Chapter VII – Cases – Strict or Liberal Construction

1. People v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05, [February 10, 1998], 349 PHIL 825-845 
FACTS: 
The accused, Alejandro “Ali” Atop, raped Regina 4 times and reported this incident only in January
1995 because of the death threat that Atop saying. Accused was the common-law husband of the victim’s
grandmother, Trinidad Mejos. ATop was found guilty of 3 counts of rape and was  sentenced to two terms of
reclusion perpetua and death.

ISSUE: Whether or not  the  common-law  husband  of  the girl’s  grandmother  is  included  in  the  provisions 
of  Sec.  11  RA 7659.

RULING: 
NO. Sec.  11  of  RA  7659,  which  amended  Art.  335  of  the  RPC, provides that the death penalty
for rape may be imposed if the  “off ender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the 3rd civil the 3rd civil degree, or the common-law  spouse  of  the  parent 
of  the  victim”  (no common-law husband of grandmother)
It is a basic rule in statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of
the accused. Courts are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Courts must not bring cases within
the provisions of the law which are  not  clearly  embraced  by  it.  No  act can  be  pronounced that is  not 
clearly  embraced  by  it.  No  act  can  be  pronounced
a criminal which is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within them.

2. People vs. Terrado G.R. No. 23625 November 25, 1983 (411) 
FACTS:
Terrado, Gundran, and Obo applied for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land in
Camarines Sur, in November 1951 and 1952. But the said land was forest land and not disposable. There were
three separate informations, in March 1962 filed against the appellees for falsification of public documents
through conspiracy. Through the act done, appellees were entitled to the free patent but in fact, they did not
meet all the necessary requirements.
Appellees' contention is that the crime has already been prescribed according to R.A. No. 3326, as
amended, but the statute argues that the crime has not been prescribed under RPC where crime of perjury is
prescribed in 10 years.
ISSUE:
Whether the prescriptive period to be applied should be 10 years under the RPC or 8 years under Act
No. 3585.

RULING:
The 8 year prescriptive period under Section 129 of Commonwealth Act 141 and Act 3326 should be
applied. Penal statutes must be strictly applied, pursuant to the doctrine of Strict and Liberal Construction:
Mandatory and Directory. Penal statutes, substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to
be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. As it would be more favorable
to the herein accused to apply Section 129 of Commonwealth Act 141 and Act 3326, as amended, in connection
with the prescriptive period of the offenses charged, the same should be applied. Since the the informations
were filed only in March 1962, or more than eight (8) years after the said offenses were allegedly committed,
the court correctly ruled that the crimes in question had already been prescribed.

3. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Province of Laguna, G.R. No. 151899, [August 16, 2005], 504
PHIL 361-375) 

FACTS:
 The Local Government Code enacted R.A 7160, which provides the power to impose local franchise tax
which stated under Section 173 and 193 on the said Act. Accordingly, PLDT was covered for such Act, in which
they are holders of a legislative franchise to render local and international telecommunications service.
The contention of PLDT is that, the Bureau of Local Government Finance issued a ruling that by virtue
of R.A. 7925 of Public Telecommunication Policy Act, PLDT became exempt from local franchise tax and this
petition was denied by RTC of Laguna.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not PLDT is exempt from local franchise tax.

HELD:
 Yes. In sum, it does not appear that in approving RA No. 7925, Congress intended it to operate as a blanket
tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax
exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favour of municipal corporations in interpreting
statutory provisions on municipal taxing power, we hold that RA No. 7925 cannot be considered as having
petitioner’s franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes. 
The BLGF is not an administrative agency whose findings on questions of facts are given weight and
deference in the courts. The authorities cited by the petitioner pertain to the CTA, a highly specialized court
which performs judicial functions as it was created for the review of tax cases. In contrast, the BLGF was
created merely to provide consultative services and technical assistance to local governments and the general
public on local taxation, real property assessment, and other related matters, among others. There is,
therefore, no basis for claiming expertise for the BLGF that administrative agencies are said to possess in
their respective fields.

4. Asian Transmission Corp vs. CA, G.R. No. 144664 (March 15, 2004) 

FACTS:
The issuance of DOLE to its explanatory bulletin shows that employees are subject to 200% of their
basic wage, even  if they did not report from work because there are two legal holidays on the same day, Good
Friday and Araw ng Kagitingan, in April 9, 1993. The petitioner failed to follow the said issuance of DOLE and
pay only 100% for its employees. This issue was submitted to the Voluntary Arbitrator and rendered a decision
in the affirmation of the employees that they are entitled to 200% of their basic wage, even if unworked.
The Court of Appeals sided to the decision of Voluntary Arbitrator, as enumerated in the law that
there are 10 regular holidays for every year and these are legal paid holidays, on whatever date they may fall
in the calendar year, that there is no condition or qualification to the said provision.

ISSUE: Whether or not daily-paid employees are entitled to be paid for two regular holidays which fall on the
same day.

RULING: 
It is elementary, under the rules of statutory construction, that when the language of the law is clear
and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, there is nothing in the
law which provides or indicates that the entitlement to 10 days of holiday pay shall be reduced to 9 when two
holidays fall on the same day.
Pursuant to  Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, afford a worker the enjoyment of 10 paid 
regular  holidays.  The  provision  is  mandatory, regardless  of  whether  an  employee  is  paid  on  a monthly
or daily basis. Since a worker is entitled to the enjoyment of 10 paid regular holidays, the fact that two
holiday’s fall on the same date should not operate to reduce to 9 the 10 holiday pay benefits a worker is
entitled to receive.
 In  any  event,  Art.  4  of  the  Labor  Code  provide  that all  doubts  in  the  implementation  and
interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor. For the working man’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.

