy. Propaganda
discipline (first of the individual over himself, then of the outfit over the
individual, whether civilian or military) is the first pre-condition of
successful psychological warfare. Violation of discipline produces dangerous
adverse reactions.

IF53. SCIENTIFIC AIDS. Basic historical, economic, political,

social, religious and other data concerning the audience should either be
inside the propagandist's head, or else in convenient reference form.
(Americans would not think much of enemies who addressed Louisiana
troops with, “Hello, Yankee I" under the impression they conveyed a sense
of cheerful friendliness, nor would they be impressed by a pamphlet which
showed Mother polishing her son's shoes while he lolled in a porch swing,
saying, “Gee whiz, I’m glad to be home, mamal” Bad propaganda is worse
than no propaganda; good propaganda requires correct background.) Know-
ing the language does not of itself indicate that the propagandist is ready to
start; even being a native or ex-citizen of the country concerned is not a
guarantee that the person is qualified. Most Americans speak good American
English; most of them know a lot about America; not many of them are
capable of becoming first-class radio commentators or great authors.
Sound psychological warfare operations depend not only on good language
facilities, and on the possession of cadres of personnel with a first-hand

25
intimate knowledge of the audience, but on scientific aids as well. The
research of anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, political scien-
tists and historians provides a body of material on almost every group
in the human race. Properly used, these scientific aids will bring to
light enemy weaknesses and traits which even the most acute untraiiled
observation would not reveal.

IT54. THE LISTENER. It is sound propaganda, in most cases,

to presume a single listener or reader as target. Propaganda should be
personal, emphatic, direct, simple, reiterative. Few.radio programs or
leaflet series can count on hitting the same man regularly enough to
build up grandiose cumulative effects. The more concretely the one-man
audience at the other end is visualized, the better his worries and hopes
are understood, the more that he feels the propagandist “talks his lan-
guage" with more than words, the more successful the operation will be.
Propaganda has little room for the general, the abstract, the formal, or
the large-audience appeal. It must get inside somebody's skin; to do so,
it must keep the target individual in mind. The only time for formality
is the occasion when the listener, by his own customs, expects it.
(Note the correct Japanese reaction when President Roosevelt died. The
Germans, gibbering with hate, called him nasty names and offended Ameri
cans. The Japanese, in a forma], silly, naive but appealing way, extended
their condolences to the American people. American public opinion
mocked them for doing it, but their action on that occasion helped build
up a picture—later to become useful to them—of the Japanese as incom-
prehensible, gauche, but with all their faults a very courteous people.
The Japanese considered their American listener; the Germans forgot
and amused themselves, attaining no real advantage.)

IF55. SPECIFIC TECHNIQUES. Specific techniques are among

the trade secrets of every major propaganda organization. Some of
them are found in the academic literature on propaganda (see Chapter
IX). Most of them are evident to common sense. The goals dictate the
technique to be used in each concrete situation; some of the permanent
goals are to prepare the enemy for defeat in war, to disunite enemy
opposition, to promote belief in the utterance of the propagandist, to dis-
credit enemy news sources, to make the individual enemy feel he has
friends on this side.

26
 VII. Wartime Propaganda Administration

II56. WARTIME CIVILIAN AGENCIES. In the United States

government, war propaganda has traditionally been a function of the execu-
tive branch of the government. Though a responsibility and power of the
President, it has not been conducted by President Wilson or President
Roosevelt in their respective capacities of commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, but has been operated as a special, emergency, civilian
enterprise in each war. In World War I, there was established the Creel
Committee. In World War II, psychological warfare was at first a re-
sponsibility of seven or eight agencies, the most active being the Office of
the Coordinator of Information (COI) and the Office of Facts and Figures
(OFF). In the summer of 1942, the OWI was established and took over most
psychological warfare functions, particularly all those involving official
use of the name of the government; other agencies, such as the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) and the established departments, maintained an
interest in the subject. Coordination was effected by a system of con-
sultation and liaison, as shown in the chart on page 29. At the termination
of hostilities, both OWI and OSS were dissolved. Some of their informa-
tional and research functions have been assigned to the State and War De-
partments.

IT57. FUTURE PROPAGANDA ADMINISTRATION. Psychological

warfare cannot be studied on the assumption that appropriate staff proce-
dures will involve civilian agencies. Since the national agency for propa-
ganda has been improvised for each war, with very little carry-over of
doctrine, skill or personnel from one war to the other, it must be con-
sidered that another war, should one occur, would require new organization.
This might or might not be military. Experience in World War II showed
excellent results in the use of large civilian staffs under military command.

T58. MILITARY FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL PROPAGANDA

AGENCY. A national propaganda agency has as its primary job the secur-
ing of the home front by sound, effective, honest domestic propaganda which
will maintain national morale, support production and keep the national
base of the military effort in good condition—so far as this can be done
through affecting opinion. The national agency must necessarily serve as
the gather and supply point for special news, features, guidances, background
studies and so on which are needed by military propaganda facilities over-
seas. It also has the exceedingly important function of supplying presses,
special radio equipment, inks, basic propaganda materials and other supplies
which cannot be drawn through ordinary army channels. The OWI in World
War n—and the Creel Committee to a lesser extent the time before—per-

27
formed the indispensible function of finding personnel with the unusual
qualifications required for psychological warfare, re-training them, and
putting them, on either its own or the Army payroll. (Finding an eloquent
Pushtu-speaking person in a hurry is no easy task I) Finally, the national
agency did a great deal of the onerous fiscal and bookkeeping work, and
carried much of the budget load for psychological warfare.

IT59. MILITARY-CIVILIAN COORDINATION. Some of the worst

possible blunders of psychological warfare are those which can be com-
mitted when there is poor civilian-military coordination. During World
War I, the Kaiser's government never succeeded in setting up effective
coordination between the military and political agencies of government
for propaganda purposes; the British had great difficulty before they worked
out a smooth administrative and consultative machinery for the purpose.
In between wars, the Japanese lost a great deal of ground because of a lack
of such coordination; the government spokesmen promised that troop action
in the “China Incident” would halt; the next day the Army would move
forward, and Japan got a reputation for calculated trickery only half of which
was deserved. Part of their effects were the result of guile and wile; part
were the consequence of administrative confusion and independence of the
armed services. Hitler, in contrast, achieved in his psychological warfare
the smoothest military-political coordination which has yet operated on a
grand scale; he had total control of the government and people to start with.
In the United States, such coordination was achieved to a much less extent
than in Germany.

IT60. GENERAL PLANS. Proper coordination of psychological

warfare facilities permits the setting up of general plans which are coordi-
nated with both strategy and national policy. Hitler's propaganda worked
in intimate liaison with his military and air headquarters; when an opera-
tion such as the conquest of Poland was undertaken, the propagandists were
able to time their operations so as to be most useful to the combat elements.
Long-range purposes could be sought by clandestine operations and “white"
operations supplementing one another. Quislings, for example, could be re-
cruited by the Germans at any one time, but they would not keep over a long
period of peace without undergoing changes of heart, twinges of loyalty,
some desertions with attendant breach of security, and other deterioration.
Coordination of all facilities gave the maximum result.

If61, CONTINGENCY PLANS, Foreseen contingencies are planned

in propaganda. An invasion, a landing, the surrender of an opponent, the
fall of a city--such news occasions call for special radio and leaflet opera-
tions. These too require coordination between various national-level or
general staff agencies, whatever the particular propaganda structure of a
country may be. In totalitarian countries, the single party must be included
so as to provide lor appropriate "‘spontaneous joy," “mass demonstrations,"
and so forth.
28
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29
 IT 62. SPECIAL PLANS. Unforeseen contingencies often call
for special plans. Emergency consultation facilities must be provided,
whereby the propagandists can be called upon to exploit an opportunity
before the time passes. To this end, most nations in wartime have propa-
ganda duty officers who are available around the clock; where military
and civilian instrumentalities are both employed, duty officers are needed
in each.

If63. APPLICATION OF PLANS AND ORDERS. If plans are

highly classified and do not reach the actual producers of propaganda,
they are of little value. Propaganda output is measured in terms of the
actual newscasts, features, radio scripts of other kinds, leaflet texts,
poster appeals and other definite writing tasks. These must be written,
translated, and broadcast or printed. The net output of propaganda is made
up of the work of the people who perform the practical tasks. In ordinary
combat operations, it.is perhaps desirable for an infantryman to know as
much as feasible about the strategic and tactical mission on which he is
engaged, but it is not a condition of his effectiveness. Commands can be
filtered down to him, without the reasons accompanying them. Direct com-
mand does not usually apply in artistic or literary work such as propaganda,
Plans must accordingly be translatable into specific do's and don't's
(usually called guidances). To be genuinely practical,"guidances must be:

a. Plain and unambiguous.

b. Organized for ready reference.
c. Dated, with automatic expiration.
d. Mandatory.
e. Non-security or low-classified.

The last provision is made necessary by the fact that the propagandist,
being in constant touch with the enemy, is always in danger of giving away
his purpose; furthermore, propaganda personnel must be recruited from
among persons familiar with the enemy or antagonist. This signifies that
the best propagandists are those who have a great deal of sympathy for
enemy customs, thought-patterns, and ifieals. They do not necessarily
prove disloyal, but it is plainly unsound to burden such persons with
important or secret information.

30
 Illustration #4. Two American combat propaganda contingency
leaflets. The map leaflet is addressed to Japanese troops of the Shimbun
Shudan on Luzon. It shows their hopeless situation and tells them how to
surrender. This was prepared to order. The text leaflet is an English
language facsimile of one dropped (in German) on any German unit found
to be isolated. The English language facsimiles were used in explaining
leaflets to our own soldiers; they helped make psychological warfare
intelligible.
31
 VIII. Combat Propaganda Operations

IT64. COMBAT PROPAGANDA ORGANIZATION. During World

War n, some theaters never extended systematic psychological warfare
organization below the theater headquarters level. Others established
elaborate operational units, of which the most ambitious were the First
and .Second Mobile Broadcasting Companies. These worked in North Africa,
Italy, and France. It was found that they functioned best when their com-
ponent elements were broken down into smaller teams. The ultimate pat-
tern in almost all instances consisted of* the creation of a small producing
center (in SHAEF, PWD ran into the hundreds; in China, the staff for
psychological warfare was not over a dozen men till the last months of war)
which was capable of composing and printing leaflets. Leaflets produced
in the United States, with the actual printing matrices sent to the theaters,
were not successful; they were too remote from theater problems; the
consequence was that leaflet production became the backbone of each theater
or, in the case of Europe, Army propaganda headquarters. Occasional
tactical leaflets were produced by smaller units, sometimes being mimeo-
graphed by an officer single-handed, but in most cases the leaflet-printing
function remained a major task. The Davidson and Webbenderfer presses,
which were used, are not very mobile, and paper supply is a constant
logistic problem.

IT65. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMAND. Each theater

commander was in complete charge of psychological warfare so far as its
use or non-use was concerned. He also controlled the entry into his com-
mand of civilian propaganda personnel. Theater commanders did not possess
authority to change national propaganda policy, to initiate political propaganda
without coordinating with the Department of State, or to improvise propaganda
without reference to the propaganda of other theaters or of the continental
United States. Theater commanders sometimes used Psychological Warfare
as the equivalent of a G-6, sometimes combined it with G-5, sometimes sub-
ordinated it to G-3, usually attached it to G-2, and in one instance operated
it under the direct scrutiny of a Military Secretary to the Supreme Commander.

