The Yogacara Idealism

Review by: Alex Wayman

P hilosophy East and W est, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Jan., 1965), pp. 65-73
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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Review Article
THE YOGACARA IDEALISM1

ALEX WAYMAN
A g e n e r a l s u r v e y of idealism in India has already been made
by Raju,2 but some other authors do not concede the validity of his inclusion
of so many schools of Indian philosophy as well as leading philosophers of
India in this philosophical category. Thus, Chatterjee, in the book under con­
sideration, admits as an idealistic school in Hinduism only the special inter­
pretation of the Advaita Vedanta known as drsti-srsti-vada (the school of
those holding that perception is creation).3 On the other hand, Padmarajiah
understands the latter interpretation (by Prakasananda) as a reasonable one
for the Advaita, which thus holds to an Absolute Idealism rather than to the
“so-called Objective Idealism” (which “attributes ‘objectivism’ to a philosophy
of objectless reality”).4 Certain mystic or occult doctrines of the Upanisads
seem to favor the growth of idealistic philosophy, and thus to provide a ratio­
nale for the generality of Raju’s coverage. It may be valuable to expand upon
this idea by relevant considerations which Chatterjee does not touch upon or
deal with as the present writer would.
The almost universal acceptance in India of the doctrine of rebirth, along
with the consequences of karma, could easily have swung all Indian philo­
sophical systems to idealism. This doctrine holds that the multitudinous personal
experiences of the present, as well as the characteristics of the body holding
the experiencing self, are the expression of past acts carried in some residual
and seminal form by a transmigrating principle. When such a doctrine comes
to be implemented by theories of being and knowledge, philosophy enters the
discussion. And then it turns out that this doctrine could, but need not, give
rise to an idealistic philosophy. While Max Muller thought the Samkhya was
idealistic—after all, it teaches that the sense organs evolve from ahamkara
1Ashok Kumar Chatterjee, The Yogdcara Idealism, Banaras Hindu University
Darsana Series, No. 3 (Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1962). Pp. xii -f- 309.
2 P. T. Raju, Idealistic Thought of India (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1953).
3 The Yogdcara Idealism, p. 244.
4Y. J. Padmarajiah, A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and
Knowledge (Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1963), pp. 291 ff. (Published post­
humously.)
65

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 66 ALEX WAYMAN
(egotism)—his was an unaccepted conclusion. The Samkhya teaches a
material evolution from prakrti (primordial substance), each successively
coarser grade of substance being invested with, and variously exemplifying, the
passive consciousness of purusa (person). The first evolute is buddhi (intel­
lect) ; the second, ahamkdra, which is the grade of substance through which
identifying and “belonging” consciousness first manifests, to become the source
of all attachment. In this system, a subtle body is the transmigrating principle.
Early Buddhism emphasized karma (“action”) as what transmigrates—and
this is as surprising to a first reading as is the Samkhya theory of evolutes. If
one goes further into the Buddhist texts he finds out that the karma that
determines destination (gati) after death is explained as an important meaning
of manas-karma (“acts of mind”) and finds out that this particular manas-
karma is cetana (“volition”). This word “cetand” has the root cit~ (“to
think”), which is the root of the word citta, often translated “mind,” as in the
expression “Mind Only” (cittamdtra), a frequent title for doctrines of the
Yogacara school. Later Buddhism used the egression “citta-samtana" or
“citta-samtati” (both: “stream of thoughts”) for the transmigrating entity.
Thus, the words “karma” and “citta” are doctrinally equivalent to indicate
the transmigrating entity. If a “stream of thoughts” can bring about a set of
external circumstances compensatory and retributive of past acts, we have at
once the idealistic picture of a subjective element of a conscious or subconscious
nature projecting the “world.” If this is true for early Buddhism, it cannot be
the whole truth, because early Buddhism was certainly realistic and pluralistic
also.
The Buddhist Yogacara text called Madhydnta-vibhanga sets up a rival
theory to that of the Samkhya for showing the evolution and resolution of the
worlds, but in common with other Indian schools has the influential Samkhya
system before it as a guide. Thus, the Buddhist text replaces the Samkhya
purusa with the “imagination of unreality” (abhiitaparikalpa) and replaces
prakrti with “voidness” (sunyatd). In this Buddhist system, both the
“imagination of unreality” and “voidness” are real, co-exist, and are yet
distinct5 Apparently, these identifications have not been recognized by modern
writers on Indian philosophy, although some have come close. “Voidness” is
the Absolute in this system, and agrees for the most part with what is said by
Raju:8 “One significant point is that this Absolute is conceived to be the
material cause of the world. This conception belongs not only to the Vedantic
but also to Buddhistic idealism. Ultimate reality, paramdrthasatya, even as
5 C£ Alex Wayman, “The Buddhist ‘Not This, Not This/” Philosophy East and
West, XI, No. 3 (Oct, 1961), 102.
6 Idealistic Thought of India, p. 417.

