JUAN BENGZON, petitioner-appellant, vs.

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE

1936-01-18 | G.R. No. 42821

DECISION

MALCOLM, J:

This case was brought by a former justice of the peace to test the validity of the veto by the
Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051, the Retirement Gratuity Law. In the trial court the petition
for a writ of mandamus directed to the Secretary of Justice and the Insular Auditor was dismissed.
Thereupon the losing party appealed.

The facts, as stipulated disclose the following: Juan Bengzon, the petitioner was appointed justice of the
peace for the municipality of Lingayen, Pangasinan, on March 7, 1912. Having reached the age of
sixty-five, he ceased to hold this position on January 14, 1933, by reason of the provisions of Act No.
3899. On the date, acting pursuant to instructions received from the Judge of First Instance for the
district, he turned over the office of justice of the peace to the auxiliary justice of the peace of the
municipality. Subsequently the petitioner addressed communications to the Secretary of Justice, the
Governor-Genera, and the Insular Auditor applying for gratuity under Act No. 4051, but all of these
officials advised him that he was not entitled to the benefits of the Act. Accordingly, on March 7, 1934,
the instant complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Act No. 4051 is entitled, "An Act to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers and
employees of the Insular Government retired from the service as a result of the reorganization or
reduction of personnel thereof, including the justices of the peace who must relinquish office in
accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other
purposes." The body of the Act provides in several sections for the officers and employees who may be
granted gratuities thereunder, the rates of gratuities to be paid, and other matters. Among these sections,
as the bill passed the Philippine Legislature, was section 7, reading: "The justices of the peace who must
relinquish office during the year nineteen hundred and thirty-three in accordance with the provisions of
Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, shall also be entitled to the gratuities provided for in
this Act." Following this is section 10, reading: "The necessary sum to carry out the purposes of this Act
is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated," and section
12 reading: "If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is disapproved by the
Governor-General or is challenged in a competent court and is held to be unconstitutional or invalid,
none of the other sections or provisions hereof shall be affected thereby and such other sections and
provisions shall continue to govern as if the section or provision so disapproved or held invalid had never
been incorporated in this Act." The Act was "approved" by the Governor-General, "section 7 excepted,
February 21, 1933." The Philippine Legislature accepted the veto.

Section 19 of the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, established the practice
for the enactment of a law, including the sanctioning of the veto power by the Governor-General.
Specifically it provided: "The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items
of an appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object." The
Constitution of the Philippines, article VI, section 11 (2) contains an exactly similar provision, except that
the words "The President" are substituted for the words "The Governor-General," and except that
succeeding sentences in the Constitution prescribed the procedure for vetoing one or more items of an
appropriation bill in a more explicit manner.
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The first thought that occurs to one in resolving the appeal of the petitioner is that, within the meaning of
section 7 of Act No. 4051, on the assumption that it be restored to the law by the judiciary, he has not
shown himself to be a justice of the peace who was forced to relinquish office during the year 1933. At
least, he did not take steps to vindicate an alleged right as did the justices of the peace of the
municipality of Malinao, Albay, and the municipality of Alabat, Tayabas. (Regalado vs. Yulo [1935], 61
Phil., 173; Tañada vs. Yulo [1935], 61 Phil., 515.) However, this point has not been advanced by the
Government either in the lower court or on appeal, and so it would seem to be inappropriate to
manufacture a defense for the respondents.

Something might also be made of the proposition on which the trial judge relied for dismissal and which
is brought into view by the first assigned error. In other words, since the duty which the petitioner claims
is enjoined by law upon the respondents not only does not exist but would require the intervention of the
Governor-General, who is not a party, to exist, no cause of action is made out. This, however, merely
results in hiding behind a technicality to keep the parties from securing the opinion of the courts on the
main issue. We prefer to satisfy the petitioner by ruling on the question suggested by the first sentence
of this decision and which is raised squarely by the second assigned error.