IT66. COMBAT PROPAGANDA RADIO. Radio broadcast facilities

were found to be extremely valuable for strategic and consolidation propaganda.
The relative immobility of even the mobile radio stations precluded their
rapid shift in the course of tactical changes, and the radio broadcast facili-
ties as such had little opportunity to reach enemy troops.

IT67. COMBAT PROPAGANDA MONITORING. Monitoring by com-

bat propaganda units was found to provide invaluable materials for loud-

32
 AT FIRST IN THE WEST:
Rundstedt’s offensive of desperation smashed!

AND NOW IN THE EAST;

East Prussia cut oil!
The Red Army deep in Silesia!
Germany’s “Eastern Ruhr” paralysed!
Zukov’s Armies West of Posen
Evacuation of Government and Party
Offices from Rerlin has started!

Illustration #5. Two types of news leaflet. The illustration

announced V-E Day to the Japanese, and was prepared in advance;
text is on the back (not shown). The printed leaflet is an English
facsimile translation of one dropped on the Germans; on the back
there were statements from Churchill and Roosevelt.

33
 niiistration #6. Two types of leaflet newspaper. The German
paper, in English, is addressed to American troops and ties in with com-
bat propaganda. The American paper, in Chinese, is addressed to Occu-
pied China; it is dated 1 September 1945.

34
 Illustration #7. Morale leaflets, white and black. The white
leaflet shows the Japanese propagandist ridiculing the U.S. air force
to the Chinese while American planes are overhead. The black is a
German item addressed to American troops (both obverse and reverse
are shown).

35
 ATTENTION
ALLIED PRISONERS
Allied Prisoners of ar and Civilian Internees,
these are your orders and/or instructions in
case there is a capitulation of the Japanese forces:
1. lou are to remain in your camp area until
you receive further instructions from this head*
quarters.
2. Law and order will be maintained in the
camp area.
3. In case of a Japanese surrender there will
be allied occupational fort es sent into your camp
to care for your needs and eventual evacuation to
your homes. \ou must help by remaining in the
area in which we now know you are located.
4. Camp leaders are charged with these
responsibilities.
5. The end is near. Do not be disheartened.
We arc thinking of you. Plans arc under wa\ to
the earliest possible moment.
assist you at

(Signed) A. ۥ WEDEMEYER
Lieutenant Ccncral. I . S. A.
Commanding

Illustration #8. Two action leaflets and one morale leaflet. The
Japanese leaflet reads, “Yearning for the native land, Forget-me-not stuck
on my sleeve, Reminding me not to forget my dear old Homeland near the
Kagu mountain." This type of poem is characteristically Japanese. The two
action leaflets are self-explanatory; the one in Chinese is part of the same
series as the one shown on the cover of this syllabus.

36
speaker and leaflet operations. (In Burma, American psychological warfare
got news to the Japanese troops from Radio Tokyo—after editing it in pas-
sage—more rapidly than did the Japanese morale officers; Japanese music
was recorded off the air in an area where no Japanese phonograph record
had ever been played before.)

IT68. MORALE LEAFLETS. All leaflets were processed in a man-

ner similar to that shown on page 38. When the tactical situation was static,
morale leaflets (Illustrations #7 and #9) were used; in situations tactically
unfavorable for the enemy, contingency leaflets were made up (Illustration #4)
and surrender passes were distributed (Illustration #11). Morale leaflets
were found to be the most difficult to write. They had to achieve the most
definite effect with the least specific appeal; they involved no call to action.
The effect of morale leaflets has never been calculated. Surrender and news
leaflets can be tested by checking the number of prisoners who come in with
surrender passes, and then quizzing them on news to find out how much came
from news leaflets; but morale leaflets are not in a comparable situation, and
most prisoners were found inclined to make snap judgments on how they
should have felt when getting the morale leaflet, rather than how they did
feel.
IT 69. NEWSPAPERS AND NEWS LEAFLETS. News of common
interest—progress of the war, political developments closely connected
with the war, the appearance of new weapons, home news from the reader's
country—provided a medium of communication which carried more propa-
ganda than did all. other means put together. News materials were used con-
tinuously, whenever the disseminator and his enemy stayed close enough
or stably enough together to permit circulation. Instances are given in the
Illustrations. It was found that the repetition of simple themes and slogans
was basic to the effective propagandizing of the news and that news, correct-
ly handled, never wore out its appeal.