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 THE YOGÂCÀRA IDEALISM 67
sünya, is said to be the tathâgata-garbha or the womb of the tathâgata, which
is the source of everything.” Where Raju goes astray is in including the
tathâgata-garbha—often equated with the Yogâcâra alayavijnâna (ideation
store)—which should be translated by Buddhist usage as “embryo of tathâ­
gata” (one who has come the same way, i.e., a buddha) and which pertains to
the “imagination of unreality,” rather than to the “voidness” principle. Das-
gupta comes close when he says, “I am led to think that Sankara’s philosophy
is largely a compound of Vijnânavâda and éünyavâda Buddhism with the
Upanisad notion of the permanence of self superadded.”7 Here the word
“Vijnànavâda” refers to the Yogâcâra kind of idealism. In short, Voidness,
or the pure dharmadhâtu (realm of natures), is the material cause of the world,
while the “imagination of unreality” is the formal cause. In respect to content,
this system is realistic; in respect to form, it is idealistic. For example, the
shape of a pot stems from the mind of the potter, but not the clay. The latter
comes from nature (dharma) and abides whether a potter arises or not.
That is certainly not understood by Chatterjee, as he often and variously
says, e.g., “The Yogâcâra holds that consciousness is the sole reality.”8 This
half-truth does not originate with Chatterjee; indeed, he simply inherits an
evaluation of the Yogâcâra almost omnipresent in surveys of Indian philos­
ophy. European writers who deal with Buddhism in the English language also
take for granted the basic idea of the Yogâcâra and develop the theme accord­
ingly. At the outset, Chatterjee is given the supposed “sole” reality of Yogâ­
câra philosophy ; and, as a philosophical dissertation, exerts a kind of tempo­
rary philosophical empathy with this “sole” reality, expanding upon it with
fine philosophical sentences to the point where he can compare it with other
systems of thought, such as realism and the Advaita as well as with other
forms of idealism (in which he does not include the Advaita). For this
purpose, it is not a serious drawback that he does not employ Tibetan or
Chinese texts, or their French translations, of the Yogâcâra school.9 Such
works would have enriched his source material. But, as long as he holds to his
presupposition of the fundamental Yogâcâra position, and has control over one
language of the relevant texts—it was Sanskrit—to write a philosophical
dissertation on the subject required his obvious training in philosophical ways
of thinking rather than more philological background.
7 Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I (Cambridge: At
the University Press, 1932), p. 494.
8 The Yogâcâra Idealism, p. 59.
9 One work can be mentioned that might have been helpful : Étienne Lamotte, La
somme du grand véhicule dfAsanga (Mahâyânasamgraha), Tome II, Traduction et com­
mentaire, Fascicule 2 (Chapitres III a X) (Louvain: Bureaux du Muséon, 1939). The
very first pages deal with the problem of the relation between the bodhisattva and the
dharmadhâtu.