The Governor-General purported to act pursuant to the portion of section 19 of the Organic Act which is
above quoted. The key words of that sentence are "appropriation bill" and "item or items." An
appropriation is the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a specified purpose.
An item is the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill.
No set form of words is needed to make out an appropriation or an item. (State vs. Moore [1896], 50
Neb., 88; Callaghan vs. Boyce [1915], 17 Ariz., 433.)

Within the meaning of these words, is Act No. 4051 an appropriation bill? Are there particular items in
that bill which the Governor-General could constitutionally veto? We are led to answer both questions in
the affirmative.

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an
integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially
a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as
those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in
this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power
to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may
defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the
Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or
hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of
the constitutionality of a veto the same as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally
passed by the Legislature. (Commonwealth vs. Barnett [1901], 199 Pa., 161; 55 L. R. A., 882; People vs.
Board of Councilmen [1892], 20 N. Y. S., 52; Fulmore vs. Lane [1911], 104 Tex., 499; Texas Co. vs.
State [1927], 53 A. L. R., 258.)

In determining whether or not the Governor-General stepped outside the boundaries of his legislative
functions, when he attempted to veto one section of Act No. 4051, while approving the rest of the bill, we
are not without the aid of the construction placed on his action by both legislative and executive
departments. That the Philippine Legislature intended Act No. 4051 to be an appropriation measure with
various items is apparent from a reading of section 12 thereof whereby the Legislature anticipated the
possibility of a partial veto of the bill by the Chief Executive. Not only this, but after the Chief Executive
took action, the Legislature made no attempt to override the veto or to amend the law to bring into being
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the section which the Governor-General had eliminated. Then the same question came again before the
executive department, and all of its officials united in sustaining the validity of the Governor-General's
veto.

While contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, yet where a construction of statutes
has been adopted by the legislative department and accepted by the various agencies of the executive
department, it is entitled to great respect. It is our understanding that it has been the practice of the Chief
Executive in the interpretation of his constitutional powers to veto separate items in bills analogous to
that before us, and that this practice has been acquiesced in previously without objection, so that it
would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality for the courts to declare against it. Since, therefore,
legislative intent and executive purpose is evident, it devolves upon the judiciary to give deferential
attention to the attitude assumed by the other two branches of the Government.

Viewed from another direction, there can be no doubt that Act No. 4051 is an appropriation bill. That is
manifest from its provisions, and particularly from section 10 by which the necessary sum to carry out the
purposes of the Act was "hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise
appropriated." It has, however, been faintly suggested that by an appropriation bill. We are shown
nothing substantial to support this allegation. Unlike in other constitutions, the word "general" was
omitted, and we presume intentionally, from the Organic Act and the Constitution. Under such conditions,
the courts would not be authorized to insert a word and by so doing amend the law.

The same considerations hold true with regard to the question of whether or not there was a particular
item which the governor-general could validly veto. No further action by the Legislature was
contemplated. The accounting officers would have experienced no difficulty in setting up the different
items provided for under Act No. 4051. It would have been a facile matter to eliminate the money needed
to make section 7 thereof effective. The Chief Executive had the right to object to the expenditure of
money for a specified purpose and amount without being under the necessity of at the same time
refusing to agree to other expenditures which met with his entire approval, and that intention was
unequivocably expressed.

We have gone to the trouble to examine all of the authorities cited by the parties and other authorities
not brought to our attention by them. It will be found that in practically all of these cases there was a
conflict between the legislative and executive departments, which the judiciary had to decide. Here there
is no such conflict, but unison between the two. Here on the contrary the judiciary is asked to take the
initiative and to restore a section to a law against the explicit confirmation of executive authority by the
Legislature and against explicit action taken by the Chief Executive. In our opinion, it was never intended
by a mere process of reasoning, however plausible, for the courts to breathe life into a portion of an Act
which has not been given life by the other departments of the government acting in conformity with the
Constitution.

Deciding, therefore, the main issue as requested by the petitioner and appellant, we are constrained to
rule against him and to hold that the veto by the Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in
conformity with the legislative purpose and the provisions of the Organic Act. For this reason, the
judgment brought on appeal will be affirmed, without special pronouncement as to the costs in either
instance.

Avanceña, C. J., Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial, Diaz and Recto, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:

Act No. 4051, as its title indicates, is "An Act to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers
and employees of the Insular Government retired from the service as a result of the reorganization or
reduction of personnel thereof, including the justices of the peace who must relinquish office in
accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other
purposes." In other words, said Act is a gratuity law, appropriating in its section 10 the necessary sum to
pay the gratuities therein granted.

Outside of section 10 there is no other provision or item appropriating any other sum of money which
may be considered an item of an appropriation.

Paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of section 1 classify the officers and employees who shall be entitled to
gratuity and establish the rate thereon according to salary and years of service.

Section 2 establishes the preference in the separation and retirement of employees.

Section 3 determines the salary on which the gratuity should be based.

Section 4 gives the separated or retired employee and officer the choice between the present gratuity
law and other gratuity laws under which they may be entitled to gratuity.

Section 5 designates the person to whom payment of gratuity shall be made in case of death.

Section 6 establishes the conditions under which a separated or retired officer or employee under the
law may be reappointed.

Section 7 extends the benefit of the law to justices of the peace under certain conditions.

Section 8 provides that the officers and positions created shall be considered abolished ipso facto, with
certain exceptions.

Section 9 excludes from the benefit of the law officers and employees who have voluntary retired.

Section 10 appropriates the necessary sum for the payment of the gratuities.

Section 11 fixes the date on which the law shall take effect.

Section 12 provides that the disapproval by the Governor-General of any section or provision of the Act,
or the declaration of unconstitutionality of the same shall not affect the other sections.

It will be seen that none of the sections above enumerated, except section 10, contains any
appropriation of money.

All the twelve sections of Act No. 4051, with the exception of section 10, contain only conditions under
which the money appropriated in said section 10 may be paid. If this is true, the vetoing by the
Governor-General of section 7 which extends the gratuity payment in said law to justices of the peace is
unauthorized by the Constitution because, as stated above, it contains no appropriation of money but a
mere designation of the officers to whom the money appropriated may be paid.
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In the case of State vs. Holder (76 Miss., 158; 23 So. Rep., 643), the question was whether the following
endorsement and qualified approval of "An act to appropriate money for the support and maintenance of
the Industrial Institute and College for the years 1898 and 1899," was constitutional or not:

"'I approve that part of this bill preceding the word "provided," in the first section; and approve the
suggestion in said section that by-laws provide for equal dormitory privileges to all pupils, whether taking
industrial or academic course, single or together; and I approve that part of said section providing for the
expenditures of said money under the direction or approval of the trustees, and for report thereof to the
legislature; and I approve section 2. The other parts, by authority of section 73 of the state constitution, I
disapprove. . . .'"

Section 73 of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi provides as follows:.

"SEC. 73. The governor may veto parts of any appropriation bill, and approve parts of the same and the
portions approved shall be law."

The law in question reads as follows:

"An act to appropriate money for the support and maintenance of the Industrial Institute and College for
the years 1898 and 1899.

"SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Mississippi, that the following sums of
money be and the same are hereby appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise
appropriated, for the support and maintenance of the Industrial Institute & College:

"For salaries of teachers and officers:

For the year 1898 $20,490.00

"All of said amounts to be drawn by draft of the president of the college, approved by the governor and
the auditor of public accounts, and the auditor shall issue his warrant on the state treasurer for the said
several sums: provided that no part of the money hereby appropriated for wages or salaries shall be
available unless the board of trustees shall first adopt and enact rules and by-laws to the following effect:
First. Conferring upon the president of the college the power to recommend to the board of trustees all
the teachers who may hereafter be employed, and to select and remove other employees who are not
teachers, and giving the president the authority for sufficient cause in his discretion to remove or
suspend any member of the faculty subject to the approval of the trustees. Second. Conferring upon the
president of the college subject to the approval of the trustees to arrange and specify the course of study
and to fix the schedules of studies and classes and to establish rules of discipline for the government of
the pupils. Third. By-laws providing for equal dormitory privileges to all pupils whether taking industrial or
academic courses, singly or together, and by-laws to enforce the faithful discharge of duties of all officers,
professors or employees, and before the auditor shall issue any warrant under this act, the board of
trustees shall file with the auditor a certified copy of their action complying with the above conditions. All
of said money to be expended under the direction or approval of the trustees of the college, and a report
of the expenditures made to the legislature."