5. Luna v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 13744, [November 29, 1918], 39 PHIL 208-226
FACTS:
In the election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal, Jose Lino Luna and Eulogio
Rodroguez and Servando de los Angeles were candidates for said office. AFter the canvassing, Rodriguez
garnered the highest votes and he is subject for the proclamation. Jose Lino Luna presented a protest against
the proclamation of the winning candidate, claiming that the court found from the evidence that 50 ballots should not
be counted to Rodriguez because in the said place, inspectors did not close the polls at 6 o’clock p.m. and a large number of
voted after that time.
By deducting the said votes in the municipality of Taytay and those cast after six o'clock p.m. in the municipality of
Binangonan, Judge McMahon concluded that Jose Lino Luna had received a plurality of the legal votes cast at said election
and ordered the provincial board of canvassers to correct its canvass accordingly. From that conclusion both parties to the
contest appealed to this court and made several assignments of error.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ballots cast after the hour fixed for closing were valid.
RULING:
The ballot were still valid. The law provides that "at all the elections held under the provisions of this Act the
polls shall be open from seven o'clock in the morning until six o'clock in the afternoon, during which period not more than one
member of the board of inspectors shall be absent at one time, and then for not to exceed twenty minutes at one time." 
The provisions of a statute as to the manner of conducting the details of an election are not mandatory, but
directory merely, and irregularities, in conducting an election and counting the votes, not proceeding from any wrongful
intent and which deprives no legal voter of his vote, will not vitiate an election or justify the rejection of the entire votes of
a precinct. 
Accordingly, the purpose of an election is to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their
government, either in determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding some question of public interest; and for
that purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done
and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the election should not be declared null. Innocent
voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of their government for mere irregularities on the part of
the election officers, for which they are in no way responsible . A different rule would make the manner and method of
performing a public duty of greater importance than the duty itself. 

6. Macasundig v. Macalangan, G.R. No. L-22779, [March 31, 1965], 121 PHIL 554-559 

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the resolution of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur dismissing the motion of
protest filed by the protestant-appellant. 

Dirungungun Macalangan, the protestee-appellee, was proclaimed as Municipal Mayor of Poonabayabao, Lanao del
Sur. One of the defeated candidates for mayor filed a motion of protest against Macalangan, who said candidate was behind
by 105 votes. After few days, Hadji Lomontod Macasundig, also filed a motion of protest against the winning candidate and
behind by 23 votes.

These two (2) cases present a dilemma to the court in proclaiming the winner for mayoralty position of
Poonabayabao, Lanao del Sur, because both cases that were filed for motion of protest won against the proclaimed mayor,
Macalangan.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not a motion of protest against a protestee which contains all the jurisdictional facts and statements
of a cause of action to warrant the hearing of the case on its merits should be dismissed simply because another motion of
protest against the same protestee had previously been filed in the same court.

RULING:
While it is true that the appellant herein had not filed his protest against the appellee in a manner as provided in
paragraph (g) of Section 176 of the Revised Election Code, court believe that this circumstance alone is not sufficient to
dismiss the protest that was filed by the appellant and deprive him of the right and the opportunity to prove that he was the
duly elected Municipal Mayor of the municipality of Poonabayabao, Lanao del Sur, in the elections of November 12, 1963. 
The motion of protest in question was filed in due time. The motion of protest contains allegations of facts that
confer jurisdiction upon that court to hear and determine the case. It would indeed be a recourse to sheer technicality if
the election protest of the appellant is thrown out of court simply because he had not strictly complied with the
requirements of the above-mentioned paragraph (g) Section 176 of the Revise Election Code. 
This Court has held that an election protest involves public interest, and technicalities should not be sanctioned
when it will be an obstacle in the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of its public officials. It is a
recognized principle that laws governing election protests must be liberally interpreted to the end that the popular will
expressed in the election of public officers will not, by reason of purely, technical objections, be defeated. 

7. Santiago vs. Commission on Audit, 199 SCRA 125 

FACTS:
The petitioner had a monthly salary of P7,219.00 and employed as State Auditor IV for the Commission on Audit.
He was assigned to the Manila International Airport Authority in 1988 and to the COA Auditing Unit at the Department of
Transportation and Communications.
On July 1, 1988, the board of directors of the MIAA passed the resolution that Mr. Teodoro J. Santiago, Jr., as
Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration will retain his plantilla position in COA; compensation from MIAA,
shall be the difference between the salary of AGM for Finance and Administration (MIAA) and that of State Auditor IV
(COA); and His retirement benefits shall be chargeable against COA.
The petitioner served in this capacity and collected the differential salary of P5,849.00 plus his salary of
P7,219.00 for a total compensation of P13,068.00. He received this compensation until December 5, 1988, when he was
transferred to the Presidential Management Staff under COA Office Order No. 8811448 dated December 6, 1988.
On March 1, 1989, the petitioner retired after working in the government for 44 years.
In computing his retirement benefits, the Government Service Insurance System used as basis the amount of
P13,068.00, considering this the highest basic salary rate received by the petitioner in the course of his employment. The
COA disagreed, however, and paid his retirement benefits on the basis of only his monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State
Auditor IV.
The petitioner requested recomputation based on what he claimed as his highest basic salary rate of P13,068.00.
This was denied on December 8, 1989, and he was so notified on February 5, 1990. On March 7, 1990, he came to this Court
to seek reversal of the decision of the COA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is no substantial distinction between appointment and designation in invoking the provision
of Section 9.

RULING:
No. Court agreed with the petitioner that in the law in question, the term "appointment" was used in a general
sense to include the term "designation." No distinction was intended between the two terms in Section 9 of Executive Order
No. 966. Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his
sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood.

