PEOPLE vs.

COGAED
LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:
Page | 1 At about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, a police officer “received a text message from an
unidentified civilian informer” that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) would
be transporting marijuana.” Thereafter, the police officers established a checkpoint.

A passenger jeepney from arrived at the checkpoint. The jeepney driver disembarked and
signalled to the police officer indicating the two male passengers who were carrying
marijuana. The two officers approached the two male passengers who were later identified as
Victor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a
sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.

The police officer asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and
Dayao told the police officer that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as
a favor for their barriomate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag,
revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. Cogaed then muttered, “nagloko daytoy
nga Marvinen, kastoy met gayam ti nagyanna,” which translates to “Marvin is a fool, this is
what [is] contained in the bag.” “SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and
brought them to the police station.”

While at the police station, the police officers asked Cogaed and Dayao to empty their bags.
Inside Cogaed’s sack was “four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops,” and
inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana. After laboratory testing, the
objects obtained were indeed marijuana.

Thereafter, the RTC convicted Cogaed of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act

No. 9165 (otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”). On the
other hand, the case against Dayao was dismissed since he was only fourteen years old.

Cogaed appealed the trial court’s decision. However, the Court of Appeals denied his appeal
and affirmed the trial court’s decision The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed waived his
right against warrantless searches when “[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he]
voluntarily opened his bag.”

ISSUES:

(1) whether there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant;

(2) whether the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and

(3) whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.

RULING:

No. The search was made without a warrant and does not constitute a valid warrantless
search.
 The Constitution provides that every person has the right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Hence, as a general rule, search and seizure is valid if it was done by a police officer
who was armed with a search warrant. However, there are exceptions to the rule that a search
warrant is needed to effect a search, to wit:

Page | 2 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

In this case, there was no valid search since there was no search warrant. Moreover, the
search made does not fall squarely to the exceptions or valid warrantless search.

Stop and Frisk

“Stop and frisk” search should be used when dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially
criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure a search
warrant. Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for
law enforcement. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of
citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police
officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the
police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals
and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that
they themselves observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a
basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

While probable cause is not required to conduct a “stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A genuine reason must exist,
in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

In this case, the search was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not comply with all
the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution. Cogaed was simply a
passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious and
criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made
by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police
that Cogaed was “suspicious.”

Moreover, The person searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The
informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even
if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin
 Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason
to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
Page | 3 person.

Hence, the warranted search is not a valid stop and frisk search.

Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest

Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest.
For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful
warrantless arrest.

In this case, Cogaed was arrested without a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was
made. Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. As in
People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, “two elements
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.” Both elements were
missing when Cogaed was arrested. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police
officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was
not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable
warrantless arrest.

Hence, the search cannot also be considered as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

Consented Search

Silence of the accused in the search cannot be considered as consent to such search. The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered
no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

Moreover, waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from
any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure, the police officer must (1) introduce himself or herself, or be known as a
police officer; (2) inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or her part will
amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a
reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a language known
to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be an
assurance given to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights.

In this case, there can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume
that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. Cogaed’s silence or lack of
 aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the
police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space.

Therefore, the search cannot be considered as a consented search.

Page | 4 Accused acquitted. Evidence is inadmissible since there is no valid search.