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In deciding the case the Supreme Court of Mississippi said in part the following:

"Section 73 of the Constitution relates to general appropriation bills, or those containing several items of
distinct appropriations; that is to say, special appropriation bills, with distinct items of appropriations. It
applies to such as are made up of parts, and consist of portions separable from each other as
appropriations. It was not designed to enable the governor to veto objectionable legislation in
appropriation bills, for that is provided for in section 69. . . ."

The same court, in another portion of the decision, said the following:

". . . The signing of the bill by the governor was qualified in the act and one the enrolled bill, and did not
become law in part, because it was not an approval of parts and disapproval of parts of such a bill, as is
in view in section 73 of the constitution; the bill in this case, in the parts votoed, not being an
appropriation bill, within its meaning, and not being a veto of parts of distinct and separable
appropriations. To hold that the bill became law as a whole would be to make it so without the governor's
approval, and in the face of his disapproval, of the conditions. Both legislative declaration and executive
approval are essential prerequisites to the enactment of any law.

"The action of the governor having been unconstitutional, and therefore void, his action in dealing with
the bill was a nullity; but the legislature having adjourned within five days after the presentation of the bill
to the governor, the bill, in legal contemplation, must be held to be yet in the hands of the governor, and
may become law, unless sent back by him within three days after the beginning of the next session of
the legislature. . . ."

On the same principle and for the same reason the veto of the Governor-General of section 7 of Act No.
4051 which is not an item of appropriation is null and void as in excess of the power granted to him by
section 19 of the Jones Law.

The fact that section 12 of Act No. 4051 has provided that "If, for any reason, any section or provision of
this Act is disapproved by the Governor-General or is challenged in a competent court and is held to be
unconstitutional or invalid, none of the other sections or provisions hereof shall be affected thereby and
such other sections and provisions shall continue to govern as if the section or provision so shall
continue to govern as if the section or provision so disapproved or held invalid had never been
incorporated in this Act," could not have rendered valid and constitutional the disapproval by the
Governor-General of said section 7; for the only power which the legislature has in case a bill is vetoed
by the Governor-General is to override said veto by a two-third vote of its members and it cannot ratify or
validate an invalid veto because of its unconstitutionality.

It is suggested in the majority opinion that the Governor-General having vetoed section 7 of Act No. 4051
and the Legislature not having overriden said veto the presumption is that the act of the
Governor-General was constitutional and this court must respect said implied approval. If such doctrine
should prevail, then the executive may encroach upon the powers of the legislature, and if the latter
should acquiesce in said encroachment either by sanctioning it in the bill which is the subject of
encroachment or by failing to override said veto, and the courts must respect such encroachment when
the constitutionality of said bill is put in question, then the judicial branch of the government instead of
being the guardian of the Constitution will become an accomplice to its violation, and the rights of the
people will have no protection.

For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion: First, that while Act No. 4051 contains an appropriation to
give it effect, it is not an "appropriation bill" containing itemized appropriations and therefore is not one
which the Governor-General can veto under the last paragraph of section 19 of the Jones Law; second,
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that section 7 of Act No. 4051, which extends to justices of the peace the gratuity granted in said Act, is
a condition for the payment of the money appropriated in section 10 thereof and not an "item" of
appropriation, and, therefore, the disapproval of the same by the Governor-General is unconstitutional
and as such null and void; and third, that the proviso contained in section 12 of Act No. 4051 to the effect
that the disapproval of any of its sections by the Governor-General shall not affect the rest of the bill, did
not and could not validate an unconstitutional exercise of the veto power.

It is, therefore, the opinion of the undersigned that the decision of the lower court should be reversed and
the writ granted.

VICKERS, BUTTE, and GODDARD, JJ.:

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