Key Technical DP Personnel (DP Vessel Maintainer Course) DP Scheme

The DPVM training scheme requires the trainee to complete the DP Vessel
Maintainer Course.
The course is a five day course of 34 hours duration.

The course involves both theory and practical on a class B simulator and covers the
following topics:
1. General Overview of DP
2. The Power Generation and Management
3. Propulsion Units
4. DP Control System and Sensors
5. Position Reference Systems
6. Environmental Reference Systems
7. Documentation
8. DP Operation and effects on DP System
9. Safe DP operation CAM, ASOG, TAM and TAGOS
10. Lesson Learned
11. Manning, Training and Competency Assessment.

GENERAL OVERVIEW OF DP
The basic purpose of dynamic positioning of a vessel is the automatic control of the
vessel position and heading.
A more sophisticated definition is to maintain variations in vessel position and
heading within acceptable limits, while achieving minimum thruster activity.
A DP system is usually a combination of a position control system and a heading
control system.
DP vessels are self-propelled and manoeuvrable thus have many advantages over
the conventional mooring vessels. Setting-up on location is quick and easy, thus
capable to complete tasks quickly and economically, and able to respond rapidly to
weather changes. DP vessels are very versatile due to functions such as Auto Track,
ROV follow, change of centre of rotation and many other specialist functions, and
not restricted to depth of water. DP vessels are capable of maintaining position even
after loss of all PRSs and /or Gyros. Although, vessels using moorings have several
advantages, yet DP remains a better option, as seabed cluttered with pipelines and
other hardware is not considered suitable for anchoring. DP vessels are manpower
and equipment intensive, thus prone to equipment failure and rely greatly on the
proficiency of the operator.
Principle of Dynamic Positioning
A free-floating vessel is subjected to environmental forces namely, wind, waves
and current which result in movement of the vessel in surge, sway and yaw axes.
The vessel also undergoes movements like roll, pitch and heave.
These six movements are often referred to as six degrees of freedom.
Motion in surge, sway and yaw axes can be controlled by the DP system with the
help of thrusters, however, the other three motions roll, pitch and heave cannot be
controlled by the DP system.

Position (surge and sway) of the vessel is measured by Position Reference System
(PRS) and heading (yaw) is measured by Gyro. Roll, pitch and heave are measured
by Motion Reference Units (MRU) or Vertical Reference Units (VRU).

Out of the environmental forces acting on the vessel, only wind speed and direction
are measured by the DP system. The remaining environmental forces such as
current, waves and other forces acting on the vessel including errors, referred to as
DP current, are not measured directly, but are estimated by the software model of
the vessel. Once in DP mode, the system compares motion parameters of the actual
and wanted position of the vessel, this added to effect of wind and calculated DP
current, gives the total force required to maintain position . This method of
positioning is very efficient due to the predictive nature of model, which predicts and
meets the thrust requirement rather than reacting to environmental forces. This also
reduces excessive movement of thrusters and minimises fuel consumption.

DP system is capable of hands-off operation and can follow chosen

waypoints(Auto Track mode), follow a moving underwater object like ROV(Follow
Target mode) , maintain heading into the weather (Weather-vane mode) etc.
In the event of failure, there are alternative methods to maintain position such as
joystick, independent joystick or manual control of thrusters.

DP Equipment Classes

The basic purpose of Dynamic Positioning is to provide safe and reliable method
to maintain position during offshore operations to reduce the risk to personnel, the
vessel, other vessels or structures, sub-sea installations and the environment. The
worksite may be located in relatively safe place or in the vicinity of structures that
pose risk of collision, risk to life and environment pollution. Thus, more reliable DP
system is needed if the severity of consequence of the loss of position is more after
a single failure. DP system consists of systems and components acting together to
provide sufficient reliability. The reliability is enhanced by progressively increasing
redundancy from Class1 to 2 to 3. For each class the associated worst-case single
failure is defined. In general terms, worst-case single failure is defined as the failure
of a bus with bigger thrust configuration or failure of an engine room. The lowest
redundancy is provided in a Class 1 vessel in which loss of position is acceptable
after a single failure. Thus, a Class 1 vessel should to be deployed where a loss of
position would not result in unacceptable consequences. Class 2 vessel, loss of
position is not acceptable after a single failure in active components. In Class 3
vessels, redundancy is further increased over and above Class2; and loss of position
is not to occur after a single failure which includes, all components in any one
watertight compartment or fire subdivision from fire or flooding. Class is, thus linked
to the task rather than to the vessel per se. Thus, a Class 2 and Class 3 vessel are
deployed if the consequence of loss of position is larger. In this regard, owner,
charterer and field administrator have important role to play in deciding the class
requirement for a task after risk assessment.