8. Berkenkotter v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-36629, [September 28, 1973], 152 PHIL 588-597 
FACTS:On September 1, 1969, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision which was opposed by the
plaintiff. On October 24, 1969, defendant Climaco filed a reply to plaintiff's opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
On August 13, 1970, he filed a "motion to dismiss and/or new trial" and on December 19, 1970, he also filed a Supplement to
the motion for reconsideration and new trial.
On June 13, 1972, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, an appeal bond and an ex parte motion for extension of time (five days
from June 13) within which to file the record on appeal which was filed two days later, or on June 15, 1972.
On July 14, 1972, defendants objected to the approval of record on appeal but the court through another Judge, Osterwaldo
Emilia, who succeeded Judge Abiera, approved the record on appeal, appeal bond and notice of appeal in an Order dated
November 14, 1972. 
The order granting the motion for five-day extension to file the record on appeal does not appear in the record on appeal,
but a certificate by the Clerk of Court as to its approval is therein incorporated. 
In the Court of Appeals defendant Climaco filed on January 17, 1973, a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it
was not perfected within the 30-day reglementary period, the last day for its filing being June 14, 1972, and not June 15th
which is the 31st day. The defendant claims that plaintiff filed his record on appeal one day late as the court neither
approved nor denied the motion for extension of time to file the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal was perfected on time.
RULING: 
A reading of the record on appeal discloses that petitioner has a meritorious case and, therefore, the "element of
rigidity should not be affixed to procedural precepts and made to cover the matter." The mere absence of a formal order
granting the motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal should not be fatal to the petitioner if the record on
appeal filed within the requested extension period was approved by the Court a quo. As stated, the approval thereof carries
with it the approval of the motion for extension and the mere failure of the record on appeal to show such approval should
not defeat the right to appeal. No trial Judge in his right mind and who is aware of the serious responsibilities of his office,
would approve a record on appeal that was not timely filed. There every reason, therefore, to apply the principle of
substantial justice to the instant case for the following consideration first, the court is given the discretion to extend the
period for filing the record on appeal, notice of appeal and appeal bond, provided the notice for extension of time is filed
within the 30-day reglementary period; second, there is every reason to assume that the record on appeal was "filed on
time" because it was approved after due hearing by the Court in its Order dated November 14, 1972; and last, but not the
least, considering the merits of the case, to dismiss petitioners appeal would not serve the ends of justice.

CHAPTER VIII – Cases – Mandatory and Directory Statutes

1. Marcelino v. Cruz, Jr., G.R. No. L-42428, [March 18, 1983], 206 PHIL 47-56 - 
FACTS:
Marcelino was charged with rape before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (People vs.
Marcelino). The attorneys for
both parties moved for time within which to submit their respective memoranda. Counsel for
petitioner submitted his
memorandum in due time, but no memorandum was filed by the People. On November 28, 1975,
respondent judge
filed with the Deputy Clerk of Court his decision in said case for promulgation. On the date set for
promulgation of the
decision, counsel for accused moved for postponement, raising for the first time the alleged loss of
jurisdiction of the
trial court for failure to decide the case within 90 days from submission thereof for decision. The
respondent judge
reset the promulgation. On January 19, 1976, counsel for petitioner moved anew for the resetting
of the promulgation
of decision. Granting the motion, respondent judge rescheduled the promulgation to January 26,
1976. On January
12, 1976, counsel for the accused filed before the Supreme Court the present petition. On January
16, 1976, the Court
issued an Order temporarily restraining respondent judge from promulgating the decision in
Criminal Case No. C-
5910.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Trial Court lost its jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:
In practice, We have assumed a liberal stand with respect to this provision. This Court had at various times, upon
proper application and for meritorious reasons, allowed judges of inferior courts additional time beyond the three-month
period within which to decide cases submitted to them. The reason is that a departure from said provision would result in
less injury to the general public than would its strict application. To hold that non-compliance by the courts with the
aforesaid provision would result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts, through which conflicts are resolved, the very
instruments to foster unresolved causes by reason merely of having failed to render a decision within the alloted term. Such
an absurd situation could not have been intended by the framers of our fundamental law.

2. Enriquez v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 139303, [August 25, 2005], 505 PHIL 193-201 
FACTS:
Facts: Maximo Enriquez died and was substituted by his heir (Carmen Agana, Igmidio Enriquez, Concepcion
Enriquez, Cipriano Enriquez, Dionisio Enriquez, Maximo Enriquez, Cleofe Enriquez, Tomas Enriquez, Raymundo Enriquez and
Nicolas Enriquez). The latter filed with the RTC of Zambales, a complaint for partitions against the petitioners (Cipriano
Enriquez, et. al). The complaint involves a parcel of land located in Zambales.
The RTC rendered a Decision ordering the petitioners to vacate the property and to surrender possession thereof
to respondents. They filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. It was approved on July 7, 1998. Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal of petitioners for their failure to pay the appellate court docket fee. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied by the Appellate Court.
In their appeal, petitioners contends that the trial court must first send them a notice to pay the appellate court
docket fee and other lawful fees within the period for taking an appeal. Hence, they waited for the notice for them to pay
the appellate court docket fee. When they did not receive any, they paid the docket fee to the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision under the 1997 rules of civil procedure should be mandatory

RULING:
The use of the word "shall" underscores the mandatory character of the Rule. The term "shall" is a word of command, and
one which has always or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory.Petitioners
cannot give a different interpretation to the Rule and insist that payment of docket fee shall be made only upon their
receipt of a notice from the trial court to pay. For it is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be interpreted together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Indeed, petitioners cannot deviate from the
Rule. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. Anyone seeking exemption from the application
of the Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant such departure.

3 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117188, [August
7, 1997], 342 PHIL 651-669