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 68 ALEX WAYMAN
Of course, there is a good reason for thinking, “The Yogacara holds that
consciousness is the sole reality.,, This is an interpretation of Vasubandhu’s
intent in his two little treatises—Twenty Stanzas [on Ideation Only] and
Thirty Stanzas [on Ideation Only].10 In the former work, Vasubandhu stresses
ideation-only (vijnaptimdtra) because he is setting forth the process of world
illusion created by the Madhyanta-vibhanga's “imagination of unreality.”
However, in verse 10 (numbering of the Sanskrit text) he sets forth the neces­
sity to enter first the “selflessness of personality” (pudgalanairdtmya) and
then the “selflessness of dharmas” (dharmanairatmya), thereby indicating the
two aspects of reality and inferring as well the two truths—conventional truth
(samvrtisatya) and absolute truth (paramdrthasatya). In the latter work,
Vasubandhu again stresses ideation-only because he is setting forth the re­
moval of the world illusion. However, throughout this second work he speaks
of two elements, beginning the first verse with the expression atmadharmopa-
cdro (“attachment to self and dharmd'). Sthiramati's commentary explains
these two as the corruption-covering (klesdvarana) and the knowable-covering
(jneydvarana), which are, respectively, removed by the two kinds of selfless­
ness mentioned in the former work. Again, Vasubandhu alludes to the voidness
reality in verse 25 of the second work with the words dharmdndm paramdrthas
ca (“the supreme state of dharmas”). In early Buddhism, it was said that
whether tathdgatas do or do not arise, the true nature (dharmatd) of dharmas
abides, meaning the moral law, impermanence of natures.11 In Mahayana
Buddhism, it is again said that whether tathdgatas do or do not arise, the
dharmadhatu remains, and this is the voidness of all the dharmas. The adepts
of the Hinayana and of the Mahayana attain this “non-discerning true nature”
(avikalpadharmata), but the adept of the Mahayana, i.e., the tathdgata, has in
addition the knowledge and glory of a buddha.12 The Mahayana text teaching
that, namely, the Dasabhumika-sutra, is the one with the celebrated doctrine
that the three worlds are “Mind Only” (cittamdtra) ,13
10 The original Sanskrit for the two treatises, each with Sanskrit commentary, was
published by Sylvain Levi, Vijnaptim&trat&siddhi (Paris: Librairie ancienne honore
champion, 1925), as No. 245 in the series Bibliotheque de Tficole des hautes etudes,
Sciences historiques et philologiques. The two works as translated from Chinese into
English are in S. Radhakrishnan and C. A. Moore, eds., A Source Book in Indian
Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 328-337. The commentarial
tradition as translated from Sanskrit into Chinese is rendered and annotated in French
by Louis de La Vallee-Poussin, Vijnaptimdtrat&siddhi, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang (Paris:
Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928, 1929), Tomes I and II; Index (Paris: same
publisher, 1948).
11 Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (London: George Allen and Unwin
Ltd., 1962), p. 93, remarks based on the Pali Anguttara-nik&ya, L285.
12 J. Rahder, DasabhUmikasutra et Bodhisattvabhumi (Chapitres Vihara et Bhumx)
(Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1926), p. 65.
is Ibid., p. 49.

