EMINENT DOMAIN

Definition

Who exercises the power?

- City of Manila vs. Chinese Cemetery of Manila, 40 Phil 349

(1919)

FACTS:

The City of Manila presented a petition to expropriate certain parcels of land situ -
ated in the Block 83 of Binondo for the purpose of constructing a public improvement
namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila.

The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was necessary. The defendants, Co-
munidad de Chinos de Manila, Ildefonso Tambunting and Feliza Concepcion de Del-
gado, with her husband, Jose Maria Delgado, and each of the other defendants, each
alleged
a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and
b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for
many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same
should not be converted into a street for public purposes.

Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the Hon-
orable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, decided that there was no necessity for the expro-
priation of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the de -
fendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs.

From that judgment the plaintiff appealed. Petitioner therefore assails the deci-
sion of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any
land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain
the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can in-
quire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning
the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in ex -
propriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted
by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the City of Manila has the right to exercise the right of expropriation?

Whether or not a private property devoted for public use be expropriated?

 HELD:

Yes, with requisites. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a mu -

nicipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist confer-
ring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must
only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain,
but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law.

In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority con-
ceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose
must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that
either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised
in accordance with law. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent do-
main is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character.
The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow,
the taking of the land.

The record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided
that there exists a necessity for the appropriation of the particular land described in the
complaint.

Yes, private property devoted for public use is still subject to expropriation, pro-
vided this is done directly by the national legislature or under a specific grant of au-
thority to the delegate. In addition, there must be a necessity for the expropriation.  In
the case at bar, evidence shows that there is no proof of the need of converting the
cemetery. Aside from insisting that there exists no necessity for the alleged improve-
ments, the defendants further contend that the street in question should not be opened
through the cemetery. One of the defendants alleges that said cemetery is public prop-
erty. If that allegations is true, then, of course, the city of Manila cannot appropriate it for
public use. The city of Manila can only expropriate private property.

It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a
cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is
used only by a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood.

Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground
can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends
to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use.

It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the
general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of
a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true,
then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of
Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property.
 But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for
the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in
its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its appropri-
ation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest
necessity exists therefore

- Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 368 (1997)

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur

passed Resolution No. 43-89, “Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition
for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National
Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other
Government Sports Facilities.”

The same was approved by the Mayor Bustillo but was disapproved by Sanggu -
niang Panlalawigan citing, “expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still
available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center.” The Munici -
pality petitioned for eminent domain in the RTC. They were allowed to take possession
of the land despite owner Percival Moday’s opposition. Moday filed motion for reconsid-
eration and was denied by the CA. Hence the current petition to reverse the decision
and to declare the resolution null and void. They contend that the expropriation was po-
litically motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved by the Sangguni-
ang Panlalawigan, there being other municipal properties available for the purpose.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Municipal of Bunawan has authority to exercise eminent domain on the
ground of disapproval of Sangguniang Panlalawigan ?

HELD:

Yes. The power of eminent domain inherently possessed by the national legisla-
ture may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utili -
ties. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking must be
for public use and there must be just compensation.

Section 153 BP Blg 337, the local Government Manager

(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, reso-
lution or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang
bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order in-
valid in whole or in part, entering its actions upon the minutes and advising the proper
municipal authorities thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordi -
nance, resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part. The action of the
sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.
 After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary
support for petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does
not conclusively prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petition -
ers' property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. In the questioned decision, re-
spondent appellate court similarly held that the pleadings and documents on record
have not pointed out any of respondent municipality's "other available properties avail-
able for the same purpose.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89

is an infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law grants
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on
the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to
issue. The provincial (board’s) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must
be premised specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is out-
side the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan
was without the authority to disapprove for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has
the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the
capacity to promulgate said resolution.

- Lagcao vs. Judge Labra, GR No. 155746, October 3, 2004

FACTS:

After acquiring title from the City of Cebu, petitioners tried to take possession of
the lOT 1029 only to discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus a demoli-
tion order was issued. However, when the demolition order was about to be imple -
mented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters] to the MTCC, requesting the
deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation
site for the squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the MTCC issued two orders sus -
pending the demolition for a period of 120 days. Unfortunately for Petitioners, during the
suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution
which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.

In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it

sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters,
an endeavor contrary to the concept of public use contemplated in the Constitution.
They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people.

On the other hand, respondents claim that the ordinance in question is valid un-
der the claim that Local Government Units has the delegated power of Eminent Domain
and that the requirements was satisfied as there is an ordinance authorizing the Execu-
tive to expropriate the land and that just compensation was already deposited in favor of
the petitioner.
 ISSUE:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 1843 is a valid exercise of eminent domain under
RA 7279?

HELD:

No. When power of eminent domain is exercised by the local government unit,
through its chief executive, it must be acting pursuant to an ordinance, for public use, or
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain should be a genuine ne -

cessity and that necessity must be of public character. Government may not capri-
ciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case,
there was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for expropriation by
the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordi-
nance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners property as the site of a
socialized housing project.

It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a
favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property but Mayor
Garcia requested the trial court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City
was still searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for
a relocation site during the suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordi -
nance No. 1843 for the expropriation of petitioners lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure
and simple. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed
clearly indicated that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA
7279.

Strict limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local govern -
ment units, especially with respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for
socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means to
acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of social-
ized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only af-
ter the other modes of acquisition are exhausted.

- Jesus is Lord Christian Foundation vs. Mun. of Pasig, GR No.

155230 August 9, 2005

FACTS:

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a

municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig.
The residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets. The munici-
pality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791square meter property
of the Ching Cuancos which is abutting E. R. Santos Street. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation
proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordi -
nance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to pur-
chase the property for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer. The mu-
nicipality filed a complaint, against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the prop -
erty under Section 19 of the Local Government Code.

The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based
on the latest tax declaration covering the property. On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC issued
a writ of possession over the property sought to be expropriated. On November 26,
1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion
of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation,
Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the property. Thereafter, the plaintiff con-
structed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters; the road was called
Damayan Street.

In their answer, the defendants claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had
sold the said property to JILCSFI as evidenced by a deed of sale bearing the signature
of defendant Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho and his wife. When apprised about the com-
plaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-in-intervention, which
motion the RTC granted on August 26, 1994. 

In its answer-in-intervention, JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative de-

fenses, that the plaintiff’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class and
not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It alleged that the property sought to be
expropriated is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome to it. The in-
tervenor filed a crossclaim against its co-defendants for reimbursement in case the sub-
ject property is expropriated. In its amended answer, JILCSFI also averred that it has
been denied the use and enjoyment of its property because the road was constructed in
the middle portion and that the plaintiff was not the real party-in-interest. The intervenor,
likewise, interposed counterclaims against the plaintiff for moral damages and attorney’s
fees.

ISSUE:

A.) WON the letter written by the Engineer inviting the owners to talk about the
price of the land was the ‘valid offer previously made’ contemplated by the law.

B.) WON if the property is being used already for public purpose, the same can
still be expropriated. Because the petitioner alleged that the land sought to be expropri -
ated was originally bought to construct a school and a church.

C.) WON the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing a road par-
ticularly in petitioners property and not elsewhere.
 D.) WON the petitioner was deprived of due process when it was not notified of
the ocular inspection.

HELD:

A.) NO. (In the present case, Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-
owners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of
the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners,
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may be
mutually acceptable to both parties.)

The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and
definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection
thereof by the latter. It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable ef-
forts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the
mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint. An offer is a unilat -
eral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract. It
creates a power of acceptance permitting the offeree, by accepting the offer, to trans-
form the offeror’s promise into a contractual obligation. Corollarily, the offer must be
complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and
definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract. An offer
would require, among other things, a clear certainty on both the object and the
cause or consideration of the envisioned contract.

(a) The offer to buy private property for public use or purpose shall be in
writing. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for its ac-
quisition, and the price offered.

B.) YES. We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer
be expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place
for religious worship and a school for its members. As aptly explained by this Court in
Manosca v. Court of Appeals, thus: It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila
Railroad Co., that: . . . A historical research discloses the meaning of the term “public
use” to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individ -
ual increases and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual
may be devoted. . . . for “whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public
use.” Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states: The taking to be valid must be for pub-
lic use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to
such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as
in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any
more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent
domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to re-
move any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer,
through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the govern-
ment. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially em-
ployed for the general welfare satisfies the requirements of public use. 

C.) YES. The respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road
particularly in the petitioner’s property and not elsewhere. We note that the whereas
clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and most suit-
able access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E.R. Santos Street. The respondent’s
complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioner’s lot has been surveyed as
the best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent failed to adduce a pre -
ponderance of evidence to prove its claims.

D.) YES. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the
record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court
conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner was
not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process. It
bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby re-
ceived and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. Consequently,
where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the
property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative
weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection
must, therefore, be rejected.

- San Roque vs Republic, GR No. 163130, Sept. 7, 2007

Facts:

The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City. It was originally
owned by Ismael D. Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. Subject
parcels of land, together with seventeen (17) others, were the subject of an expropria-
tion proceeding initiated by the then Commonwealth of the Philippines docketed as Civil
Case No. 781. Judge Felix Martinez ordered the initial deposit of P9,500.00 as pre-con-
dition for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. On 14 May 1940, a Decision
was rendered condemning the parcels of land. However, the title of the subject parcel of
land was not transferred to the government. Eventually, the land was subdivided and
T.C.T. No. 11946 was cancelled and new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot No. 933-B-3) and 128198 (Lot
No. 933-B-4) were acquired by defendant-appellee. In 1995, defendant-appellee begun
construction of townhouses on the subject parcels of land.