FACTS:
This is apetition for certiorari  to examine the Court of Appeals' ruling upholding the Home Insurance
and Guaranty Corporation's ruling (HIGC). This quasi-judicial authority recognized Solid Homes, Inc.'s Loyola
Grand Villas Homeowners Organization (LGVHA) as the only homeowners' association inside the legally
recognized subdivision of Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon City and Marikina City.
However, LGVHAI did not submit its corporate bylaws for an unclear cause. HIGC told LGVHAI that
they had been dissolved automatically. The HIGC received a complaint from LGVHAI. They expressed concern
over the fact that LGVHAI's certificate of registration was revoked without due notice and an opportunity to
be heard, and they concurrently prayed for the cancellation of the North and South Associations' certificates
of registration due to the earlier issuance of a certificate of registration in favor of LGVHAI.
The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (North) Association, Inc. and Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners
(South) Association, Inc.'s certificates of registration were revoked or cancelled by HIGC after due notice
and hearing, and the private respondents were declared to be the legally recognized and operating homeowners
association for Loyola Grand Villas residents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its
incorporation, as mandated by Section 46 of the Corporation Code, result in its automatic dissolution.
RULING:
HELD:
NO. Petition DENIED. Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
[U]nder the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima statuli interpretatix
est ipsum statutum), Section 46 of the Corporation Code reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory,
and not mandatory, meaning for the word “must” in the first sentence thereof. Note should be taken of the
second paragraph of the law which allows the filing of the by-laws even prior to incorporation. This provision in
the same section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance with the requirement of filing the by-laws
“within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.” It necessarily follows that failure to file the by-laws within that period
does not imply the “demise” of the corporation. By-laws may be necessary for the “government” of the
corporation but these are subordinate to the articles of incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and
related statutes.
[I]f the languages of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object reveals that
the legislature intended to use the words “shall” and “must” to be directory, they should be given that
meaning. 

4. Adasa v. Abalos, G.R. No. 168617, [February 19, 2007], 545 PHIL 168-197 
FACTS:
Two complaints were made against Bernadette Adasa by Cecille Abalos for estafa. The City
Prosecutor's Office established probable cause and brought two criminal complaints against the petitioner.
The prosecutor argued that there is probable cause despite the Trial Court's direction for a further inquiry.
Adasa submitted a Petition for Review with the DOJ following her arraignment, during which she
unconditionally pleaded not guilty. The trial court allowed the prosecutor's request for the case to be
withdrawn after the Secretary of Justice overturned the prosecutor's decision and ordered it. Asserting that
Circular No. 70 clearly forbids the Secretary of Justice from taking cognizance of a Petition for Review filed
AFTER the accused has already been arraigned, the Court of Appeals overturned the Trial Court's decision to
dismiss the case. The Supreme Court confirmed the CA's decision and rejected Adasa's argument that
Sections 7 and 12 should be read to give the Secretary of Justice discretion over whether to take an appeal
under consideration or not.
There is no inconsistency between Sections 7 and 12's objectives; they both clearly state what must
be done. Both must therefore be adhered to exactly as written. Adasa filed her appeal AFTER she had already
unconditionally pleaded not guilty, thus the DOJ shouldn't have given it any consideration. She is assumed to
have waived the right to a preliminary investigation as well as the right to contest any irregularities that may
have arisen, which is relevant in situations when an investigation is being repeated.

ISSUE:
Whether     or     not   the     DOJ     can     take     cognizance     of     an     appeal     or   petition    
for     review     (of     the     resolution     of     the     Office     of     the   Prosecutor)   filed   AFTER   
arraignment    of    an    accused
RULING:
the word "shall" in Section 2 of Republic Act 304 which states that "banks or other financial
institutions owned or controlled by the Government shall, subject to availability of funds xxx, accept at a
discount at not more than two per centum for ten years such (backpay) certificate" implies not a mandatory,
but a discretionary, meaning because of the phrase "subject to availability of funds." Similarly, the word
"shall" in the provision to the effect that a corporation violating the corporation law "shall, upon such violation
being proved, be dissolved by quo warranto proceedings" has been construed as "may."
After a judicious scrutiny of the cited passage, it becomes apparent that the same is not applicable to the
provision in question. In the cited passage, the word "shall" departed from its mandatory import connotation
because it was connected to certain provisos/conditions: "subject to the availability of funds" and "upon such
violation being proved." No such proviso/condition, however, can be found in Section 7 of the subject circular.
Hence, the word "shall" retains its mandatory import.

5. Mendoza v. Cayas, G.R. Nos. L-8562-8563, [December 17, 1955], 98 PHIL 107-111 
FACTS:
Born in 1893, allegedly begotten out of wedlock by Claro Bustamante, widower, and Paula Mendoza,
single, the claimant Josefa Mendoza was supported and reared by said Claro Bustamante and was openly
introduced as his daughter to his acquaintances. Shortly before his death in March 1929, Claro delivered to
Josefa a private document (Exhibit G)signed by him and attesting that she was his natural daughter. This
document Josefa kept until the outbreak of the Second World War in 1941; then, in the confusion caused by
the hostilities, she lost the paper and did not find it again until 1953. Claro Bustamante’s widow by a second
marriage, Teodora Cayas, and his legitimate son, Nicasio Bustamante, had extrajudicially partitioned his estate,
composed of lots 1776 to 1778 and 1806 of the Naic Friar Lands.
 
On May 6, 1953, the natural child, Josefa Mendoza, instituted these proceedings against Teodora Cayas and
Monica Nazareno (heir of the late Nicasio Bustamante), for the judicial administration and settlement of the
estate of her natural father, Claro Bustamante, and for the recovery of her corresponding share therein as his
acknowledged natural child; but the defendants-oppositors resisted her claims, alleging that she was never
duly acknowledged and that her action for acknowledgment was instituted too late.
 
The court having sustained the defense, Josefa Mendoza appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter
certified the case to us because only questions of law are involved.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant Josefa Mendoza was properly recognized by Claro Bustamante as his
natural daughter?

RULING:
 the new Civil Code of 1950 cannot be retroactively applied to disturb the vested rights of the appellees as
stated in the Article 4 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that “Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided.”
In order for the appellant to be recognized as the natural daughter of the deceased, in which in this case,
appellant must meet the requisite that the action to compel recognition is expressly conditioned by law upon its
being commenced during the lifetime of the natural parent, unless the latter dies while the claimant was a
minor, or unless a document of recognition, previously unknown, is discovered after the parent’s death (Art.
137 of Spanish Civil Code of 1889) assuming that the limitation of actions set by the last paragraph of Article
137 was repealed by the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190),
6. Gonzales v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-14532, L-14533, [May 26, 1965], 121 PHIL 861-871
FACTS:
The petitioners Jose and Juana Gonzales share an 871 [982] square meter plot of property that they
and four other co-heirs received from their mother as co-heirs and co-owners (one-sixth each). As a result, on
November 15, 1956, Jose Leon Gonzales and Juana F. Gonzales filed a joint petition with the Court of Tax
Appeals asking for a refund of P86,166.00 respectively.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners' claim for refund of the total of P86,166.00 may be properly entertained;
and the sum of P89,309.61 which each of the petitioners received as interest on the value of the land
expropriated is taxable as ordinary income, and not as capital gain.