1170. LEAFLETS AND ORDER OF BATTLE. Order of battle in-

formation contributed tremendously to the effect of some very successful
leaflets. The mention of troops by their correct unit names, reference to
unpopular officers by name, correct description of enemy conditions—such
devices gave the enemy troops the bewildering feeling that they had no
security at all, and that the propagandist's forces were omnipotent. (In-
formation of this kind came in great part, of course, from prisoners.) How-
ever, the mistaken or incorrect use of names, or even the delivery of the
wrong leaflets to a given unit can undo much of the special effect obtained
through battle order information and through the revelation of correct front-
line intelligence. A simple leaflet which is sure of committing no blunder
is commonly more effective than a complicated or tricky leaflet which may
have unfavorable repercussions.

37
 Production
of a

Tactical Leaflet
(Army level)
Intelligence
RECORDING CIVILIAN
UNIT INTBRROG.
OFFICERS
Production
INTELLIGENCE LEAFLET
OFFICER WRITER
AND STAFF

I
FOW COBPS
INT1RROG. UAISOB LAYOUT
OFFICERS OFFICERS ARTIST

MONITORING mCH.WAH.
AT OTHER
UNIT LEVELS PW COMBAT TEAM PRINTWC UNIT
OPERATIONS CHIEF (MOBILE)

AIR CORPS ARTILLERY

LIAISON OFFICER LIAISON OFFICER

LEAFLET
AIR BOMB ROLLERS
DEPOT OFFICER Dissemination 1

SHELL
LOADERS
BOMB
LOADERS

ARTILLERY
FIGHTER INSTALLATIONS
BOMBER (ASP’S BATTERY POSITIONS,
FIELDS DIVISION ARTILLERY, DAO’S)
Legend,
Flow of material and ideas
» Operational control

(Taken from History of the Second Mobile

Broadcasting Company, no publisher given,
issued within the unit, 1945.)

38
 1T71. TACTICAL COORDINATION. The use of psychological war*
fare devices is ineffectual if the results desired are not rendered practical*
For example, pursuit planes should not ask for the surrender of individual
prisoners without explaining—in the leaflet—just how, where, and to whom
the prisoners should surrender. Invitations to surrender must always be
accompanied by control of the troops on the inviting side; if one prisoner
starts across and is picked off by an over-enthusiastic sniper, other surren-
ders are not likely to follow: positive harm will have been done. Coordina-
tion between artillery or tactical rockets and leaflet shelling is important;
the effect of leaflets can be stepped up measurably if heavy shelling is an-
nounced, delivered, lifted for the purpose of accepting surrenders, resumed,
lifted again. This type of coordination requires the presence of a psycho-
logical warfare liaison officer at the regimental level or below, whether such
an officer be one of the normal component trained in psychological warfare
techniques or an outsider detailed for the purpose.

