7 Malayan Emergency

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 7

Malayan Emergency

-The British Empire colonized Malaysia in the late 1700s


-Ruled the region until Japan’s invasion in 1942, after which the
Japanese Empire occupied the country
-At the end of WWII, a defeated Japan pulled out of Malaysia
-In the 12 days between Japan’s retreat and Britain’s reclamation of
the colony, the Malayan Communist Party took control of the country.

MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY


-Chin Peng --- leader of MCP
-founder in 1930 as an organizer of anti-Japanese resistance
from 1941-45, receiving some British assistance
-they assembled guerilla units called the Malayan National
Liberation Army composed of 90% Chinese with a minority Malays and
Indians

Four Periods of the Malayan Emergency


1. June 1948 - Oct 1949
The Communist attempt to seize power by violence and
revolution was held and the CTs (Communist Terrorist) withdrew into
the jungle to reorganize a prolonged war
2. Oct 1949 – Aug 1951
The CTs took the offensive to seize power by violence and
revolution all over Asia. A Director of Operations (Sir Harold Briggs)
was appointed to coordinate civil and military measures (in April 1950),
both of which were showing some serious weaknesses. By 1951,
violence had reached its peak, but eliminations also began to increase
as SF (Security Forces) start to improve.

3. Aug 1951 – Jul 1954


The Briggs Plan matured, bringing the dispersed Chinese
population under control, and the CTs became less aggressive in the
face of large numbers of eliminations.
Outline of the Briggs Plan
(a) dominating the populated areas and building up a
complete sense of security in them, with the object of obtaining a
steady and increasing flow of information
(b) Breaking up the Min Yuen (mass base/organization—
where troops are recruited, logistics and supplies as well) within the
populated areas.
Hamletting  built new villages for propaganda.
(c) thereby isolating the bandits from their food and info
supply
(d) and finally destroying the bandits by forcing them to
attack
In Feb 1952, General (now Field Marshall) Sir Gerald Templer,
(relieved Briggs) was appointed as High Commissioner and Director of
Operations with full power over all civil and military resources. The CTs
lost over half their strength and SF and Civilian casualties declined to
less than one seventh of the 1951 peak. The back of the revolt was
broken.

4. Jul 1954-Aug 1957


The crisis being over, the posts of High Commissioner and
Director of Operations were again separated. CT strength dwindled
steadily, as did incidents, contacts and casualties on both sides.
Malayan political leaders gradually took over control in preparation for
independence.

WHY BRITAIN WAS SUCCESSFUL?


-Brits owed its victory to extreme racial divisions in the population of
Malaysia, which, due to its extraordinary ethnic diversity, was unable
to unite against the British occupation.

50.4% of Malaysia’s population is Muslim Malay


23.7% is Chinese-Malay
11% is Indigenous Malaysian
7.1% is Indian
7.8% is comprised by other ethnic group
-Ethnic identities and ethnic group relations are shaped largely by
historical experience
-The Brits exploited tensions between the eth groups
-The Brits facilitated Malay nationalism in an attempt to unite
-This strategy ostracized non-Malay eth groups, such as the Chinese-
Malays, and gave Malays pol dominance over the eth groups
-The diff ethnic group were wary of each other
0The seeds for this disunity were sown in the 19th century
-Under British rule, ethnic groups were sig and intentionally divided
-Ethnic tensions were exacerbated by Brit’s explicit stereotyping and
creation of social hierarchies among the groups
-Japan’s 1942 takeover changed this status quo. The Indians and some
Malays rose in power.

BRIGGS PLAN
-Gen Harold Briggs – sent to put down the insurgency
-The Chinese and Indigenous Mal were specifically targeted

Insurgent’s Advantage
-One disadvantage the British faced was a lack of familiarity with the
territory compared with the fighters on the side of the Malayan
Communist Party
-Many insurgents possessed training in guerilla warfare, skills learned
during their efforts to repel the Japanese invaders.
-Malaysian insurgents were somehow familiar with British Strategy,

How the British defeated the Insurgents


-adaptive nature of the British Fighting forces neutralized the primary
advantages of the insurgents
Honeycomb
-superior training allowed them to conduct themselves in more
organized formations
-attempting of head-on fights would be useless against the MCP
guerrilla fighters
-got faster at responding to sneak attacks
-possessed more food, manpower, and means of communication, all
key assets in fighting long-term battles
-about 40 000 British soldiers were deployed, facing approximately 8
000 insurgents at the Malayan Emergency’s peak.
-scattered pamphlets across particularly conflict-ridden regions,
offering monetary rewards to rebels who turned in their weapons
-some pamphlets also encouraged Malays and indigenous tribes to
report to British troops to receive medical aid, food, etc.

AFTERMATH
-Only about 1 800 soldiers and police officers and 6 000 communists
and their supporters died during the Malayan Emergency.
-Discrimination and segregation of ethnic minorities is still rampant,
due to continuing government policies that discriminate in favor of
Malays in areas ranging from employment to education.

LESSONS LEARNED
How to conduct an effective COIN (Hack, 2009)
-population control
-persuasion, or “winning hearts and minds” through using minimum
force, political concessions, and social provision
-command, unified and dynamic leadership
-need for security forces to become effective “learning organizations”

Prerequisites for Successful Insurgency


1. A cause
2. Weakness of the counterinsurgent
3. Geographic conditions
4. Outside Support

Insurgency Framework
The Shortcut Pattern
1. Blind terrorism
2. Selective terrorism
3. Guerilla Warfare (if required)
4. Movement Warfare (if required)
5. Annihilation campaign (if required)

Laws of Counterinsurgency
1. The support of the population is as necessary for the
counterinsurgent as for the insurgent
2. Support is gained through an active minority
3. Support of the population is conditional
4. Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential

You might also like

pFad - Phonifier reborn

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.

Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.


Alternative Proxies:

Alternative Proxy

pFad Proxy

pFad v3 Proxy

pFad v4 Proxy