RULING:
No. In this instance, the prerequisite of a prior, timely application for a refund of the amount of
P86,166.00 had not been satisfied. It is required that the demand for a return come before filing a lawsuit;
failure to comply with this condition prevents you from taking legal action.
It is considered ordinary income under Section 29 of the Philippine Tax Code's definition of gross income,
which states that "the acquisition by the Government of private properties through the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, said properties being justly compensated, is embraced within the meaning of the term
"sale" or "disposition of property." Court also maintained the position that the profit from the sale or
exchange of property through condemnation proceedings counts as capital gain.
According to the authorities, interest is not considered to be a portion of the amount that the government
paid during condemnation proceedings or a component of the capital gain for income tax purposes.

7. Gachon v. Devera, Jr., G.R. No. 116695, [June 20, 1997], 340 PHIL 647-660 
FACTS:
A complaint was filed with the private respondent accusing the petitioners of entering the MTCC in
Iloilo City under duress. On August 25, 1993, petitioners were served and given a summons, instructing them to
submit an answer within the customary ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara was out of the country at the time, so
the MTCC did not get jurisdiction over him.
Petitioners submitted an urgent move for an extension of time to file an answer to the MTCC on
September 4, 1993. The MTCC dismissed the motion on September 7, 1993, citing the Rule on Summary
Procedure's prohibition against such pleadings. The petitioner made an urgent motion on September 8, 1993, or
more than ten days after receiving the summons, asking for the admission of their attached answer.
Petitioners submitted another motion requesting the admission of an updated answer two days later.
The MTCC denied the motions and took the case up for determination on September 23,
1993. The MTCC subsequently denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration on October 27, 1993. The
MTCC then rendered a ruling on November 26, 1993, settling the charge of forcible entrance in favor of the
present private respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure on the period of pleadings to be applied
STRICTLY or LIBERALLY.

RULING:
The petition has no merit. The word "shall" ordinarily connotes an imperative and indicates the mandatory
character of a statute. This, however, is not an absolute rule in statutory construction. The import of the word ultimately
depends upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, object and the consequences that would follow from
construing it one way or the other. As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done,
or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly
and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. 
The Rule on Summary Procedure, in particular, was promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases." For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of motions for
extension of time. Consistent with this reasoning is Section 6 of the Rule which allows the trial court to render judgment,
even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period.

8. Lloren v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 196355, [September 18, 2012], 695 PHIL 288-301 
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent Rogelio Pua, Jr. (Pua) were the candidates for Vice Mayor of the Municipality of
Inopacan, Leyte. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Pua as the winning candidate.  Alleging massive vote-buying,
intimidation, defective PCOS machines in all the clustered precincts, election fraud, and other election-related
manipulations, petitioner commenced Election Protest Case (EPC) No. H-026 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Hilongos,
Leyte. In his answer with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaim, Pua alleged that the election protest stated no
cause of action, was insufficient in form and content, and should be dismissed for failure of petitioner to pay the required
cash deposit.

ISSUE: whether or not Petitioner timely perfected his appeal

RULING:
Yes. The rules on the timely perfection of an appeal in an election case requires two different appeal fees, one to be paid in
the trial court together with the filing of the notice of appeal within five days from notice of the decision, and the other to
be paid in the COMELEC Cash Division within the 15-day period from the filing of the notice of appeal. The reliance on
Section 4 of Rule 40 of the COMELEC 1993 Rules of Procedure was plainly arbitrary and capricious. In effect, the period of
perfecting the appeal in the COMELEC was extended from the original period of five days counted from promulgation of the
decision by the trial court to a longer period of 15 days reckoned from the filing of the notice of appeal in the trial court.
The evident intent of rendering Section 18, Rule 40 of the 1993 Rules of Procedure discretionary and permissive is to accord
the movant an opportunity to pay the motion fee in full. It appears, however, that petitioner’s failure to pay the motion fee
simultaneously with his filing of the motion for reconsideration was neither deliberate nor unreasonable. He actually paid the
fee by postal money order on March 3, 2011.

9. Aguila v. Genato, G.R. No. L-55151, [March 17, 1981], 191 PHIL 10-16 

FACTS:
Petitioners David Aguila and Edita Bueno are the Deputy Administrator and Director for Cooperative
Development, respectively, of the National Electrification Administration (NEA). Petitioner Evelito Elento is
the Acting General Manager of MOELCI II, while petitioners Ressurrection Inting, Antonio Lim and Wilfredo
Cabardo, are members of its Board of Directors.
Private respondent Dominador B. Borje, representing the North District of Ozamiz City, was elected
Director of MOELCI II, to hold office as such for three years starting March 25, 1979.
After the private respondent filed his candidacy, the NEA Deputy Administrator sent a telegram to
the Acting General Manager of MOELCI II stating that should private respondent Borje be elected to the
Sangguniang Bayan, he shall be considered resigned from his position as Director. Private respondent moved
reconsideration and requested that he be allowed to serve the unexpired term of his office in accordance with
PD No. 269. Reconsideration was denied by NEA on 7 February 1980. On 3 March 1980, having won the
election, private respondent assumed office and began discharging his functions.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a Restraining Order

RULING:
 Court ruled that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing the
various Restraining Orders, the last of which was dated 6 June 1980. Private respondent has shown no clear and explicit
right to the position of Director of MOELCI IIand is, therefore, not entitled to a Restraining Order, which partook of the
nature of a mandatory Injunction, commanding as it did that private respondent be retained in his position as such Director.
By having been elected member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Ozamiz City, private respondent rendered himself
ineligible to continue serving as a Director of MOELCI IIby virtue of the clear mandate of PD No. 269 providing that except
for "barrio captains and councilors", elective officials are ineligible to become officers and/or directors of any cooperative.
It is clear to us that the term barrio modifies both captains and councilors. Further, the MOELCI II, by-laws explicitly
state that no person can remain a member of the Board if he "holds an elective office above the level of barrio captain.

10. Querubin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-2581, [December 2, 1948], 82 PHIL 226-230 
FACTS:
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to continue taking cognizance of the
appeal in the election case of Fidel C. Querubin v. Felipe S. Mamuri, CA — 2843-R, concerning the mayoralty of
Ilagan, Isabela, because of the expiration of the three- month period provided for in section 178 of the
Revised Election Code.
The record of the appealed case was received by the Court of Appeals on May 22, 1948. On August
23, 1948, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the three-month period provided
for by section 178 of the Revised Election Code expired on August 22, 1948, and that, consequently, the Court
of Appeals had lost its jurisdiction over the case, invoking to the effect the doctrine in Portillo v. Salvani (54
Phil., 543) holding mandatory a former legal provision that "all proceedings in electoral contest shall be
terminated within one year.”
The motion to dismiss was denied on September 15, 1948, upon the ground that the period within
which appellant had to file his brief had not as yet expired.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals continue to take cognizance of appeal in the election case after
the expiration of the three- month period.

RULING:
The provision of section 178 of the Revised Election Code, that the appeal in election contests be
decided "within three months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of the court to which the
appeal has been taken," the same as the provision in section 177 of the same code requiring that the trial court
shall decide a protest within six months or one year from its filing when contesting a municipal or a provincial
office, is directory in nature.
The purpose of the law in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code is to impress the need of
speedy disposal of election contests, as imperatively demanded by public interest. The terms of office of
elective positions are short. Any cloud as to the true result of an election should be dispelled as soon as
possible. Public faith, confidence and cooperation, essential to the success of government, are jeopardized by
controversies as to who have been actually chosen by the electorate. These controversies should be settled as
soon as possible. Doubts as to the true expression of the will of the people in polls should be cleared out
without delay. The legislative policy, as embodied in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code, of
hastening the administration of justice in election contests, is aimed at making more effective the
constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the people. The lapse of the period of time provided for in
said sections should not have the effect of defeating the purposes of the system of judicial settlement of
protests.

CHAPTER 9 CASES
1. Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100776, [October 28, 1993], 298 PHIL 221-235   
FACTS: 
On September 1, 1983Petitioner Albino Co. delivered a check to the salvaging firm against the Associated
Citizens’ Bank, postdated November 30, 1983. This check was considered as Closed account as it was
dishonored two days after they deposited on January 3, 1984. A criminal complaint was filed against the
petitioner in the violation of BP 22 to the RTC of Pasay. The contention of the petitioner is that at the time of
issuance of the check, in the existing jurisprudence of the Que v. People, delivery of bouncing check was not
considered a punishable offense.

ISSUE: whether the decision issued by the Court be applied retroactively to the prejudice of the
accused.
 
RULING:
No. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form
part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that
"laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar
legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against
retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional

2. Radia v. Review Committee under Executive Order No. 17, G.R. No. 78973, [January 29, 1988], 241
PHIL 795-803) 
FACTS:
Upon appointment of respondent Basman as OIC of the MAyor of Marawi City,he ordered the immediate
transfer and delivery of office equipment. REspondent issued another memorandum directly to the petitioner
stating that Basman had been reliably informed that most of the City Engineering Equipment stored in the City
Motor Pool had been intentionally destroyed by some "bad elements" and directing petitioner to transfer
immediately all equipment to the present City Public Works and Highway Engineer's Office and if not, it would
constitute to "malfeasance and serious insubordination."

Petitioner contends that under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 17, it is the "Ministry Head
concerned" who is authorized to determine who may be separated from the service, and that respondent
Basman is not "Head of a Ministry" and, therefore, without power to terminate the petitioner and  is
inapplicable to his case, considering that petitioner's services as City Engineer of Marawi City were terminated
on 30 April 1986 while Executive Order No. 17 was issued on 28 May 1986, twenty (20) days after petitioner
was removed from his position. Petitioner argues that Executive Order No. 17 cannot be applied retroactively
to cover his case. 
ISSUE; Whether or not EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 17 should be applied retroactive APPLICATION WITHOUT
LEGAL OR MORAL OBSTACLE.

RULING:
There is no legal nor moral obstacle to the retrospective application of Executive Order No. 17 which
expressly envisaged its application to "those already separated from the service on the issuance of this Order,
including those whose resignations were accepted or whose successors have been appointed/designated"
(Section 6). Although the Provisional Constitution did not require any ground or cause for removal as above
pointed out, the Government, in an act of auto-limitation and "to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of personnel
in the Career Civil Service whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of public service of the
New Government," issued Executive Order No. 17 dated 28 May 1986, which enumerated certain grounds for
the separation or replacement of elective and appointive officials authorized under Article III (2) of the
Provisional Constitution were: "1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil
Service Law; 2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as
determined by the Ministry Head concerned; 3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of
functions; 4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes; [and] 5) Any other analogous ground
showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of
the service."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. Alvia vs. Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63

FACTS:
Petitioner Alicia V. Alvia is charged with one hundred eighteen (118) counts of qualified theft in connection
with her employment in the Philippine National Bank, a government-owned and/or controlled corporation. 
In the cases pending in Branch 1, Court of First Instance, petitioner was arraigned and the trial has
commenced. In the cases assigned in the City Court, petitioner was also arraigned, the cases were tried jointly
and partially heard.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the seventy-nine (79) cases filed in Branches II and III of the then Court of First Instance where
petitioner has not yet been arraigned, the court, upon motion of the City Fiscal, transferred said cases to the
Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion before respondent Sandiganbayan to have the
aforementioned cases sent back to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Lanao del Norte.
The motion was denied and petitioner was arraigned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

ISSUE:Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1606 is an Ex-post facto law.

RULING:
No, PD No. 1606 is not an Ex-post facto law because the same is not a penal statute, it merely provides for the
transfer of jurisdiction over certain cases where the defendant has not yet been arraigned.

As of the date of the effectivity of this decree, any case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not an ex post
facto law because it is not a penal statute nor dilutes the right of appeal of the accused.
The argument that Presidential Decree No. 1606 is an Ex-post facto law is without merit because the same is
not a penal statute, It merely provides for the transfer of jurisdiction over certain cases where the
defendant has not yet been arraigned, from the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) to the
Sandiganbayan. The fact that the trial win be held here in Manila in which case it will bring inconvenience to
the petitioner is not a valid excuse for remanding the said cases from the Sandiganbayan which has proper
jurisdiction over them to the court of First Instance, chanrobles virtual law library

4. Larga v. Ranada, Jr., G.R. No. 79576, [August 3, 1988], 247 PHIL 19-26 

FACtS:
Petitioner Celso M. Larga, one of the owners and operators of the "Bistcor Diesel Calibration Service,"
issued in favor of respondent Home Development Mutual Fund ("HDMF") Security Bank & Trust Company  a
Check as payment of the employer-employee contributions to the Pag-ibig Fund. The check was, however,
dishonored for being stale when it was presented for payment by the drawee bank. Demand was made upon
petitioner Larga to replace the dishonored check or otherwise to pay the amount thereof in full, but he failed
and refused to comply.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash asserting as ground thereof that the criminal liability for the
offense with which he was charged was extinguished with the issuance of Executive Order No. 90 dated 17
December 1986 by the President of the Philippines, since Section 10 there of had made contributions to the
Home Development Mutual Fund ("HDMF") voluntary. Consequently, petitioner argues, the respondent court
had lost its jurisdiction to try and sentence the petitioner for the crime charged

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90 can be given retroactive affect to the
petitioner?

RULING:It is perhaps well to stress that there was no constitutional compulsion upon the legislative authority
to amend Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752 retroactively. A court, moreover, cannot give retroactive effect to
Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, even though favorable to the accused-petitioner, against the
express terms of the amending provisions themselves. Obligations under the statute already accrued as of 1
January 1987 did not lose their positive law obligatory character. More specifically, the obligation to remit to
the Fund previously accrued employer-employee contributions continued to exist and be exigible. Put a little
differently, Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752, not
retroactively, but only prospectively

5. Republic v. Samia, G.R. No. L-17569, [May 31, 1963], 118 PHIL 198-204 -

FACTS: 
On July 18, 1957, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the expropriation
of 21 parcels of land located on Pingkian Street, Tondo, Manila, pursuant to Republic Act No. 1162, as amended.
The lands, with a total area of 19,618.60 square meters, are owned by Manuel, Antonio, Amidea, Virgilio Asis
and Maria Teresa Asis, all surnamed Samia, all of whom were named party defendants.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, after which the case was tried upon a stipulation of facts entered into
by the parties.
Later, on May 29, 1959, the plaintiff amended its complaint in order to include 10 other parcels of land
belonging to the minor children of Manuel, Antonio and Amidea Samia, who were also made party defendants.
These lots have a total area of 18,660.70 square meters and are located at the corner of Jose Abad Santos
Avenue and Bambang Street.

ISSUE:Whether or not Republic Act No. 2342 has retroactive effect.

RULING:
NO, Republic Act No. 2342, which took effect on June 1959, cannot be given retrospective application
so as to govern the present proceedings for condemnation, because it affects substantive rights and not
merely procedural matters. The amended complaint in this case, as already stated, was filed on May 29, 1959,
At the time, the law applicable was Republic Act No. 1990 which referred only to :landed estates or haciendas
in the City of Manila, Quezon City and its suburbs.”

6. Municipality of Sta. Fe v. Municipality of Aritao, G.R. No. 140474, [September 21, 2007], 560 PHIL
57-72 -

FACTS: On October 16, 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, filed before
the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 28, Civil Case No. 2821 for the Determination of Boundary
Dispute involving the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. As the parties failed to amicably settle during the
pre-trial stage, trial on the merits ensued. 
Respondent moved to consider Resolution No. 64 as final and executory. In its Order dated February 12, 1991, 5
the trial court, however, resolved to deny the motion ruling that since there was no amicable settlement
reached at the time the Provincial Board had exceeded its authority in issuing a "decision" favoring a party.
The court held that, under the law in force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an
opportunity to amicably settle with the intervention and assistance of the Provincial Board and that in case no
such settlement is reached, the court proceedings shall be resumed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the trial courts dismissal of the instant case for lack of
jurisdiction on the ground that at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss the original jurisdiction to
hear and decide, the case had been vested on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and no longer on the RTC.

RULING:Under the rules, it was the responsibility of the court to dismiss an action "whenever it appears that
[it] has no jurisdiction over the subject matter." 22 Indeed, the RTC acted accordingly because at the time of
the filing of the motion to dismiss its want of jurisdiction was evident. It was duty-bound to take judicial
notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction as the choice of the proper forum was crucial - for the decision of
a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time by this Court as it
would never become final and executory.23 Likewise, the standing rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it
affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action; 24
otherwise, the inevitable consequence would make the court's decision a "lawless" thing.
7. People v. Zeta, G.R. No. L-7140, [December 22, 1955], 98 PHIL 143-148 -
FACTS:
In this case, the petitioner was charged with violating RA 145, which was passed a year after he started an
effort to help Eugenio Albiza, a member of the Philippine Armed Forces and then of the United States Armed
Forces in the Far East. The latter experienced a disability while doing his duties in 1942, and the respondent
and Eugenio came to an agreement in 1946 that the latter would pay the former 5% of whatever compensation
he received in accordance with Section 11 of the Commonwealth Act. The current law is No. 675 at the time.
Eugenio Albiza received his benefits in June 1951 and, as he and the respondent had previously agreed, paid
the respondent in accordance with their contract after RA 145 was passed on June 14, 1947. The defendant
was then charged with violating RA 145.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 145 shall retroact to the act of the respondent prior its passage.
Ruling
No. The Supreme Court held that the legislature had not intended to give RA 145 any retroactive effect such
as to affect contracts entered into under the sanction of the CA No. 675. It further stated that in general,
law operate prospectively only unless that legislative has clearly indicated its intention that the law operate
retroactively. Statutes should not be interpreted in a manner that would render its application violative of a
constitutional inhibition. The court stated that strict construction to prevent retroactive operation has often
been applied in order that the statute would not violate contract obligations or interfere with vested rights.
The principal explanation offered by the court is that statute must me be construed so as to sustain its
constitutionality and thus prospective operation will be presumed where a retroactive operation would produce
invalidity. The judgment appealed is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant was acquitted.

8. Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 54305, [February 14,
1990], 261 PHIL 283-301
FACTS: 
AFter all the operating agreement of the petitioner, it instituted a petition for declaratory relief with the
then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 8, and which was docketed as Civil Case No. 16669-R. Cited as
respondents therein were BIGA COPPER, BIGA PARTNERS, CUENCO-VELEZ and some thirty-one (31)
assignees.
Due to the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1281, effective January 16, 1978, a number of the
defendants in the court filed a supplemental motion to dismiss dated February 17, 1978. They alleged in their
supplemental motion that the operating agreement which BIGA COPPER signed with ATLAS had already been
revoked by a letter dated February 11, 1978, and that by reason of this rescission, the trial court is deemed to
have lost jurisdiction pursuant to Section 7, paragraphs A and C and Section 12 of Presidential Decree No.
1281.
ISSUE; whether or not SPECIAL STATUTE PREVAILS OVER JURISDICTION GRANTED BY GENERAL LAW.

RULING:
Presidential Decree No. 1281 is a special law and under a well-accepted principle in statutory construction, the
special law will prevail over a statute or law of general application. Jurisdiction having been conferred by a
special statute therefore prevails over the jurisdiction granted by a general law. As aptly observed by the
respondent appellate court, it is a rule oft repeated by this Court that the construction placed upon a law by
the officials in charge of enforcing the same deserves great and considerable weight. Unless the same would
result in legal absurdity, the same should be respected.

9. Tayag v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95229, [June 9, 1992], 285 PHIL 234-247 
FACTS:
Chad Cuyugan, the deceased attorney's son, As can be inferred from unquestionable letters and documents of
the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, the offspring of his illicit amorous relationship with EMILIE, the plaintiff and
legal guardian, was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980, having been sired, showered with exceptional
affection, fervent love, and care by his putative father for being his only son. Ocampo is the claimant here.
The recognized administratrix of the real and personal property bequeathed by her late father is CORITO,
the deceased person's daughter and the present defendant, according to attorney. Ocampo, who passed away
on September 28, 1983, in Angeles City without a will.
The defendant argued that Cuyugan lacked the legal and judicial personality necessary to launch the lawsuit
and that it was banned by prescription. According to the petitioner, Article 175 of the Family Code is in
effect, and in that case the complaint must have been submitted while the putative father was still alive or it
must be dismissed due to prescription. However, the private respondent maintains that Article 285 of the Civil
Code governs and that the action for filiation may be brought within four years of the minor kid's attaining
majority because the putative father allegedly passed away while the child was still a minor.
ISSUE;Whether or not Article 175 of the Family Code should be given a retroactive effect.

RULING:Yes. Under Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action for
recognition is a vested right or not. Court ruled  that the right of action of the minor child bas been vested by
the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. Where court held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right
to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time,
and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

10. Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 120295 & 123755, [June 28, 1996], 327 PHIL 521-598 
FACTS:

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of
Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another
candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any
public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of
Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, Comeclec granted the petition.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, praying for the annulment of the June 30,
1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the
afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation
under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received
by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the
proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor .
ISSUE; WON Frivaldo was able to successfully gain back his Filipino Citizenship.

RULING: YES. Court ruled that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed
by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to
which he has been elected. Court further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present,
not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by
virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest
effect to the manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life
and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot

11. Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. Nos. L-17566, L-17567, [July 30, 1965], 122 PHIL 25-33
-
FACTS:
Petitioners herein were allegedly employees of the respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, which required
them to work 18 hours a day without giving them additional compensation. In June 1954, petitioners, together
with the crew members of respondent Luzon Stevedoring's tugboats and barges, formed a Union, known as the
Universal Marine Labor Union. As a Union, they presented with the Wage Administration Service (WAS),
Department of Labor, a claim for accrued overtime compensation, covering the period from 1948 to 1954. The
claim was however, dropped by the WAS, it appearing that before the hearing could be terminated, the Union,
thru its officers, entered into an amicable settlement with respondent Luzon Stevedoring and presented with
the WAS on November 26, 1954, a petition 
Under date of April 11, 1960 and February 26, 1959, petitioners herein filed with the Court of Industrial
Relations Cases Nos. 1328-V (L-17566) and 1183-V (L-17567), respectively, both for overtime compensation,
money value of their vacation leaves and Christmas bonuses, covering the period from 1948 to 1956, the same
as those they had presented and asked to be dismissed before the WAS.
Respondent Luzon Stevedoring points to the cases presented with the WAS, which were dismissed, upon the
very instance of the herein petitioners except a few. Regarding prescription, respondents invoke the provisions
of Section 7-A of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended, by Republic Act No. 1993
ISSUE;WOn Republic Act No. 1993 should be given a retroactive effect.

RULING:  Yes. Upon the enactment of Republic Act No. 1993 on June 22, 1957, and because of its retroactive
effect, the claims covering 1954 to 1956 could still be validly instituted. Because Act No. 1993 shortened the
period within which to bring such actions, and in order not to violate the constitutional mandate about due
process, the claimants should have a reasonable time from the enactment of said law, or one year from 1957,
within which to sue on said claims. Unfortunately, however, petitioners lodged their claims in 1959 and 1960
only, beyond the period of time. Lex reprobat romam the law disapproves of delay; lez dilationes semper
exhorret, the law always abhors delay.