Plaintiff-appellant filed the present case (Records, pp. 1-15) alleging that it is the
owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the 1938 Decision in the expropriation
case, thus, T.C.T. Nos. 128197 and 128198 are null and void. It argued that defendant-
appellee, had no right to possess the subject properties because it was not its lawful
owner. In its Answer, defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It
also claimed that there was no valid expropriation because it was initiated by the execu-
tive branch without legislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation was never
consummated because the government did not actually enter the land nor were the
owners paid any compensation. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Repub-
lic's complaint and upholding SRRDC's ownership over the subject properties as sup-
ported by SRRDC's actual possession thereof and its unqualified title thereto. It also
found that there was no valid expropriation since the records are bereft of a showing
that consideration was paid for the subject properties. Aggrieved, the Republic appealed
the decision to the CA insisting on its absolute ownership over the subject properties.
The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appeal from the CFI Decision
in the expropriation case was never perfected by the original owners of the subject
properties, and thus, the expropriation of Lot No. 933 became final and binding on the
original owners, and SRRDC, which merely stepped into the latter's shoes, is similarly
bound.

Issue:

WON the CA erred in holding that the

(a) validity of the expropriation proceedings;

(b) respondent had a better right to the subject properties and
(c) respondent is not guilty of laches

Ruling:

The CA disregarded relevant facts and ignored the evidence, noteworthy among which
is that when the Republic filed its complaint with the RTC, it alleged that the CFI Deci-
sion in Civil Case No. 781 had long become final and executory. However, this asser-
tion would compound the Republic’s predicament, because the Republic could not ade-
quately explain its failure to register its ownership over the subject property or, at least,
annotate its lien on the title. Trying to extricate itself from this quandary, the Republic
belatedly presented a copy of an Exception and Notice of Intention to Appeal dated July
9, 1940, to show that an appeal filed by the original owners of Lot No. 933 effectively
prevented the Republic from registering its title, or even only annotating its lien, over the
property. The CA’s categorical pronouncement that the CFI Decision had become final
as no appeal was perfected by SRRDC’s predecessor-in-interest is, therefore, contra-
dicted by the Republic’s own allegation that an appeal had been filed by the original
owners of Lot No. 933. Not only did the CA fail to resolve the issue of the Republic’s fail -
ure to register the property in its name, it also did not give any explanation as to why ti -
tle and continuous possession of the property remained with SRRDC and its predeces-
sors-in-interest for fifty-six years. The CA ruling that disregards these established facts
and neglects to reconcile the contradiction mentioned above does not deserve concur-
rence by this Court. In Republic v. Lim, Court emphasized that no piece of land can be
finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation in paid. Without
FULL PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, there can be no transfer of title from the
landowner to the expropriator. Thus, the Republic's failure to pay just compensation pre-
cluded the perfection of its title over the lot sought to be expropriated. In fact, we went
even further and recognized the right of the unpaid owner to recover the property if
within 5 years from the decision of the expropriation court, the expropriator fails
to effect payment of just compensation. Time and again, we have declared that EMI-
NENT DOMAIN cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The pay-
ment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is an indispensable
requisite for the exercise of the State's sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to
observe this requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed
public purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to
expropriate is to ride roughshod over private rights. From the records of this case and
our previous findings in the related case, the Republic manifestly failed to present clear
and convincing evidence of full payment of just compensation and receipt thereof by the
property owners. More importantly, if the Republic had actually made full payment of
just compensation, in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the cancellation
of title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on the certificate
of title. The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest arising from
the exercise of it's power or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land Registra-
tion Act. There is no showing that the Republic complied with the aforesaid registration
requirement. From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to
cause the registration of the subject properties in its name or record the decree of ex-
propriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic fail to register the subject proper -
ties in its name, it failed to do so for 56 years. LACHES is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due dili-
gence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The general rule is that the State can -
not be put in estoppel or laches by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. This
rule, however, admits of exceptions. One exception is when the strict application of the
rule will defeat the effectiveness of a policy adopted to protect the public, such as the
Torrens system. Very telling of the Republic's silence and inaction, whether intentional
or by sheer negligence, is the testimony of Infante, the Republic's witness in the pro -
ceedings before the RTC, testifying that several surveys were conducted on a number
of expropriated lots, which surveys showed that the subject lot was still registered in the
name of the original owners. As such, Infante recommended in his report that legal ac -
tion be taken. Yet despite aforesaid recommendation, title to subject lot remained regis-
tered in the name of the original owners, ans subsequently, its transferees. This silence
and unexplained inaction by the Republic clearly constitute laches. The trial court cor-
rectly held that title registered under the Torrens system is notice to the whole world.
Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of its cer -
tificate of title and the law will not oblige him to go beyond what appears on the face
thereof to determine the condition of the property. An innocent purchaser for value is
one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought the property from the registered
owner, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in such property
and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before ha
has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is GRANTED
 Constitutional limitation - Art. II, Sec. 9

What can be appropriated

- RP. v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1969)

FACTS:

Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications Inc., an American corporation, whereby telephone messages coming
from the US and received by RCA’s domestic station, could automatically be transferred
to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa. 

The plaintiff through the Bureau of Telecommunications, after having set up its
own Government Telephone System, by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment
and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT, entered into an agreement with RCA for a joint
overseas telephone service. 

Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with them, PLDT notified the former and re-
ceiving no reply, disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the same.

Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the
right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the
Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone
System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent con-
tends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had
between them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone

System can be a valid object for expropriation.

HELD:

Yes, while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it,
the Republic, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, may require the
telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service
may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services
to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropri-
ation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

  The theses that the Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair competi-
tion, and that the Bureau was guilty of fraud and abuse under its contract, are, likewise,
untenable.
   First, the competition is merely hypothetical, the demand for telephone service
being very much more than the supposed competitors can supply. As previously noted,
the PLDT had 20,000 pending applications at the time, and the Bureau had another
5,000. The telephone company's inability to meet the demands for service are notorious
even now.

- City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil 34 9

FACTS:

The City of Manila presented a petition to expropriate certain parcels of land situ -
ated in the Block 83 of Binondo for the purpose of constructing a public improvement
namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila.

The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was necessary. The defendants, Co-
munidad de Chinos de Manila, Ildefonso Tambunting and Feliza Concepcion de Del-
gado, with her husband, Jose Maria Delgado, and each of the other defendants, each
alleged
a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and
b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for
many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same
should not be converted into a street for public purposes.

Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the Hon-
orable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, decided that there was no necessity for the expro-
priation of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the de -
fendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs.

From that judgment the plaintiff appealed. Petitioner therefore assails the deci-
sion of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate any
land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain
the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can in-
quire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning
the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in ex -
propriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted
by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the City of Manila has the right to exercise the right of expropriation?

And whether or not a private property devoted for public use be expropriated?

HELD:
 Yes, with requisites. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a mu -
nicipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring
the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must only find
(a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b)
also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law.

In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority con-
ceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose
must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that
either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised
in accordance with law. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a
genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment
of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land.

The record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely decided
that there exists a necessity for the appropriation of the particular land described in the
complaint.

Yes, private property devoted for public use is still subject to expropriation, pro-
vided this is done directly by the national legislature or under a specific grant of author-
ity to the delegate. In addition, there must be a necessity for the expropriation.  In the
case at bar, evidence shows that there is no proof of the need of converting the ceme -
tery. Aside from insisting that there exists no necessity for the alleged improvements,
the defendants further contend that the street in question should not be opened through
the cemetery. One of the defendants alleges that said cemetery is public property. If
that allegations is true, then, of course, the city of Manila cannot appropriate it for public
use. The city of Manila can only expropriate private property.

It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a
cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is
used only by a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood.

Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground
can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends
to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use.

It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the
general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of
a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true,
then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of
Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property.

But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for
the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in
its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its appropri-
ation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest
necessity exists therefore

- Philippine Press Institute vs COMELEC, GR No. L-119694,

May 22, 1995

FACTS:

Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to

provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of politi-
cal parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission,
free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications,
their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall
also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of news-

paper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolu-
tion No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent
Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of
the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations
of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, im-
partial and credible election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that
to compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of pri-
vate personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropria -
tion cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established
by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell ad -
vertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the consti-
tution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does
not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench,
there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers.

Where Expropriation Suit is Filed

 - Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, GR 138896 June 20,
2000

DOCTRINE:

An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. It falls within the juris-

diction of the RTC regardless of the value of the subject property. If the action is primar -
ily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary es-
timation and therefore jurisdiction would depend on the amount of the claim.

But, if the basc issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the prin-
cipal sought, such actions are actions that is incapable of pecuniary estimation, jurisdic-
tion of which shall fall in the RTC.

FACTS:

Barangay San Roque of Talisay, Cebu filed a complaint to expropriate the prop-
erty of Pastor with MTC. The MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of ju-
risdiction. It reasoned that “The principal cause of action is the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental.
An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court.”

This was then filed to RTC but was dismissed, holding that an action for eminent
domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated
would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. The
property value was less than 20k and should be filed with MTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for eminent domain is within the jurisdiction of the
MTC?