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THE YOGÀCÀRA IDEALISM 69
Vasubandhu's stress on Ideation Only is consistent with the standard doc­
trine of Buddhism through all its periods that the person whose mind is
stabilized or concentrated sees things as they really are. From the beginning,
the theory was that an entity can be somehow visualized mentally in better,
more real or truer form than in ordinary sense perception. To remove error
and illusion, one has to do something about the foundations of mind, rehabili­
tate or transform it. In an ethical sense, the acts of speech and body are
dependent upon the acts of mind; the latter are the real villain or saint. In
yoga training, one should transfer the object to the mind, then eliminate all
mental straying from the meditative object and avoid any alteration of the
meditative object itself. In the final stage of such meditation, the object ceases
to be the object, since the subject-object relation has been transcended. With
the “eye of prajñd”—which is no “eye”—the mediator sees the entity in the
form of the void: he has carried it back to the realm where it abides in itself,
devoid of all adventitious relations, and so it is not the “object” of a “subject.”
The Madhyánta-vibhañga teaches that the “imagination of unreality” creates
dependent origination (pratltya-samutpdda) and the unreal subject-object
relation, and that liberation is achieved by elimination of the subject-object
duality. It is no wonder, then, that Vasubandhu should write his two classic
treatises about Ideation Only. But he does not forget the viewpoint of the
Madhyánta-vibhañga, on which he wrote the basic commentary. The Buddhist
path is principally in terms of mental training and reorienting, but the goal of
the Yogacara school was the condition of the dharmadhatu or voidness free
from subject-object duality—the condition called parinispanna (perfect). Then
the “imagination of unreality” is in voidness, and voidness in it. So, the two
inseparable reals.
The distinctness of the two reals is shown by such statements as whether or
not a tathdgata arises, the void dharmadhatu abides—comparable to saying,
whether or not a potter arises, the void clay abides. Immediately it follows that
a tathdgata, foremost of all, and all other beings, selves, persons, pertain to
the category called “imagination of unreality.” And all grades of matter, subtle
or coarse, pertain to the void dharmadhatu. The inseparability of the two
reals derives from the fact that man has devised this system of thought; and
man cannot conceive of an act of thinking apart from a substantial vehicle for
thought, cannot conceive of a form without a content. It is significant that the
theory of three buddha bodies arose in the Yogácára school. The one called
dharmakdya (body of natures) is on the side of the Void Absolute, the self-
abiding Dharmadhatu (realm of natures). The two other realms, sambhoga-
kdya (body of bliss) and nirmdnakdya (body of transformation), are on the
side of the “imagination of unreality” in the sense, respectively, of the purusa

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70 ALEX WAYMAN
(person) and mdya (illusion-creating power). Hence, Mahayana Buddhism
teaches that the sambhogakdya has the thirty-two characteristics of the Great
Person (mahdpurusa), and teaches that the nirmdnakdya has the power of
magical creation of different bodies, comparable to the illusory power that is
tndyd (and the two expressions are based on the same Sanskrit root, md-). So,
the Yogacara school does have a subjective kind of idealistic philosophy limited
to formal cause. The myriad forms of things are no more real than the forms
seen in dream: they are all projections of mind—foundation mind or evolving
mind (alayavijndna or pravrttivijndna; citta or caitta)—on the blank screen
(voidness) that is the Absolute in this system, pure substance of unlimited
impressionability, capability, efficiency. The reality of voidness is paramdrtha-
satya, literally: the actual fact of the supreme thing (artha). The reality of the
“imagination of unreality” is samvrtisatya, literally: the actual fact of the
covering process. Thus, the “imagination of unreality” covers the pure dhar-
madhatu with transient dharmas (samskrta-dharmas), which arise and pass
away with “dependency characteristic” (paratantra-laksana), while it covers
itself with corruptions (klesa) having the “imaginary characteristic” (parikal-
pita-laksana). And when the pure dharmadhatu is free from those transient
dharmas evoked by the subject-object covering, it has the “perfect character­
istic” (parispanna-laksana). But, before the dharmadhatu can become free of
the “dependency characteristic,” the “imagination of unreality” must become
free of the “imaginary characteristic.” Therefore the prescription: first, selfless­
ness of personality, and, next, selflessness of dharmas. That is the Yogacara in
brief.
While the Madhyanta-vibhanga does not discuss how the system takes
account of the multiplicity of beings, one can infer this topic in Samkhya-like
fashion, according to the explanations of Dasgupta. He explains that the first
evolute of prakrti, called buddhi, has a preponderance of intelligence-stuff
(sattva) ; “it thus holds within it the minds (buddhi) of all purusas which were
lost in prakrti during the pralaya [the quiescent period].” At the beginning of
the new evolution, there is a separating out of the old buddhis, or minds,
belonging to the purusas from beginningless time, and each of these buddhis
holds the old specific ignorance (avidya). This stage is called mahat (the great
one) because it is the synthetic unity of all the minds of the purusas.1* There
is as yet no individual evolution, as this will begin with the next evolute, that
called ahamkdra. The equivalent statement in Yogacara terminology is that the
“imagination of unreality” is the synthetic unity of individual citta-samtdnas
(“streams of thoughts”), each with its specific dharma. Individual evolution
14 A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 248-249.