IT 72. ATROCITY PROPAGANDA. Atrocity propaganda created a

revulsion against war generally when it was employed in World War I. The
audience reacted against the enemy, but the reaction consisted of nausea and
nervous upset to such an extent that it is not now considered desirable to use
atrocity propaganda. It may lift morale momentarily, but its long-range ef-
fect is not favorable to morale. It will be found in almost every case that
rumors--resembling propaganda, except that they are not systematized to
achieve a known end—will circulate in the course of operations among the
troops themselves, alleging fearsome enemy atrocities. Inevitably, some of
these rumors have their foundation in fact. They should not be encouraged
and should be made the subject of propaganda campaigns only when the ne-
cessity therefor is compelling. It has been found that atrocity propaganda
begets atrocities. An audience subjected to atrocity propaganda will react
in the normal human way and will effect reprisals in kind if the opportunity
offers, so that the outcome is an auction of cruelty, each side seeking to
excel the other in wantonness without achieving any respectable military
goal. Such propaganda makes combat operations more unpleasant without
increasing their effectiveness, and it interferes with national policy in the
post-war period, by leaving residual hatreds which are difficult to overcome
for normal international relationships. When an enemy has in fact committed
atrocities, news thereof is good propaganda only when it is desired to punislt
the enemy, when punishment can in fact be applied without reprisal in kind,
or when publicity may have the effect of forestalling further atrocities of the
same kind. (This signifies, usually, that atrocities committed against ci-
vilians or prisoners far behind the line of operations are often the appro-
priate subject of publicity, but that atrocities committed in the course of
operations are not sound propaganda material unless compelling national
policy requires their use.)

39
 Ich bin ein
Fluf blattpAckchen
und wiege fut nichta.
Mmm ■writ ■!( mmd
ftfc mMi *«i(«r Rack vara!

Yrnmkmm,*m mm wZdTL mmckmm.

Ich helfe
Dein Blut iparenl

Illustration #9. German black morale leaflet (small photo) and in-
struction sheet telling German combat units to take along a package of leaf-
lets when proceeding to the front lines, saying “Comrade I take me along
and pass me forward. I' e got to get to the Tommy and the Yankee to make
T

them soft. I help save our blood I”

 1T73. FURTHER COMBAT PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES. Loud-
speakers were proved effective, especially after the Brittany operations
in Europe and in the last phases of the island operations in the Pacific.
Where fighting occurs along beaches, loudspeakers may be mounted on
boats and run along the shore. Tank-mounted loudspeakers can sometimes
be employed with results which are sensationally effective. When propa-
ganda personnel cannot be taken in the boat or tank, it is possible to arrange
a radio-telephone relay. The commander of the boat or tank describes the
situation in English to the propaganda broadcaster back at the command
post; when the propaganda man has the essential facts, the commander con-
nects the radio-telephone directly into the loudspeaker circuit, and the tanks
or boats begin speaking coHoquial Japanese, German, Czech, Polish, or
whatever language may be required. Loudspeakers are useful in mopping
up; they avoid some of the waste effort and possible loss of life involved in
using infantry against an enemy whose position is already hopeless, and
they are more flexible than leaflets. Their range at the end of the second
World War was two miles.

Loudspeakers may, in the interests of humaneness, be made availr

able to enemy prisoners for the purpose of reassuring other enemy soldiers
or fragmented units that further resistance involves loss of their lives. At
Saipan and Guam, brave Japanese individuals volunteered to help save Japa-
nese and American lives in this fashion. They spoke directly into the loud-
speaker with a language officer standing by to make sure that no treachery
was achieved. They were able to testify to good treatment. On occasion,
the prisoners were so effective that they were given leave to return to the
enemy lines, or to look for enemy units, for the purpose of bringing back
others. (The Chinese forces in the guerrilla areas used this technique with
audacity and astounding success. Lacking loudspeakers, they cut in on
field telephones, talked propaganda at the operators, left presents at iso-
lated sentry posts, invited exchanges of letters on the cause of the “im-
perialist” war, and shouted with megaphones.)

1174. CONSOLIDATION. Leaflets, loudspeakers, posters, news-

papers and local broadcasting are effective in consolidating occupied terri-
tories. Decisive action immediately upon occupation, coupled with genuinely
effective supply and relief measures, will often prevent the appearance of
irregular resistance measures which would involve the local populace and
the occupying force in bitter antagonisms. The Germans promoted their own
defeat by the arrogant, haughty, and arbitrary way in which they addressed
conquered populations; a more genuine attempt to understand local popula-
tions would have involved the German army in fewer difficulties, and might
have avoided such measures as outright terror; but if the Germans had been
capable of such action, they would not have been Nazis and would not have
conquered the territories in the first place

41
 Illustration #10. Ma-ri-ya-na Ji-ho. The Mariana Times was
published by Psychological Warfare Division, CINCPAC-CINCPOA, for
both news-to-troops and consolidation propaganda purposes. Colonel
Johnston found experienced Japanese newspapermen among the internees
and set them to writing columns about Occupied Tinian and Occupied
Saipan. Issue shown is 6 July, 20th Year of Showa Emperor (1945).