HELD:

No. The Court ruled that the action for eminent domain is within the jurisdiction of
the RTC.  In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a
sum of money but it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right
to take private property for public use. The subject of an expropriation suit is the govern-
ment’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. 
The value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the
court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it.  However, this is merely
incidental to the expropriation suit.  The amount is determined only after the court is sat-
isfied with the propriety of the expropriation.
 What is Taking

Requisites of Taking

- Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)

FACTS:

Petitioner, as a lessee, occupied the property of Castellvi in 1947 on a year to

year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year.) Before the ex -
piration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic sought to renew the
same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after
the termination of the contract, on July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff,
AFP, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue leas -
ing the property. Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff, answered the letter
of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the
permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected
and already established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the
acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be recom-
mended to the President.

Petitioner Republic stated that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property should be

deemed as of the year 1947 by virtue of the lease agreement.

Respondent argued that the two essential elements in the “taking” of property un -
der the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the
condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the
property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its bene-
ficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi prop-
erty in 1947.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner’s contention that the taking occurred in 1947 (and not in 1959,
is correct

HELD:

No.The following must be present in the “taking” of property for purposes of emi -
nent domain: 1) The expropriator must enter a private property. 2) The entrance
into private property must be for more than a momentary period. 3) The entry into
the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. 4) The property
must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuri-
ously affected. 5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the prop-
erty.

The “taking” of Catellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be con-
sidered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the prop-
erty as lessee thereof.  The Court finds merit in the contention of Castellvi that two es-
sential elements in the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely:
(1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or in-
definite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted
from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic
entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation” is to be

determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when
the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement
of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint
for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1
SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed
in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959.
The “taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensa-
tion to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for
eminent domain was filed.

- City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)

FACTS:

Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to

provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of poli-
tics on (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media en-
terprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credi-
ble election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that
to compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of pri-
vate personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropria -
tion cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established
by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to s
 - Deprivation of Use

- Republic vs. Fajardo , 104 Phil.443 (1958)

FACTS:

The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that con-
struction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and
therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein ap -
pellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to con-
struct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fa -
jardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza
by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed
building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.

Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor
turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the
building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their
former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on
leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and
subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinance is constitutional.

HELD:

No. An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can
not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property.

It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and op-
pressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their
own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking
of appellant’s property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern
tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort
and happiness of residents.

As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land,
regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, be-
cause it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appel-
lants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the ob-
vious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve
that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity
to be heard.
 An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be
used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recog-
nized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between
restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the bur-
den of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden.

While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the
state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently di-
vest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely
to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.

Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban
purposes. To do this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given
an opportunity to be heard.

- Napocor v. San Pedro, G.R. 170945, September 26, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner for the construction of its Transmission Line and Tower negotiated with
respondent for an easement of right of way over her property. Respondent executed a
Right of Way Grant in favor of NPC. The payment voucher for the residential portion of
the lot valued was then processed. However, the NPC Board of Directors approved
Board Resolution stating that it would pay only for easement over agricultural lands,
adopt median or average if there are several amounts involved.

NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain in the RTC against Maria and other
landowners. According to NPC, in order to construct and maintain its Northwestern Lu-
zon Transmission Line Project, it was necessary to acquire several lots for an easement
of right of way. The RTC rendered judgment, declaring as well-grounded, fair and rea-
sonable the compensation for the property. NPC appealed the amended decision to the
CA, asserting that the lower court gravely erred in fixing the just compensation for Re-
spondents.

CA rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, NPC filed a Motion for Reconsider-
ation, which the CA denied, Hence the appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the Right of way easement resulting to the deprivation of use of the
property is considered a taking.

HELD:
 Yes, The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property
rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as in the present case, also falls
within the ambit of the term “expropriation.” It perpetually deprives defendants of their
proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that
below said transmission lines. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results
in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property;
but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an ease-
ment of right-of-way.”

- U.S. vs. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)

FACTS:

Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Car-
olina. Respondents’ property contained a house and a chicken farm. The end of one of
the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet from Respondents’ property, and the glide
path passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet
above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree.

The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June
1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal until June 30, 1967, or
six months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is earlier. The United
States’ four motored bombers make loud noises when flying above the property, and
have very bright lights. Respondents’ chicken farm production had to stop, because 150
chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. In the Court of Claims, it was found
that the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and
that the value of the property depreciation as the result of the easement was $2,000.00.
The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was granted.

ISSUE:

Has the Respondents’ property been taken within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment?

HELD:

Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value of the easement
and whether the easement was permanent or temporary.

The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the
sky above the land. However, the court notes that an act of Congress had given the
United States exclusive national sovereignty over the air space. The court noted that
common sense made the common law doctrine inapplicable.
 However, the court found that the common law doctrine did not control the
present case. The United States had conceded in oral argument that if flights over the
Respondents’ property rendered it uninhabitable then there would be a taking compens-
able under the Fifth Amendment. The measure of the value of the property taken is the
owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain.

The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner is to have
the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches
of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were not true then landowners could not build
buildings, plant trees or run fences.

The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the
public domain. The court does not set the precise limits of the line of demarcation.
Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, like here, they are so low and frequent
as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land. The Court
of Claims must, upon remand, determine the value of the easement and whether it is a
temporary or permanent easement.

- PPI v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272 (1995)

Philippine Press Institute vs COMELEC, GR No. L-119694, May 22, 1995

FACTS:

Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to

provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of politi-
cal parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission,
free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications,
their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall
also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of news-

paper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolu-
tion No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition im -
posed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solici -
tor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of super-
vision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media en -
terprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credi-
ble election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

 HELD:

The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to

compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of pri-
vate personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropria -
tion cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established
by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell ad -
vertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the consti-
tution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does
not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench,
there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers.

- City of Mandaluyong v. Francisco, G.R. No. 137152, January

29, 2001

FACTS:

Antonio, Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio, and Rodolfo N. Aguilar, constructed resi-

dential houses several decades ago on a portion of the 3 lots located at 9 de Febrero
Street, Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong. The Aguilars had since leased out
these houses to tenants until the present. On the vacant portion of the lots, other fami -
lies constructed residential structures which they likewise occupied. In 1983, the lots
were classified by Resolution 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council as an Area for Priority Development for urban land reform under
Proclamation 1967 and 2284 of then President Marcos. As a result of this classification,
the tenants and occupants of the lots offered to purchase the land from the Aguilars, but
the latter refused to sell. On 7 November 1996, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Man-
daluyong, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and occupants of the
subject land, adopted Resolution 516, Series of 1996 authorizing Mayor Benjamin Aba-
los of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of the subject lots
and construction of a medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of the land. On
10 January 1996, Mayor Abalos allegedly sent a letter to the Aguilars offering to pur-
chase the said property at P3,000.00 per square meter. On 4 August 1997, the City filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City a complaint for expropria-
tion, seeking to expropriate 3 adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847
square meters in the names of the Aguilars, and praying that the fixing of just compen-
sation at the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter. In their answer, the
Aguilars, except Eusebio who died in 1995, denied having received a copy of Mayor
Abalos' offer to purchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their land is
arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; that the subject lots are their
only real property and are too small for expropriation, while the City has several proper-
ties inventoried for socialized housing; and that the fair market value of P3,000.00 per
square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Rev-
enue is P7,000.00 per square meter. As counterclaim, the Aguilars prayed for damages
of P21 million. On 5 November 1997, the City filed an Amended Complaint and named
as an additional defendant Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the same time, substituted Euse-
bio Aguilar with his heirs. The City also excluded from expropriation TCT N59870 and
thereby reduced the area sought to be expropriated from three (3) parcels of land to two
(2) parcels totalling 1,636 square meters.The Amended Complaint was admitted by the
trial court on 18 December 1997. On 17 September 1998, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the Amended Complaint after declaring the Aguilars as "small property own-
ers" whose land is exempt from expropriation under Republic Act 7279. The court also
found that the expropriation was not for a public purpose for the City's failure to present
any evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are landless and
homeless residents of Mandaluyong. The City moved for reconsideration. On 29 De-
cember 1998, the court denied the motion. The City filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the City has exhausted all means to acquire the land under the hands of
private persons, but which is within the Areas for Priority Development (APD)

HELD:

Presidential Decree (PD) 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was issued by then
President Marcos in 1978. The decree adopted as a State policy the liberation of human
communities from blight, congestion and hazard, and promotion of their development
and modernization, the optimum use of land as a national resource for public welfare.
Pursuant to this law, Proclamation 1893 was issued in 1979 declaring the entire Metro
Manila as Urban Land Reform

Zone for purposes of urban land reform. This was amended in 1980 by Procla-
mation 1967 and in 1983 by Proclamation 2284 which identified and specified 245 sites
in Metro Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones. The
acquisition of lands for socialized housing is governed by several provisions in the law.
Pursuant to Section 9 of RA 7279, Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in
the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3)
unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority
Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and
Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have
not yet been acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands. Section 9, however, is not a sin -
gle provision that can be read separate from the other provisions of the law. It must be
read together with Section 10 of RA 7279. Thus, lands for socialized housing under RA
7279 are to be acquired in several modes. Among these modes are the following: (1)
community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land
banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated
purchase; and (8) expropriation.
 The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to
only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and (b) parcels of land
owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition.