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 THE YOGÀCÀRA IDEALISM 71
begins at the next stage with dependent origination. Elsewhere I have equated
its first three members with the three kinds of Samkhya ahamkara, as follows :
(1) unwisdom (avidya) — tamasika ahamkara
(2) motivation (samskdra) = rdjasika ahamkara
(3) perception (vijnana) =; sdttvika ahamkara.15
The prt-ahamkara stages of the “imagination of unreality” are difficult to
describe. Before the equilibrium is upset it seems to be what some Mahayana
scriptures call the tathdgata-garbha (embryo of the tathdgata). At this point,
since there is as yet no subject-object duality, this element is not “aimed” at
the pure dharmadhatu. The first change that occurs is a kind of “turning
around” which causes the tathdgata-garbha to be reversed into the dlayavijndna
(the basic perception), which, the Madhydnta-vibhanga explains, has as object
the mere object (artha). As such, the dlayavijndna corresponds to the Samk­
hya buddhi, which, as Dasgupta explains, has a mere understanding as “this-
ness.”16 The first of the evolving perceptions is called the klistamanas, and, ac­
cording to the same text, its object is the qualities of the thing (arthavisesa).
This klistamanas must then correspond to ahamkara and inaugurate dependent
origination.
Chatterjee writes, “For the Vedantin the function of Avidya consists in
covering up the real, which is the unrelated object, the rope, and showing in
its place, the snake; the snake is false because it is subjective which has being
only as it is related with consciousness (Pratibhasika). The Yogacara holds
that the function of Avidya is just the reverse; the snake is perfectly real as
the form of the subjective; its illusoriness consists in its objectification; the
snake is false because it is objective ”17 The foregoing discussion leads to the
comment that the person Chatterjee here calls the “Vedantin” could just as
well have been called the “Yogacara” person, with one qualification. That is,
when one goes into the foundations of the Yogacara school to expound the
Yogacara in ways Chatterjee does not—one finds that at the stage of dlayavi­
jndna there is still no positive falsification because there is mere object and
nothing else, and so the initial subjectivity does not alter the rope into the
snake: this is the one qualification. But this initial subjectivity has “set the ball
rolling” : it is a privation of snake, a forecast of snake. Once the subject-object
duality has been posited, the next stage of “evolving perception” (klistamanas)
is inevitable and necessarily introduces the positive falsification, because the
re-emerging ignorance (avidya) causes the subject to project various transient
15 Alex Wayman, “Buddhist Dependent Origination and the Samkhya Gunas,” Ethnos,
1962 (The Ethnographical Museum of Sweden, Stockholm), pp. 14-22.
16 A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 250.
17 The Yogacara Idealism, p. 183.