Vessels’ Capability

During the planning stage, assessment of the position keeping capability of a DP

vessel under different weather and failure conditions is essential so that only the
tasks within the capability envelope of that vessel are attempted. DP capability of a
vessel is dependent on available thrust ( power) to maintain position in the
prevailing weather. A conventional monohull vessel requires less thrust when
heading (or stern) into environmental forces, than from the beam. Thus, a vessel
can withstand higher weather conditions when heading (or stern) into the
environmental forces than from other directions.

A DP vessel is positioned with respect to weather and the work-site, so as to

maintain position within acceptable excursions. As weather changes, heading is
altered into the weather to keep thrust(power) consumption within its limit. Once
the weather conditions are beyond the capability and heading cannot be altered due
to physical constraint, decision to abandon DP operation is taken. Various
information tools such as capability plot , foot-print plot and consequence analysis
are useful in this critical decision making. Thus, a Class1 vessel can work up to its
full capability, whereas, Class2 and 3 vessel operate within the capability limited to
its post worst-case single failure. Consequence Analysis triggers an alarm if this limit
is breached. Capability plot enables heading limit within which a vessel can operate
for a given weather condition. Footprint plot provides excursion of a vessel in
different weather conditions, an important parameter in certain task such as crane
operation.
Risk Assessment

When planning a DP operation within the 500 m zone of an offshore structure,

due consideration is taken of the installation, the vessel and any other activity
affecting the work plan. This plan should be in the form of a bridging document
which will interface the Safety Management System(SMS) of the company. The key
to preparation of operating procedures is hazard identification and risk assessment
of health and safety of employees who are connected to the work activities. The
risk assessment identify hazards of the activity and provide an estimate of the extent
of the risks present. The extent of the risk is related to the number of people
exposed and the consequences from them. The Master, OIM and key DP personnel
with previous experience should be involved in the process of risk assessment.

The process of risk assessment commences with an analysis of the task to

identify the associated hazards. This is done by listing all components of the task,
the equipment involved and environmental conditions. From the various components
of the task hazards are identified, analysed and assessed risks are reduced to
ALARP(as low as reasonably possible). This may require modification to the
procedures, equipment, process or a more detailed analysis. The risk is also
dependent on type of operation the vessel is deployed for. For example, during
diving operation, a loss of position may result in death or injury of divers
underwater. In case the operation is close to a fixed structure, it may result in
collision with possible loss of the vessel or the structure. In other cases, it may only
be damage to equipment, or cause delay in the operation.

The following factors contribute towards the overall degree of risk that a
vessel is exposed to in the vicinity of a platform:

State of weather and its forecast and its implication on capability.

Distance of vessel from the platform determines the degree of risk and its severity.
Length of the vessel and its aspect to the platform influences reaction time available
to an operator.

Constraint on vessel’s ability to alter heading affects its ability to get back in the
capability envelope after weather change.
 A DP vessel working blow-on ie windward or up-current to a structure in vicinity,
is exposed to higher degree of risk and requires extra margin of thrust to maintain
position and withdraw safely.

Model instability caused by sudden change in external forces and wind/current

shadow may result in loss of position.

Position-keeping of vessels is affected when working in close proximity due to

thruster wash, shadow of wind and current etc.

A vessel engaged in a Class2 or Class 3 task are likely to deploy crane, divers, ROV
etc. restricting its manoeuvrability. Thus, after a single failure, the vessels will have
to maintain position to safely terminate the task and move away to a safe location.
The degree of risk is proportional to time required to safely terminate the operation
and move the vessel to a safe location.

An operator’s ability to control the vessel after loss of position depends on his
response and reaction time available.

Planning a DP Operation

As the vessel approaches the work-site, withdrawal option is limited due to

proximity to other structures. The operator should be prepared to deal with possible
single failure of a thruster, generator or a bus. It is, therefore, essential that the
vessel is checked for simulated worst-case single failure on the heading as on the
worksite before entering the 500m zone. It need not be overemphasized that vessel
is not to continue task after a single failure as possibility of another single failure
cannot be ruled out resulting in catastrophic failure like black out. If the failure,
however, does not affect the class requirement, vessel may decide to continue the
task. Before commencing a task, the vessel can be withdrawn immediately,
however, once the task has commenced the vessel has no option but to maintain
station till the task is safely terminated. This may include recovering of divers, ROV,
crane etc.

A contingency plan should be prepared to withdraw the vessel from the worksite
after worst-case single failure. Escape route is identified to withdraw the vessel on
least-power and drift-clear direction. Escape route is planned taking into
consideration the factors like environmental forces, structures and hazards in
vicinity, availability of safe waters etc. The planned escape route must be updated
after any significant change in weather conditions or external conditions. Ideally, a
vessel after a single failure should be brought to blow-off aspect to enable drift-clear
should another single failure occur.