- Lagcao vs Judge Labra- GR No. 155746, October 13, 2004

Facts:

The Province of Cebu donated several lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots
was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City. In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot
1029 on installment basis. But then, in late 1965, the lots, including Lot 1029, reverted
to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029
by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for
specific performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance. CFI ruled in favor
of petitioners. After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to
discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, petitioners instituted ejectment
proceedings against the squatters. The MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a deci-
sion ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s
decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition. However, when the de-
molition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two
letters to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the
City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayor’s re-
quest, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days.
During the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City passed a res -
olution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
Then, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 which in-
cluded Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. On July, 19, 2000,
Ordinance No. 1843 7 was enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of
Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was
registered in the name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to be used for the
benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants thereof.

Petitioner’s Claim:

They argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expro -
priation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor con -
trary to the concept of “public use” contemplated in the Constitution. 8 They allege that it
will benefit only a handful of people. The ordinance, according to petitioners, was obvi -
ously passed for politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes.

Respondent’s Claim:

That the ordinance in question is valid under the claim that Local Government
Units has the delegated power of Eminent Domain and that the requirements was satis-
fied as there is an ordinance authorizing the Executive to expropriate the land and that
just compensation was already deposited in favor of the petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 1843 is a valid exercise of eminent domain under
RA 7279?

Ruling:

NO. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity
and that necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or ar -
bitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was
no showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for expropriation by the city
ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance No.
1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site of a socialized
housing project. There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1)
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise by local
government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of
RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws. Strict limitations on the exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain by local government units, especially with respect to (1) the order of priority
in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings
as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of
socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only
after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is
mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of pri-
vate property against what may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their prop-
erty is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use. The Local Government Unit
failed to follow section 9 and 10 of RA 7279.

What should be the order of priority?

- Filstream International v. CA, 284 SCRA 716 (1998)

FACTS:
The case involves the favorable judgment obtained by Petitioner in an ejectment case (on
the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals) it filed before
the MTC. The judgment became final and executory. However, during the pendency of the
ejectment proceedings, the City of Manila passed ordinance no. 7813 authorizing Mayor
Lim to expropriate the subject properties of petitioner then occupied by private respon-
dents. Pursuant to the complaint for eminent domain filed by the City of Manila, the trial
court issued a Writ of Possession. On appeal, the Court of Appeals likewise finds for the
condemnation of the property and further issuing a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against the order issued by the trial court for the imposition of its ruling in the ejectment
case which has became final and executory. Petitioner went to the Supreme Court objecting
to the issuance of the TRO and the preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the
writ of demolition issued in the ejectment suit.

There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in favor of peti-
tioner ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties subject of the dis-
pute. However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to
exercise its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. More specifically, the City of
Manila has the power to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land re-
form and housing program as explicitly laid out in the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right of an LGU to expropriate by virtue of an ordinance is absolute.

RULING:

No, the Court held that local government units are not given an unbridled authority when
exercising their power of eminent domain. The basic rules shall have to be followed. The
exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not without limita-
tions.

The right to expropriate private property for public use is expressly granted to it under
Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code. More specifically, the City of Manila has the
power to expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing
program as explicitly laid out in the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409).

Local government units are not given an unbridled authority when exercising their power
of eminent domain. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: “no per-
son shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution); private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section 9,
1987 Constitution)”. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent
domain is not without limitations. Even Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code is
very explicit that it must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposes of urban land
reform and housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992). Sections 9 of the said Republic Act clearly provides for the limitations with respect
to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation pro-
ceedings as a means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for
purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, Section 10 of RA 7279 states that expro-
priation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have
been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory because
these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due
process when their property is expropriated for public use.

What is public use?

- Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983)

Facts:

The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu City for the ex-
propriation of 282 of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City for
the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic
areas with potential tourism value. The PTA will construct a sports complex, club house,
golf course, playground and picnic area on said land. An electric power grid will also be es-
tablished by NPC as well as deep well and drainage system. Complimentary support facili-
ties (malls, coffee shops, etc) will also be created. The defendants alleged that the taking is
allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution. Also, assuming that PTA
has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as
a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by legislative fiat is constitu-
tionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court
of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance, that has jurisdiction over the ex-
propriation cases. The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the PNB, an
amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to PD1533, the lower
court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises
and directing the issuance of writs of possession.

The petitioners who are occupants of the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They
contended that (1) the taking was not for public use; (2) the land was covered by the land
reform program; and (3) expropriation would impair the obligation of contracts.

Issue: WON the public use requirement has been complied with

Held: Yes, There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the ex-
ercise of the power of eminent domain. Sec 2, Article IV states that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article XIV allows the
State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation
to transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the
government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon
payment of just compensation the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into
small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.

The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of
roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been
discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The petititioners
have not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and that the affected per-
sons have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The contract
clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise
eminent domain.

While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment of just
compensation, the provisions on social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exer-
cise of police power together with the power of eminent domain in the implementation of
constitutional objectives are even more far reaching insofar as taxing of private property is
concerned. The petitioners look for the word "tourism" in the Constitution. Understandably
the search would be in vain. In said case, this Court emphasized that the power of eminent
domain is inseparable from sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and in-
herent in government even in its most primitive forms. The only purpose of the provision
in the Bill of Rights is to provide some form of restraint on the sovereign power. It is not a
grant of authority .

The petitioners face two major obstacles. First, their contention which is rather sweeping
in its call for a retreat from the public welfare orientation is unduly restrictive and out-
moded. Second, no less than the lawmaker has made a policy determination that the power
of eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion and development of Philippine
tourism. The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circum-
scribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big
and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public
purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a laissez
faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too of-
ten found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.There can be no
doubt that expropriation for such traditional purposes as the construction of roads,
bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelec-
tric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office build-
ings, and flood control systems is valid.
However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is pub-
lic use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and
other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use." The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use"
because private concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as
restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit.
Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using
public streets and highways do not diminish in the least bit the public character of expro-
priations for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on
expropriated land does not make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers cater-
ing exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. The ex-
propriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public pur-
pose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, en-
tertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.

- Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 170 (1993)

Facts:

December 1988, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of CamSur authorized the provincial governor

to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site in order to es-
tablish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing
project for provincial government employees. Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte
filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren San
Joaquin. Upon motion for the issuance of writ or possession, San Joaquins failed to appear
at the hearing.

San Joaquins later moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the
price offered for their property. The court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the
province to take possession of the properties. San Joaquins filed for motion for relief, but
denied as well. In their petition, asked by the CA, Solicitor General stated that there is no
need for the approval of the president for the province to expropriate properties. However,
the approval of the DAR is needed to convert the property from agricultural to non-agricul-
tural (housing purpose).

CA set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession and expropriation of
the property until the province has acquired the approval of DAR.

Issue:

Whether or not the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject,
to the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the
agrarian reform program

Ruling:
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive
Order No. 129-A, Series of 198, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose
to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the
Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conver-
sions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is
limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant ben-
eficiaries.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer
expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospi-
tals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department
of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the
land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize
whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine
whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being
an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and
will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the
public use.

- Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996)

Fact:

Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro
Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the par-
cel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder
of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 42 of
Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The
resolution was approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports.

At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order
to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by peti-
tioners. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional market and as-
sessed values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property once
the required sum would have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig,
Metro Manila.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropria-
tion was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an applica-
tion of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo,
a religious entity, contrary to the provision of the Constitution. 
Issue:

Whether  the expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act
would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Ar-
ticle VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
 
Held:

No, It’s for public use. Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking
is for a public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of
the Philippines. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent do-
main. For condemnation purposes, “public use” is one which confers same benefit or ad-
vantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of
right of public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as
public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a “public ad-
vantage” or “public benefit” accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. The idea that “pub-
lic use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has long been discarded.

- Reyes vs. NHA, GR No. 147511, January 20, 2003

Facts:

Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of
sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropria-
tion was the expansion of the Dasmariñ as Resettlement Project to accommodate the squat-
ters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judg-
ment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public
purpose for the expansion of the Dasmariñ as Resettlement Project when it failed to relo-
cate the squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection con-
ducted by the trial court which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain
unoccupied. Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA
when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units, which is al-
legedly different from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it
is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expro-
priation judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned to herein peti-
tioners.

Issue:
Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of re-
spondent NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally
different purpose.

Held:

The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot
insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contend-
ing that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now
settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes.
The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public
benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use."

In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is
for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, com-
mercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. More-
over, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in co-
operation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing
which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged
and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of pri-
vate property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in fur-
therance of social justice.

- MCWD v. J. King and Sons Co., Inc. 175983, April 16, 2009

- Moday vs NHA, 268 SCRA 568

 Can the Government Withdraw?

- NHA v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, G.R. No. 154411. June 19, 2003

Fact: 

Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against the property of the Re-
spondent, that the lands are within a blighted urban center which petitioner intends to de-
velop as a socialized housing project. Respondents herein, filed a Manifestation stating that
they were waiving their objections to petitioner’s power to expropriate their properties.
Hence, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the Petitioner has a lawful right to ex-
propriate the properties of the Respondents.

Petitioner, filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss complaint for eminent domain, al-
leging that the implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible
by the unconscionable value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended ben-
eficiaries can not afford. The Motion was denied on the ground that the Partial Judgment
had already become final and executory and there was no just and equitable reason to war-
rant the dismissal of the case. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was de-
nied, thus filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which summarily dis-
missed the petition. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner can withdraw the expropriation proceedings after the determina-
tion of the Power of Eminent Domain

Held:

No, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court dated December 10, 1999, which
declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondent Heirs of
Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became final and may no longer be subject to review or
reversal in any court. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or
reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are not in-
fallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits on
the same claim.

- NPC & Pobre v. CA, G.R. No. 106804. August 12, 2004

FACTS:

Antonio Pobre owns a land which he developed into a resort subdivision, beneath which is
thermal mineral water and steam. For one year, Pobre leased to NPC eleven lots from the
approved subdivision plan. To own the land for industrial purposes, NPC filed an expropri-
ation case against Pobre, during the pendency of which the former dumped waste materials
beyond the site agreed upon by the parties. Then NPC filed its second expropriation case
against Pobre to acquire an additional area of the property.

In his motion to dismiss the complaint, Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots
affected by NPC’s actions and for the payment of damages. But NPC itself filed a motion to
dismiss the second expropriation case on the ground that NPC had found an alternative site
and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Po-
bre’s opposition. The trial court ruled that because of the pollution generated by NPC’s geo-
thermal plants NPC had rendered Pobre’s entire Property useless as a resort-subdivision.
The Property has become useful only to NPC. NPC must therefore take Pobre’s entire Prop-
erty and pay for it. But NPC insists that it has the right to move for the automatic dismissal
of its complaint, relying on Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court (the Rules in effect
at that time).

ISSUE: Whether or not NPC has the right to automatically dismiss complaint for eminent
domain

HELD:

No. In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff’s matter of right to auto-
matically dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suf-
fered damages at the start of the taking.

If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to judi-
cial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private
rights may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of
the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure no longer makes the dismissal of the complaint automatic. The right of the
plaintiff to dismiss his action before the defendant has filed his answer or asked for sum-
mary judgment must be first confirmed by the court in an order issued by it.

(It is not Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court that is applicable to this case but
Rule 67 of the same Rules, as well as jurisprudence on expropriation cases. Rule 17 re-
ferred to dismissal of civil actions in general while Rule 67 specifically governed eminent
domain cases.)
 Recovery of Expropriated Land

- ATO v. Gopuco, G.R. No. 158563, June, 30 2005

Fact:

Respondent was the owner of a property located in the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in
Cebu City. in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) informed the owners of the var-
ious lots surrounding the Lahug Airport, including the herein respondent, that the govern-
ment was acquiring their lands for purposes of expansion. Some landowners were con-
vinced to sell their properties on the assurance that they would be able to repurchase the
same when these would no longer be used by the airport. Others, including Respondent.
Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport commenced operations, the Lahug
Airport was ordered closed by then President Corazon C. Aquino in 1989. Respondent
wrote the Bureau of Air Transportation, through the manager of the Lahug Airport, seeking
the return of his lot and offering to return the money previously received by him as pay-
ment for the expropriation.  Respondent filed an amended complaint for recovery of own-
ership of the said lot against the Petitioners. RTC dismissed the complaint and directed the
respondent to pay the MCIAA exemplary damages, litigation expenses and costs. Respon-
dent appealed to the CA, which overturned the RTC decision, ordered petitioners to recon-
vey the property. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied in 2003,
 
hence this petition, which raises the following issues:
 
Issue:

Whether  private land is expropriated for a particular public use, and that particular public
use is abandoned, does its former owner acquire a cause of action for recovery of the prop-
erty?
 
Held:

No, When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land,
and the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, with-
out any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
but If the land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that
purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of
course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the
property so expropriated.
 - Republic v. Lim, G.R. 161656, June 29, 2005

Fact:

On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil
action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, involving Lots of the
Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reser-
vation for the Philippine Army. After depositing ₱9,500.00 with the Philippine National
Bank, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, the CFI rendered its Decision or-
dering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of ₱4,062.10 as just compensation. In
1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corpora-
tion a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it “denied knowledge of the matter.” Another
heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to the Office of then President Carlos Garcia who
wrote the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expe-
dite action on said claim. in 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza
and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over
Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republic’s failure to pay the amount of ₱4,062.10, ad-
judged in the expropriation proceedings. In view of “the differences in money value from
1940 up to the present,” the court adjusted the market value at ₱16,248.40, to be paid with
6% interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings,
until full payment.

Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged and foreclosed Lot 932 to Vicente
Lim for failure to pay. in 1992, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title with the
(RTC) seeking an absolute and exclusive possession of the property. in 2001, the RTC ren-
dered a decision in favor of respondent. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA but the Rul-
ing of the RTC was upheld and affirmed.

Issue:

Whether the owner of the expropriated land is entitled for the repossession of his property
when party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or
agreed upon?

Held:

Yes, while the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots,26 however, in
cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the
finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have
the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle
that “the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.” To be sure,
the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation
punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the govern-
ment, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the
payment of just compensation which the court defined as not only the correct determina-
tion of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property
within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
“just.”

- Vda. De Ouano v. Republic, GR No. 168770, February 9, 2011

Facts:

In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA’s predecessor agency, pursued a
program to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators, NAC
met and negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around the airport.

The landowners claim the government negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them that
they could repurchase their respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion project
do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations transferred to Mac-
tan-Cebu Airport.

On February 8, 1996, Ricardo L. Inocian and four others (all children of Isabel Limbaga who
originally owned six [6] of the lots expropriated); and Aletha Suico Magat and seven others,
successors-in-interest of Santiago Suico, the original owner of two (2) of the condemned
lots (collectively, the Inocians), filed before the RTC in Cebu City a complaint for recon-
veyance of real properties and damages against MCIAA. The RT rendered a decision direct-
ing MCIAA to reconvey the lands.

Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers en-
tered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos.
On February 8, 1996, Ricardo L. Inocian and four others (all children of Isabel Limbaga who
originally owned six [6] of the lots expropriated); and Aletha Suico Magat and seven others,
successors-in-interest of Santiago Suico, the original owner of two (2) of the condemned
lots (collectively, the Inocians), filed before the RTC in Cebu City a complaint for recon-
veyance of real properties and damages against MCIAA. The RT rendered a decision direct-
ing MCIAA to reconvey the lands.

Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers en-
tered and occupied Lot No. 763-A which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos.

Issue:

WON Ouano is entitled to recover their properties

Ruling:
Yes. At the outset, three (3) fairly established factual premises ought to be emphasized:
o First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject of
the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were origi-
nally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport.
o Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. A significant portion of it had,
in fact, been purchased by a private corporation for development as a commercial complex.
o Third, it has been preponderantly established by evidence that the NAC, through its team
of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners that they would be entitled
to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer used for airport pur-
poses.
 
In the case at bench, the Ouanos parted with their respective lots in favor of the MCIAA, the
latter obliging itself to use the realties for the expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its
end of the bargain, MCIAA can be compelled by the former landowners to reconvey the
parcels of land to them, otherwise, they would be denied the use of their properties upon a
state of affairs that was not conceived nor contemplated

Genuine Necessity

- Mun. of Meycayauan vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 640 (1988)

Fact:  

In 1975, private respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the
Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence
a parcel of land which will to enable the storage of the respondent’s heavy equipment and
various finished products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports,
wharves, and harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter
concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing. In the same year, the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution manifesting the in-
tention to expropriate the respondent’s parcel of land. On 1976, the Special Committee rec-
ommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove the resolution in question be-
cause there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality to expropriate the respondent’s
property for use as a public road. The respondent, then, reiterated to the Office of the
Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. On
1983, however, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D.
Daez, passed Resolution for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent’s land. The
Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution and filed with the RTC a spe-
cial civil action for expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount of value of the land, the RTC
issued a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner. In 1984, the RTC issued an order the
taking of the property and ascertain the just compensation for the property. The respon-
dent went to the IAC on petition for review. In 1985, the IAC affirmed the RTC’s decision.
However, it was subsquently reversed after the court found no genuine necessity to expro-
priate the land for use as a public road as there were several other roads for the same pur-
pose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public road.
Issue:

Whether the expropriation of the Respondents Lot is of Public Necessity?

Held:

No, the Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain
is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Condemnation of pri-
vate property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity of a
public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the
exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine neces-
sity therefor. here is no genuine necessity for the Municipality of’ Meycauayan to expropri-
ate the aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation for use
as a public road. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available road and vacant
lot offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question and lying Idle, unlike the lot
sought to be expropriated which was found by the Committee to be badly needed by the
company as a site for its heavy equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining va-
cant lot, the justification to condemn the same does not appear to be very imperative and
necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The desire of the Munici-
pality of Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully
and better attained by acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser
costs without causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate business therein. Or, the
municipality may seek to expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered
for sale for a wider public road to attain decongest (sic) of traffic because as observed by
the Committee

- Republic vs. De Knecht, G.R. 87351, February 12, 1990

- De la Paz Masikip v. Judge Legaspi, G.R. No. 136349, January 23,

2006

Principles:

Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the benefit of a small commu-
nity which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility, notwithstanding that there
is such a recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking... cannot be considered
to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid.

Facts:
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area
of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. In a letter
dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent, noti-
fied petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property
to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents... of
Barangay Caniogan.

On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropria-
tion of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is nei-
ther sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our...
community."
In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropria-
tion of petitioner's property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor resi-
dents.”

Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for
expropriation. On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss,[5] on the
ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and
recreational activities of the residents of Pasig.

Issues:

whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property

Ruling:

No. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the
necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. the very foundation of... the
right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a
public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany
and not follow, the taking of the land. necessity within the rule that the particular property
to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or
practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public... with the least
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent
with such benefit.

Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that
there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's property. Our scrutiny of the
records shows that the Certification[14] issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council, indi-
cates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a
private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It... can be gleaned that the
members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and
recreational facility. Petitioner's lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is,
therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not... been shown, espe-
cially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and com-
munity recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of
Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

What is just compensation?

- Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001

Fact:

Respondent is the owner of a lot in South Cotabato. Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager
of the NIA, approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot.
Respondent’s husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be
paid by the government for the area taken after the processing of documents by the Com-
mission on Audit. a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between respondent and the
NIA who paid respondent for the Right-of-Way damages. Respondent subsequently exe-
cuted an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any compensation for
damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as a result of the construction of a
right-of-way on her property. The same year, petitioner offered respondent the sum of
P35,000.00 by way of amicable settlement. Respondent demanded payment for the taking
of her property, but petitioner refused to pay. Accordingly, respondent filed on December
10, 1990 a complaint against petitioner before the RTC, praying that petitioner be ordered
to pay as compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal
constructed by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs. Petitioner, an Answer, in which
he admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the property of the plaintiff and
that NIA paid a certain landowner whose property had been taken for irrigation purposes.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering National Irrigation Administration, to pay to
plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Seven Thousand Five Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Sixty
Centavos (P107,517.60) as just compensation for the questioned area of 24,660 square me-
ters of land owned by plaintiff and taken by said defendant NIA which used it for its main
canal plus costs.

On November 15, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on October 31,
2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
 
Issue:

Whether the value of just compensation shall be determined from the time of the taking or
from the time of the finality of the decision?
 
Held:  

Yes, With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is enti-
tled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which should be paid or “that
sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but
not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.” Further,
just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land
but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” for then the property owner is made to
suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait
for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Nevertheless, there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property
prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of
the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.

- RP vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005

FACTS:

NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc (PIATCO) was nullified.

Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through expro-
priation filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending that  a mere de-
posit of the assessed value of the property with an authorized government depository is
enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court).

However, respondents avers that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued,
direct payment of just compensation must be made to the builders of the facilities, citing RA
No. 8974 and a related jurisprudence (2004 Resolution).

ISSUE:

WON expropriation can be conducted by mere deposit of the assessed value of the prop-
erty.

HELD:

No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only after di-
rect payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the basis of fairness. The
same principle applied in the 2004 Jurisprudence Resolution and the latest expropriation
law (RA No. 8974).

- Office of the SolGen v. Ayala Land Inc., GR No. 177056, September

18, 2009

FACTS:

Respondents operate or lease out shopping malls that have parking facilities. The people
that use said facilities are required to pay parking fees by the respondents. In 1999, the
Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights conducted a
joint investigation for the following purposes: (1) to inquire into the legality of thepreva-
lent practice of shopping malls of charging parking fees; (2) assuming arguendo... that the
collection of parking fees was legally authorized, to find out the basis and reasonableness of
the parking rates charged by shopping malls; and (3) to determine the legality of the policy
of shopping malls of denying liability in cases of theft, robbery, or carnapping, by invoking
the waiver clause at the back of the parking tickets. The investigation found that such prac-
tice is against the National Building Code. Respondents then received an information from
various government agencies enjoining them from collecting parking fees and later a civil
case against them. Respondents argued that the same constitutes undue taking of private
property. OSG argues that the same is implemented in view of public welfare more specifi-
cally to ease traffic congestion.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. CA denied the appeals of both petitioners and
respondents on the following ground:
that section 803 of National Building Code and Rule XIX of IRR are clear that they are only
intended to control the occupancy of areas and structures, and in the absence of provision
of law, respondents could not be obliged to provide parking spaces free of charge.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents are obligated to provide free parking to its consumers
and the public?

RULING:
 
No. Respondents are not obligated to provide for free parking to the people.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly applied Article 1158 of the New Civil Code,
which the explicit directive of the afore-quoted statutory and regulatory provisions, gar-
nered from a plain reading thereof, is that respondents, as operators/lessors of neighbor-
hood shopping centers, should provide parking and loading spaces, in accordance with the
minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor area.There is nothing
therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by respondents. In
fact, the term "parking fees” cannot even be found at all in the entire National Building
Code and its IRR.

Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without any attempt at interpretation. Since Section 803 of the
National Building Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply,
said provisions do not regulate the collection of the same.

- Internal Revenue vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083, July

21, 2006
- RA 8974 (NEW LAW on Expropriation-national projects)
- Rule 67 of the Rules of Court
 - LBP v. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No. 169903, February 29,
2012
FACTS: 

Honeycomb Farms Corporation (Honeycomb Farms) was the registered owner of two
parcels of agricultural land in Cataingan, Masbate. Honeycomb Farms voluntarily offered
these parcels of land, with a total area of 495.1374 hectares, to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). From
the entire area offered, the government chose to acquire only 486.0907 hectares.

The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as the agency vested with the responsibility of de-
termining the land valuation and compensation for parcels of land acquired pursuant to the
CARL, and using the guidelines set forth in DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 17, series of
1989, as amended by DAR AO No. 3, series of 1991, fixed the value of these parcels of land.

When Honeycomb Farms rejected the LBPs and the DARs valuation for being too low, Hon-
eycomb Farms filed a case with the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), against
the DAR Secretary and the LBP, praying that it be compensated for its landholdings in the
amount of P12,440,000.00, with damages and attorneys fees.

The RTC constituted a Board of Commissioners to aid the court in determining the just
compensation for the subject properties. Since the Board of Commissioners could not reach
a common valuation for the properties, the RTC made its own valuation. First, the RTC took
judicial notice of the fact that a portion of the land, measuring approximately 10 hectares, is
commercial land, since it is located a few kilometers away from Sitio Curvada, Pitago,
Cataingan, Masbate, which is a commercial district. The lower court thus priced the 10
hectares at P100,000.00 per hectare and the remaining 476 hectares at P32,000.00 per
hectare. Both parties appealed to the CA.

The LBP argued that the RTC committed a serious error when it disregarded the formula
for fixing just compensation embodied in DAR AO No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR
AO No. 11, series of 1994. The LBP also argued that the RTC erred in taking judicial notice
that 10 hectares of the land in question is commercial land.

In contrast, Honeycomb Farms maintains that the DAR AOs were issued merely to serve as
guidelines for the DAR and the LBP in administratively fixing the valuation to be offered by
the DAR to the landowner for acceptance or rejection. However, it is not mandatory for
courts to use the DAR AOs to fix just compensation as this would amount to an administra-
tive imposition on an otherwise purely judicial function and prerogative of determination
of just compensation for expropriated lands specifically reserved by the Constitution to the
courts.
The CA affirmed with modification the assailed RTC judgment with respect to the computa-
tion of the amount fixed by the trial court and the award of attorneys fees is deleted.

ISSUES:

Did the CA commit a serious error of law when it failed to apply the mandatory formula for
determining just compensation fixed in DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994?

Did the RTC correctly take judicial notice of the nature of the subject land?

HELD: 

It is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power to determine just compensation for
parcels of land acquired by the State, pursuant to the agrarian reform program. In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, the DAR, as the administrative agency tasked with the
implementation of the agrarian reform program, already came up with a formula to deter-
mine just compensation which incorporated the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA
6657.

In Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court emphasized the duty of the RTC to apply
the formula provided in the applicable DAR AO to determine just compensation, stating
that: While [the RTC] is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current
value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors to de-
termine just compensation, it is equally true that these factors have been translated into a
basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No.
6657. As the government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform pro-
gram, it is the DAR's duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law.
[The] DAR [Administrative Order] precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, R.A. No.
6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken
into account. The [RTC] was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to im-
plement the said provision.

These rulings plainly impose on the RTC the duty to apply the formula laid down in the per-
tinent DAR administrative regulations to determine just compensation. Clearly, the CA and
the RTC acted with grievous error when they disregarded the formula laid down by the
DAR, and chose instead to come up with their own basis for the valuation of the subject
land.

How determined?

- EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987)

Facts:
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Pro-
cessing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Anto-
nio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are regis-
tered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them
reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an or-
der for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was
later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per
square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis
of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower.
Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing
was set for the reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed this petition for cer-
tiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.

Issue:

Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD
1533 is unconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533
is unconstitutional.

The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to

judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may
only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but
it may not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial func-
tion. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party
may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much
less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensa-
tion.

- Belen vs. CA, 195 SCRA 59

- Republic vs. CA, 227 SCRA 401

- Sps. Lee vs. LBP, GR No. 170422, March 7, 2008

When Determined?
 - Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, G.R. 50147 August 3, 1990

Fact:  

The lots belong to the petitioners are covered by title in their names. These lots were taken
from the Ansaldos sometime in 1947 by the Department of Public Work Transportation
and Communication and made part of what used to be Sta. Mesa Street and is now Ramon
Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, Metro Manila. This, to repeat, without demur on the part of
the owners. Said owners made no move whatever until twenty-six years later. They wrote
to ask for compensation for their land on January 22, 1973. Their claim was referred to the
Secretary of Justice who in due course rendered an opinion dated February 22, 1973, that
just compensation should be paid in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 76. The De-
cree provided that the basis for the payment of just compensation of property taken for
public use should be the current and fair market value thereof as declared by the owner or
administrator, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever was lower.
The Secretary of Justice thus advised that the corresponding expropriation suit be forth-
with instituted to fix the just compensation to be paid to the Ansaldos.

