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02
NO.

2022

Basic Papers
Growth, Degrowth or Post-growth? Towards a
synthetic understanding of the growth debate
Xhulia Likaj, Michael Jacobs & Thomas Fricke
Impressum:
Forum New Economy Basic Papers
ISSN 2702-3222 (electronic version)
Publisher and distributor: Forum for a New Economy
Neue Promenade 6, 10178 Berlin, Germany
Telephone +49 (0) 30 767596913, email press@newforum.org
Lead Editor: Thomas Fricke

An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded

· from the RePEc website: www.RePEc.org
· from the Forum New Economy website: https://www.newforum.org
 GROWTH, DEGROWTH OR POST-GROWTH?

TOWARDS A SYNTHETIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE GROWTH DEBATE

Xhulia Likaj*, Forum New Economy

Michael Jacobs*, University of Sheffield (SPERI)
Thomas Fricke*, Forum New Economy

Abstract
Arguments about the possibility and desirability of exponential economic growth have animated the
environmental movement for half a century, since the publication of the Club of Rome report The
Limits to Growth in 1972. The debate has been revived in recent years as the climate crisis has reached
centre-stage. This paper seeks to unpick the different strands in the debate and the different kinds of
arguments - philosophical, empirical, and policy-prescriptive - used by different writers and
institutions. It suggests that the contemporary debate is best understood as a disagreement between
political strategies, in which the character of public and academic discourse plays a key role.

JEL codes: O4, O44, Q45, Q56

Keywords: economic growth, green growth, degrowth, post-growth, wellbeing, GDP

The authors would like to thank Jonathan Aldred, Jonathan Barth, Brian Czech, Paul Ekins, Tim Jackson, Giorgios
Kallis, Till Kellerhof and Katherine Trebeck for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, along with the
discussants and participants in a Forum for a New Economy symposium in August 2021.

*Corresponding authors: xhulia.likaj@newforum.org, m.jacobs@sheffield.ac.uk, thomas.fricke@newforum.org.

 1. INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to unravel and explain the different arguments which have been made, and
the different conclusions reached, in the debate about the possibility and desirability of economic
growth, a debate which is soon to reach its 50th birthday. These arguments have raged within the
environmental movement throughout that period (and to a lesser extent among feminist scholars, and
more recently social justice advocates) but have only ever been on the fringes of academic economics
or mainstream politics. Today, however, as the urgency of the climate and environmental crisis has
become more widely evident, and the growth of inequality in multiple forms has led to searching
questions about modern capitalism, they are beginning to move closer to centre stage. It remains
unfortunately the case, however, that the debate about growth tends to generate more heat than light.
Riven with ideology and selective use of empirical data, different arguments become fused and
confused, and different conclusions elided. We hope this paper can offer some clarity, and in doing
so move the debate on to more useful ground. For all its faults, the issues it seeks to address are the
most urgent the world now faces.1

The paper is structured as follows. The first section embeds the growth debate in a historical
perspective by outlining briefly the origins of economic growth as a material phenomenon during the
industrial revolution, and how it radically changed many aspects of human life. It then turns to the
concept of economic growth, describing how growth emerged and established itself after the Second
World War, initially as a statistical idea and then as a principal policy goal.

The second section focuses on the critiques of economic growth as a policy goal.
Distinguishing between the environmental and social costs of growth, it seeks to disentangle the dif-
ferent types of argument – logical, ideological and empirical – that have been made about these, and
whether such costs are inevitable or contingent on the particular form which growth has taken.We
have attempted a diagrammatic representation of these in the Annex.

Finally, the third section describes the three overall positions generally taken in the debate
today: green and inclusive growth, degrowth and post-growth. It notes how these are adopted by
different protagonists as much for political strategic reasons (which term and kind of argument is

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The paper is concerned almost entirely with issues of political economy in high-income countries. Even advocates of
degrowth acknowledge that low and middle income countries still need to experience economic (income) growth in order
to take large numbers of their citizens out of poverty. Although the environmental impacts with which the growth debate
is concerned are global, the focus on growth is almost exclusively about countries which have already achieved high
levels of per capita GDP.
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likely to be most effective?) as for logical, ideological or empirical ones. It concludes with some
remarks on whether a coalition of forces straddling these current groups might be achievable.

1. THE ORIGINS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

1.1. Growth as a material phenomenon

In the pre-capitalist era, there was little economic growth and the term was not used. Before the
19thcentury economic activity had only experienced meagre expansions in line with population
increases, and mostly as cyclical fluctuations (Morady et al. 2017). Indeed, in the period around the
start of the industrial revolution, attempts to explain economic growth or development were still
largely dominated by the Malthusian view that population growth would inevitably come into conflict
with constrained economic output. While capturing developments in economic activity during the
preceding epochs, this view rapidly became obsolete as the industrial revolution took off (Diebolt
and Perrin 2016).

From the early 19th century European countries experienced an unprecedented growth in both
economic activity and population. This led to huge changes in living standards and
prosperity. Industrial technologies enabled rapid increases in labour productivity, with the result that
economic growth outpaced population growth (Crafts 2004). Coupled with the benefits of colonial
resource extraction, this allowed European and New World countries to break through the so-called
‘Malthusian trap’ and for incomes to decouple from the rate of population change. As more countries
industrialised in the 20th century, their economies started to grow too, and poverty rates to decline.
The share of the world population living in extreme poverty has fallen continuously during the last
200 years, a result made possible because economic growth has outpaced population growth.

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Figure 1. GDP per capita, 1800 to 2016 (adjusted for inflation and PPP and measured in international
-$ in 2011 prices).

Source: Maddison Project Database, 2018.

Note: These series are adjusted for price differences between countries based on only a single benchmark year, in 2011.
This makes them suitable for studying the growth of incomes over time but not for comparing income levels between
countries.

Figure 2. Share of the world population living in absolute poverty, 1820-2015 (adjusted for
inflation and PPP).

Source: Ortiz-Ospina and Roser, 2017.

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1.2. Growth as a statistical concept

For most economists before the 20th century, the expansion of economic output was seen as the natural
result, and key characteristic, of capitalist production and commerce (Maddison 1977, Arndt 1989,
Brewer 2010, Dörre et al. 2015). It was generally referred to, not as ‘growth’ but as ‘progress’,
‘development’ or ‘increase in national wealth’. In seeking to understand how the institutions and
relations of capitalism generated it, 18th and 19th century economists laid the foundations for later
growth theories (Brewer 2010). But it was not until the early 20th century that the term ‘economic
growth’ began to be used; and not until the 1950s that it became dominant within economic
disciplines and other social sciences.

In the 1920s and 1930s economics began to turn back from the microeconomic theories of
Walras, Marshall and others to the macroeconomic analysis of output growth, and in particular how
to measure it. The theoretical revolution instituted by John Maynard Keynes, coupled with Leontiev’s
input-output analysis and the development of econometric modelling of national economies,
contributed to the birth of the first national accounting systems. In a report in 1932 to the US
Congress, Simon Kuznets first presented ‘Gross Domestic Product’ as the way to measure a country´s
national output within a period of time.

Kuznets was well aware of the limitations of GDP, both in the methodologies of its
calculation, and its use. He warned that ‘[d]istinctions must be kept in mind between quantity and
quality of growth, between costs and returns, and between the short and long run’, and that ‘(t)he
welfare of a nation can scarcely be inferred from a measurement of national income’ (Kuznets 1962,
1934). Nevertheless, GDP quickly became the widely recognized tool for measuring output, and
therefore economic growth. It proved a valuable comparative indicator for national statisticians, a
benchmark for policy makers, and an apparently comprehensible measure for use in public debate
(OECD 2013).