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72 ALEX WAYMAN
dharmas onto the object in the dharmadhdtu. From that time on, the rope is al­
ways falsified into the snake; that is, unless one reverses the process by yoga
meditation or other means to the point where he re-attains the stage of
dlayavijndna and then introduces a transmutation (pardvrtti) or “turning
around” of this element so that it re-becomes the tathdgata-garbha. Then what
shall we say of the person Chatterjee calls the “Yogacara” ? The latter is the
one who “holds that consciousness is the sole reality.” Chatterjee very well
states how this so-called “Yogacara” individual regards the function of avidyd.
In Chatterjee’s excellent chapter entitled “Dharma Theory in the Yogacara,”
he brings forth some facts that might have been, or at least ought to have been,
disquieting to him regarding the thesis of consciousness-only as the sole reality.
Besides the caitasika-dharmas (the dharmas related to thought), there are the
dharmas called rupasy “out of which the objective world is made.” Since
Chatterjee is consistent to the last with this imputation to the Yogacara that
for it subjectivity is the only reality, the objective world false by virtue of
objectivity, he is now forced to say, “It is consciousness itself which creates
and projects these rupas, making them seem as though external and inde­
pendent.” This amounts to saying that the rupas, which include such things
as the four elements (fire, wind, etc.) and their derivatives, are projections
of thought, but unaccountably the Yogacara school believes in these rupas
and still does not classify them as caitasika-dharmas, which would have proved
Chatterjee’s point. The next group of dharmas, called citta-viprayukta-
samskara-dharmas, are even harder to fit into the usual theory—the expression
means “the dharmas or samskdras that are independent of mind (citta).”
Chatterjee now writes, “Though they must ultimately pertain to consciousness
in order to attain reality, their relation to consciousness is not very apparent.
They are really ‘forces' or functions which are neither specifically material nor
mental; they can belong to either indifferently.” However, one need not be
forced into this logical corner if one admits at the beginning of the discussion
the two realities which the Madhydnta-vibhanga set forth in its first verse.18
These considerations could be continued in extenso, but the conclusion
would be the same. If Chatterjee’s “Yogacara” is indeed the Yogacara person
that Vasubandhu was, then Chatterjee’s book is certainly a wonderful exposi­
tion of the Yogacara philosophy. But, if the Yogacara fundamentals are what
I have indicated above, happening to be in rough agreement with Raju and
with Dasgupta, the Chatterjee book is still worth reading as a philosophical
exegesis of what was traditionally held, principally by non-Yogacarins, to be
the Yogacara position. And I cannot help admiring the sinewy thread of
philosophical discourse by which he expands his presupposition.
18 Ibid., pp. 143-166, especially pp. 163-165.

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THE YOGÂCÀRA IDEALISM 73
The “dharmas that are independent of mind” deserve some further con­
sideration. These dharmas are included in the Abhidharma-samuccaya of
Asanga, the elder brother of Vasubandhu and founder of the Yogacara school.
Among this class of dharmas, nine seem to correspond to Vaisesika reals, and
eight of these are designations (prajnapti) for some feature of the cause-and-
effect continuum. For example, “time” (kala) is among these and is defined by
Asanga as a designation for the evolution of the cause-and-effect continuum.19
In Yogacara philosophy, the cause-and-effect continuum is what is meant by
the “dependency characteristic” (paratantra-laksana), which covers the dhar-
madhdtu.20 The dharmadhatu as voidness is the foundation for objectivity as
impressed upon the dharmadhatu by the “imagination of unreality.” While
the various forms conjured up by that imagination are unreal, the underlying
substance, the content of those forms, is real. So, the cause-and-effect con­
tinuum is not quite real, not quite unreal. However, Asanga has no qualms
about including dharmas equivalent to Vaisesika reals. One interpretation is
that Asanga intends these particular dharmas to mean something quite dif­
ferent from what they mean in the Vaisesika system. Asanga employs them
in roughly the same way as does the Vaisesika, for Asanga in adhering to an
idealistic viewpoint of the Mahayana did not thereby reject or forget the
realistic viewpoint of the Hlnayana.21
19 Pralhad Pradhan, ecL, Abhidharma-samuccaya (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1950),
text, p. 11.
20 Cf. Vijnaptim&trat&siddhi, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang, II, p. 526.
21 C l Alex Wayman, Analysis of the SrGrvakabhumi Manuscript, University of Cali­
fornia Publications in Classical Philology, Vol. 17 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1961), p. 29.

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