Pursuant to this opinion, the Commissioner of Public Highways requested the Provincial
Assessor of Rizal to make a redetermination of the market value of the Ansaldos’ property
in accordance with PD 76. The new valuation was made, after which the Auditor of the Bu-
reau of Public Highways forwarded the Ansaldos’ claim to the Auditor General with the rec-
ommendation that payment be made on the basis of the “current and fair market value, . . .
and not on the fair market value at the time of taking.
The Commission on Audit, however, declined to adopt the recommendation. In a decision
handed down on September 26, 1973, the Acting Chairman ruled that “the amount of com-
pensation to be paid to the claimants is to be determined as of the time of the taking of the
subject lots, i.e. 1947. The ruling was reiterated by the Commission on September 8, 1978,
and again on January 25, 1979 when it denied the Ansaldos’ motion for reconsideration. It
is these rulings of the Commission on Audit that the Ansaldos have appealed to this Court.

Issue: Whether the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants is to be determined

as of the time of the taking of the subject land?

Held:

Yes which is in 1947. there is a “taking” when the owner is actually deprived or dispos-
sessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a material impairment of
the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof.

There is a “taking” in this sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for
a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the
property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all bene-
ficial enjoyment thereof. For ownership, after all, “is nothing without the inherent rights of
possession, control and enjoyment. Where the owner is deprived of the ordinary and bene-
ficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking
within the Constitutional sense. Under these norms, there was undoubtedly a taking of the
Ansaldos’ property when the Government obtained possession thereof and converted it
into a part of a thoroughfare for public use. Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos’ prop-
erty must be ascertained as of the year 1947, when it was actually taken, and not at the
time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which, by the way, still has to be done. It is as of
that time that the real measure of their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed,
shall earn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected, conformably with other
principles laid down by case law

- NAPOCOR v. Tiangco, G.R. No. 170846, February 6, 2007

Facts:

Herein respondents are the owners of a parcel of land in Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal
and registered in their names. petitioner NPC requires the respondents’ aforementioned
property, across which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose Transmission Line Project will tra-
verse. NPC’s Segregation Plan for the purpose shows that the desired right-of-way will cut
through the respondents’ land. After repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the respon-
dents, NPC filed with the RTC a complaint for expropriation against them which the RTC is-
sued Condemnation Order, granting NPC the right to take possession of the area sought to
be expropriated. Which RTC subsequently ordered directing NPC to pay and deposit with
the Rizal Provincial Treasurer an amount representing the temporary provisional value of
the area subject of the expropriation prior to the possession. The RTC rendered judgment
expropriating in favor of [NPC] a parcel of land covering a total area and ordered the
amount of P40,594.07 as just compensation for the 19,423 square meters of land affected
by the expropriations; and the amount of P324,750.00 as reasonable compensation for the
improvements on the land expropriated. The respondents moved for reconsideration, pre-
senting for the first time a document entitled “BIR Circular of Appraisal,” which shows that
for the year 1985, 1992, 1994 that the lands valued at ₱30.00, ₱80.00, ₱100.00 per square
meter respectively. NPC and the respondents went on appeal to the CA whereat the sepa-
rate appeals who modified the decision of the RTC that the compensation awarded for the
19,423 square meters of land affected is increased to ₱116,538.00, and the reasonable com-
pensation for the improvements thereon is likewise increased to P325,025.00.

Issue:

Whether the Just Compensation Is it to be based on the 1984 or the 1993 valuation?

Held:

Neither of the two determinations made by the the CA and RTC is therefore correct. A new
one must be arrived at, taking into consideration the foregoing pronouncements.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. In this case, this simply means the property’s fair market value
at the time of the filing of the complaint, or “that sum of money which a person desirous but
not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received therefor.” The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the
owner’s loss.

In the determination of such value, the court is not limited to the assessed value of the
property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial or city appraisal
committee; these values consist but one factor in the judicial valuation of the property. The
nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for deter-
mining how much just compensation should be given to the landowner All the facts as to
the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capa-
bilities, should be considered.

Manner of Payment
- Assoc.of Small Landowners v. DAR, 175 SCRA 343 (1989)

Facts:

In G.R. No. 79777, the subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four ten-
ants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked
by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared
full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

Petitioners are questioning constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229.
Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or
in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value. However, in an amended peti-
tion, petitioners contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and
21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself
also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same infirmities
as the earlier measures.

Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:

SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner
in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in ac-
cordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provi-
sions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the
land.

The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the
landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
 (a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned —
Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instru-
ments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty per-
cent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at
any time.

(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the
balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.

(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares,

physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the
PARC;

(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;

(4) LBP bonds

Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 18 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of
the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which
is the only medium of payment allowed.

Held:
No. It cannot be denied from these case that the traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been
paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional
excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where
only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its
owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of
whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their
owners.
the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided
for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We
do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on
this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities
and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be
made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other
things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of
the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the
smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner
will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds
and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments mak-
ing up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are
likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because pay-
ment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and
other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

Trial with Commissioners

- Meralco v. Pineda, 206 SCRA 196 (1992)
- Leca Realty v. Republic, G.R. No. 155605, September 27, 2006

Legal Interest for Expropriation Cases

- NPC v. Angas, 208 SCRA 542 (1992)

- Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo, G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004

Facts:

Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare unirrigated and un-
tenanted rice land, and situated in the Sitios of Ablang, Saguingan and Pinamunghilan, Bar-
rio of San Juan, Licab, Nueva Ecija. In line with the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Pro-
gram (CARP) of the government, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to the Depart-
ment of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9 million. In November 1991, after the DAR’s eval-
uation of the application and the determination of the just compensation by the Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP), a notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property
for P1,342,667.466 was sent to Wycoco. The amount offered was later raised to
P2,594,045.39 and, upon review, was modified to P2,280,159.82. Wycoco rejected the offer,
prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary administra-
tive proceeding. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account in the name
of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by DAR. In the meantime, the property
was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. On November 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a
decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to present evidence in support of
the land valuation inasmuch as it is of public knowledge that the prevailing market value of
agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare.
The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire
94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. It also
awarded Wycoco actual damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest. The DAR and the
LBP filed separate petitions before the Court of Appeals. The petition brought by DAR was
dismissed. The petition brought by LBP was likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals
however, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by deducting from the compensation
due Wycoco the amount corresponding to the 3.3672 hectare portion of the 94.1690
hectare land which was found to have been previously sold by Wycoco to the Republic.

Issues:
(3) Did the Regional Trial Court, acting as Special Agrarian Court, validly acquire jurisdic-
tion over the instant case for determination of just compensation?
(4) (2) Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, was the compensation arrived at supported
by evidence?
(5) (3) Were the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits valid?
(6)

Held: In the jurisdiction issue, the laws in point are Sections 50 and 57 of Republic Act No.
6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) which, in pertinent part, provide:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary ju-
risdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, ex-
cept those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA)
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)….

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclu-
sive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landown-
ers, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Special Agrarian Courts
shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days
from submission of the case for decision. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, it was held that
Special Agrarian Courts are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of
cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation; and (2) the prose-
cution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. Section 50 must be construed in har-
mony with Section 57 by considering cases involving the determination of just compensa-
tion and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657. The DAR, as an administrative
agency, cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over criminal
cases. The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which
is vested with the Special Agrarian Courts and cannot be lodged with administrative agen-
cies. In fact, Rule XIII, Section 11 of the New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB acknowl-
edges this power of the court, thus – Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determi-
nation and Payment of Just Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator on land valua-
tion and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appeal-
able to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as
Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any
party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. Under Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 405, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of
determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the just compensation to be
paid for their taking. procedure for the determination of just compensation: Through a no-
tice of voluntary offer to sell (VOS) submitted by the landowner, accompanied by the re-
quired documents, the DAR evaluates the application and determines the land’s suitability
for agriculture. The LBP likewise reviews the application and the supporting documents
and determines the valuation of the land. Thereafter, the DAR issues the Notice of Land Val-
uation to the landowner. In both voluntary and compulsory acquisition, where the
landowner rejects the offer, the DAR opens an account in the name of the landowner and
conducts a summary administrative proceeding. If the landowner disagrees with the valua-
tion, the matter may be brought to the Regional Trial Court acting as a special agrarian
court. the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycoco’s complaint for determi-
nation of just compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary administrative
proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal mandate of ini-
tially determining the value of Wycoco’s land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series
of 1990. The trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon in-
stead of practically assuming a valuation without basis. While market value may be one of
the bases of determining just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at with-
out considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving

at the fair market value of the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like
properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. Since these fac-
tors were not considered, a remand of the case for determination of just compensation is
necessary. On the 3rd issue, The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be
deleted. The amount of loss must not only be capable of proof, but must be proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty. The claim must be premised upon competent proof or upon
the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts or other documentary proof.40 None having
been presented in the instant case, the claim for unrealized profits cannot be granted.
THEREFORE, The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23, acting
as Special Agrarian Court, cannot be enforced because there is a need to remand the case to
the trial court for determination of just compensation.