The universalization of this indicator of national economic activity was however a rather
complex historical process. As Schmelzer (2015, 2016) points out, GDP accounting was originally
tailored for the specific purposes of mid-century Western capitalist economies. Used as a tool for
estimating militarization costs and organizing the economy by the Allies in the fight against fascism,
it subsequently became an instrument for planning the post-war reconstruction of Western European
countries. To understand how this contributed to the idea of growth as an economic strategy –one that
subsequently established itself as a long-lasting and global paradigm – one would need to include in
the frame the implementation of the Marshall Plan (1948-1951), the establishment of the Bretton
Woods institutions (1944), and the widespread adoption of Keynesian interventions to achieve full
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employment. The Organisation of European Economic Cooperation, which became the OECD in
1961, the UN and the new institutions of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, all played
a role in the international standardization and global diffusion of GDP as a measuring method
(Morady et al. 2017). By the 1950s this new economic measure of output had quickly become the
foundation of standardized national income accounting, in turn establishing the main empirical
framework for macroeconomic analysis and policy at the national and international level (Bos 1992,
Maddison 2003). GDP and its growth thus came to shape the dominant idea of what indeed constituted
an ‘economy’, a statistical definition still used today (Tooze 1998, Schmelzer 2016). Economic
growth is defined as an increase in GDP, that is, an increase in the monetary value of all the goods
and services produced within a country in a given time period.

1.3. Growth as the overriding economic policy goal

The use of economic growth as a primary policy goal for national governments derived not just from
the development of national accounting, but from the emergence of the first modern growth theories
in the early 1950s. In the exogenous growth models proposed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956),
growth occurred primarily as a result of productivity increases achieved through technological pro-
gress, which were not constrained by the law of diminishing returns. These models led rapidly to an
understanding that, while an economy may have limited resources in terms of capital and labour,
technological innovation can contribute to apparently unlimited growth. Sustained economic growth
therefore became not just desirable but achievable. It is at this point therefore that the modern ‘growth
paradigm’ can be said to take off (Arndt 1978, Schmelzer 2015, 2016).

The combination of internationally standardized national accounting techniques, new growth

theories and Keynesian policy tools turned economic growth in the 1960s into the primary economic
responsibility of national governments. By sustaining aggregate demand, investing in universal
education, funding industrial research and development and controlling the exchange rate and
financial flows, national governments could set and achieve annual growth targets. As this was
accepted, economic growth became, not just a technocratic economic objective, but the centerpiece
of a new narrative of national social and economic development, which effectively equated progress
with sustained increases in economic output as measured by GDP, that is, to growth (Maddison 1977,
Arndt 1978, 1989).

In the era of the Cold War, when western governments worried about the attractiveness of
communism as an alternative political system, it became commonplace to believe that capitalism and
liberal democracy would only survive if they delivered on the promise of a better life for everyone.
The Great Depression had challenged this claim; the Marshall Plan and the welfare state had to re-
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establish it. In the immediate post-war years policy-makers´ main objective was still that of stabilizing
the economy and achieving high employment levels, rather than seeking long-term growth (Arndt
1978). But by the mid-1950s the pursuit of economic growth had become the main policy goal of
Western governments and by the end of the decade the goal had spread throughout the world.

Growth had the power to create a political consensus in favour of capitalism, for it promised
to address the social problems of post-war reconstruction in a pragmatic, non-ideological manner. It
integrated military expenditures into a wider economic plan without hindering living standards; it
stabilized the institutions of the Bretton Woods system and reinforced international cooperation (and
its associated international organizations); and at least temporarily shifted the focus away from
distributional conflicts while presenting the idea that the total economic pie was increasing
(Schmelzer 2015, 2016).

In this climate, policymakers started setting growth targets. In 1951 the OEEC announced a
goal of achieving a 25% increase in the combined GNP of its member states within five years. A
decade later, shortly after declaring growth its main policy objective, the Soviet Union committed to
raising national output by 500% within twenty years (Allen 2001). In the same year the OECD (now
including non-European members, including the US and Canada) declared its plan to increase the
combined GNP of its member states by 50% by the end of the decade (Schmelzer 2012). Over the
next two decades countries all over the world, whatever their political stripe, set similar growth targets
(Schwarzer 2014).

1.4. The idea of a ‘growth paradigm’

When they emerged in the 1950s and 60s, specifically growth-oriented policies were initially attempts
by governments to achieve full employment and stabilize the economy. But as the technologies of
mass production developed, such policies rapidly became associated with raising living standards,
particularly in the form of household consumption. At the same time, they generated the tax revenues
which allowed the new welfare states to improve and expand public services, notably universal health
and education, social housing and public transport. For the first time, the state had fully taken on the
task of improving the welfare of the population as a whole (Wilensky 1975). It was thus in these two
decades – the so-called ‘golden age’– that the ‘growth paradigm’ (first described as such by Herman
Daly (1972)) achieved its complete form. National states would judge their success by how far they
could provide their populations with both an ever-growing supply of consumer goods and ever-im-
proving public services; families measured their welfare in terms of rising household consumption;
private sector industries expanded their output and developed new products for ever-growing mar-
kets, supported by state-funded infrastructure, education and welfare services. All three sectors –
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state, households, and businesses – were legitimized by economic growth; an entire society directed
towards its realization.

When western capitalism began to experience a succession of crises in the 1970s, with
declining profit rates, rising unemployment, accelerating inflation and industrial and social unrest,
the growth paradigm might have been challenged. In popular culture it was; but in mainstream
political economy it simply took a new form. The free market revolution (what is often now known
as the birth of neoliberalism (Blyth 2002)) did not question the goal of growth, merely the ability of
governments to achieve it through interventionist public policy. To the contrary, it was now claimed,
growth would best be achieved by releasing markets from the restrictions of the state (Duménil and
Lévy 2005, Robison 2006). Indeed, growth did not merely persist as the overriding goal of economic
policy and society, it was strengthened, as other objectives of the Keynesian era (increasing equality,
a strong welfare safety net, the development of social institutions) were abandoned, and household
consumption became more narrowly the primary indicator of economic success. Economic policy
and politics might have radically changed, but the growth paradigm remained.

1.5. The benefits of economic growth

It is not hard to see why this should have happened. For around half a century, from 1950 to around
2000, the empirical evidence seemed to show fairly unequivocally that economic growth generated
critical economic benefits.

First, technological innovation and productivity increases are positively correlated with
growth, moving in a pro-cyclical way. Investment in innovation is usually higher during times of
generally more dynamic economic activity; firms and governments tend to cut these expenditures in
times of low growth or recession. Productivity advances in agriculture provide a stark illustration.
Before the industrial revolution about two thirds of the population of European countries worked in
agriculture; today less than 5% of the labour force in advanced economies is so employed (Huberman
and Minns, 2007). At the same time, hours worked per worker per year have fallen by more than
50%. Yet the economies of Western Europe are able to feed a population that has tripled in size over
the same time period (Maddison, 2018). And this does not even include the quality of work that comes
with using a tractor compared with using bare hands when harvesting crops.

Second, there is also a strongly positive correlation between economic growth and both the
level of employment and of wages. It might have been that rising productivity led to mass
unemployment, or falling wages to prevent it. But in practice, despite periodic fluctuations, economic
growth has shifted employment from high productivity to lower productivity sectors, which in turn
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has sustained aggregate demand, and therefore employment. In turn, for much of the last 200 years
higher employment rates have strengthened the bargaining power of skilled labour, thereby increasing
their wages and reducing poverty and (in many periods) inequality. Over the last two hundred years
economic growth has generated an unprecedented improvement in general living standards, first in
Europe, then in the New World, and later (at least for some groups of the population) in most other
nations, of a kind and scale which would have been unimaginable when it began.

Third, economic growth is also strongly correlated with the growth of government tax revenue
and public spending. In the post-war period it was growth which increased the fiscal capacity of the
state, opening the opportunities for increased spending on education, health and other public goods
and services.

