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National Academic Press, 2001. 300 pp. $47.95 (significant discounts are available for orders placed via the Web), plus
shipping and handling. To order, contact the National Academy Press, 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW, Lockbox 285,
Washington, DC 20055; Tel: (888) 624-7645 or (202) 334-3313; Fax: (202) 334-2451; http://www.nap.edu The volume
can be read in its entirety on-line at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9834.html", Disaster Prevention and Management: An
International Journal, Vol. 11 Iss 3 pp. 222-222
Ibrahim M. Shaluf, Fakharul-razi Ahmadun, Aini Mat Said, Sa’ari Mustapha, Rashid Sharif, (2002),"Technological man-made
disaster precondition phase model for major accidents", Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol.
11 Iss 5 pp. 380-388
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since the inception of the company until the the tragedy based on the findings from the
date of the triggering of the tragedy. In the inquiry report. Finally, the paper proposes
tragedy, 23 people lost their lives, 103 were some lessons which could be learned from
seriously injured and the entire factory was Bright Sparkler's disaster, and international
destroyed. experience.
Although the old proverb said that ``every
dog is allowed one bite'' (Kletz, 1974), which
is not applicable in high risk technology,
Bright Sparklers related governmental
however, the company's management and the
organizations
related authorities failed to learn from all the
warnings which allowed the errors to Figure 1 shows Bright Sparklers, and the
accumulate to produce the fatal bite ± ``the organizations (authorities) which had direct
tragedy''. and/or indirect authority to monitor and
Therefore, a decision was made not to allow
control the activities of the Bright Sparkler's
the installing of any fireworks factory in
Sdn. Bhd. Company.
Malaysia.
The continued source of the potential Figure 1 The Bright Sparklers Sdn Bhd. Company and the authorities
hazards due to fireworks manufacturing has which monitor and control the company
been eliminated in Malaysia, however, the
discrete points of hazards appear
occasionally every year during the new year
celebration, and other occasions. Therefore,
the safety standards, and the quality of the
products, storage, handling, location, and
use of these fireworks should be monitored
and controlled carefully, otherwise the
shadow of the Peruvian tragedy could be
repeated whenever the conditions are
available.
This paper summarizes the history of the
company, the governmental organizations
which were monitoring and controlling the
activities of the Bright Sparklers Company. In
addition, the paper summarizes the causes of
215
Bright Sparklers fire and explosions: the lessons learned Disaster Prevention and Management
Ibrahim M. Shaluf et al. Volume 11 . Number 3 . 2002 . 214±221
products were stored at the factory. due to lack of communication between the
The fireworks were assembled by hand Police Petaling jaya and the FIDA, due to lack
and tested in the factory. The main types of understanding of the relevant laws by the
of fireworks manufactured by the factory customs department, lack of following-up by
were hand-held sparklers, Roman candles, the inspection body, the department of
fountains and rockets. machineries and factory, and lack of
On 7 May 1991 at about 3.45 p.m. enforcement of law by the Police Petaling
a new product was being tested close to jaya. The inspection authority did not benefit
chemicals which had been dried. It is from the Bhopal disaster. The company and
believed that fire sparks and smouldering the authority failed to learn from the warnings
casing fragments flew in many directions, such as the fire, fire-explosion accidents and
some falling on the chemicals, causing a from the complaints. Consequently, fireworks
fire. Some fragments flew towards the manufacturing was banned in the country.
inside of the canteen. At that time, the Also the use of fireworks occasionally
canteen contained thousands of finished during religious celebrations and national
and semi-finished products. The fire occasions could trigger a disaster waiting to
spread, causing an explosion, which happen. When the triggering event combines
caused the rockets to fly everywhere, with the unsafe conditions, a disaster results,
spreading the fire to other places and e.g. the Peruvian disaster.
buildings. There were finished products Kuala Lumpur shopping centre is one of
and various types of chemicals being stored the largest commercial centres, filled with
in various buildings within the factory merchandise susceptible to ignition and
premises; also, it was indicated that there spreading of fire. Therefore, the Peruvian and
were two containers loaded with finished other lessons should be learned from this; in
products ready for shipment. The fire addition, all of the safety measures should be
rapidly spread to other buildings, causing a taken during the use of fireworks on occasions
series of explosions. such as festivals, etc.
The fire and explosion destroyed the entire
factory. In the tragedy, 23 people lost their
lives, in addition, 103 others sustained Conclusion
injuries of varying degrees of seriousness.
Among the injured was one who was crippled. . The management of the Sparklers
Several properties, including residential and Company and the authorities failed to
factory buildings surrounding the factory, learn from the fire and explosion
were damaged as a result of the fire and accidents and from the complaints
explosions. ``warnings''.
The causes of the tragedy are summarized . The Sparklers Bhd. Sd. Company's
in Table II. management was the main cause behind
216
Bright Sparklers fire and explosions: the lessons learned Disaster Prevention and Management
Ibrahim M. Shaluf et al. Volume 11 . Number 3 . 2002 . 214±221
Figure 2 Flow chart summarizes the sequence of events that led to the Bright Sparklers disaster
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217
Bright Sparklers fire and explosions: the lessons learned Disaster Prevention and Management
Ibrahim M. Shaluf et al. Volume 11 . Number 3 . 2002 . 214±221
Figure 2
Downloaded by Universiti Putra Malaysia At 01:02 11 February 2015 (PT)
218
Bright Sparklers fire and explosions: the lessons learned Disaster Prevention and Management
Ibrahim M. Shaluf et al. Volume 11 . Number 3 . 2002 . 214±221
Figure 2
Downloaded by Universiti Putra Malaysia At 01:02 11 February 2015 (PT)
the sparkler tragedy through the violation Lessons learned from Bright
of the country rules, regulations and laws Sparklers disaster and international
and the standard codes. experience
. The authorities who have direct contact
with the company's activities failed to . Respect and adherence to the country
enforce the law and to follow-up the regulations, laws are obligatory and of
recommended actions. paramount necessity for the
. The fireworks continuous hazard source continuation of any organization's
was eliminated in Malaysia, however, the business legally.
fireworks hazards still appear occasionally . The application of the standard
during celebrations, and national regulations and specification during
occasions. design, installation, manufacturing,
219
Bright Sparklers fire and explosions: the lessons learned Disaster Prevention and Management
Ibrahim M. Shaluf et al. Volume 11 . Number 3 . 2002 . 214±221
221
This article has been cited by:
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Tahan, Pahang, Malaysia. International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance 1:1, 24-27. [CrossRef]
3. M.S. Aini, A. Fakhru'l‐Razi. 2009. Issues and lessons from fire inquiry tribunals. Disaster Prevention and Management: An
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4. Ibrahim Mohamed Shaluf, Fakhru'l‐Razi Ahmadun. 2006. Disaster types in Malaysia: an overview. Disaster Prevention and
Management: An International Journal 15:2, 286-298. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]
5. Ibrahim M Shaluf, Fakhru’l-Razi Ahmadun, Abdul Rashid Shariff. 2003. Technological disaster factors. Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries 16:6, 513-521. [CrossRef]
6. Ibrahim M. Shaluf, Fakharul‐razi Ahmadun, Sa’ari Mustapha. 2003. Technological disaster’s criteria and models. Disaster
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