Writ of Possession

- City of Manila v. Oscar Serrano, G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001

Facts:

On 21 December 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance 7833, authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Manila's First District in Tondo, covered by TCTs
70869, 105201, 105202, and 138273 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, which are to be
sold and distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Pro-
gram of the City of Manila. One of the properties sought to be expropriated, denominated as
Lot 1-C, consists of 343.10 square meters, and was in the name of Feliza de Guia. Lot 1-C
was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the heirs of Alberto De Guia, in turn one of the
heirs of Feliza de Guia. On 29 July 1994, the said property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui,
in whose name TCT 217018 was issued. The property was subsequently sold on 24 January
1996 to Demetria De Guia to whom TCT 226048 was issued. On 26 September 1997, the
City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation (Civil Case 94-72282) with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots covered by
TCTs 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202, and 138273, which included herein re-
spondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed Ser-
rano. On 12 November 1997, the Serranos filed a consolidated answer, praying the exemp-
tion of Lot 1-C from expropriation. Upon motion by the City, the trial court issued an order,
dated 9 October 1998, directing the City to deposit the amount of P1,825,241.00 equivalent
to the assessed value of the properties. After the City had made the deposit, the trial court
issued another order, dated 15 December 1998, directing the issuance of a writ of posses-
sion in favor of the City. The Serranos filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Ap-
peals. On 16 November 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that al-
though Lot 1-C is not exempt from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square
meters which is no longer considered a small property within the framework of RA 7279,
the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in §§59-10 of the law must first be
tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation, and thus enjoined the
City from expropriating Lot 1-C. In its resolution, dated 23 February 2000, the Court of Ap-
peals likewise denied two motions for reconsideration filed by the City. The City filed a pe-
tition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the expropriation of the property is proper in relation to R.A. 7279.

HELD:

Rule 67, §2 provides that "Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and af-
ter due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government de-
positary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxa-
tion to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in
money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a
government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized
government depositary. If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally as-
certained and the amount to be deposited shall be fixed by the court. After such deposit is
made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff
in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court
with service of copies to the parties." Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court
upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the as-
sessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these require-
ments, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. Herein, these require-
ments were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue
the writ of possession. The distinction between the Filstream and the present case is that in
the former, the judgment in that case had already become final while herein, the trial court
has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to deter-
mine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in RA
7279. Whether the City has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of ev-
idence, although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with
the requirements. The determination of this question must await the hearing on the com-
plaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties
sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condem-
nation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose
or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking
of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three com-
missioners.

- Republic vs Gingoyon, GR. 166429, December 19, 2005

FACTS:

NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals
Co., Inc (PIATCO) was nullified.

Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through expro-
priation filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending that  a mere de-
posit of the assessed value of the property with an authorized government depository is
enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court).

However, respondents avers that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued,
direct payment of just compensation must be made to the builders of the facilities, citing RA
No. 8974 and a related jurisprudence (2004 Resolution).

ISSUE:

WON expropriation can be conducted by mere deposit of the assessed value of the prop-
erty.

HELD:

No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only after di-
rect payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the basis of fairness. The
same principle applied in the 2004 Jurisprudence Resolution and the latest expropriation
law (RA No. 8974).

- Rep. v. Holy Trinity Realty Dev. Corp., 551 SCRA 303

Facts:

On December 29, 2000, Petitioner, represented by Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), filed be-
fore the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against
landowners whose properties would be affected by the expansion of the North Luzon Ex-
pressway. Respondent HTRDC was one of the affected landowner. On March 18, 2002, TRB
filed a motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting that it deposited a suffi-
cient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the affected properties, in
the total amount of PhP 28,406,700.00, with Land Bank South Harbor Branch. The RTC is-
sued, on March 19, 2002, the Writ of Possession. On March 3, 2003, HTRDC filed with the
RTC a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying that the respondent be allowed to withdraw
the amount of PhP 22,968,000.00, out of the TRB’s advance deposit of PhP 28,406,700.00,
including the interest which accrued thereon. The RTC issued an Order, on April 21, 2003,
directing Land bank South Harbor Branch to release in favor of HTRDC the amount of
PhP22, 968,000.00. However, the issue on the interest earned by the amount deposited in
the bank, if there any, should still be threshed out. On March 11, 2004, the RTC ordered that
the interest earnings from the deposit of P22,968,000.00 respecting 100% of the zonal
value of the affected properties in this expropriation proceedings under the principle of ac-
cession are considered as fruits and should pertain to HTRDC. TRB filed a Motion for Re-
consideration. The RTC granted the motion and ruled that the issue on the payment of in-
terest should be ventilated before the Board of Commissioners which will be created later
for the determination of just compensation. HTRDC filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The
motion was denied by the RTC. On appeal to the Court of Appeals by HTRDC, the CA ruled
that the interest which accrued on the amount deposited in the expropriation accounts be-
longs the HTRDC by virtue of accession. The Republic filed a Petition for Review on Certio-
rari before the SC. They argued the HTRDC is entitled only to an amount equivalent to the
zonal value of the expropriated property, nothing more and nothing less as provided under
Sec. 4 of RA 8974. They further argued that it is only during the determination of just com-
pensation when the court will appoint commissioners and determine claims for entitle-
ments to interest.

ISSUE:

W/N the interest earned by the deposited amount in the expropriation account would ac-
crue to HRTDC by virtue of accession?

HELD:

Yes, the Court ruled that HTRDC is determined to be the owned of only a part of the amount
deposited in the expropriation account, in the sum of PhP 22,968,000.00. Hence, it is enti-
tled by right of accession to the interest that had accrued to the said amount only. When the
TRB deposited the amount as advance payment for the expropriated property with an au-
thorized government depositary bank for purposes of obtaining a writ of possession, it is
deemed to be a constructive delivery of the amount corresponding to the 100% zonal valu-
ation of the expropriated property. Since HTRDC is entitled thereto and undisputably the
owner of the principal amount deposited by TRB, conversely, the interest yield, as acces-
sion, in a bank deposit should likewise pertain to the owner of the money deposited. Fur-
ther, the Court pointed out that TRB does not object to HTRDC’s withdrawal of the amount
of PhP22,968,000.00 from the expropriation account, provided that it is able to show (1)
that the property is free from any lien or encumbrances and (2) that it is the absolute
owner thereof. The said conditions do not put in abeyance the constructive delivery of the
said amount to HTRDC pending the latter’s compliance therewith. Art. 1187, NCC provides
that the effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition have been fulfilled,
shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation. Hence, when HTRDC complied
with the given condition, as determined by the RTC in its Order dated (April 21, 2003), the
effects of constructive deliver retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the amount in
the expropriation account of DPWH.
 Expropriation of Utilities, Landed Estates and
Municipal Property
- Art. XII, Sec. 18
- Art. XIII, Sec. 4
- Art. XIII, Sec. 9

- City of Baguio vs. Nawasa, 106 Phil. 114 (1959)

Facts:

Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public corporation,

created under Act.1383. It contends that the said act does not include within its purview
the Baguio Water Works system, assuming that it does, is unconstitutional because it de-
prives the plaintiff ownership, control and operation of said water works without just com-
pensation and due process of law. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss ion the ground
that it is not a proper exercise of police power and eminent domain. The court denied the
motion and ordered the defendants to file an answer. The court holds that the water works
system of Baguio belongs to private property and cannot be expropriated without just com-
pensation. Sec. 8 of R.A.1383 provides for the exchange of the NAWASA assets for the value
of the water works system of Baguio is unconstitutional for this is not just compensation.
Defendants motion for reconsideration was denied hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of police power of eminent domain.

Held:

R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. The act does not confiscate,
destroy or appropriate property belonging to a municipal corporation. It merely directs
that all water works belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal districts in the Philip-
pines to be transferred to the NAWASA. The purpose is placing them under the control and
supervision of an agency with a view to promoting their efficient management, but in so
doing does not confiscate them because it directs that they be paid with equal value of the
assets of NAWASA.

The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public prop-
erty held in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public. But it is a prop-
erty of a municipal corporation, water works cannot be taken away except for public use
and upon payment of just compensation. Judgment affirmed.

It is clear that the State may, in the interest of National welfare, transfer to public
ownership any private enterprise upon payment of just compensation. At the same time
, one has to bear in mind that no person can be deprived of his property except for
public use and upon payment of just compensation. There is an attempt to observe
this requirement in Republic Act No. 1383 when in providing for the transfer of appellee’s
waterworks system to a national agency it was directed that the transfer be made up
on payment of an equivalent value of the property.

- Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334

(1968)

FACTS: 

After the incorporation of the Municipality of Zamboanga as a chartered city, petitioner

province contends that facilities belonging to the latter and located within the City of Zam-
boanga will be acquired and paid for by the said city.
However, respondent city avers that pursuant to RA No. 3039 providing for the transfer
free of charge of all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of
Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga to the said City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not facilities which the province shall abandon will be acquired by the city
upon just compensation.

HELD:

Yes, If the property is owned by the municipality in its public and governmental capacity,
the property is public and can be transferred free of charge. But if the property is owned in
its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and can be expropriated upon pay-
ment of just compensation.

The court held that to resolve the issue it is important to identify the nature of the proper-
ties in dispute. The properties that are devoted for public purpose are owned by the prov-
ince in its governmental capacity. Those that are not devoted for public use remain as patri-
monial property of the Province. The RA 3039 is held valid in so far as the properties that
are devoted for public use or owned by the province in its governmental capacity and thus
must retain its public purpose. Hence these governmental properties need not be paid by
the City of Zamboanga. 

With respect to the patrimonial properties from the 50 lots in dispute, the RA 3039 cannot
be applied in order to deprive the province of its own patrimonial properties that are not
devoted for public use. Hence the City of Zamboanga shall pay just compensation to the
Province of Zamboanga for these patrimonial properties.