42
 J75. PROPAGANDA EQUIPMENT. Propaganda equipment for
printing is usually procured from civilian supply. A variety of presses,
from the simplest stencilling machine up to offset machines capable of
millions of leaflets per month, is available. Radio equipment can be
supplied by existing Signal Corps materials, supplemented where neces-
sary by civilian supply. In the India-Burma and China Theaters, there was
developed a leaflet-dispensing machine built into an old auxiliary gasoline
tank. All the pilot had to do was to set the controls at the number of leaf-
lets per batch and the speed of ejection. He was then ready to fly over
jungle territory, pinpointing possible enemy positions with leaflets. In
ETC, there was developed the Monroe bomb, a leaflet bomb suitable for
controlled dispersal from high-altitude planes. (If loose leaflets are
dropped from high altitudes, they will scatter over immense territory and
loqe their effect.) Other ordnance and related devices are currently under
study; information concerning this is available from Propaganda Branch.

43
 Illustration #11. Surrender Passes, West and East. The standard
form of each is used. Note prominent use of English on the Japanese; the
stripes are a brilliant red, white and blue, since the Japanese soldiers
wanted to be sure we knew they were surrendering. The German, on the
other hand, had to be reassured that everything was properly official.

44
 DC. Reading List

Books listed here are likely to be procurable at the larger

municipal and college libraries. The bibliographies listed below provide
a guide to further reading; a very large body of writing exists on the
subject. Most of the books on World War II propaganda remain yet to be
written.

Stewart ALSOP and Thomas BRADEN, Sub Rosa: The O.S.S: and American
Espionage, New York, 1946.
Heber BLANKENHORN, Adventures in Propaganda, Boston, 1919.
QE. G. BORING, Psychology for the Fighting Man, Washington, 1943
George C. BRUNTZ, Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire in
1918, Stanford, 1938.
Philip DAVIDSON, Propaganda and the American Revolution, Chapel Hill,
1941.
Leonard DOOB, Propaganda, Its Psychology and Technique, New York, 1935.
Adolf HITLER, Mein Kampf, various editions; Chanter VI, War Propaganda’
{<

Harold LASSWELL, Propaganda Technique in the World War, New York,

1938.
Harold LASSWELL, Ralph D. CASEY, and Bruce Lannes SMITH, Propaganda
and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography, Minneapolis,
1935, and its sequel, Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion,
A Comprehensive Reference Guide, Princeton, 1946.
Vladimir Ilyitcli LENIN, The Teachings of Karl Marx (various editions).
Paul M, A. LINEBARGER, Psychological Warfare, A Practical Textbook
(in preparation).
Leo J. MARGOLIN, Paper Bullets, A Brief Story of Psychological Warfare
in World War H. New York, 1946.
Karl MARX and Friedrich ENGELS, The Communist Manifesto (various
editions).
George Fort MILTON, Abraham Lincoln and the Fifth Column, Washington,
1943.
Edmond TAYLOR, The Strategy of Terror, New York, 1941.
J. P. WARBURG, Unwritten Treaty, New York, 1946.

45
 Illustration #12. Propaganda money from three wars. The French
revolutionary bill of the Year 2 (1793-95) modestly circulates the slogans
of the French revolution: upper left, “unity and indivisibility of the Re-
public"; upper right, “liberty, equality, fraternity or--death". The Russian
bill, recalled and no longer valid as money, appeals in many languages for
the world revolution (1919). The Japanese puppet 10-peso note from the
Philippines has been overprinted by the PWB at General MacArthur's head-
quarters; enemy money carried American propaganda.