Fourth, in some dimensions it even seemed that economic growth was correlated with higher
environmental standards. As advanced countries started implementing environmental protection
legislation from the 1950s onwards, which reduced the worst forms of air and water pollution and
protected some natural areas, the idea of an ‘environmental Kuznets curve’ was proposed (Stern
2004). This appeared to show that, historically, damage to the environment first rose with economic
growth in the early phases of industrialisation; but then peaked as countries got richer, and
subsequently declined as higher living standards allowed societies the seeming luxury of being
concerned about pollution and biodiversity, and gave governments the tax revenues to spend on
environmental protection.

Fifth, economic growth has contributed to extraordinary advances in scientific knowledge,

which in turn have enabled (among other things) huge improvements in human wellbeing. Without
growth it seems safe to say that there would have been no decline in the mortality rate of newborn
children and their mothers, no near-doubling of life expectancy, no mass higher level education, no
decent housing for the majority of the population, and no cures for mortal diseases. It may be that,
today, further scientific and technological advances – such as the development of vaccines – would
be possible without economic growth. But as we turn to the environmental and social costs of growth
its benefits to date are worth bearing in mind.

2. THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL COSTS OF GROWTH

By the late 1960s, and with growing force during the 1970s and after, the growth paradigm created
its own opposition. In the environmental movement, criticism focused on the phenomenon and
celebration of growth itself; among Marxists, advocates of social justice, anti-colonial movements

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and feminists, the target was more often the capitalist system which generated it. Two distinct
critiques emerged: the environmental and the social.

2.1. The environmental costs of growth

While environmental damage had been highlighted before (most notably in Rachel Carson’s Silent
Spring in 1962, often regarded as marking the birth of the modern environmental movement) it was
the Limits to Growth report by the Club of Rome in 1972 (Meadows et al. 1972) which first empha-
sized the conflict between economic growth and the natural environment. Based on new systems
modelling of the relationship between population growth, economic output, resource use and pollu-
tion, The Limits to Growth set out the idea that the exponential increase in global economic output
could not be sustained over time due to the finite resources and absorptive capacities of the earth on
which it was founded. Resource depletion and pollution would bring growth to an end – and likely
lead to the collapse of human societies as food production declined – within the following hundred
years.

The Limits to Growth was quickly criticized, particularly for its failure to model economic
feedback effects (by which resource scarcity would lead to price rises and therefore to both lower and
more productive use of them), and technological advance (which could both improve the efficiency
of resource use and waste disposal and substitute away from declining resources) (Cole et al, 1973;
Simon 1981). Some of its predictions of resources running out were famously proved wrong (Sabin
2013). But to a considerable extent the actual empirical record since 1972 has vindicated The Limits
to Growth to a remarkable extent (Turner 2008, Herrington 2020).

Since then, environmental science has introduced new conceptualisations of the idea of ‘en-
vironmental limits’. Arguably the most influential is the idea of planetary boundaries (Rockström et
al. 2009), the levels at which in nine different environmental dimensions (climate change, biodiver-
sity loss, biogeochemical cycles, ocean acidification, land use, freshwater use, ozone depletion, at-
mospheric aerosols and chemical pollution) it is likely that tipping points will lead to catastrophic
change, and which thus mark the limits of the ‘safe space for humanity’. Over the last 30 years, the
huge global increase in the use of natural resources and sinks has led to four of the nine planetary
boundaries being crossed (climate change, biosphere integrity, land system change and biochemical
flows) (Steffen et al. 2015).

At the same time, new techniques for understanding the relationship between economic ac-
tivity and the natural environment have been developed. Economy-wide material flow accounting
(EW-MFA) has enabled analytical studies of material inputs into and out of national economies and
10
changes in the material stock inside the economic system (Fischer-Kowalski et al. 2011, Krausmann
etal. 2015). EW-MFA conceptualizes an economy as a ‘biophysical and socio-economic system em-
bedded in its socio-economic and biophysical environment’ (Krausmann et al. 2015, p. 10) and refers
to the rate at which environmental resources are used as the economy’s ‘socio-metabolism’ (Fischer-
Kowalski 1998). Just as human beings and other organisms require a regular throughput of materials
to survive, human economies needs a continuous input of materials and energy. These are processed,
transformed, consumed, stored, discarded or recycled and ultimately leave the socio-economic sys-
tem in the form of wastes or emissions. In his study of long-term historical trends in global material
and energy use, Krausmann points out that the major environmental problems now faced by humanity
are closely related to the huge increase in the economy’s socio-metabolism which has occurred over
the last two hundred years (Krausmann 2011, Krausmann et al 2008).

2.2. The social costs of growth

If the environmental costs of economic growth are not difficult to understand, the analysis of its social
costs is a little more complex. Three primary critiques have emerged.

Positional goods

Not long after the Limits to Growth report, Fred Hirsch (1976) described what he called the ‘social
limits’ to growth. He argued that economic growth could not lead to ever-rising welfare, because the
satisfaction individuals derive from goods and services depends not only on their own consumption
but on the consumption of others too. As basic material needs are satisfied, people increasingly desire
high-status ‘positional goods’ whose value is defined by their scarcity (a house with an unbroken
view, a holiday in an unspoiled location). Economic growth, Hirsch argued, was bound to lead to a
‘distributional struggle’ for positional goods; and individualist consumerism could undermine the
social foundations of the liberal state itself.

Happiness, life satisfaction and wellbeing

A more widely made social critique of economic growth is that – after a certain point of material
consumption – it does not lead to an overall greater level of happiness or life satisfaction, or what
today is often termed ‘wellbeing’. This was most famously pointed out by Richard Easterlin (1974),
whose ‘Easterlin paradox’ notes that, while that at a single point in time self-reported happiness and
life satisfaction vary with income both between and within nations, over time they do not trend up-
ward as national income grows.

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On closer consideration there is of course something entirely obvious about this: human beings do
not have an infinite capacity for happiness, such that people living today could be (say) ‘twenty times
as happy’ as people living two hundred years ago who were twenty times poorer. That is not what
happiness is like. But in relation to economic growth it is also a profound observation. As Easterlin
(1974, 2010) himself observed, it is partly to do with the inescapably comparative nature of happi-
ness: human beings are more satisfied with their lives when they perceive themselves to be doing
well (or not badly) relative to others in the social group to which they belong. But this is not a function
of overall economic growth.

It is also related to the fact, as Herman Daly (1996) argued, that as economic growth contin-
ues, the environmental and social costs of achieving it rise, reducing and ultimately cancelling out
any improvements in life satisfaction it might otherwise have brought. At this point, Daly observes,
the costs of growth exceed its benefits, so further growth becomes ‘uneconomic’. Beyond the level
where most people’s most important needs and wants are satisfied, Daly identifies a ‘disutility level’
where increased consumption would cause so much loss of leisure, pollution, congestion and inequal-
ity that overall life satisfaction will decline. Eventually a society where uneconomic growth occurs
will reach the ‘futility limit’ where further consumption adds no utility at all (Daly 2005).