In the event of loss of position , it may be tempting to use joystick or manual

control to get away quickly. Auto DP mode consumes minimum power and thus
should be preferred in such situation. On failure of DP mode, joystick mode with
auto heading should be used to control position. In the event of failure of the DP
system, IJS should be preferred mode over manual mode.

Role of Management

Many activities can be linked to training , such as emergency response from

the operator, planning process and reducing the impact of human error.
Effectiveness of training can be controlled by refresher training, monitoring
competence of operators, watch keeping standards, awareness of rules and
regulations, and checks /trials of DP vessels as laid down by the company’s SOPs.

Safety Management System (SMS) has direct role to play in activities such as
planning, risk analysis, company’s SOPs and contingency planning to reduce the
human error. It is seen that, only 20% of the total human errors are due to
substandard acts by individual operator. The remaining 80% were attributed to
factors over which management had direct control.

Field administration control activities of the vessels within its jurisdiction to

ensure correct selection of work-site and adherence to safety regulation
promulgated by the field. It should ensure that vessels are employed within their
capability envelope. Certain additional checks may be imposed if operating blow-on
to the structures in vicinity. They should maintain real time exchange of information,
promulgate regular safety warning to traffic in vicinity and ensure that identified
escape route is clear. Incidents of single failure leading to class degradation, loss of
position, operating blow-on and, operating beyond capability must be reported.
Vessel should be asked to leave the 500m zone after a single failure and be
permitted to enter only after the completion of requisite trials.

Human Factors
 A large number of DP incidences take place due to human errors. DP systems
are generally robust and low frequency of failures could easily lead to complacency.
The potential for human error is intensified in times of stress and panic. Excessive
work pressure result in impaired thinking and decision making. To mitigate the effect
of human error factors may be considered such as ergonomics at DP consoles,
workload on DP Operators, watch hand-over procedures, isolating outside
distractions, encourage climate of openness, risk taking attributes and psychological
suitability of DP Operators.

A range of organisational failures such as multi-cultural issues , incentives,

morale, rules and regulations, management style, pressure of work etc. may affect
operators’ efficiency.

Trials and checks

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is used to demonstrate that worst-
case single failure will not cause loss in position keeping capability for Class 2 and 3
vessels. FMEA considers all possible single point failures and redundancy based on
technical failures of the DP system. The term failure mode is used to indicate the
manner in which a component or subsystem fails. The term failure effect is the
effect of that failure mode on the system itself and on the vessel’s position keeping
capability. It is a classification society requirement that Class 2 and Class 3 vessels
are proven by a FMEA and repeated every five years.

In addition to FMEA, the following trials are undertaken during operational

cycle of a DP vessel:-

Annual DP Trials are conducted as a series of tests relevant to the DP system to

prove redundancy, as defined in the FMEA.

Field Arrival Trials are carried out before the vessel enters 500 metres zone of
the installation, to ensure satisfactory operation of the DP system and should include
full functional checks of the operation of the thrusters, power generation, auto DP,
joystick, IJS and manual controls. The checks are to ensure that the DP system is
set up correctly for the appropriate DP class.

Field Re-entry Trial. This trial is less stringent than the Field Arrival Trials and
to ensure that the entire DP and propulsion system is set up and functioning
correctly.

500m Entry Checklist is performed before entering 500m zone of an asset to

ensure that the vessel, after the worst-case failure, is able to maintain position to
safely terminate the operation and move out on the planned escape route.

Location Checklist is to make sure that the DP system is functioning

correctly and the system has been set up for the appropriate equipment class.

ECR Checklist is a series of checks and tests that verify that the configuration
of systems and equipment to meet the requirements of the necessary mode of
operation as determined by the critical Activity Mode Operation (CAMO) or the Task
Appropriate Mode (TAM).

Watchkeeping Checklist is to verify and confirm the setup of DP system prior

to taking over the DP watch and during the DP operations at regular intervals to
ensure class requirement is met.

The vessel specific and equipment specific checklists are given in the vessel’s DP
Operations Manual.

Brief history of DP system development:

Dynamic positioning (DP) is a rapidly evolving technology.
The first vessel to fulfil the accepted definition of DP was the "Eureka", of 1961,
designed and engineered by Howard Shatto. This vessel was fitted with an analogue
control system of very basic type, interfaced with a taut wire reference. Equipped
with steerable thrusters fore and aft in addition to her main propulsion, this vessel
was of about 450 tons displacement and length 130 feet.
By the late 1970s, DP had become a well established technique. In 1980 the number
of DP capable
vessels totalled about 65, while by 1985 the number had increased to about 150.
Currently (2002) it
stands at over 1,000 and is still expanding. It is interesting to note the diversity of
vessel types and
functions using DP, and the way that, during the past twenty years, this has
encompassed many
functions unrelated to the offshore oil and gas industries. A list of activities executed
by DP vessels
would include the following: