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F105RA

The document provides an overview of the US Army's process for determining and documenting organizational authorizations known as Total Army Analysis (TAA). TAA is a two-phase iterative process that first identifies force structure requirements through quantitative analysis of scenarios and concepts of operation. It then determines the optimal force structure and authorizations to resource based on priorities, budgets, and guidance. The process aims to provide the best mix of capabilities to meet requirements within resource constraints and guides the Army's programming and budgeting requests.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
112 views8 pages

F105RA

The document provides an overview of the US Army's process for determining and documenting organizational authorizations known as Total Army Analysis (TAA). TAA is a two-phase iterative process that first identifies force structure requirements through quantitative analysis of scenarios and concepts of operation. It then determines the optimal force structure and authorizations to resource based on priorities, budgets, and guidance. The process aims to provide the best mix of capabilities to meet requirements within resource constraints and guides the Army's programming and budgeting requests.

Uploaded by

Johnny Hagg
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

US Army Command and General Staff School


Command and General Staff Officer’s Course (CGSOC) Common Core
F100: Force Management

F105: Rightsizing the Army


F105RA: Determining and Documenting Authorizations

Overview

Are past decisions about the size and composition of the Army still valid given a changing operational
environment? If not, how should the Army decide what to change? Are the size, capabilities, and number
of Army divisions and brigades sufficient for projected requirements? What risk should the Army accept
in the mix of active and reserve component capabilities? Given that the Army will never get all the time
or money it needs to prepare for every circumstance, what should the Army sacrifice for a new
capability? How might the Army convince DOD and Congress to resource new Army capabilities?

Based on national, DOD, and Army planning, the Army first determines, then documents,
organizational authorizations for the force structure to answer these and many other force
structure questions.

Role of Army Guidance

In addition to the guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army
(SA) and Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) provide guidance and direction regarding change in The
Army Plan (TAP). TAP provides guidance on Army strategy, planning, resource priorities, and
force structure. Additionally, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA), G-3/5/7, and G-8 provide
directives and guidance through the Army Planning System in form, substance, direction, and process that
identifies Army missions and functions that also guide force structure decisions to meet joint force
requirements. TAP ultimately guides the building of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), the
request that details the resources required to operate and maintain the Army.

The Army Secretariat (ARSEC), Army Staff (ARSTAF), Army commands (ACOMs), direct
reporting units (DRUs), and field operating agencies (FOAs) use TAP guidance during Total Army
Analysis (TAA). TAA is an annual process that modifies the current force, identifies the total
requirements, and ultimately serves as the basis for resourcing justification of the future force.
Additionally, other initiatives and documents legitimately influence force structure decisions, such as
Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) rebalance initiatives, base realignment and closure
(BRAC) guidance, and the Army Modernization Strategy.

Determining Organizational Authorizations

The first parts of the Army’s force development process looked into the future and, using joint and
Army concepts and requirements, developed the ways in which the Army will function (concepts),
analyzed the requirements needed to function in that way, and designed new (or redesigned existing)
organizations (capabilities) to perform those functions. Next, the Army must decide on the
appropriate mix of capabilities it can afford to maintain.

Having identified future requirements, the Army must now decide what to authorize (resource).
To make such a decision, the Army considers how it must support joint and Army needs and planning
while acknowledging the anticipated resourcing constraints of uniformed end strength (size), by
component, and within funding (dollars), as decided by Congress.

F105 Reading A 1 June 2021


Total Army Analysis

Total Army Analysis (TAA) is the heart of what occurs during the fourth phase of the force
development process. It ultimately determines organizational authorizations (the capabilities that
the Army will possess). Determining the size and the content of the Army’s force structure is an iterative
risk-benefit and tradeoff analysis process. TAA determines the force for each program year. It has Army-
wide participation, culminating in Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army (SLDA) decision
and approval. The SLDA consists of the Secretary of the Army (SA), the Under Secretary of the Army
(USA), the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA).

The Army uses TAA to determine the Army’s total requirements and, subsequently, the
authorizations defining the force structure that the Army must build, raise, provision, sustain,
maintain, train, and resource to meet DoD or Army strategic guidance, combatant commanders’
requirements, and force structure initiatives. TAA is the decision process that moves the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process from planning into programming.

The requirements, as modeled by newly designed or redesigned Tables of Organization and


Equipment (TOEs) approved by HQDA, “compete” for authorizations (resourcing) within TAA.
This is the Army’s way of “buying” new or emerging capabilities that fill identified gaps. This is where
the organizational resourcing tradeoffs occur.

Given force structure (size) constraints, this competition can be viewed as an exercise in tradeoffs
broken into “grade plate” trades between officer, warrant officer, and enlisted spaces. Unless growth is
approved, for example, unit activations (adding to the force) must be “paid for” by unit inactivations
(deleting from the force). Any congressionally-approved Army end strength growth (people), without a
commensurate increase in resourcing (money), would require sacrifices to readiness or modernization
resourcing. Lastly, keep in mind that this process is not building an Army ‘from scratch,’ it is evolving
what already exists towards future use. Overly simplified: TAA determines what is added, changed,
and deleted to and from the existing force structure within resourcing limitations to provide the
best mix of future capabilities to combatant commanders.

TAA Process

The Army conducts TAA in two main phases: the “Quantitative” (capability demand analysis of
requirements) and “Qualitative” (resourcing and approval) phases. TAA first determines the total
requirements (the number of units, by type, fully manned and equipped) that it needs to perform its
functions. TAA then determines the force the Army should resource based on priorities, budgetary
limits, and guidance and verifies the Army’s ability to afford, support, and integrate different
capabilities into the organizational structure to effect needed change.

Ultimately, the Army uses the TAA process to:

1) Determine the appropriate force structure (capabilities) required to address joint and Army
requirements outlined in DoD and Army guidance within resource limitations;
2) Provide analytical justification for resourcing of the POM Force (cost of the force structure)
to DoD, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, the President, and Congress;
3) Develop the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), the resourcing request that aligns
resources to raise, provision, sustain, and maintain the Army;
4) Assess the impacts of plans and potential alternatives for materiel acquisition, the production
base, and equipment distribution programs on the projected force structure;
5) Assure continuity of force structure requirements within the PPBE process; and

F105 Reading A 2 June 2021


6) Provide program basis for structuring organizational, materiel, and personnel
requirements with projected authorizations.

F105 Reading A 3 June 2021


Total Army Analysis Phases

TAA Phase I: Quantitative

Phase I of TAA identifies force structure requirements through quantitative analysis. It begins
with an analytical review of DoD and joint guidance. The guidance provides all services, including the
Army, with analytical baselines – requirements packages comprised of results from specific planning
scenarios and their corresponding concepts of operation.

The Army’s Center for Army Analysis (CAA) conducts a quantitative analysis using multiple
computer models and simulations to analyze different aspects of a variety and combination of
selected scenarios. The CAA facilitates wargames that allow for calculations of the force (capability)
mix that best addresses potential requirements on the Army’s worst day (sometimes referred to as a
‘simultaneity stack’ exercise, or how do you best mitigate all potential adversaries doing what you
don’t want them to do at the same time).

The Army refers to the MTOE-documented combat and echelons above brigade (EAB) support forces
recommended for resourcing as “operating forces,” the primary focus of warfighting capabilities
deliberations within TAA. Arguably as essential to the organization, Army civilians and organizations not
primarily designed for battlefield employment are considered “generating forces” whose costs and
resourcing are also decided within TAA.

Various Councils of Colonels (CoCs) or General Officer Steering Committees (GOSCs) review
and approve the warfighting capability requirements portrayed by the CAA-facilitated modeling
efforts. Additionally, these forums reach agreement on the force structure demands supporting
homeland defense, Army Support to Other Services (ASOS), and foundational activities as well as the
appropriate level of contractor support, strategic partner capabilities, use of partner assets, joint
capabilities, and other risk mitigation variables. This helps to scope the capability demands within
approved Army end strength, ensuring a focus on shaping the Army and not on sizing the Army. A

F105 Reading A 4 June 2021


general officer level review then reviews and recommends approval of the resultant capability demands to
the SLDA.

TAA Phase II: Qualitative

Phase II of TAA is a qualitative analysis that the Army uses to refine the quantitative analysis to
develop the initial POM force, within total strength guidance. The Army uses the POM force as a
basis to program resource requests for the Army’s budget submission.

The phase typically starts with a resourcing conference held in two forums: a CoC and then a
separate GOSC. The CoC provides an initial analysis and review of the CAA-developed force and
allows the ARSTAF, commands, and other support agencies to provide input and to propose changes
based on resourcing and integration considerations.

This phase further identifies concerns with AC and RC unit mix and end strengths, as well as
potential resource billpayers and claimants. The GOSC is a series of two- and three-star committee
meetings that review and approve the issues and recommendations made by the CoC, as well as proposing
recommendations for those issues that the CoC was unable to resolve. All recommendations are then
presented to the SLDA for review and approval.

TAA Approval

Recommended force structure options are briefed through the Director, Force Management and G-
3/5/7 to the SLDA. The SLDA scrutinize, review, and evaluate the options. At the conclusion of the
briefings, the SLDA approve a force structure.

The Army divides the approved force structure, for resource management and programming
purposes, into the nine components (COMPOs) of the Total Army. The nine COMPOS are:

1. Active Army
2. Army National Guard (ARNG)
3. United States Army Reserve (USAR)
4. Requirements to accomplish the Army’s missions; not resourced
5. Unmatched units
6. Prepositioned Stock (APS)
7. Direct Host-Nation Support
8. Indirect Host-Nation Support
9. Logistics Civil Augmentation (LOGCAP Force Structure Offsets)

Any capability the Army identifies as needed but not feasible (unaffordable or unable to integrate)
in the current TAA structure becomes a potential input into the next TAA cycle. Following SLDA
review and approval of the capability demands, the G3/5/7 produces a match report that identifies the
difference between the capability demands and the current force in order to determine the
projected unit deficits (COMPO 4: unresourced requirements, see below) for future programming
discussions and issue formulation.

Army Structure Memorandum (ARSTRUC)

The G3/5/7 announces the approved TAA decisions though publication of the Army Structure
Memorandum (ARSTRUC). The ARSTRUC is the historical record of final SLDA decisions made
during the TAA process. The ARSTRUC is directive in nature, providing results of TAA force
structure changes down to the standard requirements code (SRC, which identifies units by type)
and unit identification code (UIC, which identifies precise, individual units) level of detail.

F105 Reading A 5 June 2021


Appendices show tallies of the organizations (capabilities) over the five-year POM period both by unit
type and by command, so reviewers can understand the evolution of the force over that time period.

The Army can make and announce decisions on force structure changes not made as part of the TAA
in an addendum to an ARSTRUC memorandum prior to the next TAA. The ARSTRUC memorandum,
however, typically marks the end of the TAA process.

POM Force

TAA is the basis for the POM force and for developing the Army’s POM. The Army develops the
POM force to achieve resourcing required for an affordable force capable of best supporting national
objectives and combatant commanders’ warfighting needs. This force supports the joint strategic planning
conducted by the Joint Staff, combatant commanders, and the services.

The POM Force becomes, in essence, the cost associated with the force structure within the
POM. The objective of developing the POM Force is to quantify and justify the cost of the structure
to obtain funding from Congress. The POM Force meets the projected mission requirements within
anticipated end strength and anticipated resourcing levels.

Documenting Organizational Authorizations

After Army leadership approves the resourced force structure during TAA, the G3/5/7, through its
subordinate, the United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) manages the
process of documenting (codifying) those decisions. USAFMSA develops the authorization documents
within the Force Management System (FMS) database that you can view through the application
FMSWeb. This process results in the generation of organizational authorizations documented as
Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) or approved Tables of Distribution
and Allowance (TDA). USAFMSA documents the programmed force to UIC level of detail to allow
organizations to place demands on the functional systems of the Army. However, before the final
documents can be published, additional review must take place in the command plan process.

The Command Plan (CPlan) Process

The command plan is the annual force management process designed to account for, formally
document force structure decisions, and resolve any outstanding authorization or resourcing
discrepancies based on DoD or congressional directives. Annually, the G–3/5/7 Force Accounting and
Documentation Division (DAMO–FMP) publishes the command plan guidance memorandum, providing
key force structure guidance and milestones for the command plan submission and describing the actions
each command must accomplish. Upon receiving the ARSTRUC, components and commands prepare to
participate in the process. The command plan process results in the approval of a new Master Force.

The Master Force adjusts current force structure, establishes the programmed force structure,
and aligns force structure requirements and authorizations (military, civilian, and contractor man-
year equivalent) with budget data and decisions. It also provides manpower, personnel and
equipment requirements, and authorizations at the grade, MOS (personnel occupational specialty
code for civilians), geographic location, UIC, LIN, and quantity level of detail through authorization
documents. The baseline for the Command Plan is the last Master Force lock point and the newly
approved ARSTRUC.

After DAMO-FMP publishes the CPlan guidance, USAFMSA drafts MTOEs and TDAs and
distributes them for review. DAMO-FMP and commands then identify and resolve the differences
between the approved force structure changes, documentation of the decisions, and the Structure
and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) database. SAMAS is the force structure database of

F105 Reading A 6 June 2021


record and accounting system for all current and planned MTOE and TDA units in the total Army.
SAMAS produces the annual master force file. Following a second review of the documents, USAFMSA
electronically reconciles the documents with SAMAS through the Automatic Update Transaction System
(AUTS).

MTOE Documentation Process.1

Once reconciled, USAFMSA supplies the G3/5/7 Force Management Director the authorization
documents for review and approval. These documents authorize the resources, personnel,
equipment, and facilities for each unit in the Army for the next 18 months.

Finally, the Structure and Composition System (SACS) computes the personnel and equipment
requirements and authorizations based on integrating the input from Basis of Issue Plans (BOIP),
TOEs, SAMAS, and FMS. SACS computes personnel (PERSACS) and equipment (LOGSACS)
requirements and authorizations for the next ten years, comparing existing inventory of personnel
and equipment to the future authorization of personnel and equipment. This allows Army commands
to project personnel and equipment demands to mitigate shortages and mismatches.

This lesson does not require you to understand all of these databases and their roles. This information
is provided to allow you to understand the systematic method used to coordinate and synchronize key
players from across the Army. Each has their own focus and their requirements have led to a range of
databases that support functional expertise and unique information requirements.

Summary

Phases IV and V of the force development process address authorizations—the fiscally-informed


decisions about resourcing of current and future required Army capabilities (units, organizations).
Organizational models (TOE), designed to provide solutions to capability gaps and future needs,
compete for resourcing inside the TAA process. Once the Army makes resourcing decisions, the Army
documents those decisions in the ARSTRUC and programs the costs of those decisions in the POM. The
ARSTRUC defines the structure of the force in the future and the POM feeds the requests to fund that

1
US Army Force Management School, Army Force Management Course, 134-100-E07, “Command Plan” (Fort Belvoir, AFMS), by Colon, Feb
2017, slide 15. Modified by lesson author 2017. This is in the public domain.

F105 Reading A 7 June 2021


structure to Congress. The Command Plan process finalizes authorizations within the Army’s systems to
begin structural change.

F105 Reading A 8 June 2021

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