Over the last decade or so the concept of ‘wellbeing’ has both helped and in some ways con-
fused the argument over the social costs of growth. It has helped by emphasising that the idea of a
person being ‘better off’ is not uni-dimensional (as in ‘utility’ or ‘happiness’) but comprised of sev-
eral different elements which are not simply commensurable through a single metric. Based on the
Aristotelian idea of a flourishing life, the idea of wellbeing insists that people need multiple goods:
income, health, satisfying work, good relationships with family and friends, purpose, creativity, and
so on. (These have often been characterised through Maslow’s ‘hierarchy of needs’ (Maslow 1954).
These things are individually experienced; but people also need, and are affected by, a variety of
‘social goods’ which are provided and experienced collectively (Jacobs 1997). These include trust in
other people, safety and security, environmental quality, culture, a sense of political agency, and a
sense of belonging. These are qualities not of an individual life but of society, and cannot simply be
bought through higher individual income. They require social organisation, and in many cases col-
lective (usually public) expenditure. The modern political concept of wellbeing recognises this; but
because the term is also now commonly used purely to describe individual experience and mental
health (as a goal of modern lifestyle and even consumption) its proponents are prone to emphasize its
twin character by talking about ‘individual and social wellbeing.’ To complicate matters further, those
who have adopted the term ‘wellbeing economy’ to describe their overall goal include within this
both ‘human and ecological wellbeing’ (Wellbeing Economy Alliance 2021).
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Though the concept of wellbeing is thus not always used in the same way, it has helped clarify the
social (and by extension environmental) critique of economic growth. Though growth may raise the
general income level, it is fairly obviously the case that it does not necessarily improve people’s
health, relationships or sense of security, or the quality of the environment and levels of social trust.
Indeed, the patterns of growth experienced over the last half-century or so have been associated, it is
often argued, with a decline in many of these things for many people (Jackson 2009).

Inequality

The third principal critique of economic growth is that over the last forty years it has been associated
with rising inequality of both incomes and wealth. Whereas the historical record in the second half
of the 20th century until the 1980s was that economic growth not only reduced poverty and raised
average incomes, but also narrowed the differential between the rich and poor, today it is widely
noted that, both between countries and within them, the gap between those on the highest and lowest
income and levels of wealth has been widening (Piketty 2013, Milanovic 2018). Indeed in recent
years in the US, UK and some other advanced countries, economic growth has not raised average
earnings at all (OECD 2015, 2019). As Stiglitz (2016) has noted, ‘a rising tide no longer lifts all
boats’.

One way of looking at this is through the allocation of national income to labour (wages and
salaries) and to capital (the returns to financial, real estate and other assets). As Piketty (2013) and
the OECD (2015) have shown, from 1945 to around 1975 the labour share of national income rose
and the capital share declined. But since the mid-1970s the reverse has occurred. Indeed the rate of
return to capital has consistently exceeded the growth rate of the economy as a whole, making eco-
nomic growth a means of enriching asset-owners and relatively impoverishing wage-earners (Piketty
2013). Since in the same period the ownership of wealth has been increasingly concentrated among
a small group of the population (Oishy 2015), economic growth has in practice increased wealth
inequality not reduced it.

It is important to note that the evidence in this field is not about growth per se. The historical
record shows no simple relationship between growth and inequality: it depends on the institutional
and political setting. For the three decades after the war, with full employment, high public spending
on welfare and public services, and narrow financial markets, growth clearly contributed to a reduc-
tion in inequality. This clearly changed with the onset of the market-liberal paradigm focused on
market deregulation and tax cuts for the highest income classes. Inequality has risen strongly since

13
the early 1980s, with the U.S. exhibiting the highest levels of inequality among industrialized coun-
tries (Kuhn et al. 2020). Overall, growth has also been lower during the market-liberal paradigm than
during the former period, but it has not been negative.

The macroeconomic evidence in fact suggests that within a given policy regime growth and
inequality are conversely related. Income and wealth inequality in Germany have grown most
strongly during the low-growth period from the end of the 1990s to 2005. In the US, inequality rose
most during the low-growth years following the 2008 financial crisis; it closed somewhat for income
when growth picked up again (World Inequality Database 2022).

To put this at its starkest: although some recent patterns of growth are associated with rising
inequality, there is no evidence that a low-growth or de-growth regime would see inequality fall
without strong and deliberate policy action.

In relation to other dimensions of inequality, both feminist and anti-colonial critics have
pointed out that the dominant growth paradigm of western societies has involved institutional ine-
quality and discrimination structurally disadvantaging women and people of colour (Waring 1988,
Robinson 1983). But there is no evidence showing growth per se is the cause of such inequalities; on
the contrary, in so far as some forms of gender and racial inequality have declined since the 1970s,
this has occurred at the same time as – and plausibly as a result of – economic growth.

Many of those noting these trends argue simply that high levels of inequality are ethically
unjust. But an associated critique has also been developed, which observes that highly unequal soci-
eties also tend to perform poorly on a range of other criteria, including physical and mental health,
crime, educational attainment and social trust. Inequality, it is argued, is not simply bad for those on
the lowest incomes, but for many others in society as well (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009, 2018).

2.3. Alternative indicators

One outcome of both the environmental and social critiques of growth has been a call to replace or
supplement GDP growth as the primary indicator of economic development or success. Many econ-
omists and policymakers have pointed out that GDP growth is not, in fact, the only such indicator:
others such as employment levels, inflation rates and (in the context of poor countries) life expectancy
and years of schooling are also commonly used. But the demand that GDP be ‘dethroned’ from its
apparent primacy has been longstanding and prominent (Hoekstra 2019).

There are in fact two different critiques of GDP. One is that it is a poor indicator of the thing
it purports to measure, namely economic activity and national income. It fails to account for unpaid
14
work (such as housework and care) and other non-market transactions; it ignores the depreciation of
capital assets (both human-made and environmental); and it undervalues computer software and other
forms of ‘intangible capital’ (Hicks 1973, Maddison 2003, Stiglitz et al. 2009, Hall et al. 2010,
Boarini and D’Ercole 2013, Coyle 2015). The other is that as a measure of economic success it is far
too narrow, failing to include – and not being correlated with – the many non-income components of
individual and social wellbeing, such as mental health, leisure time, environmental quality, levels of
inequality, and other social goods (Daly and Cobb 1989, Pilling 2017).

These critiques of GDP have led to the design of a number of other indicators. Some of these
are alternative single indexes, such as the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (Daly and Cobb
1989) and the Genuine Progress Indicator (Cobb, Halstead and Rowe 1994). Others are ‘dashboards’
of multiple indicators (OECD 2021).

Much of the critique of economic growth in policy discourse has been transmuted into the
question of alternative indicators: unsurprisingly, critics of growth have argued that so long as GDP
growth is the primary measure of economic success, it will be pursued by policymakers. But in many
ways the quest for alternative indicators is a distraction: economic growth does not depend on its
statistical measurement, and will not be ended by changing this. Critics of GDP as an indicator could
indeed sometimes be accused of naivete in apparently suggesting that, if only GDP were relegated in
importance, economic growth would no longer occur. But economic growth is a material
phenomenon driven by population growth, economic interests and technological advance, not simply
a product of economic policy.

2.4. Disentangling the environmental and social critiques

The environmental and social critiques of economic growth have both encompassed, but often failed
to disentangle, two different kinds of claim.

The first is that GDP growth as it has been experienced so far has generated unsustainable
environmental costs and (during the period of market-liberalism) damaging social costs, and without
radical change will continue to do so.

The environmental and social dimensions of this claim are largely independent of one another,
though they are often argued together. Environmentally the claim is in many ways incontrovertible:
the evidence of 200 years of environmental damage and its correlation with economic growth is plain.
But it is much more contestable on the social side, where social policies seem more critical than
growth per se.
15
But merely acknowledging the existence of costs does not entail rejecting growth. Many advocates
of growth (in both its past and likely future forms) accept that it has costs, but regard these as
acceptable or ‘worth it’ for the benefits of higher income, living standards and technological advance
that growth brings. It might be noted that those who defend economic growth in such debates are
often those most concerned with the incomes and living standards of the poor, particularly in low-
income countries (though also in advanced ones); those who reject it often seem more focused on
middle class consumption patterns in rich countries. Indeed, many of the latter such critics agree that
economic growth is still needed in low-income countries in order to alleviate and eliminate poverty.
In this sense the growth debate is largely an argument about advanced countries, not a global one.

The second kind of claim made about the environmental and social costs of growth is much
more fundamental: it is that GDP growth can never be environmentally sustainable or socially
beneficial. The problem is not simply the historical record, or the likely future one if nothing is
changed. It is that growth is logically or in all practical circumstances incompatible with
environmental sustainability or a certain set of preferred social outcomes (such as wellbeing and
equality), or both. This claim takes a slightly different form in its environmental and social
dimensions.

Is green growth possible?

On the environmental side the claim that continued growth is ultimately incompatible with the
ecological health of the earth and with a sustainable (permanent and acceptable) level of
environmental impact, derives from the thermodynamic understanding of economic activity. As
originally developed by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971) and popularised by Herman Daly
(1977), this observes that, like the rest of the universe, human economic activity is governed by the
first two laws of thermodynamics. These are that matter-energy can be neither created nor destroyed,
and without an external energy source matter-energy tends to entropy, or a state of greater disorder.
In these circumstances, economic growth is inevitably dependent on the ever-increasing extraction of
natural resources, which must inevitably lead to the creation of material and energy wastes in a
volume and form beyond the capacity of the natural environment to absorb them without damage. As
The Limits to Growth report argued, exponential economic growth would inevitably run up against
the earth’s finite capacities to fuel it with resources and to assimilate the wastes it generated.

It is important to note, though it is not often pointed out, that for the argument about economic
growth it is critical to say at what point economic growth is deemed to have become too
environmentally damaging to be justified. It is logically possible to accept that ultimately growth will

16
become environmentally impossible or unacceptable, but that right now its costs are still outweighed
by its benefits. It is notable that even The Limits to Growth projected that societal breakdown might
not occur for another hundred years. Before that point, one might accept the logical impossibility of
indefinite growth but argue that it should continue now because of its economic and social benefits
(such as poverty reduction and technological advance), and only be stopped when those benefits
ceased to outweigh its present (and projected future) costs. Of course this line of reasoning would be
entirely time-dependent: the same person might have supported continued growth in 1972 for these
reasons, but be unwilling to do so today, when both the present and future costs of economic growth
have become so much larger and more imminent.

It is essential here to clarify what ‘economic growth’ in this discussion is growth of. The
thermodynamic claim concerns material and energy resources. These cannot be indefinitely extracted
on an exponentially growing basis without running up against the earth’s limits to supply them and
(rather earlier) to assimilate the resultant wastes. But this is not an argument (at least, not a logically
incontrovertible one) about economic growth as measured by GDP. GDP is a measure of traded
economic activity; it does not measure the energy-resource content of that activity, or its
environmental impact. Some economic activities clearly have much more energy-resource content
and environmental impact per dollar of value than others. If economic activity were shifted
progressively towards less damaging activities (such as through the use of renewable energy sources,
organic and inert materials and the reuse and recycling of wastes, and a progressive increase in the
efficiency of their use), it might be possible to have economic growth without increasing
environmental damage.

This argument has often been expressed through the equation I = PCT was originally
developed by Paul Ehrlich and John Holdren (1971). I is environmental impact, P population, C
consumption per head and T ‘technology’, or more accurately, the ‘environmental impact coefficient’
of output (Jacobs 1991). If PC (population times per capita consumption) is growing (i.e., there is
economic growth), environmental impact can nevertheless be held constant, or even be reduced, if T
is declining more rapidly than PC is growing.

Economists making this argument (e.g. Jacobs 1991, Ekins 1993, Ekins and Jacobs 1995,
UNEP 2011, World Bank 2012) have not denied that indefinite exponential growth of carbon and
material throughput are impossible. But they have argued that, at least in principle, a deliberate and
concerted attempt to reduce the environmental impact coefficient of output could allow GDP growth
to continue at the same time as environmental impact declined. This would require significant
technological and organisational changes to ‘dematerialize’ both production and consumption,

17
requiring entirely renewable sources of energy and a highly efficient and circular material economy
(‘net zero’ as these would now be collectively called).2 But in theory at least one could imagine in
this way an environmentally sustainable growth of GDP: one in which economic growth and
environmental damage had been ‘uncoupled’. Whether or not such ‘green growth’ could actually be
achieved would then be an empirical question, not a logical one. It would depend on a combination
of technological innovation, social organisation and consumer preferences, and the policies
governments introduced designed to shift them in a sustainable direction (Jacobs 1991, World Bank
2012l; for reviews of the empirical and theoretical bases of these arguments, see Everett et al 2010,
Steinberger et al 2013, Ward et al 2016, Frankel 2018, Carson, 2019, Jackson and Victor 2019. Jakob
et al 2020.).

This argument, however, does not satisfy the more radical critics of GDP growth (Kallis 2017,
Hickel and Kallis, 2020; Kallis et al. 2020). Such critics insist that even much greener forms of
production and consumption could not continue to grow indefinitely. Production and consumption
cannot be wholly dematerialized – there are always material components, even to the provision of
renewable energy, digital outputs and human-provided services. (Note, they point out, the very high
energy costs of computing; and the dependence of solar power on rare earth metals.) By generating
higher income, resource efficiency improvements have a ‘rebound effect’ which just leads to further
growth. And such improvements cannot continue at a high rate forever: they will ultimately come up
against thermodynamic limits. This essential materiality of production means that it is simply not
possible for GDP to grow indefinitely and exponentially without eventually creating a rising and
unsustainable environmental impact (Czech 2019).

Moreover, such critics argue, the claim that GDP growth could be environmentally sustainable
is not borne out by any actual empirical evidence: there has been very little absolute decoupling3 of
physical resource use from growth over the last forty years, and much of what advanced countries
claim to have achieved in this regard is merely because they are not counting the environmental
impacts they have effectively ‘exported’ to China and other countries from which they now import
most of their polluting goods (Wiedmann et al. 2015, Hickel and Kallis 2020).

2
It would also require the decoupling of production from the use of nature. This point is made by the Dasgupta Review
of the Economics of Biodiversity (Dasgupta 2021) conducted for the UK Government. (For a counter-argument based on
the ‘trophic theory of money’ see Czech 2019.)
3
‘Absolute decoupling’ is said to occur when environmental pressure decreases or remains stable while economic growth
(measured by GDP) increases. ‘Relative decoupling’ occurs when economic growth and environmental pressure are both
increasing, but the latter at a slower pace.

18
 For such critics, the advocates of ‘green growth’ are clutching at straws at best, and guilty of
dishonesty at worst: such growth not only has not been achieved, it cannot be achieved. It is time to
acknowledge that, if we want to live on an environmentally healthy planet, GDP will have to decline.
At least for high-income countries, there will have to be ‘degrowth’, that is, a progressive reduction
in GDP levels (Latouche 2004, Kallis et al. 2012, Kallis 2017, Hickel 2020).

The advocates of green growth unsurprisingly have a retort to this: the fact that there has been
up to now less ‘decoupling’ of growth from environmental damage than is sometimes claimed does
not prove that it could not happen in the future. No advanced country has ever tried to reduce its
environmental impacts sufficiently to achieve sustainable outcomes; if it made a really concerted
effort to do so, it might be achievable. This is a contingent, empirical matter, they argue, for which
the answer is not certain (van den Berg, 2011).

But a further argument is critical here. It matters how fast current environmental impacts have
to be reduced to avoid tipping points and other catastrophic environmental impacts caused by past
damage. Thirty years ago it looked like such tipping points were some way off, so the necessary rate
of environmental improvement was relatively slow (Ekins and Jacobs 1995). If the ‘environmental
impact coefficient’ (EIC) of GDP only has to improve by, say, 3% a year, then a concerted effort
might make it possible to continue growing GDP even while environmental impacts slowly declined.
But if – because of accumulated past environmental damage – we are much closer to such tipping
points and to avoid them EIC needs to be improved by (say) 10% a year, this might be not just much
harder but in practice impossible to achieve. In fact, since greenhouse gas emissions need to fall by
around 7.5% between 2020 and 2030 if the global average temperature rise is to be limited to 1.5C
above pre-industrial levels (UNEP 2019), this is indeed the kind of annual reduction in emissions per
unit of global output which will be required.

If moreover this has to be done not just to GHG emissions but across a whole range of
environmental impacts (air pollution, ocean pollution, soil depletion, biodiversity, forest loss, etc)
where other catastrophic impacts are close, this too might turn out to be empirically impossible. For
this reason, advocates of ‘theoretically possible green growth’ might be forced to acknowledge its
empirical impossibility in the specific circumstances the world faces today. And indeed it may lead
the same person to take a different view of the possibility of green growth today from one they might
have taken 30 years ago, because the environmental facts in that period have changed.4

4
This is the position of one of the present authors.
19
Finally, the distribution of resources also matters. If, to give any hope of environmental justice to the
global South, developed countries must reduce their environmental impacts even further than a
uniform global distribution of effort would suggest, this will also make it empirically harder to
achieve GDP growth in such countries as well (Kallis 2018).

Inclusive growth

As with the environment, the social critics of growth also split into two groups. One group argues
that historical and current patterns of economic growth have not produced, and do not produce,
overall social benefit. They have led to unacceptable levels of inequality and poor levels of individual
and social wellbeing. But it should nevertheless be possible to organize the economy and society in
such a way as to have both growth and those social goods. The economy could achieve a much more
equitable distribution of its fruits; it could prioritize full employment, with good, secure work and
work-life balance; it could focus more on providing social goods and less on competitive individual
consumption. With its particular attention to lower levels of inequality, this line of reasoning is often
described as seeking inclusive growth (OECD 2021, Bhattacharya et al 2021).

Against capitalism

The other group argues that growth in a capitalist society will always be based on the
exploitation of labour and nature, and can therefore never properly generate overall social good
(Foster 2011, Kallis 2018, Hickel 2020). The processes which generate growth inevitably generate
inequality (especially between capital owners and workers, men and women, and different racial
groups), along with degrading and precarious work, unemployment, various forms of consumption
and social competition which make people miserable, and so on. For proponents of this view, the
only way to achieve a better society is therefore to abandon, not just growth, but capitalism.

The environmental and social arguments come back together at this point. For those who see
green or inclusive growth as impossible, the problem is not, fundamentally, economic growth. It is
the capitalist economic system as a whole. Capitalism is a system geared towards capital accumula-
tion, which both generates and requires growth in the overall value of output (GDP). It will therefore
inevitably exploit every increase in labour and resource productivity to achieve output expansion
(rather than, for example, to create more value from less output). In its pursuit of growth, capitalism
will inevitably seek to push beyond planetary boundaries, and it will inevitably be based on unequal
and exploitative economic relations and an acquisitive, competitive social ethos. A sustainable econ-
omy and healthy society can only be achieved if capitalism is abandoned (Klein 2014, Kallis 2018,
Hickel 2020).

20
3. ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS: INCLUSIVE GREEN GROWTH, DEGROWTH AND
POST-GROWTH

3.1. A typology of arguments

The foregoing arguments lead to seven different conclusions, as drawn by different authors.

On the environmental side it is possible to identify four distinct positions:

E1. Economic growth improves welfare by raising household incomes and increasing public revenues
which can be spent on public goods and services. Historically, and still, dominant patterns of growth
have been and are environmentally damaging and unsustainable. But by changing the composition of
output and consumption towards renewable energy sources, high levels of resource efficiency, non-
polluting processes and a more circular economy, ‘green growth’ of GDP is possible. So policy
should be focused on achieving this (OECD 2011, World Bank 2012; for a review see Jacobs 2013).

E2. Whether sustainable growth is possible or not is an empirical question. But no rate of GDP growth
determines the level of environmental impact. So growth should not be a primary economic objective.
Policy should focus rather on living within sustainable environmental limits or planetary boundaries
(Jacobs 1991, Ekins 1993, van den Bergh 2011.). This could be achieved, for example, through a
system of statutory policy targets and plans obligated by a ‘Sustainable Economy Act’ (Jacobs 2018).
Growth may or may not be possible within these; but it is a subsidiary objective, so if it is not possible,
that is of lesser concern.

E3. Though it might have been possible in the past, sustainable growth is almost certainly impossible
today for advanced nations, given the speed that environmental impacts must be reduced, the existing
slowdown in growth rates, and the needs of low-income nations to use the earth’s resources. Therefore
we should not merely abandon growth as a primary economic objective and focus policy on achieving
sustainable and just environmental limits. We should recognise that GDP growth is unlikely to be
able to continue and adjust political expectations accordingly (Jackson, 2019, Parrique et al 2019).

E4. GDP growth today is inevitably environmentally unsustainable. Organising the economy and
society to reduce environmental impacts to sustainable levels will therefore require a contraction of
output and consumption, resulting in the ‘degrowth’ of GDP (Kallis 2011. 2018, Hickel and Kallis
2020, Kallis et al 2020).

On the social side, the same four positions can be identified, but the second and third are in practice
generally combined:

21
S1. Economic growth improves welfare by raising household incomes and increasing public revenues
which can be spent on public goods and services. Current patterns of growth have some social
disbenefits. But economic reform can reduce these: by changing the composition of output (for
example towards a higher level of public goods and welfare payments), its production methods (for
example through more satisfying work), and distributional outcomes (for example by raising
minimum wages and the more progressive taxation of wealth). In these ways growth can achieve
higher levels of social wellbeing as measured by a range of indicators. The policy objective should
be ‘inclusive growth’ (World Bank 2012, OECD 2021).

S2. Current patterns of growth are associated with higher inequality and various social ills such as
poor mental health. The relentless pursuit of growth moreover imbues society with a culture of
materialism, individualism and social competition which is corrosive of social cohesion and personal
wellbeing. So growth is not only the wrong objective for policy; it is culturally damaging. Policy
should focus instead on achieving social goods directly, rather than rely on growth to achieve them.
In particular, this should include policies to achieve more equal outcomes and a focus on both
individual and social wellbeing (Raworth 2017, Club of Rome, 2020, Wellbeing Alliance 2021,
Jackson 2021).

S3. Growth is inextricably tied to capitalism, which inescapably generates inequality and other social
harms in the process of capital accumulation. So capitalism needs to be abandoned, and society
acculturated to a reduction in material consumption and output. This will result in ‘degrowth’ of GDP
(Kallis, 2011, 2018, Kallis et al 2020).

3.2. Political strategy

Each of these seven positions derives from a particular understanding of, and claim about, the
relationship between GDP growth, environmental impact and social outcomes. As can be seen, the
environmental and social arguments take a similar form. And indeed most proponents today use both
together.

But there is another consideration which also motivates the differences between different
authors writing about growth. That is: what is the best form of language and discourse to use to
achieve one’s aims? What terms support the most effective political strategy?

Here proponents divide into essentially three camps, with a fourth, somewhat separate one,
also worth mentioning.

22
Inclusive green growth

The first group take the view that arguing against economic growth is doomed to political failure.
Economic growth is so embedded in society’s understanding of what constitutes a successful econ-
omy, and is so closely related to employment levels, government tax revenues, pension systems and
business interests, that it is politically hopeless to argue against it. Therefore advocates of environ-
mental sustainability and greater equality have adopted the goal of ‘inclusive green growth’. This
focuses policy on changing the composition and form of economic output and consumption, so as
better to reduce environmental impact and achieve social goods, while continuing to seek GDP
growth. So long as its damaging environmental and social impacts are constrained, it is argued, such
growth is a positive good. It generates employment, supports better public services, raises pensions
and generates profits for investment, not least in technological advances. Some advocates of inclusive
green growth admit that such a strategy may ultimately have limits, due to deeper-rooted tensions
between sustainability, wellbeing and growth. But in the short term, they argue, only such a strategy
will be politically winnable, and short-term success is better than failure. So such arguments can be
left to another day.

Inclusive green growth advocates include the OECD, the World Bank, and business-oriented
institutions such as the World Economic Forum.

Degrowth

For advocates of degrowth, growth per se is the problem. It is the source of western society’s
environmental and social ills, not just as an economic phenomenon but as a culture and paradigm of
thought. Therefore it must be confronted head-on (Kallis, 2011, 2018). Only a ‘steady-state’ economy
(Daly 1997) which limits the rate of material and energy throughput to the regenerative and assimi-
lative capacities of the global ecosystem, can preserve ecological health within planetary boundaries.
This will inevitably lead to the degrowth of current GDP. But this should not be feared, because
growth is anyway not socially desirable: it rest on social exploitation and generates inequalities and
other social ills.

Contrary to the claim sometimes made by their critics, those advocating for degrowth do not
(in general) argue that reducing GDP is how an environmentally sustainable and high-wellbeing econ-
omy should be achieved. A fall in GDP is not the means to those ends; it would be the consequence
of taking measures to achieve them. An analogy might be made with the lockdowns introduced by
governments to limit the spread of the Covid virus.5 A fall in GDP was not the goal; but it was the

5
This analogy was made by Giorgos Kallis in a personal communication with the authors.
23
inevitable consequence of the measures required. So degrowthers argue that a fall in GDP would be
inescapable if the economy were genuinely constrained within planetary boundaries, for example by
the rapid cessation of the extraction and consumption of fossil fuels.

Degrowth is an explicitly anti-capitalist position (Latouche 2004, Evanoff 2010, Kallis 2018,
Hickel 2020). But this is politically necessary. Its proponents argue that only by abandoning capital-
ism, with its essential growth dynamic and unequal relations between capital and labour, can envi-
ronmental limits be respected, and social equality and wellbeing achieved. Pretending or hoping oth-
erwise is to mislead the public, and therefore to delay the moment when sufficient action will be
taken. Small gains may be achievable within the current growth paradigm; but they will only distract
from and potentially undermine the wholesale transformation of the socio-economic system which is
the only way in which environmental sustainability and social good can be secured.

Advocates of degrowth propose a wide range of policies and institutional reforms, going well
beyond the kinds of technocratic instruments favoured by the proponents of inclusive green growth.
These include a reduction in trade and decentralisation of economic scale and political power; the
redistribution of wealth and ownership, particularly through common ownership business models; a
deepening of democratic practices; the reorientation of culture away from materialism and
individualism towards simpler, more spiritual and communitarian practices; and the defence of
ecosystems and other living beings, not merely the preservation of resources for human use (Ariès
2007, Bonaiuti 2009, Schneider et al. 2010, Kallis et al. 2012, Kallis 2018). Proponents of degrowth
call for stringent state regulation and taxation of energy and resource use, in order to limit macro-
environmental impacts. But most also advocate for deeper reforms such as reductions in working
time and a universal basic income. Many argue for caps to incomes or to income ratios, limits on
advertising, shared use of goods and services such as transport, consumer goods and housing, and a
localised financial system through alternative credit institutions and community currencies. They
argue that such reforms would improve the quality of life for many people, even if the currently
affluent would see their material consumption inevitably reduced (Schneider et al. 2010, Kallis et al.
2012, Hickel 2020).

Both the practicality and consequences of such policies have been seriously questioned. In
particular, critics often argue that degrowth has failed to appropriately conceptualize social welfare
(Jakob and Edenhofer, 2014). Large reductions in GDP will not just mean lower household
consumption, but cuts to essential public services whose financing depends on public revenues stem-
ming from economic activity. Historically, spikes in unemployment and general economic instability
have triggered major political disruption, including political shifts towards nationalism and

24
xenophobia (Funke and Trebesch 2017). Advocates of degrowth insist that the reduction in output
they seek would occur in a planned way, not as an uncontrolled economic recession (Schneider et al.
2010, Kallis et al. 2012). But their critics question whether this would be feasible in a highly
interconnected and globalized economy: it might prove impossible to prevent an uncontrolled
downward spiral. Regions heavily dependent on specific industries would be likely to bear the brunt
of the change, as happened during the deindustrialization of the 1980s and globalization of the 1990s
and 2000s. Given the two-way causality between GDP growth and technological innovation, it is
even likely that degrowth would so reduce investment in innovation that the development of greener
technologies would be retarded, and the goal of environmental sustainability thereby set back, not
advanced (Maradana et al. 2017).

Critics of degrowth further question whether it could ever win public support. Astrid Matthey
(2010) has explored the conditions under which democratic societies might secure a voluntarily
endorsement of lower consumption levels from the majority of the population. She points out that,
since people in industrialized countries have high levels of consumption as the reference point for
wellbeing, it will be very hard to prevent a deep sense of loss and dissatisfaction if their consumption
levels are involuntarily reduced.

Post-growth

In terms of discourse, inclusive green growth and degrowth are opposing strategies. One accepts that
growth occurs and has benefits, is politically hopeless to oppose and can be ameliorated today, and
therefore adopts a discourse of growth modification. The other believes growth to be the core problem
and only economic transformation will suffice, so adopts a discourse of anti-growth. But they share
a common feature. Both focus on the idea of growth.

A third political strategy is to abandon the growth discourse altogether. This is the position
taken by a growing array of theorists and practitioners arguing for ‘a-growth’ (van den Bergh 2011),
‘beyond growth’ (OECD 2020) or more generally ‘post-growth’ (Jackson 2021). Beneath the labels
these positions are not all identical; some are closer to the inclusive green growth position, others to
the degrowth one. But all share the desire to escape what they perceive to be the tired and politically
unhelpful discourse of pro- and anti-growth, and to focus political and policy debate on the issues
that will actually affect environmental and social outcomes.

At the core of the post-growth position is the argument that no rate of economic growth,
whether positive, negative or zero, is automatically correlated either with social benefit or harm or
environmental goods or ills (Jacobs 1991, van den Bergh 2011). It entirely depends what is growing,
25
and what is contracting, and how production and consumption are organized. It is therefore
economically misleading, and politically unhelpful, to keep talking about growth and degrowth.
Economic and political discourse needs to focus on what is being produced and how, and the impacts
being caused. Kate Raworth (2017) describes this position as being ‘growth agnostic’: it does not
take an a priori or single position on growth, but wishes to see what the outcomes of any economic
policies actually are. It seeks to design an economy to achieve substantive environmental and social
goals, and does not much care whether these result in economic growth or not. The indicators used
to judge economic progress should be those which measure the achievement of the substantive goals,
not the aggregate level of traded activity (GDP), which cannot measure them.

The Beyond Growth report by an advisory group to the OECD (2020) sets out four core goals
which, instead of growth, it argues should be the paramount objectives for high-income countries
today. These are:

• Environmental sustainability – understood as a path of rapidly declining greenhouse gas

emissions and environmental degradation, consistent with avoiding catastrophic damage and
achieving a stable and healthy level of ecosystem services
• Rising wellbeing – understood as an improving level of life satisfaction for individuals, and a
rising sense of improvement in the quality of life and condition of society as a whole
• Falling inequality – understood as a reduction in the gap between the incomes and wealth of
the richest and poorest groups in society, a reduction in rates of poverty, and a relative
improvement in the wellbeing, incomes and opportunities of those experiencing systematic
disadvantage, including women, members of ethnic minorities, disabled people, and those in
disadvantaged geographic communities
• System resilience – understood as the economy’s ability to withstand financial, environmental
or other shocks without catastrophic and system-wide effects

‘Post-growth’ is not yet a widely used term. But it intersects interestingly with the idea of ‘secular
stagnation’ which has been discussed by economists over recent years (Summers 2016). Since the
2008 financial crash, Western economies have been experiencing much lower growth rates than in
the past, and these look likely to persist for the foreseeable future. So adjusting to a post-growth
economy may anyway be necessary, whether designed or not. As Tim Jackson (2019, 2021) has
pointed out, persuading mainstream economists and politicians already becoming accustomed to the
idea of low growth to focus instead on achieving substantive environmental and social outcomes
might be less of an uphill struggle than in the past. Jackson and Victor (2019, 2020) have been seeking

26
to model the macroeconomic impacts of a very slow- and non-growing economy (for a wider analysis,
see Victor, 2019).

An important idea here among post-growth theorists is that of ‘growth independence’ (Zoe
Institute 2021a, 2021b). It is recognised that many social benefits (notably employment, pensions and
public services) are currently dependent on growth for their achievement and improvement. So a key
policy goal is to make such benefits independent of growth. This is a recognition that economic
growth was never properly an end-objective in its own right: it was a means to the primary objectives
of higher household incomes, better public services and so on. If these objectives remain but growth
is likely to be slower or non-existent in an environmentally-constrained world, it is sensible to
consider how they can be achieved in its absence.

In a report commissioned by the German Federal Environment Agency, Petschow et al. (2020)
identify – based on an analysis of the current positions around growth - the principal drivers of
growth, the main growth-dependent areas of economic activity, and potential ways to reform said
areas. Full employment and generous social security systems are identified as particularly important,
in that these goals fulfil a socially critical function and appear to be highly dependent on growth. The
following are some of the policy instruments and institutional arrangements emerging from the
literature that would achieve these functions independently from economic growth:

• For employment: a sectoral transformation towards a more service-oriented society, a reduc-

tion of working hours, a shift in the focus of technological change to resource productivity
(through strong eco-taxes, subsidy cuts, cap-and-trade systems), and a reduction in depend-
ency on wage income. As the authors of the report note, however, such measures would re-
quire significant changes in social preferences and values; the details of their practical imple-
mentation remain somewhat vague.

• For social security systems (including pensions and health insurance): adjustment of the
length of working life and hence a redistribution of the burdens between contributors and
beneficiaries; an expansion of the group of contributors (through the integration of civil serv-
ants, the self-employed, and people in marginal employment); and a recognition of non-mar-
ket based activities. Health sector financing should be addressed through the incentivization
of health-conscious behaviour, reform of pharmaceutical costs and an expansion of voluntary
assistance activities.

27
It is clear that, while these are encouraging avenues for further policy exploration, the details of how
they could be implemented in different specific polities need considerable elaboration. (For a survey
of post-growth policy ideas, see Zoe Institute (2021c).)

One of the striking features of the new ‘post-growth’ discourse is that it includes within it
both people who regard growth as the wrongly framed objective but nevertheless value the benefits
it can bring and believe that it might still be possible alongside the achievement of environmental and
social goals (OECD 2020); and those who believe that sustainable growth is impossible (Jackson
2021). That is, in terms of our typology above, it encompasses positions E2, E3, S2 and S3. Indeed,
in relation to capitalism, its proponents are an even wider group than this. Among the proponents of
a ‘post-growth’ discourse are those who would argue that the growth imperative and unequal social
relations of capitalism make it ultimately incapable of achieving environmental sustainability and
social goods; and those who believe it could be reformed in such a way as to do so. (Though as Jacobs
(1991) has noted, this might simply be a question of semantics – the definition of capitalism – rather
than substance.) What unites such protagonists is the belief that talking explicitly about alternatives
to capitalism – like arguing for degrowth – is not a good way of making political progress. Post-
growth offers a more promising route for a mainstream political and economic discourse.

Post-growth may also be seen as a recognition of the fundamental uncertainty about the future.
If we do not know how far green growth strategies may be possible or not, it is wise to plan for
alternative scenarios, including those in which economic contraction may be necessary to stay within
planetary boundaries (Barth and Hafele 2020).

Advocates of post-growth are nevertheless united in their insistence that achieving environ-
mental sustainability and social goods cannot be achieved by incremental policy reforms or ex-post
ameliorative measures. A much more fundamental transformation in the way economies work is
required. As the OECD’s Beyond Growth report (2020) puts it, the goals of environmental
sustainability, increased wellbeing, inequality reduction and system resilience will need to be ‘built
into the structure of the economy from the outset, not simply hoped for as a by-product, or added
after the event’ (p.16).This means, notably, that absolute environmental limits based on a fair national
share of planetary boundaries need to be set and the economy manage to constrain overall environ-
mental impacts within these. For this Jacobs (2018) proposes a ‘Sustainable Economy Act’ modeled
on the UK Climate Change Act, which would legally bind the government to set environmental limits
and a clear action plan with short-and long-term targets for a complete set of environmental indicators
including biodiversity, soil fertility, air quality, plastics pollution and marine fish stocks.

28
Post-capitalism

It is worth mentioning one further group hovering on the outskirts of these debates. These are the
explicitly left-wing political economists and writers interested in both environmental sustainability
and in equality and wellbeing, but not particularly in the debate about growth. For want of an accepted
unifying label, we might call these the ‘post-capitalists’. For writers like Naomi Klein (2014), Yanis
Varoufakis (2021a) and Paul Mason (2015), the issue is not primarily one of economic growth. It is
of economic organisation. Within a capitalist system of the present kind, neither sustainability nor
general social welfare is achievable; the task is therefore to replace capitalism with a new economic
and political order. Whether or not this would be able to reinstate GDP growth or not is a question
most of these authors barely examine (though see Varoufakis 2021b); they take it as read that GDP
is an indicator of capitalist performance, so are largely uninterested in it.

In this sense they fall somewhere between the degrowth and post-growth positions. On the
one hand, like the degrowthers, they call for the radical replacement of the capitalist economy. But
on the other they explicitly reject the degrowth position as missing the point. Rather, like the post-
growthers, they seek a political discourse focused positively on the kind of economy they wish to
build, not a negative attack on an uninformative economic indicator from a previous age.

4. CONCLUSION

Our argument here, therefore, is that ‘post-growth’ could become – or indeed may be becoming – a
unifying concept for writers and practitioners whose primary and urgent goal is to shift policy and
practice in the directions of environmental sustainability and social equity. Such people can differ in
their view about how far GDP growth might or might not be possible in an economy focused on these
priorities. But such differences are much less important than their points of agreement. These are that
economic policy:

(i) should focus directly on operating within environmental limits or planetary boundaries; (ii) should
focus directly on providing a decent living standard for everyone, emphasising wellbeing, a reduction
in inequality and resilience;
(iii) should cease to focus on economic growth as a policy objective per se, since none of these goals
are achieved by any particular rate of growth;
(iv) should give priority to establishing systems and institutions that can provide meaningful work,
incomes, pensions and social security without having to depend on economic growth.

29
It would be fair to say that ‘post-growth’ is not likely to become a political concept with wide popular
appeal. So other terms will no doubt be required for the same set of ideas. Kate Raworth’s (2017)
‘doughnut’ has already provided a best-selling visual model and popularisation. Herman Daly’s
(2005) concept of ‘uneconomic growth’ – growth whose costs outweigh its benefits – offers a neat
critique of current growth patterns, allowing a popular distinction to be drawn between good and bad
growth. The OECD (2020) report’s idea of going ‘beyond growth’ suggests helpfully that growth is
too simplistic an objective and something more sophisticated and contemporary is needed.

Whether through these routes or others, it is clear that the policy content of a ‘post-growth’
political economy still needs considerable elaboration. But in the post-growth discourse a new way
forward may be found for an old debate, free of some of the dogmas and disagreements that have
bedevilled it for half a century.

30
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APPENDIX I -THE GROWTH DEBATE: A SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION

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